Sborník příspěvků XVII. mezinárodní kolokvium o regionálních vědách Hustopeče 18.–20. 6. 2014
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DOI: 10.5817/CZ.MUNI.P210-6840-2014-49
THE INFLUENCE OF THE HORIZONTAL REDISTRIBUTION
MECHANISM UNDER THE GENERAL SUBSIDY UPON THE
FINANCIAL SITUATION OF VOIVODESHIPS IN POLAND –
STUDY RESULTS
JAROSŁAW OLEJNICZAK, PH.D.
Department of Finance
Faculty of Economic Sciences
Wroclaw University of Economics
* Komandorska street 118/120, 53-345 Wroclaw, Poland
E-mail: jaroslaw.olejniczak@ue.wroc.pl
Annotation
The main objective of this paper was to conduct the analysis and the assessment of the significance of
a equalisation and regional part of the general subsidy for the voivodeships in Poland. The study
procedure encompass the analysis of the horizontal redistribution scale in the all 16 regions in
Poland, the analysis of the financial situation of the voivodeships in the years 2008-2012, using the
databases of the Ministry of Finances, and also the comparative analysis of initial indicators and the
corrected indicators obtained as a result of excluding income streams resulting from the equalisation
mechanism. Therefore, for the better understanding the importance of the subsidy redistribution
mechanism, it was necessary to reduce the calculation elements of the indicators by their value. In the
majority of cases omitting the subsidy in the calculation resulted in the deterioration of the budgetary
indicators in the half of voivodeships. It should be noticed that in the most extreme cases, the volume
of subventions received was as much as twice the size of own revenue. This may attest to the striking
maladjustment between the structure of regional income and the regional financing demands. It must
be also noted that the outflow of proceeds under the pending ‘Robin Hood tax’ regulations – in the
case of the Mazovian Voivodship(mazowieckie) – reached as much as a third of regional revenue,
overall. This has the effect of greatly reducing the level of financing available for self-governing
regions. In the Mazovian Voivodeship, the adopted fiscal solution resulted in liquidity loss.
Key words
equalisation, regional self-government budget, Robin Hood Tax
JEL classification: H2, H7
Introduction
The second stage of public finance decentralisation in Poland, introduced in 1998, established the
legal framework of territorial self-government administration at voivodeship level. The new
legislation determined the distribution of competences between regional bodies of state
administration, represented by voivodes (regional governors), and those of regional self-government
administration – the assembly and the regional executive board. Regional self-government bodies are
responsible for the proprietary tasks as formulation of regional development strategies,
implementation of regional development strategies, public education, including higher education,
health promotion and protection, culture and protection of cultural heritage, welfare policy,
modernization of rural areas, spatial development, water management, regional roads and
transportation, countering the unemployment.
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The use of the term ‘proprietary task’ stipulates that the voivodeship is the sole executor of the tasks
presented above, with the power to decide on the manner of execution, and held responsible for their
proper realization. At the region (voivodeship) level, the activities undertaken in the areas defined in
the Act (Act on the Regional Self-Government) may go beyond the territorial boundaries of
individual districts (poviats - the second level of local government administration). It should be
noted that the above tasks are defined in the respective legislative decisions that specify the legal
framework of administration in the aforementioned areas. Thus, in general, it may be observed that
regional self-government is, first and foremost, responsible for interregional and transfrontier
relations. At the same time, regional self-government bodies are responsible for the realization of
tasks conferred to them by the respective legislative regulations of central administration, such as the
management and maintenance of geodesic and cartographic repositories etc. They are also authorised
to negotiate and perform other tasks, at the behest of the regional governor or other territorial selfadministration
units.
The 1998 reform of the territorial administration system was, undeniably, influenced by the intent to
continue the adopted public finance decentralisation approach, with the main emphasis on supporting
the independence of regional self-administration bodies. In this context, the independence is defined
as: the ability to autonomously decide on the regional budget, with the corresponding set of
responsibilities; or the ability to make autonomous decisions with respect to the objectives, the manner
and the volume of public purse expenditures, within the limits set down for the region; or the ability to
decide on their income structure.
The objective and study method
The essential objective of this paper is finding an answer to the question, whether in the case of
voivodeships in Poland horizontal redistribution mechanism constitutes a significant support for their
financial management. Therefore, to answer the above question, it will be important, first of all, to
conduct the analysis of the development of basic budgetary indicators describing financial
management the voivodeships in the years 2008-2012 (the data of the Ministry of Finances); second of
all, it is important to analyse the influence of the equalisation mechanism being part of the general
subsidy upon the formation of the above-mentioned indicators (data of the National Statistic Office).
The result of the above-mentioned analyses will be an answer to the question, whether in the case of
the all regions in Poland, the equalisation mechanism inherent to the general subsidy exerts a
significant influence upon their financial management. Indirectly, it will constitute an answer to the
question concerning the necessity and usefulness of the existence of the horizontal redistribution
mechanism in voivodeships.
The study procedure will encompass the analysis of the horizontal redistribution scale in the all 16
regions in Poland, the analysis of the financial situation of the voivodeships in the years 2008-2012,
using the databases of the Ministry of Finances, and also the comparative analysis of initial indicators
and the corrected indicators obtained as a result of excluding income streams resulting from the
equalisation mechanism.
Main theoretical and law issues
A. Budgetary indicators used for the assessment of the financial condition of selfgovernment
(Olejniczak, 2014).
In order to make it possible to conduct the comparison of financial situation of the units of territorial
self-government, the Ministry of Finances presents a set of indicators calculated for the units of
territorial self-government every year. The group of budgetary indicators includes seven indicators,
describing mainly the general structure (current, on property and proprietary) of revenues and
expenses (Ministry of Finance). Among the budgetary indicators analysed in this paper, we include,
first of all, the indicator – expressing the share of current yields in total revenues.
Sborník příspěvků XVII. mezinárodní kolokvium o regionálních vědách Hustopeče 18.–20. 6. 2014
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= (1)
Where: Tr – total revenues, Cy – current yields (revenues not belonging to the category of proprietary revenues).
shows what part of total revenues is constituted by current yields. It should be pointed out that it is
nothing else, but the level of current yields that the scale and the scope of the tasks performed by a
self-government depends. The reason for that fact is the general principle set forth in The Act on
Public Finances, namely that the current expenses of a self-government should not exceed the level of
its current yields. The act stipulates that so-called operational deficit is no permitted under the act in
question. Correction by the size of equalization elements of the subsidy (S) makes it possible to
answer the question, concerning the impact of the subsidy mechanism upon the level of revenues – to
what degree, equalisation and balancing part of the subsidy exert influence upon increasing the
possibilities of financing current expenses in the regions. The corrected will, therefore, have the
following value:
= (2)
Next indicator proposed by the Ministry of Finances is Ce2 – expressing the share of proprietary
revenues in total revenues. It shows what part of the total revenues (Tr) is constituted by proprietary
revenues (Pr), which means, therefore, revenues excluding, among others, subsidies and grants.
Amounts contributing to the budgets of self-government from the two parts of the subsidy discussed
before may significantly ‛deteriorate‛ the state of the revenue independence of regions, and the reason
for that fact is that they exert influence upon increase in the level of revenue in general. Separating the
subsidies from the total amount of revenues should make it possible to achieve the better
comparability of financial data between regions and their actual level of self-financing.
= (3)
The corrected indicator will, in turn, have the following form
= (4)
Another discussed indicator is Ce3 – reflecting the share of operating surplus in total revenues.
Operating surplus is the positive result of comparing current yields (Cy) with current expenses (Ce).
= (5)
Operating surplus indicates the potential abilities and possibilities of a unit of territorial selfgovernment
in terms of meeting its liabilities, and also of financing investment expenses. The share of
operating surplus in total revenues (Ce3) determines the degree to which a unit could incur new
liabilities in relation to the actual revenues. Correcting this indicator by the value of equalisation and
regional part will make this indicator show the actual ability of a voivodeship in terms of meeting its
liabilities. The modified equation will, therefore, be as follows:
= (6)
Nextr one of the analysed indicators is Ce6. It reflects the share of and income from property
sale (Ps) in total revenues. The higher value of this indicator in comparison with the previous one (Ce3)
proves that a voivodeship, apart from generating a positive result, has also obtained additional
revenues from property sale. This indicator may be expressed in the following form:
Sborník příspěvků XVII. mezinárodní kolokvium o regionálních vědách Hustopeče 18.–20. 6. 2014
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= (7)
In turn, the corrected indicator will have the following form:
= (8)
The last one of indicators is so-called self-financing indicator (Ce7), being the proportion of the sum of
operating surplus and property revenues (Pr) to expenses on property (Pe). The value of it shows the
degree to which a voivodeship finances its investments with the use of its own means. The higher this
proportion is, the smaller the risk of losing financial liquidity in connection with the excessive debt
service costs, however, the high value of it may also prove a low level of the implemented investments
in proportion to its own possibilities. It may be expressed in the following way:
= (9)
In turn, after correcting by the value of equalisation and regional part of the subsidy, it will have the
following form:
= (10)
B. Regions revenues – equalisation part
The problem of providing the regions with revenue adequate to the tasks delegated to them is of
particular importance in the context of financial independence. In accordance with the
recommendations presented in art. 14) of draft European Charter of Regional Self-Government,
adopted at the 4th
session of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (Strasbourg, 3-
5 June 1997), the funding system for the regions shall provide them with a foreseeable amount of
revenue commensurate with their competences and allowing them to conduct their own policies.
The self-government voivodship authorities in Poland have limited sources of own revenue. These
include, among others: proceeds from regional budget entities, payments from regional budget
organizations, proceeds from regional assets, bequests, endowments, donations, proceeds from fines
and other financial measures imposed by law, and other. But the main financing sources for regions
come in the form of share in the income tax revenues levied from natural persons registered as
residents in the region and established at 1.60%, and the share in the income tax revenues levied from
legal persons residing in the region – established at 14.75% of total revenue.
Consequently, as suggested by the above, the self-government voivodship authorities have little
influence over their income levels. This raised the necessity to provide some statutory system for
supplementary financing, in the form of equalisation subventions and regional subventions (Act on
the Revenues of the Units of Territorial Self-government).
The equalisation part of the general subvention is designed to level the disproportions of income
potential between regions. It is defined as sum of basic quota and supplementing quota. The basic
quota is granted to those voivodships where the tax revenue index per capita (W) is found below the
level calculated for all regions (Ww). The amount of basic quota due is calculated as 72% of the
difference between Ww and W indexes multiplied by the number of the region’s inhabitants.
The supplementing quota, on the other hand, is received by voivodships with population less than
3 million inhabitants. It is calculated as 9% of the Ww index multiplied by the number of inhabitants.
The population count, in this approach, is calculated regressively – the higher the population, the
lower is the associated increase of population level.
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The second part of the general subvention – the regional subvention – is determined as the sum of
payments collected from voivodships under the so called “Robin Hood tax”. This particular taxation
mechanism applies to regions with W index surpassing the 110% of the Ww index, and the amount
due is calculated as the product of the region’s population count by 80% of the surplus of W index
over the 110% of the Ww index – for regions with W found no higher than 170% of the Ww index –
or as 48% of the Ww index, supplemented by 95% of the surplus of W index over the 170% of the
Ww index – for regions with W found in excess of the 170% of the Ww index.
The resulting quota is then divided into the following: 20% between regions with unemployment
level found below 110% of the mean national unemployment rate; 40% between regions with regional
road area per region inhabitant found in excess of the mean national per capita level; 10% between
regions with GDP per inhabitant lower than 75% of the national GDP per capita; 15% between
regions based on reported levels of expenditure on regional rail passenger transportation for the
previous year; 15% between regions where planned revenue from equalisation part and from regional
part of general subvention per budget year, adjusted by planned state budget contribution, is lower
than the corresponding value calculated per base year.
Survey results
The significance of horizontal equalisation of financial resources between self-governing regions is
best illustrated in the correlation between the volume of financing and the volume of own proceeds in
individual regions. The reported figures show the colossal effects of state subventions in five of the
sixteen voivodeships. In the most extreme cases, the volume of subventions received was as much as
twice the size of own revenue. This may attest to the striking maladjustment between the structure of
regional income and the regional financing demands. At the same time, it must be noted that the
outflow of proceeds under the pending ‘Robin Hood tax’ regulations – in the case of the Mazovian
Voivodship – reached as much as a third of regional revenue, overall. This has the effect of greatly
reducing the level of financing available for self-governing regions. In the Mazovian Voivodeship, the
adopted fiscal solution resulted in liquidity loss. Consequently, the present administrative regulations
will be revised by 2016 by the power of Constitutional Tribunal decision, in order to satisfy the
financial demands of those regions which at present are the net payers of the ‘Robin Hood tax’.
Tab. 1: The correlation between the volume of financing and the volume of own proceeds
Region Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Dolnośląskie 9,6% 11,5% 11,6% 9,7% 5,1%
Kujawsko-pomorskie 54,0% 78,0% 93,4% 67,7% 60,6%
Lubelskie 77,6% 117,6% 176,1% 111,1% 98,5%
Lubuskie 68,0% 80,7% 98,7% 70,7% 95,7%
Łódzkie 26,0% 32,5% 35,7% 22,5% 16,8%
Małopolskie 15,3% 20,7% 22,4% 13,5% 19,3%
Mazowieckie -28,7% -36,3% -46,3% -34,1% -36,2%
Opolskie 36,2% 62,3% 87,4% 56,2% 68,1%
Podkarpackie 82,5% 103,9% 162,6% 100,1% 115,4%
Podlaskie 67,4% 94,9% 148,3% 106,3% 124,5%
pomorskie 16,3% 25,0% 26,8% 19,9% 16,2%
Śląskie 3,2% 10,0% 9,7% 12,0% 7,8%
Świętokrzyskie 52,7% 82,5% 99,4% 64,3% 88,4%
Warmińsko-mazurskie 77,1% 129,3% 162,7% 118,8% 119,6%
Wielkopolskie 5,5% 8,1% 9,8% 4,6% 5,3%
Zachodniopomorskie 55,5% 79,3% 102,2% 67,7% 64,6%
Source: Own calculations based on MF (Ministry of Finance) data
The volumes presented in table 2 show explicitly that, for some regions, the equalisation mechanism is
an invaluable source of financing. As many as seven out of the sixteen Polish regions report their
adjusted indicators of the share of current yields in total revenues (Ce1s) to be lower by ca. 10
percentage points. This suggests that horizontal equalisation in those regions has the effect of
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significantly improving their ability to perform the current tasks delegated to them. It must also be
noted that the significance of the equalization mechanism has grown steadily since the early months of
the recent financial crisis, as attested by the noticeable increase of the difference between the base and
the adjusted indicators. In the case of the Mazovian Voivodship, the lack of significant adjustment of
the indicator may be attributed to the fact that the region is a net payer of the Robin Hood tax, while
the adjustment applies solely to the relative quotas of the regional part of the subventions.
Tab. 2: The share of current yields in total regions revenues
Region Ce1 Ce1s
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Dolnośląskie 87,00% 60,90% 83,90% 80,60% 74,40% 86,1% 59,2% 82,9% 79,6% 73,7%
Kujawsko-pomorskie 88,30% 68,60% 70,70% 81,70% 83,30% 84,8% 61,5% 62,7% 77,0% 79,3%
Lubelskie 87,50% 72,10% 79,80% 71,80% 78,50% 82,4% 62,6% 68,0% 62,4% 71,0%
Lubuskie 83,30% 46,10% 68,10% 71,10% 77,40% 77,4% 37,2% 56,9% 63,1% 70,5%
Łódzkie 88,70% 54,30% 79,10% 75,00% 71,80% 86,8% 50,2% 75,3% 72,2% 69,6%
Małopolskie 81,50% 56,50% 60,90% 60,70% 70,30% 79,7% 53,5% 57,8% 58,4% 67,9%
Mazowieckie 95,40% 86,50% 85,80% 84,80% 87,00% 95,2% 85,8% 84,9% 84,7% 86,8%
Opolskie 70,90% 54,70% 61,90% 63,30% 75,80% 65,3% 47,9% 52,9% 56,2% 70,2%
Podkarpackie 86,40% 74,90% 76,30% 72,80% 74,70% 80,9% 67,1% 65,3% 63,3% 65,8%
Podlaskie 84,80% 57,70% 77,90% 70,70% 72,00% 79,4% 48,2% 67,3% 61,7% 62,9%
pomorskie 78,60% 53,90% 77,60% 73,30% 70,10% 76,4% 50,6% 74,5% 70,6% 67,7%
Śląskie 85,40% 67,80% 70,70% 82,10% 77,50% 85,1% 66,6% 69,2% 80,8% 76,6%
Świętokrzyskie 88,40% 64,40% 70,50% 70,80% 61,60% 84,9% 56,8% 59,9% 63,4% 51,8%
Warmińsko-mazurskie 83,90% 65,50% 85,20% 75,10% 70,50% 77,5% 56,5% 76,5% 65,0% 60,2%
Wielkopolskie 88,30% 47,60% 72,40% 68,80% 76,20% 87,8% 46,4% 71,0% 68,1% 75,6%
Zachodniopomorskie 86,00% 52,80% 63,00% 65,20% 63,20% 81,7% 45,2% 51,9% 57,2% 55,3%
Source: Own calculations based on MF (Ministry of Finance) and NSO(National Statistical Office) data
With respect to the second indicator – the share of proprietary revenues in total revenues (Ce2s)– it can
be observed that regions reported increases in their financial independence indicators after deducting
the redistribution elements of the regional subvention quota (table 3). For some regions, this increase
was as much as 10 p.p. This means that, after considering the share of subvention in total revenues,
and depending on the volume of subventions received (which are, in part, unrelated to the region’s
revenues, since their volume may also be related to infrastructural indicators), there will be significant
differences between individual regions, even if they report similar levels of proprietary revenues. This
may have a negative effect on the comparability of the regions’ revenue potential calculated using the
above indicators. Also in this respect, the Mazovian Voivodship reported ca. 3 p.p increase of the
indicator, based on their share of the regional part of the subvention received.
Tab. 3: The share of proprietary revenues in regions total revenues
Region Ce2 Ce2s
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Dolnośląskie 67,90% 36,30% 52,40% 52,00% 54,90% 72,6% 37,9% 55,8% 54,7% 56,5%
Kujawsko-pomorskie 42,90% 23,60% 23,00% 30,00% 31,80% 55,8% 29,0% 29,2% 37,7% 39,4%
Lubelskie 37,20% 21,70% 21,00% 22,60% 26,30% 52,3% 29,1% 33,3% 30,2% 35,4%
Lubuskie 38,40% 17,40% 26,40% 30,60% 24,40% 51,9% 20,3% 35,7% 39,0% 31,9%
Łódzkie 57,00% 25,80% 43,00% 44,30% 43,40% 66,9% 28,1% 50,7% 49,3% 46,8%
Małopolskie 58,90% 31,20% 32,90% 40,10% 38,30% 64,7% 33,3% 35,6% 42,4% 41,3%
Mazowieckie 83,40% 67,10% 69,30% 72,60% 69,60% 86,62% 70,86% 73,93% 73,15% 70,49%
Opolskie 44,30% 21,00% 21,80% 28,70% 27,90% 52,8% 24,2% 26,9% 34,2% 34,4%
Podkarpackie 35,20% 22,70% 19,50% 25,90% 22,70% 49,6% 29,7% 28,6% 35,0% 30,8%
Podlaskie 38,80% 19,50% 21,90% 22,10% 19,70% 52,6% 23,9% 32,4% 28,8% 26,1%
pomorskie 56,10% 27,20% 45,30% 46,70% 46,70% 61,8% 29,2% 51,5% 51,4% 50,5%
Śląskie 66,60% 37,10% 48,90% 55,30% 51,10% 68,0% 38,6% 51,3% 59,3% 53,2%
Świętokrzyskie 43,60% 21,30% 26,40% 31,50% 23,00% 56,6% 25,8% 35,9% 39,5% 28,9%
Warmińsko-mazurskie 36,50% 16,00% 22,60% 24,30% 21,50% 50,8% 20,1% 35,8% 34,1% 29,0%
Wielkopolskie 65,80% 28,90% 49,40% 52,60% 48,70% 68,3% 29,6% 51,9% 53,9% 50,0%
Zachodniopomorskie 42,60% 17,50% 22,60% 27,70% 27,20% 55,8% 20,3% 29,4% 34,1% 33,0%
Source: Own calculations based on MF (Ministry of Finance) and NSO (National Statistical Office) data
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In the case of the indicator reflecting the share of operating surplus in total revenues Ce3, the
adjustment suggests that more than a half of Polish regions are unable to generate any surplus
whatsoever, and have no potential to meet their liabilities on their own (table 4). In the case of the
Mazovian Voivodship as the (usually) sole example of a net payer of both the regional and the
compensatory part, it must be observed that the respective indicator will be elevated (for this
particular region, total revenues are not adjusted against total fiscal contribution, but only against the
regional part of the subvention). Similar adjustments were observed for Lower Silesia (dolnośląskie)
and Great Poland (wielkopolskie) in the period when those two regions were net payers of the ‘Robin
Hood tax’, but the effect of those payments on the adjusted indicator were marginal. The increase of
the self-financing indicator for Mazovia region, reported at times to be even more than 30 p.p., clearly
attests to the negative impact of the ‘Robin Hood tax’ on the region’s financial standing. In general,
however, it may be concluded that the volumes of adjusted indicators clearly attest to the significance
of the equalisation mechanism for less-developed regions.
Tab. 4: The share of operating surplus in regions total revenues
Region Ce3 Ce3s
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Dolnośląskie 23,10% 7,10% 2,50% 9,20% 21,50% 17,8% 3,0% -3,8% 4,4% 19,3%
Kujawsko-pomorskie 19,20% 13,00% 6,20% 9,80% 12,00% -5,1% -6,7% -19,3% -13,2% -9,0%
Lubelskie 26,30% 12,10% 13,90% 10,70% 10,00% -3,6% -18,1% -36,6% -19,3% -21,4%
Lubuskie 18,00% 6,90% 8,30% 7,30% 7,50% -10,9% -8,4% -24,0% -18,3% -20,7%
Łódzkie 21,90% 9,70% 15,30% 7,90% 6,10% 8,3% 1,5% -0,1% -2,3% -1,3%
Małopolskie 27,40% 8,90% 3,20% 9,50% 10,60% 20,3% 2,6% -4,5% 4,4% 3,5%
Mazowieckie 20,80% 8,30% 2,80% 5,40% 9,50% 46,30% 34,53% 37,19% 30,36% 35,17%
Opolskie 11,40% 5,10% 1,80% 1,00% 9,30% -5,6% -9,2% -21,3% -18,0% -11,9%
Podkarpackie 24,00% 13,20% 15,20% 13,90% 14,00% -7,2% -13,6% -24,3% -16,2% -16,6%
Podlaskie 25,90% 16,80% 19,70% 12,90% 9,80% -0,3% -2,0% -18,8% -13,8% -19,6%
pomorskie 22,20% 6,40% 10,10% 13,20% 8,30% 14,4% -0,4% -2,4% 4,4% 0,8%
Śląskie 20,70% 7,80% 15,40% 18,50% 11,10% 19,0% 4,3% 11,1% 12,7% 7,4%
Świętokrzyskie 37,00% 17,90% 10,80% 13,10% 13,60% 18,2% 0,4% -21,1% -9,0% -8,5%
Warmińsko-mazurskie 20,20% 6,70% 16,90% 8,70% 9,70% -11,2% -17,6% -31,4% -28,3% -21,6%
Wielkopolskie 17,20% 11,80% 13,90% 10,90% 10,20% 14,1% 9,7% 9,5% 8,7% 7,8%
Zachodniopomorskie 21,30% 9,40% 9,30% 8,50% 8,10% -3,1% -5,2% -17,9% -12,7% -11,5%
Source: Own calculations based on MF (Ministry of Finance) and NSO (National Statistical Office) data
Another indicator under scrutiny is the share of operational surplus and proceeds from property sale in
total revenue. For the whole period under study, the Ce6s indicators were higher than the corresponding
Ce3s indicators only for three of the analysed regions, namely: Mazovia, Silesia(śląskie) and Great
Poland. This may suggest that only those three regions, apart from being able to generate surplus
earnings, reported additional profits from sale of their property. In turn, negative values of the
indicator (also for the whole period) were reported by 8 regions, suggesting that their proceeds from
fixed asset sale were not adequate to cover the operational deficit. It must also be noted that
differences between the adjusted indicators Ce6s and Ce3s were found in surplus of 0.1 p.p. in more than
those 3 regions, but were definitely highest for Mazovia (up to 3 p.p.).
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Tab. 5: The self-financing indicator
Region Ce7 Ce7s
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Dolnośląskie 123,3% 88,9% 39,3% 55,6% 98,4% 101,1% 80,9% 26,4% 45,8% 92,6%
Kujawsko-pomorskie 92,8% 95,0% 90,9% 84,4% 97,2% 23,2% 55,5% 36,1% 23,4% 31,8%
Lubelskie 82,3% 109,9% 94,6% 87,9% 79,2% 21,1% 39,7% -8,0% 31,1% 14,1%
Lubuskie 109,5% 95,6% 83,4% 98,0% 94,8% 27,1% 73,5% 29,4% 39,5% 21,3%
Łódzkie 92,0% 88,5% 78,3% 64,7% 77,7% 50,8% 75,1% 45,1% 45,0% 61,2%
Małopolskie 101,6% 91,7% 79,0% 87,8% 99,4% 81,7% 80,4% 65,2% 78,1% 81,2%
Mazowieckie 55,9% 68,7% 88,2% 78,6% 105,0% 108,0% 145,5% 254,8% 173,2% 222,2%
Opolskie 119,1% 85,9% 76,1% 86,6% 102,0% 71,9% 63,6% 39,8% 49,7% 44,2%
Podkarpackie 125,1% 79,7% 78,8% 92,1% 94,6% 28,3% 30,7% 14,4% 34,0% 31,4%
Podlaskie 155,2% 118,0% 119,8% 86,4% 88,1% 56,5% 81,1% 26,9% 38,3% 30,9%
pomorskie 113,1% 86,5% 61,5% 82,2% 91,2% 89,3% 75,3% 38,5% 63,1% 73,1%
Śląskie 77,1% 75,8% 89,4% 81,5% 86,9% 72,4% 68,8% 79,9% 66,6% 76,5%
Świętokrzyskie 181,3% 107,5% 83,9% 94,1% 76,4% 95,7% 72,2% 29,2% 49,0% 46,5%
Warmińsko-mazurskie 147,2% 92,6% 88,7% 89,4% 78,8% 32,7% 46,2% -14,0% 12,8% 27,1%
Wielkopolskie 84,6% 102,6% 88,2% 83,4% 91,1% 74,0% 98,8% 77,9% 78,6% 84,2%
Zachodniopomorskie 102,7% 97,4% 87,1% 74,7% 90,8% 33,8% 73,6% 43,6% 42,3% 55,2%
Source: Own calculations based on MF (Ministry of Finance) and NSO (National Statistical Office) data
The last of the indicators under analysis is the so-called self-financing indicator, representing the share
of own resources in the financing of regional investments(Ce7). For the majority of regions, this
indicator, when adjusted by revenue from horizontal equalisation quotas, dropped considerably. In
some cases, the drop was well below 100 percentage points. Increase was observed mainly for
Mazovia – in the absence of equalisation mechanisms, this region would surely profit from full
liquidity of investment financing.
Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to conduct the analysis and the assessment of the significance of
a equalisation and regional part of the general subsidy for the voivodeships in Poland. In the majority
of cases omitting the subsidy in the calculation resulted in the deterioration of the budgetary indicators
in the half of voivodeships. It should be noticed that in the most extreme cases, the volume of
subventions received was as much as twice the size of own revenue. This may attest to the striking
maladjustment between the structure of regional income and the regional financing demands. It must
be also noted that the outflow of proceeds under the pending ‘Robin Hood tax’ regulations – in the
case of the Mazovian Voivodship – reached as much as a third of regional revenue, overall. This has
the effect of greatly reducing the level of financing available for self-governing regions. In the
Mazovian Voivodeship, the adopted fiscal solution resulted in liquidity loss. However, in the face of
the present ‘Robin Hood tax’, the Mazovian Voivodship found itself on the verge of bankruptcy last
year, and refused to contribute, pending future development of the debate. To sum up, both the
negative and positive effects of the horizontal equalisation mechanism can be demonstrated with
respect to financial position of the regions in Poland.
References
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Sborník příspěvků XVII. mezinárodní kolokvium o regionálních vědách Hustopeče 18.–20. 6. 2014
401
[6] The Act on Public Finances Dz.U.2009.157.1240
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