Part I: Concepts of Global Civil Society
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3
T
he first few months of 2003 witnessed a global
popular mobilisation on a scale unprecedented
in history. On 15 February 2003, some 11 million
people demonstrated in approximately 800 cities all
over the world (see Map 1.2). A new generation was
politicised with young people walking out of school
to demonstrate against the war in Iraq. The New York
Times was moved to describe global civil society as
the `second superpower' (Tyler 2003), and the New
Yorker magazine (2003) wondered if the mass
mobilisation of people on that day amounted to the
largest one-day protest in history.
Yet despite this energy, the anti-war movement
was defeated. Within a few weeks, the United States
and Britain had gone to war with Iraq. The United
Nations was sidelined and all major international
institutions were deeply divided. In particular, the
European Union has been immobilised by divisions of
opinion.
A crisis represents a danger and an opportunity. On
the one hand, we face the real possibility of the
unravelling of the global institutional framework,
painfully built up over the last 50 years, but especially
in the last decade. This applies both to the framework
of economic institutions that establish rules about
trade and investment and to the framework of
international law, justice, and human rights. Most
troubling is that the prohibition against starting wars,
first codified in the Kellogg-Briand pact in 1928 and
later fortified by the decisions of the Nuremberg court
and by the United Nations Charter, has been seriously
undermined. This global institutional framework made
possible the growth of global civil society--and global
civil society helped constitute global institutions. This
synergetic relation is now being challenged by what
Martin Shaw in Chapter 2 of this Yearbook calls
`regressive globalism', and which we understand as a
form of displaced, latter-day particularist (quasiimperial,
nationalist or fundamentalist) thinking in
the context of global capitalism.
On the other hand, the mobilisation of global civil
society in the first few months of 2003 was by no
means an isolated event that could be easily reversed
or neutralised. As we show in this chapter, the 1990s
were a period of consolidation of global civil society,
a period in which a solid infrastructure was established,
based on a broad shift in cultural and social
values, especially in developed market economies.
Indeed, there are signs that the dramatic development
of social forums in the early 2000s, the anti-war
movement, and other developments may not only
indicate continued expansion of global civil society but
may also suggest an evolution in institutional terms.
Of course, we do not know how the present crisis
of global governance will be resolved. However, we
argue in this chapter that it is possible to outline
different directions of change, possible scenarios,
which depend both on the positions and strategies of
global civil society and on the responses of states
and global institutions such as the United Nations or
the World Trade Organisation. In order to elaborate
this argument, we start with some conceptual themes
that run through many of the chapters in this
Yearbook. They concern how we think about the
complex and conflictual nature of global civil society
and its relation to globalisation. We then summarise,
in more detail than in previous Yearbooks, what we
have learned from our data collection effort that
accompanies the production of the Yearbooks and is
summarised in our records section. The next section
deals with the recent popular mobilisation, the rise
of social forums and the anti-war movement. And in
the final section, we draw some conclusions and set
out what this analysis might imply for possible future
directions of change.
Conceptual Themes
In the first edition of this Yearbook, published just
days before the tragic events of 11 September 2001,
we introduced the concept of global civil society to
our readers as a useful and ultimately normative
concept for depicting what we saw as an emerging
reality of global civic action and connectedness. In
our initial understanding, the growing transnational
character of civil society seemed to offer a positive
C h a p t e r 1
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN AN ERA OF
REGRESSIVE GLOBALISATION
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response, even counterweight, to narrow notions
that linked globalisation to economic processes
alone; and the concept also seemed to suggest
greater participation and involvement of the world's
citizens in shaping a common future. At the same
time, we argued, the very notion of a global civil
society runs up against the conventional political
discourse of a world seemingly dominated by
nation-states, and is at odds with the conceptual
frameworks and methodological toolboxes of the
social sciences (see Chapters 2 and 3).
Aware of the terminological
tangle that had developed around
the concept of global civil society,
we offered a working definition of
it as the sphere of ideas, values,
organisations, networks, and individuals
located primarily outside
the institutional complexes of
family, market, and state, and
beyond the confines of national
societies, polities, and economies.
At first sight, this working definition
might appear rather abstract--or,
rather, `usefully abstract', as we
would like to think--but what it
suggests is ultimately straightforward:
global civil society is about
people, organisations, and the
values and ideas they represent, but
with the major difference that these are, at least in
part, located in some transnational arena and not
bound or limited by nation-states or local societies.
We also emphasised the normative implications of
the concept. Global civil society is also about the
meaning and practice of human equality in an
increasingly unjust world, and about the complex
debate on how individual human beings can develop
their own capabilities to meet their needs. It is also
about searching for, and developing, new forms of
civic participation and involvement in a globalising
world; it is about finding and giving `voice' to those
affected by old, new, and emerging inequities in the
broadest sense, and providing a political and social
platform for such voices to be heard. Global civil
society is about civic engagement and civicmindedness
in a transnational, potentially global
sphere; it is about private action for public benefit
however defined. It is an arena for people to express
different views, values, and interests, and to agree or
disagree about them.
Methodological nationalism
An important theme of this Yearbook is `methodological
nationalism', a term introduced independently
by Shaw (2000), Scholte (1999), and Beck
(2000). We often read, for example, that Germany
and France were against waging war on Iraq, while
the British and the Americans were in favour. It is
in this reified way that the media explain world
politics to us, and it is in this way that we often talk
amongst ourselves, wondering whether `the Italians'
might change sides, and what
`Turkey' will do. It seems so natural
to equate government positions
with the entire country so that,
irrespective of the millions of
people marching against the war
in Britain or Italy, we continued
to speak of `the British' and
`the Italians' on the basis of their
government's position. It is hard to
even notice that there is something
absurd in the complaints of
American academics and activists
against American (rather than US
government) imperialism (see, for
instance, Schiller 1998; Mokhiber
and Weissman, 2001).
We are conditioned to believe
that nations take stands in international
politics en bloc, that governments represent
the views of the nation, and that what other people
in that country might think is domestic politics and
irrelevant at the international level. It is conceivable
to us that the anti-war mood in Britain might bring
down Tony Blair, but we still find it much more
difficult to imagine that it might change the
dynamics of international decision-making. In our
first yearbook, and in reference to Shaw (2000)
and Beck (2000), we termed as methodological
nationalism1 this deeply entrenched world view that
affects everyday language, journalism, and the media
as much as it does the social sciences and policy
analysis. In this Yearbook, we further refine the
concept in essays by Shaw and Beck. Shaw, who
compares the old way of doing social science to
`stamp-collecting', pleads for a deep inter-
4
We are conditioned to
believe that nations
take stands in
international politics
en bloc, that
governments
represent the views of
the nation, and that
what other people in
that country might
think is domestic
politics
1 This nationalism is not a fanatical insistence on the superiority of one
nation over another; it means to consider nation-states as the natural
and only way to divide up the world. As the `prime divisor', it takes
precedence over all other possible categorisations.
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disciplinarity, a global social science in which
disciplines are just building blocks. Beck gives us the
example of social inequality to show that the myopia
of methodological nationalism is not just unhelpful,
but ends up being immoral because we can see only
small inequalities within nation-states and are blind
to global inequalities. Beck insists on a `methodological
cosmopolitanism' to underpin new social
science research and teaching.
This is not just an academic discussion but also a
matter of great political and practical importance.
How scientists do research, what kind of research
gets funded, how university professors and
secondary-school teachers teach, and what textbooks
they use ends up determining how decision-makers,
journalists, activists, ordinary people see the world
and how they think. It is for this reason that we find
it so very difficult to shake the habit of thinking
about states as if they were single actors: this is
how we have been brought up
and taught. The direction of social
science therefore determines
whether present and future generations
will have an analytical toolkit
that is appropriate for their decisionmaking
in the twenty-first century
context. This is important for policymakers
at all levels, but above all for
transnational activists, whose goals
and methods simply disappear from
view in the methodological
nationalist framework.
In producing the Yearbook, our
goal is to engage in the `global social
science' or `methodological cosmopolitanism'
Shaw and Beck call for.
Fortunately, we are not alone in this and, as Shaw
acknowledges, a transformation of the social sciences
is under way. In contrast to standard globalisation
research, we emphasise the importance of individual
agency in globalisation, and focus on what could be
described as `globalisation from below'. Specifically,
the Global Civil Society Yearbooks try to break
through conventional social science boundaries by:
* challenging methodological nationalism. Both
in our choice of subject matter and in our
methodology, we try to delineate and illuminate
what is both non-governmental and
transnational;
* overcoming disciplinary fragmentation. Because
there is no specific discipline devoted to civil
society, nor is any discipline the `most natural'
or dominant one, we experiment with a mix of
lenses and methodologies; and
* building bridges between research, policy, and
practice. Our aim is to create a space for selfreflection
and debate about the role of global
civil society for practitioners, activists, policymakers,
and researchers alike.
Positions revisited: regressive globalism
While the idea of a global civil society still seems to
us as relevant as ever, it is also clear that the global
political environment has changed. An important
new concept in this respect, proposed by Shaw in
Chapter 2, is that of regressive globalism. In our first
Yearbook, we categorised positions
on globalisation in terms of
Supporters, Reformers, Alternatives,
and Rejectionists--a categorisation
close to that of Held et al. (1999:
10). These positions reflect the
preferences of actors and organisations
in global civil society as well as
those of political parties, governments,
and individuals. In the course
of our research, it has become clear
that there are very few `out and out'
Supporters, that is to say, groups or
individuals who favour all forms of
global connectedness (trade, finance,
migration, law, and politics); there
are also very few `out and out'
Rejectionists, i.e. people who oppose all forms of
connectedness and seek to return to some form of
nation-state nirvana however defined.
Rather, the dominant responses to globalisation
are mixed. We have therefore revisited the two other
positions, and added a new one: regressive globalisers.
These are individuals, groups, firms, or even
governments that favour globalisation when it is in
their particular interest and irrespective of any
negative consequences for others. Regressive
globalisers see the world as a zero-sum game, in
which they seek to maximise the benefit of the few,
which they represent, at the expense of the welfare
of the many, about which they are indifferent at
best. What we call Reformers or redistributive
5
`Regressive globalisers'
are individuals, groups,
firms, or governments
that favour
globalisation only
when it is in their
particular interest
and irrespective of any
negative consequences
for others
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6
Globalisation Supporters Regressives Reformers Rejectionists
of:
Economy For: As part of Mixed: If beneficial Mixed: If leading Against: Greater
economic to own country or to greater social protection of
liberalism. E.g. group and leading equity. E.g. ATTAC; national economies
The Economist; stakeholders. E.g. Fair trade coop- needed. E.g. 50
Thomas French farmers; eratives; Novib; Years is Enough;
Friedman British fuel protest; Jubilee 2000 Walden Bello;
US Administration Ralph Nader
Technology For: As part Mixed: For in Mixed: If beneficial Against: Technology
of open economic terms and to broader groups threatens local
competition for for military and and the communities and
technological security purposes, marginalised traditional ways
innovation. E.g. against for social E.g. Treatment of life. E.g. Friends
gene and plant or environmental Action Campaign; of the Earth; Aids
technologists purposes. E.g. private Copyleft sceptics; Vandana
sector scientists and Shiva
business associations
Law For: With Against: For if For: Building global Against:
emphasis on facilitating private rule of law not Undermines
international investment and solely dependent on national
commercial law trade but generally sovereign states. sovereignty and
and human against. Emphasis Pronounced role democracy.
rights legislation; on strengthening for International E.g Euro-sceptics
role for national laws on Criminal Court. (left & right);
International property rights and E.g. Amnesty; anti-humanitarian
Criminal Court domestic democracy; Women's Caucus intervention(left &
no role for International for Gender Justice right) such as
Criminal Court. Noam Chomsky,
E.g. anti-Kyoto lobby Samuel Huntington
People For: Open border Mixed: For immigration For: Open policy. Against: Closed
policy, e.g., The for economic and E.g., Genoa Social border policy.
Economist domestic needs but Forum; European E.g. European
against for asylum Council on Refugees anti-immigrant
seekers or people of and Exiles parties; Australian
other cultures and government
ethnicities
Table 1.1:Positions on globalisation revisited
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globalisers are groups or individuals who favour
`civilising' or `humanising' globalisation; in other
words, Reformers favour those dimensions of
globalisation that benefit the many.
As can be seen from Table 1.1, the Regressive
globalisers occupy a somewhat contradictory policy
position between Supporters and Rejectionists. In
cases where Supporters are generally for the
globalisation of the economy, technology, law, and
people movements, and Rejectionists against, the
Regressive globalisers come out with mixed messages
or conditional policy statements. They are for globalisation
if it strengthens their national positions
and/or if it is likely to benefit key political stakeholders,
electoral groups, or particular communities.
If, however, globalisation processes could potentially
weaken stakeholder institutions and in particular
national sovereignty, or otherwise threaten the
interests of powerful lobby groups or
ethnic or religious groups, Regressive
globalisers become very similar to
Rejectionists.
Regressive globalisation has
become much more visible since 11
September and this is why the
environment for global civil society
has become so much more inhospitable.
It has in fact become the new
doctrine of a unilateralist Bush
White House, a policy position which
both Reformers and Supporters
regard as a nineteenth-century reaction
to twenty-first century
problems. The re-emergence of
nation-state thinking with promarket
economic policies and minimalist government
leads to greater emphasis on international security
concerns and assertiveness about domestic values.
One important area in which this new policy
manifests itself is that of biological and chemical
weapons, discussed in Chapter 5. On the one hand,
the Bush Administration raises the spectre of
biological and chemical terrorism as a justification for
increased defence spending and `pre-emptive strikes',
on the other hand it has rejected a new protocol to
improve multilateral monitoring of biological
weapons capacities.
Regressive globalism also characterises the
religious and nationalist groups that are described in
Chapter 7. These groups favour nation-state thinking;
yet they organise transnationally and indeed are
growing both as a reaction to the insecurities generated
by globalisation and because they are able to
mobilise by making use of the new global media and
funding from Diaspora groups. Regressive globalists
tend also to promote masculine, aggressive cultures
where women have a traditional and passive role to
play. In this respect, they also present new challenges
for the movement that combats violence against
women, described in chapter 6.
At the same time, however, the growth of social
forums and the anti-war movement represents
what social movements theorists call a `political
opportunity structure' (see McAdam 1996; Diani
and McAdam, 2003)--a framework where
individuals can participate and engage in global
debates. In particular, as we argue, the social forums
have become the institutionalisation of the `newest
social movements', from the so-called anti-capitalist
movement to environmental concerns
and Internet-based forms of
activism. The activists who are
engaged in these new movements
are, in fact, divided between
Rejectionists and Reformers. In the
anti-war movement, for example,
there are those who oppose all
forms of state-based humanitarian
engagement, believing that this a
legitimisation for imperialism. And
in the economic field, there are
those who oppose free trade and
free capital movements. There are
also of course those who want to
strengthen the capabilities of
multilateral institutions to deal
with humanitarian emergencies and to contribute
to global justice. A big concern in this Yearbook,
spelled out in Chapter 4 on trade by Desai and Said,
is that the former group, the Rejectionists, might
combine with the Regressives to squeeze out the
possibilities for a more humane form of glob-
alisation.
Manifestations of global civil society
One of the main characteristics of global civil society,
celebrated by some, deplored by others, is its multifaceted
nature. We believe it is helpful to think about
global civil society not just in terms of the positions
it takes but also through the various forms in which
it manifests itself. The different manifestations,
7
Regressive globalisers
favour globalisation
only if it strengthens
their national
positions, and if it is
likely to benefit key
political stakeholders,
electoral groups,
or particular
communities
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summarised in Table 1.2, play different roles in the
triad of market, governance, and civil society.
The first is the new public management
manifestation, which is part of the modernisation
of welfare states currently under way in most
developed market economies, and is, via World Bank,
EU, and IMF policy prescriptions, also affecting the
rudimentary social welfare systems in developing
countries and transition economies. At the international
level, new public management is replacing
conventional development assistance policies
(Deacon, Hulse, and Stubbs 1997; Clark 2003) and
seeks to capitalise on what is viewed as the
comparative efficiency advantages of non-profit
organisations through public-private partnerships,
competitive bidding, and contracting under the
general heading of privatisation (McLaughlin,
Osborne, and Ferlie, 2002).
The main actors, according to this approach, are
the professionalised organisational components of
global civil society, in other words NGOs and INGOs.
Prompted in part by growing doubts about the
capacity of the state to cope with its own welfare,
developmental, and environmental problems, analysts
across the political spectrum have come to see NGOs
as strategic components of a middle way between
policies that put primacy on `the market' and those
that advocate greater reliance on the state (Giddens
1999). Institutions like the World Bank (Fowler 2000),
the United Nations (UNDP 2002) or the European
Union (Commission of the European Community
1997) together with bilateral donors and many
developing countries are searching for a balance
between state-led and market-led approaches to
development, and are allocating more responsibility
to INGOs. In fact, as shown below, service provision
has been the fastest growing area of INGO activities
in the 1990s.
With the rise of new public management, the
emphasis on NGOs as service providers and instruments
of privatisation casts them at the international level
essentially in a subcontracting role. NGOs have become
instruments of national and international welfare
state reform guided by the simple equation of `less
government = less bureaucracy = more flexibility =
greater efficiency' (see Kettle 2000). Hence, this
approach is typically associated with the Supporters
and Reformers of globalisation.
To some, the public management manifestation is
associated with co-option (Chandhoke 2002). This
takes different forms. In some cases, NGOs are
artificially created as a fig-leaf for states unable or
unwilling to act, especially in failed states. In other
cases, NGOs are supported if not created by
international institutions, and then hand-picked for
consultation rounds to provide a semblance of
democratic legitimacy for the institution (K. Anderson
2000).
8
Forms Main actor Of primary Example
interest to
New Public Management: NGOs and devolved Supporters Oxfam, World Vision,
Civil society organisations as government and Reformers Save the Children
sub-contractors to robust
national and IGO policy-making
Corporatisation: Civil society NGOs and TNCs Supporters Nike and GreenPeace;
organisations partnering with and Starbucks and
companies Reformers World Wildlife Fund
Social capital or self-organisation: NGOs and associations; Reformers; Community building
civil society building trust alternatives Rejectionists; organisations, faiththrough
networking Regressives based communities
Activism: civil society monitoring Movements, Reformers Global Witness;
and challenging power-holders transnational and Corporate Watch;
civic networks Rejectionists Social Forums
Table 1.2:Manifestations of global civil society
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Increasing and more frequent corporate facets
are the second manifestation of global civil society.
This has to do with the `corporatisation' of NGOs as
well as the expansion of business into local and global
civil society. As Perrow (2001; 2002) argues,
corporations use extended social responsibility
programmes to provide, jointly with non-profits,
services previously in the realm of government (e.g.
health care, child care, and pensions, but also
community services more widely). On the other hand,
NGOs `professionalise'; under pressure from
management gurus they increasingly adopt corporate
strategies, as well as being increasingly open to
partnerships with business. We suggest that the
corporatisation of NGOs will gather momentum,
encouraged by a resource-poor international
community eager to seek new forms of cooperation,
particularly in development assistance and capacity
building.
Given that over one third of the world's 100 largest
`economies' are transnational
corporations (TNCs), there are
growing `points of contact' between
global businesses and global civil
society organisations, in particular
INGOs like Greenpeace, the World
Wildlife Fund, Oxfam, and World
Vision--the global brand names of
civil society. TNCs and INGOs work
together in addressing global
problems (e.g., environmental degradation,
malnutrition, low skills
and education levels) but also many
local issues in failed states and areas
of civic strife and conflict.
Yet it is not only in the developing
world that global business and
INGOs are forging partnerships. In some ways as a
backlash to, in other ways as an implication of, neoliberal
policies and `lean states', public opinion in
developed market economies is expecting greater
corporate responsibility and `caring' about the
societies in which they operate. Increasingly, as
Oliviero and Simmons (2002) point out, this goes
beyond adherence to principles of corporate governance
and some core of conduct; it implies greater
emphasis on service delivery to employees and their
communities (e.g., educational programs, child care),
addressing negative externalities or `bads' of business
operations (e.g., pollution, resource depletion), and
public goods (health, sustainability). Willingly or
reluctantly, companies and NGOs team up to divide
responsibilities the state is failing to meet. This
approach is typically associated with Supporters and
Reformers of globalisation.
A third manifestation is social capital or selforganisation.
Here the emphasis is not so much on
management as on building relations of trust and
cohesion. The idea is that norms of reciprocity are
embodied in transnational networks of civic
associations. What is important, according to this
approach, is that self-organisation across borders
creates social cohesion within transnational
communities. In contrast to the basically neo-liberal
role NGOs assume in the public management
manifestation, they are now linked to the
perspective of a `strong and vibrant civil society
characterised by a social infrastructure of dense
networks of face-to-face relationships that crosscut
existing social cleavages such as race, ethnicity,
class, sexual orientation, and gender that will
underpin strong and responsive
democratic government' (Edwards,
Foley, and Diani 2001:17). Norms of
reciprocity, citizenship, and trust
are embodied in national and
transnational networks of civic
associations. Put simply, the essence
of this manifestation is: civil society
creates social capital, which is good
for society and good for economic
development.
According to this thinking, NGOs
are to create as well as facilitate a
sense of trust and social inclusion
that is seen as essential for the
functioning of modern societies
both nationally (e.g. Putnam, 2000;
2002; Anheier and Kendall 2002; Dasgupta and
Serageldin 2000; Halpern 1999; Offe and Fuchs
2002) as well as transnationally (Lindenberg and
Bryant 2001; see Edwards and Gaventa 2001). The
main argument is that participation in voluntary
associations, including social movements, creates
greater opportunities for repeated `trust-building'
encounters among like-minded individuals, an
experience that is subsequently generalised to other
situations such as business or politics. Thus, what
could be called the neo-Tocquevillian case for NGOs
is largely an argument based on the positive and
often indirect outcomes of associationalism.
9
NGOs
`professionalise':
under pressure from
management gurus
they increasingly
adopt corporate
strategies, as well as
being increasingly
open to partnerships
with business
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The term `social capital' is associated with the
Supporters of globalisation, who see the creation of
transnational social capital as good for political
stability and international business. But it is also
relevant to the Regressives, who create trust and
bonding among transnational religious or ethnic
groups, what Putzel (1997) has called the `dark side
of social capital'. And it is relevant for Reformers as
well. In our first Yearbook, we
included a category of `Alternatives'
in addition to the positions of
Reformers, Rejectionists, and
Supporters of globalisation. What
we meant by this were groups of
people who choose to organise their
own communities and represent
alternative ways of living--local
barter schemes, for example, or
ecologically responsible communities.
The category of `Alternatives'
is more appropriately
treated as a form of global civil
society organisation than a position.
Someone who adopts an alternative
lifestyle could be a Reformer (ecological
experiment), Rejectionist
(protecting the local), or Regressive
(orthodox religious communities).
The final form is the activist manifestation. Here
the main actors are social movements, transnational
civic networks, and social forums. They are a source
of dissent, challenge, and innovation, a countervailing
force to government and the corporate sector (see,
for instance, Howell and Pearce 2001; Keane 2001).
They serve as a social, cultural, and political watchdog,
keeping both market and state in check, and they
contribute to and reflect the diversity, pluralism, and
dynamism of the modern world. This approach
includes Rejectionists and Reformers and, in so far as
religious and nationalist militant groups are active,
Regressives as well.
The first two approaches--new public management
and corporatisation--are more top-down and
professional. As we shall show, they dominated global
civil society during the last decade, and are important
in providing the infrastructure for global civil society.
The second two approaches--social capital and
activism--are more bottom-up and have again
become important in recent years. They tend to
provide the mobilising impetus and agenda-setting
component of global civil society.
The Contours of
Global Civil Society:
Portrait and Interpretation
I
n the context of the dramatically changed geopolitical
situation and the rise of regressive
globalism since the first edition of the Yearbook,
it is important to gain a better
understanding of the major
contours of global civil society. To
this end, we will revisit and expand
our initial analysis (Anheier, Glasius,
and Kaldor 2001: 4­12) and look
closer into the scale, scope, and
changing composition of global
civil society over time. We will also
examine its relationship to other
aspects of the globalisation process,
in particular economic globalisation
and international law. We will
summarise our findings under five
headings, following our working
definition and the notion that
global civil society includes an
institutional and organisational
infrastructure, values and ideas, and
individuals willing to participate and contribute
to it.
The infrastructure of
global civil society
The infrastructure of global civil society includes a
vast array of NGOs, voluntary associations, nonprofit
groups, charities, and interest associations, in
addition to more informal or less permanent ways
of organising such as Diaspora networks, dot.causes,
or social forums. INGOs account for a large part of
the formal part of that infrastructure. Quantitative
information on the scale of INGO operations is still
patchy and limited to very basic indicators such as
numbers of organisations and fields of activity. The
limitations of organisational counts become clear
when we put the number of the some 48,000 NGOs
that were included in the Union of International
Associations database in 2001 (UIA 2002/3: 3) in
relation to the UNCTAD (2001) estimates of over
60,000 TNCs for the same year. Although the
respective numbers of organisations seem not far
apart, measures of economic scale would obviously
10
In the activist
manifestation of
global civil society,
social movements,
transnational civic
networks, and social
forums are a source
of dissent, challenge,
and innovation, a
countervailing force
to government and
the corporate sector
GCS2003 pages [01] 6/01 7/10/03 1:49 pm Page 10
dwarf the NGO totals. At the same time, as many
have argued, NGO presence, operations, and impact
are not primarily about economic measures. Noneconomic
aspects such as membership base,
volunteers, clients served, people mobilised, or
indicators of achievements in terms of social and
political change would be more in line with the
organisational characteristics and raison d'tre of
civil society organisations like NGOs.
Scale. Unfortunately, these data are not available
to us at the transnational level in any comprehensive
way, and we are limited to examining different facets
of the phenomenon. One set of information is
provided by the Johns Hopkins
Comparative Non-profit Project
(Anheier and Salamon 2003;
Salamon and Anheier 1996) that
attempted to measure basic
economic indicators on the size of
international non-profits in a broad
cross-section of countries. These data
allow us to fathom at least some
aspects of the scale of INGO
activities, albeit from a countrybased
perspective. For the 28
countries for which such data are
available INGOs amount to 1­2 per
cent of total non-profit sector
employment, or 134,000 full-time
equivalent jobs. They also attracted
a larger number of volunteers, who
represent another 154,000 jobs on a
full-time basis (see Record 21).
For some countries, it is possible
to examine the growth for the 1990s.
Employment in French INGOs grew by 8 per cent
between 1990 and 1995 (Archambault et al. 1999:
89), over 10 per cent in Germany (Priller et al. 1999:
115), by over 30 per cent in the UK (Kendall and
Almond 1999: 188) during the same period. Even
though the data are limited, the resulting pattern is
in line with some of the other evidence we present
below: international non-profit activities have
expanded significantly and, while they continue to
represent only a small portion of national non-profit
economies, their share has nonetheless increased.
In terms of revenue structure, the international
non-profits, as measured by the Johns Hopkins team,
receive 29 per cent of their income through fees and
charges, including membership dues, 35 per cent
from both national and internal governmental
organisations in the form of grants and reimbursements,
and 36 per cent through individual,
foundation, or corporate donations. With volunteer
input factored in as monetary equivalent, the
donation component increases to 58 per cent of
total `revenue', which makes the international nonprofit
field the most `voluntaristic and donative'
part of the non-profit sector after religious nonprofit
(73 per cent) and far more than is the case for
domestic service-providing non-profits.
This suggests that INGOs benefit more from
volunteer commitment and general mobilisation of the
population behind particular causes (e.g., human rights,
humanitarian assistance, peace and
international understanding) than
more conventional non-profits in
social services, culture and the arts,
or housing, which are increasingly
financed by the public sector and
commercial revenue sources.
The pronounced donation and
volunteer element applies also to
INGOs of significant size and with
complex organisational structures
that increasingly span many
countries and continents (Anheier
and Themudo 2002; Anheier and
Katz in this volume). Examples
include Amnesty International with
more than 1 million members,
subscribers, and regular donors in
over 140 countries and territories.
The Friends of the Earth federation
combines about 5,000 local groups
and 1 million members (see Map M2
in methodological chapter). The International Union
for the Conservation of Nature brings together 735
NGOs, 35 affiliates, 78 states, 112 government
agencies, and some 10,000 scientists and experts
from 181 countries in a unique worldwide partnership.
Much of the international coordinating work
involved is done on a volunteer basis.
As Figure 1.1 shows, the share of NGOs in official
aid flows has increased significantly since the 1970s.
At that time NGO aid as share of all aid flows from
OECD countries to developing countries was 11 per
cent. Since then the INGO share has doubled, with
most of the gain in the 1990s, a period which
coincides with the significant expansion of INGO
operations more generally. What is more, INGO
contributions increased in both relative and absolute
11
International INGOs
benefit more from
volunteer
commitment and
general mobilisation
of the population
behind particular
causes (e.g., human
rights, humanitarian
assistance, peace and
international
understanding) than
more conventional
non-profits
GCS2003 pages [01] 6/01 7/10/03 1:49 pm Page 11
terms as official aid flows decreased, as Figure 1.1
illustrates.
The change in the economic weight and political
importance of INGOs is highlighted even further
when we look at the composition of INGO aid flows,
using estimates compiled by Clark (2003: 130).
Whereas in the 1980s INGOs increasingly become an
additional circuit of official development and
humanitarian assistance flows, jumping from 44
per cent to 55 per cent of total aid between 1980
and 1988, the 1990s saw a remarkable reversal:
official aid flows declined overall, both directly
(bilateral and multilateral) and indirectly via INGOs.
In 1990 dollars, official grants to INGOs fell from
$2.4 billion in 1988 to $1.7 billion in 1999. By
contrast, private donations, including individual,
foundation, and corporate contributions, more than
doubled from $4.5 billion to $10.7 billion. These
figures underscore the significant expansion of
INGOs in the changing development field of the
1990s, and the major private mobilisation effort
they represent.
The infrastructure of global civil society is, of
course, broader than that of INGOs in development
and humanitarian assistance. The most comprehensive
data coverage of INGOs is provided by the UIA in
Brussels. Indeed, as we stated in the first edition of
this Yearbook (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001: 4),
the data indicate a sustained rise in the number of
NGOs since the 1970s (see also Anheier and Themudo
2002: 194; Keck and Sikkink 1998).
Dispersal. The growth of INGOs and their organisational
presence is, of course, not equally spread
across the world. Not surprisingly, Europe and North
America show the greatest number of INGOs and
higher membership densities than other regions of
the world (see Map M4 in the methodological
chapter). And even though, as we will show, cities in
Europe and the United States still serve as the NGO
capitals of the world, a long-term diffusion process
has decreased the concentration of NGOs so that
they are now more evenly distributed around the
world than ever before.
There are several ways to illustrate the greater
reach of global civil society's infrastructure. Figure 1.2
shows the growth in membership for different world
regions. As is to be expected, INGO memberships
increased in all regions, but more in some than in
others. The highest expansion rates are in central
and eastern Europe, including central Asia, followed
by East Asia and the Pacific. The growth in central and
eastern Europe is clearly linked to the fall of state
socialism and the introduction of freedom of
association, whereas the growth in Asia is explained
by economic expansion and democratic reform in
many countries of the region. Figure 1.3 adds a
12
Figure 1.1: Aid from OECD to developing countries and share of NGOs as % of total
$60
50
40
30
20
10
0
25%
20
15
10
5
0
1970 19881980 1999
OECD official aid in constant 1990
$ billion
NGO aid as % of total OECD and
NGO aid
Sources: Clark (1991; 2003); Lindenberg and Bryant (2001)
GCS2003 pages [01] 6/01 7/10/03 1:49 pm Page 12
Figure 1.2:Percentage growth in INGO membership by region, 1990-2000
400
350
300
200
150
100
250
50
0
13
Figure 1.3: Percentage growth in INGO membership by country income group, 1990-2000
Source: UIA (1990;2000)
High Middle Low
Country Income Group
120
100
60
40
20
80
0
Source: UIA (1990; 2000)
GCS2003 pages [01] 6/01 7/10/03 1:49 pm Page 13
different dimension and shows INGO membership
growth in relation to economic development. Growth
rates throughout the 1990s were higher in middleincome
countries (East Asia, central and eastern
Europe, parts of Latin America) than in the highincome
countries (western Europe, Pacific, and North
America). What is more, the expansion rate of INGOs
in low-income countries is higher than in richer parts
of the world.
Together, these data indicate that the growth of
the organisational infrastructure of global civil society
does not involve concentration but dispersion, and
points to inclusion rather than exclusion. In organisational
terms, global civil society today is less a
Western-based phenomenon than in the past, and the
significant growth rates of recent years enhanced
its reach and expansion outside North America and
the European Union. In the terms of David Held et al.
(1999), the organisational infrastructure of NGOs has
attained wider reach (extensity) and higher density
(intensity), a finding also supported by Anheier and
Katz (Map M4) in the methodological chapter in this
volume.
To illustrate the process of dispersion, it is useful
to review some basic patterns of NGO locations over
time, and to go back briefly to the beginnings of
modern NGO development. In 1906, only two of the
169 INGOs had their headquarters outside Europe; by
1938, 36 of the total of 705 INGOs existing at that
time were located outside Europe. By 1950, with a
significant increase of US-based INGOs and with the
establishment of the United Nations, 124 of the 804
existing INGOs were not based in Europe. With the
independence movement and the generally favourable
economic climate of the 1950s and early 1960s,
the number of INGOs increased to 1,768, of which 83
per cent were located in Europe, 10 per cent in the
United States, and between 1 per cent and 2 per
cent each in Asia, South America, Central America,
Africa, Middle East, and Australia (Tew 1963).
By 2001, much of this concentration had given
way to a more decentralised pattern around an
emerging bipolar structure of INGOs, with two
centres: Western Europe and North America (Map
M4 in Anheier and Katz). Europe still accounts for
the majority of INGO headquarters, followed by the
United States, but other regions like Asia and Africa
have gained ground, as have seen in Figures 1.2
and 1.3. Nonetheless, among the ten countries
hosting the greatest number of intercontinental
organisation headquarters in 2001, we find eight
European countries (United Kingdom, France,
Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy,
and Austria), next to the USA and Canada (UIA
2002/3: Vol. 5: 81).
In terms of cities, we find that by 2001 the
traditional role of Paris (729), London (807), Brussels
(1,392), Geneva (272), and New York (390) has not
been diminished in absolute terms. They are, however,
less dominant in relative terms: over ten other cities
in four continents have more than 100 INGO
headquarters and another 35 on five continents over
50 each.
Organisational links. As we have already pointed
out in Global Civil Society 2001, the infrastructure of
global civil society in terms of INGOs has not only
become broader in geographical coverage, it also
became much more interconnected throughout the
1990s. In 2001, the UIA reported over 90,000 such
links among NGOs and 38,000 between INGOs and
international governmental organisations. The
average number of links jumped from an average of
6.7 in 1990 to 14.1 in 2000: an increase of 110 per
cent. The infrastructure of global civil society has
not only become bigger and broader, it has also
achieved greater density and connectedness.
While these links measure a range of interorganisational
activities from consultations, joint
projects, and financing to publication and outreach
campaigns, Figure 1.6 focuses on three critical areas
of inter-organisational relations from the perspective
of institutional development. In each of three cases--
participation in founding or creating an INGO,
membership interlock, and joint activities--we see
substantial increases in recent years, as indicated by
the increased thickness of the arrows linking INGOs
to INGOs and IGOs. In all of these areas, INGOs have
become more interconnected as well as more
connected to international institutions like the United
Nations or the World Bank.
Composition. Next to scale and connectedness,
field of activity or purpose is another important
dimension in describing the infrastructure of global
civil society. When looking at the purpose or field in
which INGOs operate (Figure 1.5), we find that,
among the INGOs listed in 2001, two fields dominate
in terms of numbers: economic development and
economic interest associations (26.1 per cent) and
knowledge-based NGOs in the area of research and
science (20.5 per cent). At first, the pronounced
presence of these activities and purposes among
INGOs seems surprising, yet it is in these fields that
14
GCS2003 pages [01] 6/01 7/10/03 1:49 pm Page 14
the need for some form of international cooperation,
exchange of information, recognition and standardsetting
has long been felt. There are thousands of
scholarly associations and learned societies that span
the entire range of academic disciplines and field of
human learning. Likewise, there is a rich tradition of
business and professional organisations reaching
across national borders, such as international
chambers of commerce, consumer associations, and
professional groups in the fields of law, accounting,
trade, engineering, transport, civil service, or health
care.
Indeed, the earliest available tabulation of INGOs
by purpose lists 639 organisations in 1924, with
nearly half in either economic interest associations
(172) or learned societies and research organisations
(238) (Otlet 1924). Only 55 organisations fell into
the category `political', 28 in sports, 25 in religion, and
14 in arts and culture. In other words, the political,
humanitarian, moral, or religious value component to
INGOs is a more recent phenomenon. Although some
of the oldest humanitarian organisations date back
to the nineteenth century, such as the Red Cross or
the Anti-Slavery Society, their widespread and
prominent presence at a transnational level is a
product of the latter part of the twentieth century.
Indeed, as Figure 1.5 shows, today value-based
NGOs in the areas of law, policy, and advocacy (12.6
per cent), politics (5.2 per cent), and religion (5.2 per
cent) make up the second largest activity component,
with a total of 23 per cent of all INGOs. This is
followed by a service provisions cluster, in which
social services, health, and education together
account for 21 per cent of INGO purposes. Smaller
fields like culture and the arts (6.6 per cent), the
environment (2.9 per cent), and defence and security
make up the balance.
Yet next to a greater emphasis on values, the
changes in the composition of purposes that took
place in the 1990s brought a long-standing yet often
overlooked function of INGOs to the forefront: service
delivery has become a visible and important part of
INGOs. Indeed, the provision of social services as a
purpose grew by 79 per cent between 1990 and 2000,
15
Figure 1.4: Links between international organisations
Founded: The INGO cites another organisation as having had some role in its founding or establishment
Members: There is a membership link betwen the INGO and another organisation, for instance because one of them is a federation of
organisations, or coordinating body of which the other is a member.
Activities: The INGO cites another organisation as having a role in its activities, for instance joint activities, or activities aimed at the cited
organisation.
Founded
Members
Activities
1991
2002
1991
2002
1991
2002
2,710 Citations
4,957 Citations
4,834 Citations
13,061 Citations
1,754 Citations
2,595 Citations
GCS2003 pages [01] 6/01 7/10/03 1:49 pm Page 15
health services by 50 per cent, and education by 24
per cent. This function of INGOs is primarily connected
to the public management manifestation of
global civil society, which we outlined above.
Although INGOs provide only a partial picture of
global civil society, INGO data show that the
infrastructure of global civil society has expanded
significantly since 1990, in terms of both scale and
connectedness. We also saw that the relative focus
on these organisations, taken together, shifted more
towards value-based activities and service provision.
Overall, the expansion of INGOs and the valueactivity
shift imply both quantitative and qualitative
changes in the contour and role of global civil
society organisations. Throwing some light on these
changes will be the task in the next section, where
we examine the relationship between value changes
in Western societies from the 1970s onwards, the
link to transnationalism, and the rise of civil society
in the 1990s.
Values and global civil society
Social, cultural, and political values show significant
variation within and across countries and cultures, but
the resulting value patterns are relatively stable over
time, and typically change more between than within
generations (Inglehart 1990). Shifts in basic value
pattern are relatively rare, and if they happen they are
full of consequences and carry many implications--
from social and economic behaviour to politics and
the institutions of society at large. However, one
such value shift took place in many OECD countries
between 1970 and the late 1980s, as social scientists
such as Inglehart and Baker (2000), Abramson and
Inglehart (1995), Klingemann and Fuchs (1995), Van
Deth, and Scarbrough (1995), and others have shown.
Researchers have used several different labels to
describe this value shift, and the precise extent and
sustainability of the changes involved continues to
be debated among experts in the field. While there
are many sociological correlates to this value shift and
its causation, it is associated with the rise of
cosmopolitan values, a preference for democratic
forms of governance, and an appreciation of cultural
diversity (Inglehart 1990; Van Deth and Scarbrough
1995). In other words, cosmopolitan values such as
tolerance, respect for others, emphasis on human
rights, and so on have become increasingly important.
Table 1.3 demonstrates the consistent and significant
increase of the cosmopolitan value `Tolerance
and respect for others as a quality in children', based
16
Figure 1.5: Growth in number of INGOs by purpose, 1990-2000
10,000
8,000
4,000
2,000
0
6,000
1990
2000
Purpose
Source: UIA (1999; 2000)
GCS2003 pages [01] 6/01 7/10/03 1:49 pm Page 16
on data from the European and World Value Surveys.
In all of the 20 countries included for which such data
are available across the three waves (1981, 1990, and
2000), `tolerance and respect for others' becomes a
more frequently cited core value; and with very few
exceptions this increase took place in the 1980s, with
a levelling off in the 1990s at fairly high levels. Across
the countries listed in Table 1.3, responses stating
that tolerance and respect for others are qualities
to be encouraged in children increased from 48 per
cent to 75 per cent in the 1980s, and to 78 per cent
in the following decade.
This shift in values goes beyond the traditional
left-right cleavage in politics. Instead, beginning
in the 1960s and more forcefully and widely in the
1970s, many people began to engage in new forms
of political activities and to participate in social
movements, in particular the women's, environmental,
and peace movements. The new social
movements provide the institutional connection
between the shift in values and the growth of global
civil society. These new movements emerged in
developed countries from the 1960s onwards: the
civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movement of the
1960s, the environmental movement, the women's
movement of the 1970s, the peace movement and
human rights movement of the 1980, and the antiglobalisation
movements of the 1990s, are all closely
related to the value shift identified by Inglehart,
van Deth, and others. Chapter 6 discusses a crucial
global achievement resulting from this value shift:
the insertion of language defining violence against
women into various international legal instruments.
Importantly, the value set connected with the
new social movements had from the beginning a
transnational element, and particularly so in Europe
(environment, peace, women), Latin America (human
rights), and Australia (indigenous rights), but less so
in the United States, where the value shift and the
changes in social structures could more easily be
linked to a renewal of some form of domestic
Tocquevillian democracy or the American Way of
Life (Anheier 2004; see Edwards, Foley, and Diani
2001; Siriani and Friedland 2000). In Europe, by
contrast, the value shift coincided with the
development of the European project (from the
Common Market to the European Community to
the European Union) as the next step in a
modernisation process that points to a more
peaceful and prosperous future and that necessitates
the evolution of nation-states and national societies
into a framework of European cooperation and
integration.
We have not yet been able to observe how far the
rise of regressive globalism, as for example in the
case of religious and nationalist militant groups
described in Chapter 7, may reverse this value shift.
Nor can we assess whether the renewed mobilisation
of global civil society will be able to sustain the trend
towards cosmopolitan values. The rise of antiimmigrant
parties and the entry of `tough' language
on asylum-seekers and integration in Europe and
Australia, the pursuit of an `America first' policy by
the US Administration, and the rise of communal
politics in many other parts of the world suggest
that `anti-cosmopolitan' values may now be in the
ascendant. In these circumstances, it is of particular
importance to safeguard and strengthen the legal
17
Country 1981 1990 2000
Argentina 44 78 70
Belgium 45 67 84
Canada 53 80 82
Denmark 58 81 87
France 59 78 84
Germany 42 76 73
Hungary 31 62 65
Iceland 58 93 84
Ireland 56 76 75
Italy 43 67 75
Japan 41 60 71
Mexico 39 64 72
Netherlands 57 87 90
Norway 32 64 66
South Africa 53 59 74
South Korea 25 55 65
Spain 44 73 82
Sweden 71 91 93
United Kingdom 62 80 83
United States 52 72 80
Average 48 73 78
Source: European Values Surveys (2003); and World Values
Survey Study Group (1999­2000; 2003)
Table 1.3:Tolerance seen as core quality in
children, in percent of respondents
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