C H A P T E R 2
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY?
John Keane
A New Cosmology
A
ll human orders, hunting and gathering societies
included, have lived off shared images of the
cosmos, world-views that served to plant the
feet of their members firmly in space and time. Yet
very few have fantasised the linking of the five
oceans, six continents, and peoples of our little blue
planet wrapped in white vapour. Each of these worldviews
in the strict sense emerged only after the
military defeats suffered by Islam, in modern Europe.
They included the forceful global acquisition of
territory, resources, and subjects in the name of
empire; the efforts of Christendom to piggyback on
imperial ventures for the purpose of bringing spiritual
salvation to the whole world; and the will to unify the
world through the totalitarian violence of fascism and
Marxism-Leninism. Each of these globalising projects
left indelible marks on the lives of the world's peoples,
their institutions and ecosystems, but each also failed
to accomplish its mission. In our times, against the
backdrop of those failures, the image of ourselves as
involved in another great human adventure, one
carried out on a global scale, is again on the rise. A
new world-view, radically different from any that
has existed before, has been born and is currently
enjoying a growth spurt: it is called `global civil
society'.
These unfamiliar words `global civil society'--a
neologism of the last decade-- are fast becoming
fashionable. They were born at the confluence of
three overlapping streams of concern among publicly
minded intellectuals at the end of the 1980s: the
revival of the old language of civil society, especially
in central-eastern Europe, after the military crushing
of the Prague Spring in 1968; the new awareness,
stimulated by the peace and ecological movements,
of ourselves as members of a fragile and potentially
self-destructive world system; and the widespread
perception that the implosion of Soviet-type
communist systems implied a new global order.1
Since that time, talk of global civil society has become
popular among citizens' campaigners, bankers,
diplomats, non-governmental organisations, and
politicians--the term even peppered the speeches of
former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright
(2000)--to the point where the words themselves are
as fickle as they are fashionable. The phrase `global
civil society' must certainly be used with caution.
Like all other vocabularies with a political edge, its
meaning is neither self-evident nor unprejudiced.
When used carefully as an ideal type, which can in
turn be wielded for purposes of descriptive
interpretation, or political calculation, or normative
judgement,2 global civil society refers to the
contemporary thickening and stretching of networks
of socio-economic institutions across borders to all
four corners of the earth, such that the peaceful or
`civil' effects of these non- governmental networks
are felt everywhere, here and there, far and wide, to
and from local areas, through wider regions to the
planetary level itself.
Global civil society is a vast, interconnected, and
multi-layered social space that comprises many
hundreds of thousands of self-directing or nongovernmental
institutions and ways of life. It can
be likened--to draw for a moment upon ecological
similes--to a dynamic biosphere. This complex
biosphere looks and feels expansive and polyarchic,
full of horizontal push and pull, vertical conflict,
and compromise, precisely because it comprises a
bewildering variety of interacting habitats and
species: organisations, civic and business initiatives,
coalitions, social movements, linguistic communities,
and cultural identities. All of them have at least one
thing in common: across vast geographic distances
and despite barriers of time, they deliberately
23
1 Among the earliest expressions of these concerns is the theory of
a `world civic culture' in Boulding (1988); the idea of `global
civilization' in the working paper by Richard Falk (1990); the
theory of the `internationalisation' of civil society and the terms
`cosmopolitan civil society' and `global' or `transnational' civil
society in Keane (1989; 1991: 135) and Ougaard (1990). Among
the first efforts to draw together this early work is Lipschutz
(1992: 389­420).
2 The importance of distinguishing among these different usages is
analysed in more detail in my introduction to Keane (1988[1998];
1998).
organise themselves and conduct their cross-border
social activities, business, and politics outside the
boundaries of governmental structures, with a
minimum of violence and a maximum of respect for
the principle of civilised power-sharing among
different ways of life.
To liken global civil society to a vast biosphere
that stretches to every corner of the earth is to
underscore both its great complexity and, as we shall
see, its vulnerability to internal and external
interference. Just as nearly every part of the earth,
from the highest mountains to the deepest seas,
supports life, so too global civil society is now found
on virtually every part of the earth's surface. To be
sure, everywhere it is tissue-thin, just like the natural
biosphere, which resembles a paper wrapping that
covers a sphere the size of a football; and its fringes,
where ice and permafrost predominate, are virtually
uninhabited. In the interior of the Antarctic, only
restricted populations of bacteria and insects are to
be found; and even on its coasts there are very few
living inhabitants. Global civil society is similarly
subject to geographic limits: whole zones of the
earth--parts of contemporary Afghanistan, Burma,
Chechnya, and Sierra Leone, for instance--are no-go
areas for civil society, which can survive only by
going underground. But in those areas of the earth
where it does exist, global civil society comprises
many biomes: whole areas, like North America and
the European Union, characterised by specific animals
and plants and climatic conditions. Each biome in
turn comprises large numbers of living ecosystems
made up of clusters of organisms living within a nonliving
physical environment of rocks, soil, and climate.
These ecosystems of global civil society--cities,
business corridors, and regions, for instance--are
interconnected. And they are more or less intricately
balanced through continuous flows and recycling of
efforts among, as it were, populations of individuals
of the same species, which thrive within communities,
such as smaller cities, that are themselves embedded
within non-living geographic contexts.
Biospheric similes are helpful in picturing the
contours of global civil society, but they should not
be overextended, if only because global civil society
is not simply a naturally occurring phenomenon.
Although it is naturally embedded within a terrestrial
biosphere, global civil society is an ensemble of more
or less tightly interlinked biomes that are in fact
social processes. The populations, communities,
and ecosystems of global civil society comprise
flesh and blood, symbol-using individuals, households,
profit-seeking businesses, not-for-profit nongovernmental
organisations, coalitions, social
movements, and cultural-religious groups. Its biomes
feed upon the work of charities, lobby groups,
citizens' protests, small and large corporate firms,
independent media, trade unions, and sporting
organisations: bodies like Amnesty International,
Sony, the Catholic Relief Services, the Federation of
International Football Associations, Transparency
International, the International Red Cross, the Ford
Foundation, News Corporation International, and
the Indigenous Peoples Bio-Diversity Network. Such
bodies lobby states, bargain with international
organisations, pressure and bounce off other nonstate
bodies, invest in new forms of production,
champion different ways of life, and engage in direct
action in distant local communities: for instance,
through `capacity-building' programmes that supply
jobs, clean running water, sporting facilities,
hospitals, and schools. In these various ways, the
members of global civil society help to conserve or
to alter the power relations embedded in the chains
of interaction linking the local, regional, and
planetary orders. Their cross-border networks help to
define and redefine who gets what, when, and how
in the world. Of great importance is the fact that
these networks have the power to shape new
identities, even to stimulate awareness among the
world's inhabitants that mutual understanding of
different ways of life is a practical necessity, that we
are being drawn into the first genuinely transnational
order, a global civil society.
Defined in this way, the ideal-type concept of
global civil society invites us to improve our
understanding of the emerging planetary order, to
think more deeply about it, in the hope that we can
strengthen our collective powers of guiding and
transforming it. This clearly requires sharpening up
our courage to confront the unknown and to imagine
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
24
Global civil society is a vast,
interconnected, and multi-layered social
space that comprises many hundreds of
thousands of self-directing or nongovernmental
institutions and ways of
life.
different futures.3 And it most
definitely obliges us to abandon
some old certainties and prejudices
grounded in the past. The words
`global civil society' may be said to
resemble signs that fix our thoughts
on winding pathways that stretch
not only in front of us but also
behind us. To utter the words `global
civil society', for instance, is to sup
with the dead, with an early
modern world in which, among the
educated classes of Europe, `world
civil society' meant something quite
different than what it means, or
ought to mean, today. Just how
different our times are can be seen by dwelling for
a moment on this older, exhausted meaning of `world
civil society'.
Consider the works of two influential authors of
the eighteenth century: Emmerich de Vattel's Le droit
des gens (1758) and Immanuel Kant's Idee zu einer
allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht
(1784) and Zum ewigen Frieden (1795).4 These books
stand at the end phase of a long cycle of European
thinking which understands civil society (societas
civilis) as the condition of living within an armed
legal order that guarantees its subjects stable peace
and good government. `A State is more or less perfect
according as it is more or less adapted to attain the
end of civil society', wrote de Vattel, for whom the
distinction between state and civil society was literally
unthinkable. A civil society is a special form of
government. It `consists in procuring for its citizens
the necessities, the comforts, and the pleasures of life,
and in general their happiness; and in securing to
each the peaceful enjoyment of his property and a
sure means of obtaining justice, and finally in
defending the whole body against all external
violence' (de Vattel 1758: Ch. 1, section 6). Kant
joined him in making it clear that civil society in this
normative sense was not necessarily synonymous
with the modern territorial state and its legal codes
(ius civile). Their classically-minded theory of civil
society emphasised that war- mongering among
states and what Kant called the `unsocial sociability'
of subjects could be cured by subordinating them
within a cosmopolitan alliance of states that is
overridden and protected by its own legal codes. De
Vattel insisted that states are obliged to respect and
to protect what he called the universal society of
the human race. `When . . . men unite
in civil society and form a separate
State or Nation . . . their duties
towards the rest of the human race
remain unchanged' (1758: Ch. 1,
section 11). Kant went further. He
envisaged a `law of world citizenship'
(ius cosmopoliticum) which binds
citizens and states into a higher
republican commonwealth of states.
This commonwealth, which resembles
not a peace treaty (pactum pacis)
but a league of peace (foedus pacificum),
would put an end to violence
for ever by treating its subjects as
citizens of a new law-governed
political union. This union he called `universal civil
society' (einer allgemein das Recht verwaltenden
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft) (1784: fifth thesis).
The subsequent birth of modern colonial empires,
the rise of nationalism from the time of the French
Revolution, and the near-triumph of a global
system of sovereign territorial states arguably
confounded this eighteenth-century vision of global
government or a world civil society. Two centuries
later, the concept of `international society', familiar
in the work of scholars like Hedley Bull and Martin
Wight, tried both to register this historical change
and to preserve something of the old-fashioned
meaning of societas civilis. The global system of
interlocking territorial states was said not to resemble
Hobbes' classic description of a lawless state of nature
racked by deathly strivings after power over others.
Territorial states were rather seen by Bull and others
as socialised by the behaviour of other states. They
were linked into `the most comprehensive form of
society on earth', an increasingly global framework
of mutually recognised, informal customs, and formal
rules: diplomatic protocol, embassy functions,
multilateral treaties, and laws governing matters as
diverse as trade and commerce, war crimes, and the
right of non-interference (Bull and Holbraad 1978:
106). These state-enforced customs and rules that
limit sovereignty by respecting it came to be called
`international society', a state-centred term that
Hedley Bull considered to be a basic precondition of
contemporary world order. International society, he
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
25
These networks
have the power to
shape new identities,
even to stimulate
awareness among the
world's inhabitants
that mutual
understanding of
different ways of
life is a practical
necessity
3 A stimulating example of such rethinking that is guided by the
idea of a global civil society is Edwards (2000).
4 The emergence of the distinction between civil society and
governmental/state institutions is examined in Keane (1988
[1999]).
wrote, `exists when a group of states, conscious of
certain common interests and common values, form
a society in the sense that they conceive themselves
to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working
of common institutions' (Bull 1995: 13; see also Bull
1990).
Contours
T
he terms `world civil society' and `international
society' still have their champions,5 but from
the standpoint of the new concept of global
civil society their `governmentality' or state-centredness
are today deeply problematic. Neither the
classical term societas civilis nor the
state-centric concept of `international
society' is capable of grasping the
latter-day emergence of a nongovernmental
sphere that is called
`global civil society'. These words,
`global civil society', may well sound
old-fashioned, but today they have an
entirely new meaning and political
significance. This is why the quest to
map and measure the contours of
global civil society is essential for
clarifying both its possible conceptual
meanings, its empirical scope and
complexity, and its political potential.
The principle is clear--theories
without observations are bland, observations without
theories are blind--but the task is difficult. Some
sketchy data are available thanks to the pathbreaking
contributions of bodies like the Union of
International Associations, the Index on Civil Society
project supported by CIVICUS (World Alliance for
Citizen Participation), the Ford Foundation-funded
comparative study of civil society in 22 countries,
and this Global Civil Society Yearbook. These efforts
confirm the widespread impression that, during the
past century, the world has witnessed a tectonic--two
hundred-fold--increase in the number and variety
of civil society organisations operating at the
planetary level.6 Today, in addition to many hundreds
of thousands of small, medium, and large firms doing
business across borders, there are some 40,000 nongovernmental,
not-for-profit organisations operating
at the global level; these international non-governmental
organisations (INGOs) currently disburse more
money than the United Nations (excluding the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund); while
more than two-thirds of the European Union's relief
aid is currently channelled through them.
The actual contours of global civil society
nevertheless remain elusive, for understandable
reasons. Histories of the globalisation of civil society--
studies of the rise of cross-border business, religion,
and sport, for instance--are in short supply.7 Most
data are nation-based and systems of national
accounting provide few detailed statistics on the
economic contribution of corporations with a global
reach (see Chapter 1). Researchers also disagree about
which criteria--book translations, diasporas, links
among global cities, the spread of the English
language, telephone traffic, geographic locations of
Web-sites, the mobility patterns of
corporate nomads--are the most
pertinent for picturing the networked
character of the emerging global
society. In-depth, qualitative accounts
of global summits, forums, and other
eye-catching events like the global
campaign against landmines and
public protests against the G7 powers
are also rare. And studies of the
intimate details of everyday life,
especially research that concentrates
on the civilising and socialising effects
at the global level of matters like food
consumption and television newswatching,
are virtually non-existent.
These empirical and technical barriers to mapping
and measuring global civil society are compounded
by a basic epistemological difficulty. Simply put, its
actors are not mute, empirical bits and bytes of data.
Linked to territories but not restricted to territory,
caught up in a vast variety of overlapping and
interlocking institutions, these actors talk, think,
interpret, question, negotiate, comply, innovate, resist.
Dynamism is a chronic feature of global civil society:
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
26
The terms `world civil
society' and
`international society'
still have their
champions, but their
state-centredness is
today deeply
problematic . . .
5 Examples include Ralf Dahrendorf's stimulating neo-Kantian
defence of a universal civil society in Dahrendorf (1988: 189):
`The next step towards a World Civil Society is the recognition of
universal rights of all men and women by the creation of a body
of international law.' Compare the argument that a `mature
anarchy' among states is a precondition of a strong
`international society' in Buzan (1991: 174­81).
6 See the data covering the period 1909­97 presented in the Union
of International Associations (1997-98: Vol. 4, 559); compare
Risse-Kappen (1995), Matthews (1997: 50­66); and the
misleadingly titled, country-by-country study by Lester M.
Salamon et al. (1999).
7 But on these topics see Hobsbawm (1989), Beeching (1979), and
Maguire (1999).
not the dynamism of the restless sea--a naturalistic
simile suggested by Victor Pérez-Diaz (1993)8--but a
form of self-reflexive dynamism marked by
innovation, conflict, compromise, consensus, as well
as rising awareness of the contingencies and
dilemmas of global civil society itself. This civil society
enables its participants--athletes, campaigners,
musicians, religious believers, managers, aid-workers,
medics, scientists, journalists, academics--to see
through global civil society by calling it both our
world and (more impersonally) this world. For this
reason alone, those who speak of global civil society
should not lose sight of its elusive, idealtypisch
quality. The concept of global civil society has what
Wittgenstein called `blurred edges'. It is an ill-fitting
term clumsily in search of an intelligent object that
is always a subject on the run, striding unevenly in
many different directions.
Sustained and deeper reflection on the subject,
and a willingness to puncture old thinking habits,
are definitely warranted. An example is the
need to question the current tendency to
speak of civil societies as `national'
phenomena and, thus, to suppose that global
civil society and domestic civil societies are
binary opposites. In fact, so-called domestic
civil societies and the emerging global civil
society are normally linked together in
complex, cross-border patterns of looped and relooped
circuitry; or, to switch to similes drawn from
the field of physics, the domestic and the global are
marked by strong interactions of the kind that hold
together the protons and neutrons inside an atomic
nucleus. The use of ecological similes earlier in this
essay may be questionable, but it serves the basic
purpose of identifying the urgent need to develop
theoretical imagery for better imagining global civil
society, as it is and as it might become.
The rule of thumb, both in the past and in the
present, is that the liveliest local civil societies are
those enjoying the strongest links with the global
civil society. So, in practice, the development of
modern civil societies within the framework of
European states and empires contained from the
outset the seeds of their own transnationalisation. The
roots of local civil societies are partly traceable to the
revival of towns in Europe during the eleventh
century, a revival that marked the beginning of the
continent's rise to world eminence--and its laying of
the foundations of a global civil society.9 Although
the distribution of these European towns--unusual
clumps of people engaged in many different tasks,
living in houses close together, often joined wall to
wall--was highly uneven, with the weakest patterns
of urbanisation in Russia and the strongest in Holland,
they were typically linked to each other in networks
or archipelagos stretching across vast distances.
Wherever these urban archipelagos thrived, they
functioned like magnets that attracted strangers
fascinated by their well-lit complexity, their real or
imagined freedom, or their higher wages. Towns like
Bruges, Genoa, Nuremberg, and London resembled
electric transformers. They constantly recharged life
by adding not only motion but also tension to its
elements. Town-dwellers seemed to be perpetually on
the move. The constant rumble of wheeled carriages,
the weekly or daily markets, and the numerous
trades--floor polishers, pedlars, sawyers, chaircarriers--added
to the sense of motion across
distance. All these occupations rubbed shoulders with
members of the better sort: merchants, some of them
very rich, masters, mercenaries, engineers, ships'
captains, doctors, professors, painters, architects, all
of whom knew what it meant to travel through time
and space.
The winding, twisting layout of towns added to
their appearance of geographic and social dynamism.
Medieval Europe was one of only two civilisations--
the other was Islam--that fashioned large towns with
an irregular maze of streets. What was different
about the medieval and early modern European
towns was their unparalleled freedom from the
political authorities of the emerging territorial states.
Local merchants, traders, craft guilds, manufacturers,
and bankers formed the backbone of a long-distance
money economy endowed with the power to dictate
the terms and conditions on which governments
ruled. Seen in this way, urban markets were the
cuckoo's egg laid in the little nests of the medieval
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
27
. . . Neither is capable of grasping
the latter-day emergence of a non-governmental
sphere that is called global civil society.
8 Compare my remarks on the self-reflexivity of actually existing
civil societies in Keane (1998: 49ff.).
9 The section that follows draws upon Braudel (1981: Ch. 8). The
urban origins of civil society are explored more fully in my work in
preparation, Global Civil Society?
towns. These nests were woven from various nongovernmental
institutions, which together with the
markets helped to nurture something brand new:
unbounded social space within which the
absolutist state could be checked, criticised, and
generally held at arm's length from citizens.
The birth of civil societies in this sense heralded the
dawn of universal history marked by the constant
reciprocal interaction between local and far-distant
events (Aron 1978: 212­23). So it can be said that the
eighteenth-century vision of cosmopolitanism
defended by Vattel, Kant, and others was a child of
local civil societies; and that cosmopolitanism was the
privilege of those whose lives were already anchored
in local civil societies. The other-regarding, outwardlooking
openness of these societies--their glimpse
of themselves as part of a wider, complex world--
constantly tempted them to engage that enlarged
world. True, this worldliness, helped along by the
superior naval power, deep-rooted pugnacity, and
comparative immunity to disease that had earlier
facilitated the rise of the West from around 1500
onwards often triumphed in violent, uncivilised form.
Among its landmarks, which now appear barbaric by
today's standards of civility, are the ruthless
aggression of Almeida and Albuquerque in the Indian
Ocean, the destruction of the Amerindian civilisations
of Peru and Mexico, and the generalised hostility
towards peoples as diverse as Muslim traders in the
Mediterranean basin and aboriginal hunters and
gatherers in such countries as Australia and Canada
(McNeill 1963: Ch. 11). And yet--the birth and
maturation of global civil society has been riddled
with ironies--the worldliness of early modern civil
societies undoubtedly laid the foundations for their
later globalisation. An example is the colonising
process triggered by the British Empire, which at its
height governed nearly one-third of the world's
population. Unlike the Spanish colonies, which were
the product of absolute monarchy, the British Empire
was driven not only by maritime-backed colonial
power but also non-state initiatives, either for profit
(as in the Virginia Company and the East India
Company) or for religious ends, evident in extensive
Christian missionary activity and the emigration of
dissenters: Puritans to New England, Quakers to
Pennsylvania, Methodists to Australia, and Presbyterians
to Canada.
Overdeterminations
T
he neologism `global civil society' belatedly
names this old tendency of local and regional
civil societies to link up and to penetrate regions
of the earth that had previously not known the ethics
and structures of civil society in the modern European
sense. But the neologism points as well to current
developments that speed up the growth, and greatly
`thicken', the networks of transnational, nongovernmental
activities. What drives this globalisation
of civil society? Its activist champions and their
intellectual supporters sometimes pinpoint the power
of autonomous moral choice. Treading in Gramsci's
footsteps, usually without knowing it, they define
global civil society as the space of social interaction
`located between the family, the state and the market
and operating beyond the confines of national
societies, polities, and economies' (Chapter 1, p.17).
That leads them to speak, rather romantically, of
global civil society as a realm of actual or potential
freedom, as a `third sector' opposed to the impersonal
power of government and the greedy profiteering of
the market (households typically disappear from the
analysis at this point). `Civil society participates
alongside--not replaces--state and market institutions',
write Naidoo and Tandon. Global civil society
`is the network of autonomous associations that
rights-bearing and responsibility-laden citizens
voluntarily create to address common problems,
advance shared interests and promote collective
aspirations' (1999: 6­7).10 Such purist images reduce
actually existing global civil society to campaign
strategies harnessed to the normative ideal of
citizens' autonomy at the global level. That in turn
creates the unfortunate impression that global civil
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
28
The other-regarding, outward-looking openness of these societies--their
glimpse of themselves as part of a wider, complex world --constantly tempted them to engage
that enlarged world
10 The more recent campaign writings of Kumi Naidoo develop less
romantic and more sophisticated images of global civil society,
which, however, continues to be understood as the space
wedged between global market forces and various forms of
government (see for example Naidoo 2000: 34­6).
society is a (potentially) unified subject, a `third
force',11 something like a world proletariat in civvies,
the universal object-subject that can snap its chains
and translate the idea of a `World Alliance for Citizen
Participation' (Tandon 1999: 5) into reality, therewith
righting the world's wrongs.
Although many things can be said for and against
these conceptions, it is worth noting here that their
Gramscian bias, which draws a thick line between (bad)
business backed by government and (good) voluntary
associations, leads them to understate the overdetermined
character of global civil society. `Solidarity
and compassion for the fate and well-being of others,
including unknown, distant others, a sense of personal
responsibility and reliance on one's own initiative to do
the right thing; the impulse toward altruistic giving
and sharing; the refusal of inequality, violence, and
oppression' (de Oliveira and Tandon 1994: 2­3)12 are
undoubtedly significant, even indispensable motives in
the globalisation of civil society. But one-sided emphasis
on the free civic choices of men and women has the
effect of obscuring other planetary forces that currently
constrain and enable their actions.
Turbo-capitalism
T
urbo-capitalism is undoubtedly among the
principal energisers of global civil society.13 To
understand why this is so, and what the term
`turbo-capitalism' means, a brief comparison needs to
be made with the system of Keynesian welfare state
capitalism that predominated in the West after World
War II. For some three decades, market capitalist
economies like the United States, Sweden, Japan, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and Britain moved in the
direction of government-controlled capitalism. In terms
of the production of goods and services, firms, plants,
and whole industries were very much national
phenomena; facilitated by international trade of raw
materials and foodstuffs, production was primarily
organised within territorially-bound national economies
or parts of them. Markets were embedded in webs of
government (Hobsbawm 1979: 313). In the era of turbocapitalism,
by contrast, markets tend to become
disembedded. Turbo-capitalism is a species of private
enterprise driven by the desire for emancipation from
taxation restrictions, trade union intransigence,
government interference, and all other external
restrictions upon the free movement of capital in search
of profit. Turbo-capitalism has strongly deregulatory
effects, and on a global scale. The transnational
operations of some 300 pace-setting firms in industries
such as banking, accountancy, automobiles, airlines,
communications, and armaments--their combined
assets make up roughly a quarter of the world's
productive assets--no longer function as production
and delivery operations for national headquarters
(Barnet and Cavanagh 1995: 15). Bursting the bounds
of time and space, language and custom, they instead
function as complex global flows or integrated
networks of staff, money, information, raw
materials, components, and products.14
Admittedly, the degree to which turbo-capitalist
firms operate globally, like border-busting
juggernauts, should not be exaggerated. Turbocapitalism
has a marked geographic bias. Its home base
frequently lies within the OECD countries, and the
capital, technology, and trade flows that it effects
tend to be concentrated, for the time being, within
rather than among the European, Asian-Pacific, and
NAFTA/Latin American regions.15 Only one of the top
100 transnational corporations has its headquarters
outside the OECD, and nearly 60 per cent of world
trade is between high income countries (see Tables R3
and R2 in part IV of this Yearbook) Yet, wherever the
turbo-capitalist economy gains the upper hand, it has
definite globalising effects. It leads to sharp increases
in profit-driven joint ventures and co-production,
licensing and sub-contracting agreements among local,
regional, and global firms. For the first time ever, modern
capitalist firms have unlimited grazing rights. Helped
along by trade and investment liberalisation and radical
improvements in transportation and communication
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
29
11 The temptation to see global civil society in this way is evident in
the introduction to Florini (2000: 1­15).
12 Similar views are defended in Korten (1990) and in Habermas
(1996: Ch. 8). The chief theoretical limitations of the (neo-)
Gramscian approach are analysed in my forthcoming Global Civil
Society? and in Keane (1998: 15­19).
13 The term `turbo-capitalism' is drawn from Luttwak (1999). It will
be seen that my substantive account of the impact of the
process differs considerably from that of Luttwak.
14 By 1997 there were some 53,000 transnational corporations
with 450,000 foreign subsidiaries operating worldwide. They
spanned the world's principal economic regions in virtually
every sector, from finance, raw materials, and agriculture to
manufacturing and services. Selling goods and services to the
value of some US$9.5 trillion in 1997, these transnational
enterprises accounted for 70 per cent of world trade and around
20 per cent of the world's overall production. Some relevant
data are usefully summarised in Held and McGrew (2000: 25).
(See Table R3 in part IV of this Yearbook)
15 Compare Hirst and Thompson (1999) and Mittelman (2000:
20­1).
technologies, they can do business anywhere in the
world. The exceptions--North Korea, Afghanistan, Sierra
Leone--prove the rule, especially since the collapse of
the Soviet Empire and the beginning of the Chinese
experiment with state-engineered market reforms.
Some economists describe this trend in terms of the
historic development of global commodity chains:
geographically dispersed yet transactionally linked
sequences of functions in which each phase adds market
value to the overall worldwide process of production of
goods or services (Gereffi 1996: 427­39; Gereffi and
Korzeniewicz 1994: Ch. 5).
When Adam Smith
famously analysed the
`division of labour'
within the emerging
civil societies of the
Atlantic region, his
references to the specialisation
of workers
within different parts
of the production process
had no specific
geographic connotations.
He could suppose
that industries
and services of all kinds
enjoyed a `natural protection'
from foreign
competition thanks to the vagaries of geographical
distance. That supposition continued to be plausible
even during the vigorous growth spurt of international
economic integration before World War I and until two
decades ago, when shallow integration (Dicken 2000:
5)--arm's length trade in goods and services among
independent firms and through international movements
of capital--was the norm. The system of turbocapitalism,
by contrast, draws everybody and everything
within its wake into processes of deep integration,
which extend from visible and invisible trading to the
production of goods and services by means of globally
connected commodity chains organised by transnational
corporations.
These processes of deep integration are highly
complex and uneven. Turbo-capitalism has unleashed
globalising forces but this has not yet resulted in a
fully globalised world economy. Turbo-capitalism
does not lead to a `global marketplace', let alone a
`global village'. Its effects are variable, ranging from
very weak or non- existent forms of integration to
very strong or full integration. At one end of the
continuum stand whole peoples and regions who are
routinely ignored by the dynamics of turbocapitalism.
Some parts of sub-Saharan Africa fall
into this category; such areas, victims of `capitalist
apartheid'--a term used by the Peruvian economist
Hernando de Soto16--suffer the consequences of
organised neglect by turbo-capitalist investors.
Elsewhere, further along the continuum, straightforward
exchange across vast distances between
wealthy core and poorer peripheral areas--for
instance, the exporting of granite mined in Zimbabwe
to the kitchens and bathrooms of western Europe--
is the norm. Then, at the opposite end of the
continuum, there are sectors of economic life, like the
highly unstable, twenty-four-hour financial speculation
conducted in cities like New York, London, and
Tokyo, in which the whole earth is a playground for
turbo-capital.
Within the industrial and service sectors of global
civil society, turbo-capitalism also slices through
territorial and time barriers by bringing about highly
complex forms of market integration involving the
fragmentation of production processes and their
geographical relocation and functional reintegration
on a global scale. In accordance with what can be
called the Low Cost and Safety Principle, turbocapitalist
firms globalise production by transferring
sophisticated state-of-the-art production methods to
countries where wages are extremely low. A number
of poorer countries, Mexico and China among them,
are consequently now equipped with the infrastructural
means of housing any service or industrial
operation, whether airline ticket and holiday
telephone sales or capital-intensive, high-tech
production of commodities like computers and
automobiles. Such trade and investment within firms
also leads to the formation of a global labour pool.17
When businesses develop globally interconnected
chains of investment, resources and finished products
and services workers based in richer countries like
Germany and France are effectively forced to
compete with workers living in places--China,
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea--where wages are
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
30
16 De Soto (2000) argues that some five-sixths of humanity has
been denied the economic fruits of globalisation.
17 Estimates are that about a third of world trade is now taken up
by trade between one part of a global firm and its other
affiliates, and the proportion is growing. Such `self-trading',
oiled by so-called transfer pricing, is strongly evident in the
operations of firms like General Electric, which like many other
firms operating across the Mexican-US border ships machinery
components to its own subsidiary in Nuevo Laredo.
The Gramscian bias of
the activists and their
intellectual supporters
draws a thick line
between (bad) business
backed by government
and (good) voluntary
associations . . .
low and social entitlements of workers are either
poorly protected or non-existent.18
Market Contradictions
T
he striking social discrepancies produced by
market processes within global civil society have
led some observers--Sakamoto Yoshikazu, for
instance (2000: 98­116)--to question whether market
forces with such destructive consequences properly
belong within the category of global civil society.
Yoshikazu's query is important, if only because it
exemplifies the strong tendency within the existing
academic literature on global civil society to draw
upon the deeply problematic, originally Gramscian
distinction between civil society--the realm of nonprofit,
non-governmental organisations--and the
market-- the sphere of profit-making and profit-taking
commodity production and exchange. Yoshikazu,
treading Gramsci's path, mistakenly conflates the
different possible usages-- empirical interpretation,
strategic calculation, normative judgement--of the
concept of global civil society. On that basis, his understandably
strong dislike of the socially negative
(disruptive or outright destructive) effects of market
forces within actually existing civil societies moves
him to banish the market altogether from the concept
of global civil society. The reasoning secretly draws
upon the distinction between `is' and `ought' in order
to defend the latter against the former. The term
global civil society is thereby turned into a normative
utopia. Ethically speaking, it becomes a `pure' concept:
an unadulterated `good', like a sparkling coveted
diamond that all would want to prize, especially if
offered it on a soft velvet cushion of fine words.
Yoshikazu's normative reasoning is tempting--who
but curmudgeons, ideologists, and crooks could be
ethically opposed to civil society in his sense?--but it
should be rejected, for three reasons. Normatively
speaking, it implies that global civil society could in
future survive without money or monetary exchanges,
rather as nineteenth- century and early-twentiethcentury
communists disastrously imagined that future
communist society would be bound together by such
attributes as love, hard work, and mutuality. In matters
of strategy, the purist concept of global civil society
fares no better. If the aim is to create and/or to
strengthen global civil society by displacing market
forces, then anything related to the market--money,
jobs, workers, trade unions-- cannot by definition be
of much use in struggles to achieve that civilising
goal. Otherwise, the means--the commodification of
social relations--would corrupt and potentially
overpower the envisaged end: the humanisation of
social relations. It seems, unrealistically, that global
civil society will be possible only if people behave as
good people. Work, trade unions, corporate philanthropy,
small businesses, advanced technologies
supplied by transnational firms: none of this (it is
supposed) could or should play a part in the struggle
to expand and thicken the cross-border social networks
that comprise global civil society.
Finally, there is a strong empirical objection
to the attempt to
separate markets from
global civil society.
The dualism between
market and global civil
society wielded by
Yoshikazu and others
is a phantom, a bad
abstraction, for in
reality markets are
always a particular
form of socially and
politically mediated
interaction structured
by money, production,
exchange, and consumption.
Global civil
society as we know and experience it today could not
survive for a day without the market forces unleashed
by turbo-capitalism. The converse rule also applies:
the market forces of turbo-capitalism could not last
a day without other global civil society institutions,
like households, community associations, regions,
and linguistically shared social norms like friendship,
trust, and non-violent cooperation.
To emphasise that market activity is always socially
embedded runs counter to the view of those who
warn that `global capital' is a profits-hungry
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
31
. . . this one-sided
emphasis on the free
civic choices of men
and women has the
effect of obscuring
other planetary forces
that currently constrain
and enable their
actions.
18 The figures are telling of this new development: in 1975, the top
dozen exporters of goods were almost all rich capitalist countries
with relatively small wage differentials. The highest average
hourly wage was in Sweden (US$7.18); the lowest was in Japan
(US$3), a differential of just under two-and-a-half times. By
1996, driven by the forces of Turbo-capitalism, a global labour
pool had developed, with a corresponding dramatic widening of
wage differences. The highest average hourly wages were found
in Germany (US$31.87) and the lowest in China (US$0.31): a pay
differential of more than a hundred times. The striking differences
are of course compounded by much longer hours of work
(sometimes up to 80 hours a week) and poorly protected working
conditions in the low-wage sectors of the global economy. See
Anderson and Cavanagh (2000: 30).
juggernaut ruthlessly breaking down political borders
and smashing through walls of social restraint
embodied in local communities and other institutions.
`Cold-blooded, truly arm's-length and therefore
purely contractual relations exemplify the entire spirit
of turbo-capitalism', writes Luttwak (1999: 43). Such
descriptions of the spread of global business correctly
capture something of its swashbuckling, buccaneer,
time-and-distance-conquering tendencies. They also
point to its amoral profiteering as a consequence of
companies' geographic separation of investment
decisions and their social consequences. These
descriptions pose a normative problem: the need to
deal politically with the chronic tendency of
commodity production and exchange to pick the
locks of global civil society and to roam freely
through its rooms, like a thief in the night. `As long
as capitalism remains triumphant', comments Soros,
`the pursuit of money overrides all other social
considerations . . . The development of a global
economy has not been matched by the development
of a global society' (1999: 102).
While these claims are sobering, they arguably
exaggerate the degree to which turbo-capitalism has
become unhinged or disembedded from the emerging
global civil society. No business, global business
included, can properly function as business unless it
draws upon and nurtures the non-market environment
of civil society in which it is more or less
embedded. The artificial distinction between `the
market' and `global civil society' obscures this fundamental
point and in so doing obscures a basic
dynamic of our times: the tendency of turbocapitalism
to nurture and simultaneously disorder
the structures of global civil society within which it
operates.
It is important to grasp these positive and negative
dynamics. On the positive, society-enhancing side,
some sectors of global business greatly `thicken' the
communications networks that enable all
organisations and networks to operate at the global
level. Under modern conditions, states rather than
global businesses have often been the inventors of
new technologies of transport and communication.
While this rule holds true, say, for the World Wide
Web and geostationary satellites, subsequent new
investments in these and other communications
technologies are typically market-driven: they go
where the returns are high. The commercial introduction
of these technologies, as well as wide-bodied
jet aircraft, fibre optics, super-freighters, and
containerisation, have several cumulative--revolutionary--effects.
Through leased networks, organisations
large and small can now operate over vast
geographical distances, thanks to the growth of
country-to-country links, regional hub-andspoke
networks, and global telecommunications
services (Langdale 1989). There is a
sharp reduction of both the operating costs
and the time it takes both information and
things and people to move from one part of
the world to another. The friction of distance
is greatly reduced.19
Business firms also have socialising
effects by virtue of their tendency to cluster
geographically in the ecosystems of global civil
society, in towns and cities that form part of a wider
region. They create regionally-based `untraded interdependencies'
(see Storper 1997; also Amin and Thrift
1994). Examples of such thriving regions include
Seoul-Inchon, southern California, the M4 corridor,
and the conurbations of Stuttgart, Tokyo, Paris-Sud,
and Milan. The recently created Special Economic
Zones, open coastal cities, and priority development
areas in China also count as striking examples. Like
bees to a hive, firms swarm to such places not simply
because it is profitable (thanks to reduced transaction
costs) but because their own profitability requires
the cultivation of densely textured socio-cultural
ties (`untraded interdependencies') that come with
agglomeration. The regional civil society becomes
the hive and propolis of business activity. Firms find
that face-to-face interaction with clients, customers,
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
32
19 The growth of market-driven communications within global civil
society `shrinks' the world, even though this time-space
contraction is extremely uneven. Shaped like a slim octopus with
the globe half in its clutches, influential cities, together with
powerful national economies and globe-straddling firms, are
drawn together as if they are part of the same body; but while
certain places and people become the head and eyes and
tentacles of global civil society, whole geographic areas and
whole peoples, many millions of them, are left out and left
behind in the spaces between the slim tentacles of
communication.
Global civil society as we know and experience it
could not survive for a day without the market
forces unleashed by turbo-capitalism
and competitors is easier. They find as well that their
chosen patch contains social spaces for gathering
business information, monitoring and maintaining
patterns of trust, establishing common rules of
business behaviour, and socialising with others: in
places like clubs, bars, cinemas, theatres, sports
venues, and restaurants. And the regional civil society
acts as `technopole' (Castells and Hall 1994) or
`technology district' (Storper 1992). It enables firms
to enhance their capacity for technical innovation:
they can better develop, test, mimic, and track
innovations, find new gaps in the market, and react
more quickly to changing patterns of demand.
Turbo-capitalist firms, aided by the local and
regional networks of smaller firms with
which they do business, also have definite
civilising effects on the global civil society
in which they are embedded. For a start,
the hundreds of thousands of firms that
inhabit the markets of global civil society are
generally antipathetic to violence. Some of
them, in certain contexts, have shameful
records of colluding with the violence of
political authorities hell-bent on destroying
their opponents--as happened in South Africa before
the revolution against apartheid, or as now happens
in the global small arms industry. There are even
global businesses, like the diamond and cocaine
trades, that operate through murderous networks of
armed guerillas. Yet--the qualification is important--
most global businesses share a commonly perceived,
long-term interest in the eradication of violence.
Their chief executive officers, for instance, do not
like working within the deathly shadows of kneecapping,
abduction, or murder. In general, the
conduct of business, which requires the freedom to
calculate risk over time, prudently and without
interruption, is made difficult or impossible when
violence threatens, which is why investment is
chronically low, or non-existent, in zones of uncivil
war, like Sierra Leone, southern Sudan, Chechnya,
and parts of the former Yugoslavia.
Turbo-capitalist firms also generate--for some
people--income, goods and services, and jobs (50 per
cent of the world's manufacturing jobs are now
located outside the OECD region, a twelve-fold
increase in four decades). These firms produce some
measure of `social capital' by training local employees
in such skills as self-organisation, punctuality, and
forward-looking initiative. Particularly in the field
of consumer retailing, through commercial radio and
television, firms also engage local cultures for the
purpose of constructing convincing worlds of more
or less shared symbols, ideas, and values. Consumer
retailing by transnational conglomerates demonstrates
the obsolescence of the neo-Gramscian
distinction between struggles for meaningful
authenticity (for instance, in the idioms of food,
dress, language, music, and dance) in the realm of
`civil society' as narrowly conceived by Yoshikazu and
others, and money-centred conflicts over wealth and
income in `the economy'. To the extent that global
civil society becomes media-saturated, with intense
pressure to consume, conflicts about the generation
of wealth and income within `the economy' are
simultaneously disputes about symbolic meanings
(see Ong 1999). The development of up-market
services--hotels in Dubai boasting seven-star status
and featuring exotic menus of breaded Dover sole and
char-grilled bison fillets--and the down-market
retailing of products like McDonald's, Pepsi, and
American television programmes to the villages of
south Asia and central America and to cities like
Shanghai, Sydney, Johannesburg, and Cairo, if
anything, have the effect of accentuating local
cultural diversity within global civil society. This is
partly because profit-seeking, turbo- capitalist
retailers themselves see the need to tailor their
products to local conditions and tastes; and also
because (as Marshall Sahlins has wittily pointed out20)
local consumers display vigorous powers of
reinterpreting and `overstanding' these commodities,
thus giving them new and different meanings.
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
33
Most global businesses share a commonly
perceived, long-term interest in the eradication
of violence. Investment is chronically low, or nonexistent
in zones of uncivil war.
20 Sahlins (1999: 34): `Why are well-meaning Westerners so
concerned that the opening of a Colonel Sanders in Beijing
means the end of Chinese culture? A fatal Americanization. But
we have had Chinese restaurants in America for over a century,
and it hasn't made us Chinese. On the contrary, we obliged the
Chinese to invent chop suey. What could be more American than
that? French fries?'
Market Failures
C
aution should certainly
be exercised on this last
point, for the truth is
that global corporations today
enter our living rooms aglow
in public-image or `pro-social'
advertising. Many firms,
backed up by high-flying,
well-paid `ethics officers',
present the world with their
`we too are citizens of the
world' corporate credo and
do their best to distract their (potential) critics
from saying that these firms employ eight-year-olds
in sweatshops or brazenly trample upon the
environment. Corporate advertising is a potential
menace when it comes to understanding clearly the
dynamics of global civil society. Although turbocapitalism
feeds and fuels the delicate social
ecosystems of the emerging global civil society, sadly
this is only half the story, essentially because turbocapitalism
also operates as a contradictory force within
global civil society. Like a predator, it misuses and depletes
its resources, endangers some of its species,
even ruining whole habitats, the effects of which
ricochet throughout the ecosystems of global civil
society. Not surprisingly, the predatory effects of
turbo-capitalism meet resistance: global resistance
that ranges from micro-experiments with credit
unions, maximum wages, and time banks, through
petitions (like the Jubilee 2000 campaign, which has
collected 25 million signatures worldwide in favour of
debt cancellation--see Chapter 3) to militant street
protests by individuals and groups, gas masks and
megaphones in hand, who are convinced that the
cutting edge of anti-capitalist politics is extra-
parliamentary.
The sources of this protest against turbocapitalism
are not hard to find. To begin with, the
business units of turbo-capitalism chronically
exercise what C. B. Macpherson (1973: 42­50; 71­75)
once called `extractive power' over their workers
and other dependents, for instance through dayby-day
hiring and firing practices and their ability
to pay ruinously low, take-it-or-leave-it wages. These
businesses also have at their disposal the power to
ruin others' lives by deciding to invest here and not
there, or instead by moving their investments from
here to there. Global civil society is also under great
pressure to adopt more or less
unaffordable turbo-capitalist
living standards, many of
them originally American, like
automobility, Windows 2000,
microscooters, Mastercards,
shopping malls, and endless
chatter about `choice'. If
during the eighteenth century
a cosmopolitan was typically
someone who thought  la
française, who in other words
identified Paris with cosmopolis,
then three centuries
later, thanks to turbo-capitalism, a cosmopolitan
might turn out to be someone whose tastes are
fixated on New York and Washington, Los Angeles,
and Seattle.
Pressured by turbo-capitalism, global civil society,
which otherwise displays a strong tendency towards
polyarchy, naturally cradles new property relations, with
staggering discrepancies in wealth and income distribution.
The economies of giant firms like Ford and
Philip Morris exceed the gross domestic products of
countries like Norway and New Zealand. Meanwhile, a
small elite of winners, the `transnational managerial
class' (Cox 1986), less politely the bourgeois
cosmocracy--corporate executives, peripatetic lawyers,
rock-stars, jet-age nomads living in penthouse
apartments in choice locations, like the Upper East Side
of Manhattan--monopolises more than its share of
wealth and income. The combined wealth of the world's
richest 200 billionaires reached an astonishing US$1.1
trillion in 1999, the year in which the combined incomes
of 582 million people living in the least developed
countries was US$146 billion, or less than a dollar a day.
The three richest people in the world own assets that
exceed the combined GDP of the world's 48 poorest
countries (Hirsh 2000: 79; Mittelman 2000: 246). For the
time being, this bourgeois cosmocracy exercises power
globally over a mass of survivors or losers of varying
affluence or poverty. They do so despite the opposition
of market-shy governments and the growth of new
forms of transnational protest, like the recent battles for
the streets of Seattle, Prague, and Québec City led by
groups like Earth First! and the Ruckus Society, and
backed up by contingents of farmers, environmentalists,
students, aboriginal rights activists, and trade unionists.
Not surprisingly--a final item on the balance sheet--
turbo-capitalism strengthens the hand of market
domination over the non-profit institutions of civil
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
34
Many global
corporations today enter
our living rooms aglow in public
image or `pro-social' advertising to
distract potential critics from saying
they employ eight-year-olds or
brazenly trample upon the
environment
society, which are twisted and torn into bodies that
obey the rules of accumulation and profitmaximisation.
Some non-governmental organisations
formerly dependent on government funding, like the
Seattle-based service agency Pioneer Human Services,
opt for self-financing through their own for-profit
business enterprises. Market forces produce great
inequalities among INGOs: Greenpeace, with a $100
million annual budget, and the World Wildlife Fund,
with $170 million, are wealthier than the UN
Environment Programme and most other state-level
governments they deal with (Shaw 2000: 14). In some
sectors, it is as if the emerging global civil society is
merely the appendage of the turbo-capitalist economy.
Some non-governmental organisations--so-called
business NGOs or BINGOs--even explicitly model
themselves on business enterprises by developing
commercial departments, head-hunters, media
sections, and private fund-raising and investment
strategies. The neat division between the corporate
and NGO worlds consequently becomes blurred.
The New Medievalism
A
lthough turbo-capitalism is arguably the force
that most strongly energises the nongovernmental
sector from within, global civil
society is not simply its child. To repeat: global civil
society is overdetermined by various forces. It is a
`syndrome' (Mittelman 2000) of processes and activities
which have multiple origins and multiple dynamics,
some of them--like the recent collapse and discrediting
of communism--more conjunctural than deep-seated.
Together, these forces ensure that global civil society
is not a single, unified domain and that it is not turned
into something that is coming to resemble a combined
factory, warehouse, and shopping mall retailing
consumer products on a global scale--let's say, a version
of Disney's `Its a Small World After All'. Global civil
society is not simply reducible to the logic of commodity
production and exchange, which helps to
explain why the ideal of a global civil society currently
appeals to an astonishing variety of conflicting social
interests, ranging from groups clustered around the
World Bank to broad-minded Muslims defending their
faith and radical ecological groups pressing for
sustainable development.
If the institutions of global civil society are not
merely the products of civic initiative and market
forces, then is there a third force at work in nurturing
and shaping it? It can be argued that global civil
society is also the by-product of state or inter-state
action, or inaction. Examples are easy to find. Most
obvious is the set of political institutions and
agreements that play a vital role in fostering the
growth of turbo-capitalism, for instance the `Final
Act' of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, a
1994 agreement that had the backing of 145 states
and that led to the establishment of the World Trade
Organisation and to the extension of the principle of
freer trade into such areas as copyrights, patents,
and services. Meanwhile, in fields like telecommunications
and air, land and sea traffic, political
bodies such as the International Postal Union, most
of them resting formally on agreements to which
states are signatories, exercise formidable regulatory
powers that enable many parts of global civil society
to keep moving at a quickening pace (see Tables R6
and R10 in part IV of this Yearbook).
Government agencies, much more than corporate
philanthropy, also currently play a major, positive-sum
role in protecting, funding, and nurturing non-profit
organisations in every part of the earth where there
is a lively civil society (Salamon 1999, see also Pinter,
Chapter 8).21 Included in this category are civil
organisations that operate on the margins of the
governmental institutions that license them in the
first place. Examples include the International
Committee of the Red Cross which, although nongovernmental,
is mandated under the Geneva
Convention and is linked to states through the
organisation of the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies; similarly, the
International Association of Religious Freedom, a
forum for inter-religious dialogue, has accredited
NGO status at the UN and UNESCO levels. Statefunded
systems of mass higher education linked
together by shared languages, common teaching and
research methods, staff and student exchanges, and
compatible hardware also fall into this category of
state-enabled civil organisations. Governmental
institutions also sometimes operate as important
catalysts of activity within global society, for instance
by hosting global conferences like the muchpublicised
1992 Global Forum and Earth Summit held
in Rio de Janeiro, and the follow-up women's and
population conferences in Beijing and Cairo (see
Pianta, Chapter 7).
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
35
21 The comparative findings are cited in Evans (1997); and on the
funding of Japanese INGOs by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, see Menju and
Aoki (1995).
This logic of catalysis is also evident in the
proliferation of human rights groups like Charter 77
after the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Accords, one
of whose `baskets' required signatories to guarantee
the civil and political rights of their citizens; similar
catalytic effects have resulted from the 1993 Vienna
Conference on Human Rights, where 171 states
reaffirmed their commitment to the
principle of the `universal nature of
the rights and freedoms' specified in
the International Bill of Human
Rights.
These well-known examples
illustrate the less familiar rule that
global civil society should not be
thought of as the natural enemy of
political institutions. The vast
mosaic of groups, organisations,
and initiatives that comprise global
civil society are variously related to
governmental structures at the local,
national, regional, and supranational
levels. Some sectors of social activity,
the so-called anti-government
organisations (AGOs), are openly
hostile to the funding and regulatory
powers of state institutions. Other sectors, for
instance those in which the acronym NGO rather
means `next government official', are openly
collaborative, either serving as willing contractors
for governments or aiming at dissolving themselves
into governmental structures (Tendler 1982). Still
others (GONGOs or GRINGOs, like the International
Air Transport Association and the World
Conservation Union) are the dependent creations of
state authorities. In between these two extremes
stand those social actors (for example, Médecins sans
Frontires, Oxfam, Greenpeace) who slalom between
self-reliance and legal and political dependency. They
form ad hoc partnerships with governments; lobby
donor intergovernmental bodies like the World Bank
to change their policies; and work with other nongovernmental
organisations in rich and poor
countries, zones of peace and war alike.
More reflection is definitely needed on the
complex, unstable relationship between global civil
society and the hotchpotch of political-legal
institutions in which it is embedded (see Young 1994;
Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). One important
generalisation can safely be made, which is that
unlike the early modern civil societies, which typically
hatched within the well-established containers of
empires and territorial states, global civil society has
emerged and today flourishes in the absence of a
global state or world empire. Practising the art of
divide et impera from below, well-organised actors
within global civil society, turbo-capitalist firms for
instance, often manage to transform territorial
governments into their submissive
courtesans or to evade the regulatory
hand of such governments, whose
own attempts to guard jealously their
own remaining sovereign powers ties
the hands of transnational governing
bodies like the United Nations.
Those who conclude from these
trends that the term `global civil
society' is therefore meaningless--as
if the term could only ever be the
Siamese twin of the term `global
state' (Brown, 1999)--overlook the
novelty of our situation. It is true that
there is currently no global state and
that it is most improbable that in
future one could be developed,
assuming that it would be desirable to
do so. The current growth spurt of
global civil society under `lawless' conditions outpaces
governments of all descriptions, and it contains
within it a pressing constitutional agenda: the need
to find the appropriate form of global governance so
that something like publicly accountable, multi-level
government can develop on a global scale.
There is currently no consensus about what form
this agenda might take, partly because of the
inordinate strength of those forces that champion
unregulated, free market turbo-capitalism über alles
and partly because some of their opponents slam
`globalisation' in the name of stronger and more
nationalist territorial states or through vague notions
of `deglobalisation' and the `deconcentration and
decentralisation of institutional power' through `the
re-empowerment of the local and the national' (Bello
2000). It should be obvious that global civil society
requires political and legal protection through
legal and political bodies that guarantee basic
freedoms of association, protect those whose voices
are ignored, enforce contracts, preserve property, and
rule against violent crimes (Christenson 1997; Falk
1992). Less obvious is which courts, governments, or
governing regimes are reliably capable of granting
such protection. Some political theorists defend the
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
36
Although
turbo-capitalism is
arguably the force
that most strongly
energises the nongovernmental
sector
from within, global
civil society is not
simply its
child...
neo-Kantian principle of a transnational democratic
legal order, a community of all democratic communities,
something resembling a global Rechtsstaat
of the kind implied in Art. 28 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: `Everyone is entitled to
a social and international order in which the rights
and freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be
fully realised.' Others anticipate a
second-best scenario that owes
everything to Emmerich de Vattel: a
complex international system of
nominally sovereign, democratic
states that are the voting members in
a variety of international forums.
Still others foresee a new
compromise between these two
options: a cosmopolitan process of
democratisation through which
citizens gain a voice within their own
states and in sites of power among
their states (Archibugi and Held
1994).
There are evidently no guarantees
that any of these competing views
can or will prevail, not least because
the form of political-legal institutions
that currently frames global civil society
has much more in common with the world addressed
in Johannes Althusius's Politica (1614), a many-sided
world of overlapping and potentially conflicting
political structures, primordial groups, and differently
sized political associations, and federalist strivings
for both particularism and universalism, community,
and ecumene (see Althusius 1614; von Gierke 1966
[1880]). From a normative point of view, it may be
that this Althusian world of political structures will
facilitate a new, multi-layered global political
settlement defined by a core of institutions designed
to rein in the most destructive behaviours and a
periphery of governing institutions based on more
voluntary and non-coercive regulations (Edwards
2000). This is the undecided future. For now, it is
clear that global civil society is today flourishing
within a thoroughly modern, strangely `neo-medieval'
mélange of overlapping legal structures and political
bodies that come in all shapes and sizes. The emerging
patterns of regulation of the Internet are a pertinent
example. The healthy mix of self-regulation and no
regulation that once characterised the medium is
now withering away. So too is the presumption that
the Internet abolishes both geographical boundaries
and territorially based laws. In fact, a regulatory net
is being cast over the Internet by three intersecting
types of political institutions. Territorial states like
South Korea have outlawed gambling Websites; in
Britain, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
has granted the police broad powers of access to email
and other online communications; and a French
court has banned the Internet portal
firm Yahoo! from providing French
users with images of Nazi memorabilia
otherwise posted on its American
sites. Meanwhile, supranational
institutions are also experimenting
with their regulatory powers. A new
European Union law drawn from the
Brussels Convention entitles consumers
to sue EU-based Internet sites
in their own countries so long as it
can be proved that the site was
targeted at their countries; the Hague
Convention aims to enforce foreign
judgements in matters such as
contractual disputes, libel and intellectual
property claims; and the
Council of Europe has drafted the
world's first global treaty on cybercrime,
which aims to harmonise laws against hacking,
child pornography, and Internet fraud (see
Naughton,Chapter 6). Finally, the `neo-medieval'
pattern of multiple jurisdictions is reinforced by
moves by e-commerce firms to claw back regulatory
powers through so-called mechanisms of alternative
dispute resolution: in effect, they are pushing for a
new market-based system of private laws which
would enable companies to operate outside of the
courts within a minimum framework of `safe harbour'
rules guaranteeing privacy and consumer
protection.22
This mélange of political and legal structures in the
field of the Internet is present in many other policy
areas, so much so that the so-called system of `global
governance' hardly deserves the name `system'. It
comprises a clutter of nation states and regional and
local governments; intergovernmental agencies and
programmes, like United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF) as well as intergovernmental structures
with sectoral responsibilities like the World Trade
Organisation and the OECD; and the International
Court of Justice and other global institutions seeking
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
37
...it can
be argued that
global civil society is
also the by-product
of state or interstate
action, or
inaction.
22 Economist, 13 January 2001: 25­7.
to enforce the rule of law. The hotchpotch system of
global governance also includes global accords,
treaties, and conventions such as the Montreal
Protocol covering ozone levels; policy summits and
meetings like the Davos World Economic Forum; and
new forms of public deliberation and conflict
resolution like truth commissions that have a global
impact. Summarising the dynamics of these
interacting and overlapping neo-medieval structures
is not easy, but they are undoubtedly having the
effect of slowly eroding both the immunity of
sovereign states from suit and the presumption that
statutes do not extend to the territory of other states.
There are many tendencies in this direction. INGOs are
licensed by bodies like the Council of Europe and
the United Nations. Non-governmental groups
participate in election monitoring and as amici curiae
in the proceedings of such bodies as the European
Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. War crimes cases are given global
publicity thanks to new bodies like the Hague
Tribunal; the project of establishing an international
criminal court is nearly completed; and local courts
show ever greater willingness to prosecute
symbolically `foreign' acts of wrongdoing.23
An Earthly Paradise?
S
uch `legalisation' of global civil society, the
effort to remedy its permanent crisis of
representation by giving it legal and political
voices and injecting the principle of public
accountability into governing institutions, has deeper
roots in the post-eighteenth-century opening of
state constitutions to international law (Stein 1994).
It arguably helps stabilise and perhaps strengthen
this society, even though it does not turn it instantly
into paradise on earth. Global civil society is certainly
rich in freedoms beyond borders, for example, to
invest and to accumulate money and wealth; to travel
and to reunite with others; to build infrastructures by
recovering memories, protecting the vulnerable,
and generating new wealth and income; to denounce
and to reduce violence and uncivil war; and, generally,
to press the principle that social and political power
beyond borders should be subject to greater public
accountability. Such freedoms are currently unfolding
in a hell-for-leather, Wild West fashion, and are also
very unevenly distributed. The freedoms of global
civil society are exclusionary and fail to produce
equalities; in other words, global civil society is not
really global. It is not a universal society.
Vast areas of the world, and certainly the large
majority of the world's population who live there, are
excluded. They are made to feel like victims of a
predatory mode of foreign intervention: they are
shut out from global civil society, or uprooted by its
dynamism, imprisoned within its discriminatory
structures and policies, like unpayable debt-service
payments, or victimised by scores of uncivil wars
(Dallmayr 1999; Falk 1999: Chs 3, 5, 8). Still others--
many Muslims say--are made to feel that the
enormous potential of global civil society to expand
dialogue among civilisations, to `affirm differences
through communication', is being choked to death by
the combined forces of global markets and military
might, manifested for instance in the violent
repression of the Palestinians by the dangerous
alliance between the United States and Israel.24
Then there are the cruel facts of communication
poverty. Three-quarters of the world's population
(which now totals 6 billion) are too poor to buy a
book; a majority has never made a phone call; and
only 1 per cent currently have access to the Internet
(Keane 1999). All these points serve to fuel the
conclusion that global civil society is currently a
string of oases of freedom in a vast desert of localised
injustice. Not only that, but the privileges within this
oasis cannot be taken for granted, for the plural
freedoms of global civil society are threatened
constantly by the fact that it is a breeding ground for
manipulators who take advantage of its available
freedoms. The growth of borderless exchanges
encourages winners, global corporations for instance,
to cultivate ideologies that slake their thirst for power
over others. Free market, IMF ideologies linked with
turbo- capitalism--talk of deregulation, structural
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
38
23 From the Los Angeles Times (11 August 2000: A11) comes a
random example: the order, applied during early August 2000 by
a US District Court in Manhattan, requiring Radovan Karadzic to
pay $745 million to a group of twelve women who filed a civil
suit, accusing him of responsibility for killings, rapes,
kidnappings, torture, and other atrocities.
24 Interview with Professor Abou Yaareb al-Marzouki, Hammamet,
Tunisia, 18 April 2001.
Global civil society has emerged
and today flourishes in the absence of a
global state or world empire
adjustment, opportunity, risk-taking, consumer
choice--have a strong affinity with these corporate
winners.
Borderless exchanges also produce strong political
reactions in favour of the local and national, for
instance among losers who react to their disempowerment
resentfully by taking revenge upon
others, sometimes cruelly, guided by ideological,
uncivil presumptions like xenophobic nationalism. In
other words, global civil society is constantly
threatened with takeovers in the name of some or
other organised ideology. Ideologies like the free
market and nationalism take advantage of the growth
of global civil society by roaming hungrily through
its free social spaces, treating others as competitors
or as enemies to be defeated or injured or left to
starve to death. Inequalities of power, bullying, and
fanatical, violent attempts to de-globalise are chronic
features of global civil society. Understood
normatively as a transnational system of social
networks of non-violent polyarchy, global civil society
is a wish that has not yet been granted to the world.
On Violence
V
iolence is undoubtedly among the greatest
enemies of global civil society, whose tendency
to non-violence stems partly from the fact
that its participants more or less share a cosmopolitan
outlook, for instance by displaying a strong dislike of
war, a facility for languages, or a commitment to
ordinary courtesy and respect for others. Given this
tendency towards non-violence, it should come as no
surprise that the contemporary revival of interest in
civil society and the corresponding invention of the
new term `global civil society' have much to do with
such twentieth-century experiences as total war,
aerial bombardment, concentration camps, and the
threat of nuclear annihilation. World War II was
undoubtedly a turning point in the contemporary
history of global civil society. That global war certainly
encouraged post-colonial and `liberation' struggles
and hence the spread of the modern territorial state
system throughout the rest of the world (Badie 1992).
But it also triggered exactly the opposite trend: the
long-term delegitimisation of state sovereignty
because of the total mobilisation and sacrifice of
untold millions by both victorious and vanquished
states, who stood accused for the first time (in the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals) of committing not
just war crimes but the `crime of war' (Habermas
1997: 126; see also the important study by Bass
2000). There followed a nuclear age, in which the
chilling fact of nuclear-tipped sovereignty has
brought the world together by subjecting it to the
permanent threat of mutually assured destruction
many times over.
Today, global civil society lives in the shadow of an
unresolved problem: the role to be played by nucleartipped
states in the post-cold war world system. This
system is dominated by the United States, the world's
single superpower, which can and does act as a `swing
power' backed by nuclear force. As such, it is engaged
in several regions without being tied permanently to
any of them, but its manoeuvres are complicated by
the fact that it is presently forced to coexist and
interact peacefully with four great powers, three of
whom are nuclear powers: Europe, China, Russia, and
Japan (Buzan 2000). The geometry of this arrangement
clearly differs from the extended freeze imposed by the
cold war, when, according to Raymond Aron's famous
formula, most parts of the world lived in accordance
with the rule, `peace impossible, war unlikely'. With the
collapse of bipolar confrontation, this rule has
changed. There is no evidence of the dawn of a postnuclear
age and the freedom from the fear of nuclear
accident or attack that that would bring. Nowadays,
as Pierre Hassner (1995) has put it so well, peace has
become a little less impossible and war is a little less
unlikely, principally because a form of unpredictable
anarchy has settled on the whole world.25 The
probability of a nuclear apocalypse, in which the earth
and its peoples are blown sky-high, may have been
reduced, but major wars remain a possibility, including
even the use of nuclear-tipped weapons in conflicts
that originate in local wars.
Future historians may well look back on the past
half-century and see it as the prelude to a barbarous
form of Hobbesian `mediaevalism' (first envisaged
by Guglielmo Ferrero), a global order riddled with
violence, suspicion of enemies, and restless struggles
that produced universal fear. Perhaps indeed our fate
has been so decided. And yet, among the most
promising signs within global civil society is the
renewal of a civilising politics, that is, networked
public campaigns against the archipelagos of incivility
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
39
25 See the concluding interview in Hassner (1995), especially p. 332:
`In the past, the doctrine of deterrence matched the civil
character of our societies: an invisible hand, or abstract
mechanism, took charge of our security, and we did not have to
bother our heads with it. But today the nuclear issue can no
longer be considered in isolation; it is inextricably mixed up with
everything else.'
existing within and beyond its frontiers. These
campaigns have a long history (see White 1968; Peiheng
1981: Ch. 2; Seary 1996). They extend back in
time, for instance to movements against slavery and
trafficking in women and children; the birth of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (first named
the International Committee for Relief of Wounded
Soldiers) after the 1859 Battle of Solferino; the
founding of The Save the Children Fund after World
War I; and Médecins Sans Frontires after the Biafran
War. Oxfam, established to provide civilian relief to
Greece when it was still under Nazi
occupation, against the wishes of
the British government, counts as
another example.
Such civil initiatives against
incivility, the attempts to build
`bridgeheads' for expanding the
reach of global civil society, are today
a feature of all zones of violence.
Some efforts, like that of Saferworld,
are aimed at publicising and
restricting global arms flows. Other
organisations like Human Rights
Watch actively `witness' others'
suffering in violent areas like Burma,
Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and southern
Sudan. Or they push for the
elimination of landmines or biological
weapons, or (like Amnesty
International, which has more than
one million members in 162 countries) campaign
against political repression, especially maltreatment
of the body and unfair imprisonment. Still others
attempt to negotiate ceasefires or to provide comfort
for lives ruined when civilians are turned into
refugees. And some groups find themselves targets of
global criticism for prolonging or complicating uncivil
wars, for instance by sheltering hostages, feeding
aggressors, or serving as cover for warring armies.
Social campaigns to civilise global civil society--
to democratise or publicly control the means of
violence (see Keane 1995a)--are among its vital
preconditions. Yet they are hampered by
countervailing trends, which are perhaps better
described as a single dilemma that the defenders of
global civil society need to recognise, to worry about,
and practically to address. Put simply, the dilemma
confronting global civil society is that while it is
vulnerable to violence, whether from within or
without, and needs armed protection, its members (by
definition) do not have the available means of
violence (police and standing armies) to eradicate
that violence unless of course they resort to picking
up the gun to wield violence--against themselves
(see Kaldor, Chapter 5).
This weakness of global civil society is partly
traceable to its own plural freedoms: to the extent
that global civil society enjoys such freedoms it can
easily be taken for a ride by mercenaries, gangs,
wired-up hooligans, mafia, arms traffickers, terrorists,
private security agents, and psycho-killers, all of
whom cavort with the devil of
violence by using, misusing, and
abusing the peaceful freedoms of
that society (see Findlay 1999).
Global civil society is further
threatened by the fact that the
organised violence (potentially)
needed to protect its citizens has a
nasty habit of getting out of hand:
arms breed arrogance, thereby
threatening everything that global
civil society stands for. As the
merchants of the early civil societies
of the Italian city-states first
recognised,26 standing armies are as
dangerous as they are necessary. The
citizens of global civil society thus
require limited armed protection.
If that is so, then defenders of
global civil society must bite the
bullet, quite literally. For among the most difficult
political problems yet to be solved is if, how, and
when armed intervention can legitimately be used to
keep alive, even to extend, the project of global civil
society. Many activist supporters of global civil society
understandably shy away from talk of violence: like
the International Network of Engaged Buddhists,
they have a principled commitment to active nonviolence
or they have simply seen enough of violence
and therefore pragmatically prefer pacific means of
protecting and nurturing the lives of defenceless
citizens. Conventional `realists', by contrast, doubt
that civil society can become the good-natured
cavalry of freedom. They point out that might often
triumphs over right. They defend the formula that
sovereigns are those who actually decide to use force
to protect citizens, which begs hard normative
questions about who can and who should shield our
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
40
The freedoms of
global civil society are
exclusionary and fail
to produce equalities;
in other words, global
civil society is not
really global. It is not
a universal society.
26 See the remarks on the relationship between markets and
organised violence by Lasswell (1935: 23).
emerging global civil society from violence, and under
what circumstances. The answer provided by the
post-Shoah advocates of `just' or humanitarian war--
that the violent enemies of global civil society should
be fought wherever they make a move--arguably
legitimises eternal war, particularly in a world bristling
with incivility.
Or does it? The geo-military scope of non-nuclear
humanitarian intervention is arguably constrained
by the fact that the United States, despite its ability
to act as a `swing power', is presently forced to coexist
and interact peacefully with the four
great powers of Europe, Japan,
China, and Russia. Not only that, but
especially under `post-Vietnam',
conditions, when log-rolling
politicians' fear of casualties leads
them to rely on the use of
computerised, `risk-free', aerial
bombardment as their preferred
means of `humanitarian intervention',
war can be waged only by
the superpower, it seems, in a very
limited number of uncivil contexts:
like those of Kosovo, where the
marauding forces to be bombed are
geographically strategic but without
powerful friends, and weak enough
to be defeated easily but sufficiently
strong to make the sensible
calculation to refrain from using
further violence (see Luttwak 2000; other limitations
of `post-heroic' aerial bombardment are examined
in Ignatieff 2000a, b). These preconditions of
successful military intervention are exacting. They
imply that most patches of the earth where global
civil society has made little or no headway--Russia,
China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia--
are for the moment safe in their outright opposition
to its principles and practice.
Hubris
H
ubris is also an enemy of global civil society.
Its critics, including those who question the
very concept because there is `no common
global pool of memories; no common global way of
thinking; and no "universal history", in and through
which people can unite' (Held 1995: 125; the same
point is made in Bozeman 1984), overlook or
understate the advantages of the heterogeneity of
global civil society. It resembles a bazaar, a covered
kaleidoscope of differently sized rooms, twisting
alleys, steps leading to obscure places, people and
goods in motion. It is marked by increasing
differentiation, thickening networks of ever more
structures and organisations with different but
interdependent modi operandi, multiplying
encounters among languages and cultures, expanding
mobility, growing unpredictability, even (despite
growing numbers of full-time moderators and
mediators) a certain depersonalisation and
abstractness of its social relations.
Such complexity is sometimes said
to be a threat to democracy
(Matthews 1997: 64). That is false,
as John Dewey (1978) long ago
emphasised, for the struggle against
simplified definitions of `the social
good' is a hallmark of a mature civil
society. It is nevertheless true that
complexity alone does not release
global civil society from the laws
of hubris. It is not only that the
plural freedoms of global civil
society are severely threatened by a
political underworld of secretive,
unelected, publicly unaccountable
institutions, symbolised by bodies
like the IMF and the WTO. The
problem of hubris is internal to
global civil society as well: just like
the domestic civil societies that form its habitats,
global civil society produces concentrations of
arrogant power that threaten its own openness and
pluralism.
Stronger legal sanctions and armed protection
can ameliorate these inequalities, but are there
additional ways of ensuring that its social freedoms
can be nurtured and redistributed more equally at the
world level? The growth since the mid- nineteenth
century of a globe-girdling, time-space conquering
system of communications, beginning with inventions
like overland and underwater telegraphy and the
early development of international news agencies
like Reuters and culminating in the more recent
development of geo-stationary satellites, digitalised
media, and the growth of giant media firms like
Thorn-EMI, News Corporation International, Sony,
and Bertelsmann is arguably of basic importance in
this respect (Hugill 1999). It goes without saying that
this global communications system is an integral--
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
41
The contemporary
revival of interest in
civil society has much
to do with such
twentieth-century
experiences
as total war, aerial
bombardment,
concentration camps,
and the threat of
nuclear annihilation.
supremely aggressive and oligopolistic--sector of
today's turbo-capitalism. Ten or so vertically
integrated media conglomerates, most of them based
in the United States, dominate the world market
(Herman and McChesney 1997). They prioritise
advertising-driven commercial ventures: music,
videos, sports, news, shopping, children's and adults'
filmed entertainment. Programme-making codes, in
the field of satellite television news for instance, are
consequently biased in various ways. They are subject
to specific rules of mise-en-scne. And material fed
to editors by journalists reporting from or around
trouble spots (called `clusterfucks' in the vernacular)
is selected, shortened, simplified, repackaged, and
then transmitted in commercial form.
Yet for all these turbo-capitalist biases, global
communications media do not simply produce turbocapitalist
audiences who are politically inactive. `The
dictatorship of the single word and the single image,
much more devastating than that of the single party',
laments Eduardo Galeano, `imposes a
life whose exemplary citizen is a docile
consumer and passive spectator built
on the assembly line following the
North American model of commercial
television'.27 Such laments are
overdrawn, partly for reasons (cited
above) to do with the marketing
process itself: the retailing of products
like American movies has had the
effect of enhancing local cultural
diversity within global civil society,
partly because profit-seeking, turbocapitalist
retailers themselves see the
need to tailor their products to local
conditions and tastes. Local consumers
of commercial television reciprocate:
they display vigorous powers of
investing these commodities with new
and different meanings.
The globalisation of media has also had a rich, if
wholly ironic, political effect, especially from the
time of the protest of youth against the Vietnam
War: it has contributed to the growth of a plurality
of differently sized public spheres, some of them
global, in which many millions of people witness
mediated controversies about who gets what, when,
and how (see Keane 1995b).28 Not all global media
events--sporting fixtures, blockbuster movies, media
awards, for instance--sustain global public spheres.
But within the besuited world of diplomacy, global
business, inter-governmental meetings, and NGOs,
thanks to wide-bodied jet aircraft, computerised
communications, and satellite broadcasting with
large footprints, the public practice of non-violently
monitoring the exercise of power across borders has
taken root. These global public spheres--the term is
used here as an ideal type--are sites within global civil
society where power struggles are visibly waged and
witnessed by means other than violence and war:
they are the narrated, imagined non-violent spaces
within globa1 civil society in which millions of people
witness the powers of governmental and nongovernmental
organisations being publicly named,
monitored, praised, and condemned, despite barriers
of time and space.
Although still rather issue-specific and not yet
strongly institutionalised, global public spheres,
helped along by initiatives like Transparency
International and nurtured by channels like CNN and
the BBC World Service (which attracts 150 million
viewers and listeners each week),
have several interesting effects,
some of which are `pre-political'.
Global public spheres, for instance,
interpolate citizens of the new
global order, in effect telling them
that, unless they find some means
of showing that global civil society
is not theirs, then it is. In this way,
global public spheres function as
temporary resting places beyond
familiar horizons; they give an
entirely new meaning to the old
watchword of Greek colonisation,
`Wherever you go, you will be a
polis'. Within global public spheres,
people rooted in local physical
settings increasingly travel to
distant places, without ever leaving
home, to `second homes' within
which their senses are stretched.
Hailed by media narratives that probe the wider
world in tones of (ironic) intimacy, the members of
global civil society become a bit less parochial, a bit
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
42
27 Eduardo Galeano, cited in the epigraph in Herman and
McChesney (1997: vi). More prudent assessments are presented
in Ong (1999); Packer (1995); and Schudson (1997).
28 Adam Michnik has suggested that the recent growth of global
public opinion can be seen as the rebirth in different form of an
earlier parallel trend, evident within nineteenth-century socialist
internationalism, that came to an end with World War I
(interview, Washington DC, 21 April 2001).
The dilemma
confronting global
civil society is that
while it is vulnerable
to violence, its
members do not have
the available means of
violence to eradicate
that violence
more cosmopolitan. Global publics are taught lessons
in the art of flexible citizenship: they learn that the
boundaries between native and foreigner are blurred
and that they have become a touch more footloose.
They learn to distance themselves from themselves;
they discover that there are different temporal
rhythms, other places, other problems, other ways to
live. They are invited to question their own dogmas,
even to extend ordinary standards of civility--courtesy,
politeness, respect--to others whom they will never
meet (Toulmin 2000). Global public spheres centred on
ground-breaking media events like Live-Aid can even
be spaces of fun in which millions taste something of
the joy of acting publicly with and against others for
some defined common purpose. Global publics, like the
recent UN-sponsored multimedia event `A World Freed
of Violence Against Women', can also highlight cruelty;
and global publics can also be sites of disaster, spaces
in which millions taste unjust outcomes, bitter defeat,
and the tragedy of ruined lives.
The public spheres housed within global civil
society also have more directly political effects.
Especially during dramatic media events--like the
nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl, the Tiananmen
massacre, the 1989 revolutions in central-eastern
Europe, the overthrow and arrest of Slobodan
Milosevic--public spheres intensify audiences' shared
sense of living their lives contingently, on a knife
edge, in the subjunctive tense. The witnesses of such
events are encouraged to feel that the power relations
of global civil society, far from being given, are better
understood as `an arena of struggle, a fragmented and
contested area' (Keck and Sikkink 1998), the result of
moves and counter-moves, controversy and consent,
compromise and resistance, peace and war. Public
spheres not only tend to denaturalise the power
relations of global civil society. They most definitely
increase its self-refIexivity, for instance by publicising
conflicting images of civility, civilisation, and civil
society. Publicity is given as well to the biased codes
of global media coverage and to hostile coverage of
global civil society itself, for instance by airing claims
that it is a soft term without specific gravity, a
Western dogma, a mere smokescreen for turbocapitalism,
that is, a mere vehicle for `the useful
idiots of globalization' (Rieff 1999).
In these various ways, global public spheres
heighten the topsy-turvy feel of global civil society.
Doubt is heaped upon loose talk that anthropomorphises
global civil society as if it were a universal
object/subject, the latest and most promising
substitute for the proletariat or for the wretched of
the earth. Global public spheres make it clearer that
`global civil society', like its more local counterparts,
has no `collective voice', that it alone does nothing,
that only its constituent individuals, group initiatives,
organisations, and networks act and interact. Global
publics consequently heighten the sense that global
civil society is an unfinished, permanently threatened
project. They shake up its dogmas and inject it with
energy. They enable citizens of the world to shake off
bad habits of parochialism, to see that talk of global
civil society is not simply Western bourgeois ideology,
even to appreciate that the task of painting a much
clearer picture of the rules of conduct and dowries
of global civil society, a picture that is absent from
most of the current literature on globalisation, is
today an urgent ethical imperative.
Democracy
T
he contemporary growth of global publics certainly
points to the need to bring greater democracy to
global civil society.29 By throwing light on power
exercised by moonlight or in the dark of night, global
publics keep alive words like `freedom' and `justice' by
publicising manipulation, skulduggery, and brutality
on or beyond the margins of global civil society. Global
publics, of the kind that in recent years have monitored
the fate of Aung San Suu Kyi, muck with the messy
business of exclusion, racketeering, ostentation, cruelty,
and war. They chart cases of intrigue and doublecrossing.
They help audiences to spot the various figures
of top-down power on the world scene: slick and suave
managers and professionals who are well-practised at
the art of deceiving others through images; kingfishers
who first dazzle others then stumble when more is
required of them; quislings who willingly change sides
GLOBALCIVILSOCIETY?JohnKeane
43
The problem of hubris is also
internal to global civil society:
it produces concentrations of
arrogant power that threaten its
own openness and pluralism
29 The exclusion of the theme of public spheres from virtually all of
the current literature on globalisation is criticised by Slaatta
(1998). A similar point is made implicitly by Appadurai (2000).
under pressure; thugs who love violence; and vulgar
rulers, with their taste for usurping crowns, assembling
and flattering crowds, or beating and tear-gassing them
into submission.
Global public spheres can also probe the powers of
key organisations of global civil society itself. Reminders
are served to those who read, listen, and watch that its
empty spaces have been filled by powerful but
unaccountable organisations (like the WTO and the
International Olympic Committee) or by profit-seeking
corporate bodies that permanently aggravate global
civil society by causing environmental damage or
swallowing up others by producing just for profit rather
than for sustainable social use. Global public spheres can
as well help question some of the more dubious
practices of some non-profit INGOs: for instance, their
bureaucratic inflexibility and context- blindness, their
spreading attachment to market values or to clichés of
project-speak, or their mistaken belief in the supply-side,
trickle-down model of social development. Public
spheres can point to the post-colonial presumptuousness
of some INGOs, their bad habit of acting as their
brothers' keepers, like missionaries, in so-called
`partnerships' that are publicly unaccountable. And
public spheres can criticise their smartly-dressed, selfcirculating,
middle-class elites, sometimes dubbed the
`Five Star Brigade', whose privileges and privileged
behaviour contradict the principles for which global
civil society should otherwise be rightly cherished its
diversity of equal organisations, its open toleration of
differences, the speed and flexibility with which it forms
complex, shifting alliances around a plurality of shared
values and interests.30
Exactly because of their propensity to monitor
the exercise of power from a variety of sites within
and outside civil society, global public spheres--when
they function properly--can help to ensure that
nobody monopolises power at the local and world
levels. By exposing corrupt or risky dealings and
naming them as such; by wrong- footing decisionmakers
and forcing their hands; by requiring them to
rethink or reverse their decisions, global public spheres
help remedy the problem--strongly evident in the
volatile field of global financial markets, which turn
over US$1.3 trillion a day, 100 times the volume of
world trade--that nobody seems to be in charge. And
in uneven contests between decision-makers and
decision-takers--as the developing controversies
within bodies like the International Olympic
Committee show--global public spheres can help
prevent the powerful from `owning' power privately.
Global publics imply greater parity. They suggest that
there are alternatives. They inch our little blue and
white planet towards greater openness and humility,
potentially to the point where power, whenever and
wherever it is exercised across borders, is made to feel
more `biodegradable', a bit more responsive to those
whose lives it shapes and reshapes, secures or wrecks.
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