Tue 3. 4. 10:00–16:00 N, Wed 4. 4. 10:00–16:00 N, Tue 10. 4. 10:00–16:00 N, Tue 17. 4. 10:00–16:00 N
Course Enrollment Limitations
The course is only offered to the students of the study fields the course is directly associated with.
Fields of study the course is directly associated with
there are 10 fields of study the course is directly associated with, display
Course objectives
The goal of the course is to help students understand the economic motivation of economic policy-makers and to see the economic background (i.e. not only the consequences but also the causes) of political decisions, which economic context is not always obvious. Understanding economic motives of relevant groups of economic subjects helps better understanding of the relationship between economic variables and their interaction.
Syllabus
1
Introduction to the course
2
Introduction to social choice theory (aggregation of individual preferences, Arrow impossibility theorem, possible solutions to AIT)
3
Theories of electoral competition (Downs' model, median voter theorem, probabilistic voting model, lobbyism)
4
"Agency problem" in politics (political rent and the commitment problem)
5
Partisan politics (ideological preferences)
6
General interest politics (welfare programs, pension system, unemployment insurance)
7
Special interest politics (interest groups)
8
Electoral systems (majoritarian vs. proportional systems – consequences for the size of political rent and the size and composition of redistributive policies)
9
Political systems (presidential vs. parliamentary democracy – consequences for the size of political rent and the size and composition of redistributive policies)
10
Dynamic politics (politico-economic cycle, public debt)
PERSSON, Torsten and Guido TABELLINI. Political economics :explaining economic policy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000. xix, 533 s. ISBN 978-0-262-16195. info
Teaching methods
Lectures
Assessment methods
Written exam, to pass the exam the student has to achieve at least 60% score.