

Motives for Donating: What Inspires Our Decisions to Make a Donation to Non-profit Organisations?¹

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Abstract: Motivation represents a foundation cornerstone on which analyses in a number of humanities and social sciences are built. For a long time, economists have seen motivation as connected with the act of giving, trying to interpret it in the context of the neoclassical economics assumptions. The objective of this paper is to find answers to the question of what mainly motivates the Czech population in their decisions to make a donation and whether there is any interdependence among such motives. We also ask what the relationship is between the determining motives and the rate or frequency of donating. The donation models that we analyze and use as the basis of our research are nowadays considered being the principal or at least interesting donation models commonly taken into account by economists in their work. We have only focused on selected microeconomics models to make the text clearly targeted; specifically, we are examining the public goods model, private consumption model investment model and impure altruism model. The data were collected through a questionnaire survey and analysed by means of mathematical-statistical methods that are commonly used in similar cases, such as descriptive statistics, the Pearson correlation coefficient and the ANOVA method based on the F-test. The empirical testing confirmed several assumptions connecting with this type of a research; however, our paper opened a space for a follow-up research, too.

Key words: Altruism, charitable giving, motive

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Introduction

Issues related to charitable donating have been researched not only in the behavioural sciences, psychology or economics; they are dealt with by experts in the fields of marketing, fundraising and political affairs, too. Non-profit studies analyse donorship especially as regards its potential to increase the share of private resources in incomes of

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non-profit organisations. Therefore, many authors (Schervish, 1997; Sargeant, 1999; Bekkers, Wiepking, 2010, Gittell, Tebaldi, 2006; Marx, Carter, 2014; Andreoni, Payne, 2011; Lammam, Gabler, 2012, and others) still ask the question: What are the variables that influence donors' behaviour both positively within the sense of its volume or frequency and negatively within the sense of its restriction or absence? In the Czech Republic, there are only a few studies that attempt to answer the question of what are the key factors influencing the donor behaviour (Frič, 2001; Hladká, Šinkyříková, 2009; Řežuchová, 2011).

The current social sciences literature that identifies/defines factors with an influence on donating is considerably extensive. Of course, its approaches and methodologies depend on a specific scientific discipline, the nature of an applied empirical investigation and also on the respective motivation agent being analysed. Most studies deal only with a specific variable. The authors (Schervish, 1997; Bekkers, Wiepking, 2010 and others) who attempt to provide a complex picture of motives that encourage individuals to make donations are not numerous. We divided the variables impacting the process of the donor's decision-making into internal and external ones. It is a division that is neglected by some researches (Lloyd 2004; Marx, Carter, 2014 and others) who interconnect individual variables, creating an unclear picture of the motives influencing the donor's decisions. In our opinion, however, it is necessary to differentiate between internal variables, which arise from the underneath of individual people and create their nature and personality, and external variables, which are independent of specific individuals although they may influence them. We name the internal variables as motives for donating, and the external variables as determinants. All these variables influence the process of the donor's behaviour.

In this paper, we only pay attention to one group of variables – motives. We present our own categorization of the motives that may influence an individual's decision to make a donation. These motives are subsequently analysed with the aim to find out how important they are in the Czech population, to evaluate mutual relationships (strength) between the given motives, and to determine the extent to which these motives influence the value of a provided donation or the frequency of donating. This is important not only as regards the theory of the donor's behaviour but also as regards potential impacts on the practice of recruiting and retaining new donors.

Theoretical Starting Points of the Research

Microeconomics models that may be used to interpret donating in accordance with the microeconomics apparatus are the starting points for classification of the motives having an influence on donating and subsequent empirical tests. These models work with the level of utility gained by the donor, specifically considering three basic types of benefits. Donating is based on various obvious or hidden motives and brings the individual various benefits. The following table classifies three basic types of benefits of an act of donating for the donor.

Economists consider the above specified sources of utility/benefits to be the key ones in explaining donor's behaviour. We can use the definitions of these three benefits as the basis on which we can build four microeconomics models depicting the process of the

donor's decision-making. The given models and their basic motives are shown in the following table.

Table 1 Potential benefits from an act of donating

Benefit	Benefit source
Altruistic benefit	The benefit is based on an improved condition of a donee. The donor is interested in increasing other people's benefits.
Personal benefit	The donor obtains his or her own benefit from an act of donating (warm-glow, social integration, etc.)
Exchange value benefit	In exchange for his or her donation, the donor obtains benefits such as experience, influence, information, etc.

Source: Authors, adapted according to Ziemek (2003)

Table 2 Microeconomics models explaining an act of donating

Model	Benefit	General motive
Public Goods Model	Altruistic benefit	To increase the offer of public goods
Private Consumption Model	Personal benefit	To be pleased by an act of donating, the "warm-glow" utility
Investment Model	Exchange value benefit	To gain experience, knowledge and contacts on the labour market
Impure Altruism Model	Altruistic/personal benefit	Combination of the first and the second model

Source: Authors, adapted according to Ziemek (2003)

Public Goods Model

The public goods model is based on the assumption that individuals make donations to increase the overall offer of available public goods or services. If we accept the assumption that public goods are characterized as non-rivalrous and non-excludable in their character, the donor gets a benefit (utility) through increasing benefits of other people who consume the public goods. The behaviour of the individual making a donation and increasing benefits of other people without obtaining anything in exchange can be described as altruistic. The existence of specified positive social feelings arising from interactions between people, especially altruism, was recognized by a number of important economists, starting from Smith and Mill and ending with for example Walras or Pareto. Altruistic behaviour is most often described using utility functions. Preferences of an altruist are not defined by the means of the level of his or her own consumption but by the level of other people's consumption (Kolm, 2000, and others). Boulding and

Vickrey were among the first modern economists to have rationalized donating. They were followed by Becker (1974) who created a formal model of such behaviour.³

The Becker model is based on altruistic donor's preferences. In order to allow for simplification, it assumes an economy with one public good and one private good. The sector consists of $n - 1$ individuals; each individual i is endowed with wealth w_i that he or she can allocate to private good x_i or make a private contribution to public good g_i . The total offer of public goods G^4 is given by the aggregate of private contributions made by all individuals $n - 1$ and resources from public budgets, i.e. $G = \sum_{i=1}^n g_i$. The model is based on the assumption that private contributions made by others and the resources from public budgets are perfect substitutes, the sum of which is expressed as G_{-i} .

$G_{-i} = \sum_{j \neq i}^n g_j$ expresses total contributions to the public good from private and public resources, except for individual i .

Preferences of the altruistic donor are expressed in the following utility function:

$$\begin{aligned} U_i &= U_i(x_i, G)^5 \\ x_i + g_i &= w_i \\ g_i &> 0 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

It must be emphasized that a contribution made by individual g_i enters the utility function not through the donation *per se* but through the aggregate offer of public goods. In solving this maximization issue, each individual thinks about an optimal level of his or her contribution. We will substitute $g_i = G - G_{-i}$ in the budgetary constraint and if we relate this to the utility function, we will get the following maximization problem, provided the Nash equilibrium is applied:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_G U_i(w_i + G_{-i} - G, G) \\ \text{Procedure: } \quad x_i + g_i &= w_i \\ \quad \quad \quad x_i &= w_i - g_i \\ \quad \quad \quad x_i &= w_i - (G - G_{-i}) \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

By deriving the function (2) according to G we will obtain the optimal amount of G for individual i . The solution of this optimization problem can be written down as a function of exogenous components:

$$G = f_i(w_i + G_{-i}) \tag{3}$$

³ Various alternatives of the given model are also presented by Schwartz (1970), Hood, Martin and Osberg (1977), Collard (1979).

⁴ Becker (1974) assumes in his model that relative prices of goods (x_i and G) are constant; he does not measure them in any manner. Contrary to this, Sugden (1983) measures the amount of goods, using the same units.

⁵ Assumption: the utility function is quasiconcave and growing in all variants.

Analogically, when we subtract G_{-i} from both sides, we will get the solution for the maximization of the function depending on private contribution i to a public good, i.e. g_i .

$$g_i = f_i(w_i + G_{-i}) - G_{-i} \quad (4)$$

The given formulation assumes that individual i considers private wealth w_i and contributions made by others to public good G_{-i} to be perfect substitutes.⁶ Individual i is thus indifferent between the situation when donations made by others are high while his or her personal wealth is low, and the opposite situation when donations made by others are low while his or her personal wealth is high, until the time when the total offer of public goods remains unchanged. As a result of that, the altruistic individual is only interested in the aggregate amount of provided public goods. When contributions made by others increase, the amount of his or her donation decreases and the other way round – the value of his or her donation grows if contributions made by others decrease.

This perfect substitution between the individual's private donation and donations made by others provides a basis for expressing a *neutral hypothesis* according to which a purely altruistic individual will decrease (increase) the value of his or her own donations g_i if donations made by others G_{-i} increase (decrease), namely in a ratio one to one.⁷

Stating that an altruist is interested only in the total offer of public goods and not in his or her own participation in the offer, the specified neutral hypothesis suggests that the increasing state expenses on the public goods that the donor also wanted to contribute to crowd out such voluntary contributions (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984 etc.). Considering the importance of such assumptions, the model specified above gave rise to empirical studies that test the validity of the stated crowding-out hypothesis. The hypothesis was brought to public notice as the Ricardo-Barro hypothesis. Studying the crowding-out effect means to search answers to the question whether or not provisions of public funds (subsidies) crowd out individual donations made by individuals. It is one of the basic questions in the area of public funding. Many theoretical and empirical researches make efforts to document the relationship between donating and state (public) funding by their outcomes. Although some researchers (Roberts, 1984) found partial presence of the crowding-out effect, none of them fully confirmed this effect.

⁶ Becker (1974) calls $w_i + G_{-i}$ the “social welfare”. The social welfare concept claims that an individual is not interested only in maximizing his or her own wealth or incomes, but also *in the values of his or her social environment*.

⁷ Barro applies this idea in the concept of *Ricardian equivalence* between taxes and public debt (according to Ziemek, 2003). According to this concept, people cope with public deficit spending if their own savings grow due to decreased taxes. He works on the assumption that households make efforts to stabilize their consumption; therefore they do not react to decreasing tax rates by increasing their consumption.

Private Consumption Model

Contrary to the previous model, donors are motivated directly through an act of donating according to the following private consumption model. It can be expected that people *feel like making a donation* because it brings them some status or praise, experience or warm-glow (Andreoni, 1989). This means that the total consumption of public goods and services has no influence on an individual's decision whether he or she will make a donation or not. Badelt (1985) classifies all these components entering the utility function of the individual, calling them Eigenvalues.

The donor's preferences in the private consumption model are expressed by the means of a framework similar to the framework used in the public goods model. The utility function has the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} U_i &= U_i(x_i, g_i) \\ x_i + g_i &= w_i \\ g_i &> 0 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

The utility depends on private consumption x_i , a voluntary contribution made by an individual i to public goods g_i . Within the given relationship, private contribution g_i enters directly into the individual's utility function and can be considered to be common consumed goods. On the other hand, the total offer of public goods G does not enter the utility function. The process of the individual's (donor's) decision-making is therefore independent of the total level of goods provided. Changes in the donor's behaviour caused by changes in contributions made by others can be derived in a similar way as in the previous model. We will do the following substitution: $g_i = G - G_{-i}$ in the budgetary constraint, and if we relate this to the utility function, we will get the following maximization problem:

$$\max_G U_i(w_i + G_{-i} - G, G - G_{-i}) \tag{6}$$

By deriving the function (6) according to G , we will get optimum amount G for individual i . The solution of this optimization problem can be written down as a function of exogenous components:

$$G = f_i(w_i + G_{-i}, G_{-i}) \tag{7}$$

Analogically, when we subtract G_{-i} from both sides, we will get a solution for the maximization of the function according to private contribution i to a public good, which means g_i .

$$g_i = f_i(w_i + G_{-i}, G_{-i}) - G_{-i} \tag{8}$$

Compared to the previous model, the equation (8) includes an assumption that donations made by others G_{-i} cannot be characterized as a perfect substitute for personal wealth w_i . This implies that the individual's decision whether he or she will make a donation is independent of the level of contributions provided by other individuals and the individual's own contribution i cannot be considered identical (substituted) with donations

made by others.⁸ Therefore, changes in the offer of services do not influence the donor's decision about the amount of his or her donation.

Because changes in the total offer do not influence decisions made by individuals about the amount of their contributions, this model cannot be related to the crowding-out effect stated previously. The above specified model, which is based on the utility arising from the very act and process of donating, also limits the existence of free riding considerably.

Investment Model

The exchange value benefit is another type of a benefit arising from an act of donating. It can be assimilated to *quid pro quo* or providing a service in exchange for another service. Although this benefit is typically associated with donation of time (volunteer work), it can be theoretically related to the whole concept of donating. According to this model, donating also brings benefits in the form of our increased value on the job market through accumulating human capital, practicing and learning new skills, obtaining new contacts or the possibility to present our competency to future employees (Duncan, 1999). Because we abnegate our existing revenues in favour of future revenues, the donating that is based on value exchange can be considered to be investment behaviour (Badelt, 1985).

The model based on the donor's investment behaviour was developed by Menchik and Weisbrod (1987). Their model focuses on such exchange values that can bring the donor certain advantages, incomes, benefits, etc. in the future. The individual is motivated to donating if he or she expects that the value of future incomes generated from obtained experience will be positive. Ziemek (2003), however, draws attention to the limits of the model concerned that result from omitting derived variables such as the quantity of contributions from other resources (regardless of whether they are private or public). The authors study the substitution relationship between private contributions made by the individual, and the level of public contributions, although, according to Ziemek, this relationship is not integrated to the theoretical framework of the model. Private contributions made by others and the level of public contributions to public goods hypothetically influence the level of contributions made by the individual. In this sense, two possible effects can be identified:

- *Signalling effect*: a positive correlation between private contributions made by the donor and contributions made by other people can be deduced intuitively. In the environment characterized by competitiveness on the labour market and uncertainty as regards qualification of the other job candidates, the goal of the donor is to find a good negotiating position in relation to the others.
- *Job-opportunity effect*: the positive influence of other people's contributions on the donor can also be deduced. The high level of contributions from public budgets in specific areas (for example the education sector) leads to expanding

⁸ The irrelevance of G and subsequently of G_i in the process of the donor's decision making is also apparent from the given model if we derive the first condition from the equation (5).

job opportunities and job demand. In an environment characterized by a high level of public expenses, skills and contacts specific for the respective area gain importance contrary to an environment where job opportunities are limited.

If we proceed from the assumption of this positive correlation among the other contributions (private or public) and contributions made by the donor, we can once again model the donor's investment motivation in a framework analogous to previous two examples.

The preferences of the donor's investment motivations are expressed in the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 U_i &= U_i(x_i, g_i(G)) \\
 \partial g_i / \partial G &> 0 \\
 x_i + g_i &= w_i \\
 g_i &> 0
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{9}$$

The donor's utility is given by personal consumption of goods x_i and own contributions to public goods g_i , which are a function of total contributions to public goods G . Donor i allocates his or her wealth w_i between personal consumption and volunteer contributions. According to the given restriction, every donor chooses such a level of his or her donation that will maximize his or her utility.

Impure Altruism Model

The impure altruism model differs from the three models specified above in the fact that it works with a mixture of various motives of donating, not just one characteristic motive. While the first three models belong to the group of comparative models, referring to just one specified benefit or motivation, the impure altruism model is a synthesis of the motives included in the public goods model and the private consumption model. The combination of motives gives a more realistic picture of the rationality of donating. When using a mix of different interests to explain donating, the impure altruism model gives us the most realistic picture of the decision-making principles followed by the donor.

When taking a decision about donating, the donor is influenced by many factors. Olson (according to Andreoni, 1990) notes that people are often motivated by their wishes to gain prestige, respect, friendship and other social or psychological advantages. Becker (1974) notes that the donor's behaviour can also be motivated by the wish to avoid being contemptedly by others or the wish to be praised.

Theoretically, the impure altruism model is based on the standard public goods model, however, it also includes motives of the private consumption model. The model was created and further developed by Feldstein, Cornes and Sandler, Steinberg (according to

Kingma, 1989) and it was called the impure altruism model according to Andreoni (1989).⁹

Under this model, the donor's utility is defined not only by the total quantity of contributions to public goods but also by the donor's own contribution. The utility function has the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} U_i &= U_i(x_i, G, g_i)^{10} \\ \partial g_i / \partial G &> 0 \\ x_i + g_i &= w_i \\ g_i &> 0 \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

The donor's utility is given by his or her own consumption x_i , the total offer of public goods G and his or her own contributions to public goods g_i . In this model, own contributions g_i enter the utility function twice: once as a part of public goods G , and once as private good g_i . In accordance with what was stated, there are two types of the donor's motivation: the motivation arising from an increased offer of public goods and the motivation arising from the very fact of donating. Analogically to the previously stated methods, we will do the following substitution: $g_i = G - G_{-i}$ in the budgetary constraint and if we relate this to the utility function, we will get the following maximization problem:

$$\max_G U_i(w_i + G_{-i} - G, G, G - G_{-i}) \quad (11)$$

By deriving the function (11) according to G we will get optimum amount G for individual i . The solution of this optimization problem can be written down as a function of exogenous components:

$$G = f_i(w_i + G_{-i}, G_{-i}) \quad (12)$$

Analogically, when we subtract G_{-i} from both sides, we will get a solution for the maximization of the function according to private contribution i to a public good, which means g_i .

$$g_i = f_i(w_i + G_{-i}, G_{-i}) - G_{-i} \quad (13)$$

It is obvious that equation (13) is identical to equation (8) based on the private consumption model. This finding is clearly not a surprise because the donor in both models are not indifferent if the contribution provide his/herself or other individuals.. In the context of impure altruism we can talk about a partial crowding - out effect, an increase in contributions made by others (for example state expenses) will not decrease a contribution made by the donor in a ratio of one to one because the donor in this model also gets warm-glow from his or her act of donating (Andreoni, 1990).

⁹ Other approaches are also stating other motives than altruism work with the moral or group motives (Collard, 1979). Actors in these models behave in accordance with moral restrictions or according to the reciprocity principle.

¹⁰ Assumption: the utility function is quasiconcave and growing in all variants.

Classification of Motives for the Use of Empirical Testing

On the basis of theories formulated using the public goods model, private consumption model, investment model, and impure altruism model (Ziemek, 2003), we have identified three basic groups of motives underlying donors’ decision-making. They are altruism, egoism and investment.

For the use of our own empirical testing, we herein present our own identification and classification (based on the previous theoretical economic models) of the most important variables that we can come across in various researches. Because we do not know all the existing internal variables that enter the process of the donor’s decision-making, we work only with those that have been identified in the most significant studies. They include first of all Becker (1974), Arrow (1974), Collard (1978), Batson (1987), Andreoni (1989), Andreoni(1990), Schervish (1997), Sargeant (1999), Kolm (2000), Bennett (2003), Kottasz (2004), Lloyd (2004), Smith (2005), Ranganathan, Henley (2008), Bekkers, Wiepking (2010), and Marx, Carter (2014). The following table shows our own classification of the motives identified in the researches analysed by us.

Table 3 Classification of motives

Altruism	Egoism	Investment
empathy, fellow feeling	profit/remuneration opportunity	personal contacts
affection, liking	desire for power	skills
compassion, solidarity	self-centredness	socio-economic status
mercy, pity	recognition	job opportunities
respect, gratefulness, love	political influence	
social rules	the feeling of not being replaceable	
believing in justice	fear, concerns	
conviction	warm-glow	
social responsibility	substitution, reciprocity	
moral duty	conscience	
religious obligation	desire to sacrifice oneself	
	reputation	
	psychological utilities	
	doing a good turn to society	
	the need to help	
	the need of belonging	

Source: Authors

Methodology

The number of researches that have been conducted about private donations to NGOs in the Czech Republic is very limited (for example Frič, 2001; Hladká, Šinkyříková, 2009; Řežuchová, 2011). We therefore executed our own empirical testing that focused on all factors that could influence donating, i.e. internal and external factors. The objective of the research was to identify factors that have an influence on decisions to donate financial means to non-profit organisations taken by individuals in the Czech Republic, and to analyse these factors as regards their mutual relationships.

As it has been stated above, this paper, however, focuses on presenting the outcomes that only capture an influence of internal variables, i.e. motives. The research questions concerning motives were worded as follows:

1. What motivates individuals in the Czech Republic to provide a donation? (significance of motives)
2. What is the interdependence of these motives? (strength of the relationship between the motives)
3. What is the relationship between the individual's motives and the amount of a provided donation?
4. What is the relationship between the individual's motives and the frequency of donating?

The data were collected through a questionnaire survey. During the survey we had to cope with some restraints that individual respondents were also acquainted with. There were three types of restraints on the research. The factors influencing donations in the Czech Republic related only to the following donations:

1. Provided to non-governmental non-profit organisations: respondents were presented with the specification of the non-governmental non-profit organisation, its definition and examples of the typical legal forms that these organisations acquire.
2. Individual: the research was related only to donations made by individuals in a society. Corporate donations were not included in the research.
3. Monetary: respondents considered only donations of money, not donations of free time, in-kind donations (e.g. clothes), donations of their skills, etc.

The questionnaire was divided into three parts. In the first one, the respondent was asked whether he or she donated or did not donate money to non-governmental organisations in 2013 and what made him or her do so. The second part of the questionnaire examined motives, opinions and standpoints influencing the act of donating by the means of an evaluation score. Both motives and determinants were included among individual statements. Respondents could express their opinions on the scale showing the rate of identification with the respective statement. The statements themselves formed the core part of the questionnaire. The third part of the questionnaire asked for information about the respondent's socio-demographic profile. The questionnaire used nominal, ordinal and interval features. All data referred to 2013.

Measuring of individual variables was done partly by the means of scaled scores, which is suitable for the features (characteristics) that cannot be measured exactly, and partly by the means of further open-ended and close-ended questions. Specific indicators used in the measuring of individual variables are shown in the following table in the sequence that was specified in the previous classification. Where one variable is expressed by the means of more indicators, the reason is that it is viewed from different perspectives.¹¹

¹¹ Indicator No. 8, stated under the *believing in justice* motive, refers to unfairness caused by

Table 4 Operationalization of internal variables (motives) in the questionnaire

Variable/motive	Operationalization/indicator
1. empathy	1. I make a donation because I would not like to be in the position of the needy.
2. affection, fellow feeling	2. I make a donation to express my affection and fellow feeling with the needy.
3. compassion, solidarity	3. I make a donation out of solidarity with the poor and weak.
4. mercy, pity	4. I make a donation because I feel pity for the needy.
5. respect	5. I make a donation out of deference to those whom I help.
6. gratefulness	6. I make a donation to those whom I myself am grateful to for something.
7. social rules*	7. I make a donation because some fixed social rules (habits) require so.
8. believing in justice	8. We must help each other because life was unfair to some people. 9. I make a donation to curb injustice in the society.
9. conviction	10. Activities of non-profit organisations are necessary for the society therefore it is right to support them financially.
10. social responsibility	12. Non-profit organisations do praiseworthy work but they should be financed by companies and entrepreneurs.
11. moral duty	14. It is morally right to donate money to the needy. 15. I consider donating to be a moral duty.
12. religious obligation	16. I make a donation because my religious belief obliges me to do so.
13. profit/remuneration opportunity	17. I make a donation because I can derive economic advantages from that.
14. desire for power	18. Making a donation endows me with power and superiority over those whom I helped.
15. self-centredness	19. Only those make donations who can afford it.
16. recognition	20. I make a donation because I expect it to make me visible or appreciated by society.
17. political influence	21. I can influence decisions taken by political representation through making donations.
18. the feeling of irreplaceability	22. Making a donation makes me feel irreplaceable.
19. fear, concerns	23. I make a donation because I am likely to need some help too.
20. warm-glow	24. I make a donation because it gives me joy and good feeling. 25. Making a donation brings me some satisfaction.
21. reciprocity	26. I do not support projects that do not generate any material, financial or other benefits for me.
22. conscience	27. If I do not help, I feel guilty.
23. desire to sacrifice oneself	28. Everybody should be able to sacrifice oneself and help other people.

“life” (e.g. when people are left paralysed after an accident), indicator No. 9 refers to injustice, it means system-related wrongs, when for example human rights are actively violated.

Indicator No. 10, stated under the *conviction* motive, refers to non-profit organisations and their neediness, indicator No. 11 refers to the necessity to make donations.

Indicator No. 12, stated under the *social responsibility* motive, refers to the responsibility of law firms and entrepreneurs, indicator No. 13 refers to the responsibility of individual in society.

Indicators No. 14 and 15, stated under the *moral justice* motive, are perceived differently, depending on what is morally right and morally obligatory to do.

Indicators No. 24 and 25, stated under the *warm-glow* motive, have the same meaning, they are only expressed differently: good feeling vs satisfaction.

Different interpretations related to the *doing a good turn to society* motive depend on whether I repay for having been helped too (indicator No. 30) or for being well off (indicator No. 31).

24. reputation	29. If I make a donation, the others will respect me more.
25. doing a good turn to society	30. I make a donation because I was helped too.
	31. I make a donation because I am well off.
26. the need to help	32. Society requires us to help the needy.
27. the need of belonging	33. Making a donation makes me feel a part of a certain group of people who have something in common.
28. personal contacts	34. I make a donation because this is a way to make contacts in a supported non-profit organisation that I can make use of in my work and personal life.
29. skills	35. I make a donation because it enables me to obtain new skills (for example to allocate my finances efficiently)
30. socio-economic status	36. I make a donation because it enables me to increase my status in society.
31. job opportunities	37. I make a donation because it can generate a business opportunity or a job offer for

** (in the following sense: habits widespread among people of various ranks)*

Source: Authors

Interviewer: A questionnaire survey was the primary source of data. It was done by a trained team supervised and methodically supported by the authors of this paper.

Respondents: The personal interview survey was carried out in March and April 2014; a total of 442 completed questionnaires were obtained. Interviewers approached respondents with a request to fill in a questionnaire. The respondents filled in the questionnaire on their own, having instructions how to proceed available. The basic set consisted of the population over the age of 18 living on the territory of the Czech Republic. Furthermore, the authors worked with available (random) sampling, when people who are “at hand” are selected to comprise a set (sample) of respondents (Škodová, 2013). Conclusions resulting from the analysis are therefore related only to this selective set.

The data collection phase was followed by an analysis of the collected data. Some questions had to be first classified according to the selected categories and marked with codes. The obtained data were analysed by the means of mathematical-statistical methods that are commonly used in similar cases.

The following were specifically used for the analysis:

- Indicators for the descriptive analysis/statistics: distribution; absolute, relative, and cumulative frequency; measures of central tendency (the mean, median, mode), standard deviation, standard error of the mean.
- Functions for the correlation analysis: the Pearson correlation coefficient (establishes how strong is a relationship between variables), the ANOVA method based on the F-test (the analyses of dispersion was used for its ability to evaluate the relation among a quantitative variable and one or more qualitative variables). The significance level determined for the analysis was $p = 0.05$, as it is common in social sciences.

Outcomes

In this section, outcomes of the research survey will be presented and the following motives analysed: with respect to *altruism*, they included empathy, affection, fellow feeling, compassion, solidarity, mercy, pity, respect, gratefulness, social rules, believing in justice, conviction, social responsibility, moral duty, and religious obligation. With

respect to *egoism*, they included profit/remuneration opportunity, desire for power, self-centredness, recognition, political influence, the feeling of not being replaceable, fear, concerns, warm-glow, reciprocity, conscience, desire to sacrifice oneself, reputation, doing a good turn to society, the need to help, the need of belonging. In the case of *investment*, they included personal contacts, skills, socioeconomic status and job opportunities.

Analysis of Motives

The following section analyses the structure of individual responses to the set of questions included in the second part of the questionnaire. Respondents used the scale from 1 (I absolutely agree) to 5 (I absolutely disagree) to answer each of the questions. Questions concerning individual motives were mutually combined in the questionnaire; in the following tables, they are sequenced in the order as stated in the previous section.

The questions examining motivation of individuals, who actually made a donation in 2013, show that altruism is the core motive for making a donation. In the case of the 16 indicators that captured altruism, respondents completely agreed or rather agreed with a respective motive in 11 cases. Full consent (I absolutely agree) was obtained especially for the motives of *moral duty* (42.5%), *respect* (39.3%) and *conviction* (35%). Partial consent (I rather agree) was obtained especially for the motives of *conviction* (51.4% and 45.3%), *believing in justice* (49.5%) and *social responsibility* (47.7%). The altruistic motives that respondents did not agree with included *gratefulness* (53.3% of disagreeing respondents in aggregate), *social rules* (65.7% of disagreeing respondents in aggregate) and *religious obligation*. This motive obtained the highest level of non-identification among the altruistic motives (73.8% of disagreeing respondents in aggregate). Respondents classified the motives of *believing in justice* (curbing injustice) and *social responsibility* of entrepreneurs and businesses to be the motives that can be identified only with difficulties.

As regards the egoistic motives, respondents provided some very unequivocal responses. Respondents - donors do not entirely identify themselves (they marked "I absolutely disagree" on the scale) with the following motives: *desire for power* (75.7%), *profit/remuneration opportunity* (71%), *reciprocity* (67.8%), *recognition* (66.8%), and also *the feeling of not being replaceable, political influence or doing a good turn to society* (...because I was also helped to). Among the egoistic motives, *warm glow* (89.7% of respondents absolutely or rather agreed with it) received positive evaluation. Respondents ranked *fear, concerns*, and also *the need to help* and *the need of belonging* among the motives that are hard to identify.

Negative standpoints unequivocally prevail with respect to the *investment motives*, respondents do not identify with them. The "I absolutely disagree" answer obtained the highest percentage for all four indicators.

It is important to separately analyse the outcomes for the respondents who did not provide any donation in 2013 (non-donors). The donor behaviour of the respective group of respondents may have been different in the previous years: they may have made donations, they also may have been among the most generous or frequent donors. Therefore, it is also appropriate to analyse their behaviour, to find out which motives played some role, which motives should be emphasized if efforts were to be made to influence the

behaviour of these donors (for example by non-profit organisations). We can also conclude from some responses of non-donors why they did not make any donation.

In the records of responses, far more questions were left unresponded by non-donors than by donors. The responses exploring motives of individuals, who did not make any donation in 2013, once again prove that the altruism was the main internal motive that influenced these people in their decisions to donate (although they did not make any donation in 2013). Full consent (I absolutely agree) was obtained especially for the motives of *moral duty* (23.7%), *conviction* (18.4%) and *respect* (18%). They correspond to the donors' motives, with just one difference: their percentages were lower. Partial consent (I rather agree) was obtained especially for the motives of *moral duty* (45.2%), *conviction* and *believing in justice* (49.5% each) and *compassion, solidarity* (43%). Altruistic motives with which respondents did not agree included *social rules* (70.2% of disagreeing respondents in aggregate) and *moral duty* (52.6% of disagreeing respondents in aggregate) and *religious obligation*. Once again, this motive obtained the highest level of non-identification among the altruistic motives (83.8% of disagreeing respondents in aggregate). Respondents classified the motives of *believing in justice* (curbing injustice) and *social responsibility* of entrepreneurs and businesses to be the motives that can be identified only with difficulties.

As regards the egoistic motives, respondents rather disagreed with their influence. The highest level of absolute disagreement relates to the motive of *desire for power* (61.4%), *recognition* (55.3%) or *profit/remuneration opportunity* (49.6%). Once again, the motives that were positively evaluated among the egoistic motives include *warm glow* (64.1% respondents absolutely or rather agree with it), or *desire to sacrifice oneself* (64.1%). Respondents ranked *reputation* and also *the need to help, the need of belonging* or *political influence* among the motives that are hard to identify.

Once again, negative standpoints unequivocally prevail with respect to the investment motives. The "I absolutely disagree" answer obtained the highest percentage for all four indicators.

Mutual Comparison of the Motivation of Donors and Non-donors

Table 5 under shows the outcomes of mutual comparisons of the differences between percentages of individual responses as obtained by donors and non-donors, but also mutual comparison of the mean values marked on the scaled scores. Value 1 was assigned to the "I absolutely agree" response, value 2 to the "I rather agree" response, value 3 to the "I do not know" response, value 4 to the "I rather disagree" response, and value 5 to the "I absolutely disagree" response. This means that the lower the mean value was, the more identified the respondents were with a respective statement; the higher the mean value was, the less identified the respondents were with a respective statement.

The first half of the table shows the difference between the percentages for donors and non-donors and clearly documents that donors identify (in the case of the altruistic motives) or do not identify (in the case of some egoistic or investment motives) with the given statements more than non-donors. Therefore, it can be assumed that donors have more decided opinions, and their behaviour reflects the influencing factors to a greater extent. This is proved by the positive differences exceeding ten or even twenty percent-

age points. The most controversial (as seen from the point of the “donors vs. non-donors” view) in terms of their declared attitudes seemed to be indicator No. 15 (*I consider donating to be my moral duty*), which received unequivocally positive responses from donors (they identified with the indicator) and negative responses from non-donors (they did not identify with the indicator). Indicator no. 6 (*I make a donation to those whom I myself am grateful to for something*) also brought interesting findings. Although it is an altruistic motive, non-donors rather identified with it while donors responded rather negatively. Furthermore, the fact that *conscience (If I do not help, I feel guilty)* does not play a very important role for non-donors is an important finding. The number of non-donors who responded to the question by marking the “I absolutely disagree” response exceeded the donors who marked the same response by 10%. Non-donors also disagreed more distinctively (as regards the percentage) than donors as regards the following motives: *moral duty, religious obligation*. As regards the egoistic motives, the motives such as *warm glow* or *the desire to sacrifice oneself* play a more important role for donors than non-donors.

Table 5 Comparison of the influence that individual motives have on donors and non-donors

Variable		The difference of the percentages between donors and non-donors					DONORS	NON-DONORS	TOTAL The mean value marked on the scaled scores				
		I absolutely agree	I rather agree	I do not know	I rather disagree	I absolutely disagree			X'	median	modus	SD	SE
empathy	1.	14.3	0.3	-12.6	-0.8	0.1	2.4	2.7	2.56	2	2	1.20	0.06
affection, fellow feeling	2.	16.3	2.7	-5.2	-3.2	-9.3	2.3	2.9	2.61	2	2	1.19	0.06
compassion, solidarity	3.	12.2	0.0	-5.4	-4.0	-1.1	2.2	2.5	2.36	2	2	1.11	0.05
mercy, pity	4.	11.3	5.3	-5.3	-4.0	-5.5	2.2	2.7	2.46	2	2	1.17	0.06
respect	5.	21.3	-0.6	-7.8	-6.1	-6.0	2.0	2.5	2.26	2	2	1.16	0.06
gratefulness	6.	-2.7	-18.3	2.3	10.1	9.8	3.4	2.8	3.08	3	2	1.36	0.07
social rules	7.	1.9	5.5	-4.6	-1.8	0.3	3.9	4.0	3.93	4	4	1.01	0.05
believing in justice	8.	14.5	5.7	-5.0	-6.5	-6.1	2.0	2.6	2.30	2	2	1.07	0.05
	9.	5.8	4.6	-1.7	1.3	-7.9	3.1	3.4	3.27	3	4	1.19	0.06
conviction	10.	16.6	1.5	-9.8	-2.3	-4.2	1.9	2.4	2.18	2	2	1.05	0.05
	11.	7.9	13.2	-7.4	-6.5	-6.0	2.2	2.6	2.41	2	2	1.07	0.05
social responsibility	12.	-4.7	-9.1	-0.2	10.0	5.7	3.1	2.7	2.94	3	2	1.21	0.06
	13.	17.8	13.5	-11.0	-14.3	-4.7	2.1	2.9	2.52	2	2	1.11	0.05
moral duty	14.	18.8	-5.9	-2.3	-5.1	-3.8	1.8	2.2	2.03	2	2	1.02	0.05
	15.	21.8	16.2	-8.9	-17.3	-11.0	2.4	3.4	2.92	3	2	1.29	0.06
religious obligation	16.	6.6	5.8	-2.6	0.5	-10.0	4.1	4.5	4.29	5	5	1.15	0.06
profit/remuneration opportunity	17.	2.4	-6.0	-6.3	-11.2	21.5	4.5	4.2	4.35	5	5	1.01	0.05

desire for power	18.	0.5	-4.3	-2.7	-6.5	14.3	4.6	4.4	4.50	5	5	0.88	0.04
self-centredness	19.	-6.4	-14.3	0.2	6.5	14.9	3.6	2.9	3.23	4	4	1.36	0.06
recognition	20.	0.5	2.6	-3.1	-9.8	11.6	4.4	4.4	4.41	5	5	0.91	0.04
political influence	21.	-1.7	-0.5	-6.0	-3.7	13.7	4.2	4.0	4.09	5	5	1.02	0.05
the feeling of irreplaceability	22.	2.4	0.8	-6.3	-6.3	12.0	4.2	4.1	4.14	4	5	1.01	0.05
fear, concerns	23.	8.1	-5.2	-0.6	0.9	-1.9	2.8	2.9	2.86	3	2	1.26	0.06
warm-glow	24.	21.6	4.1	-11.1	-7.2	-6.5	1.7	2.4	2.06	2	2	1.07	0.05
	25.	7.8	13.1	-5.0	-5.0	-7.5	2.3	2.8	2.57	2	2	1.22	0.06
reciprocity	26.	-0.7	-0.6	-7.5	-9.9	19.5	4.4	4.1	4.27	5	5	1.06	0.05
conscience	27.	-0.7	0.8	9.1	2.4	-10.7	3.8	4.0	3.91	4	5	1.14	0.05
desire to sacrifice oneself	28.	17.3	-3.7	-3.4	-6.2	-2.6	1.9	2.3	2.13	2	2	1.02	0.05
reputation	29.	0.6	2.7	-7.6	-3.0	9.0	3.7	3.6	3.70	4	4	1.10	0.05
doing a good turn to society	30.	-2.5	-4.3	-1.7	1.9	7.9	4.2	3.9	4.05	4	5	1.13	0.05
the need to help	31.	2.6	7.9	0.9	-2.5	-6.3	2.8	3.1	2.99	3	2	1.30	0.06
the need of belonging	32.	6.7	-0.4	2.8	-5.3	-2.1	2.6	2.8	2.74	2	2	1.17	0.06
personal contacts	33.	3.3	2.8	-2.4	5.3	-8.2	3.2	3.4	3.27	3	4	1.27	0.06
skills	34.	2.9	-2.2	-7.3	-9.3	16.8	4.2	4.0	4.14	5	5	1.08	0.05
socio-economic status	35.	-1.3	1.5	3.6	-2.5	0.0	4.1	4.1	4.07	4	5	1.03	0.05
job opportunities	36.	1.5	-0.9	-5.3	-3.0	9.0	4.1	4.0	4.05	4	5	1.05	0.05
doing a good turn to society	37.	0.1	-1.0	-9.6	-9.7	22.9	4.4	4.1	4.25	5	5	1.00	0.05

The table also presents the outcomes of the descriptive statistics for individual motives. It is the calculation of the mean/expected value (X'), median, modus, standard deviation (SD) and standard error of the mean (SE).

Source: Authors

The second part of the table mutually compares the mean values that were selected by the respondent on the scaled scores. Both donors and non-donors achieve the same mean values for the following two motives: *recognition* and *obtaining skills*. The most important difference between the mean values is achieved by the indicator of the *moral duty* motive, the size of which is one percentage point.

For donors, the following motives were the most influential: *warm glow* (mean value 1.7), *moral duty* (1.8), *desire to sacrifice oneself* (1.9), and *conviction* (1.9). The motives that donors identified to the least degree with are: *desire for power*, *profit/remuneration opportunity*, and *reciprocity*. The motives the influence of which donors could not identify included: *believing in justice* (curbing injustice) or *social responsibility* of entrepreneurs and companies. There is no investment motive that donors would unequivocally identify with.

The records reveal that non-donors are far more likely to leave some questions unanswered. Non-donors do not have so clear idea of what influences their standpoints or opinions on donations. Because they did not make any donation at least during last year,

they could think about the act of donating to less extent than donors. However, the causality could also be reversed. Because non-donors have no unequivocal opinion about what motives underlay an act of donating, they are less determined to make a donation.

Analysis of the Interdependence between the Motives

We were also interested in the mutual relationships among the specified motives. We asked ourselves whether there was any interdependence among the outcomes, and if yes, then how strong such potential interdependence was. In this case, we used correlation analysis as a tool. Mutual interdependence is assessed on the basis of the calculated Pearson correlation coefficient¹². The correlation coefficient is given by the following relation:

$$r = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2 \sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \bar{y})^2}}$$

The assessment of the correlation coefficient value and the effect (influence) arising from it was as follows: $r \in (0.1; 0.3)$ small, $r \in (0.3; 0.5)$ medium, $r \geq 0.5$ strong effect/strength of a relationship.

The values of the Pearson correlation coefficients are calculated from the whole research set, i.e. for donors and non-donors together. A high value of mutual interdependence can be identified between the following pairs of motives:

- Job opportunities – profit/remuneration opportunity (.634)
- Recognition – profit/remuneration opportunity (.595)
- Job opportunities – personal contacts (.586)
- Personal contacts – profit/remuneration opportunity (.569)
- Socio-economic status – personal contacts (.554)
- Job opportunities – recognition (.541)
- Socio-economic status – recognition (.508)
- Fear, concerns – empathy (.505)
- Job opportunities – socio-economic status (.504)
- Socio-economic status - profit/remuneration opportunity (.503)
- Moral duty – social responsibility (.502)

If we summarize the outcomes declaring a high mutual relationship between the motives, we will see that the variables listed under the Investment group constitute the majority of these motives. The investment motives are also significantly interconnected with the egoistic motives. Therefore, they are rather the motives that the respondents expressed their disagreement with.

The altruistic motives included the following: *moral duty* (1×), *empathy* (1×), *social responsibility* (1×); the egoistic motives were: *profit opportunity* (4×), *recognition* (3×),

¹² The Pearson correlation coefficient was chosen on the basis of an assumption of a common distribution of variables (taking into account the number of characteristics) and linearity of the relationship.

and *fear and concerns* (1×). High statistical dependence was most frequently associated with the investment motives: *personal contacts* (3×), *socio-economic status* (4×), and *job opportunities* (4×). The aforementioned shows that the highest level of mutual correlation is found between the motives that have the minimum influence on donations made by individuals.

Table 6 Arrangement of the pairs of motives with a high level of mutual dependence to three groups of motives

	Altruism	Egoism	Investment
Altruism	x		
Egoism	.505	.595	
	.502		
Investment	x	.634	.586
		.569	.554
		.541	.504
		.508	
		.503	

Source: Authors

Medium dependence between the motives is represented in the outcomes to a large extent. In summary, it can be stated that the pairs of motives mostly fall into the category of altruistic motives; other pairs include those where one of the motives is warm glow. Low interdependence is obvious for example in the pairs where one of the motives is religious obligation, doing a good turn to society, the need to help or the need of belonging.

Analysis of the Interdependence between the Motives and the Amount or Frequency of Donating

We will come to interesting findings in evaluating whether a certain motive and the degree of identification with it influence the amount of a donation provided. The following approach was selected to determine whether or not any such relationships existed. The research sample then consisted of 214 characteristics. The amounts of donations as stated in the questionnaires were categorized as follows:

Regarding that the values of the provided donations reached a considerably uneven variation interval, it was not possible to assess the influence of individual motives with respect to the average amount of the provided donation (the absolute donation amount). In mutual comparison, the amount of a donation is assessed by the means of the category value (the relative donation amount). The tenth category was not included in the calculation.

The most significant influence on the amount of donation provided was exerted by investment motives (*personal contacts, socio-economic status and job opportunities*) and egoistic motives (*profit/remuneration opportunity, reciprocity, and reputation*). The respondents who identified with these motives donated higher amounts. We will find only one motive (*religious obligation*) among the altruistic motives which, when confirmed by donors, plays a positive role as regards the amount of donation provided. The

motives of *compassion and solidarity* or *the need to help* brought about unexpected outcomes. Higher amounts were donated by the respondents who did not identify with the given motives. The lowest possible average amounts were donated by the respondents who expressed disagreement with the following motives: *believing in justice, conviction* or *feeling good about giving*.

Table 7 Categorization of responses by the donation amount

Category	Donation amount in CZK	Number of characteristics
1	0-100	29
2	101-200	36
3	201-500	41
4	501-1,000	29
5	1,001-2,000	27
6	2,001-5,000	26
7	5,001-10,000	12
8	10,001-50,000	9
9	>50,000	3
10	Not specified	2
	Total	214

Source: Authors

The mutual interdependence between the amount donated and the degree of identification with a respective motive can also be studied by the means of the single-factor analysis of variance, ANOVA. The method is based on assessment of relationships between the variances of the sample sizes being compared – the equality of mean values testing is converted to the equality of two variances testing (F-test). The goal towards which the application of the ANOVA method is directed is either to accept the H_0 null hypothesis or to reject H_0 (on a selected level of significance). In this perspective, it is a common test of statistical hypotheses. The calculation method was therefore the same as the method used for the testing of classical hypotheses.

The basic statistics used in the analysis of variance is generally the F testing criterion, which is used to test the hypothesis whether mean values in the groups determined by an acting factor (or factors) differ more than the mean values influenced by the action of natural variability (the accidental fluctuation).

We use the F-test (the test of difference between two variances) to test the null hypothesis: $H_0: \sigma_1^2 = \sigma_2^2$

According to the executed statistics, the H_0 hypothesis was not validated for 8 indicators. P-values for the concerned indicators were lower than the selected significance level of α 0.05 and according to ANOVA they have statistically significant influence (at the level of 5%) on the amount of a provided donation.

They are comprised of four of the following motives included in the altruism category: *empathy, social responsibility, moral duty, religious obligation*, two motives included in the egoism category: *profit/remuneration opportunity, warm glow* and two motives included in the investment category: *personal contacts and skills*.

The respondents who made a donation to a non-profit organisation in 2013 were asked in the questionnaire how often they made a donation. They were to choose from the following options: (1) once (2) more times, and (3) regularly. In the case of the second and third option, the respondents could specify how many times they made a donation or how often they made a donation respectively. The responses showed that more than a half of respondents (55%) made a donation more times (they most often specified that 2 times, 3 times or 4 times), more than one third (35%) made a donation only once. The remaining 10% of the respondents made a donation regularly (most often every month, i.e. 12 times).

The following procedure was selected to find out whether there was a mutual relationship between the frequency of donating and some of the motives. It was found out that the identification with each motive achieved average rates for each of the frequencies of donating. The scores measuring the rate of identification with a motive were 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (similarly as in the questionnaire) and the scores for the categories of frequency were 1, 2, 3.

As regards the highest positive values, it is possible to see the strongest positive relation between the rate of identification/non-identification with a motive and the frequency of donating. On average, a donation was made most often (the average frequency value is 2 and more) by the respondents who identified with the following motives: *profit/remuneration opportunity, political influence or social rules*. Furthermore, the respondents who did not identify with the following motives: *empathy, compassion and solidarity, and conviction*. The respondents who did not identify with the motive of *moral duty* or, to the contrary, identified with the motive of *skills*, showed the lowest frequency of donating.

The mutual relationship between the motive and frequency of donating was also examined by the means of the ANOVA analysis of variance. The analysis of variance did not validate the H₀ null hypothesis for six of the indicators. The previous table summarizes only the significance levels of the F-test of the null influence of a respective indicator (so called p-value) achieved. The p-value of a test indicates the degree of statistical importance of a respective indicator. The lower the value is, the higher is the statistical significance of an effect.

The p-values for the emphasized six indicators were lower than the selected level of significance of α 0.05 and according to ANOVA, they have a statistically significant influence (at a level of 5%) on the frequency of donating. They include three altruism indicators: *mercy, pity, respect, and believing in justice*, two egoism indicators: *reciprocity, and the need of belonging*, and one investment indicator: *job opportunities*.

Conclusion

The objective of this paper was to present our own categorization of motives that can influence decisions to make a donation to a non-profit organisation, test the concerned motives empirically and ascertain their significance for the Czech population. In the paper, the authors answer the four basic questions they asked: What motivates individuals in the Czech Republic to provide a donation (significance of motives)? What is the interdependence of these motives (strength of the relationship between the motives)? What is the relationship between the individual's motives and the amount of a provided donation? What is the relationship between the individual's motives and the frequency of donating?

In this paper, motives mean driving forces of a psychological character (*driving* because they set human conduct and activities in motion; *forces* because they have their own direction and intensity). When making their decisions on donating, every individual is influenced by a given complicated structure of motivation dispositions, which are partly inborn and partly acquired. As Jas (2000, p. 2) states: “*Charitable donating is an exchange process which includes both economic and social values and which is driven by both selfish and altruistic motives. Approaches that do not take into account this two-fold character of the exchange will always encounter problems in explaining the phenomenon.*” The presented paper follows a similar line of thought as the research it is based on. The authors classify individual motives in accordance with findings of the theoretical models to the categories of altruistic, egoistic, and investment motives.

The empirical testing confirmed assumptions that are characteristic for this type of a research:

- When data (especially any data concerning human behaviour) are collected indirectly, it is of the utmost importance to operationalize the examined phenomena in a suitable manner. In interpreting the outcomes generated from the research, the way how questions were worded and understood (validity of a question) was important. Several differently worded questions could refer to one motive. The outcomes document that findings related to one motive could be different (sometimes even opposite), depending on the wording of a question. Hence, a respective motive was validated in connection with one question and failed to be validated in connection with another.
- Although it is somehow possible to measure and identify which motives influence decisions to make a donation, the influence or the willingness to donate cannot be identified with the donorship rate (or a respective amount of the provided donation). The research outcomes document that in the case of some donors who can be characterized by high willingness to make donations (the willingness to donate is derived from the ratio of donors to non-donors for a selected variable) a low donorship rate (the donorship rate is derived from the amount of a provided donation) can be observed concurrently. Donors can be found who do not significantly incline to the motives being studied, nevertheless can be characterized as the most generous donors.
- The direction and strength of a type of behaviour is determined by motives, however, its manner is determined by situational factors, too: behaviour adapts

to a situation, and so the same objective can be reached in various situations (Nakonečný, 1999). The statement can be also applied to behaviour of the donor. It is influenced by a number of obvious and hidden internal or external variables, with various causal relationships existing between them. Hence, it is not possible to define a complex overview of all variables for any situation and any research sample or scientifically define dependence relationships.

The donorship related issues represent a very heterogeneous and extensive topic as regards the frequency of potential research questions. In order to narrow the topic as it was described above, it was also necessary to think about the objective of the research: to characterize factors influencing the individuals who donate most generously or most frequently or most willingly. The research focuses on all three types of donors, describing and identifying those with the highest willingness, rate (they donate most) and frequency (they donate most frequently) of donating. The comparison of the willingness, rate and frequency of donating shows that outcomes can be various: the most willing donors do not necessarily be the most generous ones, regular donors do not necessarily have to be the most willing ones, and the most generous donors do not necessarily have to be regular donors.

The outcomes of the executed testing have opened a space for a follow-up research that would:

- focus on examining the influence of selected variables, also taking into account individual areas of activities of non-profit organisations, the scope of operation of supported projects or individual forms of donorship;
- present specific proposals and recommendations for the public administration of the Czech Republic and organisations of the non-profit sector as regards support to individuals' donating in society based on an adapted research design and new, statistically representative data collected according to it;
- extend the research survey with a longitudinal research that would follow the same group of respondents for a longer period of time, with the aim to find new variables entering the individual's decisions on making a donation or capture the rate of change in the influence of individual variables;
- ascertain the rate of the dependence strength by means of the determination coefficient for rejected H_0 .

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