Muslim Tombs and Ethnic Folklore: Charters for Hui Identity

Dru C. Gladney

The Hui minority, the largest of ten Muslim nationalities in China, is distributed throughout every province and city and over 70 percent of all counties (Map 1; Diao 1967:169). This paper endeavors to shift discussion away from conventional considerations of whether the Hui are really "Muslim" or merely inheritors of a cultural tradition somewhat different from the Han majority. Instead, I propose to examine one important area of interest to Hui communities throughout China, namely the lore and events surrounding various tombs and shrines, which I categorize as historic, Sufi, and local. Historic tombs reflect concerns that put local Hui identity in an international perspective; Sufi tombs link the Hui in national networks and

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The Hui people are the second largest of China's fifty-five minority nationalities (the Han majority comprises over 94 percent of the total population). According to the 1982 census (MinzuJuanjie 1984), the total population of the ten Muslim minority nationalities in China is 14.6 million. These nationalities are, in order of size, the Hui, Uigur, Kazak, Dongxiang, Kirgiz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Baoton, Tatar (see Schwarz 1984). They represent about 1.45 percent of the total population (Pillsbury 1984:231). However, the census registered people by ethnic group, not by religion, so the actual number of Muslims is still unknown, and the local figures I have collected range widely from the census reports. The Hui minority numbered 7.2 million in 1982; the figure was adjusted to 8.4 million by the end of 1984 (Chinese Islamic Association interview).

Space prevents discussion of the background for the Chinese term Hui or Hui jiao for Muslim or the Hui people, which derives from a medieval Chinese transliteration for the Uigur people (huī bù), but see Bai 1951; d'Ollone 1911; de Thiersant 1878, 1:1–15; Ma 1979; Nakada 1971; Pillsbury 1973:iv–viii. Under the Nationalist government, the term included all Muslim peoples, whereas since the 1950s, the Communist government has used the term to refer to the Chinese-speaking Muslims, as opposed to the other nine Turkic-Altaic Muslim language groups. Other terms used to refer to the Hui include Dungan in Russia (Dyer 1979) and Panthay in Southeast Asia and Yunnan (Yegar 1966), as well as Zhuantu Hui ("turban head Hui"), Hanhui, Huihui, Huhe, Khojami, Khalkhas, Musuln or Mumin ("Muslim") and Chinese Muslims.

Israeli (1982, 1984) portrays Hui and Chinese government relations as inevitably con

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often divide them regionally; and local tombs evoke interests that are more communal, reflecting practical concerns and personal identities.

Tombs vividly encapsulate Hui ancestral tradition and ethnic identity. As charters for identity, they provide a sense of continuity with the past and assist adaptation to the changing social present. The tombs also serve, I argue, to focus attention on two levels of tension Hui experience in China: the interethnic competition between Hui and Han for scarce resources, and the struggle within Hui communities in defining appropriate Islamic ideals. Variant interpretations of these ideals have led to the rise of separate factions and expressions of identity among the Hui as they seek to adapt to changing historical and socioeconomic conditions.

Historic Tombs and International Prominence

Historic tombs are among the monuments preserved by the Chinese government's Historic Artifacts Bureau. They include the tombs and monuments erected in special graveyards in southern China, especially in Quanzhou, Guangzhou, and Yangzhou, to persons identified as Muslims who served as officials, militiamen, and merchants from the Southern Song through the Qing dynasties (eleventh through nineteenth centuries). Historic tombs also contain the graves of Hui who played major roles in China's development and interaction with the West, including Zheng He, Hai Rui, Sai Dianchi (Sayid Edjell), Li Zhi, and more recently the Panthay rebellion leader, Du Wenxiu (see Gladney 1983). Of central importance is the acknowledgment by the Chinese government of the contribution Muslims made to Chinese history. Many Hui look to these historic figures as foreign Muslim ancestors who provide proof of distinguished descent and who link them with a larger Muslim world.

Along China's southern coast are large lineages of Hui communities for whom foreign Muslim ancestry is critical to ethnic identity. In Quanzhou, Fujian, a typical response to a question about Hui ancestry was "Of course, I know my family are descended from foreign Muslims. My ancestor was an Arab, and our name was changed to Jin in the Ming dynasty. We have our family genealogy to prove it. . . . We are Hui because we are descended from these Muslim ancestors." I asked this question in a Hui household that openly includes pork in its diet and practices Chinese folk religious traditions in ancestral worship. Although cognizant of their Islamic heritage, these Hui have not practiced Islam or attended a mosque for generations. Because many of the Hui in Quanzhou do not follow Islamic practices, the Chinese State Commission for Nationality Affairs did not recognize them until recently as belonging to the Hui nationality.

The historic tombs of Arab and Persian ancestors of the Hui in Quanzhou are playing an increasingly important role in the interaction between Islamic identity

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4 In this article, "charters" are those shared texts, myths, rituals, or objects that are accepted and used primordially to refer to a group's distinctive identity. Nagata (1981:111) writes, "Charters of identity that draw on a (purative) notion of common blood, origin, descent, or kinship connection as a reason for being or acting may be labeled ethnic." See also Bentley 1983:9–10; Schwartz 1975; Trotter 1981.

5 For the Chinese debate over the Muslim identity of these individuals, see Bai [1947] 1985; Bai and Yang 1985; Chen [1975] 1984; Pei 1959. Also see Tazaka's (1941:91–110; cited in Lipman 1981:293) assertion that Li Zicheng was raised in a Muslim household.

6 See Huang and Liao 1983 regarding the changing of the surnames of several Hui lineages in Quanzhou during the Ming dynasty. Bai and Ma [1958] 1984 discuss the background for this discriminatory policy.
and government policy.\textsuperscript{7} In 1961 the Fujian provincial government declared that the Ashab mosque in Quanzhou (founded in 1009–10) and the Lingshan Muslim tombs located outside the city were historic monuments. Since 1979 the state, provincial, and city governments have provided substantial funds for the restoration of these structures, to the extent that the tombs have now been refurbished and rededicated with a large tract of land and a sign at the entrance proclaiming “Lingshan Holy Islamic Tombs.” All tourist maps for Quanzhou City highlight these two Islamic sites as important attractions.

The Lingshan tombs are primarily those of two Muslim saints said to have been sent to China by the Prophet Muhammad, who were buried in their present location before the Yuan dynasty. According to He Qiaoyun’s Minshu (c. 1620) the two saints buried in Quanzhou are Imam Sayid and Imam Waggas from Medina. They were two of four foreign Muslims said to have visited southern China during the Tang Emperor Wu De’s reign (618–26).\textsuperscript{8} Fujian provincial and local municipal publications proudly proclaim Quanzhou as the site of the third most important Islamic holy grave and the fifth most important mosque in the world (see Yang 1985:1–15). Substantial research has been carried out on the more than three hundred Islamic carvings and artifacts left by the Muslim communities that concentrated in Quanzhou during its tenure as a key international harbor on the southeast coast from the Tang to the Yuan dynasties (seventh to fourteenth centuries).\textsuperscript{9} The government’s efforts to refurbish historic Islamic monuments in China have attracted foreign Muslim attention and investment. In 1980 Kuwaiti funds helped to build the new international airport in nearby Xiamen, and in 1985 the Kuwaitis initiated a hydroelectric dam project on the Minjiang outside Fuzhou. Recently, a Jordanian businessman offered U.S. $1.5 million to reconstruct the Ashab mosque.

Unforeseen developments have arisen, however, in the changing identity of the local Hui communities. Until 1979 many Hui belonging to the Ding, Jin, Huang, Pu, and Guo lineages were not officially recognized as members of the Hui nationality, even though they had claimed to be Hui since before 1949. In 1940 Ding Deqian stated, “We are Muslims [Huijiao ren], our ancestors were Muslims” (Zhang 1940:1), in response to a question regarding his ethnic background posed by a research team sent from Beijing to Quanzhou by the China Muslim National Salvation Society. It was not until 1979, however, that members of the Ding lineage in Chendai Township were officially recognized by the State Commission for Nationality Affairs as belonging to the Hui nationality. In Chendai Township, just outside of Quanzhou City, there are thirteen villages whose inhabitants, numbering over sixteen thousand, bear the

\textsuperscript{7} Shichor’s (1984) analysis of the interplay between Middle Eastern foreign relations and China’s treatment of its Muslim minorities does not reflect the role of the minorities themselves in interacting with policy. See also Voll’s analysis (1985), which distinguishes important differences between Muslim identity in China and Russia resulting from divergent ethnic policies.

\textsuperscript{8} Wahb Abu Kabcha is said to be buried in the Guangzhou’s famous “Bell tomb.” The fourth saint is buried in Yangzhou, and over the entrance to the tomb, recently restored, was displayed a Chinese epitaph proclaiming the foreign origin of Islam: “The Dao Originates in Western Lands” (Dao yuan xi tu). See Liu and Chen (1962) 1984). The early Tang date of this visit by foreign Muslims is hotly debated by Chinese Muslims and scholars; see Chen 1983b:167–76, 1984:95–101; Yang 1985:16–38; and Zhi 1983:148–56.

\textsuperscript{9} Artifacts discovered thus far have been laboriously catalogued, photographed, and translated into Chinese, Arabic, and English by the Fujian Maritime Museum (Chen 1984). The representations, calligraphy, and photography are all excellent in this significant volume, which is largely a reproduction and expansion of Wu Wenfeng’s Religious Inscriptions in Quanzhou (1957). Although the translation from Chinese to English is quite good, it is hoped that future editions might consider translating the Arabic on the stone inscriptions directly into English, rather than having the English based on the Chinese translations of the Arabic.
single surname of Ding. Failure to recognize the Ding and other southeastern Hui lineages derived from a complex combination of state policies and traditional ideas that identified as Hui only persons who were culturally Muslim and generally abstained from pork.\textsuperscript{10} Investigations into the genealogies of these Quanzhou lineages in the late 1970s linked many of them with foreign Muslim ancestors. Based on this research, the State Nationalities Commission agreed to recognize as Hui anyone who could verify his or her descent from foreign Muslims.\textsuperscript{11} They thus found themselves in the position of recognizing as Hui people who raised pigs, knew little of Islam, and actively participated in Chinese folk religious rituals.

Although this recognition is consistent with the present government's policy of making a clear distinction between the Hui ethnic group and the Islamic religion, it was a source of embarrassment and tension for many conservative Hui Muslims.\textsuperscript{12} As a result, in 1983 the Chinese Islamic Society authorized funds to send four trained Imams (\textit{Ahong}, from the Persian \textit{Akhun[d]}\textsuperscript{13}) from the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region as teachers and missionaries to help educate the local Fujian Hui in their proper Muslim tradition. The government supported this effort in order to avoid the difficulty of escorting foreign Muslim dignitaries to some of the earliest Muslim communities in China where Islam is no longer practiced. Communist government policies of "freedom of religion" are now even more vividly evident to visiting Muslims. The Hui in Fujian are not only free to believe, they are encouraged to do so.

Many of the local Hui have been actively taking advantage of this change in official status. They have requested and received large state educational, agrarian, and industrial development grants (Gladney forthcoming). The historic Lingshan tombs have become a focal point in this ethnic activity. Significantly, the Ding lineage relocated its ancestral graves to Lingshan Hill in August 1980, claiming religious and perhaps blood ties to the foreign Muslim saints buried there. Behind the Ding tombs is a tablet in Chinese and Arabic indicating that this is the first ancestor of the Ding lineage in Chenjiang (now Chendai Township) and the ancestor of the fourth generation of the Ding lineage from Jinjiang County (see Quanzhou 1983:207–13). On the back of the tablet is the following Chinese inscription: "I bought this famous hill Luyuan and it was my intention to have my parents buried here, my brothers all agreed with me without objection. Litchis are planted to give shade just as our ancestors shall protect us forever. Mind you, my descendants, safeguard this important place. Written by Uncle Chengzhai in the eighth month of the second year of Xuantong [1910]" (in Chen 1984:108). The inscription clearly sets forth the "rights and obligations" of Ding descendants to maintain the traditions of their ancestors: in


\textsuperscript{11} The continuing recognition of these Hui since 1979 has led to a dramatic increase in the population of Muslim minorities in Fujian Province, widely ranging in early accounts from 1,000 in 1910 (Broomhall 1910:215) to 13,000 in the 1953 census, to 31,060 in the 1982 census, and to over 60,000 in 1986 (estimate of the Quanzhou Historical Research Society). Many other Hui, such as the 4,871 Guo members in the East Street neighborhood of Quanzhou (personal interview), have yet to be recognized and are currently making application based on genealogical research.

\textsuperscript{12} The policy of distinguishing between ethnicity and religion is viewed as a concomitant of Marxist nationality policy in China. See the State Commission for Nationality Affairs (1983) as well as Bai 1951; Fei 1981:60–78.

\textsuperscript{13} A note on transliteration: Except in cases of well-known proper names (Ulur, Canton), I follow the pinyin romanization system now standard in China. Islamic terms used by Hui Muslims are transcribed in their vernacular, known as \textit{Huibi hua} ("Hui talk"), using pinyin (see Pillsbury 1973:275–83 for a glossary of Hui terms in Taiwan). Where known, I give their Arabic or Persian origins. Other Islamic terms are based on Arabic as given in the \textit{Encyclopaedia Britannica}.  

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return for preserving their identity, they will be “protected forever.” The survival of the Ding lineage as a people and the preservation of their tombs demonstrate the veracity of this promise. “Ethnicity in its deepest psychological level is a sense of survival,” DeVos (1975:17) writes. “If one’s group survives, one is assured of survival, even if not in a personal sense.” If nothing else, the Hui are tenacious survivors.

Recent visitors to Chendi Township would say that the Hui concentrated there are more than surviving. Prosperity has come to the Ding from government minority assistance and their increased contacts with overseas relatives. Although the Ding lineage only occupies one-seventh of the township’s population, they account for over one-third of the total area’s annual income (party secretary interview). Over half of the Hui in the township have their own two-story homes, which they paid for with cash. Every household owns a color television set, and there are more than 550 motorcycles in the thirteen Hui villages.

Economic prosperity has been accompanied by ethnic and even religious revival. The Ding have refurbished their central ancestral hall (zongtang) and developed an exhibit highlighting their foreign Muslim ancestry and recent prosperity as Hui. In November 1984 the government recognized the Jinjiang County Chendi Township Commission for Hui Nationality Affairs, a grass roots organization the Ding themselves initiated. They have applied for permission to be recognized as an autonomous Hui township and hope to build a mosque. In 1987 they plan to celebrate Ramadan—the first time these Hui have undertaken the fast in several generations.

Historic Muslim tombs are important for modern Hui in their understanding of their descent from foreign Muslim ancestors. The growing Muslim identity of the Fujian Hui in interaction with changing sociopolitical conditions and government policy reveals an interesting dialectical process that is the basis for ethnic change (compare Nagata 1981:112). These lineages have always maintained a Hui identity; only now, in conjunction with recent events, are they beginning to take on a decidedly Islamic commitment. The historic Hui tombs have acquired added international significance in the present government’s improving relations with foreign Muslim governments. They have become objects of ethnic tourism and pilgrimage by foreign Muslims, as well as by urban and northwestern Hui in China who wish to explore their Islamic “roots.” Hui cadres who are Communist party members often make a point of visiting historic Muslim tombs, such as the large monument and public park outside Kunming, Yunnan, dedicated to the father of Zheng He, the fifteenth-century Ming explorer and Muslim eunuch. Hui visitors to these historic Muslim tombs reaffirm their international Islamic heritage. As Eaton (1984:355) found for pastoral nomads in Pakistan, tombs often serve to link local systems of culture into a larger cultural framework. In this case, historic shrines as objects of veneration and tourism remind local Chinese Hui of their international and religious roots. Before Zheng He departed on his fifteenth-century voyage to Hormuz Island in Persia, he inscribed the following request for protection, thus demonstrating the significance the tombs represented at that time for China’s Muslims: “The imperial envoy, general, and eunuch Zheng He went to Hormuz and other countries in the Western Seas on an official mission. He offered incense here on [May 30, 1417]. May the saints bless him. This was recorded and erected by the Zhenfu Pu Heri.” (Chen 1984:96).

14 For the relevance of tourism to ethnic change, see Adams 1984; Cohen 1979; Grayburn 1977; Greenwood 1972; and Smith 1977. See Jamjoom 1985 for an interesting account of a Saudi delegation’s visit to Islamic sites in China. For a local Ningxia example, see Gladney (1986).
Early-twentieth-century missionaries and travelers who visited Islamic centers in Northwest China often reported the importance of various tombs and shrines. Claude L. Pickens wrote of his visit to one of Ma Hualong’s tombs in Zhangjiaquan, Gansu: “To say in Kansu and Ningxia that one has visited this place means much in friendship among Moslems in the northwest and most parts of China. The outstanding characteristic of this Order in its several ramifications is the reverence which its members give to their leaders, who, one might say, act as mediators between man and Allah” (Pickens 1937:416). Because early observers often misinterpreted the meaning of these tombs for the Hui communities and the Sufi orders attached to many of them, they were apt to label the Hui as a sect of “tomb worshipers” and polytheists. Even as late as 1961, Joseph Trippner was arguing that the “grave-worshiping cults” in China’s northwest were all Shi’ite in origin and that the religious tradition of Islam in China may have been completely Shi’ite. The tombs continue to spark debate in China over the nature and legitimacy of the various Islamic orders that either venerate or denounce them. Jonathan N. Lipman (1986:10) has demonstrated that the late-nineteenth-century reforms of the Yihewani (Chinese for Ikhwan, the Muslim Brotherhood) in China pointedly proscribed the veneration of these tombs and Sufi saints. Conflicts surrounding the tombs and their followers reflect an ongoing debate in China over orthodoxy in Islam, revealing an important disjunction between “scripturalist” and “mystical” interpretations. Hui Muslim literature in China also reflects this debate (see Leslie 1981; Löwenthal 1940; Mason 1925). In a similar fashion, the study of Southeast Asian Islam has often centered on the contradiction and compromise between the native culture of the indigenous Muslims and the shari’a of orthodox Islam, the mystical and scriptural, the real and the ideal (see Roff 1985:8–10). The supposed compromise of orthodox Islamic tenets with local cultural practices has led to the use of often misleading explanatory concepts, such as syncretism and assimilation; “sinification” has been the term used to describe this process among the Hui (Lipman 1981:139; Pillsbury 1973:8). An alternative approach, and one perhaps more in tune with the interests of Hui themselves, sees this incongruence as the basis for ongoing dialectical tensions that often lead to reform movements and conflicts within the Muslim communities (see Eickelman 1976:10–13; Kessler 1978:19–20). These studies follow Weber (for example, 1952, 1958), in seeking to understand the wide variety of Islamic expression as reflecting processes of local world construction and programs for social conduct in which a major religious tradition becomes meaningful to an indigenous society (Geertz 1968:97; Eickelman 1981:12–13).

Contemporary economic and sociopolitical upheavals provided the impetus for the important movements and reforms taking place within Islam in China. The source of much of the power and effectiveness of these new movements among Hui Muslims, however, lay in internal conflicts over incongruities between the state of Islam as it was and as it should be in the eyes of the reformers. The earliest Muslim communities in China were descended from the original Arab, Persian, Central Asian, and Mongolian Muslim merchants, officials, and soldiers who settled along the southeast coast

\footnote{In contrast to the classical approach to Sufism, which is concerned primarily with philosophical and theological issues (for example, Ali 1933; Arberry 1950; Archer 1980; Shah 1969), this study attempts to look at the social role of Sufi saints and their tombs in influencing Hui identity. A “Sufi” is any person belonging to the mystical Islamic tradition (Lapidus 1984:60).}
and in the northwest in varying numbers from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{16} Generally residing in independent small communities clustered around a central mosque, they became known as the Gedimu (from the Arabic qadim for "old") traditional Sunni, Hanafi Islam, in contrast to the "new" Sufi reform movements (Feng 1985: 135–36).\textsuperscript{17} Different Islamic orders reflecting ethnic and regional diversity within Chinese Islam existed from its inception.\textsuperscript{18} However, Sufi reform movements did not begin to make a substantial impact in China until the late seventeenth century, in what Lipman (1986) calls the "second wave" of Islam's entrance into China. Like the Sufi centers that had proliferated after the thirteenth century (Trimingham 1971: 10), many of these Sufi movements developed into socioeconomic and religiopolitical institutions built around the schools established by descendants of early Sufi saintly leaders. The institutions became known in Chinese as the menhuan, the "leading" or "saintly" lineages.\textsuperscript{19} Although it is impossible here to delineate the history and distribution of these Sufi menhuan and the tombs important to them, Fletcher's cogent introductory discussion of their development is worth noting:

Over the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries a considerable number of these "saintly lineages" came into being in northwest China, most of them within the Naqibbandi [Naqshbandi] "path." Typically, each saint's tomb had a shrine, or qubba (Chinese gongbai or gongbei), and the main shrines became centers of devotional activity. The "saintly lineages" obtained contributions from their followers and amassed substantial amounts of property. The growth in the number and importance of the menhuan represented an important change, because they gradually replaced the "old" (gedimu) pattern by linking together the menhuan adherents all over the northwest. The widening compass of social integration that resulted made it easier for the "saintly lineages" and other leaders to harness the Muslims' political and economic potential, facilitating the rise of Muslim warlordism in that region in the twentieth century. (Fletcher n.d.: 15)

Many Sufi reforms swept Northwest China during the tumultuous decades of the early Qing dynasty (seventeenth to eighteenth centuries). Increased travel by and communication between Muslims in both eastern and western directions during what Fletcher terms the "general orthodox revival" of the eighteenth century had great influence on Muslims from West Africa to Indonesia and, not least of all, on China's Hui Muslims.\textsuperscript{20} Exposure to these new, generally Sufi ideas led to a reformulation of traditional Islamic concepts that rendered them more meaningful to the Hui Muslims of that time. That reformulation was gradually institutionalized into such forms as the menhuan. Of those that took root and developed into full-fledged menhuan, only

\textsuperscript{16} For the early history of Islam in China, see especially Leslie 1986; Lipman 1981: 288–99; Ma 1983; Nakada 1971.

\textsuperscript{17} The misleading distinction between Islamic orders known as "old sect" (laojiao) and "new sect" (xinjiao) was an unfortunate attempt by Qing-dynasty officials and later Western scholars (Israel 1978: 155–80) to distinguish between conflicting Hui factions involved in the many nineteenth-century Hui rebellions, much as "White Lotus" was used as a generic label for Buddhist sectarian movements of the same period (Harrell and Perry 1982: 283–305). See Chu 1955; Gao 1985: 245–61; Gladney 1983; Lipman 1981: 134–39; Yang 1981, forthcoming.

\textsuperscript{18} See Chen Dasheng's (1983a: 53–64) interesting inquiry into Islamic factional disputes that led to the ten-year Isbah factional disturbance in Quanzhou at the end of the Yuan dynasty (fourteenth century).

\textsuperscript{19} Menhuan is the Chinese technical term describing the socioeconomic and religious organization of Sufi brotherhoods linked to the "leading lineage" of the original Sufi founder, extending through his appointees or descendants to the leader himself and from him to Muhammad. For a more detailed discussion, see Jin 1985: 187–203; Lipman 1984a: 302–4; Ma and Wang 1985; and Nakada 1971.

\textsuperscript{20} For further information on this period of Islamic revival and reform, see Rahman 1968: 237–60; Voll 1982: 33–86.
four maintain significant influence among the Hui today. These are the Qadariyya, Khufiya, Jahriyya, and Kubrawiya *menhuan* (see Ma [1981] 1983; Mian 1981:45–117; Pickens 1942; Yang forthcoming). These four main *menhuan* are subdivided internally into myriad smaller *menhuan* and subbranches because of ideological, political, geographical, and historical differences (see Appendix). The history of these divisions and alliances, if it could ever be written in any detail, would reveal the tensions and new meanings created as Hui communities dealt with perceived incongruities between Islamic ideals and changing social realities.

The Qadiri *tariqa* (known as the Qadariyya in China) was established early among the Hui by Khoja Abd Alla, a twenty-ninth-generation descendant of Muhammad (Shah 1969:126–35; Subhan 1960:264–85; Trimingham 1971:40–44). Chinese Sufi records show he entered China in 1674 and preached in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Linxia, Gansu, and was finally buried in Guizhou in 1689 (Yang forthcoming). Although the generally acknowledged founder of the Qadiri *tariqa* was Abd al-Kadir al Jilani, Abd Alla probably studied under Ibrahim b. Hasan al-Kurani (1616–90), who was initiated into both the Naqshbandi and Qadiri *tariqas*, as well as several other Sufi orders. This great teacher and his son, Abu t-Tahir Muhammad al-Kurdi (d. 1733), drew students from as far away as Sumatra, the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, and East and West Africa. The Qadiri path became rooted most firmly in Chinese soil through one of Abd Alla’s students, Qi Jingyi, Hilal al-Din (1656–1719). Qi daozi (great master Qi) was buried in Linxia’s Great Tomb (*Da gong bei*) shrine complex, which became the center of Qadariyya Sufism in China.

The appeal of Qadariyya Sufism as a renewal movement among the Hui is the result of its combination of a simple ascetic mysticism with a noninstitutionalized form of worship that centers on the tomb complex of deceased saints rather than the mosque. Qadariyya Sufi continue to attend the Gedimu mosques in the communities in which they live, gathering at the tombs for holidays and individual worship. Familiar Confucian moral tenets, Daoist mystical concepts, and Buddhist folk rituals pervade Qadariyya Sufism, becoming infused with new Islamic content (Ma [1981] 1983:328–54). Although the Qadariyya *menhuan* has always been less influential and powerful politically among the Hui than other orders, such as the Jahriyya *menhuan*, it set the stage for many to follow.

The Naqshbandi *tariqa* became rooted in Chinese soil by the establishment of the Khufiya and Jahriyya *menhuan* (see Ali 1933:97–112; Shah 1969:141–58; Subhan 1960:286–309; Trimingham 1971:62–66). Originating in an earlier Central Asian and Yemeni Naqshbandi Sufism, the Khufiya order emphasized the veneration of saints, the seeking of inspiration at tombs, and the silent *dbhikr* (properly “Khufiya,” the “silent” ones, Fletcher n.d.). There are now over twenty subbranch *menhuan* throughout China, with mosques in Yunnan, Xinjiang, and Beijing. Most Khufiya orders are concentrated in Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, and the distinctiveness of the original Khufiya ideals are beginning to lose their appeal in some outlying areas such as northern Ningxia. The most influential of the Khufiya *menhuan*, the Huasi (Flower Mosque) branch, is centered in Linxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu, at the tomb of Ma Laichi, which is currently under restoration. After studying for six years in Naqshbandi hostels in Bukhara, Yemen, and the pilgrimage

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21 An interesting example is provided by the Jiucaping *menhuan*, a branch of the Qadariyyah in Haiyuan County, southern Ningxia, who say their order is the “flagpole of Ali” and venerate Fatima as *hange laomu* (true mother), who resembles the Buddhist Guanyin (see Mian 1981:102) or the heterodox “Venerable Eternal Mother” (Weller 1987:50).

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cities, Ma Laichi returned to China in 1734 and propagated the Khufiyya Huasi order for thirty-two years among the Hui and Salar in Gansu and Qinghai before dying in 1766 at the age of eighty-six (Yang forthcoming).

The Naqshbandi Jahriyya order was founded in China under the dynamic leadership of Ma Mingxin (1719–81) (see Fletcher 1971; Ford 1974:153–55). After twenty years of study under Naqshbandi Sufis in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula, he returned to China in 1744 with more militant, fundamentalist reforms, and his order became known for its use of the jahr (vocal dhikr, from which comes the name Jahriyya, the "vocal" ones). After the failure of the Northwest Hui rebellion (1862–76) led by Ma Hualong, the famous Jahriyya Sufi and fifth-generation descendant of Ma Mingxin, the dispersion of the proscribed "New Sect" led to the establishment of four Jahriyya branch orders (Bai 1953; Chu 1955). Today, there are two main subbranches of the Jahriyya that continue to be of significant influence among Naqshbandi Sufi Hui in China. The Shagou menhuan claims spiritual descent from Ma Yuanzhang, who is said to have received the "oral transmission" (koubuan) from one or two chosen Ahong who were initiated by Ma Hualong himself just before he died. Shagou members maintain that all of Ma Hualong's blood descendants were lost in a Qing pogrom that killed 130 of his family members. Hence, the mantle of leadership could only come to Ma Yuanzhang spiritually. After Ma Yuanzhang's death during the 1920 earthquake in Shagou, Xiji County, southern Ningxia, his fourth son, Ma Zhenwu, took up the leadership of the order (see Lipman 1981:148). The Shagou branch is said to have 145 mosque communities (jiaofang) in southern Ningxia, 40 in Xinjiang, 20 in Guizhou, more than 10 in Yunnan, and at least 1 in Beijing, Tianjin, Jinan, and Jilin Province, with followers totaling over one hundred thousand (Mian 1981:68). The second main Jahriyya menhuan claims direct descent from Ma Jinxi, the grandson of Ma Hualong, whom it alleges escaped the massacre of Ma Hualong's descendants. Concentrated in Zhangjiachuan, Gansu, and Banqiao, Ningxia, it claims more than twenty-five thousand followers, with 120 mosques in Ningxia, 20 in Xinjiang, and at least one in Gansu, Qinghai, Jiangsu, Sichuan, and Yunnan (Ma [1981] 1983:431; Mian 1981:70).22

Of minor influence in China is the fourth main Sufi order, the Kubrawiyya (seeTrimingham 1971:55–58). It is said to have been introduced in China as early as 1370 (or as late as the 1660s) by an Arab, Mohidin, who taught in Henan, Qinghai, and Gansu, and died in the Dawantou, Dongxiang Prefecture, Gansu Province (Ma [1981] 1983:451–55; Yang forthcoming). Although the total population of the various Islamic orders in China has not been published, Yang Huaizhong (forthcoming) writes that of the 2,132 mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, 560 belong to the Yiwewani (Ikhwans), 560 to the Khufiyya, 464 to the Jahriyya, 415 to the traditional Gedimu, and 133 to Qadarriyya religious worship sites (some of which include mosques). This distribution is similar to the one found throughout Northwest China.

The importance and extensiveness of these Sufi orders for uniting disparate Hui communities across China cannot be underestimated. Gellner’s (1981:103) suggestion

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22 Given the rebellious history of the Naqshbandi Jahriyya in China (see Bai 1953; Yang 1981), the Chinese government has made important efforts to incorporate present leadership whenever possible. The current mursibids for the Shagou and Banqiao menhuan in Ningxia, while not Communist party members, are regional vice-chairmen in the People’s Political Consultative Conference (zhengxie) and the People’s Government (renmin zhengju). In recent years, Muslim Sufi leaders have accompanied state-sponsored delegations to foreign Muslim nations.

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are often left unresolved, as Fabian (1982:212–14) suggests in his study of African religious movements. Their very dynamism derives from the questions they raise and the doubts they engender among people struggling with traditional meanings in the midst of changing social contexts. Out of these struggles sometimes arise new movements in dialectical tension with the old. These dialectical transitions have led to the powerful appeal of Islamic movements among Hui Muslims, who are faced with making Islamic ideals meaningful in the changing Chinese sociopolitical world.\textsuperscript{25} Many of the conflicts and issues uniting and dividing these Sufi orders revolve around the tombs built for their deceased saintly leaders.

Mention of the tombs either in print or in person has been rare on the mainland. In the pre-1949 Chinese literature, only one article refers to them specifically (Ma [1937] 1985). In a few recent publications still unavailable outside China, Hui scholars are beginning to refer to the tombs (Ma [1981] 1983; Mian 1981). This official reticence can be attributed to the unclear policy of the state with regard to Sufism and tombs. Even though the Chinese government has fully supported the rebuilding of mosques and religious assembly, tomb reconstruction has been a quasi-legal issue that few are willing to address. Local cadres generally decline to comment on the policy: some have noted that “they are still illegal”; others have said, “As long as they don’t influence production, they should be okay.”

Their ambivalence has numerous reasons. These tombs, like many Chinese graves, were traditionally located in the middle of a field, obstructing valuable agricultural production. The vast majority of tombs were torn down or moved during the land reform and collectivization campaigns of the late 1950s. The early Communist criticisms of the so-called superstitious practices of geomancy (\textit{fengshui})—which had sometimes dictated the placing of graves in the middle of fields—and the restrictions on lineage or clan temples also militated against the maintenance of the tombs. More important, Sufi-related criticism movements in the 1950s were linked to these tombs. Sufi \textit{w}a\textit{q}f holdings had grown during the Republican period, in some cases in the northwest to large proportions, and \textit{murs}hids (a \textit{murs}h\textit{id} is a \textit{men}\textit{huan} leader, or \textit{pi}r, sometimes referred to as \textit{jiao}z\textit{hang}, or “teaching director”) were accused of landlordism. In Ningxia after 1958, when the Shagou branch leader of the Sufi Jahriyya order, \textit{Ma} Zhenwu, was criticized for landlordism and later died in prison, all Jahriyya and \textit{men}\textit{huan}-related tombs were torn down. By the end of 1966, the peak of radicalism in the northwest during the Cultural Revolution (the \textit{posijin}, “destroy four olds” campaign), only a few local tombs in remote places remained. These tombs and shrines were—and in many cases, still are—regarded by cadres as feudal vestiges, backward politically, religiously, and culturally.

Throughout Ningxia and Northwest China, even as the issue of rebuilding these tombs is being debated at the various levels of government, the tombs are being reconstructed with enthusiasm. A cadre in southern Ningxia commented: “The Hui

\textsuperscript{25}The development of the Yihewani (\textit{ikhu}an) in China is an especially relevant example of this dialectic, where a conservative reformist Wahhabi movement initially critical of the nonscriptural elements of earlier Islamic orders in China, became identified more with nationalist and political causes that espoused education and modernism. See especially Lipman 1986:14–21, as well as Ma 1982; Ma [1981] 1983:127–54; Mian 1981:118–31; Ye 1981. Within the Yihewani emerged another reform movement in the 1930s, the Salafyye (see Eickelman 1976:226–28), that stressed a nonpoliticized fundamentalistic return to Wahhabi scripturalist ideals. In turn, in the last few years, a controversy has arisen within the Salafyye in Gansu over the immanence or transcendence of Al-lah, with members of the side advocating transcendence demonstrating their position by cutting their hair short. Irnanentalists, by contrast, let their hair grow down to their collars, symbolizing God’s presence in the world.
Rebuild the tombs on their own at night with their own materials and money. Who can stop them?" Under the present state policy of protecting and assisting minorities, most local cadres are hesitant to interfere with any ethnic activity that does not directly violate existing ordinances. The dismantling of the commune and the recontracting of the land back to the farmers under the new responsibility system has also led to more personal discretion in land usage (Diamond 1985; Lardy 1986:99–102; Shue 1984). It is significant that many of the Sufi-related shrines have begun to be rebuilt since August 1983, when the state posthumously rehabilitated the Jahriyya mursid Ma Zhenwu.

Sufi Shrines and Hui Identity

The importance of these Sufi tombs, both as a vehicle for linking Hui adherents and as the locus of conflicts that divide them, is illustrated well by the main tomb of the Qadariyya Sufi order in Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province. Known as the "little Mecca" of China, partly as a result of its key location along important trade and communication routes, Linxia has been a center for Chinese Islam and exchange with the outside world since the middle ages. Almost every major Islamic movement in China finds its origin among Muslims who came to Linxia disseminating new doctrines after returning from Middle Eastern pilgrimage centers. As a result, Linxia combines the spiritual importance of Mecca and the central theological learning of the Iranian city of Qum for China's Hui Muslims (cf. Fischer 1980).

Although most Chinese Sufi shrines are small monuments erected over the grave of the saint, the main Qadariyya tomb in Linxia is part of a huge shrine complex of buildings at the northern outskirts of the city that includes a mosque, a cemetery, a Qur'anic school, housing for guests and the resident religious leaders, and the "great gongbei" (da gongbei) itself, from which the menghuan derives its name. The complex combines in one locality the institutions of the saint's shrine (siyyid) and the brotherhood (zawiya), which Clifford Geertz (1968:49) distinguishes in Moroccan maraboutism. The gongbei is located at the back of the complex, encircled by a low fence, with incense smoke billowing from large pots in front and to the sides. Before the silk-covered tomb are prayer mats, where visitors are often found kneeling and reciting. Over eight thousand followers celebrated Ramadan here in 1985. The majority of worshipers were women, which is consistent with attendance at gongbei prayers in general across the northwest.

The resident saint is Imam Yang Shijun Ali (addressed as laorenjia, "old master"). Eighty years old, he is the tenth-generation descendant of Qi Jingyi, Hilal al-Din, the original founder of the Qi Men Great Gongbei branch. Ewing (1984:107) has discussed the charismatic quality of the Sufi saint (pir) who radiates Allah's blessing (baraka) and the psychological importance of his dress and manner for reflecting divine

26 For interesting firsthand accounts of the vibrant Hui Muslim life in Linxia (formerly Hezhou), see Ekwall 1939:15; Lattimore 1929:78–81, 1951:18–20, 228–29; and Fletcher's 1979:25–30 introduction to this area as the crossroads of four cultures.

27 Like other menghuan in China, it has names taken from its founder and from its locality. It is called the Qi Men (Qi menghuan) branch for Qi Jingyi, who is entombed in the shrine; it is also known as the Great Tomb (Da gongbei) menghuan (Ma [1981] 1983:329).
power. The appearance of the Qadariyya murshid is also quite striking. He is about five feet tall, with a wispy beard extending to his chest; his hair is completely white, and his attire often consists entirely of black silk. His deep-set eyes exude authority and knowledge. Similarly, the appearance of the neophyte imam (halifat, from khalifa, a successor, or student with the right to eventually take on disciples), one of fifteen residing at the shrine, is surprising. Unlike most Hui halifat of other Islamic orders, who are generally young and well scrubbed, dressed in brand-new black or blue Sun Yarsen jackets, this novitiate wears a wrinkled, long-sleeved shirt with unbuttoned cuffs hanging down over his hands. He is thin, with sunken cheeks and dark red, tired eyes. It is important to note here that, in contrast to several other Sufi orders in China, most Qadariyya orders are distinguished by leadership succession through religious merit, not blood inheritance. The students are promoted to higher ranks in the order because of their dedication to studies, personal piety, and abnegation according to Qadariyya doctrines. This young halifat literally has a chance at sainthood, if not in this life, quite possibly in the next. The appearance and manner of both murshid and halifat reflect the Qadariyya values of asceticism and advancement through personal dedication.

An Arabic inscription on the wall directly behind the tomb provides a crucial text for Hui Sufi identity. The young student reverently recited the text, first in Arabic, and then in Chinese: “He who sees my person of Muhammad, that person actually sees Allah” (kanjiante wo Muhamde de ren, neige ren dishi kanjiante Anla). Imam Yang Shijun quietly described how the text inscribed on the wall was originally spoken by the Prophet Muhammad himself shortly before he died, to his four caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar, Ali, and Uthman. This saying insured the proper succession of leaders. He said it is inscribed on the wall because it is the key to the Qadariyya Sufi order. On a rival Qadariyya shrine located in the Beishan (North Mountain) Hui graveyard on the outskirts of Linxia the following text is inscribed, written in parallel quatrains of four Chinese characters:

Those who wish to obtain the Dao must take the good medicine of the Dao; to receive what you desire, you must follow often the right rules and principles. Here are thirty rules, recorded as follows:

Honestly tao bai [pray at the gongbei to Allah through the murshid]
Be completely beautiful [mei] and reliable [tuo kao]
Follow Allah's orders and proscriptions
Respect the religious leader [Dao zhang]
Firmly remember all of the true words
Follow and listen to the teacher's instruction
Piously worship
Fast often
Propagate the heavenly lessons
Be filial to your parents
Pray for Allah's favor
Fear Allah's anger
Be free from corruption [qinglian jijiao]
Be diligent in studies
Do not overeat
Do not oversleep
Loyalty and adherence to the Sufi leader’s precepts are recurring themes in this and many other texts, in addition to concepts of personal piety and asceticism. The personal power of the saint derives from the authority of his descent from Muhammad, which is mediated by the silsila of succession from the original Sufi saints who are buried in the tombs. This was explained further by an Ahong who was an important member of the Jahriyya Sufi order, Shagou menhuan, in Xiji, Ningxia: “The highest level next to Allah is the Prophet Muhammad. The next level is the mursid. We should therefore respect him. We can ask him to help intercede with Allah for our requests and to help us after death. We must respect him, seek [qi] him, but not worship him. Whoever sees the Prophet’s mursid, sees Allah.”

Sufi shrines and their saints in China, like the ṭawīdh-sufīḥ system in the Punjab (Eaton 1984:336–37), provide a conduit between the devotee and God. For Hui Sufis in Northwest China, their identity as Hui is inextricably linked to their understanding of their relationship to their foreign Muslim ancestors and, ultimately, to the Prophet and Allah, through the mursids, either living or entombed. Unlike the process Ewing (1984:108) describes, where the baraka of the saint is important for healing and the validation of his authority, in China the mursids and their tombs are critical primarily for providing the ancestral and theological link. Sufis in China, like those in India (Eaton 1978), have filled a wide variety of roles, including teacher, trader, soldier, warlord, and rebellion leader, but most important for this discussion is the role that Sufi saints and their tombs play in authenticating Hui identity. Saints and their tombs have provided an immediate sense of identity for the Hui minority in China, a minority whose common people are generally unable to read the Qur’an in Arabic, unaware of Islamic history, isolated from the outside Muslim world, and on the fringe of Han Chinese society (cf. Gellner 1969:149). Literally living between two worlds, the tombs provide a point of integration for the Hui.

Hui concerns with identity are evident in the many conflicts of Sufi orders over the building and maintenance of tombs. At the shrine of the Quanji (Complete Property) gongbei outside Linxia, the overseer pointed out the lineage of Sufi saints inscribed on the wall of the shrine. He emphasized that this proved the Jiayang faction was a legitimate branch of the Nadariyya, an assertion disputed by the Nadariyya Qi Men menhuan leaders (cf. Ma [1981] 1983:346–47). Unlike the Hui in Quanzhou, for whom personal genealogy and the tracing of their lineage to foreign Muslim ancestors are critical, northwest Sufi Hui are more interested in the lineage (silsila) of their saintly order. Discussion of membership in the proper order based on descent is often the basis for conflict with and denigration of inferior orders. Hui often say

28 Important Daoist concepts pervade Nadariyya Sufism in China. The rather complete and complex integration of the two mystic systems accomplishes practically what Izutsu (1983), in his ambitious comparative study, attempts philosophically — “un dialogue dans la métahistoire.” In the history of Nadariyya Sufism in China we see the working out of Izutsu’s metahistorical dialogue between Sufism and Daoism in the lives of Hui adherents.

29 Ewing (1984:106–7) suggests that for Pakistani Sufi, the personal power and relationship of the pir with his client is more important than membership in the brotherhood itself, as Crapanzano (1973:217) writes is true for the Hamadsha in Morocco. For Masud (1984:124–51), the authority of the mufsil rests wholly in the knowledge and personal character. I would argue that for the Nadariyya in China, the power and authority of the mursid is directly related to the menhuan he represents. The charismatic personality and knowledge of the Nadariyya mursid is crucial for authenticating his right to inherit and tap that power, because succession to leadership is based on merit, not blood inheritance.

30 Tombs and saints also provide access to religious knowledge unavailable to nonlettered Hui. Adherents of a Khufiyya menhuan tomb recently rebuilt outside Tongxin, Ningxia, claim to possess knowledge of 110 names of Allah, which their mursid passes on only to those initiated into the order. On the relationship of religious knowledge to moral authority, see Eaton 1984:336; Gilmartin 1984:239–40; Masud 1984:144–45.

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that their Sufi branch is superior to a rival branch because their leader is a blood
descendant of the original saint, whereas the other branch leader is only appointed.
Conversely, a rival branch will argue that blood inheritance of leadership is inferior
to appointment by merit—the passing on of the oral transmission (kouhuan) by the
saint to the follower who possesses the most baraka. This dispute is particularly
evident between contemporary followers of the Jahriyya Shagou and Banqiao menhuan.

A split in a Sufi branch developed recently over the destruction of their own and
another order's tomb. Apparently, a relative of one of the order's members who moved
to Saudi Arabia before 1949 has been influenced by Wahhabi doctrines, which de-
nounce the veneration of saints and tombs. This relative has been sending cassette
tapes to his sister-in-law and telling her of the need to reform the order. She in turn
has been involved in tearing down many of the tombs, including the gongbei built
for her father-in-law. Another succession problem arose in a Qadariyya branch in
Qinghai when, following the murshid's death, three of his halifat claimed they had
received his kouhuan and were to take his place. One of them was his son, another
possessed his cloak, and the third was his star student. There are now three new
orders where once there was one (compare Gilmartin 1984:228–36).

Occasionally, the participants in these disputes attempt to resolve their differences
in the streets. To help settle the disputes, the regional government often brings in
respected Sufi leaders as mediators. Although these conflicts give local cadres many
headaches in their nationality work (minzu gongzuo), they have as yet not led to any
widescale violence that I know of. The conflicts seem to have remained at the local,
intrafational level, and I have not heard that any of them were directed toward the
local government or Han neighbors. Instead, I have witnessed the concern of local
government cadres and Chinese Islamic Society leaders to work out the differences
without enforcing any rigid policies. The existence of these conflicts and the flexibility
of the government in helping to resolve them illustrate that the state policy of freedom
of religion, although not without its problems, is beginning to be realized in a
significant way in the countryside.

These conflicts and tensions also demonstrate the continued power of Hui Sufi
saints and their tombs for mobilizing collective action. Although they often divide
the Hui among themselves, they also provide a cohesiveness for Hui communities
linked in extensive networks across China. They play a critical role in defining identity
for Hui in their multilevel hierarchy of ethnoreligious authority. At various levels
Hui can identify themselves as coreligionists of the international Muslim community,
Chinese citizens of the PRC, members of the Hui nationality, adherents to a Sufi
brotherhood, and residents of a local village or lineage. Sorting out how Hui maintain
and manipulate their identity in the midst of these conflicting loyalties and non-
congruencies reveals much about the dynamic process of ethnic change among the
northwest Hui.

Local Tombs and Communal Interests

Just before Xinhua Bridge on the way to Wuzhong City from Yinchuan in central
Ningxia, a large white dome rises in the middle of a wheat field. It stands in contrast
to the many small mosques that, like tudigong (earth god) shrines throughout Fujian,
are regularly encountered on either side of the main north-south highway in Ningxia.
The local Hui peasants say that this dome is a tomb belonging to Qi taiye (Grandfather
Qi), dating back over one hundred years. Like many other local gongbei, it was torn

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down in 1958 and rebuilt in 1982. Inside the whitewashed dome, the simple grave is made of bare concrete without adornment, and stocked with the customary prayer mat, incense, and water pot for ritual washing. When I visited it in 1985, the incense had been burning when the unlocked door was opened, revealing that someone had been there recently. The local farmers did not seem to know much more about it.

Across southern Ningxia are small local *gongbei*, called *tu gongbei* ("local tombs"), that have existed for as long as five hundred years. The role and significance of these tombs for local Hui communities are to be distinguished from the Sufi-related shrines described above. Dedicated to local heroes, Ahong, or Hajji returned from Mecca, they are often the focus of collective and individual ritual action. Small tombs standing alone in a graveyard or field with no attached shrine, they usually house only one grave of a deceased local saint. In central Ningxia, Lingwu, and Tongxin counties, they tend to be white rounded domes, six to eight feet tall, with a low brick base and topped with a crescent moon or other Islamic ornament. There is rarely a shrine or prayer hall attached to these tombs, and the person taking care of them generally lives in the village nearby. Even the names of the entombed saints are often unknown; they are called by titles such as Baba, Ahong, Hajji, or Taiye. In many cases it is only known that they were a religious leader of great knowledge (*ah lin*) or spirituality (*yimani*). There are several *gongbei* built to outsiders (*waillaide ahong*) who did important work and then died in that vicinity.

These tombs have often been confused with the Sufi shrines mentioned by early twentieth-century Western travelers in the northwest. However, their importance and influence at the local level was well known. In the following account, Mark Botham (1924:185–86) describes a tomb he encountered at "Tan-wan-tou":

Behind closed doors was the grave of the founder of the Mohammedanism of this district, hung with silk and linen draperies, in a room whose equally beautiful tomb was in the front court. . . . [The caretaker] was old and nearly blind, his unseeing eyes a type of his darkened soul. . . . We learned that many hundred years ago there came a traveller from Baghdad to these wild mountains—in those days they were desolate and well-nigh uninhabited—and he lived an austere and holy life, and took him a wife of the people of the country who were "aborigines" or "Mongols," who knows which! And the present inhabitants of all that country are (they said) his progeny. . . . "Do you expect him to intercede for you?" "We hope that he will gain for us the favour of Allah. We know nothing; we are ignorant and sinful; but he has been accorded a place in heaven, and we may go there because of him." So it is everywhere.31

Many of these local tombs were rebuilt in the early 1980s when the land where they were formerly located was contracted back to the local peasants. Locals or passersby visit at all hours and read or chant prayers (*nianjing*).32 Often local Hui women bring their daughters into the *gongbei* for prayer, sometimes late at night. If the death day of the grave's occupant is known, there will sometimes be a small gathering where the local Ahong will read scriptures. If the *gongbei* is located in a graveyard, Hui generally go to the *gongbei* and pray before going to their own ancestors' graves.

There are at least nineteen of these *gongbei* in Ningxia's Tongxin County and thirteen in Lingwu County, many recently rebuilt. These *gongbei* are generally main-

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31 This tomb perhaps belonged originally to the Kubrawiyya *menhuan* in Dawantou, Dongxiang Prefecture, Gansu Province (see Ma [1981] 1983:451–54).

32 The meaning of *nianjing* (literally, "read scripture") differs among the various orders of Hui Islam. For the traditional Gedimu, it generally means to recite memorized Qur'anic texts.
tained by the Gedimu traditional order of China's Islam, but many are former Khufiyaa Sufi brotherhood tombs. Although the distinctions between the Jahriyya, Qadar-iyaa, and Yihewani orders are clearly maintained in Ningxia, in northern Ningxia the difference between the Khufiyaa and Gedimu has become less distinct (Mian 1985:203-25). Hui from these areas often say, "We are laogu [Gedimu], Khufiyaa," combining the two orders in one breath. This response reveals two points: first, in some areas there is no difference between Khufiyaa and Gedimu, and Hui can be former Khufiyaa adherents who have become Gedimu "traditional" Muslims. Second, in other areas they maintain the dbiker (remembrance) of the Sufi Khufiyaa but do not owe loyalty to the menhuan saintly leaders (see Gladney 1986). Interestingly, there are several tombs maintained in areas where people predominantly follow the Yihewani, a group Lipman (1986) has shown to oppose the veneration of tombs and saints. A local Yihewani Ahong from Lingwu says they only oppose tombs "with names," which means they condemn menhuan-related tombs, where the names of local saints are well remembered.

The importance of these local gongbei and the reasons for rebuilding them reveal much about Hui community interests. These tombs are inherently practical. Like Indian and Moroccan shrines, their fundamental raison d'etre is religious (Eaton 1984:334). Although more sophisticated reformers may discount and condemn their use for utilitarian purposes, they are important to local Hui for making the Islamic tradition more personally meaningful. "It was through its rituals," Eaton (1984:334) maintains, "that a shrine made Islam accessible to nonlettered masses, providing them with vivid and concrete manifestations of the divine order, and integrating them into its ritualized drama both as participants and sponsors." Many Hui say the gongbei are still popular because people attribute miraculous powers to the saints buried within. One elderly Hui woman from Lingwu, Ningxia, said, "Through the laorenjia [old master] we can have our message delivered to Allah. He is a saint who has gone to heaven and will remember us if we remember him. It's sort of like using the back door [zou houman]." Requests brought to the saint are often related to childbirth and domestic problems: asking for a son, finding a mate, and having a good harvest. One Tongxu, Ningxia, woman had two daughters and was hoping for a son, since she was from a poor desert region and, as a Hui minority, was allowed to have three children under present birth planning policy. She often went to the local gongbei to ask the saint to help. Many urban Hui scoff at the thought of going to these gongbei, but they continue to have an important place in the social landscape of the Hui countryside.

Like the Sufi tombs, the importance of these local tombs centers on the power of the deceased saint to provide a direct link to Hui Muslim ancestors and, by extension, to the Prophet and Allah. It is not surprising that many graveyards built around these tombs adopt these saints into their lineage or community. On the fringe of the Gobi Desert in Lingwu County, central Ningxia, a series of Hui graveyards extends for thirty kilometers along the sand dunes and rocky wastelands. In one of the villages, Guo Jia Jiitan (Guo family alkaline bank) of Du Muqiao Township, there were four gongbei that had been rebuilt between 1981 and 1984 within the

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33 Using the "back door" is a Chinese euphemism for obtaining favors through personal connections, most often exploited by the children and families of important cadres.

34 As a minority, the Hui are given special consideration with regard to China's birth policy of one child allowed per family. In Ningxia, a "one-two-three" policy is followed. One child is allowed in the city (Yinchuan), two in the countryside, and three in the desert or mountain areas.

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space of one square kilometer in the local graveyard. The gongbei belonged to various Ahong who had been on the Hajj: Wang West Ahong, Wang Third Ahong, Jin Ahong, and an unknown “outside” (wailaide) Ahong. On one occasion, a funeral was held for an eighty-two-year-old woman surnamed Yang, who was buried next to the Jin Ahong gongbei because her husband was surnamed Jin and almost everyone buried in the vicinity of the gongbei was of that clan. The graves clustered around the other three gongbei also tended to have the same surname as the saint.

The important role of a saint’s mediation on the behalf of his adopted lineage or village is illustrated by the Arabic inscription on the unusual brick gongbei of Wang Third Ahong. In addition to the shahadah and the dedication of the tomb to “Haji Burhan al-Din,” the following three lines are inscribed on the front:

The Prophet said these scholars of religion [‘ulama’] will last as long as the world lasts
The Prophet said he who loves knowledge and the scholars, God will do away with his sin
Think highly of the scholars because you will need them in this world and in the hereafter. 36

The emphasis on the importance of this saint and the other “scholars of God” as moral exemplars, intercessors with Allah, and dispensers of blessing (baraka) was obviously important to the one who wrote the verses. Because of their authority and influence, Hui who patronize them might also experience Allah’s favor despite their own personal shortcomings in living up to the demands of Islam, resolving incongruencies between the ideal and the real.

Local Gongbei and Ethnic Folklore

Many local legends are associated with the saints of these tu gongbei. To my knowledge, these legends have never been written down and may have little historical basis, but they are significant for our understanding the socioeconomic context and concerns of Hui life.

One legend comes from a gongbei in south central Ningxia, Tongxin County, Wang Tuanzhuang Township, Qian Hong Village. The story goes that four hundred or five hundred years ago an old Haji Ahong lived in the lower level of the valley. He did not wish to have a wife or children and worked just enough to be able to go to the mosque and pray. In the lower valley the frost came early; occasionally hailstones fell, large enough to kill farm animals. Weather had always plagued the Hui farmers, who could barely get by in a good year with the little rain water in the area. The old Haji was concerned about this problem and said that after he died he would ask Allah to stop the hailstones and early frost. After he died the weather improved dramatically. The local people attributed the climatic improvements to his influence with Allah. Consequently they built him a gongbei and his death date is still com-

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35 The recurring theme of pilgrimage and completion of the Hajj to Mecca is an important aspect of the status of these saints, as well as the fact that many of them were foreigners or outsiders (wailaide ahong). For an account of its importance in Southeast Asian Islam, see Roff 1984.

36 It is noteworthy that although the Arabic states clearly that this is the tomb of Burhan al-

Din, the local Hui, most of whom only recite Qur’anic Arabic and cannot read or speak it, refer to the tomb as Wang Third Ahong’s. Farhat Zia
deh (personal communication) noted that there were also several errors in spelling and syntax in the Arabic. I am grateful for his translation of these inscriptions.

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memorated. When a Hui friend paid a visit there recently and asked if there had been any hail, a local villager answered that it no longer hailed because of the gongbei Baba's continuing influence.

Another popular story comes from a gongbei in Tongxin County, Wang Tuanzhuang Township, Zhang Ershui Village. This is the tomb of Niu Ke Baba, an outsider who came through the area and stayed only twenty days. After the second day he asked the people to help him dig his grave, for he had been told in a dream that his death was imminent. The next morning he went up on the mountain and dislodged a large stone, which rolled down the slope into a wheat field. He bought the field from the owner, and on the spot where the rock fell they dug up the ground and found a body. Instead of a foul smell, the grave emitted a fragrant odor. The body had not decomposed and was in perfect condition. They reburied the body and gave it a gongbei because Allah had preserved it. When the outsider died, he was buried just behind it. The gongbei was torn down in 1966 during the posijiu campaign. A local cadre told me that he went to the area on four separate occasions in 1985 and asked if there were any plans to rebuild the gongbei, but the villagers denied it. On his fifth visit he found a beautiful new white tomb in the middle of the field. People go there often, individually and in groups, but there is no organized prayer service on any certain date. Occasionally, when an important local villager has a funeral, the villagers ritually slaughter a cow at the tomb, perhaps because it is named after the "cow guest father" (niu ke baba).

There is a popular Hui legend about a gongbei dedicated to the jinjue ("barefoot") laorenjia, which comes from Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang Province. The barefoot Ahong was so poor that he could not afford to wear shoes, even in winter when temperatures averaged well below freezing. The power of his baraka kept his feet from freezing. He wandered from place to place eschewing material possessions, devoting himself to prayer and the study of the Qur'an. One day he appeared to a group of villagers, saying that he knew of an Ahong's body out in the desert and that they should go bury it. When they went to the place he told them, they found that it was his own corpse.

These stories often combine themes of poverty, asceticism, spiritual dedication, and reward in a language familiar to anyone who has traveled in the harsh northwest environment where Hui are concentrated. Until the large hydraulic works were developed recently, Tongxin County was almost a barren wasteland because it could not receive any of the water from the nearby Yellow River. It is not surprising that many stories come from this area, where the gongbei are still popular ritual centers, despite the fact that many of the Hui in Tongxin belong to the Yihewani order.

The stories of miraculous events and special powers emanating from Muslim tombs are common wherever Sufism is popular (Eickelman 1976; Geertz 1968:48–54). Most Hui who visit these local tombs, however, are members of the traditional Gedimu Islam. They are not adherents to Sufi brotherhoods, know little about the doctrines of the Sufi orders around them, and have no exposure to Islam outside China. Despite their recognition of the efficacy of deceased saints in influencing Allah's actions on their behalf, they maintain a strict belief in monotheism. For them, the saints are extensions of their own line of Hui Muslim ancestors. Even though Hui might not be directly related to a particular entombed saint, they often say they are related ethnically to each other and to the foreign Muslims who came to China sometime in their distant past. "All Hui under heaven are one family" (Tianxia Huihui shi yi jia) was a popular saying in China before Hui had to be careful about being accused of "local ethnocentrism" (difang minzu zhuyi, subordinating national to ethnic con-

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cerns). For Hui in Quanzhou, blood descent from foreign Muslim ancestors is critical for their personal and legal identity as Hui. In the northwest, descent from foreign Muslims or Sufi saints who came from the West (xiyu ren) is couched in more general, spiritual terms. At issue in both places, however, is the idea of descent from foreign Muslims, whether actual or spiritual.

It is not surprising that most gongbei are located in the middle of Hui lineage and village graveyards. In contrast to their Han neighbors, Hui often build their graveyards either adjacent to or within the confines of their village (Ekvall 1939:23). The local graveyard plays an important role in the daily life of Hui villagers. In one village of 723 households, an average of four to eight persons went to the graveyards (shangfen) every day to pray, with thirty or more visitors on Friday, the main day of prayer. Someone from each extended household made at least one trip to the graveyard per week. Hui do not believe in ghosts and gods like their Han neighbors, and they are not afraid of the graveyards at night. A popular Hui proverb says, “When on the road the safest place for Hui to sleep is the Han graveyard; the ghosts won’t bother us because we don’t believe in them, and local Han bandits won’t bother us because they are too afraid of the ghosts.” Desecration of graveyards and tombs was one Red Guard activity in Hui areas during the Cultural Revolution that led to major and minor confrontations.

Arthur Wolf (1978:175) has suggested that for Taiwanese villagers the hierarchy of the social world is mirrored by the metaphysical realm. Although the Hui do not have a developed theology of angels and heavenly officials, they are of course cognizant of their own power hierarchies at the local level. For the Hui villager who knows of the various levels of leadership in the Sufi silsila hierarchies extending from Allah through Muhammad through the line of the murshid to their appointed administrators (reisi, from re’is, headman or chief) to their acolytes (kalifat) and finally to the adherents themselves, it would seem likely that heaven also reflects these hierarchies. Like the village head, Allah seems to honor the suggestions of devout followers closest to him—as we have seen with the deceased saint. In any non-Sufi Hui village, the power and influence of the local Ahong over his appointed sub-Ahong, administrators, and students, makes the social and spiritual hierarchy significant to the average village. By coming into the company of living saints through prayer at the tomb, the Hui villagers both transcend this hierarchy and reaffirm their identity as Muslims belonging to the succession (Brown 1984:34–35; Metcalf 1984:12). Upward mobility by means of religious learning is an important strategy in every Hui community, almost without parallel in Han villages in the northwest. And if one cannot obtain favor through Qur'anic learning, one can always use the “back door” by patronizing a local saint’s tomb.

In its role and the powers of the saint buried there, the gongbei resembles the traditional temples dotting the Taiwan countryside (Weller 1987:37–42). Women often take their daughters to these temples; they seek otherworldly help in having sons or resolving financial problems. The Chinese folk shrines influence the natural powers of the earth, bringing good weather and fruitful harvests, and miracles are also not unknown in their vicinity. Local lineage ghosts and historic heroes may be adopted by the local community as patron deities over time (Harrell 1974). Although Hui do not have any known institutionalized practice of geomancy (fengshui)
with professionals skilled in selecting sites for buildings and graves, it is interesting that many of these tombs are placed in a similar location. Hui graves are distinguished by lying on a north-south axis, with the entrance to gongbei tombs almost always to the south. The body lies with the head to the north, the feet to the south, and the face turned west, toward Mecca. Many Hui graveyards and tombs follow standard fengshui principles: they are placed on the side of a hill with a stream or plain below. The most notable example is the graveyard and gongbei complex at North Mountain, Linxia.

Conclusion

The tombs and graveyards that are important to the Hui differ significantly in their social, political, economic, and religious usage and interpretation. Their influence varies in scale from historic tombs that are important internationally to the local village tu gongbei. The historic tombs highlight conflicts between accepted popular and state definitions of the Hui nationality and the definitions of southern Hui lineages, who maintain an ethnic identity that is no longer Islamic in content. The tombs are meaningful because they concretely demonstrate the genealogical bond between these Hui communities and their foreign ancestors, validating their claim to ethnic minority status. Sufi tombs are important to northwest Hui because they often serve as the focus for national networks as well as linking worshipers directly to Muhammad through the mediating power of the saints buried within. Conflicts surrounding their legitimacy and history reveal much about the daily tensions experienced by Sufi Hui in working out the practical implications of their faith in light of Islamic ideals. An assurance of the authority of their Sufi order is critical to the identity they derive from their descent from a decidedly Islamic heritage. Local tombs and the lore that surround them reveal daily communal and socioeconomic concerns, ways in which Hui seek to maintain their identity in the competition for scarce resources. The tombs are powerful “sacred symbols” (Geertz 1968:79) that orient the Hui in terms of local heroes who, when patronized appropriately, will assist them in fulfilling the demands of Islam and preserving their identity in the field of social relations.

Given this diversity in form and meaning, how can the Hui be said to be a single ethnic group? The power and meaningfulness of the tombs resides in their ability to translate local systems of culture into a larger shared cultural system (Eaton 1984:354). The tombs and interpretations attached to them differ radically among different Hui communities, but at one point they come together to provide a common point of reference: they give evidence of descent from a long tradition, an ethnic and religious heritage that is distinct from, and in many cases in opposition to, the dominant Han society. Even though Hui in various localities throughout China differ from each other linguistically, religiously, culturally, and geographically, this idea of common descent from foreign Muslim ancestors is at the root of their ethnic identity as Hui (see Keyes 1981:18, 25). This shared identity allows strict Sufi Muslims from the northwest to stay, without fear of violating halal (Chinese qingzhen, “pure and true”), in the homes of Hui in southern China who no longer practice Islam. It also allows Hui party cadres from Beijing to stay in the inexpensive hostels attached to large mosques in the northwest without concern for their religious belief or Islamic affiliation. It might also have something to do with the popularity of Gansu beef-noodle restaurants among urban Hui in Shanghai and Canton.
Although tombs may not be relevant to all Hui and will be interpreted differently, they continue to serve as powerful frameworks for personal identity and social action that distinguish Hui communities from one another and provide important charters for their corporate identity.
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<td>1850s</td>
<td>Gansu, Lanzhou Xujiaowan</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Gansu, Lanzhou, Jingtai</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Other Names</th>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
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<th>Initial Period</th>
<th>Original Location</th>
<th>Adherents</th>
<th>Present Distribution</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Men</td>
<td>Gansu, Jingtai Jiantou Jing</td>
<td>Er Zezi (Hong Hairui) [Zhou Taoren] [Ding Wanming]</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>Ningxia, Guyuan</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Ningxia, Guyuan, Tongxin</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wenquan Tang</td>
<td>Arabia</td>
<td>Ma Wenquan [Ma Xing]</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>Gansu, Lanzhou Gengjiazhuang</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Gansu, Lanzhou, Linxia; Qinghai, Xunhua</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yantou</td>
<td>Gansu, Linxia</td>
<td>Hajji Han [Han Zhenzhe]</td>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>Gansu, Linxia Dahejia Meipo</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Gansu, Linxia Dahejia Liuji, Bafang, Lanzhou</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao Zhaojia</td>
<td>Gansu, Linxia</td>
<td>Ma Yiheiya [Reng Yixi]</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Gansu, Linxia, Liuji Gaozhaojia</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Gansu, Linxia, Liuji</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonggui</td>
<td>Gansu, Lanzhou</td>
<td>Ma Guanglin [Qiao Dianma Ahong]</td>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>Ningxia, Tonggui</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Ningxia, Tonggui, Yongning, Pingluo; Gansu, Pingliang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salajiao</td>
<td>Qinghai, Xunhua</td>
<td>Suwa Lemanzi [Ma Heizile]</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Qinghai, Xunhua</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Qinghai, Xunhua; Gansu, Linxia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ling Ming Tang</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
<td>Ma Lingyi [Shaan Ziyu]</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Gansu, Lanzhou</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Gansu, Lanzhou, Tangle, Guanghe; Qinghai, Xinjiang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<th>Initial Period</th>
<th>Original Location</th>
<th>Adherents</th>
<th>Present Distribution</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ming Yue  Tang</td>
<td>Gansu, Lanzhou</td>
<td>[Ma Renfu]</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Ningxia, Guyuan, Sanying</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Ningxia, Guyuan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa Men</td>
<td>Arabia</td>
<td>[Fa Zhen]</td>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>Gansu, Linxia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Gansu, Linxia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jahriyya9</td>
<td>Zheherente Xuanhuagang Xinjiao</td>
<td>Ma Mingxin</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>Gansu, Linxia; Qinghai, Xunhua</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>Gansu; Qinghai; Xinjiang; Shaanxi; Sichuan; all China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banqiao</td>
<td>Jinji pai Maqiao pai</td>
<td>Gansu, Pingliang</td>
<td>Ma Datian [Ma Tengai]</td>
<td>1813</td>
<td>Ningxia, Wuzhong</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Ningxia, Wuzhong, Lingwu, Tongxin, Qingtongxia; Gansu, Linxia, Lanzhou; Xinjiang, Urumqi, Yanqi; Yunnan, Shadian; Beijing, Tianjin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanchuan</td>
<td>Ningxia, Banqiao</td>
<td>[Ma Tengni]</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>Gansu, Zhangjiachuan, Nanchuan</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Gansu, Zhangjiachuan, Linxia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shagou</td>
<td>Honglefu pai</td>
<td>Gansu, Ningxia</td>
<td>Ma Yuanzhang (Ma Zhenwu) [Ma Liesun]</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>Ningxia, Honglefu, Xiji</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Ningxia, Xiji, Guyuan, Haiyuan; Gansu, Pingliang; Xinjiang; Yunnan; Jilin; Hebei; Shandong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Initial Period</th>
<th>Original Location</th>
<th>Adherents(^2)</th>
<th>Present Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beishan</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Ningxia,</td>
<td>Ma Yuanlie [Ma Dianwu]</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Gansu, Zhangjiachuan, Beishan</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Gansu, Zhangjiachuan, Weicheng, Guanghe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xin Dianzi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shagou</td>
<td>Ma Jiwu</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Ningxia Xiji Xindianzi</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Ningxia, Xiji; Gansu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kubrawiyya</td>
<td>Khubulinye</td>
<td>Arabia</td>
<td>Mohidin</td>
<td>1370(^11) or 1660s</td>
<td>Gansu, Dongxiang Dawantou</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Gansu, Dongxiang Dawantou, Tangwang, Heishishan, Chenjiaketu, Shawa, Shuangshu, Ahlimadu, Tangle Shanwan, Caonan, Yangjiazhuang, Fengtai, Taogonggou, Lanninan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Present leaders, where known, are placed in brackets. Former prominent leaders are placed in parentheses.


\(^3\) Sunni, Hanafi, Reformist Wahhabi Islamic brotherhood (ikhwan), Mosque-centered, no hereditary leadership.

\(^4\) Sunni, Hanafi, Mosque-centered communities, traditionalist, no hereditary leadership.

\(^5\) Note that Trippner's 1961:171 schema places the Gedimu within the Wahhabi, continues to use the confusing Laosjiao ("Old Teaching"), Xinjiao ("New Teaching"), and Xinxinjiao ("New New Teaching"), and tends to arrange groups according to geographic, rather than historical or religious, affiliation.

\(^6\) Reformist, Mosque-centered, no inherited leadership, emphasizes Chinese scholarship.

\(^7\) Earliest Sufi menhuan, Qadiri tarīqa, dispersed, often centered on tombs, inherited leadership.

\(^8\) Naqshbandi tarīqa now decentralized into smaller Mosque-centered menhuan.

\(^9\) Naqshbandi tarīqa, connected through menhuan, hereditary leadership.

\(^10\) Kubrawiyya tarīqa, concentrated in small Mosque-centered communities, hereditary leadership.

List of References


He Qiaoyuan. c. 1620. Minshu, vol. 7.


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Tazaka Kōdō. 1941. "Ri Jisei wa kaikyōto ka?" [Was Li Zicheng a Muslim?]. Tōhō gekubō 12, no. 2: 91–110.


