Introduction

Since the 1980s, the migration issue has returned to the top of the political agenda in various regions of the world, as we see in the evident return to 1920s nativism now taking place in the United States. This politicization of migration and its consequences has led to an over-dramatization, and sometimes an over-mediatization, of the human migration issue. Both migratory flows and the presence of immigrant populations are largely perceived as a cause of insecurity and even as a real threat (Martiniello 2001).

Two significant features mark public debate concerning international migratory movements. Firstly, the emphasis is on real or potential migratory flow and on political and police measures to be brought into force for supranational regulation, in practice to keep the flow at a minimum level. The refugee issue is also on the way to becoming the major pre-occupation of politicians and, to a certain extent, of certain sections of public opinion who are particularly aware of the migratory situation. Secondly, a certain “social alarmism” often predominates in these discussions where an essentially negative view of migration is presented and even seen as legitimate. There are many Europeans who accept the “invasion of Europe” doctrine and are ready to fight it. Immigration is thus presented as a fearful plague that must be swiftly vanquished, before it is too late.

In other words, current migratory flows are often supposed to have a harmful effect on international security insofar as they may compromise relations between immigrant supplying states and immigrant host states. This is only a short step from claiming, as is often done in the popular press and by politicians, that migratory flows hinder the emergence of a new world order. This alarmist approach to migration is then logically followed by attempts to control, limit, or prevent it from doing harm by means of increasingly international political and police cooperation.
Towards a proactive immigration policy?

Migration is also perceived as a cause of insecurity inside states. The presence of immigrant populations is often presented as a threat to "native" economic well-being. Immigrants and their offspring are often accused of taking jobs from nationals or of taking unfair or fraudulent advantage of rich countries' social security systems. Immigrant populations are also presented as a threat to law and order, so that immigration is associated with the rise in trans-frontier organized crime (drugs, prostitution, arms-dealing, and human-trafficking, mafias, etc.). Immigrants, particularly of the second generation, are associated with the rise in urban criminality affecting many towns and suburban areas of Europe. Consequently, since the presence of migrants is presumed to encourage feelings of insecurity in the native population, it is sometimes used simplistically as the main reason for the rise of extreme-right parties. In this way, immigration finally appears as a threat to democracy and immigrants as "internal enemies" who put in jeopardy our social benefits, our relative economic well-being, and even our cultural and national identity. Islam and Muslims thus become our bogey men. According to this view, Europe is suffering from galloping Islamization, threatening European cultures and values, including democracy and human rights.

Stressing only the negative economic, democratic or security aspects of immigration is unsatisfactory from the academic point of view. Being too simplistic, it leads to manifest ambiguity and paradox. The growing economic exploitation, especially of illegal immigrants in certain sectors (for instance, in Spanish agriculture), coincides with declarations about the supposed costs for receiving countries. In cruder terms, the more we get out of immigrants the more they are accused of getting out of "us" (Adam et al. 2002).

It is more realistic to recognize that migrations may have positive as well as negative effects both for the country of origin and the host country. There are no absolutes in the matter. It all depends on the general context of these migrations.

We must also remember that migration is nothing new in human history. On the contrary, history is simply the long story of successive migratory flows across the planet. Humans have always moved over the face of the earth and nothing suggests they are likely to stop, whatever sort of restrictive migratory policies are brought into force. Modern means of communication and transport developments have, in fact, made it easier for people to travel to the four corners of the globe. Is it not a paradox, in the present state of the world, to make migration easier and cheaper for the many while trying at the same time to draw up more and more restrictive immigration policies?
Immigration and the Transformation of Europe

Migration is an inescapable feature of the start of this century, and is very likely to continue throughout it (Castles and Miller 2003). How could it be otherwise considering the number of existing and even increasing migratory pressures on a world-wide scale (demographic and economic inequalities, environmental and political causes, desire for better living conditions), and the technical possibilities for human mobility? In spite of restrictive immigration policies, frontiers between states remain more or less easy to cross. This is even more the case for the frontiers of democratic states which, in principle, are not willing to use force in order to deport human beings or to prevent their arrival or departure.

This chapter shows in what way Europe can be considered as an immigration continent. It briefly follows migratory flows to Europe since 1945 and considers the outlook for the future. It also presents European immigration policies adopted since the postwar period, finally stressing the need to go further towards a common immigration approach in the European Union.

Immigration in Europe since 1945

Like other regions of the world, Europe has always been, from prehistoric times and all through the countless population movements up to the present day, a continent of immigration (Enzenberger 1994). During the prehistoric period, migrations took place all over the world, including Europe. The classical period was a time of great population movements known as the "great migrations." Towns and cities like Athens and Rome were largely formed by drift from the land when peasants left for a more prosperous life in the urban centers. The Middle Ages saw the Germanic and Ottoman invasions as well as the Crusades. Learned men of the time traveled everywhere in spite of the difficulties to be faced. When Pope Alexander VI divided the New World between the Spanish and the Portuguese, he set off transoceanic migratory movements on a gigantic scale. Such movements were to mark the history of European populations' right up to World War I. Millions of Europeans left their continent to take part in the conquest of the Americas. Between the wars, population shifts within Europe also gained considerable momentum for the following reasons: the depression, the closing of the United States to emigrants, and the appearance of dictatorships in certain European countries like Spain, Italy, and Germany. Belgium, at this time, was already recruiting foreign workers and accepting refugees from eastern and southern Europe (Caestecker 2000).
Towards a proactive immigration policy?

From 1945 to 1973–74

Just after World War II, demographic and economic indicators were announcing a new period of intercontinental emigration from Europe. The heady rise in fertility rates looked likely to lead to over-population in certain parts of the continent. In the economy, poverty was rife and restarting production was an enormous challenge. In such conditions, it was no wonder large numbers of Europeans went off to seek their fortune elsewhere, like in Canada or Australia. It was, however, mainly within Europe that migratory flows reached record levels in the period up to 1973–74 (Castles and Kosack 1985). During the industrial and economic reconstruction period of 1947–60, northern European economies suffered from a persistent manpower shortage in mining and heavy industry, whereas unemployment reigned in southern European countries such as Italy and Spain. These countries became immigrant labor pools for countries such as Belgium or Germany to draw on, and they recruited intensively. During the "Golden Sixties" (1961 to 1973–74), with industry constantly in search of fresh manpower, the demand for unskilled, cheap labor often outran supply. Immigration towards northern Europe continued, mainly on account of short-term economic requirements. At the time, the migration equation was generally perceived as relatively simple. When a manpower shortage appears, the immigration tap is turned on. When the vacancies have been filled, the tap is turned off again (Martens 1976).

At a finer-grained level, the 1945 to 1973–74 period featured five migratory scenarios. In the first, northern European countries invited manual workers from southern Europe, then the Balkans, North Africa, and Turkey. This is the origin of the large numbers of Turks present in Germany and of the Italian and Moroccan communities in Belgium. In the second, colonial powers such as France and Great Britain encouraged immigration from their colonies and later from their ex-colonies. Algerian workers thus arrived in France (Sayad 1991); Caribbean or Indo-Pakistani workers settled in the British metropolis. In the third, the decolonization process led to the return of ex-colonials to the mother-country. When Algeria became an independent state, numbers of ex-colonists came back to France. Some, called "Pieds Noirs", met with serious problems of re-insertion. Similarly, the new dictatorships in ex-British East Africa turned out large numbers of resident migrants from the Indian sub-continent who, instead of returning to the mother-country, made for Great Britain. In the fourth, Europe was already facing the arrival of political asylum-seekers mainly from the communist bloc and later from Latin America where authoritarian regimes were in power.
Finally, there was considerable movement of highly qualified elites thanks to industrial trans-nationalizations and the development of European and non-European international organizations.

To different degrees and according to each European Union (EU) country’s specific timetable, most countries saw at least one of these five scenarios between 1945 and 1973–74 (Martiniello 2001). In Belgium, for example, the organization of southern Mediterranean immigration began very soon after the war, in 1946. With the independence of the Congo, Belgian colonists returned home. Belgium also accepted political refugees from eastern Europe and Latin America. As Brussels gradually became the European capital, a business and administrative elite moved there. In contrast, unlike France, Great Britain, and Holland, Belgium never encouraged immigrants from her colonies to come and work there. Two reasons are often quoted to explain the absence of colonial worker immigration in Belgium. Firstly, industrial exploitation of the Congo necessitated an abundant manpower supply which sometimes fell short locally. Secondly, on account of Belgian colonial racist attitudes, the government did not want to risk black workers settling in Belgium.

At the European level, this period’s most significant migration scenarios were those of unskilled worker and colonial and post-colonial immigration. This led to considerable change in the ethnic and national composition of many European urban and industrial zones. The fact that Leicester is fast becoming the first non-white majority British town, that in Marseilles the northern area has a high proportion of French citizens of North African origin, that there is a significant Turkish presence in the Ruhr, that in Brussels, Charleroi, and Mons, an Italian accent is often heard, is largely due to migratory shifts that took place after the World War II and before 1973–74.

Since 1973–74

The early 1970s marked the end of the “Golden Sixties” and the beginning of a global economic restructuring period. The first oil crisis, which struck in 1973–74, was of both economic and political importance, highlighting a fundamental transformation of the global economy and labor markets. There were several contributing elements: firstly, investment strategies underwent profound modifications; capital and jobs were increasingly being transferred to parts of the world where workers enjoyed less social security. Secondly, the micro-electronic revolution made for lower unskilled worker demand in certain industrial sectors. Thirdly, industrial decline took shape and gathered pace. Formerly prosperous mining and heavy industry areas faced a situation of almost unstoppable
job losses. Economic desertification (which actually began during the "Golden Sixties") became rampant in Wallonia, Yorkshire, and the north of France. Fourthly, the service sector exploded. One of the main features of the workforce was flexibility, the essential element for operational efficiency. Fifthly, as from this period, we see the development of the "black" economy, with large numbers of illegal workers. Lastly, under-employment as a whole progressed, as well as job instability. All these developments took root during the following decades. They brought about a widening of the North–South divide and accentuated the poverty gap in the rich countries. They were also paralleled by global geopolitical transformations which took concrete form after 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

These upheavals caused changes not only in the perception of European immigration but also in world-wide migratory scenarios. Until then, immigration had been seen largely as an essentially economic resource to be mobilized according to precise labor requirements. Generally speaking, the presence of immigrants was supposed to be temporary. In the case of unfavorable economic conditions, they were expected to go home. But in 1973–74, the expected departures did not take place, in spite of the recession and rising unemployment. Most European governments seem to have lost their bearings at this point. Several governments decided to end all further labor immigration.

Yet despite its official termination, labor immigration into Europe continued. Certain previous migratory scenarios proceeded at a slower rate. Other older scenarios took a firmer hold. In addition, there were new immigration mechanisms appearing and developing both in Europe and on a global scale. Two distinct sub-phases can be seen in immigration within and into Europe after 1974— the first up to 1989, and the second from the fall of the Berlin Wall up to the present day (Martiniello 2001).

In the first sub-phase, European governments somehow never seemed able or inclined to see that their own decision to halt immigration was strictly respected. Foreign workers continued to obtain work permits in Belgium, France, Germany, and Holland after 1974. In Belgium, 30,000 new work permits were delivered to foreigners arriving directly from another country between 1974 and 1984 (Groenendijk and Hampsink 1994). Admittedly, these migrants did not have exactly the same profile as before. The proportion of highly-qualified workers tended to be higher. Also, family members continued to arrive. Not only did most migrant workers fail to leave the country after the 1970s oil crisis, but they increasingly brought in their family and gradually settled into less temporary situations in northern European countries. Refugees of more
and more varied origins continued to arrive in relatively moderate numbers. In general, refugees from the communist bloc also continued to be welcomed— for reasons of international politics, among others. To some extent they were considered as desirable symbols of the failure of the communist egalitarian ideal.

But the most striking development of this period concerned the Mediterranean countries. Historically speaking, Italy, Spain, and Greece had always been countries of emigration; now they became countries of immigration. Italy, for example, was historically the outstanding country of emigration. From 1876 to 1942 alone, over 18 million Italians left the country (Assante 1978). After the war and until the 1960s, the average annual number of emigrants stood at 300,000. It later fell to about 125,000. With industrialization in the north, however, the trend was gradually reversed. Fewer and fewer Italians emigrated and more and more foreigners entered Italy. Today the country has over 2.6 million legal immigrants, not counting “illegals” whose numbers are difficult to estimate with any accuracy (Caritas/Migrantes 2004).

The second sub-phase came with the thawing of the cold war in the late 1980s, which brought a new sense of the potential for immigration. The nearer we got to the watershed of 1989, the more there was the feeling that political changes in the East might cause an unmanageable influx of migrants. There were alarmist forecasts. According to some sources, several million Russians were ready to leave as soon as they could. The fear of invasion gradually took root in Western Europe. In the summer of 1991, a boat carrying hundreds of Albanian emigrants, like bees in a hive, berthed in Italy. It was the media event of the summer, and aggravated the vague fear of a migratory flood. And yet we can but note that although immigrants continued to arrive in Europe after 1989, the feared invasion never took place.

It is true that political crises in eastern Europe, Africa, or Asia have led to a global asylum crisis. There are indeed a growing number of refugees in the world (Joly, Kelly, and Nettleton 1997). In spite of the correct impression of a major rise in numbers of asylum seekers in the 1990s, Europe does not take in all the world’s refugees. Far from it. In fact, the vast majority of them take refuge in another poor country. Nonetheless, in the 1990s, European populations and their governments turned a colder and colder face to these immigrants. They were increasingly seen as “false refugees” or “disguised economic immigrants.”

East–West migration after 1989 also included other new streams. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans, who had lived for generations in the East, went back to re-unified Germany, the eternal mother-country. Meanwhile, the German government tried to encourage Jewish
immigration into Germany. Lastly, migrant workers from the east came to do seasonal work in the west.

The increasing politicization and mediazation of immigration was particularly striking in the 1990s and early 2000s, especially around the theme of illegal immigration and people-trafficking. Whether we consider the tragedy of the fifty or so young Chinese who perished in a cross-channel refrigerator truck going to England, the hundreds of Africans who disappeared while trying to cross the straits of Gibraltar in unseaworthy craft, or the hundreds of girls from eastern Europe forced into prostitution in western cities, these highly publicized dramas tend to produce a simplified impression of present migratory flows, which become connected with human tragedy, illegality and delinquency. This contributes strongly to the definition of immigration as essentially a security issue. However, different forms of non-legal immigration were partly the consequence of immigration and the hardening of asylum policy in Europe over the previous twenty years. The drastic restriction of legal immigration routes meant candidates were willing to try their luck by other means, either alone or with recourse to the services of illegal immigration professionals. It is also important to underscore the vague nature of the "illegal immigration" category. It covers, in fact, very different migratory trajectories. Some of these people enter the European territory legally, for example, with a tourist visa or as students, and then stay in the country after expiration of their visa. Others make a clandestine frontier-crossing and immediately become "illegal." And some reside legally in Europe, but work illegally (Adam et al. 2002).

This is not to deny the existence of illegal immigration and human-trafficking organizations. But neither can illegal immigration or immigration as a whole be reduced to the sordid activities of international organized crime. The many and complex causes of migratory flows in our globalized world are so compelling that, with or without illegal organizations, would-be immigrants will try their luck until they succeed or even die in the attempt.

Complexification and multiplication of migratory scenarios

It is sometimes claimed that economic globalization is the root cause of new migratory scenarios, making them fundamentally different from traditional immigration scenarios. In the globalized economy, it is said, it is becoming more and more difficult to identify and distinguish between emigrant countries and host countries (Martiniello 2001). Most countries may have somehow become both at once, as we see in those African states where large numbers of their population emigrate while immigrants
from neighboring countries pour in. In Europe, Mediterranean countries, which have always known large-scale emigration have now become immigration countries.

Moreover, it may be becoming more and more difficult to retrace the complex routes and trajectories followed by today's migrants and thus give shape to multidirectional migratory flows. To simplify, it could be said that current migrations are increasingly less likely to feature a departure point A and an arrival point B with, in a certain number of cases, a final return of migrants to point A, or, for the majority, permanent residence at point B. In the age of globalization, migratory scenarios may actually involve points A, B, C, D, and E, between which some of the new migrants travel, making it impossible to identify their departure point (especially for those without identification papers) or their final point of arrival. The following anecdote illustrates this new migratory reality (as does Jacqueline Andall's chapter in this volume). A young Senegalese man I met in autumn 1998 in the New York area of Battery Park, where he was selling T-shirts to tourists going to see the Statue of Liberty, explained in perfect French that he had worked for about a year in Italy, selling African statuettes in the streets. He also told me he was preparing to go for the third or fourth time to Belgium where he would stay a few months in order to buy second-hand cars and export them to the Ivory Coast. He thought he would stay a while in Belgium and then go back for a rest in Senegal before setting out again either for Europe or for the United States. Of course, there is no proof that this "global migrant" was telling the truth, but the migratory scenarios he describes, that of a young man ready to go where there are the best opportunities and stay as long as necessary, may at least seem more plausible and widespread today than was the case thirty years ago.

It is, in any case, undeniable that migratory movements today correspond to more-and-more numerous, complex, global scenarios. Traditional migratory customs are disappearing before our eyes and new ones are appearing which will continue to develop. Thus, the patterns of post-war European migration ebb and flow across at least six major types of migration:

(1) Unskilled labor migrations were crucial to industrial development after the war. Today, they remain important in certain economic sectors such as agriculture, building construction or catering.

(2) Migration of highly qualified workers has steadily increased as technology has become more complex. This migration type is likely to spread in the future in Europe.

(3) Armed conflicts and ecological disasters all over the world have caused, and will continue to cause, more or less forced population shifts towards Europe.
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(4) Inasmuch as human beings aspire to family life, family regrouping is an important scenario.

(5) Return migration has always existed, though of varying importance according to time and country.

(6) Migratory movement is developing on a global scale, as shown above. This type of migration is not the most widespread, but it already affects our continent (Castles and Miller 2003).

Serious observers no longer doubt that migration will be an inescapable feature of the twenty-first century. Migratory pressures continue to exist in the "global village" and are growing at the global level due to demographic and economic inequalities, environmental and political concerns, and the desire for better living conditions. Material possibilities for travel have multiplied and made for easier access. On the other hand, there is no prospect of anything that could be called a migrant invasion of Europe. The United Nations estimated total migrant numbers in the world in 1990 at 120 million (Castles 2002). Despite an increase in the 1990s, migrants still represent no more than 4 percent of world population. Moreover, only a small minority reaches Europe. The idea of a European invasion, therefore, in no way corresponds to current migratory reality.

That said, European migratory prospects are hard to foresee with any accuracy. But it seems clear that the immigration policies brought into force may have an impact. Admitting that mobility has always existed and will always exist should not lead to an attitude of political fatalism or passivity. A clear, fair and proactive immigration policy is not only possible, but absolutely essential if migratory flows are to be to the benefit of all, here and elsewhere. Up to now, however, European policies have not always fully fulfilled these criteria. This takes another look across postwar European history to trace these policy choices.

**European immigration policies from 1945 to the present day**

Before starting to examine immigration policies some definitions are in order. Following the work of the Swedish political scientist, Thomas Hammar, a distinction is generally made between a state's immigration policy and its immigrant policy (Hammar 1985). Immigration policy concerns migratory flow regulation, border-controls and admission of foreign nationals. It consists of all legal measures and procedures as well as administrative practices governing the selection, admission and entry of foreign nationals to state territory. Refusal of entry, removal, and expulsion measures are also included in immigration policy.

Immigrant policy combines all legal measures and administrative practices governing the immigrant's life in the new country. It covers work
practices, social security, accommodation, education, social, and political participation as well as the immigrants' cultural life. Immigrant policies plainly concern integration, incorporation, insertion or assimilation of newcomers to society.

Immigration policy and immigrant policy are really two distinct, although linked, branches of what can be called migratory policy. They are distinct because the one aims to manage human movement while the other is concerned with aspects of migrants' new living conditions. They are linked because, in certain countries (particularly the traditionally immigrant countries like Canada, the United States, or Australia), immigration policy is the initial phase of immigrant policy. The final objective of these countries is, in fact, to transform migrants into full citizens. These two branches of migratory policy are also frequently associated in political discourse. A much-used argument for a very strict immigration policy is that it represents an essential condition for ensuring the success of immigrant policies put in place. In Great Britain, for instance, politicians often attribute the success of race relations measures, which many would like to copy in continental Europe, to the strict frontier controls brought into force in 1962 (Favell 1998). Along the same lines, those who wish to follow a closed frontier policy today are ready to declare that higher immigration into Great Britain would harm the country's ethnic and racial cohesion. British researchers, however, express open criticism of this simplistic linking of immigration to immigrant policy.

This section is almost exclusively devoted to immigration policies in Europe. There are two other fundamental preliminary remarks to be made before delving into this sensitive issue. First, until recently, the EU states as well as outside states have had sovereign control over their immigration and immigrant policies. Each state is responsible for deciding, freely, but within international legal regulations, who may or may not enter the country, stay or reside and under what conditions. The state also has exclusive power of decision as to who may acquire citizenship. These issues are, in fact, at the heart of national sovereignty, which explains the difficulty and slow-going in drawing up a supranational European immigrant and immigration policy partly outside each state’s control. This point will be dealt with later in this chapter.

Secondly, Western European and traditionally immigrant countries have widely different histories both in their approach to immigration and the type of immigration policy applied. The United States, Canada, and Australia consider themselves as nations of immigrants. Nation-building in these "New World" countries relies on the immigration myth. Of course, in the interest of historical objectivity, we can hardly accept the idea of virgin territory conquered by immigrants from all over the
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world to form new nations. In the United States, genocidal treatment of Indians and slavery played an equally important part in the formation of the American nation. Immigration remains, however, a critical element in social imagery of the country's history. The Ellis Island immigration museum in New York is one of the most popular in North America. There everyone can commemorate the immigration story, the starting-point of United States history, as well as their pride in being American descendents of immigrants. In these circumstances, the idea of bringing in migrants to settle, exploit available resources, and contribute to development is historically rooted. They have admittedly often adopted restrictive immigration policies, but the idea of a proactive immigration policy is not seen as preposterous in immigrant nations.

In Western Europe, on the other hand, the predominant notion is of age-old nations eventually achieving their own state (Smith 1986, 1995). What is the German nation? What is the French nation? There can be fierce debate on the subject, but rarely does anyone question the existence of these nations previous to immigration. In other words, European societies consider themselves as already populated and constituted entities, which needed the help of foreign labor at particular times in their economic development. They are much less likely to see immigration as a constituent part of the nation than are traditionally immigrant states. Immigration is considered as a temporary aid to national economic development and an essentially short-term factor, which does not necessarily lead to the granting of citizenship. Consequently, the idea of a reactive immigration policy adapts well to this perception of migratory events. According to the state of the economy, immigrants are invited with the idea that they can be got rid of when no longer needed.

Yet European history shows that migration has also made a large contribution to the formation of European nations. France is a very good example. Though the French sense of a pre-existing nation is highly developed, it is also a long-standing immigrant state like the United States (Noiriel 1988). The difference between the two countries is that one of them has incorporated the migratory phenomenon into the romance of its national history, but not the other. To varying degrees, this would be true of all European countries. They have all experienced migratory flows, but this migratory history is more often ignored than integrated into national history. This is the case in Belgium. By reason of its geographical position, the country has always been criss-crossed by diverse populations. Yet the subject of immigration remains strikingly absent from Belgian history books. Even if immigration practically always leads part of the migrants in permanent residence, Europeans still broadly conceive of it as provisional and temporary. The French-Algerian sociologist, Abdelmalek
Sayad, already pointed out, twenty years ago, that the distinction between labor migrations and population shifts correspond only approximately to reality (Sayad 1991, 1999). Human beings cannot be moved around like merchandise. Germany, for example, may well claim that it is not an immigrant country, but 2 to 3 million Turks are now a permanent part of its population. In the long term, many of them will become German citizens.

Whatever the reality of permanent immigration, these differing perceptions of the importance of migratory facts for nation- and state-building are reflected in political attitudes to immigration and affect immigration policies put into practice on either side of the Atlantic. The trend in the western world towards strict frontier and immigration control – some would say the tendency to pretend we control the frontiers – has gathered force during the 1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, the United States has actually set up a wall that is several thousand kilometers long along the Mexican border, creating one of the most highly militarized frontiers in the democratic world. In Europe, very strict rules apply at checkpoints for entry into the EU. But in countries where immigration is traditional, there is still the possibility of legal immigration through various procedures (annual quotas, points system, lottery, family regrouping, etc.). Some regions such as Quebec even foresee increasing the number of visas to be issued to would-be immigrants in the next few years. In contrast, there is still no proactive immigration policy in most European countries. Legal immigration possibilities are at a minimum. The zero immigration doctrine is certainly running out of steam, and yet it has held out since 1973–74, when the European frontier was essentially closed to all new labor immigration.

**From the end of World War II to the first oil-crisis**

Between the end of World War II and the first oil-crisis, several types of immigration policy were set up in Europe. The reasons for these policies were chiefly economic. In a certain number of cases, they were also demographic and political.

As Albert Martens writes, immigration was mainly seen as supplementary manpower to be mobilized according to the industrial system's special requirements (Martens 1976). When labor demand outran supply in certain sectors, governments imported poorly-skilled migrant workers who were satisfied with low pay and accepted very hard working-conditions. In certain cases, recruitment took place in the country of origin, organized by the importing country's government at the request of employers and with unwilling trade union consent. The unions feared
possible downward pressure on pay-packets due to the arrival of migrant workers. But rather than stand by passively during these manpower importations, they often decided to take part and try to limit the potentially harmful effects on local workers.

The basic instruments of this immigration policy, which was no more than an appendage to employment policy, were bilateral agreements between countries. In June 1946, for example, Belgium signed an agreement with Italy providing for tens of thousands of Italian workers to be sent to the Belgian collieries. In exchange, Belgium would export coal to Italy on favorable terms (Martiniello and Rea 2001). As part of the so-called “contingent” system, the agreements provided for the workers to be brought to Belgium in special rail convoys. Belgium would also sign bilateral immigration contracts with other countries such as Spain, Morocco, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Germany also had recourse to bilateral agreements to set up its system of Gastarbeiter (“guest workers”) through which foreigners were invited to come and work for a limited period (often five years). Switzerland invented a rotating immigration system in order to prevent foreigners settling in its territory. After their stint in Switzerland, immigrant workers had to go home and leave room for other foreign workers who would be subject to the same regime.

In spite of these different immigrant worker recruitment and management methods, certain common features are present in the bilateral agreements signed by labor importing and exporting governments. Firstly, immigrant workers were given work and residence permits for a limited stay. Secondly, labor market access was initially restricted to certain industrial sectors, generally mining or iron and steel industries. Thirdly, the agreements concerned at first the recruitment of just the male worker—he could not bring his family. But from the early fifties, things began to change in certain countries. Fourthly, priority was given to strong, healthy young men who could be immediately productive.

Whatever the immigration system chosen, the legal distinction between citizen status and foreign status was the central criterion for the migrant’s right to work, residence and social security. The immigrant was a foreign worker whose presence was seen as temporary. His only social existence was as a worker. In these circumstances, unemployment was an intolerable anomaly in the migrant’s trajectory. Either he worked or he had no place in the host country.

In the 1960s, labor demand reached such a high level that certain governments adopted a laissez-faire policy. Foreigners, some of whom had already migrated under the bilateral agreements, arrived in Belgium or Germany simply on a tourist visa (Martens 1976). They found jobs in industry, without any trouble. Later they could
regularize their situation as to residence and working rights. The granting of tourist visas thus plainly appeared as a part of reactive immigration policy.

Certain colonial powers set up other immigrant labor recruitment methods. Prior to decolonization, colonial labor migration to the home country was in fact assimilated to internal migration. France and Great Britain had, in most cases, no need for collective labor recruitment in their colonies. On account of poverty and the demographic explosion, many colonial subjects were attracted by the opportunities they thought they would find in the metropolis. Leaving was easy thanks to their citizen or subject status, which gave them entry into France or Great Britain. In theory, colonial immigrants enjoyed the same rights as other citizens. In practice, however, they faced hostility from the local population and various types of discrimination in their social and working life. They essentially played the same economic role as immigrant workers in countries like Belgium or Germany. But in terms of status, they had the immediate advantage of a secure residence permit. Decolonization put an end to freedom of movement between colonies and home country. Both France and Great Britain would endeavor to control immigration from former colonies, which is the object of the British 1961 Immigration Act (Layton-Henry 1992).

Immigration policies are also often put in place for internal demographic and political reasons. In the 1960s, Walloon demographic decline was seen as a danger for the region's political equilibrium with Flanders. The French demographer, Alfred Sauvy, recommended the immigration of young families to compensate for the demographic shortfall. Without the Belgian population being really aware of it, this concern was partly responsible for the Belgian authorities' comprehensive attitude to family regrouping, which had, in fact, already taken place since the 1950s.

In short, it is obvious that European immigration policies from 1945 to 1973–74 were largely reactive. According to particular economic requirements and sometimes the demographic situation, governments called on labor immigration that they generally considered as temporary. In most cases, permanent residence, and the formation of new ethnic minorities resulting from these migratory processes were neither anticipated, desired, nor organized. Generally speaking, European migratory policy during this period was no more than an element in employment policy and a reaction by governments to market forces and the sometimes contradictory, sometimes converging, interests of migrants' countries of origin and host countries. It was also very nationally oriented. Each state drew up its immigration policies on its own, according to its sovereign rights, without consulting European Community partner states.
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or taking account of special links with each of the European or other
countries.

**Unfinished Europeanization (from 1973–74 to the year 2000)**

With the development of the European integration process since the 1957 Rome Treaty, immigration policy was to become an issue for discussion, and eventually decision at the supranational level. Insofar as European integration is based on four fundamental freedoms—free movement of capital, goods, and services as well as of persons—migratory policy was bound to appear sooner or later on the European political scene. Chapter 16 in this volume discusses these developments in greater depth, but a rapid summary of them is a crucial part of my overview.

The baseline of the story is that the realization of the four freedoms has been extremely hesitant and complex. On the one hand, many European states have been very reluctant to give up their sovereignty on migration issues, especially as they have become more politicized. On the other hand, within fifty years, we have progressed from essentially national immigration policies to European-scale intergovernmental cooperation, with a growing tendency to common discussion and, to a lesser extent, a common immigration policy. This process has been hampered by running disagreements over the appropriate institutional format for cooperation, notably with several states objecting to the federal-style centralization of migration issues in truly common policies. Also crucial is the fact that this slow, laborious process of migratory policy Europeanization has taken place in a spirit of respect for the zero immigration doctrine. An important result is that the Europeanization of immigration policies—whether tending towards relative harmonization, convergence or more closely concerted national policies—has led to a considerable heightening of the restrictive nature of immigration policy and border controls at Europe’s external frontiers. In becoming more European, immigration policies have become even more security-based.

Most of the developments in the Europeanization of immigration policy took place after 1973, occasionally taking giant steps. Two important periods stand out: the first from 1973–74 to 1989, the second from 1989 to the present day (with an important sub-phase of more accelerated activity since 1996). During the first period, migration was discussed at the European level mainly as a by-product of discussions about the construction of a common European market. During the second period, migration became a European issue in its own right.

Two earlier dates provide the background to the former period: 1957 and 1968. The Treaty of Rome of 1957 establishing the European
Economic Community (EEC) provided a legal basis for a European intra-community migration policy. The principle of free labor force movement, one of the founding principles of the Common Market, implied abolition of all discrimination based on Member-State workers’ nationality with regard to employment, pay or other working conditions. The EEC’s Council of Ministers was to be responsible for adopting Directives and Regulations in this respect. In 1968 the EEC took its first actions in this sphere, adopting legal norms concerning freedom of movement for European workers. EEC Regulation 1612/68 established a legal difference between European and non-European workers. From this date, a line was drawn between the issue of intra-European mobility and that of extra-Community immigration. In other words, the difference of status between those who become European citizens and those from outside countries is fixed by a European legal norm. In the same year, Directive 68/130 widened the scope of freedom of movement for workers to certain members of their family, of whatever nationality. The aim of this Directive was above all to facilitate European worker mobility with the Common Market. And yet, in some ways, it laid the foundations for the future development of an extra-European immigration policy (Martiniello and Govaere 1989).

The first steps toward elaborating such a policy in the 1973–74 to 1989 period began with an EEC summit in Paris in 1974, where the question of “non-Community foreign nationals” status was seriously examined for the first time. This was the logical consequence of the recently-affirmed idea of a “Citizens’ Europe.” How was this to be managed without considering similar treatment of non-European foreign nationals? Abandoning intra-European border controls while leaving each state free to adopt its own immigration policy did not seem feasible in the long term. In 1976 the Council therefore decided in favor of intergovernmental cooperation on the matter – if only in principle.

The growing importance of the immigration issue led the Commission to present, in March 1985, a document on “Orientations for Common Migration Policy.” This text pleaded in favor of more elaborate European personal mobility legislation. The Commission also defended the idea of intergovernmental consultation on Member States’ non-European immigration policies. Already at this time, the Commission was playing a leading role in sensitizing European authorities to the importance of the migratory issue and in cautiously trying to plead for a European immigration policy. A few months later, the Commission presented the idea of European coordination of entry, residence and work-permit regulations for non-European citizens. It also considered the creation of a common visa policy.
In June of the same year, the Commission took a further step in this direction by deciding to set up a procedure for previous notification and concerted action on migratory policies with regard to third countries (Martiniello and Govaere 1989). Its aim was to encourage Member States to inform their Community partners and the Commission of any changes planned in existing non-European immigration legislation. This decision made it possible for the Commission and the Member States to coordinate their action without any binding constraints. Member States were reluctant to accept this decision, however, which many saw as an attack on national sovereignty. The Council thus adopted a resolution again stating that non-European immigration policy remained a national responsibility. Even this was not enough for France, Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands, and Great Britain, who asked the European Court of Justice to annul the Commission's decision since (they argued) the Commission was not competent to deal with the matter. They thus indirectly contested the very idea of a common, coordinated non-European immigration policy. After extensive debates in which the European Parliament participated, and often spoke in defense of the Commission, the Court rescinded the Commission's decision, while upholding the idea that a European migration policy is feasible. The parties met halfway. The Commission re-attacked in 1988 with a second decision setting up a previous notification and coordination procedure for non-European immigration. This amended version of the initial text caused less trouble.

The Member States seemed divided between the wish to set up an internal market and saving their freedom of action on migration issues. This ambiguity is clear in the Single European Act of 1987, which revised the EEC treaty and launched the "Single Market 1992" program. On the one hand, governments promised to cooperate over non-Community foreign nationals, rights of entry, movement, and residence. On the other, they reasserted their right to take national measures for controlling non-European immigration.

This ambiguity endured. In 1989, during finalization of the Single Market program, the Palma Document (prepared for the June 1989 European Council summit in Madrid) drew up a list of problems to be solved for achieving personal freedom of movement in the EEC. It included border control on internal and external frontiers as well as visas and expulsions. Priority was given to the drawing-up of a list of countries whose nationals would need a visa for entering any Community country. Another priority was common external border control and surveillance measures. The document also attacked the question of improved cooperation and information exchange between customs and national police, as well as
prevention of illegal immigration. But if immigration policy harmonization was now presented as desirable, in-depth discussion of the content and development of a future common immigration policy did not take place.

Meanwhile, in the middle of the 1980s, senior officials in the Benelux countries, France and Germany were working, in secret and outside European institutions, on an agreement for gradually eliminating border controls on these five countries' common frontiers. The final objective was to completely abolish internal frontiers in this group of states and place all border controls at their external frontiers. The Schengen Agreement signed in June 1985 raised a number of questions not only among migrant defense associations but also among parliamentarians from these states, who were left out of the negotiations. There was a regrettable lack of information. The agreement admittedly provided for visa and entry policy harmonization, but it heavily emphasized police and judicial cooperation—clearly associating immigration with criminality and terrorism. The Schengen Agreement application clause was signed in 1990. It stresses interior or exterior frontier crossing, visas, mobility conditions, residence permits, and state responsibility for dealing with asylum applications. This agreement also provides for the setting-up of the Schengen Information System (SIS). This huge data bank, mainly concerned with wanted persons, is more a tool for improved police cooperation than a means of ensuring personal freedom of movement (Collinson 1993).

Some see Schengen as a practical method of work. Rather than proceeding through the usual intergovernmental channels, or accepting the leading role of the Commission, is it not better for a small group to make some progress towards an immigration policy, even if it is security-oriented, and later try to rally other European states to the same idea? And in fact Schengen did gradually attract most EU members, and even some from outside the EU. Among the EU Member States, only Great Britain and Ireland have not yet signed up to the Schengen Agreement. Moreover, although they cannot formally join, Iceland and Norway adopted the entire content of Schengen in March 2001. The Schengen method may be efficient. However, the fact that the basic agreement was negotiated in secret, hidden from the public gaze and from its representatives, poses a major problem for European democracy.

Thus, until 1989, it cannot be said that a common non-European migration policy existed. Each state tried to regulate migratory flows and check out foreigners on its own. Cooperation between states was difficult and took place within the negotiations for setting up the Internal Market by 1992 (or in parallel to them, in the Schengen format). The maximum attempted was to coordinate national border-control policies at the
European level. In the absence of a more coherent collective discussion of migration, these national immigration policies practically all became more restrictive and security-oriented while remaining as reactive as ever (Martiniello 2001).

As mentioned above, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the following collapse of nearly all communist regimes aroused the fear of a massive, uncontrollable migratory influx from the east. Illegal migrant and refugee flows from the south were also a cause of anxiety. It was increasingly recognized that an urgent political response to these migratory “threats” must be found. In a troubled geopolitical environment, external border-control became a priority for the EU, if only in European political rhetoric. Migration became a major issue in the European and even non-European political context. Intergovernmental and multilateral cooperation gained increasing momentum from the end of the 1980s. In the early 1980s, five multilateral forums were dealing with migratory issues. A few years later, there were fifteen, including the Schengen group, the Rhodes group, the Trevi group, the “ad hoc immigration group”, the “mutual assistance” group, the European anti-drug committee, the Berlin group, the “horizontal group,” the European Security and Cooperation Conference, and others (Collinson 1993).

This intense intergovernmental and multilateral activity is a main feature of the new migration policy regime set up during this period. The states increasingly realized that it was in their interest to cooperate in finding solutions to migratory dilemmas. Migration is in itself transnational. It may therefore be no use trying to regulate it simply between countries of origin and host countries. The Maastricht Treaty setting up the European Union came into force in 1993 and confirmed this trend towards an intergovernmental and multilateral approach to immigration policy. But, although visa policy was included in the supranational “first pillar” of core “Community competence,” all other features of immigration policy were relegated to Title IV of the Treaty, concerning Justice and Home Affairs cooperation. This is the famous “third pillar” of the Maastricht Treaty, the creation of which sought to limit centralized, supranational policy harmonization, and which pointedly did not provide for a common migratory policy as a whole.

A particularly significant area in the post-1989 expansion of activity was political asylum. Cooperation on asylum dates from 1986 with the adoption of the Single Act. At this time, one of the aims pursued by the “ad hoc immigration group” was to put an early end to abuse of the asylum process in Europe. With the enormous increase in asylum cases after 1989, however, pressure for development of a European asylum regime accelerated. Considerable progress has since been made, though
Member States have continued to disagree over how much their cooperation should operate through hortatory resolutions and declarations or through more centralized and legally binding common agreements and actions. Even given extensive coordination on asylum, certain states remain anxious to retain a degree of national sovereignty.

There has been no shortage of resolutions and declarations on asylum since 1986. The 1989 Palma Document presented several asylum policy proposals. It called for a common Geneva Convention-based policy involving Member State acceptance of identical international commitments, simplification of screening procedures for "plainly unfounded" asylum applications, determining the state in charge of asylum application screening and the creation of a data bank to record the date and place of asylum applications. In 1991, the Commission presented to Member States an asylum policy communication that prioritized the harmonization of expulsion policy. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 defined asylum policy as a matter of common interest to be dealt with through intergovernmental cooperation. A year later, the Edinburgh European Council again stated Europe’s intention of keeping to the asylum tradition but also of countering the potentially harmful effects of uncontrolled immigration. Among the principles inspiring European action was the recommendation to try to maintain displaced persons in the secure regions nearest to their home country. The idea of temporary protection appeared in these discussions, but did not lead concretely to a clearly defined status.

In terms of legally binding agreements and measures, two major instruments are directly pertinent to the asylum issue. The Dublin Convention 1990 was mainly aimed at determining the country responsible for asylum application screening. To avoid the "orbiting refugee" phenomenon, it lays down that one Member State alone shall be in charge of screening each asylum application. Asylum seekers thus have only one chance of obtaining refugee status. The state responsible is that of the applicant’s first entry into EU territory. The Convention also considers the question of information exchange on asylum rights between different states. As to the Convention on European external frontier crossing of 1990, it deals with the policy to be adopted with regard to asylum-seeker conveyers. In 1995, it was still at a standstill because of disagreement between Spain and the United Kingdom about the Straits of Gibraltar. The debate continued for some time within the Schengen framework.

With the opening of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European policy regime for international migration underwent four main developments that marked a new, more ambitious phase. Firstly, the political agenda widened considerably in comparison with previous periods. The Treaty assigned the EU
five major tasks: admission policy harmonization, development of a common illegal immigration approach, drawing-up of a labor immigration policy, solving of problems raised by non-EU foreign nationals’ presence within EU territory, and action to stem outside migratory pressure. Secondly, the emphasis was laid on joint international action. The basic notion was to set up a political regime stretching beyond the Schengen frontiers, and even beyond those of the EU and of the European Free Trade Association, stressing the importance of dialogue with the fifty-five-member Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the forty-one member Council of Europe, and the thirty-member Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The eastern enlargement of the EU was already on everyone’s mind, leading to an emphasis on coordination with the accession countries as well. Thirdly, the prevailing state of mind remained largely defensive. The EU and its Member States wished, above all, to protect EU frontiers by putting border controls on its external frontiers and creating buffer zones. Finally, this new regime was marked by a new level of confusion. It became even more difficult to discover exactly who does what in European immigration policy.

During the Intergovernmental Conference preparing the Amsterdam summit, it was obvious that opposition from Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland would block any sort of immediate immigration policy revolution. The other Member States claim to support the idea of a common immigration policy, leading to a compromise of sorts that has been decried by some political observers on both sides.

Of all the difficult texts in EU history, the Amsterdam Treaty is one of the most complex and least readable, with fourteen protocols and forty-six appended declarations. Its migration-related provisions were particularly Byzantine. It provided for the incorporation of Schengen principles in the “first pillar,” except with respect to the three above-mentioned states. The Community thus adopted the Schengen restrictive, security-oriented approach. The Maastricht Treaty’s Title IV on freedom of movement, immigration and asylum was moved to the first pillar. In other words, most of the migration and asylum issues left the third intergovernmental pillar and became subject to the more supranational procedures of core “community competences.” The Amsterdam Treaty also foresaw the possibility, within five years of its ratification, of creating a common immigration policy, which would have to be unanimously adopted by the Council. But discussion of the content of this supposed future policy was avoided.

Nonetheless, migration issues remained high on the agenda. At the 1999 European Council summit in Tampere, the Member States stressed the need to reach a common immigration and asylum policy within the
five-year time frame in the Amsterdam Treaty – by 2004. Border-control and anti-illegal immigration measures were again emphasized.

Two years after the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999, nobody denied the slow progress made on common immigration and asylum policy. The Commission played its part with no less than eleven proposals. Only two of them have so far been adopted by the Council. In a speech delivered in Rome in July 2000, Commissioner Vittorino, in charge of the dossier, wrote off zero immigration. In November 2000, the Commission presented a communication on Community immigration policy. In one way, things began to change. More and more political actors recognize the limits of zero immigration doctrine as well as the security-oriented, restrictive approach to immigration. Otherwise, things remain the same. Firstly, Member States are still suffering from a sort of schizophrenia. On the one hand, they declare they want to set up a common immigration policy. On the other, national bureaucracies cling to their national sovereignty. Secondly, the restrictive, security-oriented approach is widely accepted by most Member States. A generous, proactive European immigration policy is still to come. We shall now look at some arguments for and against such a policy.

**Conclusion: For a proactive immigration policy in the European Union**

In the last few years, demands have been voiced all over Europe for official re-opening of frontiers to certain forms of labor immigration. Several European governments have already seriously studied this hypothesis, often under strong pressure from industry, in order to counter the highly skilled manpower shortage in certain sectors, or unskilled in others. Others see immigration as a solution to our demographic ageing and decline as well as a means of safeguarding our social security system, particularly our pensions. In this view, we would import large numbers of young immigrants, who would have a lot of children and contribute, through taxation, to the costs of our welfare state. Lastly, there are those who advance our commitment to human rights in support of a more generous immigration and asylum policy.

Nevertheless, zero immigration is still considered the reference. Official re-opening of frontiers to new immigration is generally regarded with suspicion, if not hostility. Trade unions, for example, are reluctant to consider it. As to governments, some ministerial departments are afraid this new immigration will prove to be at the expense of labor market integration for the immigrant-origin youth. Most demographers are opposed to the idea of using immigration as a remedy for population ageing.
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After September 11 had stopped any attempt to seriously move beyond the zero immigration doctrine at the EU level, the European Commission has tried hard to stimulate a debate on the necessity to have a global approach to immigration, asylum, and integration. In June 2003, the Commission presented a Communication on immigration, integration, and employment (COM [2003]: 336) advocating a holistic approach targeting all dimensions of immigration and integration (economic, social, and political rights, cultural and religious diversity, citizenship and participation). Referring to a 2000 Communication (COM [2000]: 757), the text determined the targeted population as essentially composed by migrant workers, their reunited family members, refugees, and persons under international protection. In November 2004, the Common Basic Principles (CBP) on Integration were adopted under the Dutch presidency. They are aimed at designing a common European integration policy. They suggest a framework to serve as a reference for the implementation and evaluation of current and future integration policies. Finally, the Commission released a Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration in early 2005 (COM [2004]: 82 final). The paper raised numerous issues and discusses various scenarios relating to an EU approach to economic migration. It has led to a consultation of all the stakeholders throughout the Union. At the time of writing, the position of the Member States still look difficult to reconcile on this matter.

Analysis of immigration policy and declarations on the subject reveal, as the American researcher James Hollifield has been stressing for some years, a flagrant contradiction between market logic and political logic (Hollifield 1997; Entzinger et al. 2004). On the one hand, liberal states are obliged to support frontier opening as a part of their foreign policy in a free-trade economy, which presupposes freedom of movement for highly-skilled labor. On the other, they are afraid a migratory influx will bring into question the social security system, national identity and social cohesion, which is why they sometimes support very restrictive immigration and border-control policies. This tension, or, as Hollifield writes, this paradox of liberalism, is at the heart of public debate on immigration in Europe and one of the major causes of the slow progress towards a more generous proactive common immigration policy in the EU.

Furthermore, anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment is widespread among the population and the idea of re-opening frontiers is far from meeting with unanimous approval. These contradictory pressures sometimes cause divisions within governments. Some ministerial departments seem willing to discuss an end to zero immigration, while others seem mentally stuck in a timid, restrictive and security-oriented attitude to migratory flows.
The realistic argument in favor of a more generous, proactive common immigration policy in the EU rests, on the one hand, on the findings of migration theories and analysis of the main immigration trends in the last fifty years and, on the other, on an assessment of the restrictive policies in force since 1973–74 in Europe. Several important points must be stressed.

First, as stressed in the first two chapters of this volume (by a demographer and economists), migration is a complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to its economic, demographic or political aspects. Economists often explain migratory flows by a juxtaposition of individual rational decisions taken by migrants on a cost–benefit basis. According to this, they leave their homes when they think they will get an economic advantage from migration. This is largely a simplification, as can also be said of certain demographic analyses explaining migration by the existence of demographic inequalities between different regions of the world. There would be emigration from overpopulated to less populated regions. Yet we observe that it is often heavily overpopulated urban zones that attract most migrants. Migration can only be explained within a transdisciplinary approach, alone capable of expressing its complexity. For the present, the most efficient theories are migratory system theories. In their attempt to explain migratory movements, they take into account both the role of the state and that of individual decision. In this way, they combine the “macro” and “micro” approaches. On the “macro” level, they recognize the importance of institutional and structural factors such as the state of the market as well as the legislation and policies adopted by different states. On the “micro” level, they take notice of the role played by migrants’ beliefs and practices as well as by social networks. Many studies highlight the importance of networks to explain the formation of same-origin migrant communities, for example, those from China or Italy, in certain European or North American towns. They also stress international comparisons as well as historical links existing between the migrant’s home country and the host country, for instance, their cultural proximity, political influences or remaining traces of colonization (Castles and Miller 2003; Verdusco 2004). Second, and as a consequence, migration can only be understood in a global context. It means little to explain immigration in Belgium, for example, while isolating this country from its European partners. Immigration can only be understood and explained if we also understand and explain emigration. This means taking note of what is happening all over the world, not imagining that immigration begins when foreigners cross the frontier.

Third, North–South inequalities, whether economic, social, demographic or environmental are the context in which migratory movements
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are formed rather than their fundamental causes. Even if such inequalities were to disappear overnight, migration would not stop. It would simply take place in another context and take on another form. Fourth, international migrations are, in reality, the expression of growing interdependence between different regions of the world in the globalized economy. Different parts of the world are all, at the same time and to various extents, both emigrant countries and immigrant countries. Fifth, migration is certainly a feature of the economic and labor market restructuring process in the wealthy, developed parts of the world. This is as true for legal migration as it is for the illegal kind. In this latter case, if hundreds of thousands of clandestine immigrants are doing agricultural work in southern Europe and California, it is because the demands of competition impose cost reductions, which, in turn, keep prices down for the consumer and increase profits for the producer. In other words, illegal immigration plays an important economic role. This is perhaps why it is flourishing despite all the policies designed to combat it and which hypocritically denounce it as a calamity. Sixth, we must not omit to mention the cultural aspect of emigration. In certain parts of the world, emigration is a compulsory phase of life for an individual or a family. It represents a sort of rite of passage or an obligatory service rendered to the community.

In front of so complex a phenomenon, it will be easily understood that restrictive, security-inspired policies relying on the zero immigration doctrine are plainly inadequate. Policies applied in Europe since 1973–74 have definitely not achieved the objectives set. Moreover, these policies have produced perverse and apparently unexpected results. In the first place, as mentioned above, they have not put a stop to immigration into Europe. Declaring an end to labor immigration does not mean that it will actually stop. Furthermore, ambiguities can be found in working visa policy. On the one hand, a total ban on labor immigration is announced and on the other, visas are still delivered to certain categories of foreign workers. Secondly, while claiming to have closed the front door on immigration, that is, legal labor immigration, European governments have, in a way, encouraged entry through the side door, the one used by asylum seekers, and the back door, which lets in illegal and clandestine immigration. So immigrants who might in other circumstances have tried to enter Europe legally have chosen to seek asylum or enter by illegal means. Growing illegal immigration and people-trafficking can be largely explained by the extremely limited legal means of access to European territory. As to asylum seekers, many of these people fall into the legitimate Geneva Convention categories but may also be potential economic migrants as well. This is in no way contradictory. Thirdly, it
is particularly inappropriate to privilege, as European governments have long been doing, a strictly national approach to a transnational and, as already noted, global phenomenon. This is all the more true for the fact that, through the European integration process, a group of European states was becoming more and more interdependent. In the international migration sphere, each state's policy has an impact on its partners' situation. For example, when Germany decided to abolish visas for Polish nationals, there was a potential risk of migratory flows for neighboring countries whose borders with Germany are now much easier to cross. In other words, by opening its frontiers, Germany was also opening those of its partners in the EU. In these circumstances, the absence of common tools for European immigration management raises serious problems. Chapters 11, 16, and 17 all stress this theme as well.

Three options are in fact offered if we recognize the fact that European immigration policies have been, for several decades, poorly adapted and inefficient. The first consists of a general opening of frontiers. Morally speaking, it is possible to dream of a totally open world, as mentioned above. However, in present circumstances, with such an array of economic, social, political, and environmental inequalities, only the well-off would benefit from a general opening of frontiers. As to the poor, they would run the risk of becoming a new proletariat, even a lumpenproletariat, globalized like the globalized economy. The second possibility is to make immigration policies even more restrictive by increasingly militarizing immigration control, by further detaining asylum seekers and increasing the expulsion of foreigners. We then risk the systematic undermining of the human rights we claim to defend. This choice would mean a great loss for democracy. Between the naive total open borders hypothesis and the hypocritical reassertion of the zero immigration hypothesis, there is maybe room for a third option: a proactive EU approach to immigration which could take into account the interests of sending and receiving countries and regions but also the interests of migrants themselves. The construction of such an approach will be one of the most important challenges of the next decade.

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