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The UN record on peacekeeping operations

Today, United Nations peacekeeping is the multidimensional management of a complex peace operation, usually following the termination of a civil war, designed to provide interim security and assist parties to make those institutional, material, and ideational transformations that are essential to make peace sustainable. That is a new role for the UN. UN peace operations during the Cold War were more limited and focused on monitoring or policing the adherence to a truce by hostile parties.

This new, expanded role for the UN represents an effort to respond to complex new challenges to international security that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. An explosion of new internal armed conflicts led to a similar explosion in UN peacekeeping missions in the mid-1990s. The UN’s new perspective on how to build sustainable peace after civil war is

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embodied in two landmark reports—the “Brahimi” and “No exit without strategy” reports of 2000 and 2001 that built on Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report “Agenda for peace” and its 1995 supplement. While the UN has been generally effective in its new role, important and highly publicized failures have generated policy debates on how to improve the UN’s peacebuilding capacity.

This article engages with those policy debates by analyzing the record of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Peacebuilding involves a blend of several intervention practices, including mediation, observation, policing, tactical enforcement, conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and institutional transformation—all helping to create sustainable peace. Much criticism of UN peace missions in the popular press or policy literature is based on a claim that peacebuilding goals are not sufficiently adaptive to local contexts and interventions by different actors sometimes have conflicting effects. Different intervention practices are interdependent in complex ways: while one form of intervention may help shore up the foundations for another intervention strategy, the two together may work better or, in some cases, they may work well only if they are properly sequenced. Appropriate standards of peacebuilding success may also vary by context and by the proximity to the war. If the goal of peacebuilding intervention is social justice and political inclusion, then best practices will be different than in cases where the goal of peacebuilding intervention is simply the absence of war.

For any conflict situation, “sustainable peace” is the best measure of successful peacekeeping. Efforts to achieve that measure are influenced by three key factors that characterize the environment of the postwar civil peace: the degree of hostility of the factions, the extent of local capacities remaining after the war, and the amount of international assistance provided. Together, these three constitute the interdependent logic of a “peacebuilding triangle”: the deeper the hostility, the more the destruction of local capacities, the more you need international assistance to succeed in establishing a stable peace.

This article will explain how the dimensions of the peacebuilding triangle affect the nature of the postwar challenge and how the UN has been able to help countries transition from war to sustainable peace. We will focus on our preferred standard of peacebuilding success: the achievement of what we call participatory peace—a peace that includes not only the absence of war, but also restoration of the state’s sovereignty over all of its territory and some degree of political openness. Resolving problems of
divided sovereignty is an essential part of state-building that UN or other peacebuilding actors cannot afford to ignore. UN missions can have positive and lasting effects by keeping the peace in the early stages of the peace process, when risks of a return to war are greatest.¹

GENERATIONS OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

In the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War, the UN’s agenda for peace and security rapidly expanded. At the request of the security council summit of January 1992, Boutros-Ghali prepared the conceptual foundations of an ambitious UN role in peace and security in his seminal report, “An agenda for peace.”²

In addition to preventive diplomacy designed to head off conflicts before they became violent, the secretary general outlined the four interconnected roles that he hoped the UN would play in the fast-changing context of post-Cold War international politics:

1) peace enforcement, authorized to act with or without the consent of the parties in order to ensure compliance with a ceasefire. Mandated by the security council acting under the authority of chapter VII of the charter, these military forces are composed of heavily armed national forces operating under the direction of the secretary general.

2) peacemaking, designed “to bring hostile parties to agreement” through peaceful means such as those found in chapter VI. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences.

3) peacekeeping, established to deploy a “United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned,” as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between the parties while diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace or officials to implement an agreed peace.

4) postconflict reconstruction organized to foster economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously war-

¹ For an analysis of the long-term effects of UN missions and the importance of restoring the countries to fast economic growth, see Nicholas Sambanis, “Short-term and long-term effects of United Nations peace operations,” World Bank Economic Review.
ring parties, and developing the social, political, and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence and laying the foundations for a durable peace.³

"An agenda for peace" is the culmination of an evolution of UN doctrine and an adjustment of the instruments used to maintain the peace since the organization was formed in 1945. It combines in a radical way instruments of warlike enforcement and peacelike negotiation that were once kept separate and that evolved separately. A unique vocabulary separates distinct strategies that fit within the generic UN doctrine of building peace. These strategies, evolving over time, have encompassed three generational paradigms of peacekeeping.⁴ They include not only the early activities identified in UN charter chapter VI (or so-called “6 and 1/2”) first generation peacekeeping, which calls for the interposition of a force after a truce has been reached, but also a far more ambitious group of second generation operations that rely on the consent of parties, and an even more ambitious group of third generation operations that operate with chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the parties’ acquiescence.⁵ In today’s circumstances, these operations involve less interstate conflict and more factions in domestic civil wars, not all of whom are clearly identifiable—and few of whom are stable negotiating parties. Current peace operations thus intrude into aspects of domestic sovereignty once thought to be beyond the purview of UN activity.

Indeed, the charter emanated from World War II and can be seen as having been designed for interstate wars (e.g., article 39’s threats to “international” peace), appropriately so since from 1900 to 1941, 80 percent of all wars were interstate and involved state armies.⁶ But from 1945 to 1976, 85

³ The secretary general and the UN often refer to this as “postconflict peacebuilding.” To avoid confusion with the wider meaning of peacebuilding we use below, we will refer to this as “postconflict reconstruction.”

⁴ The timeline of evolution has by no means been chronologically straightforward. One of the most extensive “third generation” operations undertaken by the UN was ONUC in the then-Congo, from 1960-64, which preceded the spate of “second generation” operations that began with UNTAG in Namibia in 1989.

⁵ The “6 and 1/2” refers to the fact that peacekeeping per se is described nowhere in the charter and thus falls between chapter VI’s peaceful settlement of disputes and chapter VII’s peace enforcement.

percent of all wars were on the territory of one state and internally orient-
ed—of course with proxies.

Traditional peace operations—or first generation peacekeeping—were designed to respond to interstate crises by stationing unarmed or lightly armed UN forces between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop with-
drawal, or buffer zone while political negotiations went forward.7 As the late F.T. Liu, an eminent UN peacekeeping official, frequently noted: monitoring, consent, neutrality, non-use of force, and unarmed peacekeeping—the principles and practices of first generation peacekeeping—constituted a stable and interdependent combination. These key principles were articulated by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and former Prime Minister Lester Pearson in conjunction with the creation of the first peacekeeping opera-
tion (PKO), the UN emergency force (UNEF) in the Sinai that was sent to separate Israel and Egypt following the Franco-British-Israeli intervention in Suez in 1956.8 The principle of neutrality referred to the national origin of UN troops and precluded the use of troops from the permanent five members of the council (P-5) in order to quiet fears of superpower inter-
vention. Impartiality implied that the UN would not take sides in the dis-
pute and was a precondition for the achievement of the consent of all the parties. Enjoying the consent of all factions in turn made it easier for mon-
tors of peacekeepers not to have to use force except in self-defence.9 Lastly,

7 The first peacekeeping operation was the UN emergency force (UNEF) in Egypt, deployed in October 1956 to maintain a truce between the Egyptian army and Israel, England, and France during the Suez crisis. UNEF’s experience helped define the four principles of traditional peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, neutrality, and use of force only in self-defence. The UN treaty supervision organization (UNTSO) was deployed in 1948 in Palestine, but it was a limited observer mission.

8 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 2nd ed. (New York: United Nations, 1990), 5-
7; and Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 133.

9 Traditional peacekeeping is a shorthand term that describes many but by no means all Cold War peacekeeping missions (the most notable exception being the Congo operation and possibly also the Cyprus operation, as we discuss later in this article). For cogent analyses of different types of peacekeeping, see Marrack Goulding, “The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping,” International Affairs 69, no. 3 (1993): 451-64; F. T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-use of Force, International Peace Academy occasional paper series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); and Thomas G. Weiss, ed., Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).
the secretary general exercised control of the force and the security council authorized it (or rarely, the general assembly under the auspices of the “Uniting for peace resolution”).

Impartiality and neutrality are frequently used interchangeably. Scholars and practitioners often speak of peacekeepers as neutral, disinterested, impartial, or unbiased; they tend to mistake the need for impartiality with a policy of “strict neutrality” and a disposition of passivity. We define neutrality as a synonym for non-interference with respect to peacekeeping outcomes and impartiality as equal enforcement of unbiased rules. “Good cops” act impartially but not neutrally when they stop one individual from victimizing another. We argue that it is as important for peacekeepers to be impartial concerning, for example, which party in a freely conducted democratic election wins the election as it is for them to be non-neutral (i.e., not passive) with respect to violations of the peace and obstructions to their ability to implement their mandate.

This is closely related to the interpretation of the fourth principle of peacekeeping—the non-use of force. Peacekeeping soldiers aren’t used to win wars, but rather to preserve the peace. But peacekeepers must also protect their right to discharge their functions, in accordance with the spirit of the parties’ consent as extended at the outset of the operation. Raising the costs of non-cooperation for the parties must, on occasion, allow the use of force in defence of the mandate. The limited use of force to protect a mandate authorized by a peace treaty or to enforce an agreed upon ceasefire (as happened in Cyprus in 1974 or Namibia in 1989), does not equate peacekeeping with peace enforcement (attempts to impose an overall settlement), but it does generate concerns with mission creep if the need to use force is extensive.

During the Cold War, the UN record indicated much success in interstate conflicts (little in intrastate), much in material and territorial settlement (little in value or identity conflicts). The success of traditional peacekeeping was also dependent on successful peacemaking; a strategy

10 A controversial resolution introduced in the context of the Korean War designed to circumvent the deadlock in the security council that resulted from the return of the USSR to the council, following the boycott that allowed, in Moscow’s absence, the council to authorize the US led force in Korea in June 1950. It was applied to authorize the Sinai peace force in 1956.
designed “to bring hostile parties to agreement” through peaceful means such as those found in chapter VI of the UN charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation, and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences. Traditional PKOs referred to a UN presence in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce while diplomats negotiated a comprehensive peace. Peacekeeping was therefore designed as an interim arrangement where there was no formal determination of aggression, and was frequently used to monitor a truce, establish and police a buffer zone, and assist the negotiation of a peace. Monitoring or observer missions had several of the same objectives as traditional PKOs, though they were typically less well armed (or unarmed) and focused on monitoring and reporting to the security council and the secretary general.

Both monitoring operations and traditional peacekeeping provided transparency—an impartial assurance that the other party was not violating the truce—and were supposed to raise the costs of defecting from an agreement by the threat of exposure and the potential (albeit unlikely) resistance of the peacekeeping force. The international legitimacy of UN mandates increased the parties’ benefits of cooperation with the peacekeepers. The price of first-generation peacekeeping, as in the long Cyprus operation, was sometimes paid in conflicts delayed rather than resolved. Today these monitoring activities continue to play an important role on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria and, until recently, on the border between Kuwait and Iraq.

Monitoring and traditional PKOs were strictly bound by the principle of consent. Consent derives from the parties’ “perceptions of the peacekeepers’ impartiality and moral authority.”12 It reduces the risk to the peacekeepers and preserves the sovereignty of the host state. Eroding consent can significantly diminish the peacekeepers’ ability to discharge their mandate, so the peacekeepers have an incentive to enhance the parties’ consent. Since eroding consent could turn PKOs into multi-billion dollar “obsolescing investments” that are easy hostages to insincere parties, it follows that the

UN should develop strategies to enhance consent. This flexibility is more easily provided in second-generation, multidimensional operations that involve the implementation of complex, multidimensional peace agreements designed to build the foundations of self-sustaining peace and have been utilized primarily in post-civil war situations. In addition to the traditional military functions, the peacekeepers are often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict. These operations are based on consent of the parties, but the nature of and purposes for which consent is granted are qualitatively different from traditional peacekeeping.

Beyond monitoring and traditional peacekeeping, the key strategy was to foster economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously warring parties, developing the social, political, and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence and laying the foundations for a durable peace. Multidimensional peacekeeping is aimed at capacities-expansion (e.g., economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g., reform of the police, army, and judicial system, elections, civil society rebuilding). In these operations, the UN is typically involved in implementing peace agreements that go to the roots of the conflict, helping to build long-term foundations for stable, legitimate government. As Boutros-Ghali observed in “An agenda for peace,” “peace-making and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace...[T]hese may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”

The UN has a commendable record of success, ranging from mixed to transformative, in second-generation, multidimensional peace operations as diverse as those in Namibia (UNTAG), El Salvador (ONUSAL),

Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). The UN’s role in helping settle those conflicts has been four-fold. It served as a peacemaker facilitating a peace treaty among the parties; as a peacekeeper monitoring the cantonment and demobilization of military forces, resettling refugees, and supervising transitional civilian authorities; as a peacebuilder monitoring and in some cases organizing the implementation of human rights, national democratic elections, and economic rehabilitation; and in a very limited way as peace enforcer when the agreements came unstuck.

In Boutros-Ghali’s lexicon, “peace-enforcing”—effectively war-making—missions are third-generation operations, which extend from low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of ceasefires and, when necessary, authoritative assistance in the rebuilding of so-called “failed states.” As with chapter VII UN enforcement action to roll back aggression in Korea in 1950 and against Iraq in the Gulf War, the defining characteristic of third-generation operations is the lack of consent by one or more of the parties to some or all of the UN mandate. These operations have been of three types. In the first, international forces attempt to impose order without significant local consent, in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, and must in effect conquer the factions (as was attempted in Somalia). In the second, international forces do not have unanimous consent and choose to impose distinct arrangements on parties in the midst of an ongoing war (e.g., no-fly zones, or humanitarian corridors of relief). In the third, international

15 Success is of course an ambiguous and contested term. We discuss its various meanings and how to measure it in Making War and Building Peace in both the data analysis and case studies.

16 Other recent categories include “preventive deployments” fielded with the intention of deterring a possible attack, as in Macedonia. There, the credibility of the deterring force must ensure that the potential aggressor knows that there will be no easy victory. In the event of an armed challenge, the result will be an international war that involves costs so grave as to outweigh the temptations of conquest. Enforcement action against aggression (Korea or the Gulf), conversely, is a matter of achieving victory—the decisive, comprehensive and synchronized application of preponderant military force to shock, disrupt, demoralize and defeat opponents—the traditional zero-sum terrain of military strategy. See John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, “Second-generation multinational operations,” Washington Quarterly 15 (summer 1992): 113-31.
forces exercise force to implement the terms of comprehensive peace from which one or more of the parties have chosen to defect.

Enforcement operations draw upon the authority of charter article 42, which permits the security council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”; article 25, under which member states “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council”; and article 43, in which they agree to “make available to the Security Council, on its call, ...armed forces, assistance and facilities.”

Insightful doctrine for these peace-enforcing operations appeared just as Somalia and Bosnia exposed their practical limitations. Recent studies have thoughtfully mapped out the logic of the strategic terrain between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement action. Militarily, these operations seek to deter, dissuade and deny. By precluding an outcome based on the use of force by the parties, the UN instead uses collective force (if necessary) to persuade the parties to settle the conflict by negotiation. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, the world organization following this strategy could have established strong points to deter attacks on key humanitarian corridors. (It actually did, but the Serbs bypassed them.) Or it could threaten air strikes, as was done successfully around Sarajevo in February 1994, to dissuade a continuation of the Serb shelling of the city. Or, it could have denied (but did not) the Serb forces their attack on Dubrovnik in 1992 by counter-shelling from the sea or bombing from the air the batteries in the hills above the city. Forcing a peace depends on achieving a complicated preponderance in which the forces (UN and local) supporting a settlement acceptable to the international community hold both military dominance and a predominance of popular support that together permit them to impose a peace on the recalcitrant local military forces and their popular supporters.

Countries provide troops to UN peace operations in various ways. Troop contributing countries negotiate in detail the terms of the participation of their forces either under UN command and thus with the secretary general (as in El Salvador or Cambodia); with a regional organization authorized as delegated in chapter VIII; or with the leader of a multina-

tional “coalition of the willing” authorized under chapter VII (as was the case of US leadership of UNITAF in Somalia). Many operations draw on a combination of authorizations: peace treaties among factions, backed-up or supplemented by other measures authorized (such as arms embargoes, no-fly zones) under chapter VII, as did the various UNROFOR and IFOR operations.\(^8\) And, as named in honour of its sponsors, “Chinese chapter VII” (employed to authorize the use of force for UNTAAES) has emerged as a new way to signal firm intent to enforce a chapter VI operation. In essence, however, it reaffirms the “Katanga rule” of the ONUC operation, which is the traditional principle that force can be used both in the mission (mobility of the force) and in the self-defence of peacekeeping troops.

The result of these three “generations” operating together in the post-Cold War world was an unprecedented expansion of the UN’s role in the protection of world order and in the promotion of basic human rights in countries until recently torn by costly civil wars. Between 1987 and 1994, the security council quadrupled the number of resolutions it issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations it authorized, and multiplied by seven the number of economic sanctions it imposed per year. Military forces deployed in peacekeeping operations increased from fewer than 10,000 to more than 70,000. The annual peacekeeping budget skyrocketed correspondingly from $230 million to $3.6 billion in the same period, thus reaching about three times the UN’s regular operating budget of $1.2 billion.\(^9\) In the process, self-determination and sovereignty were enhanced and a modicum of peace, rehabilitation, and self-sustaining self-determination was introduced in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and eastern Slavonia. Tens—perhaps, even hundreds—of thousands of lives were saved in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. But in 1993 and 1994, the more ambitious elements of third-generation peace enforcement encountered many of the problems interventionist and imperial strategies have faced in the past, and discovered fresh problems peculiar to the UN’s global character. Boutros-Ghali then famously called for a retrenchment of an over-extended UN commitment to peacekeeping in his supplement to “Agenda for peace” report of January 1995.

The debacles in Somalia and Bosnia forced a radical rethinking of when and where the UN should get involved. Disingenuously, President Bill Clinton told the general assembly that it needed to learn when to say “no.” Many came to believe that the UN was not well suited to mounting effective peace operations—no more suited to make peace than the lobbyists who represented a trade group of hospitals would be to conduct surgery. Others thought that such operations should be delegated to regional organizations, and NATO preeminently. This last group began calling for a “fourth generation” of delegated peacekeeping.

The lessons of the 1990s were embodied in an eloquent plea for strategic peacekeeping made by in the report of the panel on United Nations peace operations chaired by the experienced UN peacekeeper and former Algerian foreign minister, Lakhdar Brahimi. In reaction to a perceived passivity in traditional peacekeeping in the face of armed challenges, the panel advocated “robust doctrines” and “realistic mandates” together with improved capacities for headquarters management and rapid deployment. In the “No exit without strategy” report, the secretary general responded to a request from the security council for comprehensive strategy to achieve a sustainable peace. The report drew on the security council’s own deliberations to make a case for an ambitious, comprehensive, three-pronged strategy: “consolidating internal and external security,” “strengthening political institutions and good governance” and “promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation.” The theme of both—the first operational, focusing on peacekeeping operations and the second doctrinal, focusing on the role of security council—was a plea for strategically matching missions to capabilities.

21 For an account of the various positions and factors, see Ramesh Thakur, “UN peace operations and US unilateralism and multilateralism,” in David Malone and Yuen F. Kong, eds., *Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 153·79.
STRATEGIC PEACEKEEPING
What can political science literature tell us about how to plan for a sustainable peace? Is strategic peacekeeping in fact realizable? The peacekeepers’ first concern in designing intervention strategies is to properly identify the type of conflict underlying the civil war. Political scientists have explored a wide range of theories about why and how parties enter into and resolve various kinds of conflicts. At the more abstract level, “neoliberal” theories explore conflicts among rational actors over absolute goods valued for their own sakes. Neorealists examine conflicts among rational actors that raise issues of security and relative gains, based on the assumption that relative power (dominance) alone provides security and therefore the gains that truly matter. Constructivists relax the assumption that perceived identities and interests are fixed and explore the circumstances in which conflicts and social relations more generally constitute and then reshape identities and interests. We find aspects of each of these three factors in the peacekeeping record we examine. Factions and their leaders seek absolute advantages as well as relative advantages. Sometimes, international actors assist the peace process by eliminating old actors (war criminals, factional armies) or introducing new actors (domestic voters, political parties, international monitors, NGOs) or fostering changes of identity (reconciliation)—or by all three together. But a more informative analytic lens portrays the peace process through two classic game situations, coordination and cooperation, each of which incorporates neoliberal, neorealist and constructivist dynamics.

Thus, to simplify, conflicts can be over coordination or cooperation, depending on the structure of the parties’ preferences over possible outcomes of the negotiations. Each preference structure characterizes a specific type of conflict and different intervention strategies are optimal for different conflict types. Some conflicts are mixed, reflecting elements of both, and conflicts do change over time, evolving from one to the other and,

sometimes, back again. Well-chosen strategies can maximize the available space for peace, whereas strategies that are poorly matched to the conflict at a particular time can reduce the space for peace.

Coordination problems have a payoff structure that gives the parties no incentives to violate agreements. A classic example is driving on the right side of the road (or on the left in Great Britain or India). The best strategy to resolve coordination problems is information-provision and improvement of the level of communication between the parties. Communication gives the parties the ability to form common conjectures about the likely outcomes of their actions. By contrast, cooperation problems create incentives to renege on agreements, particularly if the parties discount the benefits of long-term cooperation in favour of short-run gain. In one-shot games of cooperation (of which the prisoner’s dilemma is a well-known example), the parties will try to trick their adversaries into cooperating while they renege on their promises. In the prisoner’s dilemma, for example, two accomplices in police custody are offered a chance to “rat” on their partner. The first to rat gets off and the “sucker” receives a very heavy sentence. If neither rat, both receive light sentences (based on circumstantial evidence); and, if both rat, both receive sentences (but less than the sucker’s penalty). Even though they would be better off trusting each other by keeping silent, the temptation to get off and the fear of being the sucker make cooperation extremely difficult. These structural differences between cooperation and coordination problems imply that different peacekeeping strategies should be used in each case.

Different strategies are needed to resolve different types of problems. Transformative intervention strategies, such as multidimensional peace-

25 For a theoretical discussion of the problem of providing assurance and building trust in conflicts that combine elements of both coordination and cooperation games, see Andrew Kydd, “Trust, reassurance, and cooperation,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): 325-57.
28 Morrow, Game Theory, 222.
keeping or enforcement with considerable international authority, are need-
ed to resolve cooperation problems, whereas facilitative peacekeeping
strategies, such as monitoring and traditional peacekeeping, are sufficient
to resolve coordination problems. Facilitative peacekeeping has no enforce-
ment or deterrence function. Transformative peacekeeping through multi-
dimensional operations can increase the costs of non-cooperation for the
parties and provide positive inducements by helping rebuild the country
and restructure institutions so that they can support the peace.
Enforcement may be necessary to resolve the toughest cooperation prob-
lems.²⁹ Not all civil war transitions are plagued by cooperation problems.
Some wars resemble coordination problems, whereas frequently we find
both types of problems, in which case intervention strategies must be care-
fully combined or sequenced.

Can peacekeeping have an impact and how? The literature suggests
that peacekeepers can change the costs and benefits of cooperation by
virtue of the legitimacy of their UN mandate, which induces the parties to
cooperate, by their ability to focus international attention on non-coopera-
tive parties and condemn transgressions, by their monitoring of and report-
ing on the parties’ compliance with agreements, and by their function as a
trip-wire that would force aggressors to go through the UN troops to change
the military status quo.³⁰

Ultimate success, however, may depend less on changing incentives for
existing parties within their preferences and more on transforming prefer-
ences—and even the parties themselves—and thus turning a cooperation
problem into a coordination problem. Later we will describe the institution-
building aspects of peacekeeping as a revolutionary transformation in
which voters and politicians replace soldiers and generals: armies become
parties; war economies, peace economies.

Reconciliation, when achieved, is a label for these changed preferences
and capacities. To be sure, the difficulty of a transformative strategy cannot
be overestimated. Most postwar societies look a great deal like they did pre-

²⁹ Transformative peacekeeping is different from peace enforcement. The former
can only deter or punish occasional violations. If the violations are systematic and
large-scale, a no-consent enforcement operation might be necessary.
³⁰ Two recent valuable contributions are Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) and Kimberly Marten, Enforcing the
war. But, for example, if those that have committed the worst war crimes can be prosecuted, locked up, and thus removed from power, the prospects of peace rise. The various factions can begin to individualize rather than collectivize their distrust and hostility and, at the minimum, the worst individuals are no longer in control.31

Therefore, even where enforcement is used at the outset, the peace must eventually become self-sustaining and consent needs to be won if the peace enforcers are ever to exit with their work done. And consensual peace agreements can rapidly erode, forcing all the parties to adjust to the strategies of “spoilers.” Their success or lack of success of doing so tends to be decisive in whether a sustainable peace follows.

How can the peacekeepers know which type of conflict they are facing? A first clue is the peace treaty. If a treaty has been signed that outlines a postwar settlement, then the parties’ preferences have been revealed to some extent (though the fact that some peace treaties are quickly undermined also means that only by observing the parties’ compliance with the treaty can we be more certain about their true preferences). Patterns of compliance with the treaty can help distinguish moderates from extremists. In other cases, such knowledge cannot be attained until the first (or several) encounters with the parties. Where a treaty is not in place, all parties can be assumed to be spoilers and strong peacekeeping must be used. Subsequent cooperation or conflict with the peacekeepers can help distinguish those parties who respond to inducements from those who are committed to a strategy of war. This also means that UN missions must be flexible to adjust their mandate given observations of cooperation or conflict on the ground and based on the peacekeepers’ changing assessments about the nature of the conflict.

A treaty is usually the outcome of a “mutually hurting stalemate,” which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful peace.32


32 The mutually hurting stalemate is from Bill Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) where he discusses “ripe” conflicts. Additional conditions for conflict “ripeness” in Zartman’s theory are a sense of crisis, a deadline for negotiation, a reversal in the parties’ relative strength, a leveraged external mediation, and a feasible settlement that can address all the parties’ basic needs.
Such a stalemate exists when the status quo is not the preferred option for any faction, while overturning the status quo through military action is unlikely to be successful. This condition pushes parties to the negotiating table and their declared preferences for peace are more credible as a result of their inability to forcibly achieve a better outcome.33

However, the parties will not negotiate a settlement unless peace is likely to generate higher rewards than continued fighting. This condition becomes unattainable if “spoilers” are present. Spoilers are leaders or parties whose vital interests are threatened by peace implementation.34 These parties will undermine the agreement and reduce the expected utility of a negotiated settlement for all parties. In terms of our previous arguments, the presence of spoilers implies the “payoff structure” of a prisoner’s dilemma or an assurance “game” as spoilers will not coordinate their strategies with moderates. Thus, if spoilers are present in a peace process, peacekeepers can only keep the peace if they can exercise some degree of enforcement by targeting the spoilers and preventing them from undermining the negotiations. The dynamics of spoiler problems deserve a closer look.

Stephen Stedman first systematically analyzed spoiler problems, and identified three types—total, greedy, and limited spoiler—according to their strategies and likely impact on the peace implementation process. These are behavioural types, and Stedman defines them in terms of their preferences over the strategies they use to undermine the peace. However, all parties can act as total spoilers if conditions deteriorate markedly. But parties whose ultimate goals over the outcomes of the peace are more moderate will have incentives not to spoil the peace process if they can get a reasonable outcome. The difficulty facing the peacekeepers is to distinguish moderates from extremists, or total spoilers, when conditions are such as to encourage all parties to defect from agreements.

The principal gain of good UN peacekeeping will be to allow moderates—limited spoilers with specific stakes—and greedy opportunists to act like peacemakers in the peace process without fearing reprisals from total spoilers who are unalterably opposed to the peace settlement. Effective strategies must combine consent from those willing to coordinate and cooperate with coercive carrots and sticks directed at those who are not. We

33 The settlement of El Salvador’s civil war is a good example of a hurting stalemate.
will suggest that the record shows that by strategically combining peacemaking, peacekeeping, postconflict reconstruction and peace enforcement, peace can be built from problematic and unpromising foundations.

A PEACEKEEPING TRIANGLE

International peacekeeping strategies and concepts of operations, therefore, should be “strategic” in the ordinary sense of that term, matching means to ends. Although a peacekeeping strategy must be designed to address a particular conflict, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. These strategies combine peacemaking, peacekeeping, postconflict reconstruction, and (where needed) enforcement.

Effective transitional strategy must take into account levels of hostility and factional capacities. Whether it in fact does so depends on strategic design and international commitment. Designs for transitions incorporate a mix of legal and bureaucratic capacities that integrate in a variety of ways domestic and international commitments.

Important lessons can already be drawn from efforts to establish effective transitional authority.35 First, a holistic approach is necessary to deal with the character of factional conflicts and civil wars. Successful exercises of authority require a coordinated approach that draws in elements of “peacemaking” (negotiations), peacekeeping (monitoring), peacebuilding reconstruction, and discrete acts of enforcement, when needed, to create a holistic strategy of reconciliation.36

Transitional strategies should first address the local causes of continuing conflict and second, the local capacities for change. Effective transitional authority is the residual dimension that compensates for local deficiencies and the continuing hostility of the factions—the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist change. We can think of effective transitional authority as authority x resources x international institutional capacities.


36 See Alvaro DeSoto and Graciana del Castillo, “Obstacles to peacebuilding in El Salvador,” Foreign Policy 94 (1994): 69-83. This is the coordinating role that Japan, for example, played in Cambodia in organizing the Tokyo conference and the international committee on the reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC).
Local root causes, domestic capacity, and effective transitional authority are three dimensions of a triangle, whose area is the “political space”—or effective capacity—for building peace. This metaphor suggests that some quantum of positive support is needed along each dimension but that the dimensions also substitute for each other—more of one substitutes for less of another, less deeply rooted causes of war substitute for weak local capacity or minor international commitment. In a world where each dimension is finite we can expect, first, that compromises will be necessary in order to achieve peacekeeping; second, that the international role must be designed to fit each case; and, third, that self-sustaining peace is not only the right aim, it is the practically necessary aim of building peace when the international community is not prepared to commit to long-term assistance.

Strategies should address the local sources of hostility, the local capacities for change, and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist change. One can conceive of the three as the three dimensions of a triangle, whose area is the “political space”—or effective capacity—for building peace.

International peace operation mandates must take into account the characteristics of the factions and whether the parties are prepared to coordinate or must be persuaded or coerced into cooperation. These mandates operate not upon stable states but, instead, on unstable factions. These factions (to simplify) come in various dimensions of hostility. Hostility, in turn, is shaped by the number of factions, including the recognized state as one (if there is one). Numerous factions make it difficult for them to cooperate and engender suspicion. Too few or many factions complicate both coordination and cooperation. In addition, harm done—casualties and refugees generated—creates the resentment that makes jointly beneficial solutions to coordination and cooperation that much more difficult to envisage. The more hostile and numerous the factions, the more difficult the peace process will be.37

37 "Factions" refers to actual factions in a civil war. While the peacebuilding triangle measures hostility generated by these factions (e.g., it can measure the number of factions, whether or not they have signed a treaty, and the issues over which they are fighting a war), we cannot measure the factions' local capacities except at the national level, so we use country-level indicators of local capacities in our empirical analysis. This is not inconsistent with our analysis, as national-level capacities are crucially important for economic construction after civil war. In some cases, only a
In less hostile circumstances (with few factions, a hurting stalemate, or less harm done), international monitoring and facilitation might be sufficient to establish transparent trust and self-enforcing peace. Monitoring helps create transparency among partners lacking trust but having compatible incentives favouring peace. Traditional peacekeeping assistance can also reduce tradeoffs (helping, for example, to fund and certify the cantonment, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants). In these circumstances—with few players, some reconciliation, less damage—international coordination and assistance can be sufficient to overcome hostility and solve implementation problems. An international peacekeeping presence itself can deter defections from the peace treaty, because of the possible costs of violating international agreements and triggering further international involvement in an otherwise domestic conflict. International capacity building—such as foreign aid, demobilization of military forces, or institutional reform—will assist parties that favour the peace to meet their commitments.

In more hostile circumstances, international enforcement can help solve commitment and cooperation problems by directly implementing or raising the costs of defection from peace agreements. International enforcement and long-term trusteeship will be required to overcome deep sources of distrust and powerful incentives to defect from agreed provisions of the peace. As in other conflict-cooperation situations such as the prisoner’s dilemma and mixed motive games, the existence of deeply hostile or many factions, or factions that lack coherent leadership, complicate the problem of achieving self-enforcing cooperative peace. Instead, conscious direction and enforcement by an impartial international agent to guarantee the functions of effective sovereignty become necessary and peacekeepers must include activities such as conducting a free and fair election, arresting war criminals, and policing and administering a collapsed state. The more difficult it is for the factions to cooperate, the greater the international authority and capacity the international peacekeepers must wield. In addition to

small part of a country is affected by civil war and local capacities are lower in that part as compared to the rest of the country. But even in those cases, the capacity of the central government to rebuild the war-torn region by redirecting resources to it is critical for the peacebuilding process. Our measure of national-level capacities captures this fact.

substantial bodies of troops, extensive budgets for political reconstruction and substantial international authority need to be brought to bear because the parties are so unlikely to trust each other and cooperate. International mandates may need to run from monitoring to administration to executive authority and full sovereign trusteeship like supervision—if peace is going to be maintained and become eventually self-sustaining.

Wartorn countries also vary in economic and social capacity. Some wartorn countries start out with considerable economic development (the former Yugoslavia) and retain levels of social capacity in an educated population. Others begin poor and the war impoverishes them further (Angola, Sudan, Cambodia). For both types of cases, reconstruction is vital; the more the social and economic devastation, the larger the multidimensional international role must become, whether consent-based multidimensional peacekeeping or non-consent enforcement followed by and including multidimensional peacekeeping. International economic relief and productive jobs are the first signs of peace that can persuade rival factions to truly disarm and take a chance on peaceful politics. Institutions need to be rebuilt, including a unified army and police force and the even more challenging development of a school system that can assist the reconciliation of future generations.\(^9\) In countries with low levels of local capacities, competition over resources will be intense at the early stages of the peace process, and this can further intensify the coordination and collaboration problems that the peacekeepers will be asked to resolve.

There thus should be a relation between the depth of hostility (harm and factions) and local capacities (institutional and economic collapse), on the one hand, and the extent of international assistance and effective authority, from monitoring to enforcing, needed to build peace, on the other. In a world where each dimension is finite we can expect, first, that compromises will be necessary to achieve peacekeeping success, and second, that the international role will be significant in general and successful when it is designed to fit the case. The extent of transitional authority that needs to be delegated to the international community will be a function of the level of postwar hostility and local capacities.

\(^9\) Having observed negotiations in El Salvador, Cambodia, eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Brcko (Bosnia), and Cyprus, it is our opinion that establishing a unified army or multiethinic police force, though difficult, is easy compared to agreeing on an elementary school curriculum.
The relations among the three dimensions of the triangle are complicated. The availability and prospect of international assistance and the existence of extensive local capacities, for example, can, if poorly managed, raise both the gains from victory (spoils of war and rebuilding assistance) and reduce the costs of fighting (as the assistance serves to sustain the fighting). So, too, deep war-related hostilities can have dual effects. They increase rational incentives to end the conflict, but also make the peace harder to achieve.

We test our hypotheses about the positive impact of international capacities using an extensive data set for all peace processes after civil war from 1945 until the end of 1999. We identify 145 civil wars and estimate a statistical model that gives us the probability of “participatory peace” success for conflicts that have just ended. Participatory peace implies an absence of war or lower-level armed conflict, undivided sovereignty, and a minimum degree of political participation. This model includes various measures of postwar hostility, local capacities, and international capacities. UN peace mandates are our key measure of international capacities. The model helps identify broad guidelines for peace strategies after civil war, given different levels of local capacities and hostility.\textsuperscript{40}

Peace processes can be divided into difficult and easy cases. In a hypothetical difficult case, all the variables with a negative coefficient in our model (i.e., variables that reduce the probability of participatory peace success) would have high values (we set them at their 75th percentile) and all the variables with positive coefficients would have low values (we set them at their 25th percentile).\textsuperscript{41} We can explore the impact of international capacities on the probability of success in hypothetical difficult and easy cases.

\textsuperscript{40} These results are discussed at great length in our book and the two supplements that are available online (see the book, chapter 3, for URL). These estimates were obtained with logistic regression. Our estimates of the effects of UN operations are statistically significant using several different model specifications and econometric assumptions. The effects of UN missions also persist in the longer term, though they are felt more strongly in the first few years after the end of the civil war.

\textsuperscript{41} Easy cases imply a non-ethnic war, two factions, 75th percentile in net transfers per capita and electricity consumption per capita, and 25th percentile in primary exports as percent of GDP and deaths and displacements. Hard cases imply an ethnic war with four factions, electricity consumption, and net current transfers at the 25th percentile of their ranges and deaths and displacements and primary commodity exports at the 75th percentile of their ranges.
The results are striking: a difficult case without a treaty or UN mission, even at the lowest level of hostility, has a very low likelihood of success, several times lower than with a transformative UN mission and a treaty. Peacekeeping does make a positive difference, and early intervention pays. But at very high levels of hostility, after massive civilian slaughter, the two probabilities decline and the probability declines more rapidly in the case with a UN mission and a treaty, although there is still a greater chance of success with a PKO and treaty. For example, a substantial multidimensional PKO made a positive difference in Cambodia, despite the massive killings and displacements that took place there; an equivalent effort might have been useful in Rwanda.

These results are almost the opposite of those for an easy case. There, the probability of success is quite high at low levels of hostility, even though it is still slightly higher if a transformative UN mission is deployed on the basis of a treaty among the parties. But the major effect of the treaty and the UN occurs at high levels of hostility, where they are crucial in maintaining the probability of success. Without a treaty and transformative UN mission, the likelihood of success drops substantially at extreme values of hostility. This appears, for example, to have mapped the situation in Bosnia during the late 1990s, one of the more developed countries among those that have had a civil war and one that has suffered many casualties. NATO, the UN, and a plethora of other international organizations held it together in peace.

A treaty and UN mission are even more important for success since the slope of the curve with a transformative UN mission gets much steeper much sooner than the slope of the curve without a UN mission or treaty and the resulting probability of success without a treaty and UN mission is very low even at extremely high levels of economic development.

By contrast, the effect of a transformative UN mission and a treaty is highest at very low levels of development, whereas neither a treaty nor a strong international presence seems necessary for success at very high levels of development. Developed countries that experience minor civil violence can put themselves back together. The UN is most needed elsewhere, in the less developed countries that have suffered extensive violence.

CONCLUSION
Our analysis identifies the critical determinants of the peacekeeping that results in a participatory peace and finds that participatory peace is more likely after non-ethnic wars, in countries with relatively high development levels, and when UN peace operations and substantial financial assistance
are available. Peaces without an element of participation—a simple end to the violence—are more dependent on muscular third-party intervention and on low-hostility levels rather than on the breadth of local capacities (although here, too, a rapidly improving economic situation will help create disincentives for renewed violence).

Peacemaking aimed at facilitating a negotiated settlement is potentially life-saving, since we find that treaties that stick and result in an end to the violence are highly correlated with success, at least in the short term. The strategic logic underlying the peacekeeping triangle seems to work. Strategically designed peacekeeping combined with peace enforcement does make a difference. International capacities can foster peace by substituting for limited local capacities and alleviating factors that feed deep hostility. Such intervention improves the prospects for peace, but only if the peace operation is appropriately designed. Enforcement operations alone cannot create the conditions for a self-sustaining democratic peace. In the right circumstances, consent-based peacekeeping operations with civilian functions (multidimensional PKOs) are, by contrast, good not only in ending the violence, but also in assisting with the institutional and political reform that helps secure longer term peace. Truly intractable conflicts, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor probably will require both enforcement and reconstruction activities, coordinated and in the right order.