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Political Violence in the Form of
International Terrorism: A Review of
Weeks 1 & 2 Lecture & Readings
MVZ 203 / 448
Spring 2010
Masaryk University
Dave McCuan
Defining Terrorism: Problematic
* State sponsors and rogue groups blur
defined terrorist acts
* Potentially politically loaded term:
­ One person's "terrorist" is another's "freedom
fighter"
­ Non-scientific, non-empirical
* Hoffman, et al.: "How we define `terrorism'
shapes policy prescriptions to fight the same"
* Implications for international cooperation
* Can be difficult to define ultimately, but we
have particular components common to most
definitions
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On the Internet: Resource Rich
Terrorism: Official Definitions
* Title 22, United States Code, Section 2656f(d)
­ "Premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience."
* Federal Bureau of Investigation
­ "The unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives."
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Official Definitions (cont'd)
* U.S. Department of Defense
­ The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of
unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals
that are generally political, religious or ideological.
* The United Nations
­ Any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or
non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population or compel a government or an
international organization to carry out or to abstain from any act, cannot
be justified on any grounds and constitutes an act of terrorism."
Source: The Economist 10 September 2005, pg. 32.
Terrorism: A Working Definition
* Use of lethal violence or threat of violence
* Political motivation (not necessarily
exclusively political)
* Individuals targeted are not directly connected
to the political objective--violence is somewhat
random
* Perpetrators are not officially connected to
the state
* See the discussion in Hoffman here.
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Psychology of Terrorism
* "What is frightening is not the abnormality of those
who carry out the suicide attacks but their sheer
normality."
* "[O]ne of the most common motivations for joining a
terrorist organization is the desire for revenge or
retribution for a perceived injustice."
* "Terrorists are exceptional demographically: usually
males between 15 and 30 years of age."
* "large-scale military responses to terrorism tend to be
ineffective or temporarily to increase terrorist activity"
[italics in original]
Source: Scott L. Plous and Philip G. Zimbardo (2004, Sept). "How Social
Science Can Reduce Terrorism" Chronicle of Higher Educations.
Psychology of Terrorism (cont'd)
Motives/ Objectives
* Causing fear within a targeted audience
* Disrupting normal life
* Damaging infrastructure
* Undermining confidence in government
* Recognition
* Coercion
* Provocation
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Terrorist Tactics - Overview
* Bombings
­ Attacks on infrastructure
* Assassinations
* Hostage-taking
* Hijacking
* Arson
* Biological/chemical attacks
Advantages of Terrorism
* Inexpensive compared to the efforts required
to suppress it
* Requires little training or equipment
* Appeals to the heroic model of conflict;
recruiting is relatively easy in distressed
communities
* Sometimes generates good media coverage
* Makes conventional political movements look
moderate in comparison
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Disadvantages of Terrorism
* Almost never works by itself because the targets do not
have political power;
­ Changing governmental policies requires either mass mobilization
or elite influence; violence alone is not sufficient
* Tends to alienate the local population through
­ Random attacks
­ Government and international retaliation
* Violates assorted norms of international law and therefore
alienates the international community
* Easily degenerates into conventional criminal activity
* Individual ideological terrorist movements typically last only
about ten to fifteen years; cycles of terrorism last about
twenty
Terrorism: The Start of a Typology
* State "terrorism" (shortcoming of field?)
­ Collective punishment
­ Suppression of dissidents
­ Some do not use terrorism to describe it, but
rather prefer `repression'
­ State-sponsored use of terrorists, e.g. death
squads
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State Sponsors of Terrorism (US
Dept of State, DoS)
Country Designation Date
Cuba March 1, 1982
Iran January 19, 1984
North Korea January 20, 1988
Sudan August 12, 1993
Syria December 29, 1979
Terrorism: A Typology (cont'd)
* Nationalist
­ Focused upon a certain state/country
­ Purpose is to acquire independence
­ Examples: ETA, IRA, PLO, PKK
* Criminal
­ Drug cartel, mafia(s)
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Terrorism: A Typology (cont'd)
* Ideological
­ Anarchist: attempt to overthrow established
gov'ts
­ Leftist: aiming to establish socialist/ communist
govt
­ Rightist: neo-Nazi or neo-Fascist groups
­ "Religious"
* 'divinely commanded purposes'?
* Targeting broad categories of foes
Al-Qaeda Terrorism
* Diffuse organization of radical "Islamic"
terrorists
­ 1980s - `Afghan Arabs' v. Soviet force
­ 1990-1 ­ Gulf War; Saudi decision to allow US troops
­ 1991-6 ­ Sudan and Al-Qaeda
­ 1996-2002 ­ Afghanistan
­ 2002-present ­ Worldwide (Pakistan/Iraq/Indonesia)
* Focus on the USA and "Islamic"
governments closely allied with the US
(Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan)
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Al-Qaeda Terrorism (cont'd)
Al-Qaeda Attacks, First Decade
* February 26, 1993 - bombing of the WTC
* October 3, 1993 - killing of US soldiers in Somalia
* June 25, 1996 - truck bomb at Khobar Towers
barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
* August 8, 1998 - bombing of US Embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
* October 12, 2000 - bombing of the USS Cole in the
Yemeni port of Aden
* September 11, 2001 - the WTC, and the Pentagon
* April 11, 2002 - truck bomb near an ancient Jewish
shrine Djerba, Tunisia
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Al-Qaeda Attacks (cont'd)
* May 8, 2002 - suicide bombing outside Sheraton Hotel in
Karachi, Pakistan
* October 12, 2002 - nightclub bombings in Bali, Indonesia
* November 28, 2002 - suicide bomb at the Paradise Hotel in
Mombasa, Kenya
* May 12, 2003 - suicide bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
* May 16, 2003 - explosions in Casablanca, Morocco
* November 15, 2003 - car bombs at the HSBC HQ in
Istanbul, Turkey
* March 11, 2004 - ten bombs explode at a train station in
Madrid, Spain
Al-Qaeda & 'Int' l Society'
How does it threaten our international society
(or `club of states')?
(1) Monopoly of force
- Challenges notion of sovereign state being sole legitimate
user of force
- `less responsible' and `unaccountable'
(2) Religious caliphate v. sovereign states
- Both territorial and source of legitimacy (divine v. secular)
- State system seen as `immoral' by bin-Laden (separates
Muslims)
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Threat to International Society
(cont'd)
(3) International Orgs and International Law
- Al Qaeda rejects UN as founded upon `Western Norms'
- Int Law is man-made law; illegitimate source compared to
God's law
(4) Undermining public's trust in state
- We no longer `feel secure' in our nation-states
(5) Killing Civilians (bin Laden's Feb. 1998 "Fatwah")
`The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and
military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it
in any country in which it is possible to do it'
Threat to International Society
(cont'd)
(5) cont'd
Two Justifications for Fatwah against civilians
* American electorate democratically supports
government policies
* Tit-for-Tat: US military makes no distinction itself
(6) Provokes most powerful member of International
Society to overreact and undermine rules
- Get hegemon to conduct un-societylike policies
ie: Detention, torture, invading another sovereign
state
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Why are these important?
* Challenges notion of sovereign state being
the sole legitimate user of force
* International Law is man-made law;
illegitimate source compared to God's law
* Undermine public's trust in state: We no
longer `feel secure' in our nation-states
* Get hegemon/most powerful members of
Intnat'l Soc to conduct un-society like
policies, to overreact and undermine rule
Combating International Terrorism -
Strategies
* (1) 'Bush Doctrine' or 'statist strategy'
make no distinction between the terrorists who
committed these acts and those who harbor them President
Bush, 9/20/2001
Assumptions
* States only units with capabilities to support
international terrorist groups
* State structures can be reformed to combat
conditions promoting terrorism
* Traditional strategy (interstate war) for a
non-traditional problem (transnational
terrorism)
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Strategies (cont'd)
* (1a) 'Flypaper'
­ Attract terrorists to one spot and 'fight them
there so we don't have to fight them here'
­ Assumes finite amount of terrorists
­ Iraq 2003 to present
Problems:
­ May backfire by instead providing 'training
ground' for terrorists (CIA analysis, May 2005)
­ Moral: placing the war in someone else's
country (Counter argument: bringing
democracy)
Strategies (cont'd)
* (2) 'Cosmopolitan approach'
­ Terrorism is driven by economic and social
deprivation
* `the root causes'
­ Poor/loss of state structures
Tactics:
­ Nation-building (Somalia, Sudan, etc.)
­ Economic aid
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Strategies (cont'd)
* (3) Financial connections
­ Eliminating Al-Qaeda's financial resources
­ Also 'energy independence' -removing source
of revenue that might eventually be used to
finance terrorism
* (4) Police-Clandestine
­ Problem with 'statist' view is that Al-Qaeda is a
non-state entity (less structured, less spatially
specific)
­ Yet, Al-Qaeda sophisticated/technologically
proficient
­ Must match individuals w/ individuals
(surveillance)
Mixing Strategies
* Military action
­ But, indiscriminant force becomes
counterproductive
* Law-enforcement
­ But, legal processes are slow and do not
quickly impede terrorist organizations
* Financial restrictions
* Intelligence