1
Suicide Terrorism & Suicide
Bombing – A Logical Choice for
Terror Organizations?
Spring 2010
Masaryk University
Department of Int’l Relations & European Studies
Dave McCuan
Suicide Terrorism as a Logical Strategy
of Terror Groups
Suicide Terrorism as a Logical Strategy
of Terror Groups
2
Suicide bombing is not something that is new!
Most terrorism throughout history has carried a high risk of death for
the terrorists themselves.
Traditionally the main weapon of the attack was the dagger, and
unless the victim could be found alone and defenseless, early
terrorists or Guerilla fighters (Guerillas as fighting military forces and
performing terror attacks on civilians) knew that they were unlikely to
return from their missions.
We’ve seen makeshift bombs used by nineteenth-century anarchists &
Russian revolutionaries that were so unstable that they had to be
thrown from a short distance (that is, if they did not explode first in the
hands of the attacker).
Those who went on an attack of this kind were fully aware of the risk
and many of them wrote farewell letters to their friends and families.
So what is different today?
Construction of Our Belts, Vests (2007)
Our “Models”
4 Elements of all bombs: Ex; Init; PS; S/D
3
Suicide Terrorism is not Linked to any
Particular Religion or Nationality
Suicide terrorism in not linked to any particular religion or
Nationality.
Far and away, the largest number of suicide terrorist attacks in
recent years have come from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE, or Tamil Tigers), a former separatist group fighting the
government of Sri Lanka.
Using suicide attackers, the Tigers managed to kill two heads of
state:
- Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, 1991;
- Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, 1993.
Bus Transport Suicide Bombing Attack, LTTE, April 2007, 17 killed, 20 injured, all civilians
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The Concept of Self-Sacrifice is not Specific
to any Given Culture
The phenomenon reaches far beyond Sri Lanka & Israel.
Other groups that have embraced suicide terrorism include the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish, Marxist separatist group fighting the
government of Turkey;
Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed group of Shiite Islamists based in Lebanon;
Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's network of radical Sunni Islamists.
And while not technically terrorism (since it was Military to Military fight), the
kamikaze attacks of Japanese pilots during World War II also showed a
willingness to use suicide as a weapon.
The concept of self-sacrifice remains not specific to any given culture.
8
Part I:
Joining Terror Networks With
Tactics – The Rise of Suicide
Bombing
Link to Tactics - Suicide Bombing:
Strategic Logic or Moral Logic?
• Current analyses & studies stress the “strategic
logic,” organization, and risk assessments
involved with violence by terror organizations.
• These are important but not sufficient to explain
exponential growth in suicide attacks.
• At the level of the organization, strategic
calculations of utility are often critical.
• But for the individual and community, moral
imperatives often trump utility and rational
choice.
9
Why Suicide Terror?
Because Terrorists, Their Leaders, & Orgs. have
Learned That This Tactic Works!
Because Terrorists, Their Leaders, & Orgs. have
Learned That This Tactic Works!
• Perception – a seemingly irrational act?
• From the perspective of a terrorist organization it is a
strategy that is:
– Well planned
– Logical
– Designed to achieve specific political objectives
• Suicide attacks have increased over the past two
decades
• Why?
• Perception – a seemingly irrational act?
• From the perspective of a terrorist organization it is a
strategy that is:
– Well planned
– Logical
– Designed to achieve specific political objectives
• Suicide attacks have increased over the past two
decades
• Why?
What gets ordinary and even smart people to blow themselves up?
10
EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES:
Suicide Terrorism as an Organizational Strategy
Costly Signaling Strategy
• Sacrificing its “best and the brightest” signals the
organization’s costly commitment to the community,
whether transnational (Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah)
or national (Hamas, Hizbollah).
• This underpins trust in the organization, thus
increasing the organization’s political “market share” in
the community.
Sheikh Hamed al-Betawi
Spiritual guide of Hamas
(Open Source Interview, September 2004)
• “Our people do not own airplanes and
tanks, only human bombs.”
• “Those who carry out martyrdom
operations are not retarded, not hopeless,
not poor, but are the best of our people.”
• “They do not flee from life. They are
educated, not illiterate, successful in their
lives.”
11
• Recruitment into most Jihadi groups is not like
recruitment into a national police or army or university.
• Almost entirely a grass-roots operation that is bottom up
rather than top down in the sense that individuals in the
organizations bring in other family members, friends, coworkers
or co-worshippers
• Organizations seek operatives who are usually better
educated and well off relative to surrounding population,
often with families and good careers or prospects
• Because such people show willingness to invest in the
future and delay immediate gratification, unlike most
regular army and police, and thus can sustain resourcedeficient
insurgencies
• Decentralized kinship, ethnic and religious
networks also offer good prospects for
sustaining resource-deficient insurgencies
because they provide a social structure that
underpins the maintenance of reputations and
the efficient gathering of information about
candidate members to ward against defection.
• In Arab society, family reputation based on
purity of lineage and honor is still the main
determinant of economic, social, & political
status. This thick web of social ties also makes
difficult for counterintelligence to penetrate.
12
Abu Bakr Ba’asyir
Emir of Jemaah Islamiyah
(Open Source Interview, August 2005)
• There is no nobler life than to die as a martyr for Jihad.
None. The highest deed in Islam is Jihad. If we commit
to Jihad, we can neglect other deeds, even fasting and
prayer. (Note: this is a radically new view of Islam)
• A martyrdom action cannot be postponed to care for
family or because the community may suffer in
retaliation. There is duty to family but duty to God always
comes first. (Note: this suggests moral imperatives that
prohibit trade-offs and preclude negotiation across moral
frames)
• Of course, a roadside bomb is preferable if the martyr
can be used for bigger purposes (note: this suggests
rational calculations of utility within a moral frame)
Suicide Terrorism & Suicide Bombing
The Culture of Death: Terrorist Organizations &
Suicide Bombing
A Survey of the Literature: Pape (2003, 2005);
Bloom (2006; 2005); & Moghadam (2006a;
2006b)
Key Questions: Is Suicide Bombing a rational
tactic? Does it “make sense” for terror
organizations?
Thinking about “threats” and “targets” as a
terror group, what means (tactics) make the
most sense?
13
Competing Tactics for Terror Groups
Why WMDs Are A Threat, But Also Problematic For
Delivery
Reasons terrorists might use WMD
Could be cheap
Available
Effective
Difficult to detect
Maximum benefit/minimum resources
Difficult to build/deliver/assure capability
Potential Threat Matrix - “Targets”
• Airports
• Apartment buildings
• Bridges/tunnels
• Buses and stations
• Chemical plants
• Civilian airliners
• Critical infrastructure
• Cruise ships
• Cultural icons
• Dams
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Threat Matrix - “Targets,” cont’d
• Financial institutions
• Government offices
• Government officials
• High-profile corporations
• High-profile individuals
• Large events/gatherings
• Military installations
• Nuclear reactors/related facilities
• Rail targets
• Shopping malls/high density locations
• Water facilities
Tactics Associated w/ Threats
• Biological
• Bombing
• Chemical
• Cyber-based strikes
• Hijacking
• Hostage taking
• Kidnapping
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Tactics & Threat, cont’d
• Nuclear
• Radiological
• Sabotage
• Shooting
• Vehicular bombing
• Suicide bombing
The Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
as the Terrorist’s “Weapon of Choice”
• Inexpensive to produce
• Various detonation techniques available, may
be a low risk to the perpetrator
• Suicidal bombing cannot be overlooked
• Suicide bombs are the ideal “smart bomb”
• Other advantages include their attention-getting
capacity-ability to control casualties through time of
detonation and placement of the device
– Easily deniable should the action produce undesirable
results.
– From 1983 through 1996, approximately half of all
recorded terrorist incidents involved explosives.
16
The IED as the preferred weapon of choice: Examples
• 07 July 2005, London bombings were a series of coordinated three
suicide bombings that struck public transport system killing 56 and injuring
700.
• 12 October 2000, suicide attack on the Navy destroyer USS Cole in the
port of Aden in Yemen. 17 sailors, 39 injured.
• 07 August 1998, bombs exploded almost simultaneously at the U.S.
Embassy buildings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.
Killed 153 and left over 4,500 injured. Severely damaged both
installations.
• 25 June 1996, Hezbollah exploded a fuel truck packed with 3,000-5,000
lbs of explosives at the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; 20 killed
and 372 wounded.
• 23 October 1983, terrorists using a truck bomb destroyed the Marine
barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. 245 killed and 146 wounded.
Common Terrorist Tactics: Bombing as Tactic
USS Cole Attack, 2000
17
Part II
Dissecting the Who, What, Where,
When, & Why of Suicide Bombing
Tactics
• Similar to other manifestations of terrorism,
suicide bombing aims at destroying a specific
target.
• However, in most cases, the real intention is to
create an atmosphere of terror which should be
translated into political gains.
• The principal difference between suicide bombing
and other types of terrorism is embedded in a
tactical perspective.
• The terrorist’s death, by means of the detonation
of an explosive charge, is an integral part of the
execution of the operation and constitutes an
essential condition of its success.
What is Suicide Bombing?
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Suicide Bombing as a Growing
Phenomenon
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
7170
55
40
21
17
10
22
26
11
7
2
6
3
133
22
2
8
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
95% of suicide attacks worldwide were
initiated by organizations (Pape, 2003)
Are These Groups Linked?
HamasHamas
PIJPIJ
AAMAAM
HezbollahHezbollah
Al QaedaAl Qaeda
ChechChech
AAIAAI
PKKPKK
LTTELTTE
KMEKME
IRAIRA
PLOPLO
FARCFARC
Abu NidalAbu Nidal
EIJEIJ LTJM
(Kashmir)
LTJM
(Kashmir)
DFLPDFLP PFLPPFLP
19
Suicide Bombing in the Middle East
and other Parts of the World
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Other Parts of the Wrold Middle East
Over the last few years suicide bombing
has become predominantly a Middle
Eastern Phenomenon.
Is Suicide Bombing Motivated by
Religion?
• Suicide Bombing is not
solely an Islamic
phenomenon.
• The LTTE is/was a radical
Tamil organization.
• The Fatah is
predominantly a
nationalist organization.
• The ideology of the
Kurdish PKK as Marxist
Leninist.
89
70
42
35
34
29
23
17 16
28
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
LTTE Hamas PIJ Fatah Hizballah Iraqi
Terrorists
Chechens Al-Qaida PKK Al-Qaida
Affiliated
Groups
20
Is Suicide Bombing a Rational
Organizational Phenomenon?
• Recent studies relate to leaders of terrorist
organizations as rational actors.
• The organization will use this strategy only as
long as it serves its strategic, domestic and
organizational purposes.
• In order to carry out a successful suicide
campaign there is a need for individuals to
perpetrate the acts and a community which will
support them.
• Hence, the organizations make efforts to glorify
suicide missions and to instill a ‘culture of hatred
and death’ within the community.
How Deployment of
Weapons Works – The
Case of IEDs in Lebanon
(late 1990s to early
2005) & Gaza (2009)
21
Campaigns of Suicide Bombings (per year)
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
LTTE 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 6 1 2 4 13 12 4 8 9 20 5 0 1
Hamas 2 4 3 3 3 2 0 3 22 15 12
PIJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 1 2 1 0 1 10 14 5
Hizballah 1 3 2 20 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Fatah 26 7
PKK 3 0 3 9 0 1
Iraqi Terrorists 20
Chechens 8 2 3 9
Al-Qaida 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 4 6 3
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Suicide bombings usually appear in campaigns. A campaign
rarely lasts more than three years.
22
Suicide Terrorism: Who?Suicide Terrorism: Who?
Perception:
• Generalized profile of suicide
terrorists, including:
– Young
– Single
– Male
– Uneducated
– Religious fanatics
Reality
• The “profile” is wrong
• Terrorists are:
– Preteen - mid-sixties
– Both single and married with families
– Both male and female
– Both educated and uneducated
– Not motivated by religious fanaticism
– World’s leader in suicide terror are
Hindu; Tamil Tigers who are
conducting insurgency against Sri
Lanka
Suicide Terrorism: Why?Suicide Terrorism: Why?
Perception:
• Seemingly irrational act
Reality
• Part of a strategy that is:
– Well planned
– Logical
– Designed to achieve specific political
objectives
• Does two things:
– Inflicts immediate punishment
against target society
– Threatens more punishment in the
future
• Suicide attacks have
increased over the past two
decades
• Why?
• Suicide attacks have
increased over the past two
decades
• Why?
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Suicide Terror Attacks are . . .
• inexpensive and effective; extremely favorable per-casualty cost
benefits for the terrorists
• less complicated and compromising – no escape plan needed, and
success means no assailant to capture and interrogate
• perhaps the ultimate “smart bomb” – this “weapon” can cleverly
disguise itself, use various modes of deception, and effect last minute
changes in timing, access, and target
• a strategic communication device – successful attacks are virtually
assured media coverage
• effective because the weaker opponent acts as coercer and the
stronger actor is the target
• Key difference from other attacks: The target of suicide campaign
cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage
• inexpensive and effective; extremely favorable per-casualty cost
benefits for the terrorists
• less complicated and compromising – no escape plan needed, and
success means no assailant to capture and interrogate
• perhaps the ultimate “smart bomb” – this “weapon” can cleverly
disguise itself, use various modes of deception, and effect last minute
changes in timing, access, and target
• a strategic communication device – successful attacks are virtually
assured media coverage
• effective because the weaker opponent acts as coercer and the
stronger actor is the target
• Key difference from other attacks: The target of suicide campaign
cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage
Suicide Terrorism: Where?Suicide Terrorism: Where?
Three types of attacks are most likely to occur:
• High value, symbolic targets involving mass casualties
– Important government buildings, installations, or landmarks
– Major means of personal or commercial transportation
• High value, symbolic targets against specific persons
– Political assassinations (e.g., head of state, regional governor,
etc.)
• Deliberately lethal attacks targeting the public
– Bus, train, subway bombings; attacks on shopping malls, cinemas,
sports stadiums, public gathering spaces
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The Study of Personal Motivations
• The first generation of scholars in the field
focused on the socio-demographic
characteristics and the personality traits of the
suicide bombers.
• Most of these studies came to the conclusion
that suicide bombers exhibit no distinct features.
• The second generation of studies emphasized
the role of social networks and the surrounding
community in motivating individuals to
perpetrate such attacks.
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Why do Suicide Campaigns Begin and End?
Hezbollah in Lebanon 1982-1999
0
5
10
15
20
25
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Why do Suicide Campaigns Begin and End?
Palestinian Organizations 1993-2004
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Hamas PIJ Fatah
27
Communities Which Exhibit Higher
Levels of Support-Suicide Bombing
• In most of the cases
communities which express
support for suicide bombing
suffer from continuous
repression.
• However, the level of
embracement of the ‘culture
of hatred and death’ varies
form one community to the
other.
Community Repression – A Comparison
4444
2.5
2
3
1
0
44
3
3.5
1
31
2
2
4
2
3
0
3
1
0
0
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Palestinians
Chechens
Kurds-Turkey
Tamils
Shi'ites-Lebanon
Catholicsin N.Ireland
Coptsin Egypt
Basques
Catalans PoliticalDiscriminations
CulturalRestrictions
EconomicInequalities
1.6
2.1
1.3
3.8
3.1
2.6
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Political
Discriminations
Cultural Restrictions
Economic
Inequalities
Other Communities Supportfor Suicide Bombings
28
Crisis and Commitment as Individual
Motivations
• Communal Crisis
• Personal Crisis
• Commitment to social
network
• Commitment to
organizational framework
• These motivations are not
mutually exclusive.
• Contrary to early
assumptions commitment
is a better predictor than
crisis.
Primary Individual Motivations
(Percentage)
Crisis, 34.7
Commitment,
27.8
Combination of
Commitment
and Crisis, 37.5
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Individual Motivations within the Primary
Category (percentage)
Commitment
to Network,
30.2
Commitment
to
Organization,
69.8
Communal
Crisis, 56.9
Personal Crisis,
24.3
Personal
Vengeance,
18.8
Networks of Suicide Bombers
Childhood Friends
• These suicide bombers
were neighbors from
the village of A-Sira A
Shimalia and close
friends.
• Before they joined the
Hamas, they were
active members of the
Fatah.
Moawiya
Jarara
(Suicide Attack at
Jerusalem
4.9.1997)
Bashar
Sawalha
(Suicide Attack at
Jerusalem
4.9.1997)
Youssef
Shouli
(Suicide Attack at
Jerusalem 30.7.97)
Tawfiq
Yassin
(Suicide Attack at
Jerusalem
4.9.1997)
All of the Group members
were neighbors and close
friends fromyoung age and
were recruited by Mahmoud
Abu Hanude
30
Networks of Suicide Bombers Al-Jihad
Mosque Soccer Team – Kinship and
Friendship
• This was the local
soccer team of Abu
Katila neighborhood
operated by the
Hamas.
• Seven of the players
perpetrated suicide
attacks in 2003.
• Four of them belonged
to the Kawasmeh
family.