Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind: Cognitive Narratography, Discursive Psychology, and Narratives in Face-to-Face Interaction

1. INTRODUCTION

Research in the cognitive sciences, including fields such as psychology, linguistics, and the philosophy of mind, can help foster the development of “postclassical” approaches to the study of narrative. At issue are frameworks for narrative research that build on the work of classical, structuralist narratologists but supplement that work with concepts and methods that were unavailable to story analysts such as Roland Barthes, Gérard Genette, A. J. Greimas, and Tzvetan Todorov during the heyday of the structuralist revolution. One such framework, or cluster of frameworks, has begun to take shape under the rubric of “cognitive narratology,” and in the present essay I hope to contribute to this emergent area of narrative inquiry by drawing on ideas from social psychology to explore the nexus between narrative and mind. Further, whereas cognitive narratologists have focused for the most part on written, literary narratives, my essay aims to broaden the scope of this research by using as a case study a narrative told in face-to-face interaction. Expanding the corpus of narratives on which narratological theories have been based, and making

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adjustments in the theories according to constraints imposed by medium, genre, or communicative situation, constitute crucial aspects of the shift from classical to post-classical models for narrative study. Thus, although the present paper foregrounds oral narratives of personal experience, cognitive narratology is transmedial in scope; it is concerned with mind-relevant aspects of storytelling practices, wherever—and by whatever means—those practices occur.

The particular strand of social-psychological research from which my essay borrows analytic tools is sometimes referred to as discursive psychology. Theorists working in this tradition draw a distinction between, on the one hand, “cognitivist approaches to language, where texts, sentences and descriptions are taken as depictions of an externally given world, or as realizations of underlying cognitive representations of that world” (Edwards and Potter 8), and, on the other hand, the discursive approach, which treats “discourse not as the product or expression of thoughts or mental states lying behind or beneath it, but as a domain of public accountability in which psychological states are made relevant” in particular contexts of talk (Edwards, “Surface” 41). Thus, whereas cognitivist approaches treat discourse as “1) the input to, or output from, or categories and schemas used in, mental models and processes; and/or 2) a methodological resource for research into mental states and representations” (Edwards, “Surface” 42), by contrast

The focus of discursive psychology is the action orientation of talk and writing . . . We are concerned with the nature of knowledge, cognition and reality: with how events are described and explained, how factual reports are constructed, how cognitive states are attributed. These are defined as discursive topics, things people topicalize or orientate themselves to, or imply, in their discourse . . . [Such topics are] examined in the context of their occurrence as situated and occasioned constructions whose precise nature makes sense, to participants and analysts alike, in terms of the social actions those descriptions accomplish. (Edwards and Potter 2)

In short, if cognitivist approaches view discourse as a window onto underlying mental processes that form a kind of bedrock layer for psychological investigation, the discursive approach studies how the mind is oriented to and accounted for in systematic, norm-governed ways by participants in talk.

As discussed further in section 3 below, analysts working in the tradition of discursive psychology as well as other, related frameworks for inquiry have sought to make a case for what Rom Harré termed the “second cognitive revolution” (“Introduction”). The first cognitive revolution, coinciding with the emergence of cognitive science in the 1950s as an umbrella discipline encompassing research in such fields as psychology, linguistics, computer science, and philosophy (Gardner), marked a shift away from behaviorism to the study of cognition; accordingly, first-wave cognitive science postulated that “there are mental processes ‘behind’ what people say and do, that these processes are to be classified as ‘information processing,’ and that the best model for the cognitively active human being is the computer when it is running a program” (Harré, “Introduction” 5; cf. Harré and Gillett 17–34). Although the
second cognitive revolution also accepts that there are cognitive processes, it views them as immanent in discourse practices. From this perspective, rather than underly ing and explaining what goes on in discourse, the mind is ongoingly accomplished in and through its production and interpretation.

The present essay uses a narrative told in face-to-face interaction to outline a program for narrative research that, by concentrating on the “rich surface” of talk rather than attempting to get beneath or beyond it (Edwards, “Surface”), thereby engages with ideas emanating from the second cognitive revolution. On the one hand, I draw on the illustrative narrative—a story told in the context of sociolinguistic fieldwork—to explore how discourse-oriented accounts of mind bear on narratology as a theory-building enterprise. On the other hand, I also suggest ways in which focusing on narratively organized discourse in particular—and integrating concepts and methods developed by story analysts—can in turn contribute to discursive-psychological research itself. Throughout I underscore how narrative functions as a resource for constructing one’s own as well as other minds; in this way, my account harmonizes with work that grounds the experiencing self in the structures of discourse and the sociocognitive processes that they afford.

My next section provides background for and a transcription of the story that I use as a case study. Then, after briefly describing some of the developments that have led to a discursive turn in social psychology, I outline five key concepts that have emerged from this rethinking of the nature of thinking, using the sample narrative to demonstrate how those concepts are relevant for narrative study. At the same time, I indicate ways in which tools developed by narrative theorists can reciprocally inform research premised on the idea that minds are always already anchored in discourse. Narratological concepts and methods, I suggest, bear importantly on the traditions of inquiry that locate the mind not in the heads of solitary thinkers but rather in socio-communicative activities unfolding within richly material settings. I conclude with some questions that mark off directions for future work in this area, while also engaging in further metatheoretical reflection on how a theory of narrative might contribute to (and not just borrow from) research in fields concerned with the interfaces among language, mind, and world. Working to translate concepts developed in a particular field (or subfield) into terms that are intelligible across multiple traditions of inquiry is one of the challenges of building foundations for interdisciplinary research on narrative. As I attempt to demonstrate in the present essay, such conceptual translation is itself an important step in the process of theoretical modeling, insofar as it leads back to core methodological assumptions that underlie field-specific nomenclatures and analytic practices. In turn, these underlying assumptions need to be revisited to enhance opportunities for synergy, or at least convergence, among the many disciplines for which narrative is a relevant concern.

2. THE SAMPLE NARRATIVE: UFO OR THE DEVIL

The story, UFO or the Devil, was told by Monica, a pseudonym for a 41-year-old African American female, to two white female fieldworkers in their mid-twen-
ties, identified as CM and RC in the transcript. The narrative was recorded on July 2, 2002, in Texana, North Carolina, near where the events recounted are purported to have occurred. Below I provide both a sketch of Texana and a transcript of the narrative, but it should be noted at the outset that the interview during which Monica told this story was not a structured, sociolinguistic interview per se. Rather, the fieldworkers happened to encounter Monica while visiting her sister, whom they had already interviewed on several occasions. After establishing a rapport with Monica, they then retrieved their recording equipment from their car and continued what had become by that point a relatively informal conversational interaction. The fieldworkers initially prompted Monica with questions about her family background and her experiences in places she had lived, but once the interaction got underway it was largely Monica who directed the flow of the discourse, apart from a few follow-up questions by her interlocutors. Thus the story that I have titled UFO or the Devil (based on a phrase used by Monica in the first line) was told as part of a larger sequence of narratives through which Monica cumulatively presents a portrait of herself. In this self-portrait, Monica emerges as someone who was profoundly shaped by experiences in her family and community settings; who has explored multiple educational and career options, while living in several urban centers in addition to the more rural environs of Texana; and who is now in a position to look back at these formative experiences and gauge their impact on her current sense of self. As the transcript reveals, the narrative that I have excerpted from this much more extended interaction (the total duration of the tape-recording is more than 145 minutes) concerns not only Monica’s and her friend’s encounter with what Monica characterizes as a supernatural apparition—a big, glowing orange ball that rises up in the air and pursues them menacingly—but also Monica’s and Renee’s subsequent encounter with Renee’s grandmother, who disputes whether the girls’ experience with the big ball really occurred. 

Located in Cherokee County, which is otherwise nearly totally white, Texana is a community consisting almost exclusively of African Americans; indeed, with about 150 residents, only 10 of whom are white, Texana is the largest black Appalachian community in western North Carolina (Mallinson, Dynamic 69, 78). It is situated about one mile from Murphy, North Carolina, as well as other small white communities, and interactions among residents of Texana and these neighboring communities are sometimes tense (Mallinson, Dynamic 78). Indeed, as Christine Mallinson discusses (Dynamic 71–76; “Linguistic”), the ethnic profile of members of the Texana community is considerably more complicated than this initial characterization would suggest. As Mallinson notes, “Texana residents are descendants of African, Cherokee, Ulster Scots-Irish, and Irish-European ancestors—which is the case for many black Appalachians, particularly those whose ancestors were slaves” (Dynamic 71). In consequence, feeling that the ethnic categories listed on questionnaires and surveys are unable to capture their complex heritage, most Texanans self-identify as black, since this designation refers to skin color rather than a particular ethnic or racial background (Mallinson, Dynamic 75).

The complex ethnic situation in Texana bears importantly on the way Monica uses her narrative to position herself and others—to invoke a concept that I will discuss more fully in section 4.1 below. From the start of her narrative, Monica
indexes herself as a member of the enclave African American (or at least non-white) community based in Texana and positioned contrastively against the surrounding, predominantly white population of Cherokee County. (As I discuss further in 4.1, this formulation captures only part of the positioning logic at work in the narrative.) Prior to the time of the interview, Monica had written features for a local newspaper during black history month, and she also spoken openly about how racism and sexism had prevented her from advancing in the medical field despite her completion of a training course for Emergency Medical Technicians (Mallinson, Dynamic 89, 97). More generally, as Mallinson remarked in a personal communication, “From what I learned about [Monica], race is very salient to her . . . she told us a lot stories about gender/racial prejudice that she faced in her life, how racist Cherokee County is, how she felt growing up in Texana and what happened after she moved to Dayton, Atlanta, etc.”

In the following transcript, I have segmented the narrative into numbered clauses for the purposes of analysis; the Appendix explains the transcription conventions used to annotate the story. Further, readers can access a sound file containing a recording of Monica’s story at the following URL: http://www.ohiostatepress.org/journals/narrative/herman-audio.htm. Indeed, given the importance of prosody in Monica’s narrative (as I discuss in section 4), readers may wish to wish to consult this online resource as they assess my subsequent analysis—rather than rely solely on my own attempt to capture relevant prosodic details in the transcript.

UFO or the Devil

M: (1) So that’s why I say..UFO or the devil got after our black asses,
(2) for showing out.
(3) > I don’t know what it was <
(4) but we walkin up the hill.
(5) this ↑way, comin up through here.
CM: (6) Yeah.
M: (7) And..I’m like on this side and Renee’s right here.
(8) And we walkin
(9) and I look over the bank*...{.2}
(10) and I see this...{.3}< BI::G BALL>.
(11) It’s glowin....{.2}
(12) and it’s orange, ...{.3}
(13) And I’m just like...{1.0}
(14) °“nah..you know just-° nah it ain’t nothin” you know.
(15) And I’m still walkin you know*
(16) Then I look back over my side again,
(17) and it has °risen up°...{2.0}
(18) And I’m like “(شروط)SHI::T.”...{.5} you know.
(19) So but Re(شرط)nee- I still ain’t say nothin to her
(20) and I’m not sure she see it or not,...{.2}
(21) so I’m still not sayin anything
(22) we’re just °walkin.° ...{1.0}
(23) Then I look over the bank again
(24) and I don’t °see° it,
(25) and then I’m like °“well, you know.”° ... {.3}
(26) But then...{.2}for some reason I feel some °heat° > or somethin other <
(27) and I °look back.<
(28) me and Renee did at the same time
(29) and it’s right °behind° us. ... {1.0}
(30) We °like...{.2} /we were scared and-/..
(31) “AAAHHH” you know=

[laughs]

RC: (32)
M: (33) > =at the same time. <
(34) So we take off °runnin° as °fast° as we can,
(35) and we still °lookin back°
(36) and every time we °look back it’s with us. ...{.5}
(37) It’s just °bouncin° behind °us/
(38) it’s °not...> touchin the °ground.°<
(39) it’s °bouncin in the °air.° ... {.5}
(40) °Just like this...{.2}°behind us°
(41) as we °run.° ... {1.0}
(42) We °run all° the way to her grandmother’s
(43) and we °open° the door
(44) and we °just fall out in the floor,
(45) and we’re °cryin° and we °screamin°
(46) and < we °just can’t° °breathe...>...{.3}
(47) We that °scared°...
(48) “What’s °wrong° with yall” you know
(49) and we °tell° them...you °know.°what °had° °happened.
(50) And then her grandmother °tell° us
(51) it’s °some° °mineral°.° this or °that°
(52) they °just° form
(53) °bah bah° °bah° °bah°
(54) and...{.3} °the° way °we° °run°...°it’s °the° °heat°
(55) °and...you °know...°{.3} Bull(°shit.
(56) °You° °know...°but °so° °I° °never° °knew° °in° °my° °LIFE...{.2}°about° that
(57) °but° we °didn’t° °do° °that° °anymore.° ...{1.0}

CM: (58) Right.
M: (59) When dark goddamn came
(60) our ass was °at° °home°.

In section 4, I examine this story in detail to suggest how synthesizing ideas from discursive psychology and narratology might throw new light on the nexus of narrative and mind. But let me underscore some of the premises that inform the integrative approach developed in the pages that follow.
In a discursive-psychological approach to communicative interaction in general and storytelling in particular, memory, perception, emotion—in short, the mind—do not reside beneath the surface of participants’ verbal and nonverbal behaviors. Rather, the mind is spread out as a distributional flow in what participants say and do, together with the material setting that constitutes part of their interaction. In the case of narrative, the question is how cognitive processes can be lodged not just in storytellers’ reports about their own or others’ behaviors, utterances, and experiences, but also in modes of narration (individual or shared, retrospective, embedded, etc.), types of perspective (internal or external to the storyworld, stationary or dynamic, fine- or coarse-grained, etc.), and strategies for situating narrated situations and events in space and time. I argue in what follows that, in conjunction with ideas developed in traditions of narrative study, discursive psychology can contribute at least some of the tools needed to explore the mind-relevance of these aspects of narrative, though extending this initial sketch will require integrating other, complementary frameworks that have been used in cognitive approaches to narrative research (Herman, “Cognitive Approaches”).

3. TWO COGNITIVE REVOLUTIONS

Emerging in the mid-twentieth century as a constellation of disciplines that included computer science, cognitive psychology, linguistics, and neurophysiology (Gardner), the first cognitive revolution was a reaction against early twentieth-century behaviorism. Itself a reaction against late-nineteenth introspectionism (Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Wundt, William James), behaviorism (John B. Watson, B. F. Skinner) holds that the mind is epiphenomenal or, at best, an explanatory fiction postulated on the basis of observable, outward behaviors of material bodies. Chomsky’s development of a theory of transformational generative grammar, which constitutes one of the cornerstones of the first cognitive revolution, stemmed in part from what Chomsky viewed as the impoverished conception of language available within a behaviorist framework (see Chomsky). Sometimes also termed “cognitivism” by its critics (cf. Edwards, Discourse), the first cognitive revolution thus re-institutes a conception of mind rejected by the behaviorists, but redefines the mind as an information-processing device—the dominant metaphor being, according to Rom Harré and Grant Gillett, the mind as a software program that runs on the “hardware” of the physical brain (17–34).

By contrast, the second cognitive revolution seeks to situate the mind in material contexts of action and interaction without however reducing mental to bodily activity in the way that the behaviorists did. Discursive psychologists thus seek to avoid the Scylla of cognitivism and the Charybdis of behaviorism. In this approach, people acquire the status of psychological beings just by participating in discourse, in normatively accountable ways (Edwards, Discourse and “Discursive”; Harré and Gillett). Further, for discursive psychologists, discourse itself can be defined in broadly Wittgensteinian terms as the rule-based manipulation of symbols in multi-
person episodes that unfold within material settings. My next section will use *UFO or the Devil* to zoom in on particular elements of this definition of discourse (see also Harré, “Discursive”; Wittgenstein), which I seek to bring into synergistic relation with research on narrative as distinct kind of discourse practice.

But what specific developments helped precipitate the shift from first-wave, cognitivist models of mind to the second-wave, discursively oriented models? Research contributing to this second revolution in thinking about thinking, which began to unfold in the late 1980s, emanated from several sources, including Vygotsky’s work on the social roots of human intelligence; the approach to discourse analysis (sometimes called “Conversation Analysis”) that can be traced back to the ethnomethodological or participant-centered theories of the sociologist Harold Garfinkel; and the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, who emphasized the embeddedness of humans’ meaning-making practices in larger “forms of life.” What links these research initiatives, as diverse as they are, is a shared attempt to steer a middle course between cognitivism and behaviorism.

Vygotsky’s hypothesis that, in the development of individuals, intramental thinking derives from shared or intermental thinking has led to a broader interest in socially distributed cognition—as I discuss more fully in my next section. Thus, whereas first-wave cognitive science sought to isolate the representation-processing properties of individuals (Frawley 13–34), the second cognitive revolution seeks to extend Vygotsky’s insight that “the notion of mental function can properly be applied to social as well as individual forms of activity” (Wertsch 27; cf. Lukes). Meanwhile, the ethnomethodological or conversation-analytic research pioneered by Garfinkel studies how participants index their understandings of an ongoing interaction precisely by making particular sorts of contributions to the course of the interaction itself, and thereby jointly constructing it as the *kind* of interaction that they understand it to be. I signal my understanding of an interaction as a conversation versus a formal lecture or a eulogy by performing types of verbal and nonverbal behaviors in the context of the interchange, which, thanks to my and the other participants’ performances, *becomes* (= counts for us as) a conversation. Knowing and doing, cognition and discourse, are thus inextricably interlinked. A similar emphasis on the discourse grounding of cognitive processes can be found in the later Wittgenstein’s characterization of meaning as use; in this account, the meaning of an utterance derives from the way communicative functions are mapped onto that utterance’s form in situations of use. Relevant, too, is Wittgenstein’s argument that pain and other mental phenomena should be anchored not in a private, inner language but rather in rule-oriented displays within normative contexts specifying how and when such displays can be produced and interpreted as such.

The discursive-psychological research that builds on these and other analytic frameworks has major implications for the study of cognitive processes in general and the cognitive dimensions of narrative discourse in particular. My next section uses *UFO or the Devil* to outline specific strategies by which narrative scholars might harness this tradition of inquiry. The section also suggests ways in which ideas developed by narrative theorists might be productive, in turn, for discursive psychology.
In this section, using *UFO or the Devil* as my illustrative example, I discuss five key concepts that can productively inform (and be informed by) narratological research. The first four concepts have emerged directly from the second cognitive revolution; the fifth concept, although it might seem to be orthogonal or even opposed to discursive-psychological research, nonetheless connects up with it in ways that have not been adequately explored, though narrative theorists have begun to sketch some of the links. The five concepts are: (1) positioning; (2) embodiment; (3) the distributed versus localized nature of mind; (4) emotion discourse and “emotionology”; and (5) qualia, or the idea that conscious experiences have ineliminably subjective properties, a distinctive sense or feeling of what it is like for someone or something to experience them. Taken together, these concepts provide scaffolding for a theory of how storytelling practices, rather than being parasitic on the minds that precede and “guarantee” them, themselves help constitute the minds engaged in the production and interpretation of narrative discourse. Reciprocally, the concepts inform the working definition of narrative that guides my analysis (see also Herman, “Description”). I define narrative as a mode of representation that is situated in—must be interpreted in light of—a specific discourse context or occasion for telling, and that cues interpreters to draw inferences about a structured time-course of particularized events (in contrast with general patterns or trends). In addition, the events represented are such that they introduce conflict (disruption or disequilibrium) into a storyworld, whether that world is presented as actual or fictional, realistic or fantastic, remembered or dreamed, etc. The representation also conveys what it is like to live through this storyworld-in-flux, highlighting the pressure of events on (in other words, the qualia of) real or imagined consciousnesses undergoing the disruptive experience at issue.

4.1 Positioning Theory

The first key concept is the notion that we make sense of our own and other minds through *positioning*. In Harré and van Langenhove’s account (1–31), one can position oneself or be positioned in discourse as powerful or powerless, admirable or blameworthy, etc. In turn, a position can be specified by characterizing how a speaker’s contributions are taken as bearing on these and other “polarities of character” in the context of an overarching storyline—a narrative of self and other(s) being jointly elaborated (or disputed) by participants, via self-positioning and other-positioning speech acts. Hence positions are selections made by participants in discourse, who use position-assigning speech acts to build “storylines” in terms of which the assignments make sense. Reciprocally, the storylines provide context by virtue of which speech acts can be construed as having a position-assigning force. It should also be pointed out, though, that self- and other-positioning acts are not always intentionally or volitionally performed. An utterance I produce may allow others to position me in ways I neither planned for nor desire—as when Renee’s grandmother uses the girls’ report about their experiences to position them as unreli-
able narrators (see lines 48–55 and below). Conversely, I may position another person in unintended ways when I produce utterances that connect up with (reinforce, undercut) storylines of which I am unaware, as when I compliment someone on his or her punctuality in the presence of others who have constructed a larger narrative about that person’s obsessive concern with being on time.

In *UFO or the Devil*, Monica engages in self-positioning via speech acts concerning racial as well as generational polarities. As already suggested in section 2, the abstract of Monica’s story (1–2) functions to situate Monica and Renee within a complex network of ethnic identities. By referring to herself and her friend in terms of “our **black** asses,” Monica on the one hand can be heard as claiming for herself an identity that is based on skin color and that, in this respect, stands in polar opposition to the identity “white”—even though the composite ethnic heritage of black Appalachians as a group undercuts dichotomous (self-)identifications of this sort. At the same time, as Mallinson has shown (“Linguistic”), Monica is one of the residents of Texana who associates herself with urban black culture and language practices. From this perspective, Monica’s abstract can be interpreted as a means by which she aligns herself with a distinct subgroup of the broader African American population—one that is not immediately present in Texana itself, but that nonetheless constitutes a point of reference for Monica’s strategies for self-presentation. In either interpretation, Monica’s abstract can be construed as a positioning strategy: on the one hand, by positioning Monica and Renee as part of a proximate minority community vis-à-vis the dominant local culture of a county that is more than 98% white; on the other hand, by positioning both girls as members of another, larger, and spatially nonproximate minority community vis-à-vis a supraregional culture that is also predominantly white. In either case, the abstract indexes the story about to be told as a counternarrative opposed to the narratives circulating within and defining the major-

This dialectical logic of positioning, whereby authoritative experiential knowledge opposes itself to the discourses that undermine the self’s claims to such authority and such knowledge, also structures the polarity that Monica sets up between herself and Renee’s grandmother toward the end of the extract (lines 48–55). The grandmother is represented as dismissing Monica’s and Renee’s experiences by constructing a storyline in which those experiences are in reality the deluded imaginings of overexcited, possibly hysterical, young girls. Specifically, the grandmother attempts to other-position Monica and Renee as unreliable narrators by proposing instead of their supernatural account a naturalistic explanation of the apparition as a formation of “minerals,” distorted somehow by the girls’ own overheated condition (50–54). In turn, however, Monica uses expressive resources of spoken discourse, including prosody, to discredit the grandmother’s purported explanation, that is, the
storyline according to which Monica’s mind has merely fabricated the big ball (see also section 4.4 below). For one thing, Monica uses a slower rate of speech and heightened pitch and volume for purposes of emphasis in lines 46 and 47, where she underscores the effect on her and Renee of the encounter with the big ball. Further, Monica manipulates both pitch and rhythm to construct dismissive, sing-song-like reproductions of the grandmother’s discourse in lines 51 and 53–54; here the downward shifts in pitch are rhythmically timed to co-occur with words that index the grandmother’s purported explanation(s) of events, suggesting the extent to which Monica disfavors and seeks to distance herself from any such account. At the same time, Monica uses nonce words (bah bah ↓ bah ↓ bah) in line 53 to suggest how, in general, the grandmother’s account is discourse devoid of relevant semantic content. She also produces, in line 55, an explicit evaluation (Bullshit) of her interlocutor’s counternarrative about what must have happened. Monica uses a word-internal downward shift in pitch in Bullshit, together with sentence-final intonation at the end of this line of the transcript. Whereas utterances ending with rising pitch (e.g., questions) can be used to implicate various kinds of uncertainty (Ward and Hirschberg), Monica’s utterance in line 53 suggests both prosodically and lexically that she is committed to the truthfulness of her own account in contrast with the grandmother’s.

Thus, exploiting a variety of expressive resources available to participants in face-to-face interaction, Monica other-positions the grandmother’s discourse as a monolithic voice of authority that in fact has no authority when it comes to this domain of experience. The storytelling process entails a complex embedding or lamination of self- and other-positioning acts, of a kind that narratively structured discourse environments are uniquely able to create and sustain. At a global level Monica uses her narrative as a means for self-positioning even though—or rather, precisely because—at a local level it recounts another person’s attempt to other-position Monica and Renee. Monica embeds a report of Renee’s grandmother’s other-positioning speech act within her own account, critically evaluates it, and thereby puts it in the service of a story about the power of firsthand experience to trump received accounts of the way the world is (cf. section 4.5).

Monica’s mode of narration also positions her interlocutors vis-à-vis the (inter)action unfolding within the storyworld (cf. Bamberg). The narrative relies heavily on what narratologists would term internal focalization: once the story is launched, events are refracted through the vantage-point of an individuated participant in the storyworld, namely, the younger, experiencing-I who undergoes the encounter. That said, as I discuss below in sections 4.3 and 4.4 Monica uses discourse resources available in the here and now (including tense shifts, deictic references, and prosody) to animate earlier events, whose life-transforming impact thus emerges through the interplay between different time-frames. The same dual positioning is marked lexically in line 55. At this juncture, Monica’s evaluation of the action is ambiguously external and internal, in Labov’s sense of those terms: Bullshit marks the fusion of the evaluative stance of the younger, experiencing-I with that of the older, narrating-I. Then, in lines 56 and following, the focalization shifts unambiguously back to the vantage-point of the older narrating-I: Monica speaks summatively about how her behavior changed after the encounter with the big ball.
In any event, using the current discourse to stage the main action of the narrative from the perspective of the experiencing-I, Monica does align her interlocutors (and analysts) with her younger self’s vantage point. Relevant here is Dorrit Cohn’s account of the discourse strategy that she characterized as consonant self-narration, where the older narrating-I does not enjoy any cognitive privilege with respect to his or her earlier, experiencing self. As I have already begun to suggest, however, the term “cognitive privilege” might need to be reformulated as “direction of flow”: is the discourse organized such that the narrating-I animates the experiencing-I’s perspective on the storyworld, or is it organized such that past events become the means for staging current conceptions of self and world? In the case of *UFO or the Devil*, by positioning her interlocutors with her younger self Monica in effect positions them against other discourses that might claim authoritative status—discourses that are synecdochically figured by the grandmother. The repositories of received wisdom, these discourses purport to invalidate the experiences whose formative role Monica’s narrative, by contrast, enacts.

Ideas about positioning can thus throw light on processes of self- and other-identification in narratives like Monica’s; conversely, concepts and methods originating in narratology, such as internal focalization and consonant self-narration, can lead to finer-grained analyses of positioning logic. Combining the resources of these research traditions generates a number of questions that could not have been posed by classical, structuralist narrative theory: How do the stories we tell about ourselves and others, and for that matter written literary narratives, position us, our interlocutors, authors, narrators, characters, and readers in networks of presuppositions and norms? Can a person’s mind be described as, in part, a byproduct of how he or she is situated at the intersection of multiple storylines? Can ideology in general, and normative assumptions about identity in particular, be redefined as entrenched storylines—master narratives that arise through an iterative process of assigning the same position to the same kind of agent, until the agent and her position appear to be indissolubly linked? And if so, to what extent can storytelling interrupt or even derail this process, working to uncouple positions from types of agents and thereby rewrite dominant storylines?

### 4.2 Embodiment

The second key concept emerging from the second cognitive revolution, and taken up in discursive-psychological research, concerns the mind’s embodiment. As Andy Clark has argued, in parallel with the introspectionist tradition from which they emerged, certain strands of first-wave cognitive science continued to treat “the mind as a privileged and insulated inner arena” and “body and world as mere bit-players on the cognitive stage” (508). By contrast, second-wave cognitive science resists both the cognitivist hierarchicalization of mind over body and the behaviorist prioritization of body over mind. Instead, it holds that the mind is always and inalienably embodied; minds should be viewed as the nexus of brain, body, and environment or world (see Clark, *Being There* and “Embodied”). In this way, by putting mind on the same footing as the world in which we think, act, and communicate,
second-wave cognitive science avoids making underlying cognitive processes wholly explanatory of overt verbal as well as nonverbal behaviors. Those behaviors, rather, help constitute the cognitive processes themselves, with which they are related in a feedback loop.

In the field of cognitive linguistics, scholars such as George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Ronald Langacker, and Leonard Talmy have explored ways in which the structure of language is grounded in (and constitutes a ground for) embodied human experience. For example, the mind-body-language nexus manifests itself in metaphor systems deriving from the experience of navigating the world in, preferably, an upright position. Thus, in English, *up* is generally valorized as positive and *down* as negative (contrast *Today was a real high-point for me* with *I’m feeling really low today*). But it is not just that the structures of language can be correlated with the physical embodiment of the mind. What is more—as *UFO or the Devil* suggests—stories help constitute characters (and character-narrators) as embodied: the process of narration constructs the experiencing self as inalienably linked to a spatially and temporally oriented body-in-the-world. Thus Monica recounts detailed trajectories of movement through the storyworld, locating herself (more precisely, her younger, experiencing self) within an orientational grid defined by two cross-cutting axes. Monica locates Renee at her side (line 7), along an axis that runs perpendicular to their path of motion through the storyworld. Along a second, main axis runs the vector leading from Monica’s house, the starting-point of the girls’ journey, to Renee’s grandmother’s house. Throughout the narrative, Monica uses verbs and participles associated with motion (*we walking up the hill...we walkin...we just walkin...take off runnin...we run all the way to her grandmother’s*) to trace the girls’ movement along this second vector, and also to correlate their speed of motion with their emotional response to events: the more scared they are, the faster they move through space.

Further, Monica’s use of internal focalization affords an expressive resource by which the narrative locates the self’s experiences in space and time. Perceptual verbs, spatial prepositions and adverbs, and other forms used in lines 9, 16, 27, 29, 35, 37, and 40—e.g., *look over the bank, look back over my side again, it’s right behind us, we still lookin back*—encode a particular perceptual position. These forms indicate that Monica and Renee are, for the duration of the reported action, in front of the big ball, looking back as the apparition keeps pace with them despite their best efforts to outrun it. The narrative thus enacts the situated nature of all perception, both in the lines just mentioned and also more globally, given that what can be seen is determined by the vantage-point of the experiencing-I over the course of the story. In this way, *UFO or the Devil* suggests not only that what can be seen, what is known about the world, alters with the spatial coordinates of the embodied self that is doing the looking; more than this, it suggests that a self is in part constituted by what it sees, when, and where—with narrative being one of the principal means for tracing this perceptual flux.

As this last remark suggests, embodied minds are temporally as well as spatially situated. Monica’s story locates the experiencing self in time: she sets up a timeline separating the earlier, experiencing-I from a self closer in time (and atti-
tude) to the narrating-I recounting events—that is, the older self who knows to be wary of supernatural apparitions in the dark of night (we didn’t do that anymore). Here embodiment intersects with positioning logic: the older narrating-I presents herself as having gone through a formative experience because of which she has had to position herself within a storyline radically at odds with the one that Renee’s grandmother tries unsuccessfully to impose on her. However, as I have already hinted at, and as I discuss more fully in my next subsection, another, different temporal logic is also at work in the narrative—a logic whereby events from other places and times can be embodied in a given discourse environment, thanks to the expressive resources that it makes available.

4.3 Mind as Distributed

In synergy with the concepts of positioning and embodiment, the discursive turn in (social-) psychological research suggests that key properties of mind cannot be grasped without an understanding of the mind as distributed. In other words, minds are spread out among participants in discourse, their speech acts, and the objects in their material environment. From this perspective, cognition should be viewed as a supra- or transindividual activity distributed across groups functioning in specific contexts, rather than as a wholly internal process unfolding within the minds of solitary, autonomous, and de-situated cognizers. Hence, instead of being abstract, individualistic, and ratiocinative, thinking in its most basic form is grounded in particular situations, socially distributed, and domain-specific, that is, targeted at specific purposes or goals.15

Although stories conveyed in different settings and media organize intelligent behavior in different ways, a property shared by narrative across media is that it not only represents but also enables the distribution of mind across participants, places, and times. Stories are often about shared or collaborative cognitive processes, portraying scenes involving multiperson activities and moments of conversational exchange. At another level, the process of narrative transmission is by its nature distributed across the participants in and the setting for storytelling practices. In UFO or the Devil, likewise, collaborative, socially distributed cognition manifests itself as both a thematic focus and a structural feature of Monica’s narration. As the story suggests, supraindividual cognitive processes can be more or less coordinated or oppositional. On the one hand, Monica’s and Renee’s shared response to the apparition (lines 28–34) confirms its presence for Monica: their simultaneous acts of seeing (and screaming) provide intersubjective validation of the big ball’s reality within the storyworld evoked by Monica’s telling. Similar validation comes from Monica’s and Renee’s shared decision to remain at home after dark (59–60; note here Monica’s strategic combination of the plural possessive pronoun and a singular noun referring to a body part: our ass). On the other hand, by embedding Renee’s grandmother’s sceptical response to the girls’ account within her own narration, Monica also suggests the extent to which non-congruent or even antithetical interpretations of events can help clarify and refine participants’ understandings, which emerge in part through the dialectical interplay of contrasting viewpoints.
Yet the narrative not only represents but also enacts or exemplifies how cognitive processes are anchored in collaborative discourse processes—how the mind is grounded in participants’ relations with one another and with their surrounding social and material environment. In particular, Monica’s use of deixis suggests how, rather than preceding (and warranting) the storyteller’s account, knowledge about the supernatural encounter is lodged in the discourse co-constructed by Monica and her interlocutors in a specific communicative context—deictic expressions (*I*, *here*, *now*) being ones whose interpretation depends on who utters them in what discourse context. In addition to using personal pronouns that create a referential link between Monica as the teller in the here and now and Monica as the co-experiencer of the supernatural encounter in the storyworld, Monica refers deictically to spatial features of the current communicative context in lines 5 and 7, as indicated by the items in bold:

MW: (4) we walkin up the hill.
(5) *this*↑ *way*, coming up through *here*.
CM: (6) Yeah.
MW: (7) And..I’m like on *this* side and Renee’s *right* here.

Because she is telling the story “on-site,” that is, where the events being recounted are purported to have taken place, Monica can recruit from features of the current environment to orient her interlocutors vis-à-vis the storyworld; those features provide spatiotemporal coordinates for the situations and events of which she is giving an account. The events themselves, together with Monica’s and her interlocutors’ inferences about and evaluations of those events, are thus a function of the relationship (= they are distributed between) between two mentally projected worlds: the world evoked by the narrative and world in which the narrative is being produced and interpreted. In line 40, Monica again recruits from features of the here and now to constitute the storyworld. In this instance she uses the demonstrative pronoun *this* unaccompanied by a noun. Although the interview was not videorecorded, one can infer that *this* is accompanied by an iconic gesture with which Monica simulates the ball’s manner and path of movement:

(40) °Just like *this*...{.2} behind us°
(41) as we run...{1.0}

The patterning of verb tenses provides another resource for the distribution of mind. Having initially used the past tense to situate the narrated events at a point earlier in time than the present moment of speaking, in line 7 Monica switches to the present tense. Not only does this tense shift help mark the apparition of and pursuit by the big ball as especially salient elements of the discourse; what is more, use of the present tense also creates a context in which reference to features of the current environment can be elided with reference to past occurrences. The morphology of English verbs does not distinguish between the simple present and the historical present; rather, discourse context must be used to determine which functional interpre-
tation of the tense marking is preferable. Monica’s narrative exploits this feature of the language—i.e., the way English present-tense verbs can both signify the here and now and presentify what is past—to construct the ball’s menacing movements less as a localized episode than as complex event-structure distributed across time(s).

Granted, Monica portrays herself as a person for whom this encounter has played a formative role, establishing a timeline whose distal end is the period in which the younger experiencing-I would walk in the woods at night (prior to her run-in with what she construes as a supernatural apparition) and whose proximal end is the present moment, by which time Monica, as the older narrating-I, has learned better than to do that. Yet by using present-tense verbs to stage the encounter in the here and now of the current interaction, Monica’s narrative deploys another, different temporal logic as well. In this double logic, time is not only a forward-directed arrow, with earlier moments incrementally giving way to (and impinging on) later ones, but also a loop or circulatory structure linking events assumed to have been separated by time’s passing. Given that tense shifts allow Monica to instantiate or perform as present actions and events that precede the time of speaking, experiential knowledge of this life-transforming event is less a thing of the past, bracketed off from the here and now, than a process that flows across time-frames and is in fact defined by how those time-frames are juxtaposed in discourse. Analogously, my next subsection discusses how Monica uses other discourse means not to convey but rather to enact the emotional effects of prior events, whose impact thus takes shape in this very process of enactment.

In short, besides using Renee’s and Renee’s grandmother’s responses to portray in the storyworld how memories, inferences, judgments, and evaluations are distributed across participants, their speech acts, and their larger environment for acting and interacting, Monica’s telling of the narrative also engages in and facilitates distributed cognition of this same sort. The capacity of the narrative to function as a resource for sense making hinges on how the story is embedded in the spatiotemporal profile of the current discourse environment as well as other, previous environments for acting and interacting. More generally, an approach inspired by ideas from discursive psychology again suggests the need for narrative theorists to expand the scope of what they consider to be mind-relevant dimensions of stories and storytelling, and to consider how cognitive processes inhere in the context for the telling as well as in the nature of what is told. To this end, ideas from discursive psychology should be integrated with research by folklorists and ethnographers on the performative dimensions of storytelling—research pointing to “the indissoluble unity of text, narrated event, and narrative event,” and also to the way narrated events are “emergent in performance” rather than being inert raw materials out of which stories are constructed after the fact (Bauman 5–6; see also section 4.5 below).

4.4 Emotion Discourse and Emotionology

As Peter Stearns points out, there is a basic tension between naturalist and constructionist approaches to emotion. Naturalists argue for the existence of innate, biologically grounded emotions that are more or less uniform across cultures and
subcultures. By contrast, constructionists argue that emotions are culturally specific—that “context and function determine emotional life and that these vary” (41).\textsuperscript{18} Squarely constructionist in orientation and methodology, discursive psychologists such as Derek Edwards concern themselves with “[e]motion discourse [as] an integral feature of talk about events, mental states, mind and body, personal dispositions, and social relations,” studying how “various emotion categories contrast with alternative emotions, with non-emotional states, with rational conduct, and so on, within the discursive construction of reality and mind” (\textit{Discourse} 170).

In studying the cultural and rhetorical grounding of emotion discourse, discursive psychologists have drawn on the concept of “emotionology,” which was proposed by Peter Stearns and Carol Stearns as a way of referring to the collective emotional standards of a culture as opposed to the experience of emotion itself.\textsuperscript{19} (The term is used in parallel with recent usages of \textit{ontology} to designate a model of the entities, together with their properties and relations, that exist within a particular domain.) Every culture and subculture has an emotionology, a system of emotion terms and concepts, that people deploy rhetorically in discourse to construct their own as well as other minds. At issue is a framework for conceptualizing emotions, their causes, and how participants in discourse are likely to display them. Narratives at once ground themselves in and help build frameworks of this sort. Everyday storytelling as well as literary narratives use and in some cases thematize emotion terms and concepts; for example, spy thrillers and romance novels are recognizable as such because of the way they link particular kinds of emotions to recurrent narrative scenarios, as I discuss further below. More generally, stories provide insight into a culture’s or subculture’s emotionology—and also into how minds are made sense of via this system.

Emotion discourse is a prominent dimension of \textit{UFO or the Devil}. Indeed, it bears importantly on other key concepts under discussion in the present section, especially positioning and qualia. Throughout her narrative, Monica draws on the vocabulary of emotion, reports behaviors conventionally associated with extreme fear, and makes skillful use of the evaluative device that Labov called “expressive phonology,” which encompasses a range of prosodic features, from changes in pitch, loudness, and rhythm, to emphatic lengthening of vowels or whole words, etc.\textsuperscript{20} To take the issue of prosody first: I have already discussed, in section 4.1, how Monica uses rhythm and pitch in line 53 (\texttt{bah bah ↓ bah ↓ bah}) to reposition herself; despite its stripped-down semantic profile, this speech production effectively dismisses as so much nonsense the storyline by means of which Renee’s grandmother tries to otherposition Monica as an hysterical imaginer of nonactual events. But beyond this, Monica deploys heightened volume and pitch and also variations in the rate of speech at key junctures throughout her narrative, foregrounding aspects of the encounter that carry the strongest emotional weight. In other words, Monica draws on the medium of spoken discourse not only to highlight events (and features of events) that were the most emotionally salient, but also to construct herself as an accountably frightened experiencer of those events. Thus, in her initial, emphatic mention of the big ball, in line 10, Monica uses slowed-down speech and heightened volume and pitch, as well as a prolonged production of the [I] vowel in \textit{big}, to underscore the
impact of her first glimpse of the apparition. Then, in line 17, it is a 2-second pause that enables Monica to emphasize the frightening quality of the ball’s movement as well as the intensity of her own fearful response, which she enacts performatively in the here and now. Similarly, in lines 38 and 39, Monica again uses these prosodic resources to indicate what makes the ball’s manner of progress so frighteningly anomalous:

(37) It’s just a-**bounc**in behind /us/
(38) it’s not... > touchin the **ground**, <
(39) it’s bouncin in the **air**... {...5}

The elongated pronunciation of **not**, the rushed-through production of **touchin the ground**, and the use of heightened volume and pitch for **not**, **ground**, and **air** all reinforce the contrast between the expected and the actual mode of movement; even the rapid rate of delivery in line 38 serves this purpose, helping to accentuate the semantic content of the subsequent line. The sound properties of spoken discourse therefore constitute a key emotionological resource in narrative contexts, allowing first-person narrators like Monica to index percepts as more or less emotionally charged and to account for their own actions by situating them within this array of emotional valences. More than this, prosody allows first-person narrators to animate in the present their previous emotional responses; storytellers can thus establish a performative link between different phases of the self whose coherence and continuity derive in part from this ongoing process of re-performance—a process that more traumatic experiences, by splitting off the past from the present, can disrupt.

Further, **UFO or the Devil** grounds itself in an emotionology not just through prosodic performances but also at the level of individual words and more complex speech-act sequences. At the lexical level, Monica’s story mirrors the way, in everyday discourse more generally, people draw on a vocabulary of emotion to make sense of one another’s minds *as* minds. Thus, in lines 30 and 47, Monica uses an explicit emotion term (**scared**) to attribute the emotion of fear to Renee and herself. In addition, as the following excerpts suggest, Monica uses a number of locutions that imply a frightened emotional state. In line 14, Monica reports an attempt on her part to quell her own fears; line 18 involves another self-attribution, this time one involving both surprise and fright; and lines 30–33 report a speech act produced simultaneously by Monica and Renee in response to the fear-inducing apparition:

(14) °“nah..you know just~ nah it ain’t nothin” you know. [...]  
(18) And I’m like “(☞)SHI::T”...{.5} you know. [...]  
(30) We like...{.2} /we were scared and-/.  
(31) “AAAAHHH” you know=  
RC:  (32) (laughs)  
MW:  (33) > =at the same time. <^2^1
What is more, Monica recounts actions that are, in the cultural, generic, and situational contexts in which her discourse is embedded, conventionally linked with the emotion of fear. These actions include running away from a threatening agent or event as fast as possible (34); running non-stop while being pursued (42); crying and screaming and feeling unable to breathe (45–46); and making a permanent change in one’s routine in order to avoid the same threat in the future (57–60). On the one hand, these behaviors are intelligible because of the emotionology in which Monica’s story is grounded. That emotionology specifies that when an event $X$ inducing an emotion $Y$ occurs, an agent is likely to engage in $Z$ sorts of behaviors, where $Z$ constitutes a fuzzy set of more or less prototypical responses. Thus, in an investigative report recently broadcast on television, police detectives were led to conclude that a mother had played a role in her own children’s death because of her atypically gleeful behavior at their gravesite. Likewise, a discourse such as Monica’s acquires (supersentential) coherence by virtue of its relationship to the broader emotionological context from which it emerges. The behaviors reported in the narrative can be construed as more than an agglomeration of individual acts because of the assumption, licensed by the emotionology in which Monica and her interlocutors participate, that actions of that sort constitute a coherent class of behaviors—namely, a class of behaviors in which one is likely to engage when motivated by fear.22

But on the other hand, although emotionology constitutes a major resource for both the production and the understanding of narrative, stories also have the power to (re)shape emotionology itself. Narrative therapy, for example, involves the construction of stories about the self in which the emotional charge habitually carried by particular actions or routines can be defused or at least redirected (Mills). Generic innovation in literary narratives can likewise entail the creation of new emotionological paths and linkages among events: consider the different logics of action, and the emotional valences associated with them, in picaresque eighteenth-century fictions versus Gothic novels. For its part, UFO or the Devil suggests how narrative provides a means for reassessing the emotion potential of whole sectors of experience; just as narrative therapy allows people to prise apart emotion-action linkages that have become inimical to their psychological well-being, other modes of storytelling bind emotional responses to regions of social or physical space hitherto uninvested with such emotions. From this perspective, narrative genres can be reconceived as relatively routinized pathways for emotional investment, keyed to dominant types of emotion-action linkages (e.g., fear in the Gothic tradition, [eventual] happiness in the canonical Bildungsroman, etc.). Tales of the supernatural such as UFO or the Devil draw on the same emotionological impulses that inform the Gothic, and can be viewed as narrative explorations of scenarios (for example, nocturnal journeys undertaken without a sizeable cohort) for which fear may be an appropriate response. Entities or forces cast as supernatural agents can be construed, in these terms, as vehicles for building or refining emotionological systems, and for gearing those systems onto the world.

Hence stories do not just emanate from emotionologies but also constitute a primary instrument for adjusting systems of emotion terms and concepts to lived experience—whose broader profile is configured, in turn, through collaborative discourse.
practices. In species terms, narrative would presumably constitute a distinct evolutionary advantage, promoting more fear in potentially threatening circumstances and less fear in circumstances whose probable harmlessness multiple storytelling acts have cumulatively revealed.

I turn now to the final key concept, qualia, with which emotion discourse is also intimately connected.

### 4.5 The Problem of Qualia

As Janet Levin notes, “[t]he terms quale and qualia (pl.) are most commonly used to characterize the qualitative, experiential, or felt properties of mental states” (688)—what Thomas Nagel characterized as the sense or feeling of “what it is like” for someone or something to undergo conscious experiences. As Daniel Dennett puts it, “‘[q]ualia’ is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: *the ways things seem to us*” (619). In the philosophy of mind, the notion of qualia continues to be debated among scholars who have adopted a range of positions on their status. Physicalists argue for the possibility of reducing qualia to brain states (Dennett). From this perspective, conscious experience only seems to have an irreducibly subjective character, and is in fact susceptible to description and explanation in the “third-person” terms afforded by scientific discourse (cf. Blackmore). By contrast, anti-reductionists point to what they see as an unbridgeable explanatory gap between accounts of brain physiology and the phenomenology of conscious experience (Jackson; Levine). Proponents of this view have drawn on Nagel’s study to argue for the irreducibly subjective or first-person nature of consciousness. For his part, David Lodge has pursued a middle way. Lodge suggests that narrative fiction, and more specifically the use of free indirect discourse/thought, makes it possible to combine “the realism of assessment that belongs to third-person narration with the realism of presentation that comes from first-person narration” (45). Although I will not delve deeper here into the technical debates concerning qualia, as Lodge’s account suggests the broader issues underlying those debates are directly relevant for my discussion. A key question is whether the notion of qualia, defined as subjective or first-person properties of conscious experience, can be reconciled with the conception of mind as constituted in and through discourse.

Here it should be noted that Monika Fludernik (48–50) has made experientiality, or the impact of narrated situations and events on an experiencing consciousness, a core property of narrative itself. Fludernik’s account suggests that unless a text or a discourse registers the pressure of events on a embodied human or at least human-like consciousness, then that text or discourse will not be construed by interpreters as a full-fledged narrative, but rather as (at best) a report or chronicle. Again we encounter important research questions for cognitive narratology: Can stories not only encapsulate but also provide access to qualia, pace Nagel? That is, do stories in fact enable us to know “what it is like” to be someone else, and maybe also ourselves? More radically, could we even have a notion of the felt quality of experience without narrative?

In *UFO or the Devil*, two moments of conflict constitute kernel events of the story: (1) Monica’s and Renee’s tense encounter with the glowing orange ball, and
(2) Monica’s dispute with Renee’s grandmother concerning what was at stake in that encounter. These kernel events, furthermore, are tightly interlinked. By constructing herself as an accountably frightened experiencer in her narrative about event (1), Monica provides crucial context for the interpretation of event (2). In essence, the second event is a dispute in which one of the participants seeks to manage and minimize the felt experience of the first event from her interlocutor’s vantage-point. In other words, in the storyline that Renee’s grandmother seeks to project, the first event lacks the experiential profile that Monica herself imputes to that kernel event, in part by configuring it as an event in the present story. As my phrasing here indicates, the positioning logic discussed in section 4.1 directly intersects with the factor of experientiality or, in philosophy-of-mind terms, the qualia that define what it is like to have or undergo an experience from a particular vantage-point on the world. Rejecting the grandmother’s other-positioning strategies, Monica refuses to become the self she would have to be—to experience the mode of felt, subjective awareness she would have to experience—were she to take up the position entailed by the grandmother’s storyline. In short, Monica is of another mind.

Analysis of *UFO or the Devil* thus points up synergistic interactions among storyline construction, positioning, qualia, and the rhetorical deployment of emotion terms and concepts. These are discursive means used to construct—to make knowable for self and others—this mind and its experiences. Further, the story as a whole reveals the active, ongoing construction, through the communicative resources available to the participants, of the felt, experienced meaning of events. Rather than being lodged more or less statically in “the privileged and insulated inner arena” that Clark characterizes as the focal object of first-wave cognitive science, the experiential profile of events emerges from the participants’ use of verbal as well as nonverbal acts, in a richly material setting, to engage in processes of self- and other-positioning—in the discursive construction of mind.

5. DIRECTIONS FOR COGNITIVE NARRATOLOGY

Identifying points of convergence between narrative theory and discursive psychology, this essay has attempted to outline directions for further inquiry. But the program for research sketched here constitutes only a beginning. Ideas from discursive psychology will need to be brought to bear on aspects of narrative structure and narrative communication besides the ones foregrounded here. In addition, narrative scholars will need to explore the extent to which discursive-psychological concepts can be put into dialogue with other models for understanding the nexus between narrative and mind. How might discursive psychology contextualize research on the acquisition of narratives by children, for example? How can discursive psychology inform the study of narrative across media, and be used to illuminate the mind-relevance of storytelling processes in semiotic systems other than those associated with written and spoken language? And how might (1) discourse-oriented approaches to the mind as a situated interactional achievement be coordinated with (2) the work in
cognitive grammar and cognitive semantics that likewises promises to throw light on the mind-relevance of narrative structures, but that focuses on discourse productions by individual speakers?26

These questions point to the challenges (as well as opportunities) facing efforts to connect the study of narrative with the study of the mind—this being, as I see it, the trait shared by all the research initiatives that can be grouped under the rubric cognitive narratology. Some of these challenges arise from general constraints on interdisciplinarity. How can practitioners, while still guided by protocols for inquiry that organize their own domains of expertise, nonetheless develop genuinely interdisciplinary approaches to a given problem? As I have tried to suggest in this essay, a way to begin is to juxta­pose discipline-specific strategies for formulating descriptions of phenomena (e.g., “positioning”/“focalization”; “qualia”/“experientiality”; etc.); test for overlap between these descriptions; and then explore the degree to which their non-overlapping aspects might complement one another. To maximize its effectiveness, however, this exploratory work should be pursued by analysts with different backgrounds and disciplinary orientations. Indeed, this brings me to my second, more specific point: namely, that traditions of scholarship on narrative are themselves donors to the hybrid discipline of cognitive narratology, not just recipients of ideas about the mind originating in other fields. There are thus two main directions in cognitive narratology, two key strategies for extending its purview, and both are equally essential to theory-building activities in this area. The first is to explore how frameworks for mind-related inquiry—frameworks developed in multiple disciplines—can enrich existing approaches to the study of narrative and yield new goals (and maybe also new methods) for narrative research. The second is to explore how insights, nomenclatures, and heuristic tools emerging from the study of stories might themselves generate new questions for cognitive science, and perhaps new ways of asking them.27

APPENDIX

Transcription Conventions (adapted from Jefferson; Ochs et al.; Schegloff, “Transcription”; and Tannen)

... { } represents a measurable pause, more than 0.1 seconds; approximate durations given in curved brackets (...{.3} = a pause lasting .3 seconds)
.. represents a slight break in timing
- a hyphen after a word or part of a word indicates a self-interruption or “restart” by the current speaker
* indicates a rising intonational contour, not necessarily a question
. indicates a falling, or final, intonation contour, not necessarily the end of a sentence
, indicates “continuing” intonation (“more to come”), not necessarily the end of a clause
: indicates the prolongation of a sound just preceding it; more than one colon indicates a sound of even longer duration
underlining indicates stress or emphasis, either through increased loudness or heightened pitch. UPPER CASE letters indicate extremely loud talk, and UNDERLINING is added for even louder speech productions

Two degree signs indicate that the talk between them is noticeably quieter than the surrounding discourse.

The up and down arrows mark rises and and falls of pitch; up arrows indicate sharper rises in pitch then those marked with underlining in stressed or emphasized words.

( الاحت) indicates downward change of pitch within the boundaries of a word; inserted before the syllable in which the change occurs.

(,) indicates upward change of pitch within the boundaries of a word; inserted before the syllable in which the change occurs.

> < indicate that the talk between these symbols is compressed or rushed relative to the surrounding discourse.

< > indicate that the talk between these symbols is markedly slower than the surrounding discourse.

[ indicates overlap between different speakers’ utterances

= indicates an utterance continued across another speaker’s overlapping utterance.

/ / enclose transcriptions that are not certain

( ) enclose nonverbal forms of expression, e.g. laughter unaccompanied by words.

[....] in short extracts indicates omitted lines.

ENDNOTES

1. For a fuller account of classical versus postclassical approaches to narrative theory, see Herman, “Introduction.” For accounts of the structuralist revolution and of the way it shaped structuralist theories of narrative in particular, see, respectively, Dosse and Herman, “Histories.”

2. See Jahn for a synoptic account of developments in cognitive narratology; see also Herman, Narrative Theory, Palmer, and Zunshine.

3. For an attempt to show how some of the ideas discussed in this paper can inform the study of literary narratives, see Herman, “Narrative Theory.” Further, a preliminary version of part of the analysis presented in section 4.4 below appears in Herman, “Narrative Analysis.”

4. Key works in discursive psychology include the items in the Works Cited by Edwards; Harré; Harré and Gillett; Harré and Langenhove; Harré and Stearns; Potter and Edwards; Potter and Wetherell.

5. I leave open the question of whether accounts of brain physiology might at some point afford another, different foundation for the study of minds. However, debates concerning the explanatory gap (Levine; cf. Blackmore and section 4.5 below)—that is, the gap between physical brain states and the condition of conscious awareness that may or may not be supervenient on those states—suggest that even a completely exhaustive model of brain structures and functions would not be equivalent to a model of the mind as such.

6. For more on the concept of the second cognitive revolution, see the website maintained by Andrew Lock at Massey University in New Zealand: <http://www.massey.ac.nz/~alock/virtual/welcome.htm>.

7. NSF Grant BCS-0236838 supported research on this narrative. See Christine Mallinson, Dynamic (61-115) for an extended discussion of the history and current sociocultural and ethnic profile of Texana; for a thumbnail sketch see http://ncsu.edu/linguistics/code/Research/20Sites/ texana.htm. I
am greatly indebted to Christine for her productive comments on an earlier draft of this essay, and also for her all-around collegiality and willingness to share insights about the Texana community and about Monica’s position within that community. Thanks are also due to Tyler Kendall, whose work on the North Carolina Sociolinguistic Archive and Analysis Project (or NC SLAAP) made it possible for me to extract and download the digitized sound file containing Monica’s story. For more information about the scope and aims of NC SLAAP, see Kendall.

8. It is worth commenting on Monica’s use of the disjunction or in the phrase from the abstract (“UFO or the devil”) that I have adopted as a title for her story. Insofar as she refuses to select definitively between a religious and a secular (if still supernatural) explanation for the experience on which her narrative centers, Monica can be interpreted as engaging in a complex form of self-positioning that is one of the hallmarks of her narrative as a whole. In parallel with Monica’s use of the self-description that occurs later in this same line (“black asses”)—one that can be construed as aligning Monica with regional as well as supraregional subgroups of the African American population, and thus against different elements of the dominant social order (see section 4.1 below)—her disjunctive explanation positions Monica amid competing sets of norms for telling stories about oneself, others, and the world.

9. As Mallinson notes ("Linguistic"), data from the 2000 U.S. Census indicate that about 230 people who self-identify as black live in Cherokee County, comprising just 1.6% of its total population.

10. Edwards and Potter define cognitivism as an explanatory strategy based on the attempt to claim “for the cognitive processes of individuals the central role in shaping perception and action” (13), whereas discursive psychology focuses on cognitive processes as sociointeractional achievements that emerge from discourse practices (cf. Lukes).

11. Research on distributed cognition that was inspired by Vygotsky includes Agre; Frawley; Herman, “‘Genette’”; Hutchins; Lave and Wenger; Rogoff; and Wertsch.

12. For foundational work in this tradition, see Drew and Heritage; Garfinkel; Sacks; and Schegloff.

13. For perspectives on the opposition between master narratives and counternarratives, see Bamberg and Andrews.

14. For an overview of this work, see Croft and Cruse. For a critique from a discursive-psychological perspective, see Edwards, Discourse 202-62.

15. See Vygotsky and the items listed in note 6.

16. This tense switch may actually occur earlier, in line 4. However, because of copula absence (an attested feature of African American Vernacular English) in this line, it is not clear whether the unreduced form of Monica’s utterance should be represented as “we [were] walkin up the hill” or rather “we [are] walking up the hill.”

17. For perspectives on the role of tense shifts in narrative, see Johnstone; Schiffrin, “Tense”; and Wolfson.

18. For a study that uses the world’s narrative literature to develop an account of emotions as innate and universal, see Hogan.

19. See, in addition to Stearns and Stearns, Kotchemidova; Edwards, Discourse 170-201; Harré and Gillett 144-61; Lee; and Stearns, “Emotion.” For an account of emotion that derives from the tradition of narrative semiotics, see Greimas and Fontanille.

20. See Wennerstrom for an overview of some of the discourse functions of prosody.

21. Lines 14, 18, and 31 also feature the use of the discourse marker you know, which has been variably interpreted as a “filler” by which speakers stall for more time to formulate an utterance (or signal their intention to continue a turn at talk), as a prompt for interlocutors to generate inferences about the significance of what is being said, and as cue to generalize on the basis of a mention of a particular event.
or situation (see Schriffrin, *Discourse* 267-311). In any case, the addressee orientation of you know underscores the extent to which the emotional profile of the events recounted in Monica’s story emerges from collaborative discourse practices.

22. An anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this essay suggested that research on emotionology should be able to register a distinction between emotional responses that are culturally conditioned (e.g., putting a bag over one’s head as an expression of grief) versus those that “are universal and a matter of common sense (running away from danger as a response to fear).” Although relevant research (e.g., Lutz’s) does acknowledge this distinction, it also emphasizes how different nomenclatural systems for emotion translate into culturally distinct ways of taxonomizing (and thus experiencing) emotion itself—thereby suggesting that the domain of emotional universals may be more restricted than previously assumed. For example, building on Lutz’s work, Harré and Gillett (144-61) show how even apparently primitive emotions like fear (the English-language designation for which already embeds the concept in a specific emotionology) can take on more or less finely differentiated valences within different cultural systems.

23. See Nagel for a classic study.

24. For example, in addition to the physicalist and anti-reductionist positions, there is the functionalist account, which holds that qualia are “multiply physically realizable,” such that they could in principle be emulated on a computer system, for example, and are therefore not specific to an individual brain (see Tye, section 4).

25. Significantly, many of the arguments about qualia in the philosophy of mind are couched in the form of stories or story-like thought experiments. Thus Jackson’s “knowledge argument” centers around Mary, the neuroscientist, who encounters a qualitative difference between what she knows through her study of the physiology of brains experiencing color, on the one hand, and the subjective, phenomenological knowledge of color that she herself acquires when she is finally let out of her windowless, colorless laboratory, on the other hand. Meanwhile, Chalmers uses an imagined race of zombies (humanoid beings exactly like us except that they have no conscious experiences) to argue against both strict physicalist and functionalist critiques of the concept of qualia (cf. Kirk).

26. On narrative acquisition, see Berman and Slobin; on cognitive grammar and cognitive semantics, see Langacker, Talmy, and Taylor.

27. I am grateful to Jim Phelan and the anonymous reviewer for their insightful and productive comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

**WORKS CITED**


