Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions

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Since the end of World War II, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, there has been an expansion in the number of third-party peacekeeping missions established throughout the world. Most of the expansion in peacekeeping missions in the past decade or so has occurred in states experiencing intrastate or civil conflicts. The questions addressed in this study are under what conditions do third-party actors either decide to establish or decide not to establish peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes, and specifically, what effect do international-level factors have on the likelihood that third-party peacekeeping personnel will be deployed in an intrastate dispute? The previous literature on third-party peacekeeping and interventions is used to derive a set of theoretical arguments and hypotheses regarding the establishment of peacekeeping missions by third-party actors (the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad hoc groups of states) during the post-World War II period. Specifically, I argue that several factors originating at the level of the international system influence the occurrence of third-party peacekeeping missions. The results of statistical analyses of the hypotheses largely support the notion that a set of international-level factors significantly influences the decisions of third-party actors to establish or not establish third-party peacekeeping missions, that international-level factors are more important than state-level factors, that these factors often have different effects on the likelihood of different types of third-party peacekeeping.

Under what conditions does a third-party actor either decide to establish or decide not to establish a peacekeeping mission in an intrastate dispute?1 What effect do
international-level factors have on the likelihood that third-party peacekeeping personnel will be deployed in an intrastate dispute? These questions are important for contemporary scholars and practitioners of international relations for two reasons. First, the conditions under which third-party actors are motivated to establish (or the conditions under which third-party actors are constrained from establishing) peacekeeping missions have not been adequately examined even though there has been a significant increase in the number of third-party peacekeeping missions initiated throughout the world since the end of World War II and particularly since the end of the Cold War (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001:3; Mason, 2003:19–20). Not only has the number of peacekeeping missions increased in the past several decades, but the complexity of these missions has also increased (Goulding, 1993:456–60; Mason, 2003:29; Fortna, 2004:269). In addition, most of the expansion in peacekeeping missions in the past decade or so has taken place in states experiencing intrastate disputes or civil conflicts (James, 1995:242; Oudraat, 1996:490; O’Connor, 2001:57; Mason, 2003:30). An examination of the frequency of third-party peacekeeping during the 60 years since the end of World War II suggests that there has been a significant amount of variation in the establishment of peacekeeping missions during this period. However, despite the variation in the deployment of third-party peacekeeping personnel during the past 60 years, scholars have paid relatively little attention to theoretical explanations for the establishment of these missions in civil conflicts. A broader understanding of why third-party peacekeeping as a means of managing conflicts is used relatively more frequently in some circumstances might ultimately provide scholars with some additional insight into the duration of civil conflicts and the resolution of intrastate disputes.

Second, many scholars have analyzed the effectiveness of third-party peacekeeping missions, including the factors influencing the success or failure of peacekeeping missions (e.g., Mackinlay, 1989; Diehl, 1993, 1994; Durch, 1993; James, 1995; Shaw, 1995; Jett, 1999; Fortna, 2004). However, the implications of some of these studies of peacekeeping effectiveness may be limited without a better understanding of the factors that influence the formation of peacekeeping missions in the first place, particularly those studies that focus solely on international conflicts during which peacekeeping missions have actually been established. In fact, the success or failure of a third-party peacekeeping mission may at least partly be influenced by the initial decision to establish or not establish the mission. For example, the United Nations (UN) chose to deploy peacekeeping personnel in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia in the early 1990s, but it chose not to send peacekeeping personnel to several other states also experiencing civil conflicts (e.g., Bangladesh, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, India, Laos, Lebanon, Philippines, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, and Uganda). Some have argued that the UN established a number of peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s in states experiencing ideology-based civil conflicts because of the end of the Cold War between post-conflict “peacebuilding” efforts (e.g., election monitoring, human rights monitoring, civilian police assistance/monitoring, refugee repatriation, humanitarian assistance, temporary administration, de-mining, etc.).

International-level factors refer to influences that originate from the interstate or global level of analysis, such as a military alliance between the government of the target state and a major power.

Virginia Page Fortna (2003:97) argued that the “most important innovation in conflict management in the last 50 years is the practice of peacekeeping: the concept of sending personnel from the international community to help keep the peace in the aftermath of war.” Fortna (2004:269) suggested that the “vast literature on peacekeeping compares cases and missions, but generally examines only cases in which the international community intervenes, not cases in which belligerents are left to their own devices.”
the Soviet Union and the United States. While UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia were largely considered successful, it is possible that UN peacekeeping missions would not have been as successful in one or more of the other states experiencing civil conflicts based largely on ethnicity, race, or religion.

On the other hand, it is also possible that third-party actors are arguably motivated to establish peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes involving significant humanitarian problems. If so, this might account for some of the ineffectiveness of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes since conflicts involving large numbers of fatalities and displaced persons might be among the most difficult conflicts to manage and resolve. In either case, it is reasonable to conclude that understanding the factors that motivate third-party actors to establish peacekeeping missions might provide some insight into the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of peacekeeping missions that are actually established.

Most scholarly studies of peacekeeping have focused on the UN primarily because the organization has been in the forefront in deploying “peacekeeping” personnel during the past 60 years. In fact, a total of 59 peacekeeping (or “peace observation”) missions have been established by the UN in interstate and intrastate disputes since its founding in 1945, including 46 missions since the beginning of 1988. However, these studies completely ignore at least two other types of third-party peacekeeping missions: peacekeeping missions by regional inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and peacekeeping missions by states or ad hoc groups of states. Several peacekeeping missions have been formed by regional IGOs throughout the world since 1945. These organizations vary from multi-regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Commonwealth of Nations (CON) to sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This category also includes organizations with members located primarily in one particular region of the world, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Western Hemisphere and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Africa. For example, the OAS deployed some 14,000 peacekeeping personnel in the Dominican Republic beginning in May 1965. In addition, several peacekeeping missions have been established by states or ad hoc groups of states outside of the official auspices of the UN or a regional IGO (although many of these missions were authorized by the UN or a regional IGO). This category includes peacekeeping missions consisting of personnel from one state (unilateral peacekeeping) and peacekeeping missions consisting of personnel from two or more states (multilateral peacekeeping). For example, France, Italy, and the U.S. formed a multinational peacekeeping mission—which was known as the Multinational Force (MNF I)—in Lebanon in July 1982.

Overall, the study of peacekeeping is limited by the relative overemphasis on evaluations or assessments of particular UN peacekeeping missions and by the relative lack of emphasis on empirical analysis of the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions in general. While previous studies of UN peacekeeping

For example, Fortna (1993:356) noted that “Namibia was very much tied up in the Cold War” and that until the late 1980s “each superpower was more concerned with minimizing its rival’s influence than with promoting a peaceful solution to the conflict.”

The UN Charter does not mention the concept of “peacekeeping,” and the UN did not establish its first official “peacekeeping mission” until 1956 when the UN General Assembly established the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Suez Canal area. However, the UN had established “peace observation” missions in Greece, Palestine, Dutch East Indies, and Kashmir beginning in the mid-1940s (Rikhye, 1983:5–6).


The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was renamed the African Union (AU) in 2002.

have contributed much descriptive information about such missions, they have contributed little theoretical understanding of the conditions under which third-party actors are motivated to establish peacekeeping missions. Therefore, the primary focus of this study is to empirically analyze the conditions under which third-party peacekeeping missions—including missions established by the UN, regional IGOs, and states—are more or less likely to be established in states experiencing civil conflicts. The emphasis on civil conflicts, as opposed to interstate conflicts, stems from the fact that most third-party peacekeeping personnel since the end of World War II—and almost all peacekeeping personnel since the end of the Cold War—have been deployed to prevent military hostilities between groups within states (James, 1994:30). In addition, it is possible that the factors explaining the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes differ from the factors explaining the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions in interstate disputes.

Following a brief review of the prior literature on third-party peacekeeping and intervention, several testable hypotheses are derived from international-level explanations of peacekeeping, controlling for the potential effects of a number of state-level influences. The hypotheses are statistically tested against the historical record of all intrastate conflicts and third-party peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 2002. The results of these empirical analyses will be assessed in terms of their implications for subsequent, and more narrowly focused, studies of the establishment and effectiveness of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes. Since there have been few prior studies of the establishment of third-party peacekeeping, this study is designed to be broad in its scope in order to provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for subsequent analyses of peacekeeping.

### Third-Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes

Although there have been numerous case studies of specific instances of third-party peacekeeping throughout the world, very few statistical analyses have been carried out on the conditions under which third-party actors are more or less likely to decide to establish peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes. Most of these case studies have largely consisted of descriptions of the events that led to the formation of one or more peacekeeping missions in one or more states, as well as assessments of the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in achieving their particular mandates. For example, William Durch (1993) edited a book examining in detail some 20 UN peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 1992, including the origin and an assessment of each of the missions. While there was little analysis of the decisions by the UN to establish the peacekeeping missions, Durch did suggest that peacekeeping missions “require complimentary political support from the Great Powers and the local parties” and that if “either is missing or deficient, an operation may never get underway or may fail to achieve its potential once deployed” (1993:22–3).

Since third-party peacekeeping tended to be one of the most expensive—and one of the most controversial—of the various tools of conflict management throughout the post-World War II period, it is understandable that most previous studies of peacekeeping focused on the success or failure of such missions. Ramesh Thakur (1984), for example, studied the involvement of Canada, India, and Poland in a peacekeeping mission—the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)—in Vietnam between 1954 and 1973. He argued that “peace-

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11 State-level factors refer to characteristics of the target state (i.e., states experiencing the intrastate conflict) or characteristics of the dispute, such as the level of human suffering resulting from a civil conflict.

keeping is successful where it is limited to narrow, precisely defined tasks of over-
seeing a military disengagement upon the cessation of hostilities, but fails when
extended to embrace political tasks of conflict resolution, and is not viable against
the self-defined vital interests of a superpower” (1984:2). Examining six cases of
third-party peacekeeping in his study of the conditions that contribute to the ef-
ectiveness of peacekeeping operations, Paul Diehl (1988:502–03) concluded that
one of the main obstacles to successful peacekeeping has been the “opposition of
third-party states and subnational groups” to the peacekeeping mission. He also
concluded that the ability of peacekeepers to adequately separate the combatants
and the perceived neutrality of the peacekeepers both influence the effectiveness of
examined several cases of “multinational forces” during the post-World War II
period, including the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo in the 1960s and the
OAU peacekeeping mission in Chad in the early 1980s. Gregory concluded that the
success or failure of peacekeeping operations is largely dependent upon the “im-
partiality” of the peacekeepers (1984:36). These and other studies generally sup-
ported conventional wisdom that third-party peacekeeping could only be successful
if the peacekeeping personnel were perceived by the disputants to be neutral, the
mandate of the peacekeeping mission was limited in its scope, and all relevant
parties in the target state were supportive of (or at least not opposed to) the mission.

Some scholars have sought to contribute to the development of a theory of third-
party peacekeeping through the categorization of peacekeeping missions. For ex-
ample, Alan James (1990:14–5) suggested five different categories of peacekeeping
missions based on the “political circumstances” that provide opportunities for such
missions, ranging from “backyard problems” peacekeeping to “dangerous cross-
roads.” The former category refers to peacekeeping missions that take place within
the sphere of influence of a major power, such as the Dominican Republic in the
Caribbean region. The latter category refers to missions that take place in situations
where the risk of military hostilities breaking out between two states is relatively
high, such as the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North Korea and South Korea.
Examining some 57 opportunities for third-party peacekeeping within the five
categories, James concluded that “peacekeeping is an activity which can be utilized
in all types of international conflict” and that “the kind of international care and
attention which peacekeepers offer can be in demand for long periods irrespective
of the sort of issue to which they are applying their skills” (1990:363). Meanwhile,
Diehl, Druckman, and Wall (1998:39–40) suggested twelve categories of peace-
keeping operations on the basis of particular functions, including traditional peace-
keeping, observation, collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian
assistance, state/nation building, pacification, preventive deployment, arms control
verification, protective services, intervention in support of democracy, and sanc-
tions enforcement. While these and other efforts have provided several useful in-
sights into the phenomenon of peacekeeping, they have arguably extended the
definition of peacekeeping well beyond what is commonly regarded as peacekeep-
ing in practice.

Although there have been limitations in the prior literature on third-party
peacekeeping, some scholars have recently examined one or more dimensions of
third-party peacekeeping in a more systematic manner. For example, Michael
Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman (2003) statistically analyzed the effects of a set
of independent variables on the duration of time from the beginning of a civil war
to the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission during the post-Cold War
period. The authors found that the UN was more likely to deploy peacekeeping
personnel in states where there was a high level of fatalities, and that the UN was
less likely to deploy peacekeeping personnel in states with large government mil-
tary forces (2003:44–8). These results suggest that both power-related motivations
and humanitarian-related motivations may influence decisions regarding UN
peacekeeping. On the other hand, Gilligan and Stedman found no evidence that the UN was more or less likely to establish a peacekeeping mission in secessionist conflicts, when the disputants have signed a peace treaty, in target states with democratic governments, or in former colonies of permanent members of the UN Security Council (2003:49–50). The authors concluded that “considerations of power are at least as important as considerations of sovereignty in constraining the UN’s universalism” (2003:53).

More recently, Virginia Page Fortna (2004) statistically analyzed the effects of a set of factors on the deployment of UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions following civil wars between 1947 and 1999, as part of a broader study of the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in “keeping peace” following civil wars. She found that UN peacekeeping, particularly “consent-based peacekeeping,” was less likely in cases in which the civil war ended with a victory by the government or rebels (as well as in cases in which the civil war ended with a formal peace treaty) and in cases in which the state experiencing the civil war had a large army (2004:280). Fortna concluded that “the answer to the question where do peacekeepers get sent is quite complicated,” and added that it “depends on whether we are talking about UN peacekeeping or missions by other actors...” (2004:281). For the most part, these and other recent empirical analyses of third-party peacekeeping have focused on the influence of particular characteristics or attributes of the target state or the civil conflict on the establishment of peacekeeping missions.

**Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes**

Notwithstanding the limitations in the literature on third-party peacekeeping, there has been a considerable amount of empirical research conducted on third-party interventions in intrastate disputes, including military, economic, and diplomatic interventions. Since peacekeeping is one particular type of third-party military intervention, we should be able to gain some theoretical insights into the formation of peacekeeping missions from these studies.¹³ Unlike the literature on third-party intervention, studies of third-party intervention have tended to focus on explanations from both the international system level and the state level. The previous literature on third-party interventions can be divided between analyses of state interventions and analyses of UN interventions.

**State Interventions**

According to Hans Morgenthau, intervention “is as ancient and well-established an instrument of foreign policy as are diplomatic pressure, negotiations and war” and “some states have found it advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf of their own interests and against the latter’s will” (1967:425). Morgenthau argued that major powers, specifically the Soviet Union and US, intervened in other states during the Cold War to support former colonies that were lacking in political, military, and economic viability; to support the government or opposition groups during revolutions and civil conflicts; and to support or oppose governments or opposition groups on the basis of ideology (1967:426–28). Since the 1960s, Morgenthau’s traditional realist perspective of third-party intervention has, to a considerable extent, influenced the literature on state interventions in other states.¹⁴ For example, Frederic Pearson (1974:453) examined foreign military interventions by states between 1948 and 1967 and found that “major power” military interventions, as well as “middle or small power” military interventions,

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¹³ The scholarly literature on third-party interventions is rather extensive, so I limit my discussion to those studies that specifically address the causes or motivations of third-party interventions in intrastate disputes.

¹⁴ For examples, see Tillema and van Wingen (1982), Feste (1992), Pearson et al. (1994) and Tillema (1994).
were primarily influenced by concerns for regional power balances or ideological interests.

More recently, particularly since the end of the Cold War, scholars have increasingly examined both strategic or power motivations and non-strategic or affective motivations of state interventions (Heraclides, 1990; Cooper and Berdal, 1993; Carment, James, and Rowlands, 1997; Regan, 2000). For example, Daniel Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001:23–33) examined the motivations of state interventions in support of insurgent movements within other states and found that states tend to support insurgencies in rival neighboring states as a means of increasing their influence within a region and weakening the influence of their rivals. In addition to ethnic and ideological motivations of state support for insurgents in other states, Byman et al. (2001:36) also found that “religion can be a powerful motivation for states to support insurgencies.” Similarly, Jonathan Fox (2001:526) found that “religious conflicts are associated with more intervention and the interveners in religious conflicts tend to have religious affinities with the minority on whose behalf they intervene.”

Some scholars have also found evidence to support the argument that states sometimes intervene for humanitarian reasons. For example, Martha Finnemore (2004:102) argued that humanitarian intervention by states during the post-Cold War period “cannot be understood apart from the changing normative context in which it occurs.” Specifically, she suggested that the extent of “humanitarian norms” existing at the level of the international system influences the extent of humanitarian military intervention by states (2004:102–03). In his study of state interventions in civil conflicts in the post-World War II period, Patrick Regan (2000:61) also provided some empirical evidence that unilateral interventions by states were more likely in civil conflicts when there were concerns about an impending humanitarian crisis.

**UN Interventions**

Some three decades ago, Oscar Schachter (1974:415–24) suggested that decisions by the UN to become involved (or not become involved) in internal conflicts were directly influenced by one or more of the following factors: (1) the interests and positions of the great powers; (2) the “territorial integrity” of a member-state of the UN; (3) the involvement of regional organizations; (4) the consent of the government of the target state; (5) legal restrictions on the UN in regard to “domestic matters”; and (6) attitudes with respect to revolutionary movements and human rights. According to Linda Miller (1967:19), the “conditions under which the UN expresses its concerns in cases of domestic strife and the means by which it responds to these disorders are determined by the interplay of national and international interests and influences.” Specifically, Miller concluded that the “status of these conflicts in world politics” influences the extent to which the UN intervenes in such internal conflicts (1967:35). Similarly, John Ruggie (1974:495–96) argued that characteristics of the international political environment largely influenced the likelihood of a UN intervention in an international dispute. According to Ruggie, during the Cold War period, the UN was less likely to intervene in an international dispute involving a “cold war issue” (i.e., an issue stemming from the rivalry between the U.S. and Soviet Union), less likely to intervene when the dispute involved the national interests of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and more likely to intervene when the dispute involved two “non-aligned” states (1974:498–503).

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15 Mitchell (1970:184–85) suggested that “affective linkages” between internal social groups and external parties involved “congruent values, attitudes, ideologies, and self-images” such as religion and ethnicity.
More recently, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (1996:518–19) also argued that the likelihood of UN intervention in an internal conflict, particularly during the post-Cold War period, is higher when one or more of the permanent members of the UN Security Council have national interests in the conflict and when one or more of the permanent members of the UN Security Council perceive the conflict to be a threat to international peace and security. Oudraat concluded that whether or not the UN Security Council takes action regarding an international conflict depends on one or more permanent members taking the “diplomatic lead” and assuming the “costs of diplomatic, economic, or military action” (1996:519–20). Overall, these and other scholars have concluded that the likelihood of the UN intervening in an international dispute depends largely on the national interests and involvement of major powers in the international system. However, some scholars have also concluded that there are circumstances in which the interests of the international community as a whole—as well as international norms and law—are also potentially important influences on the likelihood of UN intervention.

Theoretical Arguments

Although a good deal of the emphasis in the previous literature, particularly the literature on third-party peacekeeping, has been on particular characteristics of the target state and conflict, I have chosen to emphasize factors influencing the likelihood of third-party peacekeeping missions at the level of the international system.16 As one of several conflict management techniques available to third-party actors, peacekeeping is perhaps the one technique that is most influenced by pressures and constraints originating from the international system. In fact, third-party decisions to deploy peacekeeping personnel in civil conflict situations typically involve the governments of two or more states in the international system, global, or regional organizations, large numbers of military and civilian personnel from two or more states, and large amounts of financial resources. Of course, these decisions often involve a number of domestic considerations as well, such as national interests and domestic political conditions. According to Alan James (1990:12), the third-party actors involved in the establishment of a peacekeeping mission “will have taken their decisions about the suggested operation in the light of its impact on their positions and policies, at both the domestic and international levels, and on balance have decided on a positive response.”

Assuming that decisions by third-party actors to establish peacekeeping missions are partially, if not largely, influenced by international politics, I have identified seven international-level explanations of peacekeeping in intrastate disputes. First, third-party peacekeeping can be explained by the presence of military alliances between major global or regional powers and states experiencing civil conflicts. The military alliance hypothesis suggests that a third-party peacekeeping mission is less likely to be established in a target state if the government of the target state has a formal military alliance with the government of a major global or regional power (Ruggie, 1974:503; Schachter, 1974:416).17 This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the deployment of third-party peacekeeping personnel in a target state allied with a major power would hinder the primary goal of suppressing

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16 Although it is tempting to categorize the explanations of third-party peacekeeping according to the two major theoretical approaches in the field of international relations (i.e. realist and liberal), there are several good reasons not to do so. Referring to explanations of the establishment of UN peacekeeping, Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman (2003:41) suggested that “from an empirical standpoint distinguishing between the idealist and realist explanations will not be as easy as it first appears,” particularly because in some instances the same prediction of the occurrence of UN peacekeeping might be made by both realism and liberalism. There is also the problem that each of these two broad theoretical approaches includes specific variants (e.g. neoclassical realism and structural realism) that might make contradictory predictions about third-party peacekeeping in particular circumstances.

17 In this study, a “target state” refers to a state that is experiencing, or has recently experienced, a civil conflict.
opposition to the government of the allied state. It is also assumed that a major power would oppose the involvement of third-party peacekeeping personnel in what would be considered the major power’s sphere of influence. In either case, a major power would be expected to use its political influence to prevent the deployment of third-party peacekeeping personnel on the territory of a military ally.

Second, third-party peacekeeping can be explained by the power status of the target state in the international or regional system. The major power status hypothesis suggests that a third-party peacekeeping mission is less likely to be established in a target state if the target state is a major global or regional power (Fortna, 2003:102). This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the government of a major power has sufficient military capabilities to suppress or defeat an internal opposition group. As a result of the power capabilities that a major power government possesses relative to an internal opposition group, such a government would have little incentive to permit the formation of a third-party peacekeeping mission on its territory. This hypothesis also assumes that a major power has sufficient political influence to prevent a third-party actor, particularly the UN or a regional organization, from establishing a peacekeeping mission on its territory since international organizations are largely reflections of the distribution of power in the international or regional system.

Third-party peacekeeping can also be explained by previous military involvement of a major power in a target state. Specifically, the military intervention hypothesis suggests that a third-party peacekeeping mission is less likely to be established in a target state if a major global or regional power has previously militarily intervened during the conflict in support of, or in opposition to, one of the parties to the dispute (Forsythe, 1972:1076). This hypothesis is based on the assumption that once a major power has militarily intervened in support of or against the government of the target state, it is likely to oppose the subsequent formation of a peacekeeping mission in the target state by any other third-party actor. The primary goal of the major power in these situations would be to assist one of the parties to the dispute in militarily defeating the other party, and a third-party peacekeeping mission would arguably hinder the achievement of that goal. As with the previous argument, it is assumed that a major power has the ability to prevent the formation of a third-party peacekeeping mission when it is not in the national interest of the major power.

Similarly, third-party peacekeeping can be explained by previous intermediary involvement of a major power in a target state. The intermediary intervention hypothesis suggests that a third-party peacekeeping mission is more likely to be established in a target state if a major global or regional power has previously intervened as an intermediary (e.g., mediated negotiations between the parties) during the conflict. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that it is occasionally in the national interest of a major power to facilitate the management or resolution of a conflict in a target state, particularly when the major power neither has a military alliance with the government of the state nor has militarily intervened for or against one of the parties to the dispute. In some situations, the primary goal of a major global or regional power may be to prevent a civil conflict in a neighboring state, or any state for that matter, from undermining the security and stability of the international system or a regional subsystem. This hypothesis is also based on the assumption that if a major power has intervened as an intermediary in a civil conflict, the major power is likely to favor (or at least not oppose) the deployment of third-party peacekeeping personnel in the target state.

A fifth explanation of third-party peacekeeping emphasizes the involvement of international institutions, such as the UN and regional IGOs, in states experiencing civil conflicts. The institutional involvement hypothesis suggests that a third-party peacekeeping mission is more likely to be established in a target state if the UN or a regional IGO has previously been involved as a “conflict manager” in the target state.
state. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that once the international community—through international institutions such as the UN or a regional IGO—has invested resources in order to manage or resolve a conflict within a target state, it will rationally seek to protect that investment through continued involvement following a cessation of military hostilities. From this perspective, one of the most effective ways to prevent the resumption of military hostilities between disputants is to deploy third-party peacekeeping personnel in the target state.

Sixth, third-party peacekeeping can be explained by the existence of a non-intervention norm in the international system. Specifically, the non-intervention norm hypothesis suggests that a third-party peacekeeping mission is less likely to be established in a target state when there is a prevailing norm of non-intervention in the international system. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that state and non-state actors in the international system are constrained, as a result of a norm of non-intervention, to intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states (Ball, 1961; Scott, 1968; Little, 1975; Slater and Nardin, 1986; Krasner, 1995). According to Vincent (1974:14), the norm of non-intervention “identifies the right of states to sovereignty as a standard in international society and makes explicit the respect required for it in abstention from intervention.” In fact, the existence of a non-intervention norm is reflected in Article 2.7 of Chapter I of the UN Charter ratified on October 24, 1945, which states that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Goodrich, Hambro, and Patricia, 1969:60). The charters of several regional IGOs, including the OAS and OAU, also contain references to a norm of non-intervention.

Notwithstanding the prevalence of a norm of non-intervention during the post-World War II period, several scholars have argued in recent years that the end of the Cold War marked the emergence of a conflicting international norm—a norm of humanitarian intervention—which permits interventions in the domestic affairs of states in order to protect human rights and provide humanitarian assistance to those adversely affected by civil conflict (Blechman, 1995; Weiss and Chopra, 1995; Finnemore, 1998; Clarke, 2001; Kardas, 2001). Indeed, Karns and Mingst (2001:219) argued that “the reality . . . is that the UN is now operating under a de facto norm of intervention in civil conflicts, using limited force to stop anarchy and humanitarian disaster.” Likewise, Finnemore (1998:198) suggested that since the end of the Cold War, states “consider intervening in small remote states for largely humanitarian reasons because the organization and normative structures of international politics have created the means and justification to do so.” The norm of non-intervention that was prevalent during the Cold War period has arguably been replaced by the norm of humanitarian intervention during the

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18 See Schachter (1974:424–45) for a discussion of 10 different “ways and means” for the UN to play a role in internal conflicts, including good offices, conciliation, fact-finding, economic assistance, and sanctions.
19 For a thorough review of the study of the influence of “international norms” on the behaviors of states in the international system, see Raymond (1997).
20 The UN General Assembly also adopted the “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty” on December 21, 1965 (Onuf, 1971:218).
21 For example, Article 19 of Chapter IV of the OAS Charter states: “No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state” (Ball 1961:23). In addition, Article III(2) of the OAU Charter requires member states to declare their adherence to the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of states” (Skjelsbaek, 1986:150).
22 Finnemore (2004:113) argued that the “humanitarian intervention norms that have evolved . . . appear to allow intervention in cases of humanitarian disaster and abuse, but with at least two caveats. First, they are permissive norms only. They do not require intervention, as the cases of Burundi, Sudan, and other states make clear. Second, they place strict requirements on the ways in which intervention, if employed, must be carried out: Humanitarian intervention must be multilateral if states are to accept it as legitimately and genuinely humanitarian.”
post-Cold War period as a result of the changes that occurred in the international system following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the superpower rivalry. As a result, it is assumed that the deployment of third-party peacekeeping personnel was generally less constrained during the post-Cold War period compared with the Cold War period.

Finally, third-party peacekeeping can be explained by the existence of a territorial integrity norm in the international system. The territorial integrity norm hypothesis suggests that a third-party peacekeeping mission is less likely to be established in a target state if there is a threat to the territorial integrity of the state, specifically if there is a movement by one particular region to secede from the target state. Referring to the norm of territorial integrity, Alexis Heraclides (1990:342) argued that third-party actors “refrain from supporting secessionist movements because of existing normative regime against involvement, particularly involvement with groups that threaten the territorial integrity of states.” The norm of territorial integrity arguably extends to the establishment of peacekeeping missions by third-party actors in civil conflicts involving secessionist movements. For example, David Forsythe (1972:1077) indicated that, in the case of the Biafran secessionist conflict in Nigeria in 1967–1970, “calls for a UN peacekeeping force . . . were rejected by Lagos since a ceasefire policed by a UN force would tend to consolidate Biafra’s separate position besides drawing international attention to its claim of independence.”

The territorial integrity norm hypothesis is based on the assumption that states in the international system are committed to, and in fact have a shared interest in, preserving the territorial integrity of all sovereign states in the international system. For example, the UN Charter explicitly prohibits members from violating the territorial integrity of any state in the international system. This hypothesis also assumes that the formation of a third-party peacekeeping mission in a state with a secessionist movement would enhance the prospects of the secessionists achieving their goals. Therefore, the common interest in preserving the territorial integrity of all states in the international system is an important constraint on third-party decisions to establish peacekeeping missions in these situations.

Research Design

In order to test the preceding hypotheses regarding the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions, some 213 civil conflicts occurring between January 1, 1945 and December 31, 2002 were identified. Unlike many previous studies of “civil wars” involving 1,000 or more fatalities, the cases of civil conflict in this study correspond to periods of military hostilities between government security personnel and members of one or more armed opposition groups within a state lasting 10

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23 Chapter I, Article 2.4 of the UN Charter states, “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN.”

or more days, regardless of the number of fatalities. The threshold for including a civil conflict in this study is intentionally low in order to account for the wide range of scenarios, including both short periods of military hostilities and long periods of military hostilities, in which a third-party actor might decide to establish or not establish a peacekeeping mission. Cases of civil conflict, including the post-conflict periods that follow the end of military hostilities, are appropriate units of analysis for this study since they represent distinct opportunities for third-party peacekeeping. In other words, third-party actors generally do not have the opportunity to deploy peacekeeping personnel in a target state unless the parties to an intrastate dispute have engaged in military hostilities.

Of the 213 civil conflicts that were identified for this study, 111 conflicts (52%) ended during the Cold War period, and 102 conflicts (48%) ended—or were still ongoing—during the post-Cold War period. The conflicts took place in each of the five regions of the world, including Asia/Pacific—69 (32%); Europe/Former Soviet Union—25 (12%); Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf—38 (18%); Sub-Saharan Africa—59 (28%); and Western Hemisphere—22 (10%). Figure 1 shows that the number of ongoing civil conflicts varied considerably during the period from 1945 to 2002. During the period from 1945 to 1960, the number of ongoing conflicts was relatively stable in the range of 3–15 per year. The number of ongoing conflicts increased sharply during the period from 1961 to 1973, and then stabilized in the range of 25–30 per year through 1978. During the period from 1979 to 1991, there was another sharp increase in the number of ongoing conflicts, peaking at 46 in 1991. Since 1992, there has been a decrease in the number of ongoing conflicts.

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25 The average duration of the 213 intrastate conflicts used in this study is approximately 74 months. The duration of the shortest conflict was 11 days, and the duration of the longest conflict was 568 months. Eight out of the 213 conflicts lasted less than 1 month, and 67 of the 213 conflicts lasted less than 12 months.

26 The only exceptions would be cases of “preventive deployment” of peacekeeping personnel; however, there have been very few such cases in the post-World War II period.

27 The cases that “ended during the Cold War period” correspond to intrastate conflicts that ended on or before December 31, 1989.
conflicts, but the number of conflicts remains at a level higher than much of the pre-1979 period.

Each of the 213 civil conflicts was examined for cases of third-party peacekeeping missions. One or more third-party peacekeeping missions were observed during or following a total of 76 (35.7%) of the 213 civil conflicts, including 28 (25.2%) of the 111 conflicts that ended during the Cold War period and 48 (47.1%) of the 102 conflicts that occurred during the post-Cold War period. A total of 111 different third-party peacekeeping missions were established during or following the conflicts, including 43 UN peacekeeping missions, 35 regional IGO peacekeeping missions, and 33 state peacekeeping missions.28 Figure 2 shows the number of third-party peacekeeping missions initiated between 1945 and 2002. This graph indicates that the number of peacekeeping missions established by third-party actors during 5-year periods ranged between two and seven from 1945 to 1989, but the number of peacekeeping missions established increased sharply after the end of the Cold War. The number of peacekeeping missions established during both 5-year periods in the 1990s ranged between 30 and 35. However, there were only 12 peacekeeping missions established during the 3-year period between 2000 and 2002.

Overall, there are at least two interesting observations regarding the information shown in Figure 2. First, the UN established no peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes between 1970 and 1984, after establishing eight missions during the earlier period from 1945 to 1969. Despite the lack of UN missions (or perhaps as a result of the lack of UN missions), regional IGOs and ad hoc groups of states established eleven peacekeeping missions during the period from 1970 to 1984. Second, the significant increase in peacekeeping missions during the first decade of the post-Cold War period was the result of the establishment of increasing numbers of peacekeeping missions by all three types of third-party actors. Although the UN established 29 peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes during the 1990s, re-

28 The complete list of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate conflicts, including the dates of each of the peacekeeping missions, is located at: http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_intrastateconflicts.htm.
Regional IGOs and ad hoc groups of states established a combined 34 peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes during the same period.

**Dependent Variables**

In order to analyze the formation of peacekeeping missions by the three different types of third-party actors, four different models are estimated in this study: (a) a model explaining the establishment of any type of third-party peacekeeping mission; (b) a model explaining the establishment of UN peacekeeping missions; (c) a model explaining the establishment of regional IGO peacekeeping missions; and (d) a model explaining the establishment of state (or ad hoc groups of states) peacekeeping missions. For each of these models, the dependent variable is coded “1” when a peacekeeping mission was established during or within 12 months of the end of a civil conflict and is coded “0” otherwise.

In addition, four models—using the same four variations of the dependent variable discussed above—are estimated with alternative indicators of five of the seven independent variables. Specifically, four of the independent variables are divided into a “global power” indicator and a “regional power” indicator. For example, the military alliance variable is divided into an indicator that accounts for a military alliance between the government of the target state and a major global power and an indicator that accounts for a military alliance between the government of the target state and a major regional power. In addition, the institutional involvement variable is divided into an indicator for the “UN” and an indicator for “regional IGOs.”

**Independent Variables**

**Military Alliance**—coded “1” if the government of the target state has a military alliance with a major global power or major regional power, and coded “0” otherwise. The source of the data on military alliances is the Correlates of War (COW) Project, Formal Interstate Alliances Data Set (version 3.03). Only “defense pacts” (Type I category in the COW Project’s alliances data) are coded as “military alliances” in this study.

**Major Power Status**—coded “1” if the target state is a major global or regional power, and coded “0” otherwise.

**Military Intervention**—coded “1” if a major global or regional power intervened militarily in support of, or in opposition to, one of the parties during a civil conflict.

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29 With one exception, the "major global powers" refer to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council during the period from 1945 to 2002: United States, Soviet Union/Russian Federation, Republic of China/People’s Republic of China, France, and United Kingdom. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) (or “mainland China”) is coded as a "major global power" during the period from 1950 to 2002, even though the Republic of China/Taiwan held the permanent seat on the UN Security Council during part of that period.


and coded “0” otherwise. In this study, the notion of “military intervention” includes any type of military involvement, including military assistance (e.g., military airlift, weapons, and supplies), military advisory, and use of military force. The source of data on military interventions in intrastate disputes is the Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes Project, Military Interventions Data Set (version 1.0).32

**Intermediary Intervention**—coded “1” if a major global power or major regional power intervened as an intermediary during a civil conflict, and coded “0” otherwise. The notion of “intermediary intervention” includes any neutral or non-partisan effort—including fact-finding, good offices, mediation, and conciliation—for the purpose of assisting the parties in peacefully managing or resolving the conflict. The source of data on intermediary interventions in intrastate disputes is the Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes Project, Intermediary Interventions Data Set (version 1.0).

**Institutional Involvement**—coded “1” if the UN or a regional IGO previously intervened to manage or resolve a civil conflict, and coded “0” otherwise. A wide variety of conflict management activities by the UN or a regional IGO in a target state constitutes “institutional involvement,” including fact-finding, good offices, mediation, conciliation, economic sanctions, military sanctions, humanitarian assistance, repatriation assistance, human rights monitoring, and election monitoring. The source of data on UN and regional IGO interventions in intrastate disputes is the Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes Project, Intermediary Interventions Data Set (version 1.0) and Participatory Interventions Data Set (version 1.0).

**Non-Intervention Norm**—coded “1” if a civil conflict ended during the Cold War period (on or prior to December 31, 1989), and coded “0” otherwise.33

**Territorial Integrity Norm**—coded “1” if a civil conflict involves a secessionist/separatist movement, and coded “0” otherwise. A secessionist movement refers to an effort by one or more groups within a state to separate themselves, as well as part of the territory of that state, from the control of the government of the state. The goal of a secessionist group is to establish a new state or attach to another state, usually for ethnic, religious, or economic reasons (Spencer, 1998: 2–3). Of the 213 civil conflicts used in this study, 69 (32.4%) involve secessionist movements. The source of data on intrastate disputes is Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes Project, Intrastate Disputes Data Set (version 1.0).

### Control Variables

Four sets of variables are included in each of the models to control for various attributes of the target state or the civil conflict that may influence a third-party actor to decide to deploy peacekeeping personnel in a target state.

First, the manner in which a civil conflict ends might affect the likelihood of the establishment of a third-party peacekeeping mission. Specifically, I control for the possibility that the likelihood of a peacekeeping mission varies depending on whether or not the parties formally agree to a cessation of military hostilities. The **ceasefire agreement** variable is coded “1” when there is a formal ceasefire agreement and coded “0” otherwise. Along the same lines, I control for the possibility that the likelihood of a peacekeeping mission varies depending on whether or not one of

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32 The data sets of the Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes Project are located at http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/trp_homepage.htm.

33 In addition to intrastate conflicts that began during the post-Cold War period or after December 31, 1989 (and therefore, occurred entirely during the post-Cold War period), conflicts that began during the Cold War period but ended during the post-Cold War period are coded “0”. The later conflicts are cases that would have been influenced by both the non-intervention norm and the humanitarian intervention norm. This coding scheme would potentially pose a problem if there were cases in which a third-party peacekeeping mission was established during the Cold War period in an intrastate conflict that began during the Cold War but ended during the post-Cold War period. However, there are no such cases in the data set.
the parties to a dispute is militarily defeated by the other party (Fortna, 2004:278). The military defeat variable is coded “1” when one of the parties to the dispute was militarily defeated at the end of the conflict and coded “0” otherwise.

Second, the duration, consequence, and intensity of a civil conflict might influence the likelihood of the formation of a third-party peacekeeping mission. Specifically, I control for the possibility that the likelihood of a peacekeeping mission is different depending on whether or not the conflict was relatively short. For example, if a third-party actor wanted to minimize the risk of peacekeeping failure, it might not want to establish peacekeeping missions during or following relatively lengthy conflicts. The conflict duration variable is coded “1” when a civil conflict lasted less than 12 months and coded “0” otherwise. Also, there is the possibility that the extent of human suffering caused by a civil conflict affects the likelihood of a peacekeeping mission (Regan, 2000:50–1; Gilligan and Stedman, 2003:44; Mason, 2003:32). The human suffering control variable is coded “1” if there was an average of 500 or more annual fatalities and 50,000 or more total displaced persons resulting from the conflict; it is coded “0” otherwise. In addition, there is the possibility that the intensity of a civil conflict—in terms of the number of combatant and non-combatant fatalities suffered per month—influences the likelihood of a peacekeeping mission (Regan, 2000:49–50). Highly intense (or extremely violent) conflicts might encourage third-party actors to establish peacekeeping missions in order to end the extreme violence or might discourage third-party actors from establishing peacekeeping missions as a result of the extreme violence. The conflict intensity control variable is coded “1” when there was an average of 1,000 or more monthly fatalities and coded “0” otherwise.

Third, the type of intrastate dispute might influence the deployment of third-party peacekeeping personnel. Specifically, there is the possibility that the presence or absence of one or more dispute characteristics such as religion, ethnicity, and ideology influences the likelihood of peacekeeping. The religion, ethnicity, and ideology control variables are coded “1” if these characteristics are present in an intrastate dispute and coded “0” otherwise.

Finally, the region of the world in which an intrastate dispute is occurring might affect the likelihood of the establishment of a third-party peacekeeping mission (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003:43). Four dummy variables are included in the models for the following regions: Asia/Pacific; Europe/Former Soviet Union; Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf; and Sub-Saharan Africa (the Western Hemisphere region is the residual or omitted category).

Analysis

As a first step in the analysis of the influence of international-level factors on the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions in civil conflicts, the percentages corresponding to the number of conflicts during which third-party peacekeeping missions were established given the occurrence of each of the international-level factors are examined. Table 1 provides these percentages for each of the different types of international influences. For example, the first entry in column 1 indicates that third-party peacekeeping personnel were deployed in about 28% of the civil conflicts (23 out of 81) in which the government of the target state had a military alliance with a major global or regional power. Furthermore, the second entry in column 1 indicates that third-party peacekeeping personnel were deployed in about 25% of the civil conflicts (14 out of 57) in which the government

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34 Two alternative measurements of this control variable are also tested (100 annual fatalities/25,000 displaced persons and 1,000 annual fatalities/75,000 displaced persons).

35 Two alternative measurements of this control variable are also tested (average of 500 or more monthly fatalities and average of 1,500 or more monthly fatalities).
of the target state had a military alliance with a major global power, and the third entry in column 1 indicates that third-party peacekeeping personnel were deployed in about 29% of the civil conflicts (23 out of 80) in which the government of the target state had a military alliance with a major regional power. Although somewhat lower, these percentages are not significantly different from the overall rate at which one or more third-party peacekeeping missions were established in the total number of civil conflicts (76 out of 213, or approximately 36%). On the other hand, the percentages corresponding to the number of cases in which the target state was a major power or major regional power (approximately 12%) are significantly lower than the overall rate of about 36%. In addition, the percentages corresponding to the number of cases in which a major power intervened as an intermediary (68%) and in which the UN or a regional IGO was previously involved (approximately 58%) are significantly higher than the overall rate of 36%.

Although the information obtained from the figures in Table 1 is somewhat useful, a significant deficiency regarding the interpretation of the percentages is that there is no means of assessing the separate effects of each of the international influences on the formation of third-party peacekeeping missions. Because there is a significant amount of overlap among the various international influences, it is nearly impossible to assess the independent effect that any one particular international-level factor had on the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions.

In order to properly analyze the separate effects of each of the independent variables controlling for other international-level and state-level factors, statistical techniques are used. Specifically, the effects of the international influences on the likelihood of third-party peacekeeping missions are estimated using logistic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Influence</th>
<th>(1) Third-Party Peacekeeping</th>
<th>(2) United Nations Peacekeeping</th>
<th>(3) Regional IGO Peacekeeping</th>
<th>(4) State Peacekeeping</th>
<th>(5) Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military alliance</td>
<td>28.4% (23)</td>
<td>9.9% (8)</td>
<td>12.3% (10)</td>
<td>9.9% (8)</td>
<td>38.0% (81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global power</td>
<td>24.6% (14)</td>
<td>8.8% (5)</td>
<td>10.5% (6)</td>
<td>8.8% (5)</td>
<td>26.8% (57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional power</td>
<td>28.8% (23)</td>
<td>10.0% (8)</td>
<td>12.5% (10)</td>
<td>10.0% (8)</td>
<td>37.6% (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status</td>
<td>11.6% (5)</td>
<td>2.3% (1)</td>
<td>2.3% (1)</td>
<td>6.9% (3)</td>
<td>20.2% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global power</td>
<td>22.2% (4)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>5.6% (1)</td>
<td>16.7% (3)</td>
<td>8.4% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional power</td>
<td>11.6% (5)</td>
<td>2.3% (1)</td>
<td>2.3% (1)</td>
<td>6.9% (3)</td>
<td>20.2% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intervention</td>
<td>36.3% (29)</td>
<td>16.3% (13)</td>
<td>12.5% (10)</td>
<td>12.5% (10)</td>
<td>37.6% (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global power</td>
<td>35.3% (24)</td>
<td>17.6% (12)</td>
<td>13.2% (9)</td>
<td>10.3% (7)</td>
<td>31.9% (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional power</td>
<td>37.8% (28)</td>
<td>17.6% (13)</td>
<td>12.2% (9)</td>
<td>13.5% (10)</td>
<td>34.7% (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediary intervention</td>
<td>68.0% (34)</td>
<td>52.0% (16)</td>
<td>20.0% (10)</td>
<td>32.0% (16)</td>
<td>23.5% (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global power</td>
<td>68.6% (24)</td>
<td>34.3% (12)</td>
<td>20.0% (7)</td>
<td>28.6% (10)</td>
<td>16.4% (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional power</td>
<td>68.2% (30)</td>
<td>29.5% (13)</td>
<td>22.7% (10)</td>
<td>34.1% (15)</td>
<td>20.7% (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional involvement</td>
<td>57.7% (64)</td>
<td>30.6% (34)</td>
<td>21.6% (24)</td>
<td>19.8% (22)</td>
<td>52.1% (111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>66.2% (51)</td>
<td>41.6% (32)</td>
<td>22.1% (17)</td>
<td>20.8% (16)</td>
<td>36.2% (77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional IGOs</td>
<td>59.8% (52)</td>
<td>27.6% (24)</td>
<td>27.6% (24)</td>
<td>19.5% (17)</td>
<td>40.8% (87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention norm</td>
<td>25.2% (28)</td>
<td>11.7% (13)</td>
<td>9.9% (11)</td>
<td>8.1% (9)</td>
<td>52.1% (111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial integrity norm</td>
<td>31.9% (22)</td>
<td>11.6% (8)</td>
<td>8.7% (6)</td>
<td>15.9% (11)</td>
<td>32.4% (69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>35.7% (76)</td>
<td>16.9% (36)</td>
<td>13.1% (28)</td>
<td>14.1% (30)</td>
<td>(213)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries in columns 1 through 4 represent the percentages of intrastate conflicts during which third-party peacekeeping missions were established given each type of international influence. The number of intrastate conflicts during which third-party peacekeeping missions were established in each circumstance is in parentheses. Entries in column 5 indicate the percentage of intrastate conflicts during which each international influence was observed. The sum of these percentages does not equal 100 because the international influences are not mutually exclusive. The total number of cases (out of the total of 213 intrastate conflicts) during which each international influence was observed is in parentheses. IGO, inter-governmental organizations.
regression analysis since each of the variations of the dependent variable is measured dichotomously.

The logistic regression results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Models 1 through 4 (Table 2) correspond to the four variations of the dependent variable using the basic set of independent variables, while Models 5 through 8 (Table 3) correspond to the four variations of the dependent variable using the alternative set of independent variables. Each of the eight models provides at least some evidence in support of one or more of the seven hypotheses. For example, the results in Model 1 provide support for three of the seven hypotheses. As predicted, third-party peacekeeping missions are significantly less likely when the target state is a major power. In addition, third-party peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely when a major power has previously intervened as an intermediary during a civil conflict and when the UN or a regional IGO has previously been involved during a civil conflict. The coefficients for military alliance and non-intervention norm are in the hypothesized directions (negative), but they are not statistically significant. Finally, the coefficients for military intervention and territorial integrity norm are neither in the hypothesized direction nor statistically significant in Model 1.

Similarly, the results in Model 5—using the alternative set of independent variables, but the same dependent variable as in Model 1—also provide support for three of the seven hypotheses. As predicted, third-party peacekeeping missions are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 (Third-Party)</th>
<th>Model 2 (United Nations)</th>
<th>Model 3 (Regional IGO)</th>
<th>Model 4 (State)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military alliance</td>
<td>-0.200 (.603)</td>
<td>-1.875** (.137)</td>
<td>0.920 (.736)</td>
<td>0.658 (.558)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power status</td>
<td>-1.345** (.780)</td>
<td>-2.195** (.108)</td>
<td>-1.775** (.977)</td>
<td>-0.615 (.596)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intervention</td>
<td>0.643 (.633)</td>
<td>-0.372 (.688)</td>
<td>0.185 (.632)</td>
<td>0.291 (.581)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediary intervention intervention</td>
<td>1.761*** (.554)</td>
<td>0.724 (.590)</td>
<td>0.065 (.518)</td>
<td>1.226*** (.506)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional involvement</td>
<td>2.396*** (.547)</td>
<td>3.369*** (.983)</td>
<td>0.938 (.759)</td>
<td>1.082*** (.636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention norm</td>
<td>-0.327 (.675)</td>
<td>1.563* (.990)</td>
<td>0.143 (.664)</td>
<td>-1.305*** (.585)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial integrity norm</td>
<td>0.291 (.781)</td>
<td>0.150 (.928)</td>
<td>-0.419 (.939)</td>
<td>-0.462 (.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire agreement</td>
<td>2.210*** (.497)</td>
<td>2.192* (1.224)</td>
<td>1.462* (.838)</td>
<td>1.404* (.745)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military defeat</td>
<td>-0.432 (.748)</td>
<td>-1.735 (1.433)</td>
<td>-0.752 (.860)</td>
<td>0.288 (1.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human suffering</td>
<td>0.841 (.530)</td>
<td>1.488** (.689)</td>
<td>0.965* (.535)</td>
<td>-0.400 (0.456)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict intensity</td>
<td>-0.325 (.597)</td>
<td>0.654 (.496)</td>
<td>-0.283 (.549)</td>
<td>0.238 (.502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration</td>
<td>1.510*** (.585)</td>
<td>0.308 (.620)</td>
<td>2.047*** (.542)</td>
<td>-0.262 (.547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-0.063 (.691)</td>
<td>0.278 (1.208)</td>
<td>1.277* (.741)</td>
<td>-0.182 (.785)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-1.102* (.580)</td>
<td>0.856 (1.231)</td>
<td>-1.825* (.936)</td>
<td>-0.330 (.801)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.473 (.665)</td>
<td>0.950 (1.043)</td>
<td>-0.371 (.824)</td>
<td>-0.595 (.831)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>-0.221 (1.004)</td>
<td>3.488** (.664)</td>
<td>*a</td>
<td>2.594*** (.878)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1.095 (1.143)</td>
<td>-2.662 (1.709)</td>
<td>1.420 (.865)</td>
<td>1.919* (.1067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-1.110 (.920)</td>
<td>-2.726* (1.635)</td>
<td>0.297 (.847)</td>
<td>*a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-0.184 (1.107)</td>
<td>2.368 (1.521)</td>
<td>2.230*** (.867)</td>
<td>0.939 (.900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.670*** (.137)</td>
<td>5.771** (.256)</td>
<td>-5.218** (.154)</td>
<td>-4.290*** (.1083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-7.153</td>
<td>-50.615</td>
<td>-55.897</td>
<td>-65.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald (\chi^2)</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>66.16</td>
<td>65.16</td>
<td>42.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-(R^2)</td>
<td>0.4847</td>
<td>0.4770</td>
<td>0.3256</td>
<td>0.2440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Robust standard errors, which are adjusted for clustering on the intrastate dispute, are in parentheses. Significance levels: \(*p<.10\); \(**p<.05\); \(***p<.01\); one-tailed tests.

IGO, inter-governmental organizations; \(a\), dropped due to lack of variance.
Table 3. Logit Analyses of the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions in Civil Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 5 (Third-Party)</th>
<th>Model 6 (United Nations)</th>
<th>Model 7 (Regional IGO)</th>
<th>Model 8 (State)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global power</td>
<td>-0.464 (1.945)</td>
<td>-5.300*** (2.042)</td>
<td>1.939* (1.308)</td>
<td>-1.833 (2.232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional power</td>
<td>0.374 (1.871)</td>
<td>3.023* (1.854)</td>
<td>-0.776 (0.910)</td>
<td>2.329 (2.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Power</td>
<td>-1.532** (.768)</td>
<td>4.725*** (1.879)</td>
<td>-2.736*** (1.140)</td>
<td>-.310 (.653)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intervention</td>
<td>0.280 (.999)</td>
<td>0.319 (1.763)</td>
<td>2.281* (1.085)</td>
<td>-1.003 (.804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional power</td>
<td>0.750 (.949)</td>
<td>0.538 (1.905)</td>
<td>-2.048* (1.147)</td>
<td>1.193* (.905)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>2.033*** (.463)</td>
<td>5.703*** (1.451)</td>
<td>-0.853* (.633)</td>
<td>0.569 (.505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional IGOs</td>
<td>1.278*** (.514)</td>
<td>-0.933 (1.759)</td>
<td>2.500*** (.998)</td>
<td>0.240 (.659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention norm</td>
<td>-0.162 (.669)</td>
<td>2.851** (1.244)</td>
<td>0.747 (.807)</td>
<td>-1.614*** (.969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial integrity norm</td>
<td>0.452 (.790)</td>
<td>-0.260 (.980)</td>
<td>-0.157 (.871)</td>
<td>-0.599 (.686)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire agreement</td>
<td>2.118*** (.527)</td>
<td>2.782*** (1.011)</td>
<td>1.772** (.786)</td>
<td>1.848** (.821)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military defeat</td>
<td>-0.518 (.808)</td>
<td>-2.965** (1.433)</td>
<td>-0.851 (.961)</td>
<td>0.594 (1.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human suffering</td>
<td>0.635 (.507)</td>
<td>0.727 (.821)</td>
<td>1.672** (.588)</td>
<td>-0.216 (.444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict intensity</td>
<td>-0.397 (.639)</td>
<td>0.584 (.653)</td>
<td>-0.179 (.615)</td>
<td>0.194 (.491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration</td>
<td>1.348** (.601)</td>
<td>0.368 (.644)</td>
<td>2.800*** (.654)</td>
<td>-0.296 (.536)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>0.339 (.681)</td>
<td>0.766 (1.406)</td>
<td>0.774 (.848)</td>
<td>-0.034 (.819)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-0.897 (.716)</td>
<td>2.953** (1.468)</td>
<td>-2.854*** (.904)</td>
<td>-0.301 (.739)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.431 (.721)</td>
<td>0.382 (1.759)</td>
<td>-0.622 (1.081)</td>
<td>-0.203 (.777)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>-0.549 (.948)</td>
<td>6.893*** (2.101)</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>3.750 (.261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0.953 (.059)</td>
<td>6.570*** (2.016)</td>
<td>2.666** (1.320)</td>
<td>3.274 (2.436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-2.129 (2.071)</td>
<td>10.218*** (3.077)</td>
<td>2.225 (1.446)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-0.348 (1.102)</td>
<td>-4.481** (2.052)</td>
<td>2.944* (1.199)</td>
<td>2.007 (2.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.500*** (1.286)</td>
<td>-5.762** (2.528)</td>
<td>-7.324** (2.421)</td>
<td>5.653*** (2.511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-69.566</td>
<td>-39.363</td>
<td>-47.264</td>
<td>-64.629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $\chi^2$</td>
<td>95.80</td>
<td>67.09</td>
<td>55.67</td>
<td>39.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-$R^2$</td>
<td>0.4987</td>
<td>0.5932</td>
<td>0.4298</td>
<td>0.2536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Robust standard errors, which are adjusted for clustering on the intrastate dispute, are in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; one-tailed tests.
IGO, inter-governmental organizations; a, dropped due to lack of variance.

significantly less likely when the target state is a major regional power. Furthermore, third-party peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely when a major regional power has previously intervened as an intermediary during a civil conflict and when the UN or a regional IGO has previously been involved during a civil conflict. The coefficients for military alliance/global power, intermediary intervention/global power, and non-intervention norm are in the hypothesized directions, but they are not statistically significant. The coefficients for military alliance/regional power, military intervention/global power, military intervention/regional power, and territorial integrity norm are neither in the hypothesized directions nor statistically significant. A more thorough discussion of the statistical results and findings from each of the models is provided in the next section.

Since logistic coefficients are difficult to interpret, predicted probabilities for each of the independent variables are provided in Tables 4 and 5. Specifically, the tables
provide estimates of the probabilities of the various types of third-party peacekeeping missions given the influence of each of the international-level factors. The baseline probability represents the probability of a third-party (UN, regional IGO, or state) peacekeeping mission being formed when all of the international-level factors (independent variables) and state-level factors (control variables) are set at “0,” except for ceasefire agreement, human suffering, conflict duration, ethnicity, and Sub-Saharan Africa, which are set at “1.” For example, column 1 of Table 4 indicates that the probability of the establishment of a third-party peacekeeping mission is substantially greater than the baseline probability of 42% when a major power has intervened as an intermediary in a target state (74%) and when an international organization has previously been involved as a conflict manager in the target state (86%). In addition, the probability of a third-party peacekeeping mission is substantially lower than the baseline probability of 42% when the target state is a major power (21%).

Although hypotheses were not stipulated with respect to the control variables, it is interesting to note that the only state-level factors that had at least somewhat consistent effects across the models on the likelihood of third-party peacekeeping missions were ceasefire agreement and conflict duration. The coefficients for ceasefire agreement were positive and statistically significant in each of the eight models, while the coefficients for conflict duration were positive and statistically significant in four of the eight models. Not surprisingly, third-party peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely to be established when the parties to the conflict have formally agreed to a cessation of military hostilities, but peacekeeping missions are also generally more likely to be established when the duration of a conflict is less than 12 months.

Table 4. Predicted Probabilities of the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(1) Third-Party Peacekeeping</th>
<th>(2) United Nations Peacekeeping</th>
<th>(3) Regional IGO Peacekeeping</th>
<th>(4) State Peacekeeping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline probability</td>
<td>.42 (.21)</td>
<td>.06 (.07)</td>
<td>.43 (.21)</td>
<td>.07 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military alliance</td>
<td>.38 (.22)</td>
<td>.02 (.04)</td>
<td>.62 (.19)</td>
<td>.13 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power status</td>
<td>.21 (.20)</td>
<td>.02 (.04)</td>
<td>.18 (.19)</td>
<td>.05 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intervention</td>
<td>.55 (.26)</td>
<td>.06 (.10)</td>
<td>.48 (.26)</td>
<td>.10 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediary intervention</td>
<td>.74 (.20)</td>
<td>.12 (.13)</td>
<td>.44 (.20)</td>
<td>.19 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional involvement</td>
<td>.86 (.10)</td>
<td>.51 (.15)</td>
<td>.64 (.13)</td>
<td>.16 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention norm</td>
<td>.35 (.18)</td>
<td>.18 (.12)</td>
<td>.46 (.21)</td>
<td>.02 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial integrity norm</td>
<td>.47 (.21)</td>
<td>.07 (.08)</td>
<td>.35 (.21)</td>
<td>.05 (.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are probabilities of the establishment of a peacekeeping mission when each of the independent variables is separately set at 1, with all other independent variables set at 0. Standard errors are in parentheses. The baseline probability is the probability of the establishment of a peacekeeping mission using all 213 intrastate conflict cases when all of the independent variables are set at 0 (the baseline probability assumes that the conflict ended with a ceasefire agreement; the conflict involved a high level of human suffering; the conflict had an ethnic dimension; the duration of the conflict was less than 12 months; and the conflict took place in Sub-Saharan Africa). Probabilities are estimated using Clarify 2.1 with Stata 8.0.

IGO, inter-governmental organizations.

provide estimates of the probabilities of the various types of third-party peacekeeping missions given the influence of each of the international-level factors. The baseline probability represents the probability of a third-party (UN, regional IGO, or state) peacekeeping mission being formed when all of the international-level factors (independent variables) and state-level factors (control variables) are set at “0,” except for ceasefire agreement, human suffering, conflict duration, ethnicity, and Sub-Saharan Africa, which are set at “1.” For example, column 1 of Table 4 indicates that the probability of the establishment of a third-party peacekeeping mission is substantially greater than the baseline probability of 42% when a major power has intervened as an intermediary in a target state (74%) and when an international organization has previously been involved as a conflict manager in the target state (86%). In addition, the probability of a third-party peacekeeping mission is substantially lower than the baseline probability of 42% when the target state is a major power (21%).

Although hypotheses were not stipulated with respect to the control variables, it is interesting to note that the only state-level factors that had at least somewhat consistent effects across the models on the likelihood of third-party peacekeeping missions were ceasefire agreement and conflict duration. The coefficients for ceasefire agreement were positive and statistically significant in each of the eight models, while the coefficients for conflict duration were positive and statistically significant in four of the eight models. Not surprisingly, third-party peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely to be established when the parties to the conflict have formally agreed to a cessation of military hostilities, but peacekeeping missions are also generally more likely to be established when the duration of a conflict is less than 12 months.

36 Gilligan and Stedman (2003:50), who found no evidence that the UN was more likely to establish a peacekeeping mission when the parties to a civil war had negotiated a peace treaty, indicated that conventional wisdom suggested that “the UN requires a peace treaty before it will send in a peacekeeping mission.” Actually, the conventional wisdom is that the UN requires a ceasefire agreement—not a peace treaty—before it will send in a peacekeeping mission. The results of this study strongly suggest that the UN is in fact more likely to establish a peacekeeping mission when the parties have formally agreed to a cessation of military hostilities.
Findings

The statistical results presented in Tables 2 through 5 suggest seven preliminary findings regarding the influence of international-level factors on the likelihood of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes. A summary of the findings is provided below.

Finding 1: There is some evidence that under certain circumstances, the formation of a third-party peacekeeping mission is less likely when the government of a target state has a military alliance with a major power (Models 2 and 6). Specifically, Model 6 indicates that UN peacekeeping missions are significantly less likely if the government of a target state has a military alliance with a major global power. This result is consistent with the military alliance hypothesis. On the other hand, Model 6 also indicates that UN peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely if the government of a target state has a military alliance with a major regional power. In addition, Model 7 indicates that regional IGO peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely if the government of a target state has a military alliance with a major global power. Each of these results is also substantively significant, as indicated in Tables 4 and 5. According to column 2 of Table 5, the probability of a UN peacekeeping mission is significantly lower than the baseline probability of 7% if the government of a target state has a military alliance with a major global power (1%). Furthermore, the probability of a UN peacekeeping mission is more than six times higher than the baseline probability of 7% if the government of a target state has a military alliance with a major regional power (44%).

Why are UN peacekeeping missions less likely, but regional IGO peacekeeping missions more likely, when the government of a target state has a military alliance with a major power?
with a major global power? One possible explanation is that while global powers are quite reluctant to allow UN peacekeeping in their own spheres of influence (mainly due to the fact that no one major global power exercises complete authority over the UN), they are sometimes willing and able to use particular regional IGOs to further their own national interests.

**Finding 2:** There is considerable evidence that the establishment of a third-party peacekeeping mission is significantly less likely if the target state is a major power, as predicted by the *major power status hypothesis*.\(^{37}\) Specifically, there is evidence that third-party, UN, and regional IGO peacekeeping missions are significantly less likely when the target state is a major power (the coefficients for the major power status variables are statistically significant in Models 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7). The coefficients for major power status variables in Models 4 and 8 (state peacekeeping) have the predicted sign, but are not statistically significant. Overall, the relationship between major power status and third-party peacekeeping is also substantively significant. As shown in column 1 of Table 4, the probability that third-party peacekeeping personnel will be deployed is significantly lower than the baseline probability of 42% if the target state is a major power (21%).

**Finding 3:** There is only minimal evidence that the establishment of a third-party peacekeeping mission is significantly less likely if a major power has previously intervened militarily during a civil conflict. In fact, the coefficients for the military intervention variables are in the predicted direction (negative) in only three of the eight models (Models 2, 7, and 8), and the coefficients are statistically significant in only one of these models. There is evidence that regional IGO peacekeeping missions are significantly less likely when a major regional power has previously intervened militarily in a target state (Model 7), as predicted by the *military intervention hypothesis*. However, there is also evidence that regional IGO peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely when a major global power has previously intervened militarily in a target state (Model 7), and state peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely when a major regional power has previously intervened militarily (Model 8).

Once again, these results point to the interesting possibility that the formation of regional IGO peacekeeping missions is influenced in different ways by major global powers and major regional powers. Similar to the results regarding the military alliance variable (finding 1), regional IGOs appear to be subject to contradictory influences from major global powers and major regional powers intervening militarily in civil conflicts. When major global powers have direct national interests in civil conflicts, they tend to influence regional IGOs to deploy peacekeeping personnel in the target states. On the other hand, when major regional powers have direct national interests in civil conflicts, they tend to influence regional IGOs to refrain from deploying peacekeeping personnel in the target states. This result is probably best explained by the possibility that while major global powers are frequently able to influence regional IGOs to deploy peacekeeping personnel when it is in their national interest for such missions to be established, regional IGOs are frequently unable to do so. On the other hand, major regional powers are often able to prevent regional IGOs from deploying peacekeeping personnel when it is not in their national interest for such missions to be established.

**Finding 4:** There is some evidence that the formation of a third-party peacekeeping mission is more likely if a major power has previously intervened as an

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\(^{37}\) As indicated in column 5 of Table 1, there are a total of 43 cases of targets states that are categorized as “major powers.” Many of these cases involve colonies controlled by major global powers (e.g., French Indochina–Vietnam). In each of the 43 cases, the major power was categorized as a “major regional power.” In 18 of those same 43 cases, the major power was also categorized as a “major global power” (e.g., France was categorized as a major global power, as well as a major regional power in Southeast Asia, in the 1950s). Since there is no variation among the 18 cases categorized as “major global powers” (i.e., they are all also coded as “major regional power”), logit coefficients cannot be estimated for the “major global power” variables in Models 5 through 8 in Table 3.
intermediary during a civil conflict (Models 1, 4, 5, 7, and 8). Specifically, there is evidence that the establishment of regional IGO peacekeeping missions and state peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely if a major regional power has intervened as an intermediary during a civil conflict (Models 7 and 8). These results are also substantively significant. As shown in column 3 of Table 5, the probability of a regional IGO peacekeeping mission is significantly higher than the baseline probability of 32% if a regional power has previously intervened as an intermediary (57%). Interestingly, the coefficients for the intermediary intervention variable in Model 6 suggest that UN peacekeeping missions are generally less likely (negative coefficient) when a regional power has intervened and are generally more likely (positive coefficient) when a global power has intervened. These results, although not statistically significant, may reflect the conventional wisdom that the UN is influenced to a large extent by the national interests of the major global powers with permanent representation on the UN Security Council (Oudraat, 1996: 518–19). Overall, these results generally support the intermediary intervention hypothesis. Third-party actors are generally more likely to establish peacekeeping missions in civil conflicts in which one or more major powers have previously signaled their preference for peaceful management and resolution.

**Finding 5**: There is considerable evidence that the establishment of a third-party peacekeeping mission is more likely if the UN or a regional IGO has previously been involved during a civil conflict (Models 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7). As predicted by the institutional involvement hypothesis, a UN peacekeeping mission is significantly more likely to be established when one or more agencies of the UN have previously been involved during a civil conflict (Model 6), and a regional IGO peacekeeping mission is significantly more likely when one or more regional IGOs have previously been involved during a civil conflict (Model 7). Interestingly, the results also suggest that the UN and regional IGOs may defer to each other in civil conflicts when the other has previously been involved in conflict management or resolution efforts. In fact, UN peacekeeping missions are generally less likely when a regional IGO has been involved during a civil conflict, and regional IGOs are generally less likely when the UN has been involved during a civil conflict. As shown in column 2 of Table 5, the probability of a UN peacekeeping mission is significantly higher than the baseline probability of 7% when a UN agency has previously been involved during a conflict (86%). Likewise, the probability of a regional IGO peacekeeping mission is significantly higher than the baseline probability of 32% when a regional IGO has previously been involved during a conflict (79%), as shown in column 3 of Table 5.

**Finding 6**: There is some evidence that the establishment of a third-party peacekeeping mission was less likely in target states during the Cold War when there was a prevailing norm of non-intervention in the international system (Model 4 and 8). However, this finding only applies to peacekeeping missions established by states. There is no evidence that UN or regional IGO peacekeeping missions were less likely during the Cold War period. In fact, the results indicate that UN peacekeeping missions were significantly more likely during the Cold War period when there was a norm of non-intervention (Models 2 and 6). According to column 2 of Table 5, the probability of a UN peacekeeping mission is more than five times the baseline probability of 7% when there was a prevailing norm of non-intervention during the Cold War (38%). Why were state peacekeeping missions significantly less likely to be established during the Cold War period when there was a norm of non-intervention, while UN peacekeeping missions were more likely to be established? One possible explanation is that states were more constrained than the UN—despite the “non-intervention” provision in the UN Charter—to deploy peacekeeping personnel during the Cold War period. Indeed, the UN was actually permitted to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states during the Cold War if there was a perceived “threat to international peace and security.” A second, and perhaps better, explanation is
that the behaviors of states regarding the practice of peacekeeping have changed relatively more than the behaviors of IGOs as a result of the end of the Cold War. The evidence, as shown in Figure 2, indicates that the number of state peacekeeping missions increased significantly following the end of the Cold War, when the number of civil conflicts also increased significantly. However, the number of state peacekeeping missions remained at a relatively high level after the late 1990s, even though the number of UN and regional IGO peacekeeping missions decreased somewhat. Perhaps, as the norm of non-intervention eroded in favor of a norm of humanitarian intervention beginning in the 1990s, states have been better able to adapt to the changing normative environment, whereas the UN and regional IGOs (retaining the “non-intervention” provisions in their charters) have been less able to adapt to the changing norms.

**Finding 7:** There is little or no evidence that the formation of a third-party peacekeeping mission is less likely if a civil conflict involves a secessionist movement. There is no statistically significant evidence that third-party actors are less likely to establish peacekeeping missions in conflicts involving secessionist movements. However, the coefficients for the territorial integrity norm variables are in the predicted direction (negative) in five out of eight models. Overall, the results indicate that third-party actors may be reluctant as a result of a norm of territorial integrity to establish peacekeeping missions during or following secessionist conflicts, but the evidence is not compelling. In fact, these results are essentially consistent with Gilligan and Stedman’s (2003:49) finding that there is “no evidence that the UN intervenes in secessionist conflicts at a different rate than it intervenes in attempts to take over control of the government.” Assuming that these results are accurate, why are third-party actors not more constrained to intervene as peacekeepers in secessionist conflicts? It is possible, and indeed likely, that a norm of territorial integrity actually does exist in the international system, but the norm is applicable to states and IGOs that might be tempted to intervene on the side of the secessionist group, as opposed to intervening as neutral peacekeepers. This explanation might account for Heraclides’ (1990:353) finding that “the regime against intervention and, in particular, against intervention with secessionists, applied to some extent . . . primarily with regard to high-level involvement.”

**Conclusion**

This study represents one of the first systematic analyses of the conditions under which third-party actors were more or less likely to decide to initiate peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes during the post-World War II period. Overall, the results from this study suggest that a set of international-level factors influence third-party actors to establish—or constrain third-party actors from establishing—peacekeeping missions during or following civil conflicts. In fact, one of the best predictors of peacekeeping in the future is the past and current actions and behaviors of major global and regional powers, as well as the global and regional IGOs that may be influenced by these major powers. Except for the positive effect that ceasefire agreements have on the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes, the influence of various state-level factors on the deployment of peacekeeping personnel (when accounting for international-level factors) is not particularly strong. This finding may cause some scholars and practitioners to reconsider some of the conventional wisdom regarding the likelihood of peacekeeping missions in civil conflicts.

Given the set of preliminary findings discussed in the previous section, future research should examine in more detail the various international-level and state-level factors that might influence the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions. For example, are there any significant differences with respect to the effects of these factors in the different regions of the world or between the Cold War
period and the post-Cold War period? If so, what accounts for these differences? One of the key findings of this study was that third-party peacekeeping missions are more likely to be established when a major power or an IGO has previously intervened militarily or diplomatically during military hostilities in a target state. Future research should focus on the factors that influence states and IGOS to choose to intervene militarily or diplomatically in some civil conflicts and not others, as well as the factors that motivate third-party actors to choose one method of intervention over another method of intervention.

Finally, future research should not only examine the relative effectiveness of peacekeeping missions that the UN, regional IGOS, and states decide to establish in response to civil conflicts, but it should also account for the factors that influence the decision to establish peacekeeping missions in the first place. In particular, future research on the effectiveness of peacekeeping should account for both international-level and state-level factors. As indicated earlier, previous research on the effectiveness of peacekeeping has focused almost entirely on state-level factors or attributes of the peacekeeping mission, such as the perceived neutrality of the peacekeepers, the scope of the peacekeeping mission, and the level of support of local parties in the target state. The importance of these factors may or may not hold up when international-level factors are considered. Overall, this study has shown that at the very least, there are factors that systematically influence whether or not a peacekeeping mission will be established in a civil conflict, and that these factors often have different effects on the decisions of the UN, regional IGOS, and states.

References


