BSS 186/486
NATO & European Security

Professor Schuyler Foerster
Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Social Studies
Department of Political Science
Masaryk University

Thursday 09:45 - 11:15 am + 11:30 am – 1:00 pm
2 March – 13 April
Course Objectives

✓ Historical challenge of finding peace & security in Europe
✓ NATO’s creation; US unique peacetime security guarantee
✓ NATO in the Cold War ... strategic debates, bipolar world
✓ NATO after the Cold War: enlargement in Europe, new missions in the Balkans & Afghanistan
✓ NATO’s future: prospects for sustained adaptability in a changing world
Course Requirements

✓ Written essays (75%)
  ✓ 5 x 15 points ~ 500 words … listed in the syllabus

✓ Crisis simulation *team* strategy paper (10%)
  ✓ 1-page *joint* point (bullet) paper – 10 points for each member

✓ Seminar preparation, engagement, participation (15%)
  ✓ Prepare
  ✓ Engage
  ✓ Participate

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Main Textbooks

- Stan SLOAN. *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama* (Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc, 2010)
- Other readings distributed electronically through IS
Structure of Each Session

✓ Each week – 2 x 90-minute sessions
  ✓ 0945-1115 – PC-25 – classroom lecture
  ✓ 1130-1300 – U-34 – seminar discussion [see syllabus for ?]
✓ Essays due in class each week (except 1st and last classes)
✓ Final week (13 April) – Crisis Simulation
  ✓ Class will divide into teams, with individual roles
  ✓ Context will be hypothetical future crisis
  ✓ Simulate NATO decision-making
Course Overview

✓ 2.3: The Genesis of NATO
◊ 9.3: NATO in the Cold War
◊ 16.3: NATO After the Cold War: Dilemmas of Enlargement
◊ 23.3: NATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Balkans
◊ 30.3: NATO & Post-9.11 Conflicts: Afghan, Iraq, Libya, Syria
◊ 6.4: NATO, Russia, & Ukraine

✓ 13.4: NATO’s Future: How Will it Respond? [crisis simulation]

◊ Note: 5 essays at beginning of class [see syllabus]
The Genesis of NATO

Session I

2 March 2017
Backdrop to NATO

- Post World War II attempts at reconciliation w/USSR
- 1947-48 turning points
  - Truman Doctrine
  - Marshall Plan
  - Fall of Prague
  - Berlin Airlift
- Kennan – “containment” doctrine (1947)
- Vandenberg (R-MI) Resolution in US Senate (1948)
  - Principle of “self-help and mutual aid”
Formation of NATO

- Truman & UK Prime Minister Ernst Bevin
- Dunkirk & Brussels Pact ~ “self-help & mutual aid”
- No anticipation of enduring US military commitment
  - Political statement was sufficient
- Precedent – “constitutional processes” … Art IV vs Art V
- 1949 – another turning point (USSR; PRC)
- 1950 – NSC 68 & Korean War
  - Acheson to NATO Ministerial: armed FRG in NATO (1955)
  - Pleven Plan … Euro Defense Community … then FRG
Look-ahead to 9 March

✓ **NATO in the Cold War**
✓ Essay #1 DUE IN CLASS:
  ✓ To what extent is NATO a unique security alliance, and was it the “right answer” for post-World War II security in Europe?
✓ Select NATO Country Team
  ✓ US, UK, FR, GE, CZ, PL, HU, EE, LT, TU
✓ Reading Assignment:
  ✓ Collins, Chapters 4 & 5 [in FSS library]
  ✓ Sloan, Chapters 3 & 4 [in FSS library]
Seminar Discussion

Was NATO the “right answer” for post-World War II security in Europe?
NATO in the Cold War
Session II
9 March 2017
EDC “non” – FRG “ja”

✓ 1950 – Acheson: rearm FRG as NATO member
✓ Pleven Plan … European Defense Community
  ✓ Ultimately rejected by France in 1954 … concerns:
    ✓ Resurgent Germany might pose a threat
    ✓ Successful EDC might encourage US to leave Europe
    ✓ US might actually provoke a way & drag Europeans in
    ✓ US focused on nuclear deterrent … Others viewed as unreliable
    ✓ Russian proposals for “European Defense Conference” (no US)
✓ 1955 – rearmed, sovereign FRG joins NATO
Debating European Defense

- 1952 Lisbon Force Goals
  - 90 divisions for defense of Europe
  - Never *did* happen ... never *could* happen
  - US: 100,000 in 1950 ... peak of 400,000 by 1954

- Burden sharing debate
  - Europeans could never make up the difference
  - US highest per capita expense

*Conventional defense of Europe – Desirable? Affordable?*
Types of Deterrence

✓ **HOW** do we deter?
  ✓ Deterrence by denial
    ✓ “I *can* defend ... *and* you will not win”
  ✓ Deterrence by punishment
    ✓ “I *cannot* defend ... *but* you will pay an unacceptable price”

✓ **ON BEHALF OF WHOM** do we deter?
  ✓ Basic (or “passive”) deterrence – deter attack on oneself
  ✓ Extended deterrence – deter attack on someone else
  ✓ **Deterrence vs. Reassurance** (Sir Michael Howard, 1982)
Deterrence vs Defense in NATO

- 1952: Lisbon Force Goals – defend NATO with troops
  - Conventional defense unaffordable to US AND Allies
  - Advent of both “fusion” and “tactical” nuclear weapons
- 1955 “Carte Blanche” NATO exercise in FRG (simulated)
  - 2 days – 300 “tactical” bombs – estimated 4.5 million casualties
- 1958: Berlin Crisis

- Is “defense” possible? Is “deterrence” credible?
“Flexible Response”

- Kennedy/Johnson Administration (1961-1969)
  - Advent of the Missile Age (“Sputnik” 1957)
  - “New Look” too risky for the US
    - US & USSR only at risk if escalate to strategic nuclear weapons
    - US needs “options” – in Europe and in rest-of-world (Vietnam)
- Europeans unwilling to risk “defense”
  - But need to keep US presence in Europe “sustainable”
  - French – de Gaulle out of integrated military structure ['66]
1967 “compromise”

- MC 14/3 NATO Strategy of Flexible Response
  - Accepted by Defense Planning Committee (no French veto)
  - “as late as possible but as early as necessary”
- Harmel Report
  - “Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.”
- Recognition of irreconcilable contradictions
  - No “light switches” … must be “both/and” & controlled
  - Hope that political solution removes security contradictions
But it didn’t quite work out

- *Détente* enabled German *Ostpolitik* but still divided Europe
- Arms Control provided inherently limited foundation
  - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I & SALT II)
  - CSCE/Helsinki Final Act important to Germany, not US
  - Mutual & Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) not serious
- By 1979, *détente* was “dead”
  - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
  - SALT II signed by not ratified in US – viewed as destabilizing
  - Soviet deployment of SS-20’s led to missile crisis
The Euromissile Debate

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) changed the strategic landscape

- USSR could hold all of Europe “at risk” without using strategic systems limited under START
- US could not hold USSR at risk unless US strategic systems
- Plausible scenario: Soviet conventional attack + ability to deter NATO’s use of nuclear weapons = incentive to attack
- NATO’s 1979 “Double Zero” decision … 0 INF or deploy
- 1983 deployment of Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) & Pershing II capable of striking USSR
The Cold War thaws ...

- 1983 INF missile deployments while Geneva arms control talks go nowhere – no one in Moscow to say "Da"
- After 1986 ... Gorbachev “perestroika” / “glasnost”
  - Begin withdrawal from Afghanistan
  - Accepts on-site-inspection in Stockholm (CDE Agreement)
  - Reykjavik Summit “failure” leads to INF Treaty in 1987
  - Signal willingness to consider real reductions in conventional forces in Europe ... leads to CFE in 1990
NATO: “now what”

- 1990-1992 – NATO’s world had fundamentally changed:
  - Reunified Germany in NATO (4+2 Agreement)
  - Warsaw Pact dissolved ... Soviet forces out of Europe
  - Soviet Union dissolved (December 1991)
  - US draws down NATO troop levels after Desert Storm
  - US pulls out almost all nuclear weapons from Europe

- NATO’s chronic, insoluble strategic dilemma ended

- No more dominant conventional threat on its borders
- No more need for reassurance of Allies on US deterrent
Look-ahead to 16 March

✓ **NATO After the Cold War: The Dilemmas of Enlargement**

✓ **Essay #2 DUE IN CLASS:**
  ✓ *Explain why NATO strategy throughout the Cold War remained ambiguous about the role of nuclear weapons.*

✓ **Reading Assignment:**
  ✓ Sloan, Chapters 5, 6, & 10 [*in FSS library*]
  ✓ Yost, Chapter 8 [*in FSS library*]
  ✓ Aybet & Moore, Chapter 7 (Kanet) [*in FSS library*]
  ✓ NATO’s Strategic Concepts – 1991 & 1999 [NATO website]
Seminar Discussion

What issues plagued NATO strategy during the Cold War, and how were they resolved?
NATO After the Cold War: Dilemmas of Enlargement

Session III

16 March 2017
Looking back …

✓ The problem with “lines” …

To include a broader membership in this new alliance “... would amount to a final militarization of the present line through Europe ... [and] create a situation in which no alteration or obliteration of that line could take place without having an accentuated military significance.”

George Kennan memorandum to US Secretary of State George Marshall & Deputy Secretary of State Bob Lovett, 1948

✓ So what to do when the “line” finally disappears?
1991 Strategic Concept

✓ Historic changes ~ fulfillment of Harmel Report
✓ “Monolithic, massive & potentially immediate threat ... has disappeared.”
✓ “Great deal of uncertainty and risks to security remain.”
✓ Adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes ... may lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts.”
✓ Seek broader patterns of bilateral & multilateral cooperation
1999 Strategic Concept

✓ “Broad approach to security” ~ pol / econ / soc / environ
✓ New “EuroAtlantic security structure in which NATO plays a central part” (OSCE, EU, WEU, UN)
✓ “Essential new activities in interest of wider stability”
  ✓ Depth of commitment ~ end suffering & conflict in Balkans
  ✓ Conflict prevention … crisis management … crisis response
✓ Emphasis on cooperation with EU
✓ European Security and Defense Identity
Tasks of the Alliance

1991

✓ Provide indispensable stable security foundation through democratic institutions and peaceful resolution of disputes
✓ Serve as forum for Allied consultations (Article 4)
✓ Deter & defend (Articles 5 & 6)
✓ “Preserve the strategic balance in Europe”

1999

✓ Provide indispensable stable security foundation through democratic institutions and peaceful resolution of disputes
✓ Serve as forum for Allied consultations (Article 4)
✓ Deter & defend (Articles 5 & 6)
✓ Contribute to effective conflict prevention, crisis response ops
✓ Partnership beyond membership
Partnership for Peace (1994)

- All former Soviet, Warsaw Pact, neutrals in Europe
  - Other “global partners” since 2011
- “build individual relationship” with NATO
- EuroAtlantic Partnership Council [today]
  - 28 Members
  - 22 Partners
  - 7 from Mediterranean Dialogue
  - 4 from Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
  - 8 “global partners”
### Who’s Who … & When?

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The Enlargement Debate

- April 1993: Clinton w/Vaclav Havel & Lech Walesa
- Clinton foreign policy theme: promote democracy
  - Tony Lake (NSC): “The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement …of the world’s free community of market democracies.” [1993]
- Bureaucratic pushback:
  - Defense: Partnership for Peace more practical
  - State: Enlargement would antagonize Russia
The Enlargement Decision

✓ Decisive arguments:
  ✓ Democracy in Central Europe fragile; need assurance
  ✓ Russia had cooperated on 4+2 … why not this?

✓ Need to coordinate “enlargement track” and new initiatives regarding Russia & Ukraine
  ✓ Gradual … not “fast track” time line: 1994-1997
  ✓ Practicalities: 1,200 NATO Standardization Agreements

✓ May 1997 – signing of NATO-Russia Founding Act
✓ July 1997 – invitation to PO, HU, CZ
Article 4, Washington Treaty (1949)

“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”


“NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.”
NATO-Russia Founding Act
[May 1997]

✓ “NATO and Russia will promptly consult within the Permanent Joint Council in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

✓ “... to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, ... joint decisions and joint action ....

✓ “... do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other, nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action.”

✓ Recite international obligations ... aspirational cooperation
Unilateral NATO Assurances

✓ “... in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will [ensure] the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.

✓ Russia will exercise similar restraint in its force deployments ...

✓ “... no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, ... and do not foresee any future need to do so.

✓ “... no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members
“Distinctive partnership” between NATO and Ukraine

“Allies ... support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle of inviolability of frontiers ....”

~ December 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances

“NATO and Ukraine will develop a crisis consultative mechanism to consult together whenever Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.”

Anticipated closer, substantive cooperation
Reaffirming the “Open Door”? 

- 2008 Bucharest Summit: “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO …
  - Membership Action Plan …
  - 2016 Warsaw Summit … “recognized progress”
- FYROM … as soon as agreement on “name”
- Montenegro … Bosnia-Herbegovina … Serbia
  - Different levels of cooperation and planning (in that order)
Look-ahead to 23 March

✓ **NATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Balkans**
✓ Essay #3 DUE IN CLASS:
  ✓ Has NATO enlargement increased European security?
  ✓ Why or Why not? Address counter-arguments
✓ Reading Assignment:
  ✓ Sloan, Chapter 8 [in FSS library]
  ✓ Webber, “The Kosovo War” [posted in IS]
  ✓ Aybet & Moore, Chapter 8 [in FSS library]
Seminar Discussion

Are there limits to NATO enlargement? What & why?
Yugoslav Civil War

- 1980: death of Tito ... power-sharing arrangements
- 1989: Milosevic at 600th anniversary of Battle of Kosovo
- 1991: Slovenia & Croatia declare independence
- 1992: Bosnia declares independence ... Sarajevo shelling
- 1993: UN 6 x “Safe Areas” ... [Srebrenica massacre 1995]
- 1994: NATO first air combat sorties
- 1995: Dayton Peace Accords re Bosnia
- 1995: NATO IFOR (32 states; 52,000 troops); SFOR til 2004
Spillover to Kosovo

- Albanian/Muslim enclave in Serbia (Serb enclave within)
  - Autonomous region status revoked 1989 by Milosevic
  - Kosovo Liberation Army formed 1991 … attacks 1995
    - Spiral of violence & atrocities
- Sep 1998 – UNSC Resolution ~ 250,000 refugees
  - Next day … NATO “activation warning”
  - 30 January 1999 … NAC gave “preauthorization” of bombing
  - 23 March-3 June – bombing campaign
Lessons Learned?

- There is a difference between “legal” and “legitimate”
  - *The sometimes inadequacy of law and diplomacy*
- Force in the pursuit of peace is justified
  - *But it still may not succeed*
- Military force can change the “situation on the ground”
  - *But it may not always “compel” a political solution*
- If force is used, then be clear about the objectives
  - *… which must be political, not military*
- Diplomacy is necessary before using military force …
  - *… and just as necessary afterwards to avoid renewed conflict*
Look-ahead to 30 March

✓ **NATO & Post-9.11 Conflicts: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria**

✓ Essay #4 DUE IN CLASS:
  ✓ *How can NATO ensure peace in the Balkans?*

✓ Reading Assignment:
  ✓ Sloan, Chapters 9 & 11 [*in FSS library*]
  ✓ Yost, Chapters 4 & 5 [*in FSS library*]
Seminar Discussion

How should we assess NATO’s actions in the Balkans?
NATO & Post 9.11 Conflicts: Afghan, Iraq, Libya, Syria
Session V
30 March 2017
Look-ahead to 6 April

- **NATO, Russia, & Ukraine**
- Essay #5 DUE IN CLASS:
  - **CHANGE:** 1 page … What should be NATO’s future priorities?
- Reading Assignment:
  - Sloan, Chapter 7 *in FSS library*
  - Aybet & Moore, Chapter 5 (Smith) *in FSS library*
  - Foerster, “NATO’s Return” *posted in IS*
  - Cecire, “Russia’s Art of War” *posted in IS*
  - NATO-Russia-Ukraine documents *NATO website*
Post 9.11 Conflicts
Global NATO?

✓ Afghanistan ~ response to invocation of Article 5
✓ Iraq ~ thanks but no thanks, US
✓ Libya ~ France & Italy force NATO’s hand
✓ Syria ~ paralysis

✓ Is there a pattern?
✓ Is NATO “stretching its legs” or “finding its limits”? 
Initially U.S. reluctant to engage NATO in Afghanistan

“The coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission.” (SecDef Rumsfeld, September 2001)

By December 2001 … Bonn Agreement

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

UK command … then Turkey … then Germany/Netherlands

August 2003 – NATO officially takes command of ISAF

6,500 to 10,000 troops in 2003 … over 60,000 by 2009

Operation Enduring Freedom … additional 38,500 U.S. troops
Afghanistan -- An Assessment

✓ The Good News:
  ✓ NATO comprehensive support *in spite of* Iraq War
  ✓ Alliance consensus over a decade in global mission despite challenges in Afghanistan and domestic support at home
  ✓ Some effective reconstruction efforts
Afghanistan -- An Assessment

✓ **The Good News:**
  ✓ NATO comprehensive support *in spite of* Iraq War
  ✓ Alliance consensus over a decade in global mission despite challenges in Afghanistan and domestic support at home
  ✓ Some effective reconstruction efforts

✓ **The Bad News:**
  ✓ As a counterinsurgency effort, it has not been a success
  ✓ No consensus on priorities:
    ✓ Counterterrorism vs Counterinsurgency vs Reconstruction
Iraq 2003

- 2002 UN Security Council debate
  - U.S. & UK vs. France & Germany
  - No “trigger”
  - No credible connection between Saddam & 9.11
  - “coalition of the willing: U.S., UK, Poland, Spain [why?]”

- March 2003-June 2004 … war & U.S. occupation
  - NATO officially on the sidelines
  - Others (e.g. Germany) joined post-war training effort, once Iraqi sovereignty restored … but impact?
Libya 2011

- February 2011 – Libyan “Arab Spring” uprisings
- UNSC – sanctions, froze bank assets, arms embargo, war crimes to ICC
- Arab League suspended Qaddafi, asked for no-fly zone
- UNSCR 1973 authorized states, “regional organizations”
  - “… all necessary means to protect civilians …” [meaning Qaddafi]
  - “… excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory
Syria

✓ Limits to coalition
  ✓ No UNSC Resolution
  ✓ No Alliance consensus
  ✓ Inevitable conflict with Russia
  ✓ Complications with Turkey
  ✓ NATO SecGen: “use of force would complicate matters …”
Global NATO?

 ✓ Clear competence when:
   ✓ Backing by UN Security Council resolution
   ✓ European allies not otherwise directly involved
   ✓ Defined political objectives
   ✓ Confined role of military force
   ✓ Not a diversion from more “core” missions

Are Afghanistan and Libya exceptions or harbingers?
Lessons Learned?

Would you change any of these from Balkans?

- There is a difference between “legal” and “legitimate”
  - *The sometimes inadequacy of law and diplomacy*
- Force in the pursuit of peace is justified
  - *But it still may not succeed*
- Military force can change the “situation on the ground”
  - *But it may not always “compel” a political solution*
- If force is used, then be clear about the objectives
  - *... which must be political, not military*
- Diplomacy is necessary before using military force …
  - *... and just as necessary afterwards to avoid renewed conflict*
Look-ahead to 6 April

- **NATO, Russia, & Ukraine**
- Essay #5 DUE IN CLASS:
  - CHANGE: 1 page ... What should be NATO’s future priorities?
- Reading Assignment:
  - Sloan, Chapter 7 [*in FSS library*]
  - Aybet & Moore, Chapter 5 (Smith) [*in FSS library*]
  - Foerster, “NATO’s Return” [*posted in IS*]
  - Cecire, “Russia’s Art of War” [*posted in IS*]
  - NATO-Russia-Ukraine documents [*NATO website*]
Seminar Discussion

How should NATO address conflict in the Middle East?
✓ “fundamental & enduring purpose ... safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means.”
✓ Collective Defense ~ Article 5 ... deter & defend
✓ Crisis Management ~ “political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security”
✓ Cooperative Security ~ “engage actively to enhance int’l security”
✓ contribute actively to arms control, non-proliferation, & disarmament …
✓ keep the door to membership ... open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.
“Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”

Growing instability from Middle East to North Africa … transnational threats

- NATO Readiness Action Plan + Spearhead Force (5,000)
  - Support reinforcement capacity – 8 C2 centers
  - 2 combat brigades of prepositioned equipment
- NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)
- “aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade”
Wales Summit Declaration

NATO – Russia – Ukraine

✓ “We condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s escalating and illegal intervention in Ukraine …
✓ “… violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty & territorial integrity …
✓ “… do not and will not recognize illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea”
✓ “We support sanctions imposed by the EU and others …”
✓ “Suspend all practical civilian & military cooperation between NATO & Russia … political channels … remain open” [Amb]
✓ “commend people of Ukraine … encourage Ukraine to further promote an inclusive political process … show restraint”
Warsaw Summit Communique
July 2016

✓ “There is an **arc of insecurity and instability** along NATO’s periphery and beyond … a range of security challenges and threats that originate both from the **east** and from the **south**.”

✓ “**Enhanced forward presence**”

✓ Beginning 2017 [*January 2017 exercise in Poland: 1,500 troops*]

✓ **Multinational forces … voluntary, sustainable, rotational basis**”

✓ 4 battalions (CA, GE, UK, US) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland

✓ 4,000 U.S. troops (combat brigade) + 2,000 prepositioned equipment

✓ Romania ~ multinational “framework brigade” for training for operations in SE Europe, Black Sea
Range of Security Threats

- Military intimidation ~ force presence, incursions in air, sea and land operations ... intent to use?
- “Hybrid” or “non-linear” warfare
  - Goals political ~ means are disruptive, cheap, risk-averse
  - Shaping the narrative – defining alternative realities
  - “Reflexive Control” to shape opponents’ responses
  - “Four D’s” of disinformation
    - Dismiss – Distort – Distract – Dismay
- How to assess – defeat – deny – coordinate NATO response
Strategic Questions
A guide for crisis decision-making

➢ What “end states” does NATO want to achieve?
  ✓ What “end states” can NATO accept? At what cost?

➢ What are Russia’s strategic goals? Others’?

➢ How does NATO address those goals to avoid conflict yet maintain the integrity of the Alliance?
  ✓ What are NATO’s “redlines”?

➢ Does NATO have a comprehensive set of political and military tools with which to respond?
  ✓ Means must be commensurate with ends
Look-ahead to 13 April

✓ **NATO’s Future: How will it respond to the next crisis?**
  ✓ See ADVANCE BACKGROUND PACKAGE

✓ Crisis Simulation TEAM Point Paper DUE IN CLASS:

✓ Reading Assignment:
  ✓ Aybet & Moore, Chapter 1 (Shea) [*in FSS library*]
  ✓ NATO Strategic Concept (2010) [*NATO website*]

✓ **Come prepared to:**
  ✓ *Think hard! … Work creatively in a team! … Have fun!*
## Crisis Simulation – 13 April

**be “in role” – bring name tags**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>FOREIGN MINISTER</th>
<th>DEFENSE MINISTER</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Sušovská</td>
<td>Vinkler</td>
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<td>Rekšáková</td>
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<td>Rodriguez</td>
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<td>Bajerová</td>
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<td>Chustinová</td>
<td>Vorda</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO [Sec Gen &amp; CMC]</td>
<td>Kling</td>
<td>Běláč</td>
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</tbody>
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Seminar Discussion

How does NATO ensure a future peace in Europe?
NATO’s Future: How Will it Respond to the Next Crisis?

Session VII
13 April 2017
NATO Crisis Simulation

TEAM Point Papers
Background Package
Evening Update
Morning Press Update
Press Injects – Breaking News
This morning, in Tartu, Estonia, a group called the "Estonian Russian Alliance" claims that they have occupied Tartu City Hall and called upon Russia to support their cause in restoring the Baltic borders of the Soviet Union. There are no known records of the existence of this group. Crowds of ethnic Russians surrounded the building and kept Estonian Homeland security forces at bay.

This follows anti-Russian protests last night in Tartu, after which some of Tartu’s 15% ethnic Russian population launched a counter-demonstration, claiming persecution.

A Kremlin press spokesman repeated Russia’s determination to protect the rights of Russian minorities living in neighboring countries.
**Moscow Times.** An explosion in the Moscow subway early this morning—before rush hour—created extensive damage but few casualties and no fatalities.

A Russian Interior Ministry spokesman said that the explosives were detonated by a suicide bomber, tentatively identified by forensic evidence as a Chechen radical. No groups have claimed credit.

A Kremlin spokesman spoke of the need for Russia and the West to focus together on a clear common enemy in radicalism and terrorism, instead of the ‘artificial issues’ currently dividing them.
Morning Press Updates 3/4

✓ *Kiev Times*. The Ukrainian Interior Ministry announced today that they had captured four Russian Spetsnaz soldiers 100 km southwest of Mariupol.

✓ Unless Russia admitted to its aggression eastern Ukraine, the Ministry said they would be tried as criminals instead of being treated as prisoners of war.

✓ The Kremlin responded that this would be viewed as a “severe provocation” in what was already a volatile relationship.
✓ *Al Jazeera*. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, announced through a video that he is still in Raqqa, in charge of the Caliphate, and that the families of “all our martyrs” are prepared to die in defense of the city.

✓ Based on reports from Kurdish and Syrian rebel fighters, the Pentagon said it expected the battle for Raqqa to be bloody and protracted.

✓ *Washington Post*. As the battle for Raqqa nears, Americans are getting increasingly concerned that the U.S. will lose many lives in trying to take Raqqa, but to what end? As Congressman Rand Paul (R-KY) said, “This is not America’s war. This is Europe’s war – they’re getting all the refugees. Where is NATO in this fight?”
CNN. NATO sources report indications of movement of units of a Russian motorized rifle brigade toward the Estonian border. Russian Defense Ministry spokesmen indicated that these were only routine maneuvers.


Oslo News. Norway’s Ministry of the Interior reports that the wreckage of a small Russian intelligence surveillance submarine has washed up on the Norwegian coastline just outside the Arctic Circle.
El País. This morning there was an explosion in a marketplace in Gibraltar. There were 15 fatalities—including the suicide bomber who committed the attack—and over 100 seriously wounded. “Al Qaeda in the Maghreb” has claimed responsibility for the attack. The Spanish government has expressed concern that the independent status of Gibraltar makes it difficult for them to control their border.
North Atlantic Council Agenda

1. Terrorism
   ✓ How to respond to Russian bombing – common enemy of terrorism?
   ✓ Terrorist attack in Gibraltar – how to respond? Similar?

2. Baltic States
   ✓ Crisis in Estonia – How to deal with Situation in Tartu?

3. Ukraine
   ✓ Russian infantry on Ukrainian land
   ✓ Minsk negotiations – Russian-Ukrainian relation – NATO position?

4. Situation in Syria – severe situation in Raqqa - Collective Approach

5. Russian claims of Arctic Circle – how to react?
Military Committee Agenda

1. Terrorism – Moscow & Gibraltar
2. Estonia & Russian troops
3. Ukraine & Russian landbridge
4. Syria/ISIS & battle for Raqqa
5. Arctic & Russian naval escorts