Western society we find a class of them which seems to be encompassing to a degree discontinuously greater than the ones next in line. Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside that is often built right into the physical plant: locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs and water, open terrain, and so forth. These I am calling total institutions, and it is their general characteristics I want to explore. This exploration will be phrased as if securely based on findings but will in fact be speculative.

The total institutions of our society can be listed for convenience in five rough groupings. First, there are institutions established to care for persons thought to be both incapable and harmless; these are the homes for the blind, the aged, the orphaned, and the indigent. Second, there are places established to care for persons thought to be at once incapable of looking after themselves and a threat to the community, albeit an unintended one: TB sanitariums, mental hospitals, and leprosariums. Third, another type of total institution is organized to protect the community against what are thought to be intentional dangers to it; here the welfare of the persons thus sequestered is not the immediate issue. Examples are: Jails, penitentiaries, POW camps, and concentration camps. Fourth, we find institutions purportedly established the better to pursue some technical task and justifying themselves only on these instrumental grounds: Army barracks, ships, boarding schools, work camps, colonial compounds, large mansions from the point of view of those who live in the servants' quarters, and so forth. Finally, there are those establishments designed as retreats from the world or as training stations for the religious: Abbeys, monasteries, convents, and other cloisters. This sublisting of total institutions is neither neat nor exhaustive, but the listing itself provides an empirical starting point for a purely denotive definition of the category. By anchoring the initial definition of total institutions in this way, I hope to be able to discuss the general characteristics of the type without becoming tautological.

Before attempting to extract a general profile from this list of establishments, one conceptual peculiarity must be mentioned. None of the elements I will extract seems entirely exclusive to total institutions, and none seems shared by every one of them. What is shared and unique about

1 The category of total institutions has been pointed out from time to time in the sociological literature under a variety of names, and some of the characteristics of the class have been suggested, most notably perhaps in Howard Korn's neglected paper, "Segregated Communities and Mental Health," in Mental Health Publication of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, No. 9, edited by F. R. Moulton, 1939. A preliminary statement of the present paper is reported in the Third Group Process Proceedings, Josiah Macy Foundation, edited by Bertram Schaffner, 1957.
TOTALISTIC FEATURES

A basic social arrangement in modern society is that we tend to sleep, play, and work in different places, in each case with a different set of occupants, under a different authority, and without an over-all rational plan. The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of the kinds of barriers ordinarily separating these throngs of life. First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority. Second, each phase of the member’s daily activity will be carried out in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together. Third, all phases of the day’s activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole circle of activities being imposed from above through a system of explicit formal rules and a body of officials. Finally, the contents of the various enforced activities are brought together as parts of a single over-all rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution.

Individually, these totalistic features are found, of course, in places other than total institutions. Increasingly, for example, our large commercial, industrial, and educational establishments provide cafeterias, minute services and off-hour recreation for their members. But while this is a tendency in the direction of total institutions, these extended facilities remain voluntary in many particulars of their use, and special care is taken to see that the ordinary line of authority does not extend to these situations. Similarly, housewives or farm families can find all their major spheres of life within the same fenced-in area, but these persons are not collectives regimented and do not march through the day’s steps in the immediate company of a batch of similar others.

The handling of many human needs by the bureaucratic organization of whole blocks of people—whether or not this is a necessary or effective means of social organization in the circumstances—can be taken then, as the key fact of total institutions. From this, certain important implications can be drawn.

Given the fact that blocks of people are caused to move in time, it becomes possible to use a relatively small number of supervisory persons where the central relationship is not guidance or periodic checking, as so many employer-employee relations, but rather surveillance—a seeming to it that everyone does what he has been clearly told is required of him, and this under conditions where one person’s infraction is likely to stand out in relief against the visible, constantly examined, compliance of the others. Which comes first, the large block of managed people or the small supervisory staff, is not here at issue; the point is that each is made for the other.

In total institutions, as we would then suspect, there is a basic split between a large class of individuals who live in and who have restricted contact with the world outside the walls, conveniently called inmates, and the small class that supervises them, conveniently called staff, who often operate on an 8-hour day and are socially integrated into the outside world. Each grouping tends to conceive of members of the other in terms of narrow hostile stereotypes, staff often seeing inmates as bitter, secretive, and untrustworthy, while inmates often see staff as condescending, high-handed, and mean. Staff tends to feel superior and righteous; inmates tend, in some ways at least, to feel inferior, weak, blameworthy and guilty. Social mobility between the two strata is grossly restricted; social distance is typically great and often formally prescribed; even talk across the boundaries may be conducted in a special tone of voice. These restrictions of contact presumably help to maintain the antagonistic stereotypes. In any case, two different social and cultural worlds develop, tending to jog along beside each other, with points of official contact but little mutual penetration. It is important to add that the institutional plant and name comes to be identified by both staff and inmates as somehow belonging to staff, so that when either grouping refers to the views or interests of the institution, by implication they are referring (as I shall also) to the views and concerns of the staff.

The staff-inmate split is one major implication of the central features of total institutions; a second one pertains to work. In the ordinary arrangements of living in our society, the authority of the workplace stops with the worker’s receipt of a money payment; the spending of this in a domestic and recreational setting is at the discretion of the worker and is the mechanism through which the authority of the workplace is kept within strict bounds. However, to say that inmates in total institutions have their
full day scheduled for them is to say that some version of all basic needs will have to be planned for, too. In other words, total institutions take over “responsibility” for the inmate and must guarantee to have everything that is defined as essential “laid on.” It follows, then, that whatever incentive is given for work, this will not have the structural significance it has on the outside. Different attitudes and incentives regarding this central feature of our life will have to prevail.

Here, then, is one basic adjustment required of those who work in total institutions and of those who must induce these people to work. In some cases, no work or little is required, and inmates, untrained often in leisurely ways of life, suffer extremes of boredom. In other cases, some work is required but is carried on at an extremely slow pace, being geared into a system of minor, often ceremonial payments, as in the case of weekly tobacco ration and annual Christmas presents, which cause some mental patients to stay on their job. In some total institutions, such as logging camps and merchant ships, something of the usual relation to the world that money can buy is obtained through the practice of “forced saving”; all needs are organized by the institution, and payment is given only after a work season is over and the men leave the premises. And in some total institutions, of course, more than a full day’s work is required and is induced not by reward, but by threat of dire punishment. In all such cases, the work-oriented individual may tend to become somewhat demoralized by the system.

In addition to the fact that total institutions are incompatible with the basic work-payment structure of our society, it must be seen that these establishments are also incompatible with another crucial element of our society, the family. The family is sometimes contrasted to solitary living, but in fact the more pertinent contrast to family life might be with batch living. For it seems that those who eat and sleep at work, with a group of fellow workers, can hardly sustain a meaningful domestic existence. Correspondingly, the extent to which a staff retains its integration in the outside community and escapes the encompassing tendencies of total institutions is often linked up with the maintenance of a family off the grounds.

Total institutions, then, are social hybrids, part residential community, part formal organization, and therein lies their special sociological interest. There are other reasons, alas, for being interested in them, too. These establishments are the forcing houses for changing persons in our society. Each is a natural experiment, typically harsh, on what can be done to the self.

Having suggested some of the key features of total institutions, we can move on now to consider them from the special perspectives of the inmate world and the staff world.

**THE INMATE WORLD**

**Mortification Processes**

It is characteristic of inmates that they come to the institution as members, already full-fledged, of a home world, that is, a way of life and a round of activities taken for granted up to the point of admission to the institution. It is useful to look at this culture that the recruit brings with him to the institution’s door—his *presenting culture*, to modify a psychiatric phrase—in terms especially designed to highlight what it is the total institution will do to him. Whatever the stability of his personal organization, we can assume it was part of a wider supporting framework lodged in his current social environment, a round of experience that somewhat confirms a conception of self that is somewhat acceptable to him and a set of defensive maneuvers exercisable at his own discretion as a means of coping with conflicts, discrediting and failures.

Now it appears that total institutions do not substitute their own unique culture for something already formed. We do not deal with acculturation or assimilation but with something more restricted than these. In a sense, total institutions do not look for cultural victory. They effectively create and sustain a particular kind of tension between the home world and the institutional world and use this persistent tension as strategic leverage in the management of men. The full meaning for the inmate of being “in” or “on the inside” does not exist apart from the special meaning to him of “getting out” or “getting on the outside.”

The recruit comes into the institution with a self and with attachments to supports which had allowed this self to survive. Upon entrance, he is immediately stripped of his wanted supports, and his self is systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified. In the accurate language of some of our oldest total institutions, he is led into a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profligations of self. He begins, in other words, some radical shifts in his *moral career*, a career laying out the progressive changes that occur in the beliefs that he has concerning himself and significant others.

The *stripping processes* through which mortification of the self occurs are fairly standard in our total institutions. Personal identity equipment is removed, as well as other possessions with which the inmate may have
identified himself, there typically being a system of nonaccessible storage from which the inmate can only reobtain his effects should he leave the institution. As a substitute for what has been taken away, institutional issue is provided, but this will be the same for large categories of inmates and will be regularly repossedessed by the institution. In brief, standardized defacement will occur. In addition, ego-invested separateness from fellow inmates is significantly diminished in many areas of activity, and tasks are prescribed that are infra dignitatem. Family, occupational, and educational career lines are chopped off, and a stigmatized status is submitted. Sources of fantasy materials which had meant momentary releases from stress in the home world are denied. Areas of autonomous decision are eliminated through the process of collective scheduling of daily activity. Many channels of communication with the outside are restricted or closed off completely. Verbal discrediting occur in many forms as a matter of course. Expressive signs of respect for the staff are coercively and continuously demanded. And the effect of each of these conditions is multiplied by having to witness the mortification of one’s fellow inmates.

We must expect to find different official reasons given for these assaults upon the self. In mental hospitals there is the matter of protecting the patient from himself and from other patients. In jails there is the issue of “security” and frank punishment. In religious institutions we may find sociologically sophisticated theories about the soul’s need for purification and penance through disciplining of the flesh. What all of these rationales share is the extent to which they are merely rationalizations, for the underlying force in many cases is unwittingly generated by efforts to manage the daily activity of a large number of persons in a small space with a small expenditure of resources.

In the background of the sociological stripping process, we find a characteristic authority system with three distinctive elements, each basic to total institutions.

First, to a degree, authority is of the echelon kind. Any member of the staff class has certain rights to discipline any member of the inmate class. This arrangement, it may be noted, is similar to the one which gives any adult in some small American towns certain rights to correct and demand small services from any child not in the immediate presence of his parents. In our society, the adult himself, however, is typically under the authority of a single immediate superior in connection with his work or under authority of one spouse in connection with domestic duties. The only echelon authority he must face—the police—typically are neither constantly nor relevantly present, except perhaps in the case of traffic-law enforcement.

Second, the authority of corrective sanctions is directed to a great multitude of items of conduct of the kind that are constantly occurring and constantly coming up for judgment. In brief, authority is directed to matters of dress, deportment, social intercourse, manners and the like. In prisons these regulations regarding situational proprieties may even extend to a point where silence during mealtime is enforced, while in some convents explicit demands may be made concerning the custody of the eyes during prayer.

The third feature of authority in total institutions is that misbehaviors in one sphere of life are held against one’s standing in other spheres. Thus, an individual who fails to participate with proper enthusiasm in sports may be brought to the attention of the person who determines where he will sleep and what kind of work task will be accorded to him.

When we combine these three aspects of authority in total institutions, we see that the inmate cannot easily escape from the press of judgmental officials and from the enveloping tissue of constraint. The system of authority undermines the basis for control that adults in our society expect to exert over their interpersonal environment and may produce the terror of feeling that one is being radically demoted in the age-grading system.

On the outside, rules are sufficiently lax and the individual sufficiently agreeable to required self-discipline to insure that others will rarely have cause for pouncing on him. He need not constantly look over his shoulder to see if criticism and other sanctions are coming. On the inside, however, rulings are abundant, novel, and closely enforced so that, quite characteristically, inmates live with chronic anxiety about breaking the rules and chronic worry about the consequences of breaking them. The desire to “stay out of trouble” in a total institution is likely to require persistent conscious effort and may lead the inmate to abjure certain levels of sociability with his fellows in order to avoid the incidents that may occur in these circumstances.

It should be noted finally that the mortifications to be suffered by the inmate may be purposely brought home to him in an exaggerated way during the first few days after entrance, in a form of initiation that has
been called the welcome. Both staff and fellow inmates may go out of their way to give the neophyte a clear notion of where he stands. As part of this rite de passage, he may find himself called by a term such as “fish,” “swab,” etc., through which older inmates tell him that he is not only merely an inmate but that even within this lowly group he has a low status.

Privilege System

While the process of mortification is in progress, the inmate begins to receive formal and informal instruction in what will here be called the privilege system. Insofar as the inmate's self has been unsettled a little by the stripping action of the institution, it is largely around this framework that pressures are exerted, making for a reorganization of self. Three basic elements of the system may be mentioned.

First, there are the house rules, a relatively explicit and formal set of prescriptions and proscriptions which lay out the main requirements of inmate conduct. These regulations spell out the austere round of life in which the inmate will operate. Thus, the admission procedures through which the recruit is initially stripped of his self-supporting context can be seen as the institution’s way of getting him in the position to start living by the house rules.

Second, against the stark background, a small number of clearly defined rewards or privileges are held out in exchange for obedience to staff in action and spirit. It is important to see that these potential gratifications are not unique to the institution but rather are ones carved out of the flow of support that the inmate previously had quite taken for granted. On the outside, for example, the inmate was likely to be able to unthinkingly exercise autonomy by deciding how much sugar and milk he wanted in his coffee, if any, or when to light up a cigarette; on the inside, this right may become quite problematic and a matter of a great deal of conscious concern. Held up to the inmate as possibilities, these few recapturings seem to have a reintegrative effect, re-establishing relationships with the whole lost world and assuaging withdrawal symptoms from it and from one’s lost self.

The inmate’s run of attention, then, especially at first, comes to be fixated on these supplies and obsessed with them. In the most fanatic way, he can spend the day in devoted thoughts concerning the possibility of acquiring these gratifications or the approach of the hour at which they are scheduled to be granted. The building of a world around these minor privileges is perhaps the most important feature of inmate culture and yet is something that cannot easily be appreciated by an outsider, even one who has lived through the experience himself. This situation sometimes leads to generous sharing and almost always to a willingness to beg for things such as cigarettes, candy and newspapers. It will be understandable, then, that a constant feature of inmate discussion is the release binge fantasy, namely, recitals of what one will do during leave or upon release from the institution.

House rules and privileges provide the functional requirements of the third element in the privilege system: punishments. These are designated as the consequence of breaking the rules. One set of these punishments consists of the temporary or permanent withdrawal of privileges or abrogation of the right to try to earn them. In general, the punishments meted out in total institutions are of an order more severe than anything encountered by the inmate in his home world. An institutional arrangement which causes a small number of easily controlled privileges to have a massive significance is the same arrangement which lends a terrible significance to their withdrawal.

There are some special features of the privilege system which should be noted.

First, punishments and privileges are themselves modes of organization peculiar to total institutions. Whatever their severity, punishments are largely known in the inmate's home world as something applied to animals and children. For adults this conditioning, behavioristic model is usually not widely applied, since failure to maintain required standards typically leads to indirect disadvantageous consequences and not to specific immediate punishment at all. And privileges, it should be emphasized, are not the same as prerequisites, indulgences or values, but merely the absence of deprivations one ordinarily expects one would not have to sustain. The very notions, then, of punishments and privileges are not ones that are cut from civilian cloth.

Second, it is important to see that the question of release from the total institution is elaborated into the privilege system. Some acts will become known as ones that mean an increase or no decrease in length of stay, while others become known as means for shortening the sentence.

Third, we should also note that punishments and privileges come to be geared into a residential work system. Places to work and places to sleep become clearly defined as places where certain kinds and levels of privilege obtain, and inmates are shifted very rapidly and visibly from one
place to another as the mechanisms for giving them the punishment or privilege their cooperativeness has warranted. The inmates are moved, the system is not.

This, then, is the privilege system: a relatively few components put together with some rational intent and clearly proclaimed to the participants. The overall consequence is that cooperativeness is obtained from persons who often have cause to be uncooperative.9

Immediately associated with the privilege system we find some standard social processes important in the life of total institutions.

We find that an institutional lingo develops through which inmates express the events that are crucial in their particular world. Staff too, especially its lower levels, will know this language, using it when talking to inmates, while reverting to more standardized speech when talking to superiors and outsiders. Related to this special argot, inmates will possess knowledge of the various ranks and officials, an accumulation of lore about the establishment, and some comparative information about life in other similar total institutions.

Also found among staff and inmates will be a clear awareness of the phenomenon of messing up, so called in mental hospitals, prisons, and barracks. This involves a complex process of engaging in forbidden activity, getting caught doing so, and receiving something like the full punishment accorded this. An alteration in privilege status is usually implied and is categorized by a phrase such as “getting busted.” Typical infractions which can eventuate in messing up are: fights, drunkenness, attempted suicide, failure at examinations, gambling, insubordination, homosexuality, improper taking of leave, and participation in collective riots. While these punished infractions are typically ascribed to the offender’s cunningness, villainy, or “sickness,” they do in fact constitute a vocabulary of institutionalized actions, limited in such a way that the same messing up may occur for quite different reasons. Informally, inmates and staff may understand, for example, that a given messing up is a way for inmates to show resentment against a current situation felt to be unjust in terms of the informal agreements between staff and inmates, or a way of postponing release without having to admit to one’s fellow inmates that one really does not want to go.10

In total institutions there will also be a system of what might be called secondary adjustments, namely, techniques which do not directly challenge staff management but which allow inmates to obtain disallowed satisfactions or allowed ones by disallowed means. These practices are variously referred to as: the angles, knowing the ropes, conniving, gimmicks, deals, ins, etc. Such adaptations apparently reach their finest flower in prisons, but of course other total institutions are overrun with them too.12 It seems apparent that an important aspect of secondary adjustments is that they provide the inmate with some evidence that he is still, as it were, his own man and still has some protective distance, under his own control, between himself and the institution. In some cases, then, a secondary adjustment becomes almost a kind of lodgment for the self, a churning in which the soul is felt to reside.13

The occurrence of secondary adjustments correctly allows us to assume that the inmate group will have some kind of a code and some means of informal social control evolved to prevent one inmate from informing staff about the secondary adjustments of another. On the same grounds we can expect that one dimension of social typing among inmates will turn upon this question of security, leading to persons defined as “squealers,” “finks,” or “stoolies” on one hand, and persons defined as “right guys” on the other.14 It should be added that where new inmates can play a role in the system of secondary adjustments, as in providing new faction members or new sexual objects, then their “welcome” may indeed be a sequence of initial indulgences and enticements, instead of exaggerated deprivations.15 Because of secondary adjustments we also find kitchen straits, namely, a kind of rudimentary, largely informal, stratification of inmates on the basis of each one’s differential access to disposable illicit commodities; so also we find social typing to designate the powerful persons in the informal market system.16

The privilege system. Secondly, demotion through messing up brings old-time inmates in contact with new inmates in unprivileged positions, assuming a flow of information about the system and the people in it.

9 An excellent description of this model universe as found in a state mental hospital may be found in Ivan Belknap, Human Problems of a State Mental Hospital, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956, pp. 164.


11 There are some interesting incidental social functions of messings up. First, they tend to limit rigidities which might occur were seniority the only means of mobility in the privilege system.


13 See, for example, Melville’s extended description of the fight his fellow seamen put up to prevent the clipping of their beards in full accordance with Navy regulations. Melville, White Jacket (New York: Grove Press, n.d.), pp. 333-347.


16 For concentration camps, see the discussion of “Prominents” throughout Cohen, op. cit.; for mental hospitals, see Belknap, op. cit., p. 189. For prisons, see the discus-
While the privilege system provides the chief framework within which reassembly of the self takes place, other factors characteristically lead by different routes in the same general direction. Relief from economic and social responsibilities—much touted as part of the therapy in mental hospitals—is one, although in many cases it would seem that the disorganizing effect of this moratorium is more significant than its organizing effect. More important as a reorganizing influence is the 

**fraternalization process**, namely, the process through which socially distant persons find themselves developing mutual support and common counter-mores in opposition to a system that has forced them into intimacy and into a single, equilibrating community of fate. It seems that the new recruit frequently starts out with something like the staff's popular misconceptions of the character of the inmates and then comes to find that most of his fellows have all the properties of ordinary decent human beings and that the stereotypes associated with their condition or offense are not a reasonable ground for judgment of inmates.

If the inmates are persons who are accused by staff and society of having committed some kind of a crime against society, then the new inmate, even though sometimes in fact quite guiltless, may come to share the guilty feelings of his fellows and, therefrom, their well-elaborated defenses against these feelings. A sense of common injustice and a sense of bitterness against the outside world tends to develop, marking an important movement in the inmate's moral career.

**Adaptation Alignments**

The mortifying processes that have been discussed and the privilege system represent the conditions that the inmate must adapt to in some way, but however pressing, these conditions allow for different ways of meeting them. We find, in fact, that the same inmate will employ different lines of adaptation or tactics at different phases in his moral career and may even fluctuate between different tactics at the same time.

First, there is the process of situational withdrawal. The inmate withdraws apparent attention from every thing except events immediately around his body and sees these in a perspective not employed by others present. This drastic withdrawal of involvement in interactional events is best known, of course, in mental hospitals, under the title of "regression." Aspects of "prison psychosis" or "stir simplicity" represent the same adjustment, as do some forms of "acute depersonalization" described in concentration camps. I do not think it is known whether this line of adaptation forms a single continuum of varying degrees of withdrawal or whether there are standard discontinuous plateaus of disinvolution. It does seem to be the case, however, that, given the pressures apparently required to dislodge an inmate from this status, as well as the currently limited facilities for doing so, we frequently find here, effectively speaking, an irreversible line of adaptation.

Second, there is the rebellious line. The inmate intentionally challenges the institution by flagrantly refusing to cooperate with staff in almost any way. The result is a constantly communicated intransigency and sometimes high rebel-morale. Most large mental hospitals, for example, seem to have wards where this spirit strongly prevails. Interestingly enough, there are many circumstances in which sustained rejection of a total institution requires sustained orientation to its formal organization and hence, paradoxically, a deep kind of commitment to the establishment. Similarly, when total institutions take the line (as they sometimes do in the case of mental hospitals prescribing lobotomy or army barracks prescribing the stockade) that the recalcitrant inmate must be broken, then, in their way, they must show as much special devotion to the rebel as has shown to them. It should be added, finally, that while prisoners of war have been known staunchly to take a rebellious stance throughout their incarceration, this stance is typically a temporary and initial phase of reaction, emerging from this to situational withdrawal or some other line of adaptation.

Third, another standard alignment in the institutional world takes the form of a kind of colonization. The sampling of the outside world provided by the establishment is taken by the inmate as the whole, and a stable, relatively contented existence is built up out of the maximum satisfactions procurable within the institution. Experience of the outside world is used as a point of reference to demonstrate the desirability of life on the inside; and the usual tension between the two worlds collapses, thwarting the
social arrangements based upon this felt discrepancy. Characteristically, the individual who too obviously takes this line may be accused by his fellow inmates of "having found a home" or of "never having had it so good." Staff itself may become vaguely embarrassed by this use that is being made of the institution, sensing that the benign possibilities in the situation are somehow being missed. Colonizers themselves may feel obliged to deny their satisfaction with the institution, if only in the interest of sustaining the counter-mores supporting inmate solidarity. They may find it necessary to mess up just prior to their slated discharge, thereby allowing themselves to present involuntary reasons for continued incarceration. It should be incidentally noted that any humanistic effort to make life in total institutions more bearable must face the possibility that doing so may increase the attractiveness and likelihood of colonization.

Fourth, one mode of adaptation to the setting of a total institution is that of conversion. The inmate appears to take over completely the official or staff view of himself and tries to act out the role of the perfect inmate. While the colonized inmate builds as much of a free community as possible for himself by using the limited facilities available, the convert takes a more disciplined, moralistic, monochromatic line, presenting himself as someone whose institutional enthusiasm is always at the disposal of the staff. In Chinese POW camps, we find Americans who became "pros" and fully espoused the Communist view of the world. In army barracks there are enlisted men who give the impression that they are always "sucking around" and always "buckin' for promotion." In prisons there are "square johns." In German concentration camps, longtime prisoners sometimes came to adopt the vocabulary, recreation, posture, expressions of aggression, and clothing style of the Gestapo, executing their role of straw-boss with military strictness. Some mental hospitals have the distinction of providing two quite different conversion possibilities—one for the new admission who can see the light after an appropriate struggle and adopt the psychiatric view of himself, and another for the chronic ward patient who adopts the manner and dress of attendants while helping them to manage the other ward patients with a stringency exceeding that of the attendants themselves.

Here, it should be noted, is a significant way in which total institutions differ. Many, like progressive mental hospitals, merchant ships, TB sanatoriums and brain-washing camps, offer the inmate an opportunity to live up to a model of conduct that is at once ideal and staff-sponsored—a model felt by its advocates to be in the supreme interests of the very persons to whom it is applied. Other total institutions, like some concentration camps and some prisons, do not officially sponsor an ideal that the inmate is expected to incorporate as a means of judging himself.

While the alignments that have been mentioned represent coherent courses to pursue, few inmates, it seems, carry these pursuits very far. In most total institutions, what we seem to find is that most inmates take the tack of what they call playing it cool. This involves a somewhat opportunistic combination of secondary adjustments, conversion, colonization and loyalty to the inmate group, so that in the particular circumstances the inmate will have a maximum chance of eventually getting out physically and psychologically undamaged. Typically, the inmate will support the counter-mores when with fellow inmates and be silent to them on how tractably he acts when alone in the presence of staff. Inmates taking this line tend to subordinate contacts with their fellows to the higher claim of "keeping out of trouble." They tend to volunteer for nothing, and they may even learn to cut their ties to the outside world sufficiently to give cultural reality to the world outside but not enough to lead to colonization.

I have suggested some of the lines of adaptation that inmates can take to the pressures that play in total institutions. Each represents a way of managing the tension between the home world and the institutional world. However, there are circumstances in which the home world of the inmate was such, in fact, as to immunize him against the bleak world on the inside, and for such persons no particular scheme of adaptation need be carried very far. Thus, some lower-class mental hospital patients who have lived all their previous life in orphanages, reformatories and jails, tend to see the hospital as just another total institution to which it is possible to apply the adaptive techniques learned and perfected in other total institutions. "Playing it cool" represents for such persons, not a shift in their moral career, but an alignment that is already second nature.

The professional criminal element in the early periods of German concentration camps displayed something of the same immunity to their surroundings or even found new satisfactions through fraternization with middle-class political prisoners. Similarly, Shetland youths recruited into the British merchant marine are not apparently threatened much by the cramped arduous life on board, because island life is even more stunted; they make uncomplaining sailors because from their point of view they have nothing much to complain about. Strong religious and political convictions may also serve perhaps to immunize the true believer against the assaults of a total institution, and even a failure to speak the language of the staff may cause the staff to give up its efforts at reformation, allowing the non-speaker immunity to certain pressures. . . .

Consequences

Total institutions frequently claim to be concerned with rehabilitation, that is, with resetting the inmate’s self-regulatory mechanisms so that he will maintain the standards of the establishment of his own accord after he leaves the setting. In fact, it seems this claim is seldom realized and even when permanent alteration occurs, these changes are often not of the kind intended by the staff. With the possible exception presented by the great resocialization efficiency of religious institutions, neither the stripping processes nor the reorganizing ones seem to have a lasting effect. No doubt the availability of secondary adjustments helps to account for this, as do the presence of counter-mores and the tendency for inmates to combine all strategies and “play it cool.” In any case, it seems that shortly after release, the ex-inmate will have forgotten a great deal of what life was like on the inside and will have once again begun to take for granted the privileges around which life in the institution was organized. The sense of injustice, bitterness and alienation, so typically engendered by the inmate’s experience and so definitely marking a stage in his moral career, seems to weaken upon graduation, even in those cases where a permanent stigma has resulted.

26 Bettelheim, op. cit., p. 425.
27 Thus, Schein, op. cit., p. 165 fn., suggests that Puerto Ricans and other non-English-speaking prisoners of war in China were given up on and allowed to work out a viable routine of menial chores.
28 Interestingly enough, staff is expected to be properly self-regulating upon first coming to the total institution, sharing with members of other kinds of establishments the ideal of needing merely to learn procedure.
29 The strongest evidence for this, perhaps, comes from our knowledge of the readjustment of repatriated brain-washed prisoners of war. See, for example, Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr., and Harold G. Wolff, “Communist Interrogation and Indocilation of ‘Enemies of the State,’” Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, Vol. 76, 1956, p. 174.

But what the ex-inmate does retain of his institutional experience tells us important things about total institutions. Often entrance will mean for the recruit that he has taken on what might be called a procreative status. Not only is his relative social position within the walls radically different from what it was on the outside, but, as he comes to learn, if and when he gets out, his social position on the outside will never again be quite what it was prior to entrance. Where the procreative status is a relatively favorable one, as it is for those who graduate from officers’ training schools, elite boarding schools, ranking monasteries, etc., then the permanent alteration will be favorable, and jubilant official reunions announcing pride in one’s “school” can be expected. When, as seems usually the case, the procreative status is unfavorable, as it is for those in prisons or mental hospitals, we popularly employ the term “stigmatization” and expect that the ex-inmate may make an effort to conceal his past and try to “pass.”

THE STAFF WORLD

Humane Standards

Most total institutions, most of the time, seem to function merely as storage dumps for inmates, but as previously suggested, they usually present themselves to the public as rational organizations designed consciously, through and through, as effective machines for producing a few officially avowed and officially approved ends. It was also suggested that one frequent official objective is the reformation of inmates in the direction of some ideal standard. This contradiction, then, between what the institution does and what its officials must say that it does, forms the central context of the staff’s daily activity.

Within this context, perhaps the first thing to say about staff is that their work, and hence their world, has uniquely to do with people. This people-work is not quite like personnel work nor the work of those involved in service relationships. Staffs, after all, have objects and products to work upon, not relationships, but these objects and products are people. As material upon which to work, people involve some of the considerations characteristic of inmate objects. Just as an article being

28 As Cloward, op. cit., pp. 80-83, implies, one important kind of leverage staff has in regard to inmates and one factor leading inmates to act conformable in presence of staff is that staff can give the kind of discharge that may appear to reduce stigmatization. Prison barracks officials can hold up the possibility of the inmate’s “restoration” to active duty and, potentially, an honorable discharge; mental hospital administrators can hold up the possibility of a “clean bill of health” (discharged as cured) and personal recommendations.
processed through an industrial plant must be followed by a paper shadow showing what has been done by whom, what is to be done, and who last had responsibility for it, so human objects moving, say, through a mental hospital system must be followed by a chain of informative receipts detailing what has been done to and by the patient and who had most recent responsibility for him. In his career from admission suite to burial plot, many different kinds of staff will add their official note to his case file as he temporarily passes under their jurisdiction, and long after he has died physically his marked remains will survive as an actionable entity in the hospital’s bureaucratic system. Even the presence or absence of a particular patient at a given meal or for a given night may have to be recorded so that cost-accounting can be maintained and appropriate adjustments rendered in billing.

Other similarities between people-work and object-work are obvious. Just as tin mines or paint factories or chemical plants may involve special work hazards for employees, so (staffs believe at least) there are special dangers to some kinds of people-work. In mental hospitals, staffs believe that patients may strike out “for no reason” and injure an official. In army prisons, staff “is ever haunted by the spectre of riot, revolt or mutiny...” In TB sanitariums and in leperosariums, staff feel they are being specially exposed to dangerous diseases.

While these similarities between people- and object-work exist, it is, I think, the unique aspects of people as material to work upon that we must look to for the crucial determinants of the work-world of staff.

Given the physiological characteristics of the human organism, it is obvious that certain requirements must be met if any continued use is to be made of people. But this, of course, is the case with inanimate objects, too; the temperature of any storehouse must be regulated, regardless of whether people or things are stored. However, persons are almost always considered to be ends in themselves, as reflected in the broad moral principles of a total institution’s environging society. Almost always, then, we find that some technically unnecessary standards of handling must be maintained with human materials. This maintenance of what we can call humane standards comes to be defined as one part of the “responsibility” of the institution and presumably is one of the things the institution guarantees the inmate in exchange for his liberty. Thus, prison officials are obliged to thwart suicidal efforts of the prisoner and to give him full medical attention even though in some cases this may require postponement of his date of execution. Something similar has been reported in German concentration camps, where inmates were sometimes given medical attention to tidy them up into a healthier shape for the gas chamber.

A second special contingency in the work-world of staff is the fact that inmates typically have statuses and relationships in the outside world that must be taken into consideration. (This consideration, of course, is related to the previously mentioned fact that the institution must respect some of the rights of inmates qua persons.) Even in the case of the committed mental patient whose civil rights are largely taken from him, a tremendous amount of mere paper-work will be involved. Of course, the rights that are denied a mental patient are usually transferred to a relation, to a committee, or to the superintendent of the hospital itself, who then becomes the legal person whose authorization must be obtained for many matters. Many issues originating outside the institution will arise: Social Security benefits, income taxes, upkeep of properties, insurance payments, old age pension, stock dividends, dental bills, legal obligations incurred prior to commitment, permission to release psychiatric case records to insurance companies or attorneys, permission for special visits from persons other than next of kin, etc. All of these issues have to be dealt with by the institution, even if only to pass the decisions on to those legally empowered to make them.

It should be noted that staff is reminded of its obligations in these matters of standards and rights, not only by its own internal superordinates, by various watchdog agencies in the wider society, and by the material itself, but also by persons on the outside who have kin ties to inmates. The latter group present a special problem because, while inmates can be educated about the price they will pay for making demands on their own behalf, relations receive less tutoring in this regard and rush in with requests for inmates that inmates would blush to make for themselves.

The multiplicity of ways in which inmates must be considered ends in themselves and the multiplicity of inmates themselves forces upon staff some of the classic dilemmas that must be faced by those who govern men. Since a total institution functions somewhat as a State, its staff must suffer somewhat from the tribulations that beset governors.

In the case of any single inmate, the assurance that certain standards will be maintained in his own interests may require sacrifice of other standards, and implied in this is a difficult weighing of ends. For example, if a suicidal inmate is to be kept alive, staff may feel it necessary to keep him under constant depriving surveillance or even tied to a chair in a small locked room. If a mental patient is to be kept from tearing at grossly irritated sores and repeating time and again a cycle of curing and disorder,
staff may feel it necessary to curtail the freedom of his hands. Another patient who refuses to eat may have to be humiliated by forced feeding. If inmates of TB sanitariums are to be given an opportunity to recover, it will be necessary to curtail freedom of recreation.\textsuperscript{22}

The standards of treatment that one inmate has a right to expect may conflict, of course, with the standards desired by another, giving rise to another set of governmental problems. Thus, in mental hospitals, if the grounds gate is to be kept open out of respect for those with town parole, then some other patients who otherwise could have been trusted on the grounds may have to be kept on locked wards. And if a canteen and mailbox are to be freely available to those on the grounds, then patients on a strict diet or those who write threatening and obscene letters will have to be denied liberty on the grounds.

The obligation of staff to maintain certain humane standards of treatment for inmates represents problems in itself, as suggested above, but a further set of characteristic problems is found in the constant conflict between humane standards on one hand and institutional efficiency on the other. I will cite only one main example. The personal possessions of an individual are an important part of the materials out of which he builds a self, but as an inmate, the ease with which he can be managed by staff is likely to increase with the degree to which he is dispossessed. Thus, the remarkable efficiency with which a mental hospital ward can adjust to a daily shift in number of resident patients is related to the fact that the comers and leavers do not come or leave with any properties but themselves and do not have any right to choose where they will be located. Further, the efficiency with which the clothes of these patients can be kept clean and fresh is related to the fact that everyone’s soiled clothing can be indiscriminately placed in one bundle, and laundered clothing can be re-distributed not according to ownership but according to rough size. Similarly, the quickest assurance that patients going on the grounds will be warmly dressed is to march them in file past a pile of the ward’s allotment of coats, requiring them for the same purposes of health to throw off these collectivized garments on returning to the ward.

Just as personal possessions may interfere with the smooth running of an institutional operation and be removed for this reason, so parts of the body itself may conflict with efficient management and the conflict resolved in favor of efficiency. If the heads of inmates are to be kept clean and the possessor easily identified, then a complete head shave is efficacious, regardless of the damage this does to appearance. On similar grounds, some mental hospitals have found it useful to extract the teeth of “biters,” give hysterectomies to promiscuous female patients, and perform lobotomies on chronic fighters. Flogging on men-of-war as a form of punishment expressed the same conflict between organizational and humane interests.\textsuperscript{23}

One of the arguments advanced by officers of the Navy in favor of corporal punishment is this: it can be inflicted in a moment; it consumes no valuable time; and when the prisoner’s shirt is put on, that is the last of it. Whereas, if another punishment were substituted, it would probably occasion a great waste of time and trouble, besides thereby begetting in the sailor an undue idea of his importance.

I have suggested that people-work differs from other kinds because of the tangle of statuses and relationships which each inmate brings with him to the institution and because of the humane standards that must be maintained with respect to him. Another difference occurs in cases where inmates have some rights to visit off the grounds, for then the mischief they may do in civil society becomes something for which the institution has some responsibility. Given this responsibility, it is understandable that total institutions tend not to view off-grounds leave favorably. Still another type of difference between people-work and other kinds, and perhaps the most important difference of all, is that by the exercise of threat, reward or persuasion human objects can be given instructions and relied upon to carry them out on their own. The span of time during which these objects can be trusted to carry out planned actions without supervision will vary of course a great deal, but, as the social organization of back wards in mental hospitals teaches us, even in the limiting case of catatonic schizophrenics, a considerable amount of such reliance is possible. Only the most complicated electronic equipment shares this capacity.

While human materials can never be as refractory as inanimate ones, their very capacity to perceive and to follow out the plans of staff insures that they can hinder the staff more effectively than inanimate objects can. Inanimate objects cannot purposely and intelligently thwart our plans, regardless of the fact that we may momentarily react to them as if they had this capacity. Hence, in prison and on “better” wards of mental hospitals, guards have to be ready for organized efforts at escape and must constantly deal with attempts to bait them, “frame” them, and otherwise get them into trouble. This leads to a state of anxiety in the guard that is not

\textsuperscript{22} Extremely useful material on TB sanitariums as total institutions will be available in the forthcoming work by Julius A. Roth, Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago. Preliminary statements may be found in his articles “What Is an Activity?” Etc., Vol. XIV, Autumn 1956, pp. 54-56, and “Ritual and Magic in the Control of Contagion,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 22, June 1957, pp. 310-314.

\textsuperscript{23} Melville, op. cit., p. 139.
of men, and about the difference between mental sickness and malingering. In prisons, we find currently an interesting conflict between the psychiatric and the moral-weakness theory of crime. In convicts, we find theories about the way in which the spirit can be weak and strong, and the ways its defects can be combated. Mental hospitals, it should be noted, are especially interesting in this connection because staff members pointedly establish themselves as specialists in the knowledge of human nature who must diagnose and prescribe on the basis of this philosophy. Hence, in the standard psychiatric textbooks there are chapters on "psychodynamics" and "psychopathology" which provide charismatically explicit formulations of the "nature" of human nature.

Given the fact that the management of inmates is typically rationalized in terms of the ideal aims or functions of the establishment and that certain humane standards will form part of this ideal, we can expect that professionals ostensibly hired to service these functions will likely become dissatisfied, feeling that they are being used as "captives" to add professional sanction to the privilege system and that they cannot here properly practice their calling. And this seems to be a classic cry. At the same time, the category of staff that must keep the institution going through continuous contact with inmates may feel that they too are being set a contradictory task, having to coerce inmates into obedience while at the same time giving the impression that humane standards are being maintained and that the rational goals of the institution are being realized.

INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES

One important difference among total institutions is found in the spirit in which recruits enter the establishment. At one extreme we find the quite involuntary entrance of those who are sentenced to prison, committed to a mental hospital, or impressed into the crew of a ship. It is perhaps in such cases that staff's version of the ideal inmate has least chance of taking hold among the inmates. At the other extreme, we find religious institutions which deal only with those who feel they have gotten the call and, of their own volition, take only those who seem to be the most suitable and the most serious in their intentions. In such cases, conversion seems already to have taken place, and it only remains to show the neophyte along what lines he can best discipline himself. Midway between these two extremes we find institutions like the army barracks whose inmates are required to serve, but who are given much opportunity to feel that this service is a justifiable one required in their own ultimate interests. Obviously, significant differences in tone will appear in total institutions, depending on whether recruitment is voluntary, semivoluntary or involuntary.

Another dimension of variation among total institutions is found in what might be called their permeability, that is, the degree to which the social standards maintained within the institution and the social standards maintained in the surrounding society have influenced each other sufficiently to minimize differences. This issue, incidentally, gives us an opportunity to consider some of the dynamic relations between a total institution and the wider society that supports it or tolerates it.

When we examine the admission procedures of total institutions, we tend to be struck with the impermeable aspects of the establishment, since the stripping and levelling processes which occur at this time directly cut across the various social distinctions with which the recruit entered. St. Benedict's advice to the abbot tends to be followed:

Let him make no distinction of persons in the monastery. Let not one be loved more than another, unless he be found to excel in good works or in obedience. Let not one of noble birth be raised above him who was formerly a slave, unless some other reasonable cause intervene.

Thus, the new cadet in a military school finds that discussions of wealth and family background are taboo, and that "Although the pay of the cadet is very low, he is not permitted to receive money from home."178

Even the age-graduating system of the wider society may be stopped at the gates, as nicely suggested in a recent memoir of an ex-nun:

Gabrielle moved to the place that would ever be hers, third in line of forty postulants. She was third oldest in the group because she had been third to register on that day less than a week ago when the Order had opened its doors to new entrants. From that moment, her chronological age had ceased and the only age she would henceforth have, her age in the religious life, had started.

It is, of course, by suppressing outside distinctions that a total institution can build up an orientation to its own system of honor. There is a sense in which the harshest total institution is the most democratic, and in fact the inmate's assurance of being treated no worse than any other of his fellows can be a source of support as well as a deprivation.

But regardless of how radical a total institution appears to be, there will always be some limits to its reshuffling tendencies and some use made

18 If the analogy were to be carried out strictly, we would have to say of course that every total institution had a semipermeable membrane about it, since there will always be some standard equally maintained on the inside and outside, the impermeable effects being restricted to certain specific values and practices.
19 St. Benedict, Holy Rule, Ch. 2.
20 Dornbush, op. cit., p. 317. The classic case of this kind of eschalon levelling is found perhaps in the fogging system in British public schools.
of social distinctions already established in the environs of society, if only it can conduct necessary affairs with this society and be tolerated by it. Thus, there does not seem to be a total institution in Western society which provides a clear dividing line between the sexes, and one does not like converts that appear to be impervious to socioeconomic gradings, in fact, tend to assert their role of converts of rural peasant background, just as the patient garbage crew in our prize integrated mental hospitals tend to be wholly Negro. * More important, perhaps, than the fact that total institutions differ in overall permeability to outside standards, we find that each is permeable with respect to different social standards. 

One of the most interesting differences among total institutions is to be found in the social fate of their graduates. Typically, these become geographically dispersed; the difference is found in the degree to which structural ties are maintained in spite of this distance. At one end of the scale we find the year's graduates of a particular Benedictine abbey, who not only keep in touch informally but find that for the rest of their lives their occupation and location have been determined by their original membership. At the same end of the scale, we find ex-cons who stay in prison until they are released to the community at large. Here, too, are ex-mental patients who studiously avoid all persons and events that might remind them of the hospital. Midway between these extremes, we find "old-boy" systems in private schools and graduate universities, which function as optional communities for the distribution of life-chances among sets of fellow graduates. 

---

60 It seems to be true that within any given establishment the topmost and lowest roles tend to be relatively permeable to wider community standards, while the intermediate roles seem to be focused on the middle ranges of the institution's hierarchy.
Závěr

Kontingenční přístup k teorii řízení koresponduje s novými pohořejší poznávání na povahu organizacji, jak jsou v zatím nejúplnější podobě syntetizovány v díle Michela Croziere. Sociální aktér i formální organizace v tomto pohledu ztrácí ty pevné obrysy, které jim přidělil taylorismus, ale také ty, které jim propojil směr "human relations". Základním východiskem tohoto přístupu je uznání faktu, že relativně jednoduché a všeobecněji formule nejsou v oblasti organizacích studit nadále ohodnocitelné, ať již jsou inspirovány jakýmkoli vyspělným paradigmatem.

Základní situace organizacího života je nejednoznačná, kontextová vázanost a proměnlivost situace. V tomto nepevném terénu platí téměř všechny poznatky, k nimž dospěla ve svém dosavadním vývoji teorie organizace, všehdy však platí pouze podmíněně. Namísto jednoznačných formulí tak nastupují relativně četnější typologie a mnohoformních modelů, jejichž úspěšná aplikace předpokládá bedlivé zkoumání terénu té které konkrétní organizace. Ještě více se ve fázi komparatistických studií teorie organizace snažila nalézt obecné v rozdílně skutečnosti, nyní je postup spíše opačný. Žádná formulece a žádně pravidlo není shledáno natolik přílišným, aby se pod ní dalo zahrnut bez četných výhrad a výjimek většiny mnoha podobných případů.

V praxi to znamená, že debata o tom, jaký je teorie řízení skutečně vědom v průmyslové slova smyslu, je dnes taková, jak věří každý případem. Na rozdíl od sociologicke teorie organizace, která si klade za cíl "pouze" porozumět předmětu svého běžání, má manažerská věda velké praktické účinky. Její uznání předpokládá ovšem nejen značně generalizující a prediktivní schopnosti, ale také (a zde se manažerská disciplína stává opět krajně zajišťovaná pro sociologii) to předpokládá více či méně manipulativní přístup k "lidským zdrojům" organizace. Věda o řízeni se tak dostává do blízkosti zóny, která sociologie zajímají převážně jako oblast experimentování s lidským faktorem, jeho tváržení a upravování. V podobě až do krajnosti vystupující je tento povazlivý motiv obsažen v případě tzv. totálních institucí.

8.1. Nápravné instituce


Dále zkoumá neformální vůdce, kteří ovlivňují názory a chování ostatních spoluživších. Popisuje rovněž mechanizmy, pomocí ních se vězeňské snaží čelit monotonii depersonalizované existence uvnitř vězni, a dále popisuje vzorce solidarity mezi vězni v závislosti na personalií dozorců. Rozhodná různé aspekty vězeňské disciplíny a způsoby adaptace na její požadavky u jednotlivých typů vězňů. Všímá se i odlišnosti v postavení i způsobu uvažování mezi vězeňskými nováky a zkušenými delikventy.

Další vývoj analýzy nápravných institucí pokračuje dvojím směrem. Na straně jedné vznikla množství detailních studií věnovaných jednotlivým aspektům vězeňské problematiky, které analytické rozšířil
8.2. Vojenské instituce

Rovněž studium vojenských institucí se rozvíjí dvojím směrem. Na jedné straně nalézají klasické studie analyzující síť armády jako specifickou instituci moderní společnosti. Tento směr empirického bývání je systematicky rozvíjen od dob druhé světové války a navazuje na rozsáhlou kolektivní práci amerických sociologů (Stouffer 1949) i na podobné široce koncipované práce pozdější (Janowitz 1960). Postupný vývoj získal manažerského myšlení se odradil i v této oblasti důrazem na potřebu rozvinutí nových stylů vedení, jež by snižovaly napětí a zvyšovaly míru identifikace podřízených s úkoly (Selvin 1960). Zároveň právě vojenské prostředí je používáno výrazně dobrovolné době prudence nabyvá na významu konflikt, který je přítomen hluboko všech typů formálních organizací, a sice konflikt mezi vertikální linii organizací (line) a horizontální linii autority (staff). Moderní zbrojové systémy, vyvíjající k svému ovládání i v porovnání s civilními sektory neobyklou míru odborné zdatnosti, zvyšují riziko kompetenčních konfliktů mezi podřízenými špičkovými odborníky a vysoce postavenými laity.

Druhé, z hlediska teorie organizace neméně zajímavá myšlenková linie zkoumá dopad existence vihavých vojenských institucí na okolní společnost. Armáda jako zosobnění státního monopolu na násilí se podstatně liší od většiny organizací, v nichž násilí vystupuje pouze jako náhodný a v princípu nelegitimitní. Vystupuje význam tvorby armády zejména v době permanentního rizika atomového konfliktu se nutně odradí i v některém charakteru života moderní společnosti. Podle Lasewella větší destruktivní moc moderních zbraní vede k "socializaci nebezpečí", riziko války je ve společnosti distribuováno cíloměrně (Laswell 1941). I v době míru dochází ke srůstání vojenského a civilního aparátu, vojenská expertiz je vyžadována u všech zvýznamnějších politických rozhodnutí. Na druhé straně závislost

armády na civilních technologiích a průmyslovém potenciálu země činí z problému obrannou univerzalizaci zcela neurčitý. Zdůle
vojí profesioniałizace armády reprodukuje zvláštní sociální řízdu (či spíše stav) schopnou prosazovat své poradní zájmy na různých úrovních společenského významného rozhodování.

Goffmanovská linie uvažování čerpá především z prvého z obou uvedených zdrojů. Zvláštnosti života v každém ukazuje některé společné tyly s režimem věznice a lečeben pro mentálně postižené. Oddělení vojaků od jejich rodin, zvláštní uspořádání života v nich i omezené možnosti toto prostředí opustit počíná kontrastovat s parametry běžného civilního života. Goffman se nechává inspirovat studiem různých typů odpovědi na toto stresovou situaci.

8.3. Léčebné instituce

Podobně jako instituce národních a vojenských, také nemocnic a zvláštní ústavy pro duševně nemocné představují v mnoha ohledech do důsledku dovedeného principy, které ve výrobních a správních kontextech vystupují méně zřetelně i pouze parciálně. Zvláštní pozornost z hlediska teorie organizace zasluhuje právě ústavy pro duševně choré, nebot v nich bývá v plnosti realizován latentní tendence všech byrokrací, snaha pohližet na klienty jako na ne zcela plnoprávné, ne zcela vyzpytatelné a zdravý odstup vyňádající objekty. Již první velká studie lečebího typu (pocházející z po loívny čtyřiletých, publikována až o 15 let později) poukazuje na jeho způsobený Mertonem jako "přemístění cílů". V ústavech pro choromyslné jsou léčebné cíle velmi často zamýšleny za cíl jiný, sloulají především ústavu (Dunham 1960). Podobným závěrům dosáhla i jedna z prvních přípravodních studii v této oblasti studující, jež státní zařízení pro choromyslné na území Texasu (Bellknap 1956).

Existují výrazné protipohody ve vývoji pohledu sociologie na zaměstnance úřadů a tvářen v na pacienty léčebných zařízení všech druhů. Ještě v první polovině padesátých let se studie věnovala zcela týmový rovinnosti sociologie při lečení pacientů. V této souvislosti sleduje i fluktuace ošetřujícího personálu a jeho právomoc morálku. Zjišťuje se, že zvláštní velké léčebné pro mentálně postižené vykazují výraznou neúčinnost při sledování svých manifestací. Dochází v nich k procesu, který Merton jí dříve nazval "přemístěním cílů". Jejich hlavním říkem se stává dohled, kontrola a poskytování pouze minimální péče. V něm je všechno o aktivitě, které mají nízký sociální status. Tato okolnost, ve spojení s chroni-
kým nedostatek financí obvykle u zařízení ekonomicky neproductivních, vede k tomu, že podobné ústavy přišlaří zpravidla něco motivačního a méně kvalitní personál. To zejména negativně ovlivňuje charakter poskytované péče, která se mění v pouhý symbol legitimitující faktycky odlučné aktivity zařízení.

Proces "premištění cílů" vyvolal zájem o studium problematiky kontraproduktivity organizací. Americká sociální psychologie (mezi jinými G. Devereux) od konce čtyřicátých let upozorňuje na skutečnost, že mentálně chorí pacienti jsou umístěni do prostředí, které stíle znovu generuje příznaky jejich choroby. Léčebny jsou tak smýčky zváděny za rozvoj chorob, na což upozorňovali ostatně již před sto lety jeden z klásníků psychiatrie Pinel. V nenormálním prostředí lze stěží očekávat rozvoj normálního jednání.

Sociologové doporučují nechat se inspirovat Hawthornským experimentem: již pouhé projevení záměru o pacienty a zvýšení komunikace s nimi má mít blahodárný dopad. Promítnutí trendu "human relations" má v oblasti léčebných zařízení analogický dopad jako v oblasti nápravných zařízení či vojenských institucí. Systémem zavedeným opatřením je znížování napětí mezi chovanci a personálem, rozšiřování jejich participace na chodu celé organizace.


K tomu je, podle Rapportova, zapotřebí demokratizovat léčebné inštituclu, tak abych ních pacientů i léčebně práva a mohli přiblížit jistou zodpovědnost ochranné sebe i druhých. Zdůrazňuje zároveň požadavek Kurta Levinova větší míru permisivity, tedy nahrazení striktní disciplíny liberalnějším přístupem a připuštěním diskuze. Kromě požadavku komunalismu, který účel spoji každodenní svět pacienta a personálu, trvá na principu konfrontace s realitu, tedy propojení dění uvnitř léčebné komunity se sledováním dění ve vnějším světě, jenž již nemá být ignorován.
Právě organizované naplňování mnoha odlišných potřeb velkého počtu lidí v rámci a pomocí prostředků byrokratické organizace povzduší Goffmana za klíčový znak totalitních institucí. Tyto instituce jsou jakými jsou sociaálními hybridmi, částečně jsou formalizované instituce, částečně nespecifikované komunity. Jsou to zřízení specializovaná na změnu osobností. Každá z nich představuje určitý sociální experiment ukazující, co lze učinit s individuální psychikou.

Z tohoto vymezení a uspořádání plynou další závažné důsledky. Proti sobě stojí chovanci ústavu a personál, dvě zcela zřetelně oddělené skupiny, které na sebe pohlížejí skrze hostitelské stereotypy. Vládní mezi nimi velká sociální distance, neexistuje prakticky žádná mobilita, jejich vzájemné chování je přesně reglementováno, což je dále posiluje ant agonistické stereotypy na obou stranách.

Totalitní instituce přijímají veškerou zodpovědnost nad svými chovanci po celý čas jejich pobytu. Jejich dohled se neomezí na oblast pracovních aktivit, jak je to běžné v moderních společnostech. Život v nich je neslučitelný se dvěma podstatnými rysy moderní společnosti:

1. Neexistuje žádný smluvně uzavřený kontrakt vymezený vztah mezi odvedenou prací a získanou odměnou. Všechny aktivity, včetně pracovních, nesou v různé míře využitou umělou.

2. Neexistuje žádná instituce rodinného života a domácnosti. Pracovní kontakt i vedení vlastní domácnosti je umožněno pouze personál, což dále zvyšuje rozdíly mezi oběma oblastmi a neúplně přirozenou jejich status. Goffman zkoumá svět chovanců a svět zaměstnanců totalitních institucí odděleně.

8.4.2. Svět chovanců

Všechny totalitní instituce vytvářejí a udržují zvláštní druh napětí mezi domovským světem, z něhož chovanci přicházejí, a světem instituce a užívají tohoto trvalého napětí jako významné strategie při zvládání a tvarování svých obyvatel. Nepřekročitelná hranice, kterou tyto instituce kladou mezi chovanci a vnitřní svět, je mimo jiné způsobu měnit role v příběhu všedního dne. Tím ochraňují jejich a omezuje jejich sociální status. Zároveň jim odebírá vše (včetně osobních věcí), co by jim mohlo připomenout jejich bývalou identitu.

Goffman popisuje, jakými způsoby totalitní instituce potlačují v nové příchodců, ať již záměrně, ať nezáměrně, jejich koncepci sebe sama, kterou si vyvinuli ve svém domovském světě. V této souvislosti analyzuje především mechanismy procesu moralizace, jenž jsou nové přichází do instituce.

Šok ze ztráty dřívějších rolí je doprovázen systematickým zbavováním vlastní tváře. Vnější se kato standardizace projevuje mimo jiné estetickým, přidělením čísla, vážením, dezinformací a přidělením povinného ústavního jména. Ucelen všech těchto procedur je navodit "civilní smrt" nových příchodců. Ty jsou tvářovány do podoby objektů, které mohou být snadno vloženy do již připravené administrativního modelu, kde budou opracovávána podle rutinních předpisů. Často jsou nové příchodci zavázeni svého placeného jména, tedy vlastnictví, které je mimořádně důležité pro určení vlastní identity. Na dobu pobytu přecházejí do majetku instituce i jejich vlastní víza.


Všechny tyto a mnohé další urmutovací praktiky, jež jsou koordinované nástrojem na civilní já chovanců, bývají zdokumentovány čistého jepragmaticky. V tělocvičnách pro mentálně nemocné jsou zdokumentovány ochranou pacienta před družími i před sebou samými, vězení jsou vyústěna za součást trestu a nástroj převýšení, v prostorech naboženských organizací jsou zdokumentovány potřeby duchovních cílů, již má být dosaženo skrze disciplinaci těla. Často je jednou pouze o zpětné racionalizaci snahy seřídit denní aktivity velkého počtu osob na malém prostoru při použití minimálních organizačních zdrojů.

8.4.3. Systém autory, systém privilegií a způsoby adaptace

Vztahy mocí uvnitř totalitních institucí vykazují několik zvláštností. Především zde existuje právo každého příslušníka aparátu organizace disciplinovat každého chovance. V moderní společnosti však totalitní ústavy existují podobný vzhled jedinců mezi policistou a občanem, kteří se dopustí určitého přestupku. Dále zde platí, že sankce lze užívat za velmi široké spektrum provedů a i po nepředpisové obolečení, stravování způsoby a podobné. A konečně, nevděčné chování v jedné oblasti může být penalizováno v jakékoli jiné. Výsledkem je maximalizace příležitostí pro udělení trestů a hustá sítě zákazů a příkazů, která upěstují všechny život chovanců a přiblíží pozici těchto dospělých situaci dítěte. Radikálně omezují míru jejich kontroly nad každodenním prostředím ve srovnání s běžným standardem, jenž je samozřejmě mimo zde ústavů. Nadměrný počet vysudpůjtníci může způsobovat, že chovanci, zvláště nově příchodní, žijí v chudé, bez vzdělávacích zařízení jejich možného překrocení.

Podobně jako v případě systematického um islandování vnějších osobností, také v případě systémového zákazů a pravidel narušují totalitní instituce především to jednání, které v běžné společnosti slouží individuálnímu tomu, aby si sama před sebou i před družstvem potvrdila, že má jistou kontrolu nad svým prostředím, že jsou zdravé autonomními a zodpovědnými bytostmi. V podmínkách totalitních institucí se napak zpravidla potlačují i marginaльнí projevy autonomního chování až po rovinu projevů nezájmu o málo odměňující vztahy a okolí k aktivní účasti na destrukci jejich dějinářské osobnosti (nováčci v kásernách, noviči v klášterech apod.).

Zatímco proces mrtvícího světa pokračuje, chovanci začínají přijímat formální i neformální instrukce o existenci systému ústavních privilegií. Kolem tohoto systému mohou začít krystallisovat prvky nové osobní reorganizace v podmínkách ústavy. Goffman rozlišuje tři základní prvky systému privilegií:


3. Znalezu forem trestu, například v podobě odmítnutí odměn a privilegií, je rovněž součástí systému privilegií, neboť tato znalost opět umožňuje zlepšit orientaci uvnitř organizace a tím i své šance na uspokojivě přežít.

V konfrontaci s mechanismy umravujícími osobnost a s využitím určitých prvků systému privilegií mohou chovanci individuálně volit několik strategií adaptace na existující podmínky. Goffman rozpoznává následující hlavní způsoby adaptace:

- Regrese. Spokojivá ve stažení se do sebe, což je vnitřní, subjektivní formou účinku z nepřijatelné reality. Tato strategie se vyznačuje minimální komunikací s družstvem, je pokusem uchránit svůj vnitřní svět jako realitu primárního významu a bagatellozí realitu skutečné.

- Rebellion. Známena odmítnutí spolupráce s personálem, vzpourou proti zákonním a ignorování pravidel totální instituce. Bývá zpravidla první reakcí na nové poměry, často po prvých sánčích přechází v formu regrese.


- Konverze. Chovanc přijímá optiku personální jak v pohledu na druhé, tak také sám na sebe. Spolupracuje iniciativně s personálem, třeba i na úkor svých kolegů.
Chovanci zpravidla kombinují popsané postoje takovým způsobem, aby z prostředí totální instituce vyšli co nejméně fyzicky a psychicky poškozeni. Všechny tyto strategie a jejich kombinace jim mají na pomocí zvládat napětí mezi domovským světem a světem totální instituce.

Goffman konstatuje, že platnost popisovaných mechanismů mortifikace, systému privilegií a způsobu adaptace se liší podle typu instituce a podle způsobu rekrutace chovanců. Způsob rekrutace varuje od nedobrovolného vstupu (vězení, pracovní tábory, léčebny pro mentálně postižené) až do vstupu zcela dobrovolný (kláštery). Některá doprostřed pak situuje Goffman kašárna jakožto instituci, kde nucený po- byt prezentuje jako čestnou službu, několikú jako trest.


Kapitola 9
Byrokracie

Prvky, kdo použil termín "byrokracie", byl francouzský ekonom fyzikrát Vincent de Gournay. Měl tak učinit roku 1745. Od té doby sdělil "byrokracie" osud snad všech pojmů užívaných ve společenských věděch. Řízení autorů mu přidělují významně často značné odlišní, žurnalistická práce a intuice politiků přispívají k dalšímu znamení již tak nejasného pojmu. Nejčastejší bývá termín "byrokracie" spojován se těmi značné odlišnými okruhy vyznam.

1. Politologie různí pod "byrokracií" vlády uskutečněnou skrze úřady, skrze státní aparát složený ze jmenovaných, a nikoli volených činitelů, organizovaný hierarchicky a závislý na legálním autoritě. Jedná se o vládu regulovanou sice zákony, avšak připouštějící jen minimální účast občanů na řízení veřejných záležitostí. Alternativní upravování předpokládá jistou decentralizaci státní správy a dopro- vedné zvýšení role volených zástupců občanů, především na úrovni lokalní a regionální samosprávy.

2. V sociologií a v historických věděch se, do značné míry pod vlivem díla Maxe Webera, rozumí byrokratizaci snahu o racionizaci kolektivních aktivit spočívající ve vytváření velkých výrobních i nevýrobních organizací a právnických osob, které jsou řízeny pomocí neobhospodárných pravidel. Alternativou moderní byrokracie v tomto slova smyslu by byl návrh k historicky ranějším formám organizace správních i produkcích aktivit, tedy v termínoch Maxe Webera návrh k baronovým či dokonce patriarchálním formám organizace. Byrokracie v tomto čistě technickém smyslu může být nahrazena jedině vůdčími neobhospodárnými dilematy, neprofesionální.

3. V běžném užívání označuje "byrokracie" nesrozumitelný způsob vyřizování poměrně jednoduchých záležitostí, který komplikuje a zne- příjměuje život občanů. Patří sem například i neúměrné dlouhé vyři- zování záležitostí, rutinní nezájëm, s nímž úředníci přispívají k vyri- zování jednoduchých případů, komplikovanost procedur, ignorování účelů, jimiž je organizace explicitně pověšena, a podobně. Alternativa bylo by co nejméně a co nejpružnější používání výkazů, statistik a dopravního, co nejkratšího frontu před dřívější úřadů a co nejkratší lživy vyřizování žádostí.

"Různost pojetí je daleko komplikovaná skutečnost, že samotný výraz "byrokracie" není stvořen přišli šťastně. Toto označení bylo dojem, že