Symbols in action: Willy Brandt’s kneefall at the Warsaw Memorial

Valentin Rauer

“Through all former and later pictures, [. . . I] see a kneeling man in Warsaw. [. . . ] there are people who can say more with their back than others with thousand words. It was obvious that every part of this body felt something that wanted to be expressed – about guilt, penance and an infinite pain.”

Cees Nooteboom

Introduction

On December 7, 1970, Willy Brandt, the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, was to sign the Warsaw Treaty, one of the treaties between Germany and Warsaw Pact nations currently seen as the first diplomatic step to the breakthrough of the Iron Curtain. The official signing took place in Warsaw and, as expected in the international political arena, it was paralleled by several commemorative ceremonies. The agenda included a visit to the Warsaw Memorial, erected in honor of the Jewish heroes of the 1943 Ghetto Uprising. Surrounded by the official political entourage and several representatives of the international press, Mr. Brandt stepped out of his vehicle, slowly approached the Memorial, straightened out the ribbon of a previously laid flower wreath and took a step back. Then something unexpected happened: he suddenly sank on to his knees in front of the Memorial and remained still for a minute. The next day, the response to his gesture was enormous. The picture of Brandt kneeling made its mark in the international press. All major newspapers in Europe and the United States enthusiastically featured this “emotional moment” in international relations.

Based on a media analysis of the German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s kneefall in Warsaw, I will demonstrate that this was not just another media-hyped occurrence in politics but in fact an extraordinary event that marked the beginning of a new stage of development in the trajectory of German identity and memory. This performative event has changed the way in which Germans attempt to come
to terms with their Nazi past (Barkan 2000; Moeller 1996: 1035). In the twenty-
year period following World War Two, Germans have perceived themselves as
victims of Hitler and Stalin rather than as victimizers. Reminders that Germany
represents a “country of perpetrators” were usually dismissed by the majority
of Germans either out of ignorance or resentment. The kneefall was the first
symbolic public representation of German guilt that did not face general imme-
diate defensive opposition in Germany. Quite the opposite, this event opened
up the way for new forms of collective remembrance of and responsibility for
the German past.

This breakthrough raises an essential theoretical question: how can a sponta-
nous gesture that lasted only one minute have such a powerful latent impact
on West German self-representation? Why and how is the kneefall currently
perceived in the German public sphere as the decisive turning point in the his-
tory of German collective memory? To expand on these issues, I will first refer
to the epistemological impact of a performed social reality (Austin 1957; Der-
rida 1982 [1971]; Eco 1977). Second, I will refer to two paradigms of social
performance that may at first glance seem incompatible: the cultural-pragmatic
approach of performance (Alexander, in this volume; Turner 1986) and the
concept of “event-ness” (Giesen, this volume; Mersch 2002). The cultural-
pragmatic approach provides analytical concepts for common performative
productions and receptions in their entireties, and highlights that any actual
performative action is always embedded in a certain cultural context, in narra-
tives and scripts, and in power relations. The concept of event-ness, in contrast,
focuses on the construction of occurrences as extraordinary events (Mast, this
volume). This transformative construction of occurrences into events is crucial
in the case of the kneefall because it enables us to explain how rigid identities
and collective memories can rupture and how they are rearranged. After an
occurrence has been perceived as an “extraordinary event” we no longer see
the world as before. The reconciliation of these two approaches will elucidate
the question of why Brandt’s kneefall as a performative act has had such a
profound path-breaking effect on German collective memory; furthermore, it
provides a theoretical contribution to performance theory, of how the relation
between cultural stability and cultural change could be conceived of.

Performances between reproduction and event-ness

After Willy Brandt, the highest representative of the Federal Republic, had
through his symbolic gesture acknowledged Germany’s past as a perpetrator,
former narratives of disclaimer and self-victimizing were not as acceptable as
before. Brandt’s acknowledgment was not a formal speech, but a symbol in
action or a gestural performance. Such acts have much more power to construct
a new social reality than formal contracts or agreements (Tambiah 1979; Turner 1986). The kneefall was a gestural “speech act” that expressed feelings of remorse and repentance. Performatives achieve their meaning by doing instead of describing; they do not claim truth in the Habermasian sense, but create social reality by doing something. Performatives are never true or false but “felicitous or infelicitous” (Austin 1957: 9f.). The “action part” of a speech act (e.g. “I am sorry,” “I promise”) creates a way of social “being” which did not exist before the utterance. The only epistemological doubt that can be raised concerns the pragmatic question of whether the act is infelicitous, inadequate, or fabricated; e.g. did the proper person make the apology, or was the apology performed authentically enough to enhance the moral status of the person or collective? Similarly, the weekly journal Der Spiegel featured the kneefall by asking the question: “Should Brandt have knelt?”

It may seem trivial at first glance, but Austin’s epistemological distinction is crucial here: Brandt invented a new performative symbol to represent the German past, thus creating a new collective reality. The discussion that followed was able to react to this new reality only by questioning the adequacy of the symbol, not its truth. The reference of truth to identity was thus shifted from the “inner” world of consciousness into the “external” world of action, expression, and perception. The philosophical being was replaced by a social being. The Cartesian cogito, “I think, therefore I am,” was transformed into “I perform, therefore I am.” The internal world was superseded by its surface; the “true” inner self became irrelevant to the social meaning of the interaction communicated.

However, all performative utterances depend on the iteration of certain textual models or scripts in order to be understood, which means that there is nothing like a new performance (Derrida 1982 [1971]: 307–30). In the media, Brandt’s kneefall was equated to a mythical historical predecessor: medieval King Heinrich IV’s kneefall in Canossa. Thirty years later, the kneefall became an object of iteration and mythification in its own right. It had been applied to various contexts (Yugoslavia, China/Japan, Italy, Chile etc.) as a symbol which one should take as a model to be followed while performing public acts of reconciliation. Derrida’s concept of iteration explains that the effectiveness of performative acts lies in the fact that their activity is meant to be understood and shared. However, what is missing from his perspective is an approach with which to study the social conditions within which such symbols in action occur. Textual iteration includes neither a notion of social power, nor of actors, nor of an audience passing judgments on or interpreting such acts. If there are only textual iterations of signs and scripts, performance theory is reduced to what Umberto Eco once called “pan-semiotical metaphysics.” There is no latent context beyond the “world as text – the text as world” (Eco 1987: 15–17, my translation).
Therefore, from a sociological perspective, the more challenging question is how and why performances have the power to transform and reproduce social identities, hierarchies, or power-structures (Turner 1986). A person who has successfully apologized for his or her deeds no longer possesses the same “degraded” identity as before (Garfinkel 1956). In order to understand that “performative magic” (Bourdieu 1991) in a sociological sense, the audience perspective must be included. The Weberian charismatic leader does not possess a real extraordinary disposition, but performs before his or her audience in such a manner that everybody believes in his or her extraordinary-ness (“. . . der Glaube an die Außeralttäglichkeit”). In the same sense, an extraordinary event is not extraordinary in itself, but rather is believed to be by the audience. In this respect extraordinary-ness and event-ness do not represent an ontological reality, but rather a social reality. For the study of the persuasive force of performative events on collective identity, this argument demonstrates that we must take the perspective of the audience into empirical consideration.

But what is the audience? In modern or postmodern societies, Goffman’s dichotomy of stage and back stage on the one hand, and audience on the other, is too simple. Audiences are not as monolithic as they seem at first glance. The functional differentiation of the means of media productions and techniques causes a multiplication of audience on at least three different levels, which can be called first-, second-, and third-order audiences. The first-order audience experiences the actual performance (the crowd actually observing the kneefall, see figure 8.1); for them, in terms of speech-act theory, the fusion of time and space and of actors and audience “creates a new reality.” The second-order audience are the media which encode the event (Hall 1980) by providing latent structures of time and space by means of textual or visual representation. The media make the “absence” of the situation possible (Derrida 1982 [1971]) and encode the event as successful or failed. The reader or viewer of the media products are the third-order audience, who more or less depend on these medial judgments while decoding its meaning (Hall 1980). However, it is even more complex than that: the audiences can become actors themselves. The first-order audience is already often included and shown on TV or in newspaper pictures. Their spontaneous utterances, their laughter, or in this case, their silence, are also taken into account by the media. Their reactions are cited by the second-order audience in order to transform a profane occurrence into an extraordinary event. In modern “media democracies” not only the audiences, but also the actors are multifaceted (Meyer 2002). In classical theatre the actor on stage represents not himself as a person, but a social type of persons. The actor does not express his “real me” but a general, typological or “social me” (Eco 1977). In theatre, abstract social categories are performed as if they were really happening. Thus the performance of social classifications is the central structural characteristic of
classical theatre (Eco 1977). In contrast, television genres such as news reports or “reality TV” represent a wider scope of social reality. Here, the mediated person simultaneously refers to him- or herself both as a “real person” and to his or her social role. On television news reports he or she walks and talks not like a politician, but as a politician (Eco 1977). If, for instance, the kneeling German Chancellor is broadcasted on TV, it shows not only an actor who plays or imitates political ceremony, but someone who creates as the “real” Chancellor a new reality of commemoration by a performative act. Television’s means of symbolic productions produce a multifaceted spectrum of social realities; the newer medium innovates and iterates theatre at the same time. Seen from the perspective of speech-act theory, this means that television enables real politicians to perform an act in order to transform the status or identity of the collective that they represent. In (post)modern societies teatro mundi is challenged by media mundi.

However, in order to understand the social impact of performance comprehensively, more than just the audience and actor perspectives are required (see Alexander, this volume). Some performances are censured and changed from “above” or due to the concrete societal context cannot even take form. Therefore, power and hierarchical aspects must always be taken into account. It is a different thing if it is the leader of the opposition or the Chancellor of the country who falls to his or her knees. In the same way, it makes a difference if a
private person has sexual affairs or if it is the President of the United States (see Mast, this volume). For a person holding extraordinary power, it is much more likely that his or her performance is not perceived as profane occurrence, but as extraordinary event. This is quite similar to the phenomenon of “charisma of office” (Max Weber).

Moreover, performances are embedded in “background systems of collective representations.” These are general belief systems, the values on which the actual performance relies. The nation as an “imagined community” of freedom and solidarity is one of the strongest belief systems in the modern era (Anderson 1983). Narratives according to which the national identity is rooted in a heroic uprising strengthen these beliefs and transform it into a stable and latent taken-for-granted-ness (Giesen 1998).

The interrelatedness and mutuality of the different pragmatic cultural patterns such as actors, audience, representational systems, scripts, and power-structures, etc., explain the reproduction and stability of collective identity and cultural specificities. However, a salient question remains: how can these collective identities change, or how can we think of cultural change in terms of performance theory? For instance, the “guilt of nations” (Barkan 2000) was a totally new phenomenon for imagined communities. There existed neither a traditional knowledge of how to remember adequately such a “counter-past,” nor were there collective scripts and commemorative rituals on which one could simply rely. All these cultural techniques and representations had to be invented almost out of nothing. The kneefall was one of these inventions.

To develop patterns for the theoretical interpretation of inventions, ruptures, breaks, and rearrangements, it is necessary to take into account the phenomenon of performative “event-ness.” Recent philosophical approaches to performance theory differentiate between “action” and “performance” (Mersch 2002). Whereas actions are intentionally driven, performances are events that are by definition “unintentional.” Events are experienced as if they “manifest themselves,” as if they “simply happen,” driven by a radical “alterity” which is beyond the sphere of profane or ordinary meaning (Mersch 2002: 9, my translation). Taking up Durkheim’s differentiation between the sacred and the profane, one can argue that, for modern societies, it is the uncontrived event-ness that takes on the former function of the sacred (see Giesen, this volume). Whereas sacred rites such as the communication with the divine are crucial for constructing collective identity in traditional or stable times, it is the experience of event-ness, or, to introduce another term, meaningful contingency, that alters rigid belief systems. Those meaningful contingencies provide a resource for the invention of new traditions, belief systems, and rituals.

As the following empirical analysis will show, the presence of meaningful contingency is precisely why enhanced moral value is still attributed to the kneefall thirty years after it took place. For the international audience, the
kneefall was unprecedented. Brandt’s “invention” expressed a change in the community of perpetrators. If, in contrast, the gesture had been commented on as intended and contrived, there would be no such attributions and transformational effects.

Cultural pragmatic as public commemoration: the West German case

Before going into the detail of the kneefall’s specific significance, the performative environment or the historical context of the kneefall must be roughly sketched (figure 8.2). The context can be patterned through a set of different periods in which the kneefall played an important role as turning point. Periodizations always risk over-simplification and West German history of memory in particular is characterized by fundamental ambiguities. Whenever it seems that the country’s historical conscience has settled down, a new, formerly taboo issue suddenly appears as the main concern for public memory. However, by using the analytical tools of cultural pragmatics and event-ness to undertake a periodization, the principal openness, fluidity, and the subjectivity of such a categorical attempt remain transparent. It is important to note that these different periods are not mutually exclusive in a strict sense. All four acts of the German memory drama more or less overlap and are to some degree still present. Some modes of remembering continually return, some come more slowly than others to a halt (Assmann and Frevert 1999) (see table 8.1).

Throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, most West Germans perceived themselves not as perpetrators but as victims. According to them, the villain was Stalin who kept millions of German POWs in his camps and occupied German territory. The suffering of Germans has frequently been paralleled to that of the Jewish victims of the concentration camps (Moeller 1996: 1026–7). Public stories portrayed German women as innocent victims of war and patriarchy (Heinemann 1996; Grossmann 1998; Schneider 1998). Yet there were some incidents which could and did indeed raise the question of guilt: war crimes trials and reparation payments to Israel. But all these public debates did not really affect the common disclaimers. Instead, these issues remained objects of contestation and resentment. The German victim-discourse was valid for both those who currently still adhered to Nazi ideology as well as for those who had regrets in retrospect. The former group usually did not feel guilt at all, whereas the latter group lived in a system of collective representations of “transcendent guilt.” Guilt was transformed into an existential condition of mankind and was thus represented within the sphere of metaphysics: “Mankind is evil, thus the war and the Nazis are only one example of this evilness and we, like all others, are victims of that human nature.” Within the primary script dominant at the time, Hitler was imagined as “the demon” who alone was responsible
for Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{10} The actors in power at that time were to a great extent former National Socialists who had either changed their identity or merely kept silent about their past.\textsuperscript{11} It is commonly acknowledged that the continuity of the elite within institutions such as medicine and law was almost unbroken, but marginal fields such as, for instance, sociology, were also no exception to this rule (Rehberg 1998). In terms of social power, it is a remarkable fact that no surviving victim was ever given the chance to speak publicly at commemoration days (Lüdtke 1993: 554).\textsuperscript{12} The means to symbolic production about the extermination camps were labeled improper, although they were available. Popular films, novels, and scholarly research depicted the general aspects as
Table 8.1  *The history of the performance of a past-as-perpetrator in the West German public sphere*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time periods</th>
<th>1949–50s</th>
<th>Early/ mid-1960s</th>
<th>Late 1960s–70s</th>
<th>1980s–90s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background representation</strong></td>
<td>Demonization of guilt</td>
<td>Individualization of guilt</td>
<td>Gener(aliz)ation of guilt</td>
<td>Nationalization of guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreground scripts</strong></td>
<td>Victimized Germans</td>
<td>Decent Germans</td>
<td>Resisting Germans</td>
<td>Victimized Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors/social power</strong></td>
<td>1st generation</td>
<td>1st generation</td>
<td>1st–2nd generation</td>
<td>2nd–3rd generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public audience</strong></td>
<td>Disclaim</td>
<td>Expulsion</td>
<td>Contestation</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means of symbolic production</strong></td>
<td>Ignored, silenced</td>
<td>(Trans) national media coverage</td>
<td>Public riots, terrorism</td>
<td>Theatricalization of memories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mise-en-scène</strong></td>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>The court</td>
<td>The street</td>
<td>TV narratives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For the theoretical model and indicators (left row) see Alexander, this volume. For historical background see Giesen 2004.*
well as the specifics of Germany’s “fate” (Moeller 1996). One striking example of this is that, during these years, only 4 percent of nearly 800 television documentaries on National Socialism mentioned the persecution of Jews (Classen 1999: 111). Metaphorically speaking, the only social drama performed on stage in respect to Germany’s guilt and its victims, was a *mise-en-scène* of absence.

In the mid-1960s, public attention was captured by the so-called “Auschwitz trials” held in the 1960s in Frankfurt am Main. Whereas the Nuremberg trials conducted by the victorious Allies could easily be dismissed as *Siegerjustiz* (“victors’ justice”), the Frankfurt trials were held before a German court. In 1961, the Eichmann trial was held in Israel. The picture of the accused bureaucrat sitting in a glass chamber went around the world and was the crucial *mise-en-scène* at the time. In both cases, the accused appeared as ordinary Germans. The “banality of evil” (Arendt 1963) no longer allowed for a metaphysical demonization of guilt. Hence, the system of collective representation shifted to the crimes of individuals. Former perpetrators and bystanders were still in power and from their point of view, the criminals had to be exculpated. Thus, the individualization of guilt did not challenge the primary script of the “decent Germans.” Furthermore, the trials triggered such an enormous international resonance that a new sensibility emerged in Germany as to how it should more adequately represent its past (Dubiel 1999: 105). The means of symbolic production ceased to be exclusively in the hands of the German public sphere; instead, it became clear that the perspective of the international public sphere had to be included. This new transnational tendency seems to indicate the presence of a recently identified phenomenon termed “international moral” (Barkan 2003), “moral universals” (Alexander 2002), the new international “politics of regret” (Olick and Coughlin 2003), or the transformation from “triumph to trauma” (Giesen 2004).

The trials were also observed by a new, younger generation. For this particular section of the audience, the collective representation of individual guilt versus “decent” German soldiers was unacceptable. They began to question their parents’ generation (Bude 1997). In West Germany, the student movement of 1968 was directed not only against capitalism, consumerism, and societal hierarchy, but also against their parents’ generation’s denial of memory. The *mise-en-scène* was constituted by their “families” or demonstrations, happenings, or riots in the street. By attributing general guilt to the older generation (“gener(aliz)ation of guilt”), they, the “children,” positioned themselves on the “safe” side of the generation gap. National guilt or a sense of responsibility did not exist for the students of 1968; since at the time capitalism was perceived as the ultimate cause of fascism, resistance against capitalism meant resistance against fascism. Some important participants in the student revolt were at that time already inclined towards national patriotic movements; later, they became
right-wing German nationalists (Kraushaar 2000). Latent anti-Semitic prejudices could still be identified within the cultural dramatizations (Stern 1992). It will be demonstrated in the following empirical sections that the first performative event to acknowledge national guilt was Brandt’s kneefall. Another occurrence discussed nationwide was the television series Holocaust of 1978. The series raised once more the question of guilt; its performative effect lay in the fact that this was not represented in the form of an abstract debate, but as a narrative (Lüdtke 1993: 554f.). In general, the public’s attention was above all caught by an increase in the “theatricalization” of memory (Bodemann 2002) and the mise-en-scène represented by biographical or fictitious narratives on television. However, this period – which continues to the present day – can be divided into several different subperiods (e.g. before and after reunification) and is characterized by a high grade of complexity and ambiguity.

The media reception of the kneefall in 1970

The kneefall occurred while Willy Brandt visited Warsaw to sign the so-called Warsaw Treaty, one of Germany’s Ostverträge. The planned visit had been frequently reported on by the national and international press. In the period between November 1970 and January 1971, in France and Italy alone each major newspaper had published around thirty articles on that topic. Within the international public sphere, the treaties were generally viewed positively, whereas in West Germany, the media, especially voices close to the conservative Christian Democrats and the associations of the ethnic German refugees from Eastern Europe (Vertriebenenverbände) opposed the treaties furiously. One famous slogan against Brandt’s politics of reconciliation was: “Brandt up against the wall” (Brandt an die Wand), which was nothing less than an appeal to homicide. This strong opposition to the treaties had been reported on in France and Italy, as well (e.g. Il Messaggero, December 7, 1970).

For the media, the kneefall was the most noteworthy event of the moment, giving it enormous international resonance. Important newspapers in Italy, France, Switzerland, and the US (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Le Figaro, Le Monde, Corriere Della Serra, Il Messaggero, and the New York Times) carried a front-page photo and feature article on this event. One month later, Time Magazine elected Brandt “man of the year” (Time, January 4, 1971). In general, the newspapers praised the gesture as an authentic symbolic admittance of responsibility for Germany’s past. For example, Le Figaro (December 8, 1970) subtitled the photo an “emotional moment.” Frequently, especially in Italy, the press portrayed the kneefall in a highly enthusiastic and emphatic style: “We saw Willy Brandt kneeling and engrossed in deep reflection, lost in grief and isolated from the world around him” (Il Messaggero, December 8, 1970). In almost every
newspaper, internationally as well as in the West German press, the kneefall was narrated in every detail of its performance:

The Chancellor slowly approached the monument, he paused for a moment, adjusted the ribbons of a wreath made of white carnations, then he spontaneously sank onto his knees, as if shot dead, remaining still and stony-faced in this position. (*Corriere della Sera*, December 8, 1970).

He stepped from his car and walked slowly toward the memorial between two flame-lit stone-menorahs. Mr. Brandt, who had spent the Nazi period in Scandinavia, dropped to his knees and remained that way for a full minute. He bowed his head slightly and then rose heavily. When he turned, the edge of his mouth was trembling. He joined his official party and walked slowly back, past the widely separated thin line of spectators. (*New York Times*, December 8, 1970)

Sometimes, especially in the Italian press, the kneefall was even deemed a historical moment which “drew a line under the past” (*Schlussstrich*) as either “a sign which deletes the past” (*Il Messaggero*, December 8, 1970) or as a “victory over the past” (*Corriere della Sera*, December 9, 1970). In contrast, comments in the German newspapers immediately following the event were reserved and rather reluctant. The gesture was, however, reported by the major newspapers, and mostly without any criticism. The only statement questioning the kneefall was to be found in an article in the conservative newspaper *Die Welt* (December 8, 1970). It printed two pictures side by side, the kneeling Brandt and the medieval emperor Heinrich IV in Canossa. The pictures were subtitled: “self humiliation does not always eliminate the ban.”

The media reception of the kneefall during the 1990s

*Empirical data*

All articles from a period of four years (1995–9) in which the kneefall was mentioned were assembled. Out of a total retrieval of about 200 articles, 80 percent covered the kneefall as their main topic. In the remaining 20 percent, the act was mentioned in different contexts as a symbolic device, for instance in sport coverage. On the most general level, the findings can first be distinguished as *memory frames* (figure 8.2: columns above) and *theatricalizations* of the kneefall (figure 8.2: columns below). The memory frames can be further subdivided into *national* frames and *international* frames.

*Interpretation*

In the media of the 1990s, the kneefall strongly symbolized the transformation from disclaiming the past towards an acceptance and acknowledgment
of “national guilt.” This significance was not attributed immediately after the event, but at a historical distance of 25–30 years. Furthermore, the kneefall was used outside of its historical and geographical contexts as a model of appropriate recollection with respect to political gestures associated with the acknowledgment of national guilt. Framing of this kind tends to stress explicitly the characteristic meaning of such symbolic gestures. In this way, the kneefall serves as a normative point of reference in order to judge a symbolic act by the state as either “successful” or as “failed.” The kneefall is iterated and re-iterated in the sense of Derrida. To give an example of a reference to the kneefall which compares it to a positively viewed, “successful” symbolic act, consider the following comment on German Federal President Herzog’s speech in Guernica, Spain:

Since Willy Brandt’s kneefall in front of the Warsaw Ghetto, there has not been a more touching gesture of guilt faced. The world had to wait for a long time for this. Until yesterday, neither Germany nor Spain had confessed publicly who was responsible for the destruction of the city. Finally a German broke the leaden silence about Guernica [. . .], naming the crime. (*Berliner Kurier*, April 28, 1997)

In this example the kneefall functions as an iterated, abstract model; Herzog did not perform any similar gesture, but simply gave a speech. In contrast, the kneefall has been used elsewhere in the same function, but to argue the opposite. For instance, it was applied to criticize the absence of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the occasion of the inauguration of the Holocaust Museum in Washington:

Willy Brandt bent his knee in the Warsaw ghetto in front of them. Though, a visible sign of German repentance would also have done well in Washington, the Germans remain guilty of the mass extermination of Jews, monstrous in its scale and execution. (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 24, 1993)

It is intriguing to see how directly the kneefall is applied within different contexts. The author did not intend to accuse Chancellor Kohl of denying German guilt, instead the contrasting comparison between Kohl’s absence in Washington and the kneefall was drawn in order to emphasize – without much explanation – how an appropriate enactment of collective memory should have been performed.

**National frames**

Furthermore, the kneefall is referred to as a “remarkable event” in the history of the Federal Republic. The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Willy Brandt’s biography, where the kneefall is presented on the occasion of its
25th anniversary, both attach particular importance to the kneefall in historical retrospective.

Another frame can be designated “the kneefall as sacred symbol.” Readers of the leftist newspaper ‘taz’ wrote critical letters to the editor about a satirical caricature in which the kneefall was re-enacted by Mr. Scharping, a candidate for Chancellor at that time. The caption read: “I can do that as well.” The two following quotations are examples of the readers’ protest:

To “estrange” Willy Brandt’s kneefall in the Warsaw ghetto […] is a painful blunder! On behalf of critical officers and non-commissioned officers of the German Federal Armed Forces I dissociate myself from this awful act and expect words of regret, insight and declaration of shame from the people responsible. (H. P., Retired Officer of the Federal Armed Forces (taz, August 22, 1994))

It’s really the worst and most reactionary thing the taz has ever come up with, to mess with Willy Brandt’s kneefall in these times of Neo-Nazism. (Member of the German Green Party (taz, August 15, 1994))

In response to the protests, taz saw itself forced to withdraw its commercial campaign. This example demonstrates that toying with the kneefall is taboo and will not be allowed, which is an indicator of the power of identification implied by the kneefall within the particular collective system of memorial representations.

Finally, two letters to the editor were coded under Schlußstrich, i.e. the kneefall was “considered to be a closed matter of memory.” In the letter, the reader argued that in the context of the “forced labour compensation debate,” Brandt’s gesture had done enough penance (Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 29, 1999). Another letter took the opposite position (taz, April 10, 1993). However, due to its singularity, such argumentation does not appear to represent the main concerns of public discourse.

Transnational frames

The kneefall is mentioned again and again as a paradigm for a successful “conciliation gesture” in transnational relations, especially between Germany and Poland. For example, Die Welt uses the kneefall as a model of successful conciliation to comment on the state visit of President Herzog to Poland:

Herzog faced his first practical test during the months of commemoration. In Warsaw he apologized in an honest and unrestricted way for the injustice done to the Polish people by the Germans. Thereby, he may have achieved an effect as important for the relations between both nations as Willy Brandt with his historical kneefall. (Die Welt, July 31, 1995)
In addition, there were statements in which the kneefall serves as a model for unsuccessful symbolic memory politics. The author of the following quotation combines the significance of Brandt’s kneefall as a performative model with the reconciliation between Poland and Germany by proposing that it was this gesture which “suddenly gave the relationship a new basis.” Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the original context of his symbolic act, which inaugurated reconciliation on the basis of political negotiations, is simply forgotten. The power of performative acts appears much more relevant for a nation’s collective memory in contrast to that of political treaties.

Nowadays, in this country the sense for symbolic action […] is not very developed among politicians. The conciliatory gestures offered by Helmut Kohl to different presidents at several war cemeteries did not find uncritical approval in the public eye. With a sigh [observers] remembered Willy Brandt’s kneefall in Warsaw which suddenly gave a new basis to the relationship between Poland and Germany. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 15, 1996)

Another frame is crucial for the question of the mutual interdependency of transnationalized public spheres. Here in particular, the viewpoint of others, i.e. the international resonance to the conciliatory power of the kneefall as a performative gesture, is quoted and emphasized. In this way, the Berliner Kurier summarized international impressions of President Herzog’s visit to Warsaw:

[…] abroad Herzog makes a good impression. With his “plea for forgiveness” at the memorial of the Warsaw uprising, he gathered international sympathy for Germany. This awakens the memory of Willy Brandt’s legendary Warsaw kneefall in 1970. (Berliner Kurier, July 12, 1998)

Another frame identifies the kneefall as a model for the others, i.e. an internationally applicable symbol “Made in Germany” and “Ready for export.” This interpretation of the kneefall is suggested within the context of the Yugoslavian conflict. Additional attributions could be found within the context of post-war relations between China and Japan or Italy and Slovenia, as well as in the case of France and Algeria, Chile and Pinochet, Germany and the Czech Republic and East Germany:

A leading Croatian scientist agreed in a public discussion that, without a symbolic gesture from the Serbian side similar to Willy Brandt’s kneefall in Warsaw, true normalization between aggressors and victims of aggression may not be achieved. (Die Welt, January 27, 1997)

China praised the Germans for coming to terms with their past and recommended it as a model for Japan. […] The news agency also referred to […] the kneefall of the German
Ex-Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1970 and compared it to the disputed gestures of the Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto. (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 16, 1996)

Finally, Fini demanded a formal apology from the Slovenian government for the bloodbath which Yugoslavian partisans committed [. . .] in 1945 among Italian citizens. No doubt, such an act of apology would only be possible for Slovenia if Italy were also to apologize for its fascist misdeeds, [thus] Fini’s reference to Willy Brandt’s kneefall in Warsaw [. . .] is misleading. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 20, 1994)

In a few further articles, the kneefall was framed as a “necessary condition for Europeanization.” The Italian journalist Franca Magnani compared the manifesto of the Italian *resistenza* with Brandt’s kneefall, designating both acts as fundamental to the establishment of the European idea. In *Die Zeit* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Brandt is praised as the politician to whose visions Europe should refer after the end of Cold War:

[The *resistenza*] is of a symbolic significance comparable to Willy Brandt’s kneefall in the Warsaw ghetto. Therefore, one can not overlook the essential factor which applies to all countries that are characterized by resistance against National Socialism and fascism: the ethical values the struggle for freedom has created as a common point of reference for every country which is prepared for the construction of Europe. (*Die Zeit*, March 3, 1995)

The international recognition of the kneefall has been enormous; *Time* chose Willy Brandt as “Man of the Year.” Since the fall of the iron curtain, he may be the only politician with a conclusive vision, the most interesting and hopeful vision of a new Europe. (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 23, 1999)

The least frequent frames concern the “German–Jewish relationships” (*n* = 5) and the “history of the Warsaw ghetto” (*n* = 3). It is remarkable that the actual historical cause at which the kneefall was visually directed is so rarely featured. This infrequency highlights the relevance of “the kneefall” as an abstract iconological symbol for the history of German memory. The main focus is not the revolt in the Ghetto to which Willy Brandt’s gesture literally referred. Instead, its significance is used to construct a redeemed, new German collective identity. The symbol has been removed from the historical context in which it initially appeared, in the 1990s coming to symbolize a “successful” performative act which challenged the denial of guilt within the culture of German historical memory.

*Theatricalizations of the kneefall*

To the group “theatricalization” or “dramatization” were attributed all those sentences which reported on the performative mimesis of Brandt’s kneefall
by artists, musicians, etc. Most articles were concerned with the opera Der Kniefall von Warschau, which had its premiere in 1997. In coverage preceding the premiere, the press responded positively to the kneefall as a theme for an opera:

The kneefall of Warsaw on 7th December, 1970 was one of the most important political symbolic acts of the century. It was readily apparent that an opera seeking to devote itself to the noble, the altruistic and the good would choose as its take-off point this great gesture before the Warsaw memorial at the very moment in which it transformed a figure of contemporary history into a hero of the theatre. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 24, 1997)

Subsequent reviewers praised the composer’s decision to have the instruments be silent during the moment at which the kneefall occurred on stage. The newspapers retold the dramatic “climax” of the opera in detail, as did for example, the Süddeutsche Zeitung:

The tension increases, the historical moment expands into immensity. WB [. . .] has just arranged the wreath’s bows on the memorial in the former Warsaw ghetto. Now he is standing and becomes engrossed, hears from afar synagogue songs: internal music accompanying the memory of the dreadful things that came to pass here. He stands, does not kneel yet. Not until a group of young people wearing the yellow Star of David, seized by panic, comes storming up to the ramp, and they all collapse, hit by imaginary shots. Just then, as the music stops, WB kneels – “the human being becomes a myth.” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 24, 1997)

However, in total, critics were quite disappointed by the opera. The Berliner Zeitung topped off its critical review with a headline pun: “Prostration was a frustration” (Kniefall war ein Reifall) (Berliner Zeitung, November 24, 1997). In general, the critics complain about the “hero-worship” of the work, i.e. its evocation of a “traditional heroic image” (Berliner Zeitung, December 3, 1997) of Willy Brandt. These reviews speak of the relative abstraction of the symbolic gesture “kneefall” in contrast to the image of Willy Brandt evoked in the opera. Whereas the act itself seems apparently suitable for the mystification, a mystification of the person Willy Brandt is viewed with skepticism and commented on with irony. Perhaps this differentiation is due to the way in which the act itself was depicted, which did not fall under the typical classical narrative presentation of a heroic protagonist. Or the criticism could also be interpreted as referring in particular to the background of traumatic memory visualized by means of a culprit/victim iconology which emphatically rejected a triumphalist hero narrative.

Another frame entails statements referring to the kneefall as a suitable subject for a stone memorial sculpture. For example, it was proposed that a sculpture
of the kneefall might be appropriate for the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. Elsewhere, a Social Democrat politician, Klaus von Dohnanyi, opposed a monumental Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, suggesting instead that “an artist could depict Willy Brandt’s kneefall on the square before the Warsaw ghetto as a work of art” (*Berliner Zeitung*, November 11, 1997).

Occasionally, the kneefall became framed in literary contexts as an important event. In particular, it was mentioned in connection to the screen adaptation of a book by Primo Levi and readings by Günter Grass or the writer Cees Noteboom from the Netherlands (previously quoted in the introduction). In addition, references were made to the work of performance artists who presented mimetic reproductions of the kneefall. The artist Matthias Währner placed himself beside the kneeling Brandt in a photomontage (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 13, 1994). The provocative trash artist Christoph Schlingensief dressed as an orthodox Jew and re-enacted the kneefall in front of the Statue of Liberty in New York after he had sunk a suitcase symbolizing “Germany” in the Hudson River (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 11, 1999).

**Empirical and theoretical conclusions**

The analysis of the media reception of the kneefall demonstrates that this short gesture has developed into a symbolic representation of a “transformed German identity.” In the German media of the late 1990s, the kneefall was a continuously renarrated and emphatically recollected symbol of atonement and the acknowledgment of guilt. Symbolic representations of the acceptance of guilt are a necessary condition for reconciliation with others (Rigby 2001). In addition, the gesture became the subject of an opera and was re-enacted in various other performative art projects.

The script of the kneefall was a spontaneous invention, or had at least been convincingly represented as such. The media coverage attributed to the act both authenticity and the ability to “fuse” different levels of meaning (see Alexander, this volume). The detailed retelling of the *mise-en-scène*, how “Brandt dropped to his knees,” how “he rose again,” how his “mouth was trembling”; all this information is provided only to prove that Brandt’s authenticity fused the reality of history by “means of sudden intuitive realization.” Such a “sudden intuitive realization” is the experience of extraordinary “event-ness” (see Giesen, this volume). The attribution of fusion to a performative act depends therefore on the unexpected “event-ness” of its script. However, it is neither this suddenness nor intuition alone which determined the media’s interpretation of the act.

The spatial context in which the performance was enacted was the *mise-en-scène* of the Warsaw Memorial. Brandt’s gesture occurred on the very square
where the hundreds of thousands of Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto were gathered to be deported to German death camps. A memorial is not the legal venue of a court room, nor is it a site of political riots like the streets of the generation of 1968. The *mise-en-scène* of a court room is juridical and the street is political, whereas the Memorial presents a moral context, and, most important of all, transcends time and space (Giesen et al. 2001). It re-presents to the present the victims of the past, and, in the case of the Warsaw Memorial, the heroes of the Ghetto Uprising, as well. The *mise-en-scène* represents not only an instance of guilt or heroic resistance, it also questions the nature of human existence in general in the sense of a “moral universal” (Alexander 2002).

As the Chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt was equipped with the maximum amount of *social power* available to a citizen of that nation. In contrast to the student revolts, the kneefall was an “act from above,” performed by the highest member of the West German federal government. If a private person or a student were to have fallen to his or her knees in the same way, it would have had no societal effect. More intriguing is the significance of the kneefall for Brandt’s *Ostpolitik*, as a part of which Germany renounced the entire territory east of the Oder/Neisse River. Brandt profited from the public attention given to his symbolic act. His policies were, at the time, met with strong opposition from conservatives and the right wing who still adhered to the narrative of victimization preferred by ethnic German refugees from Eastern Europe. Taking advantage of his position as Chancellor, Brandt was able to challenge symbolically this narrative of victimization without explicitly denying it. He strengthened his position by contrasting the “victimization” they claimed for themselves with that of German guilt. His performance was an indirect but nevertheless powerful way of silencing or diminishing the influence of these oppositional voices.

The collective meaning attributed to this specific location must be linked to the performing *actor* in the person of Willy Brandt. As an individual he was innocent. He had emigrated to Norway during the war and participated in the resistance movement against Nazi Germany. The actor “Willy Brandt” as individual person could in no way be suspected of hypocrisy. The paradox seems to be that only a person who individually bears no guilt that could be admitted is in the position to perform an authentic role. If a German perpetrator had acted as Brandt did, it would have reeked of strategy and calculated action. This observation brings us into the fourth and fifth part of the argumentation: the script and the systematic that lies behind collective representations.

According to the rules for the fulfillment of official scripts and systems of collective representations, the gesture represented an innovation. It was spontaneous (or at least it seemed to be spontaneous to various audiences, which is the decisive factor). Its authenticity was a factor of this spontaneity. Acting
unexpectedly and in an uncontrived manner, the Chancellor’s kneefall symbolized the “re-fusion” of different identities. Within this moment, the “role” of the representative of the Federal Republic and the individual “real” person Willy Brandt, overwhelmed by the “sacredness of the moment,” fused into one. He did what he felt, and he felt what he did, both regardless of and in regard to his official role. These “two bodies of the Chancellor,” to modify Ernst Kantorowicz’s (1990 [1957]) terms, are crucial to understanding the suggestive power of the script. The individual innocent body of the Chancellor bowed down as the representative of the collective body of Germany.

The innocent takes up the burden of the collectivity’s “original sin,” thus re-founding and redeeming the nation. It is with this understanding that a former member of the Polish Resistance declared: “Within me there is no longer any hatred! He knelt down and – elevated his people [. . .] He highly elevated it in our eyes, in our hearts. I confess this as a Pole and a Christian.” Brandt’s kneefall had a transforming or even “cathartic” effect on the audience. In terms of performance theory, it appears that Germany “has undergone a transformation of state and status, been saved, elevated or released” (Turner 1986: 81).

This example demonstrates that the performative success of Brandt’s kneefall is highly dependent upon the presence of a Christian background culture in the form of “Christomimesis” (Giesen 2004). The representative of a community which is founded on the concepts of an “original sin,” is him- or herself simultaneously included within and excluded from that community. The performative magic lies within this fused or trickster-like script. A person who simultaneously does and does not belong to the community of guilt is able to transform scripts in which the community’s past is disclaimed. Christian myth provides both collective guilt and collective forgiveness. This might also lie behind the ease with which the German audience was able to accept Brandt’s proclamation of national repentance and guilt. Since the script was decodable in accordance with Christian patterns of meaning, it claimed both collective guilt and forgiveness for an unforgivable past.

However, the most salient impact of the kneefall is its power to challenge rigid structures in which culture was represented and with which it was identified. Rejection of the past and self-perception as victims were transformed into scripts that more and more acknowledged the past of victimizers. Why is this so? The spontaneity of the event is the key to understanding the elements of potential transformation to be found even within rigid and stable cultural representations. The combination of contingency with a deeply rooted Christian culture was the condition under which a rewriting of the possible forms in which a national self could be imagined could be accomplished. If a spontaneous contingent act resonates with existing patterns of cultural representation, or seems to fit into a system of collective representations, then this act will not be
interpreted by its audience as “accidental,” but instead as a manifestation of a “truer meaning.” An occurrence is transformed in a meaningful event. It is the cultural meaning attributed to contingency which disentangles meaning from its either accidental or intentional, and therefore profane, significance. The power to challenge an existing script is based on this combination; on the one hand on the background presence of patterns of cultural meaning which resonate well with the challenge, and on the other hand on the meaningful contingency of a performative moment. The mutual reference between the systematic of the cultural background and occurrences transforms some of these occurrences into extraordinary events. After such a transformation “the world is seen differently.” Hence, the performative event-ness enables cultural systems to alter or challenge their rigid collective self-ness enables cultural systems to alter or challenge their rigid collective self-images and paradigms.

Notes

3. These assertions are not ultimately new in sociology (see also Junge, this volume). Classical frame-analysis (Goffman 1974) and the famous Thomas theorem (“if men define situations as real, then they are real in their consequences”) imply very similar assumptions.
4. To put it bluntly, the aim of Derrida’s argument is to prove that even action depends finally on discourse or text. Such an argument is in general at odds with social theory; however, the notion of iteration does contribute to concepts of social performance if it is interpreted as a condition for constructing “common sense.”
5. For instance, Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt’s counselor, stood in Warsaw behind the wall of the crowd, unable to see what was happening. Later on, he was quoted saying that suddenly the audience became absolutely silent while the journalists whispered to one another, “he’s kneeling.” Bahr went on to say that the rarity of moments when journalists turn silent proves the extraordinarily intense atmosphere. This is exactly the successful “re-fusion” (Alexander, this volume) of the kneefall. Thus, if we seek to understand the collective meaning of a public ritual in modern societies, we cannot avoid analyzing the media response to it (Buser and Rauer 2004).
6. Karl Jaspers ([2000 [1946]]) was the first German intellectual to understand this new phenomenon and wrote a highly influential essay on different types of German guilt: “criminal guilt,” “political guilt,” “moral guilt,” and “metaphysical guilt.”
7. The dialectical relation between change and stability is already at the core of the classical definition of performance as a means for the construction of collective identity: “Self is presented through the performance of roles, through performance that break roles, and through declaring to a given public that one has undergone a transformation of state and status, been saved or damned, elevated or released” (Turner 1986: 81).
8. At the opening session of the new German Bundestag 1949, the speaker did not mention the victims of the Germans, but instead the German Members of Parliament who had been victimized during the National Socialist period (Dubiel 1999: 37–42).

9. War criminals were euphemistically framed as “war prisoners” (*Kriegsinhaftierte*) and always seen as victims (Schildt 1998: 34f., 43). In general, “newspapers describing ‘Graves and Barbed Wire: The Fate of Millions’ evoked images of millions of German POWs, not millions of victims of concentration camps” (Moeller 1996: 1021, quoted in *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, October 25, 1950).


11. See, among others, the contributions in the volume edited by Loth and Rusinek (1998).

12. It is also remarkable that in the Adenauer Administration there was no “Ministry for Survivors of Nazi Persecution and Nazi Concentration Camps,” but there was a “Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War-Damaged” (Moeller 1996: 1032, 1020).

13. Some of the accused were alleged members of the SS and were accused of committing mass murder and torture in concentration camps.

14. Nevertheless, the public narrative of this movement that forced the nation to come to terms with its past is still unbroken. Marcel Reich-Ranicki (1999), a prominent German literary critic who survived the Warsaw Ghetto, writes in his memoirs that during the early 1960s, nobody ever dared to discuss his past with him. The first time a German publicly asked him to share his experience was after the Frankfurt trials at which he was called to testify. The name of the young journalist was Ulrike Meinhof, who later on became one of the most prominent figures of the ‘RAF’, a leftist terrorist group. The group perceived themselves as a latter-day resistance movement against fascism and capitalism.

15. See, among others, Frei (1999). Some of the many important issues were the “historians’ debate” of the 1980s concerning the singularity of the Holocaust, the speech by President Weizäcker on May 8, 1985 (Dubiel 1999), and the debate concerning the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin during the 1990s (Kirsch 2001). Recent debates have focused on reparation payments to former forced labourers (*Zwangsarbeiter*), on German victimization by Allied bomb raids (triggered by the bestseller *Der Brand* by Jörg Friedrich (2002)), and on the commemoration in the form of a monument in Berlin of those who were expelled from the former Eastern territories. Whether these latter two debates could lead to a new German self-victimization (or sustain it) and if they will have strong effects on the system of collective representations cannot yet be determined.

16. Also: “East Treaties” or “treaties of reconciliation.” Among others, the treaties were to confirm a West German renunciation of former territory which had become part of Poland since the end of World War Two.

17. Kneefall pictures or articles on the front pages can be found within all newspapers we selected for research: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*: (December 8, 1970), *Le Figaro* (December 8, 1970), *Le Monde* (December 8, 1970, article, no picture), *Corriere*

18. In the case of the German public sphere in 1970, we analyzed the newspapers Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and the weekly journals Der Spiegel and Die Zeit. Each newspaper featured about four articles on the event at the Warsaw Memorial following its occurrence. In general, the photo was presented and at the textual level the kneefall was mentioned in a few paragraphs within coverage on the Ostverträge. One week later, Der Spiegel (December 14, 1970) covered the kneefall as a main feature. It published an opinion poll in which the majority of Germans deemed Brandt’s act an exaggeration.

19. In order to analyze how the kneefall has been represented in the media thirty years later, two different methods can be used. First, one could choose the media coverage at an anniversary of the event such as December 7, 2000, when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder attended a ceremony in Warsaw in order to dedicate a new monument commemorating Brandt’s symbolic kneefall. Or, this being the method I have chosen, articles are selected during a non-memorial period, i.e. a time when nothing specific happened within that memorial context. Among the newspapers sampled are agenda-setting nationally published newspapers, as well as regionally distributed newspapers: Berliner Kurier, Berliner Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ), Neue Zürcher (NZZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), die tageszeitung (taz), Die Welt, and Die Zeit. In cases where newspapers provide an online archive reaching as far back as 1990, these articles have been included as well. The newspapers’ political orientation ranges from conservative to liberal-leftist. Since all newspapers are available either as Internet archives or on CD-Rom, data retrieval was achieved by an online search strategy. In terms of methodology, a computer-assisted, quantifying frame analysis has been applied. A media discourse analysis was conducted in which Goffman’s (1974) proposed method was further developed. The software “Winmax,” which enables the coder to construct an inductive frame typology and to quantify the results afterwards, was used for coding.


21. The question whether this impression of the act’s spontaneity is true or not is irrelevant to its social effects due to the fact that this spontaneity was attributed by the media audience.

22. Quote in Die Zeit (February 4, 1977): Lew Kopelew, “Bekenntnisse eines Sowjetbürgers.” The Christian symbolism of the kneefall was discussed once in an article in Der Spiegel (December 14, 1970). Journalists debated whether the gesture was more Protestant or Catholic. Since Brandt was an atheist, the question was irrelevant in terms of his ideological intentions. However, what was not discussed in the article was the importance of Christian symbolism from the audience’s perspective.

23. The absurdity of Christian “forgiveness” in the context of the Holocaust and the problematic connotation of any Christian iconology cannot be further outlined here (cf. Bodemann 2002). See e.g. Koselleck’s analysis of the cynical anti-Judaist connotation of the Pietà. The Pietà is a monument placed in Berlin’s “Neue Wache”
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in the year 1992 to commemorate the victims of World War Two (the statue was originally created by Käthe Kollwitz in 1937/8, referring to the victims of World War One). The monument shows a mother holding in her arms her dead son which again symbolizes Mother Mary mourning for the crucified Jesus Christ, who was, according to the anti-Judaic Christian tradition (and later for the Nazis), “murdered by the Jews” (Koselleck 2002: 78).

References


