Introduction

Cosmopolitanism has become an enormously popular rhetorical vehicle for claiming at once to be already global and to have the highest ethical aspirations for what globalization can offer. It names a virtue of considerable importance. But, and these are my themes, it is not at all clear (a) that cosmopolitanism is quite so different from nationalism as sometimes supposed, (b) whether cosmopolitanism is really supplanting nationalism in global politics, and (c) whether cosmopolitanism is an ethical complement to politics, or in some usages a substitution of ethics for politics. In many ways the enthusiasm for cosmopolitanism extends decades of attacks on the state. These have come from both the libertarian right and the anti-authoritarian left. They have been marked by both a capitalist celebration of free markets and a romantic, sometimes anarchist notion of self-organizing civil society. A key result is that there are fewer defenders of the importance of government than there might be. This makes it hard to articulate the value of stronger public institutions. And it makes it easier to imagine that there are approaches that might bring global order more by bypassing states than improving them, more by direct exercise of individual ethics than by large-scale politics. This raises a variety of issues from problems with privatization as a solution to weak public institutions to approaches to making states stronger without stifling freedom to efforts to build effective mechanisms of interstate governance. The present chapter takes up one specific dimension of this larger whole, the question of whether the always imperfect link between nations and states is now so deeply ruptured by migration and multiculturalism that it makes little sense to talk of ‘belonging’ to particular nations or more generally to emphasize solidarities at a level well...
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below that of the world as a whole. The primacy of belonging simply to the human race is basic to most versions of cosmopolitanism. It is a valuable ethical norm, but I ask whether the contemporary vogue for cosmopolitanism may both state it too categorically, neglecting the need to complement it with attention to more local belonging and state institutions, and distort it by allowing a fashion for universalism to mislead us about the inequalities built into ostensibly universalist projects.

Cosmopolitanism in the modern social imaginary

Salman Rushdie writes that ‘among the great struggles of man – good/evil, reason/unreason, etc. – there is also this mighty conflict between the fantasy of Home and the fantasy of Away, the dream of roots and the mirage of the journey’ (Rushdie, 2000). Cosmopolitanism is a central way in which the modern era has organized ‘the fantasy of Away’. The term is operative in culture and commerce, ethics and politics. Whether as the fashionable man of the world or the responsible (and gender neutral) citizen of the world, the cosmopolitan inhabits the world. The modern era has also reorganized ‘the fantasy of Home’. The more local world of face-to-face relations still matters of course, but so do nations. The old contrasts of country village and capital city, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, are reworked in the era of globalization.

To have a merely national outlook seems altogether parochial (even though nations may be large and historically built by integrating very diverse groups). Human nature is indeed contradictory. We seek excitement and security, difference and familiarity, and, as Salman Rushdie suggests, the pleasures of being both home and away. This is not like the contradiction between seeking good and doing evil anyway. In this case, moral virtues are claimed for each side. Great explorers and patriot heroes are both praised in schoolbooks. Loyalty to one’s own is reinforced not only by myths and moral tales but by ‘one’s own’ themselves. Yet as the parable of the Good Samaritan reminds us, a more expansive view of moral obligation has also long been taught.

At the moment, away is more in fashion among intellectuals and especially political theorists. But home has a strong popular following. Debates over cosmopolitanism are largely about this tension. Cosmopolitanism means focusing on the world as a whole rather than on a particular locality or group within it. It also means being at home with diversity. Its main meanings refer in this sense to an orientation or capacity of individuals. But the noun ‘cosmopolitan’ is also used to describe the actual diversity of specific countries or cities. Paris is
more cosmopolitan than Lille, one might argue, and New York more cosmopolitan than Cleveland (and neither Lille nor Cleveland is at the opposite end of the spectrum). The meaning is primarily that the city’s diversity reflects that of the world – without denying that many inhabitants of Paris and New York are in fact quite parochial in their perspectives. At the same time, cosmopolitan may describe the growing interconnection of the whole world across national and other boundaries. Paris and New York have cosmopolitan connections – to Shanghai, Delhi and Cairo. And the world itself is more cosmopolitan the more such connections exist.

Sometimes cosmopolitan is used loosely simply to mean transnational. Often it denotes a more rigorous stress on the truly universal. This is crucial to most systematic use of the term in ethics and political philosophy. But though the later usage is more linguistically precise – cosmos refers to the whole – it raises the theoretical question of just what makes the world – or the cosmos – whole. Is it nature? Or divine creation? Or human history? Most ethical thinking approaches the whole, the universal, as a complete set of all human individuals (usually those alive at one time, though occasionally ancestors and more often those yet to be born are also given consideration). Each of us, we might say, has a duty to consider the implications of our actions for everyone. But thinking in terms of a set or category of human individuals misses part of what makes cosmopolitanism a compelling concern today: the extraordinary growth of connections among human beings and variously organized social groups, relationships mediated by markets and media, migrations and infectious diseases. Precisely because the world is so intensively connected today, cosmopolitanism has become an important theme in politics and social science, not only ethics. It figures in practical affairs and public debates as well as intellectual explorations. Interest in cosmopolitanism has also been fuelled by anxieties over identity politics and multiculturalism. Many commentators are worried that efforts to support different ways of life undermine the common culture required by democracy. They think that too much respect for ethnic and cultural differences among nations undermines attempts to enforce universal human rights.

There are, however, three potential lines of confusion built into the idea of cosmopolitanism. We have noted two already. First, does it refer to what is common to the whole world and unites humanity? Or does it refer to appreciation of the differences among different groups and places? And second, does it refer to an individual attitude or ethical orientation, or does it refer to a condition of collective life? But
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confusion of the third sort is at least as common: cosmopolitanism is both description and normative programme and the distinction is often unclear. Indeed, part of the attraction of the idea of cosmopolitanism is that it seems to refer at once to a fact about the world – particularly in this era of globalization – and to a desirable response to that fact. Ulrich Beck suggests that we should think of two linked processes. The growing interconnection of the world he calls ‘cosmopolitanization’. He uses ‘cosmopolitanism’ for the attitude that treats these as a source of moral responsibility for everyone. But the very overlap in terminology suggests (despite occasional disclaimers) that one is automatically linked to the other. And this is not just an issue in Beck’s writing but a wider feature of discourse about cosmopolitanism.

Clearly, neither the interconnectedness nor the diversity of the world brings pleasure to everyone. Growing global connections can become a source of fear and defensiveness rather than appreciation for diversity or sense of ethical responsibility for distant strangers. Globalization can lead to renewed nationalism or strengthening of borders – as has often been the case since the 2001 terrorist attacks. But like many others Beck hopes that instead a cosmopolitan attitude will spread. He emphasizes that risks such as environmental degradation turn the whole world into a ‘community of fate’ (cf. Beck, 2006). Cosmopolitanism is, for him, the perspective on what humanity shares that will help us deal with this. Cosmopolitanism offers an ethics for globalization. Globalization requires an ethics not only because ordinary people find themselves interacting more often with people from other countries, cultures and religions but because they are implicated in relationships with others around the world whom they will never meet. Through trade and foreign aid and wars and diplomacy and the tourist industry and the global organization of religion people on every continent are joined to others through indirect relationships. These are mediated by information technology, business corporations, governments and NGOs. But they remain human relationships and therefore demand ethical evaluation. What are we doing (or failing to do) for those dying in Darfur? What responsibility do we share for the intellectual property regime that – depending on how you evaluate it – ensures the production of new drugs to treat diseases around the world or makes those drugs harder to buy for anyone who is not rich. And how should we think about the very fact that some are rich and some are poor for reasons having more to do with the countries into which they are born than the efforts or intelligence they have put into their careers. But as even these examples should make clear, globalization demands more than ethics. Precisely because so many of
the crucial relationships that drive and shape it are indirect, they do not resolve easily into interpersonal norms. They require action aimed at states, corporations, markets and media – systems and technologies in short. They require politics. And politics is required in another sense as well, the sense of political speech that constitutes social organization, not only interpersonal relationships.

Mixing fashion, commerce, ethics, and politics

Always in vogue for elites, though sometimes suspect to others, cosmopolitanism has lately become even more fashionable. The trend started in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War amid intensifying globalization. ‘Cosmopolitan’ is now a compliment for the suave in a way it has not been since the 1920s or at least the 1960s (when in Cold War spirit spies epitomized the cosmopolitan). The Cosmopolitan is a popular drink, a ‘sophisticated vodka based cocktail, flavored with orange and cranberry’, made famous as the favourite drink of the girls on TV’s Sex and the City. Those self-styled girls did not show much interest in the political philosophy of globalization or Kantian ethics. But they were surely cultural descendants of Helen Gurley Brown, who reinvented Cosmopolitan magazine in the 1960s. Now, as then, cosmopolitanism lives a double life as a pop cultural evocation of openness to a larger world and a sometimes more systematic and academic claim about the moral significance of transcending the local, even achieving the universal. Both have flourished especially in good times and amid optimism about globalization. Cosmo (as the magazine came to be called) was founded in 1886, riding the wave of a stock market boom not unlike those of the 1920s and the 1990s. The Gilded Age (as Mark Twain’s novel named it) ground to a halt with the stock market crash of 1893. The Roaring Twenties took a dive, along with flappers and Fitzgeraldian cosmopolitanism, in 1929. Their 1990s successor was wounded deeply by the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center (among the headquarters of corporate cosmopolitanism) and deflated in 2002 after overheating. But though 2002 marked a ‘severe correction’ it was not a bust of 1893 let alone 1929 proportions. Cosmopolitans with lifestyles linked to the market were chastened. But like the Dow Jones Industrial Average, they caught their breath and came back. The Dow has set a new record (though volatility is growing as I write) and enthusiasm for cosmopolitanism is similarly buoyant. It is of course not merely a matter of drinks but of hopes for human rights. Cosmopolitanism is what we praise in those who read novelists from every continent, or
in the audiences and performers of world music. It is the aspiration of advocates for global justice, and the claim of managers of multinational businesses. Campaigners on behalf of migrants urge ‘cosmopolitan’ legal reforms out of both concern for immigrants and belief that openness to people from other cultures enriches their countries. ‘Cosmopolitan’ is the first category in the advertisements posted by would-be husbands seeking brides (and vice versa) in the *Sunday Times of India*.

The many different usages reinforce the fashion for the concept but they muddy its meaning. ‘Cosmopolitan’ is claimed sometimes for a political project: building participatory institutions adequate to contemporary global integration, especially outside the nation-state framework. It is claimed sometimes for an ethical orientation of individuals: the suggestion that each should think and act with strong concern for all humanity. It is claimed sometimes for a stylistic capacity to incorporate diverse influences and sometimes for a psychological capacity to feel at ease amid difference and appreciate diversity. It is used sometimes for all projects that reach beyond the local (with some slippage depending on whether the ‘local’ is the village or the nation state). It is used other times for strongly holistic visions of global totality, like the notion of a community of risk imposed by potential for nuclear or environmental disaster. It is used still other times to describe not individuals but cities, as for example New York or London, contemporary Delhi or historical Alexandria gain their vitality and character not from the similarities of their residents but from the concrete ways in which they have learned to interact across lines of ethnic, religious, national, linguistic and other identities. Of course citizens of these cities interact largely in trade and there is an easy extension of usage from the cosmopolitanism encouraged by interaction in physically located markets or along long-distance trading networks to the idea that a global market is intrinsically cosmopolitan because not contained by nation states.

Britain was a centre of the 1990s boom in talk of cosmopolitanism. Reference to ‘cosmopolitan Britain’ became standard speech. As in: ‘cosmopolitan Britain has emerged as one of the world’s most diverse and innovative food and drink markets’. It evoked sophisticated, metropolitan culture vs the non-cosmopolitan hinterlands; this was a period of renewal in the cultural and financial life of British cities with yuppies, art galleries, and startling improvement in restaurants. It evoked multicultural Britain vs monocultural English, Scottish or Welsh national identity; this was not only a matter of revaluing the different historically British cultures but of incorporating immigrants from former colonies, Eastern Europe and elsewhere (with the accent on black and brown faces
at Cambridge and Oxford, in Parliament and reading the TV news – only somewhat undercut by more concentrated and less happy black and brown faces in Brixton, Bradford and other less thriving locales. Perhaps most of all, cosmopolitanism evoked a positive orientation towards European integration and engagement with the rest of the world. The LSE was academic headquarters for this, with a range of intellectual exchanges and conferences, new master’s programmes focusing on fields like human rights and NGO management, a clutch of international celebrity professors, and (not coincidentally fee-paying) students from all over the world. The LSE became in a sense the first really European university (as the European University Institute outside Florence was a more rarified centre for advanced study only). Britain was especially well placed to embrace this cosmopolitanism because English was increasingly the world language, because it had joined the EU without losing its special relationship with the US, because it was a major financial centre, and because its former empire gave it unusually strong connections around the world. Britain remains a centre of cosmopolitan discourse, and also offers a good example of the way in which cosmopolitan style can flourish as part of economic and statist projects. Consider British Airways’ rebranding as ‘a global, caring company, more modern, more open, more cosmopolitan, but proud to be based in Britain’:

What is vital to this new identity is its international feel. This is indicative of BA’s desire to be a global player. Also, according to BA, it shows Britain’s own multicultural mix. However, the emphasis is on presenting the positive aspects of different cultures and how British Airways truly supports its operations, including its many joint ventures, in different countries. All this leads to a positive image for the 60 per cent of BA customers who are not British. (Ayling, 1997)

But the message is not just for foreigners. As British Airway’s branding consultants point out: ‘the United Kingdom is not keen on being seen as the country of outmoded traditions and old castles. The new surface shows a youthful, cosmopolitan Britain, confidently looking to the future.’ Indeed, this example of commercial cosmopolitanism comes on the heels of the late 1990s rebranding of Britain itself as ‘Cool Britannia’. ‘New Labour’ was in the leadership but hints of the Mod Sixties and the once mighty empire were not accidental. Advertising campaigns designed to brand nations have become common, in fact, situating countries in global communications and global markets. Nearly every nation claims to be cosmopolitan but with distinctive arts and culture
and delightful local scenery (see Aronczyk, 2007). With their logos and slogans, nations are marketing themselves not just to tourists but to investors and sometimes to their own citizens. The nation-branding around the Olympics – whether in China, Greece or Spain – always includes a reminder to citizens to feel good about themselves, and their government.

In both popular culture and political science, cosmopolitanism often figures as an attitude, a style, a personal commitment. This is not necessarily political or even ethical. The contrasting significance of the phrases ‘citizen of the world’ and ‘man of the world’ suggests the difference. The latter is as likely to be about expanded tolerance for ethical lapses, or simply about more fashionable clothes. Cosmopolitanism signals a direct connection between the individual and world as a whole. But if this is sometimes given ethical emphasis, equally often the world appears simply as an object of consumption, there for individuals’ pleasure: ‘The goal of cosmopolitanism is self-expression and self-realization’, writes Kimberly Yuracko. ‘Cosmopolitanism presents individuals with a wide range of options; they choose the one that will bring them the most pleasure and gratification’ (Yuracko, 2003: 91). More commonly, being cosmopolitan is glossed as being a ‘citizen of the world’. Even if this suggests more ethical obligations than mere self-gratification, contemporary usage gives this almost unambiguously positive valence – who would not want to be a citizen of the world? But of course the idea can be terrifying if what world citizenship means is exclusion from citizenship and rights in particular states. Past demonizations of ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ should not be forgotten. And the two often coexist. There is no upper class in the world more dedicated to cosmopolitan shopping than that of Russia. But it is not just ignorant rural Russian masses with minimal access to the new megamalls that participate in xenophobic nationalism. State elites and well-connected millionaires press anti-cosmopolitan policies. Even oligarchs who drive Bentleys and have homes in the South of France are complicit – though they may also become objects of nationalist attack. The issue is not just consumerism vs ethics, or the coexistence of stylistic cosmopolitanism with political nationalism. It is the tendency to substitute ethics or style for deeper senses of politics. Cosmopolitan typically suggests an attitude or virtue that can be assumed without change in basic political or economic structures – which are external to the individual. Much of its appeal comes from the notion that cosmopolitanism (a version of ethical goodness) can be achieved without such deeper change. But therein lies a key problem in an otherwise attractive concept. Cosmopolitanism
is not simply a free-floating cultural taste, personal attitude or political choice, however; it is a matter of institutions. What seems like free individual choice is often made possible by capital – social and cultural as well as economic. Take the slogan in Sony's recent computer advertisements: ‘C is for Choice, Color, and Cosmopolitanism.’ Surely C is also for capital.\(^8\)

Or again, after Singapore’s president spoke of the island’s ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘heartlanders’, a local blogger posted mock advice on how to be a cosmopolitan: ‘Many Heartlanders think that to become a Cosmo, you need a lot of money. Nothing could be further from the truth. Being a Cosmo is essentially a state of mind, and has nothing to do with that overdraft that keeps you awake at night.\(^9\)’ He continues with advice on wine and watches, cars and condos. But, as he says, ‘Travel is the true measure of a Cosmo. “Been there, done that” is their motto.’ Sadly, his readership is ‘those of us who haven’t been, primarily because we haven’t a bean’. The markets, the migrations and the media that encourage and shape cosmopolitanism are not simply responses to individual taste or morality but creatures of capitalism. This does not determine every detail of their operation nor does it make them necessarily bad. But it does mean that cosmopolitanism is not free-floating, not equally available to everyone, not equally empowering for everyone. The material globalization on which cosmopolitanism rests is strikingly unequal as well as uprooting. This is one of the reasons why the cosmopolitanism of some sparks the resentments of others. But it would be a mistake to identify anxieties about cosmopolitanism simply with resentment or indeed with ethnic prejudice or benighted localism. In the first place localism is not always benighted. More basically, belonging to specific social groups is an important source of collective strength for many; the solidarity of these groups is a basis for action to redress many ills and sometimes even to mitigate inequality; communities, nations and religions motivate many in ways that abstract membership of the human race does not. We need not simply oppose cosmopolitanism and belonging, as universalism and particularism are opposed in logic and in Parsonsian theory.\(^10\) They can be complements to each other.

**The melting pot**

The cosmopolitan critique of particularistic belonging is a sort of global revision of the older idea of a melting pot. This was proposed most famously as a description of the United States in the early twentieth century. An era of high immigration had brought together speakers
of different languages, followers of different religions, people raised in
different cultures. A prominent rabbi used the image of a melting pot
in a Passover sermon, simultaneously praising American openness and
warning his congregation against excessive assimilation. Israel Zang-
will, a London-born playwright of Russian Jewish ancestry, took up
the phrase as the title of a 1908 play in which he suggested that in
America all would be remade in a new common culture. Each would be
free to pursue a new individual destiny. Theodore Roosevelt attended
and applauded. The phrase stuck. But the phrase had much older roots.
Emerson, for example, referred in 1845 to racial and cultural mixture
through the metaphor of ‘the smelting pot’; there were still earlier antic-
ipations in Crevecoeur and other colonial commentators. The ‘melting’
metaphor was used to discuss the question of how autonomous and
distinct the separate American states should be, as in Winterbotham’s
(1795) observation that: ‘some from jealousy of liberty were afraid of
giving too much power to their rulers; others, from an honest ambi-
tion to aggrandize their country, were for paving the way to national
greatness by melting down the separate states into a national mass’
(quoted in Kohn, 1944: 288). The passage reminds us helpfully of the
parallel between debates over the integration of immigrants and those
over the incorporation of disparate regions, provinces and states into a
larger common nation state. By the 1970s, some worried patriots were
writing of ‘the rise of the unmeltable ethnics’ (Novak, 1973). And some
happier patriots were celebrating the salad bowl or the mosaic instead
of the melting pot, mixture without loss of distinction. In other words,
America remained diverse and maintaining cultural distinctions and
ethnic solidarities – rather than melting them away in the assimila-
tionist pot – became a positive goal. Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggested
claiming both sides of this debate, arguing that especially in cities there
was simultaneously assimilation and reproduction of ethnic identity
and that both things could be good (Glaser and Moynihan, 1970).
Richard Sennett (1970) argued for the ‘uses of disorder’ that made cities
vital, even when it spilled over into conflict, and that made the lives of
individuals richer.

A new wave of immigration in the 1990s put the issue back on the
front burner. It came, moreover, after 20 years in which the idea of
multicultural coexistence and a politics of recognition had been in
the ascendancy. An increasing number of authors called for stronger
assimilationism, for a deeper sense of political commonality, for resis-
tance to ‘identity politics’. Then the terrorist attacks of 2001 made the
issue feel newly acute. Samuel Huntington, as often, caught an aspect
of the national mood and framed an issue on the minds of many who hesitated to name it so bluntly. His recent book, *Who Are We?*, is shaped by a deep anxiety that Hispanic immigrants do not want to become Americans in the same sense as his WASP (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) ancestors (it is perhaps no accident that he traces descent to immigrants who came on the *Mayflower* and is a descendant of several generations of Harvard men) (Huntington, 2004). Indeed, Huntington suspects, Latin American immigrants not only do not want to assimilate, they cannot. It is not clear to what extent Huntington thinks that the problem is the strength of Hispanic–Catholic identity and to what extent the unanticipated weakness of American nationalism as a culture of assimilation. Either way, he articulates a sense of threat among many in the US analogous to that which many Europeans feel over Islamic immigrants.

Yet this new anxiety over unmelted immigrants has risen at the same time as a widespread celebration of the melting pot ideal in the form of mixed race identities. In the US this is symbolized by the golfer Tiger Woods – who describes himself as ‘Cawnasian’; simultaneously Caucasian, black, Indian and Asian. It is given a reified form by genetic testing which gives sharp percentages and geographies to ancestry. People who thought themselves simply black – like the jazz musician Quincy Jones – may be told their genes are only 66 per cent African. The prominent African American literary critic Henry Louis Gates learned that his traceable ancestry is half-European and joked that perhaps he wasn’t black enough to head African American Studies at Harvard (Gates, 2007).

But just as the extension of this into a popular expression like ‘his blood is half white’ represents a slippage from genes to one of their physical manifestations, so the reimagining of sociocultural categories as biological represents a slippage. Ironically, while the dominant response to genetic accounts of ancestry is to see race as biological, it makes as much sense to say that the demonstrated genetic diversity within populations like ‘African Americans’ reveals the extent to which these were social and cultural constructions (though not the less real for that). On the one hand, mixed race identities are important and should not be dismissed in favour of ethnic essentialism. On the other hand, it is a worrying illusion to think that problems of race will simply fade away because of intermarriage or genetically demonstrated ancestral mixtures. It is also an illusory solution to problems of migration and citizenship simply to say – though it can be true – that many migrants have rights in multiple nation states and understand their belonging in complexly overlapping ways. Take Palestinians in Israel. Multiple and
overlapping identities are real, but not without problems. Jewish Israelis are frightened by a demographic peril: a growing population of Muslim Arabs inside the Jewish state. Arab Israelis benefit from citizenship but also chafe at its limitations, injustices and initial premises. And if nationalism is problematic, it is far from obvious that there is a ‘post-national’ resolution available for the problems of Palestine. With their own history of minority life, Jews involved in the founding of Israel were of course worried about creating new minorities. For a (perhaps ironic) example, return to Israel Zangwill, the playwright who popularized the idea of the melting pot. Zangwill (1917) was a prominent cultural Zionist and the author of books like *The Principle of Nationalities*. As an advocate of Jewish ethnic nationalism, he argued that Jews needed to face up to the necessity of forcing Arabs out of Palestine (see Simons, 2007). The new Jewish state, Zangwill argued, needed a clear Jewish majority. He thought constitutional government and especially democracy required this. In a 1916 conversation with Vladimir Jabotinsky, for example, Zangwill asked what Jabotinsky would do with the Arabs if the Jews got a Charter for Palestine. Jabotinsky replied with the classic answer that there was enough room in Palestine on both sides of the Jordan for 6 or 8 million people and the Arabs only numbered half a million. ‘All this is just idle chatter’, replied Zangwill, adding that people, such as Jabotinsky, from Eastern Europe considered it quite normal for more than ten minority groups to be found living together in a small area. However, peoples from Western democracies would see this as a disease for which there could be no cure. To allow such a situation in our Jewish State would be like gorging out our eyes with our hands. If we receive Palestine, the Arabs will have to ‘trek’.

The last reference is, of course, to the Boer trek to escape English domination in South Africa. Zangwill’s name became associated with the description of Palestine as a ‘land without people for a people without land’. In fact, he did not offer this as a mere description. Rather, responding to Lord Shaftesbury’s suggestion (originally with reference to Syria) that Britain might give ‘a country without a nation to a nation without a country’, Zangwill was clear that there were Arabs who would have to be moved in order to achieve the desired goal (see Garfinkle, 1991). ‘A land without people for a people without land’ became a slogan justifying Jewish appropriation of Palestine to create Israel and not surprisingly provoked a nationalist response.
Imagining a world without nations, a world in which ethnicity is simply a consumer taste, a world in which each individual simply and directly inhabits the whole, is like imagining the melting pot in which all ethnicities vanish into the formation of a new kind of individual. In each case this produces an ideology especially attractive to some. It neglects the reasons why many others need and reproduce ethnic or national distinctions. And perhaps most importantly it obscures the issues of inequality that make ethnically unmarked national identities accessible mainly to elites, and make an easy sense of being a citizen of the world contingent on having the right passports, credit cards and cultural credentials. American debates over immigration and assimilation predate independence, often as debates about the peopling of specific colonies, and shape both images of America and practical policies through the history of the United States. The dominant American ideology – common among scholars as well as the broader population – suggested that the ‘first new nation’ was precisely not an ethnic nation. Tom Paine famously held that ‘Europe, not England is the parent country of America’ – though one might suggest that ‘European’ is itself an ethnic category of sorts, at least by comparison to, say, Asian or Latin American. In any event, British – and indeed, specifically English – history loomed large in US school curricula. But both ‘consensus’ historians (e.g. Higham, 1955) and later social scientists (e.g. Greenfield, 1992; Lipset, 1996) have commonly seen nativist movements as aberrations, recurrently overcome, and the main pattern as an idealized mixture that transcends ethnicity. This view perhaps grasps an element of truth in its contrasts to Europe, but it has been very uncritically held. From the beginning it failed to confront both the fundamental challenge of racial domination and the continuing hegemony of an elite constituted in part through ethnicity. Long described as WASP, this has broadened, but not entirely disappeared, and continues to be reproduced in common experiences of education, religion and culture as well as networks of social relations. Recurrently, the notion of the ideal post-ethnic nation has also confronted waves of less elite nativist sentiment and political agitation. And finally, the assertion of ethnic identities and the positive valuing of difference also have a long tradition, and one that has long made uncomfortable those who would see the struggle as only between assimilationists or cosmopolitans and nativists or racists. W.E.B. DuBois wrote famously of the double-consciousness of those for whom an ascriptive racial identity must always compete with an inclusive national identity. Yet, in *The Souls of Black Folk* he advocated no simple choice. ‘One ever feels his two-ness, – an American, a Negro; two
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder (DuBois, 1994: 2). The American Negro may long ‘to merge his double-self into a better and truer self.’ But

in this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American… (DuBois, 1994: 3)

Various sorts of ‘both/and’ identities are pervasive in the modern world. They are brought to the fore by international migration, by European integration, and by the claims of multiple states on common cultural traditions and identities, like China and Taiwan and for that matter Singapore. Islam and Christianity are each religions that produce common identities crossing national divisions. Gender, race and even engagement in social movements can produce ‘both/and’ identities (see Anzaldúa, 1987; Collins, 1990). Neither universalism nor essentialist nativism or nationalism deals well with these multiplicities and overlaps, and indeed it is common for universalists to imagine all claims to group solidarity on the model of nativist closure – and for nativists and nationalists to imagine all suggestions that multiple identities matter as ‘rootless cosmopolitan’ challenges to the integral whole. Celebration of multiple identities has recently come into vogue – for example as multiculturalism – and has produced both universalist and particularist responses. Salman Rushdie says he writes love songs ‘to our mongrel selves’; he refuses to be simply Indian, lives in England, and travels enough to show those who would stop him in the name of religious purity that they have failed (Rushdie, 2000: 394). Indeed, one might think it is hard for anyone to be ‘simply Indian’, so deeply plural and cross-cutting are the identities of the subcontinent. Yet there are other Indians living in England whose very sense of being is bound up with being Indian. And as Tariq Modood notes, many immigrants from India in the era of partition became Pakistanis without ever living in that country, and then in the dominant British politics of identity became ‘Asian’ and then more commonly ‘Muslim’ (Modood et al., 2004). ‘Indian’ now distinguishes mainly Hindu Britons (ironically echoing the assertions of religious purity of some Hindu fundamentalists back on the subcontinent). There are also angry Englishmen determined to make
sure that neither Indians nor Muslims ever feel they belong unequivocally to England’s green and pleasant land. Of course there are also Indians in India for whom England is only ancient history and India itself somewhat abstract but for whom village or caste are central locations. There are at least as many for whom a militantly Hindu account of being Indian is fundamentally compelling. And there are still other Indians for whom the Communist Party (or rather, one of them) is still vital and transcends ethnicity and nationality and others who love mathematics partly because it seems a universal language as well as a good source of that other universal, money. In England, when asked their national identity, those of Indian descent face the same puzzle as others: is the right answer English, British or just possibly European?

This sort of field of multiple and heterogeneously structured identities has become increasingly common in the contemporary world but it should not be thought that identities were ever quite so clear or singular in the past as ideology sometimes suggested. Colonialism produced plenty of examples and independence did not neatly straighten them out. Think of Léopold Senghor, first President of Senegal but before that a member of the French National Assembly and all the while a pan-Africanist, one of the founders of the idea and movement of negritude. Earlier empires produced their own such complexities, but even villages were not quite the homogenous communities of myth and nostalgia. From the 1960s to the 1990s multiculturalism was in vogue. The wave seems since to have crested. By 2007 a New York Times art critic could draw a contrast between Manhattan’s somewhat more central art world and its Brooklyn cousin by saying ‘Multiculturalist terms like identity, hybridity and diversity may sound like words from a dead language in Chelsea, but they are the lingua franca of the Brooklyn show’ (Carter, 2007).

It’s not only in the Chelsea galleries that ‘identity’ sounds passé; it seems so 1990s to a range of social theoretical hipsters. They want to give identity and especially identity politics a rest and be cosmopolitan. But cosmopolitanism is claimed by multiculturalists as well as those who think multiculturalism has got out of hand and needs to be tamed by emphasis on universal humanity (and those who think multiculturalism is simply no longer trendy). Indeed the very idea of multiculturalism was also something of a theoretical muddle. On the one hand it suggested the essential malleability of identity and on the other the essential priority of identity (though both sides tended to condemn essentialism). The same went for the ‘politics of identity’. This meant most coherently that identity was always subject to politics – to struggles within groups over what they stood for, to struggles between those with different agendas.
over which identity would be primary. But to many it also meant simply that different groups struggled politically to get due recognition for their identities or over issues in which the stakes were defined by group identity (see Calhoun, 1994).

Cosmopolitanism is most often invoked by those who see identity politics as a sort of mistake – like lingering ethnonationalism, rather than citizenship of the world. But the issues have not gone away. European politics is rife with struggles over whether national identities or the common claim of ‘European’ should be primary. There are few African countries where claims for religious, or ethnic, or regional or ‘tribal’ identities are not sometimes as powerful as projects of national integration. Latin American countries find themselves common identity in the struggle against US domination, but internally are split by movements deriving significant force from indigenous resentment against elites defined in part by European ancestry (as well as cosmopolitan property). The economic rise of China both masks identity struggles within the People’s Republic and intensifies others around Asia. And from the Middle East through South and South East Asia (and indeed in Europe, Africa and the US) Islamic renewal generates both struggles over identity and struggles defined by religious identities that modernization theorists had pronounced permanently fading.

European integration and the politics of fear (and hope)

In 2005, just before the first series of referenda on the proposed European constitution, observers noted a perplexing trend: European Jews voting for far-right wing political parties. In Antwerp, for example, at least 65 per cent of those registered as Jews during the Second World War died during the Holocaust yet at least 5 per cent of the Jewish population today has voted for Vlaams Belang, the xenophobic far-right party that focuses on Muslims but was founded by Nazi collaborators (Smith, 2005). Most of Antwerp’s Jews are probably outraged by Vlaams Belang. There may be a long-term drift of Jewish voting from more Leftist to Rightist parties, but that is not really the issue. The issue has nothing to do with generalizing about Jews, nor simply with Left or Right. It has to do with fear making for strange alliances, since after all the party the surprising 5 per cent of Antwerp Jews have voted for is not simply Rightist, it is extreme Dutch nationalist. It is, in an ironic way, a party of unity – for some – a party that says one particular common bond should trump certain internal differences and at the same time create a wall against ‘foreign’ incursions.
It is no accident that such nationalism could play on anxieties raised simultaneously by Muslim immigration and European integration. But this is not just a Dutch or a European phenomenon. Versions of the same thing are happening in many places in the world. People are seeking protective solidarities against a variety of real or perceived threats. They seek different kinds of solidarities: ethnic, nationalist, religious, regional, corporate and others. In general, none feels adequate and fears remain powerful – which may help turn any of the defensive solidarities into something offensive. The strange juxtaposition of Jews voting for the descendants of Nazis because they fear Muslims is not merely an ironic reflection of how difficult it is to make sense of the multiple identities by which each of us is located in the modern world. It is a challenge to the notion that ‘thin’ identities, those grounded in the common procedures of a constitution or an entirely civic nationalism, are ascendant in Europe. The very language of civic nationalism is ironically deployed in articulating what amounts to an ethnic identity. A group of immigrants is described as undesirable because of the ‘thickness’ of its cultural traditions, which resist assimilation, and the undesirable character of some of its alleged cultural practices. The charges are framed in the language of civic nationalism and Enlightenment. That a not insignificant number of Dutch Jews join in reflects not only how widespread the phenomenon is, but also the power of this rhetorical formation.

This involves a peculiar form of ‘culturalism’ which is widespread in European debates about immigration (Schinkel, 2007). Informed, ironically, by modern anthropological relativism, it suggests that the immigrants need to return to their ‘own cultures’ which must follow their own paths of development. Indeed, many in the Netherlands implicitly, if paradoxically, claim the heritage of the Enlightenment as a sort of ethnic attribute. Their main insistence is not on race but culture, on having absorbed the Enlightenment into their culture in a way that Muslim immigrants could not or would not. This sort of view is widespread not just in the Netherlands but in Sweden and other countries where a liberal immigration policy has been juxtaposed to a strong sense of national identity – with the result that the grandchildren of immigrants, themselves citizens and often children of citizens, are not recognized as nationals. And it is analogous to Samuel Huntington’s arguments about the gulf between the democratic-capitalist culture of the United States and the inescapable alienness of Hispanics.

Cosmopolitanism becomes, ironically, the language of rejection of immigrants who are inadequately cosmopolitan. The immigrants are
accused of not respecting human rights or other universal values, thus, as well as of not learning the local language. European struggles over the relationship of cosmopolitanism to belonging reflect a particular history of nationalism and a particular project of transnational integration. They have influenced the development of cosmopolitanism as a core theme in both political theory and global politics. This has sometimes brought problematic assumptions. For example, the 300 years after the Peace of Westphalia are sometimes treated as an era of global order based on national states. The nation-state project was indeed one powerful force between 1648 and the current period. But to call this an era of global order requires some sense of irony, since nation states engineered such massive violence. It was in the context of these wars, indeed, that the very cosmopolitan idea of humanitarian actions to reduce the suffering wars entailed took root, with the founding of the International Committee for the Red Cross in 1863 and the Geneva Conventions of 1864 as its symbols. But the fact of these wars, and the fact that refugees were hardly greeted with open arms in all instances, remind us that Kant’s effort to renew commitments to the ancient idea of political asylum were efforts in theory that did not immediately define practice. Likewise, the Peace of Westphalia ended Europe’s main religious wars, but ushered in an era of new struggles to define, unify and strengthen national states, not simply an era when the nation-state form was dominant. It was not simply an era of actual nation states, and therefore the present era is hardly simply the end of the era of nation states. It was an era in which national projects – and states – confronted different challenges. European nationalism, moreover, was almost always intimately connected to European imperialism. At its most Republican, revolutionary France never ceased being actively imperial – not when the Revolutionary Assembly confronted the Haitian revolution and not when the Third Republic faced the Algerian drive for independence.

Over decades, the project of European integration has itself become a response to the fact that no European country is a superpower. This encourages cooperation as much as does the threat of war any one of them might pose the others. Europe needs to unite, Europeans are told, in order to compete effectively in global markets. This is made possible, Europeans are told, by a common European civilization. And moreover, Europeans still have a mission civilisatrice to the rest of the world. Not least of all, as Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003) argued in their joint letter after the US invasion of Iraq, Europeans have an opportunity and a responsibility to ‘balance out the hegemonic
unilateralism of the United States'. Europe’s solidarity is not simply intra-European, but also counterposed to the US and the non-West. And here again, the assertion of cosmopolitanism figures as among other things an answer to perceived excesses of nationalism. Global projections of US state power are at the same time imperialist, nationalist and neo-liberal. They combine attempts to reshape semi-autonomous nation states, to derive national advantages for the US, and to promote global capitalism. Some US leaders express ambitions to spread democracy, and it is important not merely to dismiss or debunk these but to demand demonstrations of honest commitment. When hegemonic powers use the language of democracy and popular will it is easy to be cynical but more productive to try to seize what openings this provides. At the same time, it is important to recognize that a new assertion of imperial power is not simply a return to some ‘pre-Westphalian’ order, as though for 350 years the world has been neatly and peacefully ordered by nation states. Nationalism and imperialism have been more mutually connected and interdependent than that. And finally, it is important to recognize that cosmopolitanism can be as much the project of neo-liberalism as of cultural creativity or human rights, that global citizenship is extremely inequitable, and that national and local structures of belonging still matter a great deal. We need not embrace nationalism uncritically to see that nation states still provide the contexts of everyday solidarities and most people’s life projects; they still are the primary arenas for democratic public life; and they are focal points for resistance to imperialism. Cosmopolitan democracy seemed not only an attractive possibility but the clear direction of progress, borne ineluctably on the tide of globalization. But of course tides have a way of turning, and globalization brought resistsances as well as embraces. Theories that made cosmopolitanism seem too easy left many cosmopolitan liberals unprepared for new challenges symbolized by September 11th and more generally for a world in which suspicions and cultural divisions were powerful, in which a struggle over solidarities and identities was by no means consistently ‘liberal’, and in which a hegemonic global superpower claimed to be cosmopolitan and advance democracy – though hardly without dissent. Even in Europe, the politics of fear flourished. The proposed ‘constitution’ of 2005 seemed to embody the cosmopolitan ideals of European integration. It fared no better than the dream of a common foreign policy faced with US-led war and struggles against terrorist tactics. Indeed, the so-called constitution illustrated not only a weak point of the European Union but also the weakness of approaches to transnational unity grounded only
in formal legal arrangements, not social solidarity. It was a document only technocrats could love, and which some technocrats loved partly because it was designed to empower them at the expense of democratic public participation. It was too long to be read, let alone memorized; too complicated to be incorporated in a meaningful way into the collective consciousness of Europeans. It was a manifestation of a process that thought of a constitution as simply a basic law and not as a process of constituting political relations among citizens. That the writing was overseen by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, a quintessential ‘Énarch’ (graduate of France’s super-elite national school of administration), was apt and that he showed no comprehension of the depth of doubt and distrust his document inspired was telling. Ironically, the debate over the constitution may have been the most meaningful demonstration of a European public sphere yet seen. But the opposition was as strong as it was (and still is) partly because the process of ‘constituting’ Europe had not included the nurturing of a strong pan-European public sphere. This contributed to suspicions of the technocratic constitution and indeed fear of the European project itself, at least as currently led.

Moreover, just as the domination of national states and large-scale markets over local communities and other groupings like craft unions or provincial cultures was hardly a one-sided blessing, so too would it be a mistake to think transcending the national is only and entirely a path of progress. Who wins and who loses is in every historical recurrence an open question, decided in significant part by how the process plays out – and by struggles over its terms. In such struggles, power is typically lopsided. As Pierre Bourdieu (2002) has suggested, unification usually benefits the dominant. This was true in the forging of national states, but the process nonetheless created openings for new groups and occasions for struggle to increase democracy and public services. There are similar opportunities in European and indeed global integration. But the advance of democracy is far from a simple or guaranteed by-product of such integration. It still takes a struggle fought with very unequal resources. In such struggles, seemingly anti-cosmopolitan resistance is often a weapon of those in danger of intensified exploitation by dominant interests; it may shape a better international order and eventually better terms for cosmopolitan transcendence of parts of the nation-state system. But equally, extensions of transnational power and capitalist markets can also inform fears that fuel populist reactions against immigrants. These are fears not merely from the ethnically prejudiced – though they may also be that – but fears as well from citizens who feel
that their citizenship buys them less and less protection from global threats and less and less participatory democracy.

European integration and non-Western immigration put enormous pressures on the solidarity and self-understanding of European societies. Much cosmopolitanism speaks only poorly to this predicament. By insisting on the language of liberal universalism as a basis for European integration or global rights, by relying one-sidedly on notions like constitutional patriotism, and by imagining that larger solidarities are always produced by escape from narrower ones, rather than by transformations of these, it loses purchase on reality. In particular, it loses purchase on the possibility of actual historical production of larger and better but still incomplete and imperfect projects of integration. The defeat of Europe’s constitutional treaty was greeted with shock by many European elites, even though the discontent behind the votes had been brewing for years and been manifestly boiling for months. As the referendum approached, opinion polls sounded the alarm for pro-European intellectuals. Jürgen Habermas (2005) famously wrote to French voters – and in general called on the European Left to vote in favour of the constitution. ‘In my view’, he said, ‘a Left which aims to tame and civilise capitalism with a “No” to the European constitution would be deciding for the wrong side at the wrong time.’ Earlier, Habermas and Derrida had jointly held that European opposition to America’s invasion of Iraq had marked the beginning of a true popular public sphere in Europe. They called for the development of a European capacity to balance American power for the sake of the whole world. Backing Europe, however, meant in this case backing the ‘basic law’, described widely as a constitution. Habermas grasped that the document was flawed and that there was widespread impatience with the elites driving European integration. He did not seem to grasp equally how elitist and offensive the document itself was, how perfectly it symbolized the notion that a cosmopolitan Europe would be democratic only in form, not in egalitarian participation. Habermas hoped Europe would be enabled to act with greater agency when bolstered by the legal unity of the constitution. ‘We can only meet the challenges and risks of a world in upheaval in an offensive way by strengthening Europe’, he wrote, ‘not by exploiting the understandable fears of the people in a populist manner.’

A politics of fear was very prominent in the European constitutional referenda. It seized in large part on immigrants and Europeans Muslims. But it also reflected the notion that democratic participation in
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public affairs was to be diluted precisely at a time when powerful global forces were undermining social benefits which citizens of different countries felt they had gained by centuries of struggle – and when their states were engineering neo-liberal reforms rather than protecting important institutions from the levelling effects of either global capitalism or the power of an ‘American model’ and military. Immigrants became readily available and relatively easy to name targets for fears aroused by other sources. The results are sometimes saddening as well as perplexing – as in the case of Antwerp Jews who voted for Vlaams Belang. Fear – a widespread basic insecurity – is a central issue, and a challenge to which global cosmopolitanism has not yet faced up. People do not always name the sources of their fears very accurately. They say they are afraid of immigrants when they are most afraid of losing their jobs. They say they are afraid of European integration when they are most afraid that their children will fail to find careers and not be there for them in their old age. Politicians may manipulate their fears by playing on the most visible foci, those easiest for them to articulate. But the pervasiveness of the fear and anxiety are clues that they transcend these causes. They come from global neo-liberal capitalism and its destruction of stable economic institutions. They come from new technologies that change social relations, even inside families, and thereby fundamental human relations to the world. They come from ageing – both individually and in whole generations – with its attendant worries over sickness and death and in the meantime where to find care and money and a safe place to live. They come from natural disasters like tsunamis and from such not completely natural disasters as the AIDS pandemic or avoidable famines and such humanly wrought disasters as civil wars and genocides, terrorism and counter-terrorist projects that seem only to breed more terrorism. And the fears and anxieties are magnified by the media because they produce audiences as well as political extremists. There are many and realistic reasons for fear and anxiety – indeed, there are enough that we should be impressed that we are not afraid all the time. We take public transport despite terrorist attacks. We approach most strangers with an optimism that we will find good ways to get along and maybe find pleasure in our very differences. We have children – despite the world they will face. But we are able to do these things precisely because we do not face the frightening and anxiety-provoking world alone. Ironically, the liberal individualist underpinnings of much cosmopolitan thought suggest in essence that we should. That is, they suggest that we start from individual moral subjects abstracted out of particular social relations and cultural traditions.
and ask what obligations they owe to each other. This is a mistake, for
the antidotes to insecurity and the capacity for democracy alike lie not
simply in individual reason but in social solidarity.

It is a mistake to treat nationalism and other forms of group soli-
darity as a deviation from cosmopolitan neutrality. In the first place,
cosmopolitanism is not neutral – though cosmopolitans can try to make
both global institutions and global discourse more open and more fair.
In the second place, national projects respond to global projects. They
are not mere inheritances from the past, but ways – certainly very often
problematic ways – of taking hold of current predicaments. The analogy
between nations faced with globalization and minorities within nation
states – both immigrants and so-called national minorities – is strong.
Nations have much the same relationship to pan-national or global gov-
ernance projects that localities and minorities had to the growth of
national states.¹⁹ And we can learn from Kymlicka’s injunction: ‘Fairness
therefore requires an ongoing, systematic exploration of our common
institutions to see whether their rules, structures and symbols disadvan-
tage immigrants.’²⁰ Cosmopolitanism at its best is a fight for just such
fairness in the continued development of global institutions. Moreover,
the building of nation states has typically involved efforts to rationalize
internal diversity – structuring the way it is represented in museums and
statistics, establishing symmetrical units of local government, and so
forth. And at least many cosmopolitanisms continue rather than break-
ing with this dimension of nationalism. But the analogy is not perfect.
Not least, most immigrants (and national minorities) make only modest
claims to sovereignty. Strong Westphalian doctrines of sovereignty may
always have been problematic and may now be out of date. But just as
it would be hasty to imagine we are embarking on a postnational era –
when all the empirical indicators are that nationalism is resurgent pre-
cisely because of asymmetrical globalization – so it would be hasty to
forget the strong claims to collective autonomy and self-determination
of those who have been denied both, and the need for solidarity
among those who are least empowered to realize their projects as indi-
viduals. Solidarity need not always be national, and need not always
develop from traditional roots. But for many of those treated most
unfairly in the world, nations and traditions are potentially important
resources. Confronted with the exercise of global power by both multi-
national corporations and the United States – whether one describes
this as empire or an extension of the US national project – resistance
and other responses necessarily start from local, national and regional
solidarities.
Universalism as style

As a social condition, cosmopolitanism is not universalism; it is belonging to a social class able to identify itself with the universal. Belonging to the global cosmopolitan class is structured by social institutions just as surely as belonging to a local caste in India or a Parisian quartier anxious about Arab neighbours or European unification. We should be cautious accordingly about following earlier modernization theories in identifying cosmopolitan unambiguously with progress or following individualistic philosophical traditions that approach such cosmopolitanism overwhelmingly as a matter of individual ethical judgement. Some modernization accounts do help us, however, for cosmopolitanism today shares much with the formation of national elites a century or two ago. As Ernest Gellner (1983) described this process, it always meant a triumph of high culture over culture embedded in popular life and more local solidarities. And as Bourdieu (1958, 1990) suggested, this always meant symbolic violence. In considering nationalism, Gellner stressed the interests industrial production gave members of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie in developing new lateral ties not mediated by courts or old trading cities, and in extending the high culture in which they participated into a (hierarchically organized) common national culture open to the larger populations mobilized in their enterprises and new cities. Deutsch (1966) and Anderson (1993) offer different causal arguments but describe largely similar processes of communication and the flourishing of elite culture and its production of much broader national culture. And cosmopolitan projects today largely continue this pattern of simultaneous class formation and integration – now transnational rather than only national. But the national solidarities forged on earlier material bases are not simply old-fashioned and sectional. What appeared often to modernization theory simply as progress was a complex pattern of loss and gain. Villages overtaken by industrialization were complexes of culture and social organization not always easily or happily given up by even poor inhabitants. Provincial cultures devalued in the course of national integration were often intensely valued by those who spoke provincial dialects and languages.

But the high culture that supplanted provincial culture was the product of cultural creativity, not simply power, and included works of brilliance and enduring value far beyond their role in creating elite-dominated national cultures. And the connections forged by workers in towns and cities enabled them to pursue democratic politics and sometimes better material conditions of life than their village-bound
forebears. They experience the loss as wrenching, but they invested themselves in struggles to make the new national cultures serve their interests and understandings of the world as well as those of elites. They achieved a level of collective voice in large-scale politics that was unprecedented (if alas, not always adequate, sometimes subverted and often squandered). In a mixture of victories and concessions they secured national institutions that offered them notable protection and support even if not as much equality or fairness as often promised.

Even more than the villages lost in earlier political, economic and cultural transformations, thus, nations are not merely objects of familiarity and affection but achievements of struggle. Far from perfect, they still should not be lightly denigrated, especially not in the name of a new elite-dominated cosmopolitan culture (nor even a corporate-dominated mass culture) that leaves underlying structures of social inequality untouched or even is complicit in versions of globalization that, like neo-liberalism, accentuate inequality. Contemporary cosmopolitanism commonly reflects the experience and perspective of elites and obscures the social foundations on which that experience and perspective rest.

Thinking about cosmopolitanism as ethical universalism reinforces the lack of attention to the social foundations on which it rests – even when ethical universalism might be a basis for egalitarian critique. Whether in the Roman Empire for the Stoics, or the (temporary) post-Westphalian pacification and growth of European states for Kant, or the great trading and imperial cities of high modernity, or global capitalism today cosmopolitanism always depends on social foundations. Transnational institutions can be developed that offer ordinary people greater voice. Emerging global elite culture and mass for-profit consumer culture can both be contested. International law and regulation can limit both capitalist rapacity and state violence. But cosmopolitanism alone, commonly focuses attention away from these political, economic and social questions and towards apparently free-floating ethics and culture.

Thinking about cosmopolitanism as taste or even intellectual orientation reinforces its association with elites and makes it harder to understand the actually existing cosmopolitanism of multicultural cities (which involves not only stylish consumption or the gaze of flâneurs but soccer matches, ethnic jokes and grudging accommodation of neighbours). This connects to a tendency to imagine cosmopolitanism more as escape from the constraints of cultural prejudice than the production of cultural capacities for interaction and integration. If we look more at the material and institutional underpinnings of actual cosmopolitanism we will see less rational planning and more historical production of
varied practical ways of organizing life across, not only in, communities. Thinking about cosmopolitanism as a political idea demands attention to whether it is a corrective and complement to national and other solidarities or itself grounded in some other global solidarity. Cosmopolitan style and taste and ethics and politics can reinforce each other but also contend with each other. I want to raise questions about the tendency for cosmopolitan ethics to substitute for transnational politics, about the tendency for abstract thinking about the potential global whole to undermine appreciation for actual if incomplete and imperfect integration in cities, nations and religions. Integrating only part of humanity, I will suggest, does not mean merely being particularistic or parochial. Political, ethical and stylistic cosmopolitanism are all important, but it is useful to distinguish them. The essays gathered here all emphasize thinking about institutional underpinnings and contexts for cosmopolitanism, and especially about the significance of ‘belonging’ or social solidarity. Cosmopolitanism is often conceived as the transcendence of such belonging. Much cosmopolitan thinking participates in seeing culture as identified with place, and travel as bringing escape from its constraints. But as James Clifford (1992) has noted, cultures can travel (compare Hannzer, 1992). Indeed diasporas can and often dramatically do produce cultural conservatism among the relocated, although they can also give rise to ‘vernacular’ or ‘demotic’ cosmopolitanism as working-class migrants find themselves opened to other cultural influences (cf. Werbner, 2006). But note the implicit shift in reference. Does saying that Pakistani migrants in Manchester or the Persian Gulf are open to new cultural influences and changed thereby indicate that they think of themselves as citizens of the world, bearing ethically equivalent obligations to all others?

Some writers identify cosmopolitanism with a reflexive, open, inclusive normative consciousness. Martha Nussbaum (1996), for example, sees cosmopolitanism in terms of individual selves, located amid concentric circles of potential connections – and sees cosmopolitanism as the ethically superior identification with, and sense of obligation to, the widest, maximally universal circle of humans as a whole. Anthony Appiah (2006) has argued for a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ in which local ties still matter even amid far-flung connections and with a global ethical consciousness. If his is the perspective of postcolonial cultural elites, and more generally those who came from somewhere but went to Princeton (and Harvard and Oxford), others stress the extent to which a range of different occupations, even warfare, may bring recognition of the larger world beyond local (or national) cultural roots (Cheah and
Robbins, 1998). But in all these cases, cosmopolitanism is an ‘outlook’. It is about either ethical obligations or cultural openness. Cosmopolitanism may be a cultural orientation, but it is never the absence of culture. It is produced and reinforced by belonging to transnational networks and to a community of fellow cosmopolitans. There are different such communities – academic and corporate and NGO, religious and secular. One may participate in multiple such networks, but it is an illusion – an ideological illusion – to imagine citizenship of the world as simply freedom from belonging to more sectional groupings. There is, thus, something misleading when Ulrich Beck writes: ‘To belong or not to belong, that is the cosmopolitan question’ (Beck, 2003: 50). It is true that some people are given the freedom and confidence to experience ‘belonging’ as much more optional than others. But we should see in such experience a systematic underestimation of the social foundations of this freedom and confidence – class position and privileged citizenship. And we should see cosmopolitans as belonging to cosmopolitan networks and culture, not just escaping locality or nation. Oddly, Beck asks the question in a paper devoted to the analysis of global inequality. His agenda is to focus our attention on the ‘big inequalities’ between rich and poor nations. These, he suggests, dwarf inequalities within nations. There is something to this, though it oversimplifies empirical patterns of inequality. Beck is certainly right that ‘it is surprising how the big inequalities which are suffered by humanity can be continuously legitimized through a silent complicity between the state authority and the state-obsessed social sciences by means of a form of organized non-perception’ (Beck, 2003: 50). But what he does not consider is the extent to which participation in a multinational cosmopolitan elite is basic to the reproduction of that non-perception.

The elites of ‘poor’ or postcolonial countries who participate in global civil society, multilateral agencies and transnational business corporations not only make money their compatriots can barely imagine but make possible the cosmopolitan illusion of elites from rich countries. This is the illusion that their relationships with fellow cosmopolitans truly transcend nation and culture and place. Cosmopolitan elites too often misrecognize transnational class formation as the escape from belonging.

It is impossible not to belong to social groups, relations or culture. The idea of individuals abstract enough to be able to choose all their ‘identifications’ is deeply misleading. Versions of this idea are, however, widespread in liberal cosmopolitanism. They reflect the attractive illusion of escaping from social determinations into a realm of greater
freedom, and from cultural particularity into greater universalism. But they are remarkably unrealistic, and so abstract as to provide little purchase on what the next steps of actual social action might be for real people who are necessarily situated in particular webs of belonging, with access to particular others but not to humanity in general. Treating ethnicity as essentially (rather than partially) a choice of identifications, they neglect the omnipresence of ascription (and discrimination) as determinations of social identities. They neglect the huge inequalities in the supports available to individuals to enter cosmopolitan intercourse as individuals (and also the ways in which certain socially distributed supports like wealth, education and command of the English language are understood as personal achievements or attributes). And they neglect the extent to which people are implicated in social actions which they are not entirely free to choose (as, for example, I remain an American and share responsibility for the invasion of Iraq despite my opposition to it and distaste for the US administration that launched it).

Whether blame or benefit follow from such implications, they are not altogether optional. Cosmopolitanism seems to signal both the identity (and therefore unity) of all human beings despite their differences, and appreciation for and ability to feel at home among the actual differences among people and peoples. We focus sometimes on the essential similarity of people and sometimes on their diversity. We should be careful not to imagine that either sort of cosmopolitanism is an immediately useful example for democracy. Modern democracy grew in close relationship to nationalism, as the ideal of self-determination demanded a strong notion of the collective self in question. Nationalism was also (at least often) an attempt to reconcile liberty and ethical universalism with felt community. This does not mean that we should not seek more cosmopolitan values, cultural knowledge and styles of interpersonal relations in modern national democracies. It certainly does not mean that we should embrace reactionary versions of nationalism which have often been antidemocratic as well as anticosmopolitan. But it does mean that we need to ask some hard questions about how cosmopolitanism relates to the construction of political and social solidarities. Does cosmopolitan actually underpin effective political solidarity, or only offer an attractive counterbalance to nationalism? How can the important potential of multiple and hybrid cultural and social identities be reconciled with political participation and rights? What is the relationship between valuing difference and having a strong enough commitment to specific others to sacrifice in collective struggle or accept democracy’s difficult challenge of living in a minority and attempting only
to persuade and not simply dominate others with whom one does not agree? It will not do simply to substitute ethics for politics, no matter how cosmopolitan and otherwise attractive the ethics. It will not do to imagine democratic politics without paying serious attention to the production of strong solidarity among the subjects of struggles for greater self-determination.

Many forms and visions of belonging are also responses to globalization, not merely inheritances from time immemorial. Nations and national identities, for example, have been forged in international relations from wars to trade, in international migrations and among those who travelled as well as those who feared their arrival, and in pursuit of popular sovereignty against traditional rulers. Nationalism has often grown stronger when globalization has intensified. Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and other religions arose in the contexts of empires and conflicts but also have been remade as frames of identity crossing nations and yet locating believers in a multireligious world. Religion has shaped globalization not only as a source of conflict but of peacemaking. The significance of local community has repeatedly been changed by incorporation into broader structures of trade and association. And communal values have been articulated both to defend havens in a seemingly heartless world and to set examples for global imitation. While structures of belonging may be shaped by tradition, thus, we need to understand them not merely as traditional alternatives to modernity or cosmopolitanism but as important ways in which ordinary people have tried to take hold of modernity and to locate themselves in a globalizing world. In a broad, general sense cosmopolitanism is unexceptionable. Who – at least what sophisticated intellectual – could argue for parochialism over a broader perspective, for narrow sectarian loyalties over recognition of global responsibilities? Who could be against citizenship of the world? But the word ‘citizenship’ is a clue to the difficulty. Cosmopolitanism means something very different as a political project – or as the project of substituting universalistic ethics for politics – from what it means as a general orientation to difference in the world. And a central strand of political theory is now invested in hopes for cosmopolitan democracy, democracy not limited by nation states. In the spirit of Kant as well as Diogenes, many say, people should see themselves as citizens of the world, not just of their countries. This requires escape from the dominance of a nationalist social imaginary (that is, a nationalist way of understanding what society is and constituting new political communities). It is an escape that carries the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. We should I think join
in recognizing the importance of transnational relations and therefore transnational politics, movements and ethics. We should try to belong to the world as a whole and help it thrive, and be more just and better organized. But we should not imagine we can do so very well by ignoring or wishing away national and local solidarities. We need to be global in part through how we are national. And we need to recognize the ways national – and ethnic and religious – solidarities work for others. If we are among those privileged to transcend national identities and limits in our travel and academic conferences and reading and friendships we should nonetheless be attentive to the social conditions of our outlook and the situations of those who do not share our privileges.

Notes

1. Part of this chapter was presented as the Ernest Gellner Memorial Lecture for 2007 and published in *Nations and Nationalism*.
2. Beck uses a similar play with the distinction between substance and process to say that Europe does not exist, only Europeanization – ‘an institutionalized process of permanent change’ which is producing ‘social and political integration through cosmopolitanization’ (Beck and Grande, 2007: 5–6).
3. One of the several bartenders with claims to have invented the Cosmopolitan, Toby Ceccini of the Odeon in New York’s Tribecca, entitled his autobiography *Cosmopolitan: a Bartender’s Story* (and the pun is intentional). Tribecca is of course the New York neighbourhood most identified with the 1990s boom, but then the boom was even more identified with Silicon Valley, so it is apt that the blogging consensus gives San Francisco the strongest claim on inventing the drink of the decade. But only in New York did the relevant bartender write his autobiography. It was that sort of decade.
4. It should be noted that while ‘cosmopolitan’ is the first category listed, the ads go on for many pages organized also (for the less explicitly cosmopolitan) by caste, community, language, religion, profession and previous marital status. International educational credentials are noted throughout, but only in the ‘cosmopolitan’ section are alliances invited specifically in terms like ‘Cultured, Cosmopolitan, Westernized’ or ‘Smart, Westernized, Cosmopolitan working for MNC’.
5. UK Ministry for Trade and Investment, online at http://www.investoverseas.org/United_Kingdom/UK_Sectors/Food_and_Drink.htm. Examples can readily be multiplied from almost any market imaginable. ‘With a more cosmopolitan Britain driven by ‘lifestyle’ and ‘design’ home and garden television programmes . . .’ (http://hiddenwires.co.uk/resourcesarticles2004/articles/20040503-05.html). In Britain as elsewhere, though, the years after 2001 marked a change. ‘Suddenly the celebration of postnational, cosmopolitan Britain has been eclipsed by the return of “security and identity” issues, as David Goodheart put it in 2006 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3445).
7. In this as in other ways, it echoes rather than transcends nationalism; see Calhoun (1997) on this presumption of ‘directness’ rather than mediation. Of course there are exceptions to this general tendency in cosmopolitan thought, efforts to understand cosmopolitanism from within various scales of relationships across lines of difference rather than categorical similarity on a global scale. For a noteworthy example, see Pollock (2000). Much more abstractly, David Held (1995) has seen recognition of diversity as a hallmark of what he calls ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ but seen the issue more as finding appropriate representative mechanisms on a variety of scales than of shifting the idea of cosmopolitanism away from global categorical similarity to the multifarious and heterogeneous making of connections which is necessarily at least partly local.


10. Talcott Parsons (see 1951) described societies as differing along several ‘pattern variables’. Universalism/particularism was one of these – and Parsons associated modernization with movement towards the universal. This notion of a linear variable diverted attention from the coexistence of the two – whether in harmony, in tension or in dialectical relationship.

11. The play is not about overcoming national difference but about overcoming a mixture of ethnic, religious and class difference. Updating the Romeo and Juliet story, it centres on love between two Russians – a poor Jewish man and a woman of noble Cossack descent who are able to find love in America.

12. Before Tiger Woods, an iconic representation of racial mixture as an attractive vision of the future was a 1993 *Time* magazine cover in which several pictures seeming to reveal different racial identities were morphed into each other by computer imaging.

13. See also the PBS documentary to which it is an adjunct.

14. See Soysal (1994) for an early consideration of important ways in which migrants may be legally recognized, afforded welfare rights and even given political representation (though usually only at the local level) even without becoming full-fledged national citizens.

15. Not all WASPS are elite, however, and interaction between those at Harvard and those in Appalachia is strained (when it takes place at all). But the connection of the two in a common category also helps to produce the primacy of ethnic over class consciousness.


17. The real and growing numbers of people who have formal rights in multiple polities shapes the issue but does not solve the problem. We see not so much ‘postnational citizenship’ as a new complexity in citizenship which is still primarily organized in nation-state terms. Discussion in political theory has often been informed too much by formal legal rights and an optimistic reading of the European case. See Soysal (1994), and the more recent discussion in Benhabib (2006).
It is worth noting that Manhattanites’ belief in having advanced beyond identity issues is exceedingly class structured. It is a post-multiculturalism for those who can afford some of the most expensive real estate in the world and pretty expensive art to go in it.

Scale is of course significant as a continuous variable; to say something like ‘at the scale of the nation state’ accordingly masks enormous diversity in the actual scale – territory, population, wealth, state capacity – of nation states (never mind the contentious question of how states are related to nations). Part of what is meant in such statements is not, I think, precisely scale but corporate organization. And of course states are not the only such corporations. It is also possible that what is meant by ‘scale’ is sovereignty, though this is not precisely a scalar concept, though it is arguably much more quantitatively variable than the usual accounts of its categorical perfection suggest (indeed, Stephen Krasner (1999) suggests it is virtually a myth, if a powerful one). Another categorical distinction is really a matter of scale: the limits of the organization of social life through face-to-face arrangements. These limits occasion the rise of forms of written, printed or electronic communication, new forms of relationships among strangers, and non-linguistic steering media.


Hannerz distinguishes different sorts of movement around the world from foreign correspondents to labour migrants and tourists and notes that these produce different challenges for, and orientations to, the production of meaning. Among other things, for some involvement with other cultures is in a sense a ‘cost’ while for others it is a benefit.

References
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