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Edited by

Richard G. Whitman

Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, UK
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The editor would like to extend thanks to Bilge Yabanci and to Marianne Skinner, PhD candidates in the Department of European Studies and Modern Languages at the University of Bath, in the preparation of this volume. Both provided expert assistance in reviewing the state-of-the-art literature on Normative Power Europe and identifying relevant publications and allowing the volume to be so cogent and comprehensive in its coverage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAM</td>
<td>Border Assistance Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDI</td>
<td>Commitment to Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPS</td>
<td>Centre for European Policy Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLS</td>
<td>Core Labour Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPRI</td>
<td>Copenhagen Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Civilian Power Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Agreement</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFP</td>
<td>European Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalized System of Preferences</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Integrated Police Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITO</td>
<td>International Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Control Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCMS</td>
<td>Journal of Common Market Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North African</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEPP</td>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
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<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favoured Nations</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>Normative Power Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUG</td>
<td>National Unity Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SIA</td>
<td>Sustainability Impact Assessments</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Treaty establishing the European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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</table>
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1

Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and International Relations

Richard G. Whitman

Introduction

It was only after the astonishing event of the fall of the Berlin Wall that the European Union (EU) genuinely started reckoning with the principles it stands for and the role it is prepared to play at the international stage. During the Cold War, scholarly arguments on the long march of EU integration were mainly concerned with the content and implementation of integration explained within the framework of mainstream integration theories (e.g. Rosamond 2000; Wiener and Diez 2004). In these discussions, nobody seemed aware of the fact that a fundamental question was left unanswered by both academic and policy circles: what do these policies and their (mis)conduct reveal about the basic foundations of the Union? In the post-Cold War era, the academic community has mostly been occupied with this broad question on the ‘software dimensions’ of EU politics (Lucarelli 2006) from different theoretical viewpoints with an aim to go beyond the traditional explanations of the EU integration and to find an explanatory framework for changing relations between the EU and the rest of the world.

A seminal article published in the Journal of Common Market Studies in 2002 by Ian Manners has started the necessary prolific debates over the visions, ideations, values and principles of the Union. For nearly a decade, the academic community has been occupied with the patterns and extent of the implementation of various norms within the EU policies. Manners introduced the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) as the ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’ (Manners 2002: 239). He mentions the fact that besides the previous conceptualizations of the EU within the narrow confines of military versus civilian power, the EU should be considered as a normative power. Therefore, the EU should be studied according to ‘what it is’ rather than ‘what it does or says’ (Manners 2002: 252). In other words, the basics of NPE argument can be traced back
to the questions regarding the object being studied and what and how we know about the nature of the object; more clearly the NPE concept closely addresses the ontological foundations of the EU (Manners 2002: 253). By distinguishing the concept of normative power from the previous discussions on military power (Bull 1982) and civilian power (Duchêne 1972), Manners (2002: 236) placed the identity and nature of the Union into a different framework in which he aims at replacing ‘the state as the centre of concern’ and refocusing on the ideations and power of norms as the substantive basics of the EU studies.

The scholarly interest in the normative and value-driven features of the EU can be surely predicated upon the developments in the area of foreign policy cooperation and the accompanying emphasis on the importance of values and norms for conduct of external relations by EU policy circles. Embodied by the foundational treaties of the EU, norms and principles consist of the inner crust of the EU’s identity and shape its role in the international arena as a foreign policy actor. As stated in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty (also Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)):

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

Similarly, the European Security Strategy (ESS) propounds that projecting these values externally is the core principle guiding the EU’s external relations:

Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

The idea of NPE has its roots in the discussions facilitated by Duchêne's (1973) ‘idée force’ and Galtung's (1973) ‘ideological power’, but in his initial writings, Manners attributed the reason of introducing NPE to the academic parsimony in normative theorizing and the need to frame post-Cold War world politics into a more principle-oriented analysis since the EU has come to the fore with an emphasis on the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In doing so, Manners states the inability of traditional approaches developed throughout the Cold War years and turns to cross-disciplinary approaches, particularly Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory as a focal point for an approach to the study of Europe.
In Manners’ (2007a: 77) words, ‘[c]ritical scholars therefore seek to escape
the intellectual straight jacket of traditional political science by questioning
assumptions about political systems and institutions, economicistic ratio-

nals and methodologies... more than anything, critical scholars share
a commitment to uncovering preconceptions about historical reality and
the contextual nature of knowledge, and they seek to change politics’. In
other words, on the basics of the normative power argument lies the rejec-
tion of a totalistic and state-centred view of traditional approaches. In this
regard, defining the EU’s foreign policy in normative terms means that the
EU’s power cannot be enucleated to either military or purely economic
means, it ‘works through ideas, opinions and conscience’ (Diez and Manners
2007: 175). Consequently, the concept of NPE attracted much excitement
within the scholarly world and many authors continue to describe the
EU in some ‘adjectival prefixes’ (Bickerton 2007). Affixing various concepts
to define the characteristics of ‘power’ the EU possesses include civiliz-
ing or civilizational power (Duchêne 1972; Sjursen 2006a, 2006b), quiet
superpower (Moravscik 2002, 2004), ethical power (Aggestam 2008), post-
modern superpower (McCormick 2006), responsible power (Mayer and Vogt
2006), vanishing mediator (Nicolaidis 2004) and gentle power (Merlini 2001;
Paddoa-Schioppa 2001).

Unsurprisingly, NPE is likely to engage students and scholars of EU affairs
in continuous reflection about certain implications of being normative for
the foreseeable future. So far, it has facilitated an alternative conceptualiza-
tion of Europe and Europe’s role through questioning the EU institutions
and policies in terms of essence, actions and impacts rather than taking
them as granted (Manners 2006e: 180). We can be confident that nor-
mative power and normative theorizations of the EU will continue to
provide various insights for the future research agenda. This book is an
attempt to bring a comprehensive and fresh approach to NPE, after nearly
a decade of breeding discussion. In this sense, the book aims not only at
bringing theoretically au courant reflections on NPE, but also at an exten-
sive recital of ‘applied’ normative power along various cases and policy
areas.

In this introduction, considering the extensive theoretical and empirical
studies within the normative approach, an overview of the vast literature
in the field is provided. Given the oversupply of conceptual definitions
affiliated with NPE which now resembles dissonant ‘a capella singing’ of
a chorus lacking operationalization of the actual role that the EU plays
through actions and impact, the first aim of the chapter is to clarify the
essence of the normative power concept and also differentiate it from sim-
ilar conceptualizations. Then, the literature on NPE is extensively analysed
and classified in order to provide clarification for the rest of the book. The
last section of the chapter gives a brief account of each chapter in the
book.
Beyond a mere excursus of an old dilemma

Aligning the EU with different concepts reflecting the non-state like features of it as an actor of international politics is not a new phenomenon. In 1972, Duchêne defined the EU as civilian, which means ‘special international actor whose strength lies in its ability to promote and encourage stability through economic and political means’ (Duchêne 1972; Sjursen 2004) rather than physical coercive force. However, the normative power argument has been raised to go beyond the discussions over whether the EU is an actor in international politics. Normative power theorizing is interested in the EU’s aim of setting standards for the others through the means of spreading norms rather than being powerful with either military or economic sources (Diez and Manners 2007: 175). In other words, NPE is independent of the discussions between soft versus hard power or civilian versus military power. The concept has been developed as a response to the absence of normative theorizing and with an aim to go beyond dichotomies of civil versus military power which was a product of Cold War politics.

Nevertheless, NPE is sometimes easily commingled with Duchêne’s civilian power which focuses on devaluation of military power by the European states and the importance of the economic and other non-military power the EU possesses. According to Manners, civilian power can be characterized by three central dimensions – ‘diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems’ (multilateralism); ‘centrality of economic power’ (non-military); and ‘legally-binding supranational institutions’ (international law) (Manners 2000a: 26; 2002: 236–7). In this sense, the civil or civilizing power concept is related to Eurocentric (neo)colonial perceptions of the rest of the world and the importance of state and physical power (Manners 2006c: 184). The nature of civilian power arguments reflects an acceptance of an international society based on the relations between states or what Manners calls ‘Westphalian culturation’ (2006e: 176). NPE conceptualizes international society as composed of various actors and rejects the tendency to limit the activities of international community to the relations between states. Although civilian power thesis is based on the relative absence of physical force and military capabilities, it still inherently acknowledges the importance of material power, whereas normative power focuses on ‘non-material exemplification found in the contagion of norms’ through imitation and representation of the EU which has become a pole of attraction. Moreover, NPE rejects any affiliation with colonial/neocolonial practice, that is, the role of mission civilisatrice for the less developed parts of the world. NPE emphasizes the cosmopolitan nature of the EU’s principles, particularly by ‘a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its member states and the world’ (Manners 2006e: 176). In its totality, rather than emphasizing merely on civilian (economic and legal relations) or material power, NPE emphasizes the overall structural power
the EU possesses as a result of its relative ambiguity. Thus, it is an inclusive approach about what is or ought to be normative about the EU, in contrast to the essentialism of civilizing Europe (Manners 2003: 73–4).

Normative power is also distinguished from ethical power. According to Manners, in ethical (foreign) policy a cosmopolitan view is prioritized. Although the principles and norms the EU is based on are cosmopolitan, its foreign policy is set between three dimensions: member states, the supranational EU and the cosmopolitical world society. The way the EU internalizes these cosmopolitical values into its policies (conversion of values into principles as discussed in Lucarelli and Manners 2006, see below) is unique to the Union. By distinguishing normative from ethical and/or civilian, Manners discusses that normative is about how policy should be, how the EU should reconstruct the current practices, while ethical is related to the genuineness of foreign policy or much more in line with ‘totality’ or ‘rescuer mentality’ (Manners 2007b: 118, emphasis added).

The essence of Normative Power Europe

If the EU is neither civilian nor military only, then what is the nature or essence of the ‘normative’ beast? According to Manners, the EU’s normative power derives from three sources: historical context (legacy of two destructive world wars), hybrid polity (the features of the Union as a post-Westphalian order with supranational and international institutions) and political-legal constitutionalism (elite-driven, treaty-based legal nature of the EU) (2002: 240–1). These three features of the Union helped bring the common principles of the member states under the same framework and facilitated commitment to principles and norms at the supranational and national levels. These common principles and values constitute the EU as a political entity in various ways and in many different policy areas (Lucarelli and Manners 2006) where the EU places the norms of peace, idea of liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights1 at the centre of its relations with the rest of the world. The EU builds its power and ‘greater legitimacy’ upon these fundamental norms (Manners 2002: 244).

In this sense, normative power is a power that is able ‘to shape conceptions of the “normal”’ (Manners 2000a: 32; also Manners 2002: 239) for others. This statement has many implications. First of all, the role of pure instrumental logic in the use of norms is not possible. In Manners’ words, ‘in my formulation the central component of normative power Europe is that it [the EU] exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way’ (2002: 242). The pursuit of democracy, the rule of law, social justice and human rights in its foreign policy, the EU’s preference for diplomacy and multilateralism consists of a substantial dimension of the EU normative foundations (Maull 2000a). Particular channels initiate diffusion of norms
in the Union’s international relations depending on the relations between
the EU and the third parties.  

Second, these normative principles are not exclusively European, but
rather reflect universal and especially post-Cold War practices of the inter-
national community. Lucarelli and Manners suggest that the universal
principles actually are internalized and converted into guiding principles
by the EU. Therefore, each broad principle is given a European reading
(Lucarelli and Manners 2006: 202) before channelled into relations with
third parties. As Manners contends in his recent article, the principles are not
exclusively indigenous and they are acknowledged by the United Nations
(UN) long before, however, the EU has internalized and included these
principles in its treaties and begun applying them in its external relations
(Manners 2010b). This feature of the NPE is in line with what Eriksen dis-

cusses in assessing the argument on NPE. According to Eriksen, absence
of coercive means or the statements over honourable aims cannot be the

defining criteria, rather the cosmopolitan criteria higher-ranking law such as
human rights and international law, justice explain the nature of an actor
(Eriksen 2006: 252–3). Similar arguments have been developed claiming that
the EU is normative because it binds itself through cosmopolitan law, delib-
erative/communicative nature and discourse on being normative (Diez 2005;
Sjursen 2006a). Therefore, normative power would seek ‘to overcome power
politics through a strengthening of not only international but cosmopolitan
law, emphasising the rights of individuals and not only the rights of states
to sovereign equality’ (Sjursen 2006a: 249).

Last but not least, the normative power argument also strongly relates to
the presence/actorness and capability of the EU in world politics. The ability
to alter normality in world politics has not only ideational but also undeni-
able practical implications. Therefore in the first instance, being normative
means changing norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics, which
is bounded by state centricity (Manners 2008b: 45). In this sense, Manners
distinguishes the two aspects of normative power: being normative and act-
ing in a normative way. The former is due to the nature of the EU or as a
result of its hybrid polity embracing intergovernmental and transnational
governance. The latter mentions behaving in an ethically good manner.

Despite her criticisms of NPE, Aggestam acknowledges that with its
increasing role, the EU’s impact also becomes important and she proposes a
shift from focusing on what the EU ‘is’ to what it ‘does’ (Aggestam 2008).
In suggesting to use the term ‘ethical’ instead of ‘normative’, Aggestam
(2008: 4) claims that the former concept captures ‘how the context of nor-

mative globalization after the end of the Cold War enabled the EU to assume
a more proactive international role by drawing on an international ethics
largely, but not exclusively, institutionalized within the UN system’. Ethical
policy also defends the interdependent nature of ethics and interests; thus
rejects the altruism and moral absoluteness (Aggestam 2008: 6). Regarding
the field of foreign policy, similarly Keukeleire’s concept of ‘structural foreign policy’ is closely related to the active international role undertaken by the EU. By emphasizing the difference between traditional and structural foreign policy, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) state that a structural foreign policy ‘aims at influencing in an enduring and sustainable way’. Similarly, Telò writes that the EU’s foreign policy aims at altering the economic and social structures of third parties ‘through pacific and original means (diplomatic means, agreements, sanctions, and so on)’ in the middle and long run (Telò 2001: 264).

Indeed, in Manners’ original conceptualization, NPE does not only rely on ideational aspects, it ‘rejects such temptations to unreflective and uncritical analysis. Instead it aims to contribute to a better understanding of what principles the EU promotes. How the EU acts, and what impact the EU has by attempting both to analyse and to judge the EU’s normative power in world politics’ (Manners 2008b: 46, emphasis added). Thereupon, studying NPE requires a deep analysis of its various impacts at different levels (individual level, legal level and non-Europeans’ level), since it is developed as a reaction to understand the growing strategic aspirations of the EU embodying civilian and military power.

Unsurprisingly, normative power has attracted much criticism especially from structural-realist/rationalist scholars. The structural-realist viewpoint rejects that the EU has a separate actoriness to its member states. Rather than being an actor on its own with a continuous support for universal values, ‘the EU was used by its most influential member states as an instrument for collectively exercising hegemonic power, shaping its “near abroad” in ways amenable to the long-term strategic and economic interests of its member states’ (Hyde-Price 2006: 226–7). Furthermore, Hyde-Price questions the normative and ethical foundations of the EU. According to him, the only ethical behaviour could be found in the Weberian ‘ethic of ultimate ends’, namely: prudence, scepticism and reciprocity (Hyde-Price 2008). In defining the EU’s relations and worldwide support for norms and values, he states that ‘[i]t is ironic that many Europeans have seen through the Bush administration’s claims that what is good for America is also good for the world, but fail to question EU claims that what is good for “Europe” is good for the world’ (Hyde-Price 2008: 32). Although from a different point of view, Laïdi’s (2006, 2008) claim against normative power stems from its close affiliation with ideals and abstraction from a notion of interest. Such a conceptualization would equate the EU with ideal power, and according to Laïdi, bound the EU by an ‘idealist trap’ (Bickerton 2007). As stated by Jørgensen, different theoretical perspectives adopt different stands towards the role and importance of values and principles (Jørgensen 2006: 56). As a response to the misconceptualization of the presence of values and principles in foreign policy, Jørgensen contends that ‘values, images and principles are completely agnostic along the dichotomies of benign/malign and soft/hard’ (2006: 57).
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contrary to the structural-realist scholars’ tendency to equate norms with ideals and good. According to Jørgensen, direct causal relationships between norms and policy cannot be established; given the contending principles, actors have to make a choice among principles and the way to convert them into policy. This calls for a closer examination of literature on the application of normative power into policy areas.

**Extending the sketches on normative power**

Eriksen states that ‘[t]he propensity to act on honourable motives cannot itself represent the criteria for judging the polity’s normative quality because they may very well be arbitrary. A policy based on good intentions may very well neglect others’ interest or values or fail to give them due consideration’ (2006: 252). This reflection represents the warning against ambiguous articulation of norms into policies. Realizing the ongoing ambiguity, Sjursen (2006b) states the need for a theory, definite criteria, a clear definition for normative power and the need for critical standards in assessing military and non-military foreign policy. Similarly, M. Smith (2006b: 325) calls attention to the ‘gap between questions about what kind of vehicle’ the EU’s foreign policy is and ‘who or what drives and steers it’, pointing to the need for further reflection on the policy implications of being normative in devising policy, and the relations between internal developments and broader international issues and structures (M. Smith 2006b: 327). It is also supported by Diez and Manners in their warning against unreflexive theorizing on normative power which would create ‘pure self interested hegemony’ (2007: 174).

This brings in the argument that principles, actions and impact are equally important for NPE. Manners draws upon procedural normative ethics in order to discuss the normative basis of the EU’s traits in its external action (Manners 2008b: 55–6). Procedural normative ethics requires first the EU to turn itself into a virtuous example by applying the same principles at home. Consistency between home and abroad would ensure that the EU is not hypocritical in promoting norms (Manners 2008b: 56). Second, taking the argument one step further in his discussion on procedural normative ethics, Manners relies on deontological ethics, that is, the extent of formalization of rules and duties which guides the EU’s external actions and states that rule-bounded governed behaviour, continuous public debate and deliberation are the basis for reasonable action in the international arena. The last dimension of normative ethics takes the impact of actions into consideration. Assessing the impact of outcomes would certainly require analysis from consequentialist ethics point of view. In this sense, the most important aspect of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world can be assessed by the outcomes, and according to Manners this should be governed by doing least harm (Manners 2008b: 58–9). Thus, the way substantive normative principles are
promoted in a normative and procedural way makes the EU a lively example in its principles, be reasonable in its actions and do least harm in its impact (Manners 2008b). Through framing the EU’s foreign policy within procedural normative ethics, Manners has increased the versatility of NPE, since his theoretical toolbox thus suggests that universally accepted values cannot be merely pushed forward on third parties but must be acceptable to Europeans and non-Europeans alike in terms of principles, actions and impact (2008b: 80).

Extending normative power representations of the EU in the literature has been accelerated by the various external policies of the EU but mostly shaped by the dilemma between current militarization of the Union and maintaining norms at the centre of foreign policy, and the implications of further militarization on world politics (Diez and Manners 2007). The difference of the EU as a polity is more or less commonly established in the literature (Diez and Manners 2007), but the discussion over what ways and to what extent the EU relies on normative principles has led to the rise of a crystallized literature on NPE. While some have conceptualized this difference in liberal western values (Cooper 2003), others mention cosmopolitan characters of the values committed by the EU (Eriksen 2006) or the difference the EU displays compared to the other actors (Lucarelli and Menotti 2006). Yet others focus on the relative lack of military capabilities due to the normative/civilian nature of the EU (Kagan 2003).

It can surely be claimed that defining the EU within normative theorizing fulfils various scholarly appetite in terms of discussing the EU’s nature and its role in world politics from different points of view, namely, whether the normative Europe is ‘instrumental or ideological, whether it acts as an actor or consist of a structure, is it a union of states or people’ (Manners 2007b: 128–9). As Wiener (2008: 38) states, ‘norms matter for politics is a widely shared observation. [However,] there is less agreement on how they matter’. Thus, the normative power conceptualization has been subjected to various litmus tests by applying it to many cases and different policy areas.

A part of the literature emphasizes the differences of the EU in comparison to other actors, mainly the United States (US). For instance, Baker (2006) contends the attitude towards environmental protection; Van Den Hoven (2006) discusses the framework of multilateral trade negotiations; and Welsh (2006) argues in science and technology, the EU displays certain normative characteristics compared to the US. Pető and Manners (2006) discuss that enlargement and development policy is used to upgrade gender equality. Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007) treat the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the agreement on the Kyoto Protocol as case studies and find evidence that the EU’s identity as a normative power is first and foremost shaped in sharp demarcation against the US as the ‘other’. The extensive implementation of normative theorizing into EU policies extends far beyond the initial application of Manners into the case of the death penalty (Manners 2002);
for instance, environmental policy (Lightfoot and Burchell 2004), the EU and global governance (Laidi 2005), EU actorness (Bretherton and Vogler 2006), EU foreign policy (Sjursen 2006a, 2006b), Europe and ‘others’ (Diez 2005), EU values and principles (Lucarelli and Manners 2006). This vast literature broadly concludes that the EU’s normative power and its actual implications in a globalized era are closely interlinked. In line with the main policy documents, the EU has been defining its relations with the rest of the world through normative commitments to norms and multilateral frameworks. The analysis of normative power in the EU literature is still going on and a classification of the mainstream literature is perhaps necessary in order to understand the debates which enliven NPE conceptualization through either conforming or confronting the normative power argument.

International identity

Manners and Whitman (2003) applied the normative conceptualization in order to explain one dimension of the multifaceted EU identity. Conventional studies tend to see the EU’s identity construction as an attempt to create ‘a single, essential, categorical identity’ through emphasis on the difference between the EU and the rest of the world. Drawing upon an earlier work on the EU’s international identity which discussed the ‘active identity’ of the Union (Manners and Whitman 1998), the authors point to a reflexive dimension of EU identity. According to Manners and Whitman (2003: 381), together with the active identity, the reflexive analysis brings another element to Europeans’ ‘complex and multifaceted identities’, which is normative identity. The authors’ emphasis on the normative aspects of the EU polity besides civilian and military roles aims at showing the absence of a shared identity given the ‘ambiguity’ and ‘incompleteness’ of the EU. In his recent article Manners (2010b: 76) states that ‘[f]or global Europe, the myth of international identity portrayed the complexities and confusion surrounding the newly created EU in the immediate post-cold war period, while at the same time helped move the discussion beyond cold war dichotomies of civilian versus military power to include a further dimension of power-normative power’.

Multiple identities imply that the international identity of the EU is shaped within a multiple texture, far more fluid and even complex and contested (Manners and Whitman 2003; Manners 2006e: 178). The idea of nationalism has caused disasters for Europeans, thus the development of a more post-national constellation and a tendency to reject the absolutism of nationalism and fascism are responses to the historical disasters. The contestation of the international identities of the EU does not aim at creation of a single identity as an end result (Manners and Whitman 2003; Manners 2006e: 178), quite contrarily the multiple identities of the Union are an attempt to look beyond ‘the [historical] evil of European nationalisms’
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(Manners 2007a: 85) with an aim to unify people under one type of identity. Therefore, ‘the EU cannot be considered a difference engine in the multiplication of a separate, single, essential, categorical, supranational EU self’. In this sense, ‘it is the fluid, complex, multiple and relational aspects of the self-other contestations which define the EU as a normative power’ (Manners 2006e: 178) and the normative nature of the EU identity does not allow crystallization of self and other in world politics. In discussing the normative presence and identity, Diez discusses that NPE is inherently a discursive construct of the EU as a model and force for good for the rest of the world. This is not a bad thing per se; according to Diez, discursive constructs can be sources of power as long as the normative frameworks of the actors overlap (Diez 2005; Diez and Pace 2007). In this sense, military and civilian power do not counter the normative identity of the EU. Diez and Manners even state that ‘normative justification of use of military force is possible’, for instance, in humanitarian intervention (Diez and Manners 2007: 178). Still the ‘unreflexive projection of norms and construction of European identity risks being undermined by military power’ (Diez and Manners 2007: 186, also see below).

Militarization

The issue of the creation of military capabilities of the EU together with the increasing autonomous military operations has attracted different reactions from scholars. K. Smith (2005a: 12) argues that military capabilities would definitely threaten the civilian identity as the EU would ‘fold to the supposedly superior hand of military force’, and possibly eventually turn out to be ‘a larger version of a sovereign state’, an ‘armed superpower of sorts’. According to Manners (2006c), militarization of the EU, that is, acquiring crisis management capabilities under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) framework, does not damage NPE per se as long as the EU avoids developing a great power mentality. Militarization of the EU is not a threat in itself but what is threatening for NPE is prioritization of military power over long-term goals of local capacity development or placing conflict resolution within the strategic framework or second pillarization of (Manners 2006c: 191) the EU policies in the conflict regions. Nevertheless, NPE eulogizes the role of the EU foreign policy integration played in the sense that the elite and technocratic nature of EU integration and more sensitive European publics towards the military use of force has acted as pacifying or de-securitizing the member states' traditional foreign policy (Manners 2006f: 407). Therefore, there is a tendency to remain within peaceful, non-coercive confines of constructive instruments rather than military force.

Contrarily, Stavridis (2001: 49–50) argues that military means might be essential in order to ensure that the EU possesses effective civilian power. Dunne (2008: 15) shares the idea that military stance and normative power
can be compatible when the EU is becoming a good citizen of the international society: ‘Europe does not need to accept a choice: either becoming a proto-superpower or retreating to Eutopia. There is a moral middle way to be found.’ Similarly, Whitman (2002: 24) writes that even if the EU acquired military capabilities, civilian power is still relevant, military power does not replace civilian nature but will be a ‘residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction’ (see also Larsen 2002). In discussing the development of the ESDP, Howorth (2004: 213) states that the ESDP points to ‘a radically new discourse on European security’ and ‘a common acceptance of integrated European interventionism, based not solely on the classical stakes of national interest, but also on far more idealistic motivations such as humanitarianism and ethics, thereby introducing a new normative paradigm into international relations’. With the militarizing EU, Lucarelli and Menotti (2006: 159) expound that in line with the normative character of the EU, the boundaries of acceptable behaviour are drawn for third parties, namely, both the actions that would be tolerated and that does not trigger military use of force and the ones that would require reaction reveal a tendency to constrain military policy. Mitzen (2006: 272) brings in a new insight by discussing the EU foreign and security policy under the concept of ontological security. According to her, the EU – like other actors in international politics – learns to become an agent ‘through routinisation of the relationship with the “significant others”’. In this sense, the EU does not only seek to secure a territory or governance but also identity. That is why a military Europe does not undermine its civilizing nature because its identity is anchored deeply in multilateral security cooperation.

Nevertheless, by the beginning of the 2000s, Manners contends that the ambitious aim to develop autonomous military capabilities for the EU and attempts to facilitate a common strategic culture with the ESS have marked ‘a sharp turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention’ (Manners 2006c: 189). According to Manners (2006c: 192), the events after 9/11 and Iraq war have shifted the EU debates to a more security-oriented framework which is marked by ‘martial potency’ and the growth of the Brussels-based military industry. ‘The interplay between institutional prioritization, military missions, and a transnational policy network have all contributed to the misdirection of the normative concerns of the human security agenda away from sustainable peace.’ The more the EU resembles big states and great powers, the more it risks normative power nature. ‘Unreflective militarisation’ is harmful for two important reasons: the balance is lost between short-term and long-term solutions to the conflict and it risks the EU’s peaceful normative and conciliatory character in the eyes of local populations (Manners 2006c: 194). This means a great power-type policy including ‘attacking the symptoms rather than addressing the causes of conflict and insecurity’ (Manners 2006c: 192).
Sustainable peace and conflict management

The above argument raised by Manners has been subject to in-depth analysis by various scholars. In Manners’ (2006f: 407) words, the EU as a security actor means being a ‘provider of “human security” in the shape of “a concern with human life and dignity” with an equal emphasis on “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”’. In other words, the most stunning side of normative power actoriness lies in its emphasis on non-military, economic, social and humanitarian instruments applied within and outside of the EU (Manners 2006f: 407–8). When the EU faces and responds to the protracted conflicts by addressing structural causes and violent symptoms (Manners 2008e: 130), it is able to combine short- and long-term goals and instruments, and develop indigenous capacity ownership (Manners 2006c: 185–6).

In various discussions of normative power within a conflict transformation/resolution framework, authors have confirmed the role that norms and human security play in EU policies. Lucarelli and Menotti (2006: 162–3) claim that since normative power rejects coercion such as pre-emptive strategies, it consists of an intervention into conflicts by far more acceptable terms by the parties, namely, political and economic construction and legal framework. Similarly, Diez et al. (2006) argue that in terms of border conflicts, the EU establishes its normative presence through offering unique opportunities of membership and association. Björkdahl (2005) concludes that the EU acts as a norm-maker in Southern Europe. Nicolaidis (2004) states that the EU has become a transitory institution or a vanishing mediator which acts against the current system and aims at creating a new society.

‘Inconsistent’ normative power: a real ‘contradiction in terms’

Manners initially asked whether normative and power concepts are in contradiction. In concluding the ability to shape the normal in world politics has become a new source of power after the Second World War (see Barnett and Duvall 2005b for a detailed discussion on a new vision on ‘power’), he concludes that normative ground provides the real source of power for the EU in world politics. Scholars have increasingly been interested in various policy areas regarding the EU action in order to test the normative power argument thoroughly. For instance, Mayer (2008) calls for a more realistic translation of ethics into action. As Alston and Weiler (1999: 4–5) acknowledged long ago, ‘the Union can only achieve the leadership role to which it aspires through the example it sets’. Then, if the EU is normative power, hypocrisy and window dressing (Eriksen 2006: 266) would be a real contradiction with the NPE.

The current literature shows that the EU’s record is mixed on this issue. Bailes (2008: 119) discusses that although the EU supports non-coercive
means and coercion is the last resort, the motives behind ESDP developments were ‘self-regarding in institutional and European political terms, rather than driven by an urge to help the suffering’. The strategic weight of the ESDP development is not only about militarization but ‘securitisation of its entire identity’ (Bailes 2008: 119). The normative practical ambiguities linger around the EU actions in terms of whether the EU has chosen ESDP missions in a purely principled manner so far. Doubts are revealed over prevalence of material concerns given the EU preference to act in the neighbourhood, especially where Russians approve, in ex-colonial territories (Bailes 2008).

In terms of democracy and human rights, although we can speak of a common commitment to the normative principles albeit at different levels for various norms when the actual practices of the EU are analysed, inconsistencies remain quite stunning. Balfour (2006: 128) states that the eastern enlargement was marked by ‘flexible adherence to principles’ in Central and Eastern Europe and South Eastern Europe. On the same issue, the EU’s economic and strategic interests seem to play an important drive as well. Especially towards Russia and China, security and economic concerns seem prioritized quite often (Panebianco 2006). Wood (2009) also mentions doubts regarding the limits of EU’s normative power in energy security. While the EU’s modus operandi constantly supports actions through international institutions, international law, dialogue and positive incentives, the EU contracts when it comes to take certain types of actions in support of its normative preferences against some actors. According to Wood (2009: 114), this shows the limits of the EU’s commitment to its norms and values, and under some circumstances ‘support for them loses vigour’. Lerch and Schwellnus (2006) explicate that consistency in applying and supporting norms externally would depend on the path the EU follows in justifying its claims. In the case of support for abolishment of the death penalty, the EU has been consistent in supporting its argument according to argumentative coherence, but in minority protection it shifted from utility to value-based argumentation where the EU’s normative power has been diminished. It seems that double standards and inconsistency provide some doubts in terms of foreign policy. Manners applied normative principles of social solidarity, equality and sustainable peace in empirical study in order to analyse to what extent the normative preferences stated by the EU are consistently and widely applied in practice. Manners himself joins into the discussion that there are variations in terms of the degree of preferences for these normative principles within the polycentric EU which is ‘a committed yet troubled normative power in the globalised world’ (Manners 2006d: 37).

As a response to these inconsistent support of norms, Matlary (2008: 132) looks for a ‘reality check’ behind the stated logic when discussing the praised emphasis on human security by stating that ‘the EU may benefit from calling all its security policy “human security”, but if rhetoric promises more
than policy can deliver, the ethical implications are grave’ (2008: 142). Pure concerns of human security do not make the EU an altruistic and realistic actor; in discussing the nature of political and military realities Matlary admonishes that the EU employs pure humanitarian concerns raised by the EU.

In its institutional relations with the neighbouring states, regardless of the region, however, the EU usually utters the importance of the core norms when conducting various relations. Bicchi (2006), in applying normative power argument empirically to the case of Mediterranean partnership, reflects upon two important dimensions of normative power in order to trace consistency empirics and normative power argument. In this sense, inclusiveness, that is, ‘the extent to which EU policy-makers permit a role (in theory and practice) in EFP [European Foreign Policy]-making for external actors affected by EFP’, is unavoidably vital for NPE. The author also underscores reflexivity which comes to mean the capacity of the EU to adapt the policy by thinking critically according to the specific needs of the area targeted by the policy (Bicchi 2006: 288). Through studying the EU policy in the Mediterranean, she concludes that sociological institutionalist reading of EU foreign policy is more suitable than normative power since the EU lacks both reflexive behaviour and inclusive approach. In its policy design, the EU remains Eurocentric or logic with ‘our size fits all’ marked by institutional isomorphism created between the EU and Mediterranean partners. Similarly, in discussing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Barbé and Johansson-Nogués (2008) state that when the ethics attached to the policies are analysed, motivation and legal/formal framework of the relations must be taken into account. Specifically, as long as the EU is able to represent the balance between utility, values, rights and fairness; the EU would act within the label of ethical policy. However, in striking a delicate balance between material gains and moral impulses, the EU remains ambivalent.

Diez and Pace (2007) also join the discussion that while the EU has a potential to transform the conflicts, there is also a potential that the normative power concept may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. ‘EU normative power is not simply able to shape conceptions of what is seen as normal; its effectiveness rather relies on the extent to which other actors accept the role that EU actors themselves project for themselves into international politics’ (Diez and Pace 2007: 13). In terms of conflict transformation, Noutcheva (2009) discusses the EU’s selfish attitude of ignoring the reactions of non-EU countries to the EU’s policies or lack of assessing the EU’s impact ‘on the ground’. Discussing the role of the EU in the Western Balkans, the EU lacks normative justification in terms of state-building in the region. The EU is more inclined to act according to the rational motives of the EU member states rather than by the EU’s norms and rules of governance or by universal principles of fairness and justice (Noutcheva 2009: 1081). The failure to take the evaluations of the receiving parties risks the credibility
of the EU (Noutcheva 2009: 1066) and triggered non-compliance, or partial compliance on the side of recipient parties.

Overall, the literature closely examined the ambivalence regarding the actual support of principles through actions. Incoherence diminishes the persuasion power of the EU argument, the EU is not necessarily ‘normative by nature’ – its normative power depends heavily on the interaction between its policy goals, means and justifications, and therefore varies between different issue areas (Lerch and Schwellnus 2006: 318). But the inconsistent application and the rhetoric between support for norms and action have brought many concerns about Eurocentricism and even ‘soft imperialism’ to the fore (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005). When Mayer states that ‘sustained Eurocentricism’ is in the EU rhetoric (Mayer 2008; see also Salmon 2005), he reiterates Nicolaïdis’ and Howse’s (2002) argument that the EU must avoid the utopian normativity through demands for absolute principles of substantive justice, regardless of context. They claim that ‘[t]he notion of the EU as a model usually refers to the propensity of the EU to seek to reproduce itself by encouraging regional integration around the world’ (Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002: 768). Nevertheless, representing the EU as the micro-cosmos ‘often lack[s] the kind of self-awareness that would lead us to recognize how “what” is being projected is not the EU as is but an “EU-topia”’ (Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002: 769).

The EU also runs the risk of inconsistent behaviour in terms of supporting tolerance, accommodation of multiculturalism. Aggestam and Hill (2008: 97) claim that ‘multiculturalism rapidly becomes not only politicized in term of a contestation over values, but also internationalized’. These values, however, actually are not backed by internal debates, namely, domestic politics does not support multiculturalism (Aggestam and Hill 2008). Europeans might not share ‘the same worldview and the same ideas about the shape of foreign policy’, and this constant interplay between European internal social composition and relations with the rest (Aggestam and Hill 2008: 114) would determine the future of support for these norms. In terms of coherence between internal and external arenas of EU policy-making, Puettter and Wiener (2007: 1085) also question the normative divergences among the member states. They contend that when there are big divergences between the member states like in the Iraq case, failure to create a common and coherent response risks also consistent normative interpretation in the foreign policy.

In terms of reflecting the unresolved question of the EU in between normatively and strategically motivated action, perhaps Youngs (2004) provides a comprehensive reading. In his discussion over the EU approach in support of human rights he suggests that ‘constructivist and rationalist explanations might be combined to account for the way in which instrumental choices are made within a range of common normative understandings’ which denotes the fact that ‘security-driven choices’ co-exist with normative logics (Youngs
2004: 431). Therefore, instrumental and normative logics might not be in strict dichotomy but ‘can be seen to set parameters for each other’ (Youngs 2004: 431).

The organization of the book

In order to analyse some of the concerns and questions of normative power that the literature on normative power has already raised, the book has been organized as four parts. Part I deals with the broader conceptualizations of power and sets the ground for empirical chapters. In Chapter 2, Christopher Bickerton brings a new area of inquiry into the scholarly debate on normative power by chasing the reasons and success of the EU’s search for legitimacy through norms. He discusses that the actual idea of the EU as a normative power shapes around the ‘question of legitimacy’. Therefore, identifying legitimacy for the EU norms has become a main concern in the academic debates, since ‘from being a source of legitimacy, normative power Europe is today in search of legitimacy’. Through closely investigating two main arguments regarding the source of NPE’s legitimacy, that is, cosmopolitan law and Europe’s communitarian social preferences, in the conclusion the author firmly contends that although the EU possesses a ‘quintessentially post-nationalist’ claim to legitimacy, the lack of unification and tendency of the Union as an introspective actor prevents normative power Europe from relying on either cosmopolitanism by embracing moral norms or on unique social preferences by embracing utilitarian benefits of communitarian norms.

Part II is mainly concerned with various applications of normative power argument in the EU’s neighbourhood. In Chapter 3, Hiski Haukkala problematizes the NPE argument by placing it within the ENP context. In developing the argument, Haukkala states that ‘both ideational and material forms of power come together in explaining the peculiarities of the EU’s normative power’. In this sense, the Union’s ability to reflect its normative power externally depends on the perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the recipient countries. Nevertheless, the enlargement fatigue forces the EU in search of alternatives for enlargement: the new perspective of neighbourhood, despite its reliance on extension of norms in neighbouring countries, has palmed off the enlargement prospect. Nonetheless, this avoidance has not prevented the partners in the neighbourhood from developing expectations for integration. Therefore, ‘by demanding the reforms right now and offering only vague and amorphous incentives somewhere down the line, the ENP puts the veritable cart before its neighbours’ horses with no tangible carrot in sight’. Haukkala concludes that this does not only erode the legitimacy of the Union but takes it away from the force for good conceptualizations of normative power and makes it rather a ‘normative regional hegemony’. His conclusion thus remains as a further reflection
on the pan-European rhetoric that pushes the third parties to adopt norms and values but also requesting no-dreaming about becoming a part of the Union.

In Chapter 4, Emma Stewart aims at examining the EU norms promotion again in the neighbourhood area with a specific focus on the South Caucasus, that is, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, in the fields of democracy, promotion of the rule of law, human rights and conflict resolution. After establishing the importance of the region in terms of economic, security and energy policies; Stewart closely analyses the role of Russia and EU relations as one of the main factors shaping the EU’s normative attitude in the region. In her conclusions, Stewart claims that the EU has only a limited impact in terms of peaceful settlement of disputes which are ongoing within Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. She concurs with Haukkala in the sense that the absence of an enlargement perspective is the main factor limiting the EU’s normative impact. Moreover, ‘the lack of a clear and constructive policy towards Russia also negatively affects the EU’s objectives in the South Caucasus’ since the politics of energy security ‘sit uncomfortably’ with EU democracy and human rights promotion. Overall, the normative power label proves inadequate to explain the complex implications the EU’s current policy or lack of proper policy entails.

In Chapter 5, Ana Juncos employs the same aim of examining NPE in one of the regions that the EU has been mostly engaged in since the early years of ESDP, that is, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In her discussion, Juncos comprehensively examines not only the norms promoted by the EU such as Copenhagen criteria, minority protection, the rule of law and compliance with international law, but also the instruments and the outcomes. In contrast to the discussions of the mainstream NPE, she argues that EU military build-up did not damage NPE. Indeed, a combination of military and civilian measures is deemed necessary for post-conflict transformation in Bosnia. But rather, other power practices like inconsistencies in policy, practices of ‘othering’, lack of ownership due to the ‘hegemonic character of neoliberal ideology’ employed in Bosnia incite the main doubts raised over NPE. In conclusion, she suggests that the academic debates should be reorganized around the daily implications of those power practices rather than the attempts at labelling the EU with variations of normative adjective.

Part III deals with the issue of broader global implications of NPE. In Chapter 6, Annika Björkdahl approaches the issues of military power and specifically the impact of peace support missions reaching various parts in the world. Organized along the main question of to what extent military power and normative power self-images are compatible, Björkdahl states that ‘the EU ought to be able to defend and uphold the norms it champions, such as norms pertaining to human rights and sustainable peace’. In doing so, the EU may employ military forces in order to ensure compliance and deter further violence when simultaneously enhancing norms in the conflict zones.
In this sense, civilian/normative means and military instruments are likely to produce synergies rather than contradictions for sustainable peace. As a conclusion, Björkdahl suggests that there is still some way to go in terms of experiences to be collected from various peace support operations in order to improve coordination and coherence between military means and normative instruments, and more research is undeniably crucial in figuring out the implications of this complex relationship.

In Chapter 7, Michael Smith steps into another important issue concerning the broader EU studies. In placing the NPE within an analysis of transatlantic relations, Smith compares and contrasts the EU and the US self-understandings within the foreign policy area by conceptualizing the former as a post-modern/post-sovereign normative power and the latter as modern/sovereign ‘goliath’. Through denying the given conceptualizations of affiliating the EU with good and the US as hegemonic and bad foreign policy actors, the author investigates the two actors within the framework of their vision regarding ‘good world’. His findings represent many interesting outcomes: first of all both the EU and the US possess a vision of good world, which was defined by the terms of normative/civil/civilizing for the former and within the confines of ‘global service provider’ for the latter. Smith questions whether this exposes a stark contrast as assumed by many. In his answer, he claims that these conceptualizations regarding self-perceptions and perceptions of the world actually compete and overlap since both represent different assumptions of self-exceptionalism. Second, contrary to many claims the EU’s self-representation and world vision might be also representing hegemonic strategies in a Gramscian sense. Third, the EU might not be as soft as considered or possesses at least some ‘hard edges’ as it faces the ‘entanglements created by “real” foreign policy’. Finally, on both sides of the Atlantic, the visions of good world are not properly fulfilled but these labels are more used to divert attention from the substance of respective policies.

In Chapter 8, empirical analysis of NPE is conducted for one of the EU’s oldest and most important external policy areas – development policy. Vicki L. Birchfield emphasizes the need that foreign aid and development policies of the EU should be analysed more thoroughly by the EU scholarship. In the analysis of EU’s development policy, by applying Manners’ tripartite model of analysis to trace the principles, actions and impact of normative power (Manners 2008b and also see above), the author questions if various development policies held by the EU are empirical examples of the normative dimensions, values and principles. Mainly relying on the EU’s performance during the Doha Round, its support for UN Millennium Goals regarding global poverty and the EU’s Commitment to Development Index (CDI) which examines the North–South relations from the prism of development aid, the author finds a bulk of empirical evidence in support of a consistency between the EU’s normative discourse and actions. In this
In Chapter 9, the last chapter on the global perspectives of NPE, Jan Orbie specifically deals with the European Social Model by discussing the Union’s focus on core labour standards and common commercial policies. Social dimension of the EU’s support in trade agreements with third parties is a commonly acknowledged phenomenon. Orbie examines the implications of normative power in the EU’s institutional set-up and content of trade arrangements by, like Birchfield, employing tripartite analysis of norms through principles, actions and impact. Looking at a time frame from 1995 onwards, Orbie argues that principally the EU’s preference for cosmopolitan law treaties and relations with the International Labour Organization (ILO) have been significantly facilitated. In terms of bilateral relations, the EU has increasingly become more active in promoting core labour standards. However, when it comes to assessing the impact, the record of the Union remains ambiguous. The most problematic areas identified by the author are exclusion of developing countries from alternative trade arrangement and lack of implementation of social trade provisions in bilateral agreements. Overall, although the Union’s trade-social policies now enjoy greater attachment to universal principles of international organizations such as the ILO, the EU is still far away from becoming a paragon of universal labour standards supporter, given the precedence of interest-orientated member states trade practices. In the long run, despite the praised principles of social Europe, the challenge of balancing between liberalization and social Europe or interventionism is likely to remain. The challenge between hybrid policy-making preventing protectionist policies and the tendency of neo-liberal power Europe would cloud the limits of norms and values regarding the social dimension of the Union’s external policies.

Finally, Part IV discusses the future implication of the argument on normative power. In this sense, Chapter 10 by Mary Martin is closely concerned with the coherent narrative of the EU’s future foreign policy identity. Given the changing nature and direction of the EU foreign policy with increasing military operations, Martin attempts to find a prospectus for the future identity and presence embracing the ‘awkward mixture of civilian, military and normative instruments, and ambiguous goals’. Such a narrative, she argues, should be able to produce a ‘reflexive articulation’ and ‘operational guidance’ for the EU’s external role. This is an unavoidable necessity if the EU will rely on a desire to be sui generis, a ‘non-state like’ entity which is in a constant search for putting normative visions into action ‘within a changing landscape of international relations’. Importantly, the examination of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exhibits that the EU has already undertaken an ambitious task to use coercive force in order to support norms. The author convincingly discusses that the human security
agenda which has been already facilitated by the EU is the most likely candidate for such a strategic and reflexive narrative in the future, providing not only operational guidance to normative power but also addressing the issues of consistency, coherence and effectiveness of the Union’s foreign policy. Therefore, the inherent dilemma and fragmented rhetoric based on coercive means and support of norms can be addressed through the narrative provided by human security.

In Chapter 11, Thomas Diez and Michelle Pace undertake an extensive analysis of EU normative power in two cases of conflict transformation, that is, Cyprus and Israel/Palestine, in order to facilitate further reflection on the extent of normative power as a discursive construction by the EU itself. While claiming that the EU’s self-created discourse of normative power enhances its potential influence and embraces potential for conflict transformation, empirical studies point to the problematic nature of such a discourse which relies on the practice of ‘othering’ the third parties. Diez and Pace claim that the EU has always seen itself as a force for good in international relations. To the extent that it is shared by the receiving third parties, these normative aspects place the EU into a ‘good position’ to transform the conflicts. However, the account offered by Cyprus and Israel/Palestine involvement suggests that these conflicts were not successfully transformed by the EU’s normative representations. Thus, the perceptions of the others become more important than the discursive construction of the EU as normative. In conclusion, the authors argue that EU normative power is not simply able to shape conceptions of what is seen as normal; its effectiveness rather relies on the extent to which other actors accept the role that EU actors themselves project for themselves in international politics. The authors warn that self-constructions of normative power thus can easily slide into hegemonic constructions without a hint of external reputation: while there are instances where the normative power Europe discourse does allow EU actors to have a positive influence in conflict situations, this should not lead us to uncritically accept this self-representation. Instead, as critical analysts, we must always point to the hegemonic constructions that come with normative power, even if it appears to be a force for good.

In Chapter 12, Ian Manners revisits critical perspective as the building block of his approach of normative theorization towards the EU studies. He draws on Cochran’s (1999: 1) statement that ‘all theory in International Relations is normative theory’ to assert that post-Cold War conceptualizations of the EU’s international identity have been marked by an infusion of normative and critical approaches. Together with his systematic classification of the previous chapters, he clarifies three different meanings of normative power: normative theory or ‘how we judge and justify truth claims in social science’ different from empirical truth claims; normative form of power such as power in ideational terms not material or physical; and normative type of actor or an actor ‘heading towards an ideal type of normative
power’. Furthermore, Manners discusses the ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations of normative power. According to him, the ontological quality of the Union lies in its polycentric and hybrid nature, being ‘an actor consisting of other actors’. Epistemologically, Manners warns against differing constructions of norms and strategic interests. Finally, in terms of methodology, the author eulogizes the tripartite method developed elsewhere (cf. Manners 2008b) which ‘opens up the possibility of using mixed- or multi-method analysis’ accompanied by ‘longitudinal interpretation’. Finally, in distinguishing between communitarian and cosmopolitical readings of normative power, Manners clearly sustains his position in favour of ‘cosmopolitical ethics’ and ‘communitarian politics’, sounding his previous assertion that the cosmopolitan values are uniquely internalized by the EU and converted into principles.

Notes

1. Besides these core norms Manners also defines social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance as the ‘minor norms’ (Manners 2002: 243–4).

2. These channels are contagion, declaratory documents (informational diffusion), institutional relations (procedural diffusion), exchange of goods or aid (transference), direct relations through missions and delegations (overt diffusion), and learning and adaptation from the EU practice (cultural filter) as the particular ways the EU exercises its normative influence (Manners 2002, 2006c: 184).
Part I

Perspectives on Power
Legitimacy Through Norms: The Political Limits to Europe’s Normative Power

Chris J. Bickerton

Introduction

This chapter analyses the idea of the European Union (EU) as a normative actor through the conceptual prism of legitimacy. It argues that the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ can be understood as part of a wider effort to find for the EU’s foreign policy a clear source of legitimacy, alongside the plethora of analogous qualifying adjectives such as ‘civilian’, ‘postmodern’ and ‘ethical’.

A quick glance through the work on normative power makes clear the importance of this legitimizing function. In a recent special issue on ‘ethical power Europe’, Aggestam (2008: 1) explains that ‘the Union of 27 is in search of a new sense of collective purpose and legitimacy’ and that it has found such purpose in foreign policy. ‘This external role’, she continues, ‘is articulated in a discourse of universal ethics which defines the EU as a “power for good” and a “peacebuilder in the world”’. In another article in the same special issue, Mayer (2008: 61) explicitly states that his purpose is to develop ‘a new rhetoric, a more mature and responsible narrative by and for the EU on its future global role’. Mayer (2008: 61) argues that ‘a more responsible rhetoric would…allow for a more realistic translation of ethical principles and political goals into successful practical action’. A review of the recent literature also suggests that the debate around the idea of the EU as a normative power has itself crystallized around the question of legitimacy.

One of the main concerns of scholars and policymakers at the present time is to identify the sources of legitimacy for the EU’s norms. From being a source of legitimacy, Normative Power Europe is today in search of its own legitimacy.

The chapter begins by identifying what the term ‘Normative Power Europe’ means. It then identifies legitimacy as a major concern of those who have taken up this concept and specifies why this problem has arisen in this case. The chapter then goes on to look at two different answers to the question of ‘where does the legitimacy for the EU’s norms come from?’. The first
answer is provided by Sjursen (2006a: 244–8) who locates legitimacy in a framework of cosmopolitan law. The second answer is given by Laïdi (2005, 2006), with a focus on European social preferences as the basis for the legitimacy of the EU’s normative power. In its analysis of these two answers, the chapter develops two parallel points. Firstly, the concept of Normative Power Europe is caught up in a central contradiction. The concept makes a virtue of the EU’s autonomy from the traditional political orders of nation-states: it is a ‘post-national’ legitimacy claim (see Sjursen 2005). And yet only a concrete political order as found at the national level can provide the EU’s normative power with the legitimacy that its promoters seek. If the EU’s normative power is to be legitimized, it must connect with the kind of political order that is considered the main obstacle to normative action in the first place. This presents the EU with a dilemma: the primary obstacle to the legitimacy of the EU as a normative power lies in precisely the lack of a unified political order which scholars originally pointed to as the reason for its predisposition to act normatively.

Secondly, in spite of its role in the study of the EU as an international actor, the notion of Normative Power Europe in fact corresponds to a number of different internal concerns the Union faces. Through Laïdi’s (2005, 2006) work, we can identify the national origins of much of the conceptual claims about Normative Power Europe. As the basis for the EU’s foreign policy, the concept of normative power has not been able to shrug off the introspection that has become a hallmark of the EU’s international action.

Europe as a ‘force for good’

The idea of the EU as an actor playing a largely civilian role in international affairs goes back to Duchêne’s description of the European Commission (EC) in the early 1970s as a ‘civilian power’. Though this idea was lost when détente gave way to a Second Cold War in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the implications of European integration for our understanding of international politics in general were never quite forgotten (see Duchêne 1972, 1973; Bull 1982). In the early 1990s, Germany and Japan – rather than the EU – were seen as the quintessential ‘civilian powers’: economic powerhouses with little military might (see Maull 1990, 2000a, 2006; Linklater 2005). The current debate around the EU as a ‘normative power’ was launched by Manners’ article in 2002. Though Manners drew upon these preceding conceptions of the EU, his argument was that the EU’s normative power should be understood as the result of the EU’s transformative impact upon the very dynamics of international politics. In his own words,

The creative efforts of the European integration process have changed what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics. Simply by existing as different
in a world of states and the relations between them, the European Union changes the normality of ‘international relations’. In this respect the EU is a normative power: it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity. (Manners 2008b: 45)

The distinction between this understanding of normative power and the prior conceptions of the EU as a ‘civilian power’ lies in the attachment of the latter to a basic state-centred conception of international politics. Manners argued that the older ‘civilian power’ concept rested upon three key assumptions: the centrality of economic power in the achievement of national goals, the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems and the willingness to work through legally binding supranational institutions (Manners 2002: 236–7). As a result of these assumptions, the notions of ‘civilian power’ were in fact not so far removed from the assumptions of Bull, who in 1982 published a coruscating critique of the ‘civilian power’ concept. What Bull, Duchêne, Twitchett and Maull all shared was a set of assumptions ‘about the fixed nature of the nation-state, the importance of direct physical power, and the notion of national interest’ (Manners 2002: 238).

In retrospect, Manners’ argument was clearly a product of its time. In highlighting the EU’s contribution to the movement of the international system beyond its Westphalian roots, Manners was suggesting that the EU’s transcendence of the nation-state was being reproduced at a global level. The EU’s international role was ‘as a promoter of norms which displace the state as the centre of concern’ (Manners 2002: 236). Manners’ argument was part of a widespread belief that international politics in the post-Cold War period was experiencing a fundamental shift away from the nation-state towards alternative forms of governance.² This view was most prevalent in those studying the emergence of a global civil society and those analysing the transformation of the state as a result of globalization.³ The force and popularity of Manners’ argument at the time came from its ability to connect the global contribution of the EU with a widespread scepticism across virtually all schools of thought in International Relations (IR) towards the sovereign state and its status as the keystone of international affairs (Bickerton et al. 2007: 1–8). The common assumption of all the different accounts of the EU’s normative power is that this power should be measured in the distance that lies between the EU as a sui generis post-national political community and the traditional sovereign nation-state.

As a legitimacy claim for EU foreign policy, this idea of the EU’s normative power has gone far beyond the academy. It has been taken up by policymakers across the EU and is regularly part of the political discourse of EU member states. Aggestam (2004) has argued in a study of British, French and German conceptions of the EU that there was a significant convergence
in their understanding of the EU's ethical power. Mayer (2008: 62) notes that ‘ethical aspirations and civilian norms can be found in abundance in the EU's official rhetoric’. In an interview in 2007, the President of the EU Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, argued that the EU is ‘one of the most important, if not the most important, normative powers in the world ... It is in fact the EU that sets the standards for others much of the time’ (Peterson 2007: 4). In his original 2002 article, Manners quoted Romano Prodi, then Commission President, who declared that ‘we must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable development ... [O]nly by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security’ (2007: 236). Even the Wall Street Journal has complained recently about the influence of the EU on norm-setting in the global economy. The EU has become, in its view, a regulatory empire (Laïdi 2005).

The limits of the EU’s normative power

For all its popularity, it became obvious very quickly that the normative prefix does not automatically make the EU a legitimate actor in international affairs. Over the last few years, the debate around defining and judging the merits of the EU’s normative power has grown and the criticisms and concerns around the normative power concept have proliferated.

One particular concern was the close correspondence between normative power and the EU’s vision of itself. In Sjursen's (2006a: 235) words, ‘the fact that [Normative Power Europe] corresponds very closely to the EU’s own description of its international role could be enough to set the alarm bells ringing’. Hyde-Price has echoed Sjursen's concerns. In his view, a problem with normative power is that ‘when the object of study is seen as embodying the core values one believes in, it is difficult to achieve any critical distance’ (2006: 218). As we saw above, this problem is evident in the tendency of many accounts of the EU’s normative power to put themselves forward not as analysis but as policy prescription. Thus Mayers’ (2008) argument about ‘responsible Europe’ is explicitly directed at improving the EU’s image and rhetoric. In his words, ‘a careful consideration of [the principles of responsibility] could guide EU foreign policy-makers, political leaders and publicists alike when deciding on the practical form of any involvement with global politics’. Mayers ends his article with a list of priorities that he describes as ‘an early attempt to translate principles into policies’ (2008: 62). When the boundary between analysis and policy prescription is so fluid, we can see why some scholars are concerned about the critical distance that can be achieved with the concept of normative power.

Another set of concerns have come from the growing militarization of the EU. This has pushed scholars towards a sharper, more contentious, definition of normative power. Does normative mean civilian power? If so,
does the rise of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the beginning of military missions outside of Europe and outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) signal the end of the EU’s normative project (Smith 2005a)? If normative power is not synonymous with civilian power, what does it mean exactly? Sjursen (2002, 2005, 2006a) suggests that there is an inevitably coercive aspect to normative power, that is, the ‘power’ part must refer to something. This lesson has been learnt by humanitarian interventionists: an ethical foreign policy requires military force in order for ethical choices to be properly executed. Powerlessness prevents an actor from acting normatively. In more recent formulations of the normative power concept, this need to combine military and civilian power has been fully assimilated. Aggestam (2008: 3) justifies her use of the term ‘ethical power Europe’ rather than Normative Power Europe partly in line with the need to properly incorporate the military component of the EU’s power. In her words, ‘the distinction between civilian and military instruments so central to the concepts of civilian and normative power does not capture more recent developments within the EU that have led to the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)’. Dunne (2008: 14) makes a similar point in his claim that

The civilian power narrative...suffers...from two defects. In the first instance, in so far as the term ‘civilian’ is the opposite of ‘military’, the EU is properly civilian in neither its instruments nor its goals. The second defect is more subtle. By implying a uniquely non-military identity, supporters of the civilian power argument are claiming a form of exceptionalism that antagonizes moderate voices in the United States. It also, curiously, appears to acquiesce in the neo-conservative view that Europeans are not prepared to stand up for what they believe... The goals of order and justice in global international society require that Europe play a more assertive role: there is empirical evidence that international public opinion believes the EU can and should take a positive part in world affairs.4

As Dunne suggests, the United States (US) has posed a number of problems for the concept of normative power. Kagan’s (2003) critique of Normative Power Europe was that it made a virtue out of a necessity. Has the EU really chosen to be Kantian, he asked, or is it Kantian only because the US is resolutely Hobbesian? Changes in US foreign policy, in particular the rise of ‘neo-conservatism’, have raised questions about the concept of Normative Power Europe. Diez (2005) drew the conclusion that the US was as much of a normative power as the EU. But if the US is a normative power, then normative cannot be synonymous with ‘force for good’ unless we think this label attaches itself to recent US interventions. Indeed, in Manners’ original formulation there is nothing specifically European about the
adjective ‘normative’. A foreign policy that promotes the *centrality* of the nation-state is normative in so far as it is defending those norms attached to classical conceptions of international politics. We have to differentiate rather between ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist’ normative powers or find a way of distinguishing good norms from bad. Some analysts have suggested that it is the EU, not the US, that risks indulging in ‘quixotic moral crusades...with the attendant risk of hubris leading to nemesis’ (Hyde-Price 2008: 29).

Drawing together all of these criticisms and concerns, we can say that a central preoccupation has been with the need to legitimize the EU’s chosen norms. As Aggestam (2008: 3, emphasis added) puts it, what is really needed today is a ‘focus on the ethical dilemmas involved in choosing either the military or civilian instruments in foreign policy; that is, on the justifications behind the exercise of power’. Aggestam also notes that a serious deficiency in the normative power debate is the existence of a set of objective standards against which the EU’s norms could be judged. In her words, ‘a charge often levelled at academics who seek to evaluate the EU’s international role is that they fail to agree on a set of explicit methodological rules by which to analyse EU foreign and security policy’. As a result, ‘they run the risk of simply confirming political, subjective assumptions, rather than opening up their analyses to the possibility that their findings can be refuted by empirical evidence’ (Aggestam 2008: 5). Sjursen has made a similar observation. In her view, focusing on the EU as a promoter of norms rather than interests cannot differentiate the EU from many other actors in the international arena. Many foreign policy goals are couched in normative terms. Sjursen concludes from this that the real challenge must lie in establishing whether or not these normative claims are merely self-interest dressed up as something else. She asks, ‘how do we know that “normative power” Europe is not simply an expression of Eurocentric imperialism?’ It is not good enough to point to norms; instead, ‘we must...be able to discriminate between different types of norms and their legitimacy and validity’ (Sjursen 2006a: 242). It is not norms per se that matter, but rather the *kinds* of norms we are referring to.

What is being articulated here is a concern with the legitimacy of the EU’s normative power. Aggestam (2008: 6, emphasis added) poses the question most starkly: ‘is there a legitimate basis on which the EU can claim to be universal force for good – or is this claim simply a reflection of a particular European conception of the “good”? According to Manners, this question has been at the heart of his research from the outset. In his words, ‘I have attempted to develop an argument that normative power in general, and the EU’s normative power in particular, is sustainable only if it is felt to be legitimate by those who practice and experience it’ (2008b: 46). At the heart of the current debate about Normative Power Europe is therefore an uncertainty regarding its status and validity as a legitimacy claim. Those working on
the normative power concept have attempted to ground its legitimacy in a number of different frameworks. Two of these frameworks will be discussed here: cosmopolitan law and social preferences. These are chosen because of their sustained exploration of the legitimacy question. The following section will consider each framework in turn and ask whether they are able to provide satisfying answers to this quest for legitimacy that underlies present discussions about the EU’s normative power.

Legitimizing the EU’s normative power

The legitimacy of cosmopolitan law

As noted above, Sjursen’s (2002, 2005, 2006a) interest in the concept of Normative Power Europe has been heavily oriented around the need to find a framework with which we can differentiate good norms from bad. This concern with the content and legitimacy of norms goes back to Sjursen’s earlier work on EU enlargement. Writing in 2002, she explored how the EU legitimizes its Eastward expansion. Sjursen’s starting point was that ‘the arguments and reasons provided in favour of enlargement have to be of a type that others can support: they must be considered legitimate’ (2002: 493). Following Habermas’ framework, Sjursen gave three justifications for EU enlargement that corresponded to three sources of legitimacy: a pragmatic justification locating legitimacy in utility; an ethical-political justification where legitimacy resided in a common set of values and a shared European identity; and a moral justification drawing legitimacy from an attachment to an abstract set of universal rights. In her empirical analysis of elite discourse on enlargement, Sjursen found that only the ethical-political justification could make sense of two features of enlargement: its normative rather than interest-based dynamic and the way in which applicant countries were not treated equally, for example, Poland favoured over Turkey. Sjursen’s conclusion was that enlargement was driven by a sense of shared kinship between Western and Central Eastern Europe. The normative dynamic thus operated within a culturally bound understanding of European identity.

In approaching the question of the EU’s normative power, Sjursen argues that such partiality undermines the legitimacy of EU foreign policy. It transforms norms into expressions of cultural bias. What is needed instead is an understanding of norms that have a universal – as opposed to particular – content. Following cosmopolitan theorists, she focuses on the rationality of norms, that is, those norms that can be openly debated – and rejected – in a rational interchange of views.5 Sjursen’s (2006a: 243) question to the EU, in order to determine the legitimacy of its norms, would be ‘does the EU, in its external action, refer to reasons that can be expected to gain approval in a free and open debate in which all those affected are heard?’. The most obvious way in which we could observe this in practice would be whether or not
the EU adheres to a set of rules that are common to all. As she puts it, ‘the law functions as a system of action that makes it possible to implement moral duties or commitments’ (2006a: 244). Therefore, ‘to “act in a normative way” would be to act in accordance with legal principles’ (2006a: 245).

This focus on law presents us with a problem. International law can as easily be derived from interests as from norms. Sjursen recognizes this by differentiating between conventional multilateralism – an interest-based framework which rests upon the formal equality of sovereignty states – and a cosmopolitan legal system that aims to protect the rights of individuals, not the sovereign rights of states. Sjursen suggests that a transformation of international power politics may be underway towards a more cosmopolitan order. The EU’s normative power should be judged according to whether it promotes this transformation and not in terms of its ability to inscribe itself into the existing international legal system (Sjursen 2006a: 247–8). A similar argument is made by Eriksen (2006: 253) in his work on the EU as a ‘cosmopolitan power’. He claims that ‘it is only by subjecting its actions to a higher ranking law – to human rights and criteria of justice – that the EU can qualify in normative terms’. The success of the EU’s normative power can therefore be measured in the degree to which international politics is institutionalized and governed through a global regime of human rights law.

This argument paints a picture of EU foreign policy legitimised by its impact upon the global community. As Manners (2007b: 120) has noted, Sjursen favours ‘rights-based normative justifications’ over any ‘communitarian cultural identity’. It is only when the EU can act in the name of an abstract universal humanity that it can escape the charge of bias and hypocrisy. The political community which is the source of legitimacy for the EU’s normative power is therefore a global community of individuals, rather than any territorially bounded entity. Normative Power Europe can be genuinely normative, and thus legitimate, only if it is not European.

The main difficulty faced by Sjursen, which she readily acknowledges, is that of norm indeterminacy. At the level of moral reasoning, where the norms in question lie outside of any determinate legal framework, it is difficult to choose between different actions and to determine how individual norms can be applied. In international politics, as in domestic politics, we are constantly faced with a clash of values, order versus justice being the most obvious. How can the commitment to one norm be justified over the commitment to another, especially when both are not compatible with each other? Saryusz-Wolski MEP gave an intuitive answer to this problem. Defending the legitimacy of the EU’s mission in Kosovo in spite of the weak legal basis, he said that ‘our legitimacy also comes from our values, not just from the right of China or Russia to block everything’. He went on to ask rhetorically: ‘in stopping the genocide in Darfur, do I need to ask the Chinese if I am allowed to stop it?’.
Sjursen herself distinguishes between a discourse of justification and one of application. The former aims at demonstrating the universal quality of a given norm, the latter with operationalizing it. It follows that only a political community regulated by a system of rights can translate universal norms into a set of policies whilst still preserving their legitimacy. Sjursen, however, does not consider whether the EU as a political order is capable of legitimizing its actions. Instead, she pursues a number of avenues in search of the legitimacy of the EU’s normative power that are external to the EU itself. This detracts from the real problem, namely translating the EU’s moral claims into political action that is considered legitimate in the eyes of European citizens.

Sjursen’s solution to the problem of operationalizing the EU’s norms in a way that does not compromise their legitimacy is to take flight into the international. She highlights the need for a greater juridification of international politics, with the legitimacy of the EU’s normative power residing in this global legal regime. In order to avoid that the EU pursue its own interests when it is expedient for it to do so, ‘common rules are necessary’. The law, argues Sjursen (2006a: 244), ‘functions as a system of action that makes it possible to implement moral duties or commitments’. However, existing international law is constrained by the fact that it is predominantly multilateral: it is the product of the will of states and so places the onus on the rights of states and their equality before the law. It is notably in the consent of states that we locate the main source of legitimacy for international law. Sjursen’s interest is predominantly in the development of a juridical regime for the protection of human rights, and she argues that the EU’s normative power will find its clearest expression in attempts to overcome the system of sovereign states and put in place a global legal regime derived from human rights, not from the rights of states.

There are two problems with this argument, both of which suggest a tension between Sjursen’s vision of a normative EU foreign policy and the need to legitimize the EU’s normative power. The first is that increasing juridification is already underway at the international level and it has raised a number of legitimacy problems. This juridification is what Kumm (2004: 912) points to when he writes of a shift from state-authorized treaties to a ‘firmly structured normative web’. According to Kumm, this shift has coincided with challenges to the role of national jurisdictions. These challenges come from the expansion in the issues now regulated by laws made outside of national frameworks (Kumm 2004: 913). We have also seen an uncoupling of the link between the consent of states and the obligations they face under international law. With powers being increasingly delegated to treaty-making bodies, international law is becoming more independent of states. Finally, Kumm argues that there is less flexibility in the interpretation and enforcement of international law, making it more of a constraint on domestic political and legal processes than in the past. Increased juridification has thus come at the cost of reduced legitimacy.
A similar set of points are made by Bogdandy (2004). In his view, we can speak today of the ‘deepening of the ethical dimension of international law, its expansion and more effective enforcement and its partial emancipation from the will of the individual state’ (2004: 894). In this shift from international law to governance, the indirect democratic legitimation of international law that operated through the will of the state is being undermined, without any democratic alternative. Instead, we have a growing distance between law-makers and law-takers and less clarity about where the political authorization for the new governance model comes from. Connecting this with the EU, Kumm (2004: 916) notes that ‘there are striking similarities between contemporary international law and European law that go right to the legitimacy issue’. It is not clear therefore that strengthening a legal order beyond the state would answer any of the concerns about the legitimacy of the EU’s normative power. In fact, Sjursen’s vision of cosmopolitan law would most likely exacerbate these concerns.

A second issue is regarding the choice of the international legal order as a site for the application of the EU’s universal norms. If such norms are to be legitimate they must obviously command the assent of European citizens. This is because the operationalization of abstract norms demands that we shift from the abstract to a more concrete level of reasoning and justification. Such a shift can only be legitimized if the reasoning is based on a claim to represent the will of European citizens. It is this claim to representation that, in a secular and democratic age, removes from such reasoning its arbitrary nature. The EU decides to value order or justice in a particular instance, for example, over Kosovo or Tibet, not out of caprice but as a result of a political debate within the Union where the will of European citizens has made itself clear. Without any grounding in popular will, political decisions become arbitrary (see Finnemore 1996; Palan 2000).

The application of such norms therefore poses the question: does the EU itself have the sufficient legal and political resources to operationalize its own normative power? Habermas has made it clear that the processes of justification and application through which universal norms must pass if they are to be useful as a basis for practical action demand a considerable degree of political and legal development. He argues that ‘the political legislature decides which norms count as law and the courts settle contests of interpretation over the application of valid but interpretable norms in a manner at once judicious and definitive for all sides’ (Habermas 1996: 115). It is this grounding of abstract norms in the process of democratic will formation that is the basis of their legitimacy. The legitimacy of the EU’s normative power will therefore depend more upon the EU’s own ability to unite law with democracy as it will on the degree of change within the international system.
Eriksen (2006) recognizes the kinds of problems this *internal* requirement poses for the EU. Contrary to Sjursen’s focus on the international legal order, Eriksen (2006: 264) asks ‘how much power the custodian of such an order – the EU, the UN – should have and what kind of organization it should be?’ He then goes on to recognize that far from securing legitimacy in a nascent cosmopolitan world order, *it is this very order which must be legitimized through the political and legal structures of the EU*. In his words,

An organization [such as the EU] above the nation-state equipped with enforcement mechanisms – namely, capacity to make threats credible – can rightly do so only in so far as its actions are democratically regulated. The codification and positivization of human rights represent *juridification* as they are made and adjudicated by legal bodies. Such bodies are in need of democratization as rights should be given by the rights-holders themselves or their representatives. In a democracy, it is the citizens themselves who give themselves the rights. Hence, no humanitarization without representation. (Eriksen 2006: 265)

Eriksen then turns to consider the EU more closely and argues that in fact it is the nation-state itself – the nemesis of Europe’s normative power – that is the source of legitimacy in this process of justification and application of universal rights. Eriksen notes that the EU has no system of its own for norm implementation, but instead relies upon national administrations. Moreover, ‘the democratic features of the system of lawmaking and norm interpretation at the European level, *constrained by the power of member states*, warrants that the EU does not become an unchecked entity’ (Eriksen 2006: 266). The EU ‘represents a constraint upon brute state power and excessive nationalism’ but it is itself at the same time ‘*balanced by the states that have the upper hand in legislative matters*’ (Eriksen 2006: 266, emphasis added).

This implies that the legitimacy of the EU as a ‘cosmopolitan power’ rests upon its ability to translate – via its own internal processes of justification and application – universal norms into more concrete policies. In pursuing the search for legitimacy for the EU’s normative power it seems that we have come full circle: from a belief that the legitimacy of the EU’s normative power lies in its distance from the nation-state framework, we find that the EU’s normative power can only be legitimized by the political order of EU member states themselves. The further juridification of international relations may only deepen existing problems of legitimacy suffered by ‘global governance’ regimes. In a world of equally valid but competing moral claims, only representative political institutions can choose legitimately between different claims. Humanitarization, to paraphrase Eriksen, requires both representation in general and more specifically majoritarian methods that allow us to choose between different morally equivalent alternatives.
The legitimacy of social preferences

In the discussion of the EU's normative power so far, we have seen the limitations that arise in trying to legitimize normative power from outside the EU. One scholar who has expressed his scepticism on this idea is Zaki Laïdi. Laïdi argues that the EU’s norms need to be properly grounded in a set of European social preferences or interests. In this way, the EU’s norms are not free-floating but rather serve the more concrete purpose of defending the EU’s preferences (Laïdi 2008: 1–20). In grounding the EU’s normative power in European society, Laïdi provides us with some insights into the peculiarity of the EU’s methods of aggregating its interests. This attempt to ground European norms in a set of social preferences also chimes with the argument made above about the need to move from morality to politics in order to legitimize the EU’s normative power. However, here we face the problem of the EU’s political order and to what extent it is really able to legitimize the EU’s normative actions. This section argues that the sources of legitimacy identified by Laïdi in his account of preference formation in the EU have their own problems of legitimacy. In particular, they are a product of the retreat from more democratic political practices that have occurred at the national level within Europe.

Laïdi’s critique of Normative Power Europe is based on its divorce from any notion of interest. According to Laïdi (2005: 56), “European norms are seen as transcendental values, standing above European societies.” Without rooting the EU’s norms in European society, there is the risk of confusing normative power with ‘idealist power’, or even with an ‘ideal power’, ‘where everything would be about values and principles, and never about interests’ (Laïdi 2005: 56). Laïdi’s (2006: 4) thesis is that ‘linking normative power to social preferences may help us get out of the idealistic trap and to cross the bridge between material power and social power’. In his formulation, normative power refers to the creation of norms that bind actors in ways that promote the public interest beyond the nation-state. In Laïdi’s words, normative power can be defined as the capacity to produce and put in place on a global scale a framework as large as possible of norms capable of organizing the world, of disciplining the game of its actors, introducing predictability in their actions, developing their sense of collective responsibility, offering to those who embark on this path, and notably the weakest ones, the possibility at least in part of making sure that these norms apply to all, including the most powerful. (Laïdi 2005: 49)

The goal of the EU’s normative power is to build at the global level a normative framework corresponding to the EU’s social preferences. Laïdi presents this in terms of a confrontation between two visions of world order: the EU’s
vision of governance through norms and the US preference for an order based on the rights of sovereign states.11

Laïdi believes the result of this confrontation will depend upon the legitimacy of the respective visions held by the EU and the US. Legitimacy, he argues, is critical to the success of the whole normative power enterprise:

Everything rests upon knowing what principle of legitimacy does this apparently superior [European and normative] rationality base itself on, especially if it aims implicitly to devalue the legitimacy of the national sphere which, after all, has the advantage of being validated by a democratic vote. (Laïdi 2005: 59)

In his answer to this question, Laïdi relies mainly upon sources of legitimacy that belong to the EU’s complex mechanisms of governance. The EU’s vision of global governance is legitimized on the basis of three principles: norms are negotiated between asymmetric actors, making this kind of governance ‘a factor of equalization in terms of power’ (Laïdi 2006: 6); negotiations take place within the framework of international institutions, which confer upon their decisions a degree of legitimacy; and the norms that result from these negotiations are subject to all concerned, regardless of their relative power positions. Obviously, such principles also underpin the EU’s own governance system. The projection of normative power is about recasting at the global level the system of governance that has proven successful at the regional level. In Laïdi’s (2005: 66) words, ‘[the EU’s] priority is…not to export its values in the name of a messianism that is out of favour, but to win recognition from the international system for those preferences that are the basis of its own originality’.

This amounts to extracting legitimacy from the framework of the nation-state and tying it to a form of neo-corporatism favoured by the EU and its institutions. Legitimacy is rooted in a claim to superior performance and in an ability to co-opt special interests into the policymaking process. This argument forces us to consider the meaning of democratic legitimacy. What Laïdi proposes comes at a cost in terms of political participation and representation. This is a cost which has already been experienced at the national level in changes that first began in the 1970s and is today being reproduced at the European level, but relabelled as a distinctive kind of EU-level norm-based governance.

Laïdi makes a number of arguments concerning the EU’s originality as a mechanism for aggregating preferences. In his words, ‘the [European] laboratory presents in effect three distinctive traits that enable us to understand why the EU manages perhaps better than other regional spaces to channel the social preferences of its citizens in addition to the intermediary of nation-states’ (2005: 63). Firstly, he claims that the European Parliament, as the world’s first directly elected transnational parliament, is particularly
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receptive to non-state interests promoted by economic, cultural and environmental groups (Laïdi 2005: 63). Secondly, the EC – by virtue of not being directly elected – is constantly looking for sources of legitimacy that might offset its ‘democratic deficit’. According to Laïdi (2005: 64), this forces the Commission to demonstrate concretely that it acts ‘in the general interest and that [it] is capable of doing so in those areas where the social demand for norm-based governance is strong, such as the protection of the environment, food security and the precautionary principle’. Thirdly, the public financing of political parties in Europe results in political life that is relatively less dominated by private moneyed interests. Private interests, in other words, are more mediated in Europe than in America, which generates greater public trust in political actors.

Summing up his argument, we can say that the legitimacy of the EU is thus a reflection of the weakened legitimacy of nation-states. The EU, he argues, was originally aimed at ‘decentring the honour of European nations’ (Laïdi 2005: 57). Norms serve to restrain the egotism of states in all areas of public policy. Laïdi gives the example of the euro, where pan-European control of monetary policy needed to be complemented by a set of fiscal rules. This was done in order to avoid states pursuing inflationary public spending strategies that would offset the consequences of entering the euro zone. Norms, in such cases, appear as a kind of ‘meta-value destined to domesticate undisciplined states’ (Laïdi 2005: 59). In Laïdi’s (2005: 59–60) words, ‘the will to circumvent the political, or more specifically the constraints of politics, explains in large part the decisive role played by norms in the political construction of Europe’.

The national origins of post-national Europe

The EU’s preference for norm-based governance is thus legitimized by a mechanism for aggregating social preferences that adequately substitute itself for the egotism and failings of national systems. It is on this basis that we should accept the superior rationality of European norms and be willing to support the extension of the EU’s norm-based governance to the global level. Laïdi’s illustration of the connection between the EU’s norms and its social preferences does not, however, suggest that the EU has adequately managed to substitute itself for the nation-state. The model the EU presents us with is of a fragmented and incomplete political order whose mechanisms of interest intermediation resemble circumscribed and partial forms of what we find at the national level. Moreover, at the national level these forms have emerged as a result of a movement away from more democratic political practices.

The works of comparative political scientists like Schmidt (2006) and Bartolini (2005) have gone a long way towards identifying the national origins of the EU policymaking process. A key feature of the EU’s method of aggregating interests is the absence of representative political processes that
channel the interests of individuals and groups into power over the decision-making process. Preference formation is technical rather than political and the EU opens up its decision-making to European citizens as organized interests, not as voters (Schmidt 2006: 25). As Schmidt (2006: 5) puts it, at the EU level we have government for the people (‘through effective governance’) and government with the people (‘through consultation with organized interests’); at the national level, in contrast, such forms of government exist but tend to be overshadowed by government of and by the people (‘through political participation and citizen representation’). What exists at the EU level is an open system of consultation organized around forms of collaborative committee-based law-making (‘comitology’). The EU operates on the basis of consensus and compromise, not in terms of partisan differences and political contestation. This is what Schmidt (2006: 22) means when she writes of ‘policy without politics’.

The function played by interest groups is overwhelmingly to provide information to the Commission and its directorates. In exchange for influence over policy outcomes, the EU receives information and secures a measure of legitimacy by openly incorporating certain groups into its decision-making procedures. Laïdi (2005: 63) claims that this process favours groups traditionally ignored by nation-states. In fact, interest groups active in the EU’s extended committee system are not much different from what we see at the national level. Estimates in the early 1990s indicated that around 50 per cent of groups were industrial and commercial. Around 20 per cent were agricultural, another 20 per cent in the services and only 5 per cent were public interest groups (environmental, consumer, trade unions and so on) (Bartolini 2005: 284). Schmidt (2006: 106) more recently noted that business interests make up around two-thirds of all interests represented in Brussels, which is why one scholar labelled the EU’s interest intermediation process as ‘elite pluralism’.

As Bartolini (2005) has argued, this particular approach to participation and representation does not amount to a new kind of EU-specific legitimacy. It is simply a much narrower kind of ‘input legitimacy’ that prevails already at the national level. What for Laïdi appears as a distinctively EU approach to aggregating social preferences and as the source of legitimacy for the EU’s normative power is in fact derived from the extension of what political scientists have called a ‘governance’ or ‘network’ based approach. Bartolini (2005) reminds us that the origins of this kind of approach are entirely national. Governance theory emerged out of the political and social instability of the 1970s. It was feared at the time that Western European nation-states were unable to cope with the demands and expectations being placed upon them (see Habermas 1975; Lindberg et al. 1975). In order to make decision-making more manageable for governing elites, it was suggested that participation should be restricted. As Bartolini (2005: 168) puts it, ‘governance structures and procedures were presented as capable of improving the effectiveness of policy implementation, by limiting the capacity of
resource controllers to boycott or otherwise impede successful policy implementation’. Participation was determined sector-by-sector and only those directly affected should have a say in decision-making. In the 1970s and into the 1980s, what occurred here was a shift of decision-making power away from electoral politics and into what political scientists described as semi-independent ‘networks’ (see Mayntz 1993).

This governance approach to political decision-making has been expanded at the EU level and has been recast – by Laïdi and others – as an alternative and EU-specific source of legitimacy. What is really being described is the narrowing of participation in decision-making processes. Matters that were once considered of interest and relevance to wider publics are today farmed out to experts and select committees. This trend, driven by the need felt by national political elites to de-politicize key policy areas in the 1970s and 1980s, has been carried through to the European level.13 We see, therefore, at the EU level procedures and processes that draw upon understandings of legitimacy that originated and still exist at the national level. These include the legitimacy of negotiated, corporatist agreements, the legitimacy of decisions made by experts and committees and the legitimacy of decisions made through public policy networks. What is different at the national – in contrast to the EU – level is that here all of these different sources of legitimacy still pass through the framework of electoral politics. As Bartolini puts it,

The holders of different kinds of resources, the politicians and the voters, the bureaucrats and the interest representatives, the experts and the judges, continuously exchange their respective assets in a situation in which, ultimately, none of them can substantiate [themselves] from the collectivized decisions that fundamentally rest upon the principle of political equality. (Bartolini 2005: 174)

The weakness of Laïdi’s argument is that what he presents as a distinctive source of legitimacy for the EU’s normative power is better understood as the culmination of trends existing at the national level aimed at reducing the scope and quality of political participation. What is distinctive about the EU is its reliance upon different sources of legitimacy but without the political vertebration provided by mass democratic politics that underscores the legitimacy of national governments. The EU’s mode of aggregating social preferences is unlikely to legitimize its normative power. Instead, it reminds us of why legitimacy is such a problem for the EU in the first place.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the question of the EU’s normative power through the concept of legitimacy. It has argued that Normative Power Europe has had difficulty in justifying itself on its own terms, with both scholars and
analysts noting that what passes for normal in the EU’s eyes might not be normal for everyone else. The result of this has been a search for new sources of legitimacy for the EU’s normative project. This chapter has analysed two sources in detail—cosmopolitan law and a set of European social preferences. What each approach has in common is the difficulty in reconciling its own account of legitimacy with the problems that gave rise to the search for legitimacy in the first place.

Sjursen’s vision of cosmopolitan law neglected the degree of political development within the Union necessary to rid universal norms of their inherent indeterminacy. It also risked exacerbating the legitimacy problems already experienced by the shift from conventional state-based international law to the more amorphous current regime of ‘global governance’. Laïdi’s attention to social preferences represents a valuable attempt at grounding EU norms in a determinate set of European social preferences. However, the legitimacy of these norms is compromised by the process of preference formation within the EU itself: the absence of equal rights of participation introduces into this process a high degree of discretion and arbitrariness, suggesting that such social preferences are above all the result of the EU’s governance model. This is a model where social power is translated directly into policy, without passing through what Habermas has called the ‘sluices’ of communicative action, that is, through a set of formal democratic processes of opinion and will formation (1996: 463–90). We saw that this problem was not that of the EU as such. Its origins lie in the emergence of governance theory at the national level which dates back to the 1970s. The legitimacy of the EU’s normative power claimed by Laïdi is thus an extension of those measures taken by European nation-states 40 years ago to offset and manage growing domestic crises of legitimacy.

In conclusion, we can say that the concept of Normative Power Europe as currently understood is unlikely to end its search for legitimacy. This search will go on until the EU itself develops the political resources necessary to introduce into the processes of norm definition a set of democratic procedures. The primary obstacle to the legitimacy of the EU as a normative power thus lies in precisely the lack of political development which scholars pointed to in the first place as the reason for the EU’s predisposition to act normatively.

Notes

1. The term ‘Normative Power Europe’ is taken from Manners (2002). In this chapter, it will from now on be referred to without quotation marks.
2. As Aggestam (2008: 2) puts it, the Normative Power Europe concept ‘grew out of the idealism and “constructivist turn” that followed the end of the Cold War’.
3. On global civil society, see the series of Global Civil Society yearbooks. The most recent is Albrow et al. (2008). For a critique of the concept of global civil society,

4. This was also the view expressed from within the Commission. In the words of one official, in recent years, regarding ‘the balance between values on the one hand and interests on the other, the ground has shifted a little towards interests’. Interview with author, 14 February 2008, Brussels.

5. On Habermas, Linklater (1998a: 122) argues that Habermasian norms ‘cannot be valid unless they can command the consent of everyone whose interests stand to be affected by them’. Therefore, ‘the validity of principles can only be established through forms of dialogue which are in principle open to every human being’.

6. For an extended critique of this sociological claim, see Chandler (2004), Part I.

7. For a seminal discussion, see Bull (1977), Chapter 4.

8. Interview with author, 14 February 2008, Brussels.

9. Habermas refers to this as a ‘post-metaphysical age’. See Habermas (1987), in particular Chapter 1 on Hegel’s concept of reason.

10. All translations of Laïdi’s (2005) work are my own. His book has been published in English (Laïdi 2008).

11. One interviewee suggested that there might be a parallel to draw between the growing adoption of the EU’s norms and standards in goods (toys, clothes and so on) and the possible emergence of the euro as a global reserve currency in place of the dollar. Interview with author, 14 February 2008, Brussels.

12. Comparative politics more generally often assumes that the EU has become a political system in its own right. See, for instance, Hix (1998, 2005) and Bartolini and Hix (2006). Schmidt and Bartolini use the tools and concepts of comparative politics to argue a different position: that the EU is not sui generis, but nor is it a unified political system in its own right à la Hix. It is a somewhat messy combination of various different ways of institutionalizing political life that we observe already at the national level.

Part II
Norms and the Neighbourhood
3

The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy*

Hiski Haukkala

Introduction

In discussions of the European Union (EU) as an international actor, there is a wide range of interpretations in the literature. The Union is often seen as a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power – in essence a force for good in the world – but in the work of scholars studying the EU there are many different normative assumptions and agendas. Normativity is of course something we can hardly escape or do without, but as such, our normative ideas can be amended or rejected and the role given to them in building social scientific explanations can vary in terms of the intensity and degree of consciousness involved in utilizing the concepts.

Although questions of norms and normativity are always present in the study of International Relations (IR), the role given to them can vary significantly. As such, we do not have to depart from normative assumptions about the EU’s inherent goodness but we can, and indeed should, seek to address these issues as empirical questions to be examined in their own right. Having said this, treating the EU as an a priori qualitatively new, and better, international entity has a long pedigree. Duchêne’s (1973) ‘civilian power Europe’ was perhaps the first occasion when the special role of the then European Community in the world was sketched out. More recently, the most prominent expression of this normativity has been the work of Manners on the EU as a normative power, or as encapsulated in his phrase, a ‘Normative Power Europe’. His ideas have proven to be highly influential but also equally controversial.¹ I myself have found his work inspirational although it has spurred my own thinking into directions which Manners himself might not approve. The reason for this stems from the fact that for Manners the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ was never an analytical device but a normative one. It was not meant to portray the EU and its international role as it is (or was) but as it should be: ‘It was, and is, a statement of what is believed to be good about the EU; a statement
which needed to be made in order to stimulate and reflect on what the EU should be (doing) in world politics’ (Manners 2006e: 168, emphasis in original).

In contrast to Manners’ own approach, in this chapter I take the Normative Power Europe argument as a starting point but seek to develop it in three different directions. First, instead of making a claim concerning how the EU should be or act, the chapter seeks to make a statement – or build a hypothetical model – about how it indeed is currently acting. Second, whereas Manners was largely interested in how the Normative Power Europe affected the wider global normative space, this chapter adopts a more regional focus examining how the EU operates its normative power in Europe and how that power is in fact uniquely circumscribed by that very same regional context. Finally, and this is where the differences with Manners become perhaps most accentuated, whereas Manners emphasized the normative, this chapter puts the onus on power.

Having said this, it is imperative to note at the outset that the chapter does not seek to put forth a structural realist variant of the Union’s normative reach. Instead, it seeks to develop a multi-causal model where both ideational and material forms of power come together in explaining the peculiarities of the EU’s normative power in Europe. By doing so, the chapter challenges Manners’ notion of normative power by arguing that his scheme is based on too passive an understanding of the EU as a norm entrepreneur in international relations. Instead of relying on passive diffusion alone, the EU is taking more active measures in promoting its norms and values. This is especially so in Europe, where the Union’s enlargement can be seen as the main instrument of its normative power. In fact, the EU can be envisaged as a regional normative hegemon that is using its economic and normative clout to build a set of highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help to facilitate an active transference of its norms and values. However, the Union’s ability to project its normative power rests not (only) on coercion, but is crucially dependent on the perceived legitimacy of the Union’s actions in the eyes of its partners. It is argued that the open-ended nature of the Union’s membership is a key factor in promoting this legitimacy in Europe.

The chapter first discusses the role of enlargement as the primary vehicle for the Union’s normative power in Europe, and then analyses the prospects of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) alleviating some of the likely problems and shortcomings in the EU’s exercise of normative power. The emphasis is put on the Union’s Eastern neighbourhood as it is the main forum in which the Union’s claims for normative hegemony in Europe will be put to the test in the future. Ukraine is selected as the main case to be discussed, as it can be – due to its size and location alone – seen as the litmus test for the viability of the Union’s new approach.
Enlargement and the EU’s normative power in Europe

The successive rounds of enlargements have been a factor shaping the EU. Previous enlargements have all resulted not only in an increase in quantity – member states, population and the size of economy – but they have also ushered in qualitative changes in the Union’s agenda, institutions and decision making, as well as shaping the ways in which the external world has perceived European integration and its different manifestations, be they institutions or policies (Ginsberg 1989: 151–2; Ginsberg 1998). There is a dialectic at work here, in which the ‘shadow of enlargement’ (Friis 1999) compels the EU and its member states to adapt their own dynamic to meet the changing circumstances (Haukkala and Ojanen 2002: 204; see also Vobruba 2005). This adaptation – together with the geographic exposure to new neighbours – starts the dialectic anew by creating an opening and a demand for further enlargements.

This intricate interplay between the internal and external facets of European integration has meant that the Union’s enlargement has been seen as one of its most effective foreign policy tools (Vachudova 2005).4 From the vantage point of European foreign policy, enlargement can be seen as having basically two main functions. First, it acts as an instrument through which the Union can seek to enhance stability in its immediate neighbourhood. In its policies, the EU acts in a manner similar to any regional power that has a stake in preserving stability on its doorstep (Missiroli 2004). The EU has often used enlargement as an instrument in locking its neighbours into stable and democratic transition. This was the case with Greece, Portugal and Spain, and the same logic applied in the recent Eastern enlargement as well. Especially in the post-Cold War era the Union has come to acknowledge the indivisibility of security in Europe: the EU cannot feel secure and continue to prosper if the rest of the continent is in a downward spiral towards increased insecurity and poverty. The European Security Strategy is based on this line of argumentation (European Council 2003). It is also the starting point for the EU’s new ENP (European Commission 2003b: 3).

Second, the enlargement process acts as a conduit through which the EU as a Normative Power Europe (Manners 2002) can project its norms and values in a way that is both efficient and legitimate. It is only through the unique and rich combination of sticks and carrots that are present in the accession process that the EU can exert the strongest normative influence on its partners. The key here is to appreciate the fact that EU enlargement is not only about drawing geographical boundaries; it is also about establishing, or imposing, an EU order in Europe through the transference and diffusion of EU norms, values, rules and regulations (Smith 1996; Friis and Murphy 1999; Christiansen et al. 2000; Diez and Whitman 2002; Lavenex 2004; Aalto 2006). It is true, as Christiansen et al. (2000) have argued, that this can result
in a certain ‘fuzziness’ in the composition of the EU, as important parts of the Union, such as the Community legislation, the Single Market or the Schengen *acquis*, are extended beyond its borders through the pre-accession instruments and the European Economic Area (EEA) mechanism. This ties in well with Wæver’s (1997: 64) ‘imperial analogy’, according to which the ‘EU Empire’ can establish its rule in a radial manner through differing zones of order. The imperial analogy is useful in highlighting the fact that the EU perhaps need not have to accept new members perpetually in order to be able to impose its normative order on others. Or, to use Michael Smith’s (1996: 13–17) terminology, the EU can modify its transactional boundary in order to accommodate its new neighbours whilst seeking to preserve the integrity of its institutional and legal boundary at the same time. As such, the EU is seeking to use the creation of new ‘grey zones’ in Europe in order to control the problems that stem from neighbouring areas without having to grant them full membership and European identity (Palosaari 2001).

However, the issue is not as straightforward as the debate above would seem to suggest. Previous experience has already shown that the EU has not in fact been very successful in projecting its normative power in cases where full membership was not on the agenda. This is due to the internal constraints inherent in the character of the Union as an actor and especially the key role played by enlargement as the main instrument of the Union’s normative power in Europe: the EU’s expectations of normative convergence and harmonization in Europe are seen as legitimate and warranted only when the incentive provided by accession is on offer. Once it is not available, the situation is radically altered, and the EU’s capacity to act as an anchor for reforms is proven to be severely limited (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 137). This has been equally true in the East, as exemplified by the cases of Russia (Haukkala 2007a) and Ukraine (Wolczuk 2004, 2008), as in the Union’s Southern periphery in the Mediterranean (Tovias and Ugur 2004; Holden 2005).

The EU as an active normative entrepreneur

In a seminal article, Ian Manners has suggested that the EU’s normative power is diffused through the processes of contagion and transference (Manners 2002: 244–5). However, in itself, Manners’ scheme betrays too static and passive an understanding of the EU’s role as a normative entrepreneur in international relations. Instead of relying on passive diffusion alone, the EU has in fact actively sought to project and promote its norms and values internationally. This is true especially in Europe where enlargement, and more specifically the highly institutionalized and structured accession process, has been the main instrument of the Union’s normative power. Vachudova (2005: 63) has made a useful distinction between the passive and active leverage that the EU enjoys over its credible future members: passive by the overall attraction of EU membership,
and active from the deliberate conditionality exercised by the Union during the pre-accession process. It is, however, important to note that it is the active component that is the key to understanding the Union’s leverage; previous studies have shown that it is only through clear (material) incentives and the concrete prospect of a full membership and European identity that the EU can effect substantial economic and societal change in its European partners. Other forms of leverage, such as social influence and transnational mobilization, have proven largely ineffective (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003, 2006; Vachudova 2005).

When viewed from the viewpoint of prospective members, a credible offer of membership is crucial in three respects: First, it lends legitimacy in the eyes of the candidates to the Union’s demands to accept its normative agenda. It is only by offering a full stake in European institutions and identity that the Union can expect others to subscribe in full to its norms and values. Second, it offers politicians in the candidate countries the political cover under which they can make the at times difficult and even painful domestic reforms while claiming that the steps are necessary (as indeed they often are) in order to enjoy the fruits of European integration in full. And finally, the accession process gives not only political but also economic and technical support and aid to the transformation of the candidates. This support is on an entirely different scale compared to the other external assistance schemes of the Union.

From the vantage point of the EU’s normative power, the accession process is also beneficial. The Union in effect uses its economic and normative clout to create a set of highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships between itself and the candidates where the projection of norms and values is entirely one-sided: the candidates are supposed to internalize not only the approximately 80,000 pages of acquis communautaire but also the value-basis of the Union, as exemplified in the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 which sets out the other prerequisites for European belonging and full accession.

In fact, this approach to enlargement reveals that Manners’ assumptions about the crucially different character of the EU as an actor have to be clarified with some further remarks. The crux of the issue is to be found in what Manners has described as the Union’s ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’ (Manners 2002: 239). In Europe, this ability is augmented by the fact that the EU has not only power to set the parameters over the legitimate aspects of international (and also domestic) life in general, but that it also has the recourse of being able to claim almost a sole monopoly on what can be called ‘Europeanness’: the Union seems to enjoy the authority of pronouncing what it means, and perhaps more importantly what it takes, to be ‘European’. But this is a mixed blessing for the Union. On the one hand, it has given the Union almost unprecedented normative power over societies in Europe, but, on the other hand, this monopoly has manifested itself in the continued pull of membership that the Union exerts.
over its neighbours, and that is now beginning to make the Union itself ill at ease. Therefore, at least in the case of the EU there is more to the enlargement of regional integration than negative externalities and rational calculus (Mattli 1999): the current state of affairs implies that the enlargement of the EU deals not only with the material side of European integration but also with more profound questions of belonging and identity. As a consequence, in Europe the Union has great difficulties in unbundling its normative power from the notion of Europeanness and consequently from questions of (full) membership. This is why it is facing such a hard time when hoping to relinquish enlargement without inflicting serious damage to its (self-)image as ‘The European Project’. In this respect, the then President of the Commission Romano Prodi’s remark about the EU’s willingness to share ‘everything but institutions’ (Prodi 2002: 6) with its neighbours is both disingenuous and misses the point: as an identity project the Union has a hard time sharing what is perhaps its most essential characteristic, Europeanness, without also sharing its institutions and membership in full.

In a sense, the EU can be seen as a regional normative hegemon (Diez 2005: 616; Hyde-Price 2006: 226–7). Interestingly, this claim ties in with the work of Mearsheimer who has argued that one reading of the last three centuries of international politics is to envisage it as a continuous struggle between Great Powers for regional – as opposed to global – hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001: 40–2). To a degree, the EU can be seen as playing the same game, although it is doing so in a different way and perhaps for different reasons as well. In this respect, the label of regional normative hegemon would seem to be an apt one: normative, as its foreign policy agenda is laden with norms and values, and a hegemon, as it seeks and seems to enjoy a monopoly on defining what those norms entail and thus creates the boundaries of normality and Europeanness.

It is not, however, entirely clear why the EU has decided to marry its normative agenda and ‘foreign policy’ so tightly. For Manners (2002), the answer stems from the Union’s own character: from what it is rather than what it does. Indeed, part of the reason undoubtedly stems from the Union’s own historical experience and identity as ‘a European civilising process’ (Linklater 2005) that entails the Union acting as a qualitatively different entity in international relations (Smith 2001; Diez and Whitman 2002). But other reasons can be found as well. The Union is a complex legal animal (although not yet an entity), and one that seems to have problems in interacting with other international actors that do not work on the basis of the same norms, standards and procedures. Granting third countries access to the highly legalized and institutionalized Single Market is no simple matter but requires a large degree of normative approximation, even harmonization, on the part of those seeking that access (Cremona 1998). The EU’s emphasis is not, however, unique, as it can be seen as part and parcel of the global processes of creating multilateral rules of the game as exemplified by
the World Trade Organization (WTO) processes as well as the wider post-Cold War debates about ‘good governance’ and a second wave of conditionality (Haukkala 2007a).

In a sense, the Union’s normative power in Europe is reminiscent of the Lukes’ (2005: 27) third dimension of power where actor ‘A may exercise power over B by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants . . . that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires’ (italics in original). In essence, the accession process, as an attempt at normative hegemony, can be seen as perhaps the most complete operationalization of this third dimension of power. However, the fact that the accession process is based on this logic does not mean that the actual accession process, and especially the negotiation phase, is consensual and free of power and coercion. In fact, the reverse is the case, with the EU and its member states often bargaining very hard and forcing applicants to conform to a process that entails deep societal reforms, partial erosion – or at least pooling – of sovereignty and accepting accession treaties that do not necessarily meet their short-term economic interests. Crucially, however, it is the expectation of future benefits associated with full membership and the possibility to have a voice in the EU and its institutions that makes this process legitimate, or at least bearable, for the applicants (Ellison 2006; Zielonka 2006).

While the Union’s claim to hegemony is only regional in its scope, as it is most specifically confined to Europe where the prospect of EU membership acts as both the source of attraction and legitimacy for its normative power, the Union’s approach more generally is not confined to Europe alone. It also seeks bilateral relationships with third parties that enable it to enjoy the asymmetric leverage often afforded by its economic and normative power (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 78–9). Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004: 231) have suggested that this is in fact a fairly shrewd strategy on the part of the Union: the Union is ‘playing to its strengths’ and applying its commercial power and attraction to promote its normative power in the international system. But these remarks fail to distinguish between the Union’s normative power globally and regionally in Europe. Although the EU seeks to build highly asymmetrical relationships with its partners in Europe, it is crucial to understand that they are not based on coercion and domination alone. The gist of the issue has been captured fairly well by Leonard (2005: 10) who describes Europe’s ‘transformative power’ as ‘broad and deep: once sucked into its sphere, countries are changed forever . . . Europe doesn’t change countries by threatening to invade them: its biggest threat is to cut off contact with them’. Thus, the Union’s normative power resides in a delicate nexus of attraction, coercion and legitimacy. As such, it is reminiscent of Gramsci’s hegemonic discourse where an actor seeks to define its own ‘interests as general interests and in using this concept to formulate general ideas on the order and development of society’ (Brand 2005: 171). In this perspective, a successful hegemony results in a situation where the relationship is largely
void of the naked exercise of power, and the ideas, values and institutions of the hegemon are seen as both natural and legitimate instead (Gill and Law 1988: 78). But herein lays the catch for the Union: the EU might have, as Manners has argued, the power to set the parameters of normality and it might have some means of projecting its vision internationally, but the limits of the Union’s influence are conditioned by the need for this exercise to be seen as legitimate. The experience so far has shown that the only way the Union can legitimately project its normative power in Europe is by offering a full stake in European institutions and identity which implies membership in the EU itself.

To be sure, to argue that the Union’s normative power is dependent on the perceived legitimacy of its actions and policies in the eyes of its partners is hardly a groundbreaking finding. The same of course applies to any international actor where the attraction of their ‘soft power’, or ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments’ (Nye 2004: x), is conditioned by the perceived external legitimacy of the policies the given actor itself undertakes. But it is worth emphasizing that at least in Europe the EU has an additional structural constraint compared to, for example, the United States (US): the Union is not a state actor that can apply its ‘soft power’ at will, but it is a regional integration process to which the ‘objects’ of that power can, and often do, aspire to join before accepting its norms and values as entirely legitimate.

This tendency has been fuelled by the Union’s own rhetoric. Since its inception it has been committed to keeping its membership open to ‘any European state’ that respects the founding values and principles of the Union (EU 1992, Article 49). As a consequence, a large part of the EU’s legitimacy in the eyes of third parties stems from the fact that at least until recently European integration has been a geographically open-ended ‘European Project’ and enlarging the Union has been the best way of countering the often voiced concerns of a ‘Fortress Europe’ and thus ensuring the legitimacy as well as stability in the EU’s own immediate environment.

The difficulties in ceasing to enlarge

In the aftermath of the latest rounds of enlargement in May 2004 and January 2007, the Union’s willingness and ability to enlarge further seems to be increasingly in doubt. Some commentators have even spoken of ‘the death of enlargement’ (Rachman 2006). Often the Union’s reluctance to embrace ever new candidates is framed in terms of the Union’s ‘absorption capacity’ (Emerson 2006; Rehn 2006). When it comes to the limits of its enlargement, the stakes are high indeed for the Union. As noted by Karen Smith (2005b: 757), ‘Inclusion means bridging the old Cold War divide and uniting a continent, but could end up shredding the carefully woven fabric of the Union itself. Exclusion means isolating countries that can ill afford isolation, and making a mockery of the very term “European union”.’ EU
officials seem to concur: in the words of former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi: ‘[w]e cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale’ (Prodi 2002).

The Cold War and its bipolar overlay served the Western Europeans well, for they could take the concept of ‘Europe’ as their own without having to think about where the final outer boundaries of European integration really lay (Wallace 1992: 34). Rhetorically, the European Community portrayed a pan-European vocation; for example, Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome accorded ‘any European state’ the right to apply for membership (Schimmelfennig 2003: 266). This served of course as a useful propaganda purpose by highlighting the key differences between the Western and Soviet integration processes in Europe: one was based on voluntary functional integration and pooling of sovereignty while the other grew from the barrels of Soviet guns. However, with the end of the Cold War the situation changed and the EU was flooded with membership applications from a host of Northern, Central and Eastern European countries. As a result, claiming a sole monopoly on Europeanness became a much more costly exercise. It also meant that the EU either had to start drawing the limits of ‘Europe’ or be ‘shamed’ by the rhetorical action of the aspirants into enlarging.9 Now, nearly 20 years since the fall of the wall, the EU has still not been able to decide where its boundaries will eventually lie. Instead, the recent wrangling over Turkey’s accession negotiations and the growing uneasiness with which the Union has greeted Ukraine’s aspirations seem to verify the point made by Wallace in the early 1990s that the EU does not really have any clear criteria for determining which countries can join and when enlargement should ultimately stop (Wallace 1992: 40).

As such, the recent Eastern enlargement is only the latest, although a major, step in the drawing of the EU’s outer boundaries in a piecemeal fashion. To date the process has not reflected any serious premeditated strategy on the part of the Union. Instead, it has been part and parcel of the dialectical process mentioned at the beginning of this chapter where it seems that at times the Union has been haplessly caught in the middle of its own pan-European rhetoric, internal economic and political success and dynamism, and external pressures and calls for belonging. This has led Wallace to suggest that the Union should seek to detach the issue of its membership from more existential questions of ‘cultural – let alone ethnic – limits of Europe’. Instead, the EU should approach the issue in a more practical manner, answering the ‘policy question’ of ‘where should the EU end?’ (Wallace 2003: 13). Also Karen Smith (2005b: 769) has argued that the current ambiguity concerning the EU’s limits is counterproductive in that it does not boost its leverage. Instead, the Union is repeatedly forced into a ‘reactive and defensive’ mode and eventually into further enlargements. In order to escape from this entrapment, Smith
(2005b: 773) urges the Union to soon decide where its final outer boundaries will eventually lie.

However, things might not be as straightforward as Wallace and Smith both argue. What makes the case of the EU interesting is that as a *sui generis* entity of regional integration it has to take into consideration not only the issue of how best to project its power in order to ensure stability and security in its immediate neighbourhood, but also how to project its normative power in Europe and elsewhere. Obviously, the point of contact where these pressures are felt most urgently is at the outer boundaries of the EU. Previously, the countries emerging at the outskirts of the enlarging Union (the ‘new neighbours’) have often also been potential future members. The logic of an empire is partly at work here (Zielonka 2006). But the EU is a reluctant empire, ever aware of the dangers posed by the entry of newcomers into the club. Moreover, the EU has not become an empire by the traditional means of conquest, but, and to paraphrase Lundestad (1998), rather by means of invitation. Nevertheless, the EU can be seen as having some empire-like qualities, as each successive enlargement creates new borders beyond which the EU normative order has to be imposed if the Union is to be secure and able to do business with its new neighbours.\(^\text{10}\)

The factors limiting the expansion of previous empires in world history apply to the ‘EU Empire’ as well.\(^\text{11}\) But due to its *sui generis* nature, the Union has some unique concerns as well. Perhaps the most pressing one is the internal imperative and the question of the future viability of the EU’s own institutions and structures. Already the recent two rounds of new members have spurred warnings of a possible meltdown of the EU’s structures in the post-enlargement situation. The words of Romano Prodi quoted above are a case in point. Therefore, it seems clear that the EU wants the enlargement to stop soon. But it is at a loss on how to go about it. The current Treaty on European Union and the so-called Copenhagen criteria do not offer any clear guidance in the matter. The same goes for the new Lisbon Treaty, which like the Constitutional Treaty that preceded it has witnessed problems of ratification. Consequently, it seems that it is the Luxembourg 1997 decision on an added criteria, that of the Union’s own readiness to accept new members, that is coming to the fore.\(^\text{12}\) At the end of the day it seems that instead of ‘imperial overstretch’ it is the danger of an ‘institutional overstretch’ that will set the limits of EU enlargement (Kennedy 1989: 666).

From the vantage point of the Union’s normative power the problem is that this is not a very moral argument. It rings of double standards and reinforces the image of the EU as a ‘Fortress Europe’ shielding its precious *acquis* behind the Schengen border. As a consequence, by relinquishing enlargement, the EU is in danger of not only losing its capacity for effectively stabilizing its nearest neighbours, but it is also in danger of losing its legitimacy and justification in their eyes (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002: 782; Hansen 2006: 130). The EU is thus in a genuine bind: by playing with the
idea of relinquishing enlargement, the previously open ‘European Project’ is increasingly perceived, especially by the EU’s Eastern neighbours, as a form of exclusion. For them it is about extending a normative and highly institutionalized wall, which will isolate them from the rest of Europe (Neumann 1998; Sherr 2002: 167). Therefore it is clear that the EU needs a third way; something to ease it out of the bind of having to choose between the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’. Since 2003 the Union has been developing an ENP that can for all means and purposes be seen as an attempt at devising new avenues through which the Union could preserve the legitimacy of its normative power and the consequent ability to project stability in its neighbourhood while also protecting its institutions, and budget, from an unacceptable overload. Next we will examine what are the ENP’s prospects for success in this respect.

**The European Neighbourhood Policy as a substitute for enlargement**

As mentioned above, the application of the EU’s normative hegemony in Europe is by no means confined to its future members alone. During the post-Cold War period the Union built an extensive web of bilateral relationships in Eastern Europe based on the same set of norms and values as the accession process. For example, the EU has negotiated 11 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with states of the former Soviet Union. Here the Union has sought an asymmetric bilateral approach but with a crucial difference, as accession has not been on the agenda (but to be precise, not all of the post-Soviet states have aspired to membership either). As a consequence, the key component of the Union’s active leverage, political conditionality, has been weak and inefficient (Smith 1998; Zanger 2000; Youngs 2001). The Union’s own half-hearted attempts at applying conditionality in practice seem to suggest that it, too, has been aware of this. The EU’s discouraging track record in influencing Russia’s policy in Chechnya is a case in point (Haukkala 2001: 51–62; Forsberg and Herd 2005), and Ukraine especially during the reign of President Leonid Kuchma is another (Wolczuk 2004).

The ENP can be seen as having a dual function: on the one hand, it is an attempt to devise an alternative to further enlargements of the Union. On the other hand, it is an attempt at (re)injecting the Union’s normative agenda and the application of conditionality more strongly to relations with non-candidate countries (Dannreuther 2006; Kelley 2006). As such, it is a conscious attempt at squaring the circle of relinquishing enlargement while retaining the Union’s normative power in Europe. These aims were present already in the Commission’s first blueprint concerning the policy, presented in March 2003 (European Commission 2003b). The communication clearly stated that the new policy was meant for countries that did not enjoy the perspective of EU membership. However, the document took
great pains to make the case that the Eastern enlargement was not about exclusion and new dividing lines in Europe but that it would bring tangible benefits also to the new neighbours. At the heart of the initiative was the EU’s offer of enhanced relations and closer integration based on shared values between the Union and its neighbours. The mechanism is simple: in return for effective implementation of reforms (including aligning significant parts of national legislation with the EU acquis), the EU would grant closer economic integration with its partners. The approach is twofold, as the EU wanted first to tap the full potential of the already existing PCAs, namely the gradual harmonization of legal norms with the EU acquis and the creation of a free trade area, and only then move beyond with the prospect of realizing the so-called four freedoms (persons, goods, services and capital) within the ‘Wider Europe’ that would have included the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, Russia and everywhere in between.13

The concept was further developed in the Commission’s strategy paper in May 2004 (European Commission 2004). The paper largely reiterated the points of departure of the earlier communication but went further by more clearly identifying the priorities and how to inscribe them into the neighbourhood action plans to be jointly adopted with the neighbours. The paper also envisaged a process based on clear differentiation between countries and the monitoring of progress. It is, however, here that the Union’s attempt at normative hegemony in its neighbourhood becomes clearly visible, as the process is built on a set of bilateral relationships between the individual neighbours and the EU. Scholars seem to be in agreement that this is a deliberate choice on the part of the Union to maximize its leverage over the neighbours (Joenniemi and Browning 2005; Smith 2005b: 762–3; Vahl 2005). Moreover, according to this strategy the Union does not give any meaningful say to the neighbours in setting the normative agenda: the objectives and the means are non-negotiable and the only time when the partners would be consulted is when the individual action plans with clear benchmarks and timetables are being agreed upon. As such, the Union is offering (or withholding) economic benefits depending on the neighbours’ ability and willingness to implement the Union’s normative agenda, and the EU is willing to give its neighbours influence only over when they want to implement the Union’s demands and not how that is to be done (Bicchi 2006). In sum, it seems evident that the neighbours are not likely to have a large say in matters that will have a profound effect on their future development and place in Europe. If this stance is accompanied by a persistent neglect of the neighbours’ calls for belonging and their claims of Europeanness, the application of the Union’s normative hegemony through the ENP can be seen as resting on a fairly dubious legitimacy.

In fact, and unlike in the case of enlargement, the ENP would seem to reveal the uglier face of the Union’s normative power as one based on domination. According to Lukes (2005: 85), the exercise of power is understood as
a form of domination when it rests on ‘the ability to constrain the choices of others, coercing them or securing their compliance, by impeding them from living as their own nature and judgment dictate’. By denying its neighbours’ calls for belonging and demanding that they nevertheless conform to its norms and values, the Union can be seen as acting precisely in this way. This does not necessarily imply that the EU is somehow evil, since the exercise of domination can be done with the best and kindest of intentions, with the well-being of the dominated in mind (Lukes 2005: 83). In fact, this seems to be the Union’s own line of reasoning when its representatives repeatedly state how the very ENP process is beneficial for the neighbours themselves, regardless of whether their wishes for accession are eventually heeded or not (Ferrero-Waldner 2006a, 2006b; Landaburu 2006; Wissels 2006). But despite the rhetoric, the ENP amounts to little else than what Hettne and Söderbaum (2005: 539) have called ‘soft imperialism’, meaning that soft (or normative) power is applied in a hard (or hegemonic) way through an asymmetric relationship that advocates a one-sided reading of norms and values without engaging the recipients in a genuine dialogue about the content and meaning of those terms.

However, the crux of the issue lies elsewhere in the fact that the EU has been trying to apply its normative hegemony in Europe along the same lines as in the accession process but without the legitimizing effect of enlargement. It should be clear from the discussion above that this is a recipe for failure, unless the ENP is made sufficiently enticing for the neighbours in terms of material incentives. Thus far this has not been the case and it is unlikely that the economic side of ENP can be robust enough to act as a sufficient incentive for the neighbours in the future (Milcher and Slay 2005: 7). Despite the grand total of €12 billion devoted to the neighbourhood in the current budgetary period in the EU (2007–13), it is clear that the sum is not in proportion to the scale of challenges the Union is facing in its combined neighbourhoods in the South and the East. In addition, the long-term overall malaise in European economic performance will be reflected in the future allocation of resources. The Euro zone’s economy has been stalling for several years, and the EU is no longer generating the kind of resources that it could use to exert its influence – at least beyond its own borders.

It is equally dubious whether the Union is able to provide its neighbours with the kind of market access that would be required, especially in the East. The French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 reflected the rise of anti-liberalism and neo-protectionism in the EU. It is unlikely that the vested interests within the Union will allow the Commission to open the Union’s internal market to the products from the East that would be most competitive there. For example, Ukraine’s and Moldova’s main exports are steel and agricultural products, but liberalization in the trading of both these commodities would face staunch opposition from within the Union (Grabbe 2001: 8; Milcher and Slay 2005: 9). As a
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consequence, it could well be that neither aid nor trade will be forthcoming from the EU in the coming years. What is more, an article written in an unofficial capacity by two members of the Commission unwittingly reveals how most of the expected economic benefits of the ENP would actually flow towards the Union with significant potential risks of over-regulation and market shocks for the neighbours themselves (Dodini and Fantini 2006).

Therefore, it can be doubted whether the ENP in its current form provides the answer the EU has been hoping for. A case in point is Ukraine, a country that since the early 1990s has been oscillating between the two main vectors of its foreign policy: the EU and the Russian Federation. Leonid Kuchma’s presidency (1994–2004) saw the schizophrenic situation of continued professions of Ukraine’s European calling without a commensurate display of its vocation in terms of actual economic and societal reforms that would have facilitated the country’s claim to be a suitable candidate for accession.14 Thus when the ENP process was launched in earnest in 2004, it seemed obvious to the Union that Ukraine should be seen as one of the laggards on its Eastern periphery, along with Belarus and Moldova.15

Ukraine’s initial reaction to the ENP was one of indignation at being grouped together with clearly non-European countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East (Gromadzki and Sushko 2005: 6). But Kyiv decided to adopt a pragmatic stance, preferring to view the ENP as a short-term solution and seeking to push towards closer forms of association and even membership (Solonenko 2006: 44). Keeping this background in mind, it is hardly surprising that the negotiations for the neighbourhood action plan with Ukraine in 2004 were protracted and difficult. Kuchma’s government was clearly dissatisfied with the Union’s offer. The EU, for its part, was equally adamant that the package was as good as it could offer (Solonenko 2006: 46). However, after the dramatic presidential elections in November–December 2004, the domestic situation seemed to change in Ukraine: the new President Victor Yuschenko not only continued the pro-EU rhetoric of the Kuchma years but sought to augment it with a series of reforms that, if implemented, would have led the country to a more credible path towards EU membership (Gromadzki et al. 2005). Since then, however, the domestic situation in Ukraine has been more turbulent, involving conflict within the Orange coalition between Yuschenko and the ambitious Yulia Tymoshenko and a new period of political infighting in the country. In the process, the president and the government have become largely incapacitated with very little headway being made in terms of reforms and implementing the ENP action plan (Moshes 2008; Wolczuk 2008).

However, even under the most promising of circumstances Ukraine’s path to Europe would be far from linear. The biggest obstacle on Ukraine’s road to modernization and Europeanization lies in the country’s weak institutional framework. As in Russia, state institutions have become hostage and tools of economic interest groups which hinder and obstruct reforms that
threaten their power and prosperity (Deutsche Bank 2005: 4, 7; Wolowskici 2008). The situation has not changed much for the better under Yuschenko whose reformist drive has become the hostage of the inertia of the corrupt bureaucrats and oligarchs. Arguably, for the current elites to relinquish their crony capitalism for good would require a significantly stronger incentive structure on the part of the Union (Larrabee 2006: 94, 97; Wolczuk 2006: 8–9; Wolowskici 2008). But the original action plan negotiated with Kuchma had few such incentives: there was no significant trade liberalization, visa facilitation or market economy status for Ukraine – things the Union has been willing to consider and implement, for example, vis-à-vis Russia. Instead, the action plan contained an exhaustive list of priorities and objectives the Union expected Ukraine to implement (Gromadzki and Sushko 2005; Smith 2005b; Wolczuk 2008).

In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution the EU was not forthcoming with clear new initiatives either. After his victory, Yuschenko sought to challenge the Union to embrace the new democratic Ukraine (Kuzio 2006: 89),16 but already in early 2005 the Union’s ‘take-it-or-leave-it approach’ showed there was no room for a renegotiation of the action plan, and the plan was subsequently adopted on 21 February 2005 (Gromadzki et al. 2005: 7). As if to sweeten the bitter pill, on the day of its adoption, the High Representative Javier Solana and the External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner did publish a ten-point letter specifying additional measures to further strengthen the action plan. However, according to some expert commentators, the letter is little more than a list of unilateral demands on Ukraine with little of substance that is binding on the Union (Gromadzki et al. 2005: 18–19). In short, the burden for the future development of relations has been put squarely on Ukraine’s shoulders while the incentives for doing so remain fairly limited, at least for the time being. What is more, Ukraine’s newly found democratic credentials together with its European vocation have basically been ignored (Kuzio 2006). Once again, a clear membership perspective would seem to be the best anchor for Ukraine (Wolczuk 2004, 2006, 2008; Deutsche Bank 2005: 9; Gromadzki et al. 2005). What is more, it also seems clear that the Union’s current ambiguity and vacillation only manages to undercut the pro-European reformist forces in Ukraine (Kuzio 2006: 105).17 As a consequence, it is likely that with its current ENP the Union’s normative power is set to remain under-utilized and its normative agenda largely unrealized.

These same trends can be detected also in the Union’s wider relations, with various neighbours showing signs of frustration with the ENP (Vahl 2005; Harpaz 2007). But there are also some indications that there is growing awareness concerning the inherent constraints faced by the ENP in the Union. For example, Kelley (2006) has traced the erosion or the dilution of conditionality attached to the policy from the initial rigid application
of benchmarks and monitoring akin to the accession process to the more recent ‘intentional ambiguity’ where the Union hopes to spur a modicum of reforms whilst acknowledging the relatively thin set of incentives at the ENP’s current disposal. This change is to be detected in the Commission’s communication on the topic of December 2006, which – while reiterating the main characteristics of the ENP discussed above – acknowledges that the EU itself must be forthcoming with a more ‘robust’ ENP in terms of actual incentives while simultaneously enhancing dialogue with its partners (European Commission 2006a). Recently, the Union has indeed adopted a slightly more accommodating stance when it comes to actual incentives. An interesting case again is Ukraine, where the EU has taken some practical steps to meet some of the long-standing Ukrainian demands. For example, the tenth EU–Ukraine summit in Helsinki in October 2006 initialled a draft agreement on visa facilitation that Ukraine was denied in the original ENP action plan a year earlier. But despite this apparent concession, a group of commentators have seen it as a ‘questionable achievement’ at best, as it does not meet the Ukrainian hopes for closer integration in full (Boratyński et al. 2006). Also the actual practice of visa facilitation seems to have left the Ukrainians disillusioned: access to visas has not been significantly improved and in some cases the costs of acquiring one has actually increased (Vucheva 2008).

An issue worth keeping an eye on is the negotiation for a new enhanced agreement between Ukraine and the EU that started in March 2007 with a view to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that will expire in 2008 (with automatic annual renewal by consent of the parties, however). But once again it seems that Ukraine is set for another disappointment as the agendas that the two sides are bringing to the negotiation table are largely irreconcilable: Kyiv is looking for a profound symbolic recognition of its European vocation whereas the Union is offering – in the words of the EU Council’s negotiation mandate – ‘gradual economic integration and deepening of political cooperation’; essentially hoping that the prospect of an eventual free trade area would suffice for Ukraine (Wolczuk 2008: 113). This brings us back to the gist of the argument: since the ENP entails a severing of the link with enlargement, the Union is facing severe obstacles in its continued attempts at regional normative hegemony in Europe.

Conclusions

In the aftermath of the ‘Big Bang’ Eastern enlargement, the EU seems to be approaching the geographical limits of its European Project, and is increasingly wrestling with the idea of ceasing to enlarge. As a consequence, in the external relations of the Union, the exclusionary aspects of European integration are coming to the fore, while the question of how to alleviate the
negative impact of relinquishing the most effective foreign policy tool at the EU’s disposal is emerging. At stake is the Union’s ability to act as a normative power – or hegemon – in Europe, which is crucially dependent on the EU’s perceived legitimacy in the eyes of its partners.

It has been argued in this chapter that the open-ended nature of the Union’s membership is a key factor in promoting this legitimacy. As such, the Union’s attempts at divorcing its normative power from the accession process in Europe can be seen as being counterproductive. Yet the Union has several reasons for ceasing – or at least pausing – to enlarge. The recent accessions have resulted in a need for a gestation period. Also the new Eastern neighbours, at least in their present form, are anything but easily integrated.

For the Union, the new ENP thus represents both the avoidance and continuation of enlargement by other means: avoidance, as it is hoped that it would enable the Union to avoid for the foreseeable future answering their demands for belonging; continuation, as the Union has built the ENP on the same logic of normative hegemony as the accession process. It was hoped that this would facilitate the emergence of an increasingly democratic and prosperous ‘ring of friends’ around the Union with which it would be willing to share ‘everything but institutions’.

Although the original offer did sound generous, the current format is far from a panacea. As has been argued in this chapter, the ambiguity concerning the limits of Europe is not working. Instead, it is eroding the legitimacy on which the Union’s normative hegemony crucially rests. Moreover, one could argue that after the severe difficulties they faced in the 1990s, the EU’s new Eastern neighbours might prefer clear institutional ties and mechanisms (including, of course, the financial support) that full membership would provide them. By demanding reforms right now and offering only vague and amorphous incentives somewhere down the line, the ENP puts the veritable cart before its neighbours’ horses with no tangible carrot in sight.\(^\text{18}\) The material benefits are not strong enough to entice the elites in the new Eastern neighbours to change the current system that is skewed in their favour. But, as is clear from the case of Ukraine, even if the ENP was made financially robust enough to act as an economic carrot, it does not answer their calls for belonging in full.

One can envisage two ways forward for the Union. The first is the continuation of enlargement(s). After all, it seems to be the only avenue through which the Union can project its normative power in a legitimate and efficient manner in Europe. This would also tie in with the ENP’s own paradoxical logic. As Hillion (2005: 23) has pointed out, the better the ENP works the less sustainable it actually becomes. With the neighbours becoming increasingly EU-compatible, also the shadow of enlargement looms larger. This does not need to be a problem, however, but it does reinforce the main point of this chapter: it is the enlargement that is the key to the Union’s normative power in Europe and any neighbourhood policy that
fails to take this issue into account is doomed to be a sub-optimal one. If this road was pursued then Ukraine’s European aspiration should be deemed as legitimate and a gradual step-by-step association and integration process should begin. Therefore Turkey’s long winding road to Europe could also be Ukraine’s. The EU should expect Moldova, Georgia and other countries of the Southern Caucasus to follow suit as well.

The second is that the EU should perhaps reconsider its claim for normative hegemony in post-enlargement Europe. The paradox of the EU’s own pan-European rhetoric is that its application of the Lukesian third dimension of power has resulted in its neighbours wanting the wrong thing: they want the full institutional membership in the Union when the EU would only want them to have the same norms and values that the Union promotes. To be fair, the EU has tried to find a way out of this conundrum by repeatedly emphasizing the inclusive aspects of the ENP without, however, realizing that in Europe the legitimacy of its attempts is linked with the accession perspective. In this respect, the ENP is not a powerful enough tool for the Union to allow it to turn the issue of membership into a ‘non-decision’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1963; Lukes 2005).

This would entail changing the neighbourhood policy, or at least the priorities within it. The current approach is not substantial enough to warrant the attempts at regional normative hegemony and the Union’s insistence that the neighbours should engage themselves in adopting large parts of the acquis without the full European perspective. Instead, the Union should consider a neighbourhood policy that is based less on heavy normative convergence and harmonization and more on tangible cooperation with more modest rhetoric and clearer material incentives. After all, what is the point of insisting on a high level of conformity with the EU acquis if these countries are not to become full members in the foreseeable future? One should also keep in mind that often, even within the Union, it is the case that if common rules and regulations are formally adopted they are in practice implemented in a rather slow and haphazard manner (Zielonka 2001: 513). If the EU can deal with this internal messiness, perhaps it could let the thousand flowers bloom in its neighbourhood, and instead of detailed normative convergence to concentrate on fostering the overall values and norms that matter as prerequisites for good governance: democracy, rule of law and basic human rights. This would ease the burden of the Union’s normative hegemony and would give the Union added and badly needed legitimacy, as it could tie its agenda to the wider normative geography in Europe that already consists of other institutions, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. In essence, this would require toning down the Union’s pan-European rhetoric and attempts at normative hegemony while embracing the plurality of overlapping institutionalized Europe’s’ instead.
Notes

∗Previous drafts or ideas related to this chapter have been presented and discussed in the Research Seminar, Department of Political Science, University of Turku, November 2005; the ERI Seminar at the University of Birmingham, March 2006; the fourth CEEISA Convention in Tartu, June 2006; and the tenth Biennial EUSA Conference, Montreal, May 2007. I want to thank all the participants on these occasions for challenging and consequently improving my ideas. Special thanks are due to Richard Whitman and Graham Timmins for their comments and enthusiasm.

1. For an illustrative sample of articles, see the Special Issue of *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13 (2), 2006.
2. For such a treatment, see Hyde-Price (2006).
3. Russia, another important case in the present context, is not chosen due to the simple fact that it has itself opted out of the ENP format. For a discussion, see Haukkala (2008).
4. Also the Union acknowledges this. For example, the communication on neighbourhood policy states that the enlargement has ‘unarguably’ been the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument (European Commission 2003b: 5). For the current enlargement commissioner’s view, see Rehn (2006).
5. See also Manners (2006c, 2006e). For Manners the notion of normative power has to remain free of any forms of coercion; it is a conceptual move necessitated by his own normative agenda. For a discussion, see Manners (2006e).
6. For an eloquent semi-official exposition, see Cooper (2003).
7. Also the failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe made the same point explicitly: ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and for international law in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (Title V, Chapter I, Article III-292, available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/, accessed 14 July 2008). Interestingly, the Lisbon Treaty that followed has settled for a much drier wording in this respect: see Part Five, Title 1, Article 205.
8. For a dissenting view, see Whitman (2007). For a fascinating study which suggests that the EU in fact badly needs further and even radical enlargements in order to keep up with global power transitions, see Yeşilada et al. (2006).
10. The EU’s zeal for the use of empire-like (normative) power is nothing new, of course. For example, also the Roman and the British empires were keen to and adept in exporting their norms, values and modes of governance (see Ferguson 2003 and Holland 2003, respectively). The crucial difference, however, is that the Union is seeking to project its normative power well beyond the reach of its pilums and maxim guns.
11. For recent treatments of the role of empires in international relations, see, for example, Ferguson (2003, 2005) and Lieven (2003).
12. This has been highlighted in the Commission’s most recent enlargement strategy (European Commission 2006d, see especially Annex 1).
13. Since 2003 the Commission’s blueprint has gone through several substantive transformations: its name was changed from ‘Wider Europe’ to ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’. Also the list of countries has changed, as Russia – due to its own insistence – was dropped from the initiative, whereas the countries of the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have been added to the list of ‘neighbours’.

14. For a fascinating account of Europe as a vocation and a calling, see Medvedev (1998).

15. To be precise, although mentioned in the ENP documents, the Union has decided to exclude Belarus from the process due to the policies of the country’s authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko.

16. For the President’s own views, see Yuschenko (2007).

17. But see also Wolczuk (2008) for a somewhat different view.

18. This is not unique in the Union’s external policies, however. Tovias and Ugur (2004: 412) have shown how the ‘Euro-Med Partnership’ in the South has been based on exactly the same logic.

19. This is in fact exactly what a group of experts advocate in Gromadzki et al. (2005).
4
Mind the Normative Gap? The EU in the South Caucasus

Emma J. Stewart

Introduction

This chapter assesses the utility of the ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) framework in explaining European Union (EU) external action in a troubled region of the ‘new neighbourhood’: the South Caucasus states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The most pressing foreign policy challenges in these former Soviet countries include the establishment of political and economic stability and the settlement of the unresolved ethno-territorial disputes in Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh) and Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The EU’s policy towards the region falls mainly under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), specifically the bi-lateral ENP action plans agreed in November 2006 with all three countries. Enlargement to the South Caucasus seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, but the region is situated across the Black Sea from Bulgaria and Romania, and is strategically important in oil and gas production and transit. ENP objectives emphasize the EU’s goal to create a ‘zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood’ (European Commission 2003b), and include statements on contributing to conflict resolution. However, EU policy in the region is complicated by the constellation of powerful state actors that circle the South Caucasus region: the Russian Federation, Iran and Turkey. The EU’s incoherent policy towards Russia in particular impacts negatively on the EU’s role in the region, particularly as EU norms compete directly with Russian norms in the de facto states established in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh, and to a certain extent in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russian influence in the Georgian separatist territories has been consolidated since the renewal of hostilities between Georgian and South Ossetian forces in August 2008, further weakening EU normative influence in these regions.

Empirical and theoretical analyses of the EU as a normative power have proliferated since Manners published his seminal article on NPE in 2002. Analysts have since discussed at length the NPE concept and its links to earlier discussions of ‘civilian power Europe’, as well as the possible negative
impact of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on the EU’s normative role (Smith 2000; Diez 2005; Manners 2006c, 2006f; Sjursen 2006a, 2006b; Whitman 2006b). According to Manners’ original proposition, the concept of NPE suggests that ‘not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, [in terms of its “historical evolution, hybrid polity and constitutional configuration”] but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics’ (Manners 2002: 252). This chapter focuses on the latter part of this statement: in other words, it is both the normative intention and the actual outcome of EU external policies that is under scrutiny. Does the EU act in a ‘normative way’ in the South Caucasus, and, if so, what norms does the EU promote, and are they contributing to stability and the peaceful resolution of the disputes? What challenges does the EU face in the promotion of these norms? How useful is the NPE framework in explaining the EU’s foreign policy action in this complex region?

Interest in the EU’s normative influence is linked to the ‘expanded normative ambition of international society’ (Hurrell 2003: 32). Citizens and politicians alike expect the international community in general, and the EU in particular, to represent and to uphold certain standards and norms, particularly those pertaining to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Implicit in the NPE approach, therefore, is that the EU is out to ‘do good’ in the world (Sjursen 2006a). Yet analysts of the EU shirk their duty if they make naïve assumptions about the benign impact of EU external policies, as Sjursen (2006b) and Merlingen (2007) have argued. EU policy is not necessarily altruistic, since, as Diez (2005: 622) warns, ‘interests and norms cannot be easily separated’ and, as Youngs (2004: 419) asserts, ‘ideational dynamics co-exist with power politics’. Whatever the EU’s stated normative intent, it is important to examine both the impact and the reception of EU policy in third countries. The distinction between whether the EU acts normatively and the Union’s normative impact (Diez 2005) is crucial in this investigation.

The intention of this chapter is not to underplay the importance of norms in the international arena, but to examine the norms promoted by the EU in the South Caucasus, and to compare the rhetoric and intention with actual impact and outcome. The focus is on the impact of constitutional norms pertaining to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and conflict resolution. Of course, the EU does not have the monopoly on these norms: most are rooted in international law, and underpin the peace-building approach taken by the EU alongside the United Nations (UN) in the countries of former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. While Paris (2004) has highlighted the problems associated with the blanket application of reforms in the aftermath of civil war, and other critics have questioned the basis of the ‘liberal peace’ approach (Chandler 2006; Pugh 2006; Richmond 2006), there is no consensus on the best way for international actors to promote sustainable peace. While it cannot simply be assumed that the EU is ‘doing good’ in its policy
towards the South Caucasus states, it is applying formulae that have arguably been implemented with some success elsewhere, such as in the Balkans.

This chapter proceeds by outlining the EU’s normative intent in the neighbourhood, and then goes on to look at the normative impact and outcome in the South Caucasus in the fields of democracy, rule of law, human rights and conflict resolution. The last part of the chapter examines the main challenge the EU faces in its promotion of constitutional norms in the South Caucasus: the role of the Russian Federation in the region, which is destabilizing not only because of the policies pursued by the Russian administration, but because of the lack of a constructive and common EU policy towards its most awkward neighbour. The conclusion considers the overall impact of EU norms in the South Caucasus, and asks whether the NPE framework contributes to our understanding of EU policy, or simply muddies the conceptual waters.

**Normative power in the neighbourhood**

The ENP was embarked upon at the same time as the EU was struggling to push through institutional reforms to cope with its larger membership. The revised Lisbon Treaty, which eventually brought in reforms to the EU’s external policies in December 2009, was designed to streamline foreign policy duties by creating the new post of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (more commonly known as the EU ‘Foreign Minister’), as well as an External Action Service to support the post. However, the reforms have so far failed to sufficiently streamline EU external representation, and the appointment of two relatively unknown officials as Foreign Minister and President of the EU Council has not helped to raise the EU’s global profile. The continued confusion and wrangling over external competences and representation therefore impacts negatively on the EU’s ability to formulate and implement coherent external action.

The ENP was first elucidated in 2003 in the run-up to the 2004 enlargement. It represents recognition by EU member states that internal stability and security can only be maintained if regions close to EU borders absorb the values, standards and norms that provide some guarantee of security at home. The links between internal and external security are stark: security challenges on the borders of the EU include transnational organized crime, illegal immigration, terrorism and the overspill effects of conflict and corruption.

The ENP (in common with the related ‘Eastern Partnership’ and the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’) is framed in terms of shared values and the mutual benefit of cooperation. There is significant emphasis on investment and ‘good governance’. According to the 2006 Commission Communication on Strengthening the ENP, ‘the EU has a vital interest in seeing greater economic development and stability and better governance in its neighbourhood’ (European Commission 2006a: 2). The organization acts
normatively by emphasizing that the policy, presented as an alternative to accession, will promote political and economic reforms in partner countries. The normative intention of EU policy is clear, but the normative impact of the EU in its neighbourhood is less so. Barbé and Johansson-Nogués (2008) have argued that the EU is only a ‘modest’ force for good in the neighbourhood, and that the Union has fallen short on issues such as visa facilitation, democracy promotion and conflict management. Pace (2007a) argues that EU normative influence has been weak in the Mediterranean, where the EU’s democracy promotion agenda has been undermined by the failure to endorse the democratically elected Palestinian government, Hamas. Indeed, the promotion of European norms in the neighbourhood has been problematic: the incentives for reform are lacking without the offer of accession, and the EU’s approach has lacked consistency. Furthermore, the EU’s neighbours have their own problems that cannot be easily lumped together under one policy programme, however tailored the ENP action plans are to individual states. As Zielonka (2008: 472) has argued, ‘the outside world looks ever less European, and Europe lacks a plausible strategy of projecting its norms’.

Not being immediate ‘new neighbours’ as a result of the EU’s 2004 enlargement, the South Caucasus were not included in the original ‘Wider Europe’ Communication from the Commission (European Commission 2003b). The region, as Lynch (2003) explains, was promoted from a footnote in the Commission’s Communication to an example of an area in which the EU should play a more active role in the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003) several months later. According to Lynch, this reconsideration of the importance of the region to the EU’s security was conditioned more by the initiatives of a few member states (Finland, Sweden and the Baltic states), rather than a clear and focused strategy towards the region. According to Jones (2006: 46), the EU’s inclusion of the South Caucasus in the ENP came as a direct result of the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003, which inaugurated a pro-reform and pro-Western government.

Despite the regional moniker, the South Caucasus states are actually approached differently by the EU: Georgia has received the most EU input, while Armenia and Azerbaijan have had significantly less EU attention. This would suggest that the EU has had less normative impact in Armenia and Azerbaijan than in Georgia. We proceed to test this proposition by examining the impact of EU constitutional norms in the South Caucasus states.

The promotion of constitutional norms in the South Caucasus

The EU and the South Caucasus

In November 2006 the governments of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed ENP action plans with the EU. Previously, the EU’s relationship
with the countries had been based solely on Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs; in force from 1999). The agreements allowed for regular high-level meetings between representatives of the EU and officials from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and included enhanced cooperation in trade, economic development and political dialogue.

Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were included from 1991 in the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) regional funding programme, and EU aid assisted refugees from the conflict zones in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh. Local populations were also supported through the EU Food Security Programme and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). The Commission has funded many non-governmental organization (NGO) human rights and civil society projects in Georgia, including within the breakaway regions, as well as infrastructure rehabilitation, and assistance under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The ENP funding instrument replaced TACIS funding from 2007.

Overall, Georgia has received approximately €505 million of EU assistance since 1992 (European Commission 2008b), Azerbaijan €400 million (European Commission 2008d) and Armenia €386 million (European Commission 2008c). The Georgia figure does not include EU funds allocated to the country in the aftermath of the Russia–Georgia conflict of August 2008, which amounted to €6 million initially, plus €8.4 million from individual EU countries. To put these figures in comparative perspective, it is interesting to note that Albania received nearly €300 million from the EU during a period of five years (2001–06) (Europa 2008a), and Macedonia has been the recipient of €870 million of EU assistance since 1992 (the figure excludes the cost of the ESDP police and peacekeeping missions) (Europa 2008d).

These figures suggest that while the EU increasingly could not ignore the South Caucasus states, proximity to EU borders does matter when it comes to attracting EU aid. Enlargement in 2004 extended EU borders to the Balkan states, and the 2007 enlargement meant that the EU bordered a state with an unresolved ‘frozen’ conflict: the Transdniester conflict in Moldova. Unresolved conflicts in the pan-European area were now EU business, and the extension of EU norms of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes was crucial for establishing stability and building a sustainable peace.

**Democracy, human rights and the rule of law**

EU foreign policy objectives in democracy, human rights and the rule of law were not clearly outlined until the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1992, when the EU pledged in the Treaty on European Union to ‘develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (EU 1992: 124). The tenets were established explicitly as key EU internal characteristics when
they formally became criteria for membership for the Central and Eastern European states in the 1990s. The widening concept of security and security threats in the post-Cold War era served to bridge the gap between norms and interests: increasingly it was in the EU’s strategic interest to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law to address international instability (Youngs 2004: 421).

Democracy promotion as an objective has featured prominently in EU discourse since 1991, which, as Smith (2003: 122) has noted, was rather late in comparison with other international actors. Human rights issues have also gained prominence, although critics have pointed out the EU’s internal and external inconsistencies in its championing of human rights policies (Nicolaidis and Lacroix 2003). Rule of law is internally prominent under the ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ remit, and has become externally significant as part of CFSP/ESDP work in law and security sector reform, particularly in candidate countries. Rule of law objectives are closely linked to democracy and human rights goals.

Democracy, human rights and the rule of law feature prominently in all three South Caucasus ENP action plans, with an emphasis on compliance with European and international norms and principles. The EU has most successfully promoted these norms in the Republic of Georgia. The Saakashvili government has been the most vocal about its ambitions to join the EU and has called on the EU for help in consolidating the country’s weak democracy and judicial system. As well as funding from the Commission for a number of democracy and civil society initiatives, Georgia hosted an ESDP Rule of Law Mission (EUJUST Themis) in 2004–05, consisting of 12 experts in judicial reform. The EU has contributed to economic rehabilitation in Georgia, including in the de facto states. Yet the Georgian administration was disappointed when the EU failed to take over the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission on the Georgian–Chechen border in 2005, despite operation EUJUST Themis demonstrating that ‘the idea of an ESDP mission in the former Soviet space has not led to increasing tensions with Russia’ (Helly 2006: 102). Nevertheless, the EU did establish a team of 20 staff to support the work of the EU Special Representative, based at the European Commission delegation in Tbilisi. This provided a follow-on service to the rule of law mission, with particular attention given to assisting with the reform of the Georgian Border Guard service.

The United States (US) has also been active in supporting Georgia’s democratic reconstruction, for strategic and normative reasons. In fact, ‘Georgia was the fourth-largest per capita recipient of USAID aid in 2002–3, much of the aid going to democracy and governance, including election reform, local government, rule of law (judicial reform) and the development of the Third Sector (NGOs)’ (Jones 2006: 42). The US also provides funds for military reform and training. Georgia’s progress in the wake of international assistance has been considerable. According to one expert, ‘Saakashvili’s
government has increased the civil service’s efficiency, improved public infrastructure, fought corruption, reduced crime, and created an attractive investment environment’ (Nodia 2008a). Unfortunately the outbreak of conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008, while not negating all the investment in Georgia’s rehabilitation, has at any rate curtailed reform and has raised doubts about the Georgian administration’s commitment to Western democratic norms. Even before the renewal of conflict, there were residual problems in Georgia that were not necessarily being addressed by EU or US engagement. Mitchell writes that ‘since the [Rose] revolution, the United States has continued to hail democratization there as a success even as concerns have begun to be raised by some observers regarding the pace and direction of this effort’ (Mitchell 2006: 670). The implication is that the US is more interested in supporting a pro-US government in the post-Soviet world than in democracy promotion per se (Mitchell 2006).

Concerns about Georgia’s progress largely centre on the level of commitment of the current administration for wide-scale reform. Commentators, for example, have highlighted the discrepancy between the rhetoric of the Georgian government in dialogue with the EU and statements made at the national level. This raises doubts as to whether norm adoption is sincere, or simply a way of maintaining EU and US funding and international support for territorial integrity. The violent government response to protests in Tbilisi in November 2007 and the subsequent closure of the independent TV and radio station, Imedi, indicate that EU norms pertaining to democracy and media freedom are not being upheld. Condemnation from the EU and the US followed, and the International Crisis Group (ICG) warned that Georgia was ‘sliding towards authoritarianism’ (ICG 2007a). EU pressure and mediation by the Special Representative, Peter Semneby, was instrumental in reinstating the Imedi stations. Saakashvili has since been re-elected as president, and his ruling party claimed victory in the May 2008 parliamentary elections. However, while the elections were deemed largely free and fair by election monitors, opposition leaders and human rights monitors claim that success was partly the result of intimidation and malpractices (ICG 2008: 11). There is also evidence that the Georgian authorities and media are undermining international confidence-building initiatives in Abkhazia. There is a lack of commitment to reconciliation, illustrated by campaigns of misinformation about Abkhaz attacks on Georgian residents that have returned to the Gali region. These returnees are also reportedly castigated for being pro-Abkhaz and intimidated into not voting in Abkhaz elections (ICG 2008: 22). Therefore while Georgia can be cited as a relatively positive example of EU normative impact, recent events demonstrate that there is still much work to be done.

The EU’s normative impact in Armenia and Azerbaijan is less evident. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law lag well behind Georgia in these two states, despite being just as prominent as objectives in the ENP
action plans. There have been no ESDP rule of law or security sector reform missions in Armenia and Azerbaijan as in Georgia, partly because the two countries have not encouraged EU involvement. Armenia values Russia as a partner over the EU, and receives significant funds from its diaspora community, mainly in the US. The Nagorno Karabakh conflict has hampered economic development with the closure of Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. The EU provided assistance under the TACIS programme for institutional, legal and administrative reform, as well as democratic reform under EIDHR initiatives. The ENP funding instrument and other initiatives continue this work. However, Armenia’s ‘democracy score’, as calculated by Freedom House, has worsened since 1999, the year in which the country signed a PCA with the EU (Walker 2008: 71). Like the other South Caucasus states, the concentration of power in the presidency impedes democracy and the close ties between the business and political communities lead to widespread corruption (Walker 2008: 72). According to one analyst, Armenia’s last free and fair election was held in 1991 (Ishkanian 2008). The latest presidential election of February 2008, installing former President Robert Kocharian’s close ally Serzh Sarkisian, was followed by demonstrations by the opposition and the death of eight people at the hands of the security forces. Human rights abuses perpetrated by the police and security forces, and unlawful detention, have increased in the climate of political unrest since the February election (Human Rights Watch 2008a).

Azerbaijan has benefited from EU assistance since gaining independence, but the impact of EU constitutional norms is barely visible. Despite (and in some ways, because of) the country’s oil wealth, Azerbaijan’s electoral system is not free and fair, and there is widespread corruption and human rights abuses (Rasizade 2003; Nazli 2008). In the run-up to the preparation of ENP Progress Reports in early 2008, Human Rights Watch submitted evidence to the European Commission detailing Azerbaijan’s continued shortcomings in media freedom and the use of torture (HRW 2008b).

The country has been classed in a Freedom House report as ‘petro-authoritarian’ alongside its oil-wealthy neighbours, Kazakhstan and Russia (Walker and Goerhing 2008). The authors of the report point out that the EU and other actors ‘have yet to agree on a common strategy that advances both energy-security needs and basic democratic values’ in these three states, which are moving further away from the rest of Europe in terms of democratic credentials (Walker and Goerhing 2008: 25). In the case of Azerbaijan at least, EU interests seem to trump EU norms – the European Commission signed an Energy Partnership Agreement with Azerbaijan in November 2006 in order to increase EU energy security (RFE/RL 2006).

This summary of the South Caucasus countries concurs with wider developments in the ENP area. Since 1999, political systems in many ENP countries have not become more democratic, and neither have human rights been improved (Kelley 2006: 42). However, the EU’s impact has to
be considered alongside a number of international actors in the region. It is difficult to disentangle the EU’s impact from that of the UN, the OSCE or the US, and even more difficult to factor in the impact of other external actors and domestic developments. The EU is also careful to point out that the ENP action plans are bi-lateral agreements, and that the achievement of the objectives relies on the commitment of the partner governments. It is a truism that the consolidation of democracy relies more on domestic socio-political drivers than in the intervention and actions of external actors. Nevertheless, the EU’s impact has certainly been an important factor in Georgia’s transition, despite recent setbacks. Resources and assistance have been allocated to Georgia exponentially since 2003. But who exactly is the ‘normative power’ in Georgia? In terms of resources, the US has made a significant contribution, as outlined above. Georgia’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aspirations, endorsed in principle at the April 2008 NATO Summit, are arguably more important than the distant prospect of EU membership. In order to gain this concession, the support of the US administration far outweighed the backing of the EU. However, Georgia’s NATO ambitions are likely to have been thwarted for some time by the renewal of conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008. While Saakashvili attempted to portray the conflict as another example of Russian aggression, an EU-commissioned report concluded that Georgian troops fired the first shot (Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 2009).

Conflict resolution

EU competences and initiatives

The EU could be said to have a normative impact in the South Caucasus in its promotion of conflict resolution in the region. Again, the EU endorses this tenet because of the history of the organization, particularly the enduring peace built by member states through cooperation in the aftermath of the Second World War. The peaceful settlement of disputes is a well-established tenet of international law that the EU broadly supports in its foreign policy objectives, alongside conflict prevention, and one in which it failed significantly in Former Yugoslavia. Conflict resolution appears as an EU objective in ENP policy documents in particular. In 2006, the European Commission admitted that ‘the ENP has achieved little in supporting the resolution of frozen or open conflicts in the region’ (European Commission 2006a: 4) and called for a more active EU role. The South Caucasus, as already mentioned, suffer from three unresolved conflicts that have a deleterious impact on political and economic stability. The EU recognizes that their resolution is important in building sustainable peace in wider Europe. However, this awareness bore little fruit in terms of proactive initiatives until the actual renewal of full-scale violence in South Ossetia in the summer of 2008.
One important step was the appointment of Finnish diplomat Heikke Talvitie as European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus in July 2003. Talvitie was tasked with developing contacts with local actors, encouraging regional cooperation and assisting in conflict resolution. He was replaced by Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby in February 2006, with an expanded mandate: to contribute to regional conflict resolution rather than simply supporting the work of the UN and the OSCE. Semneby is arguably the greatest asset the EU has in regional conflict resolution. Nevertheless, he is based in Brussels rather than in the region and relies on political advisers (appointed in 2007) based in Baku and Yerevan, and EU staff based at the delegation in Tbilisi, to provide regional information. The EUSR’s frequent meetings with the leaders of the South Caucasus states means that high-level diplomacy is a common feature of EU–South Caucasus relations, although before the South Ossetian conflict in 2008 it was not clear how much this involved discussion on the resolution of the frozen conflicts. Some commentators have argued for a more comprehensive EU approach. Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish President and UN special envoy to Kosovo, suggested that the EU create a mediation unit to pull together and expand its expertise in this area (Ahtisaari 2007). European Commission documentation indicates that EU personnel recognize the need for a more active and better defined EU role in conflict resolution (see European Commission 2007b).

The European Commission also champions the role of the EU in indirect conflict resolution measures like confidence-building. The EU can contribute by ‘working around the conflict issues, promoting similar reforms on both sides of the boundary lines, to foster convergence between political, economic and legal systems, enabling greater social inclusion and contributing to confidence building’ (European Commission 2007b). Confidence-building is one of the stated objectives of the Black Sea cooperation initiative. The European Commission’s Black Sea Synergy initiative of April 2007 was instigated by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania and the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. It advocates a coordinated regional EU approach to the Black Sea region (defined as Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and the South Caucasus countries). Intended as an initiative complementary to existing EU policies, the idea is to ‘focus political attention at the regional level and invigorate ongoing cooperation processes’ (European Commission 2007c: 3). The South Caucasus conflicts are listed as one of the main areas of cooperation, with particular attention being paid to ‘promoting confidence-building measures in the regions affected, including cooperation programmes specifically designed to bring the otherwise divided parties together’ (European Commission 2007c: 4). The initiative is not intended to make a direct contribution to conflict resolution, but, the Commission argues, ‘over time, could help remove some of the obstacles that stand in the way [of peace]’ (European Commission 2007c: 1).
The human dimension of the ENP promotes people-to-people contacts, cross-border cooperation and student exchanges under the Erasmus Mundus scholarship programme. These measures can be cited as contributing to conflict resolution, but their impact is dispersed and difficult to measure. The EU is reluctant to tout itself as an actor in mediation, preferring a softer approach. Yet this gives the impression that the EU’s enthusiasm for confidence-building is an easy substitute for more robust action. As regional expert Nodia writes, ‘the EU supports politically uncontroversial confidence-building measures that can reap results only in the long term, if ever’ (Nodia 2008a). The EU has been reluctant to become more actively involved in conflict resolution partly because of the established roles of other organizational actors in the region. Moreover, the role of the Russian Federation and the protracted nature of the conflicts have, at least until the 2008 South Ossetian conflict, worked against further EU engagement. According to the ICG, conflict resolution has ‘fallen by the wayside’, and while it is a priority in ENP rhetoric, it plays a lesser role in the ENP action plans than might be expected (ICG 2006: 8). We now move on to examining EU impact in the individual conflicts.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia

Violence erupted in Georgia from 1989 onwards, with conflict first in the autonomous region of South Ossetia, then in the violent overthrow of President Gamsakhurdia, and finally the war over the autonomous republic of Abkhazia (Zücher 2005). South Ossetia and Abkhazian forces, with Russian assistance, defeated Georgian forces and established de facto states that have survived outside central government control since ceasefires were agreed in 1992 and 1993, respectively. Abkhazia has had a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force since 1993, consisting of Russian personnel. The UN sent a mission, the Unites Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), to monitor the peacekeepers in 1993, and in 1996 set up a human rights office, jointly staffed with the OSCE. From 2003, UNOMIG has been bolstered by a police component, primarily to assist in the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees (UN 2008). Some progress has been made, notably the return of 45,000 IDPs to the Gali region, but diplomacy has been stalled since 2006, when Georgia launched a Special Forces operation in the Kodori valley region (ICG 2007b). The UN Group of Friends of the Secretary General (Germany, France, the UK, Russian Federation and US) provides a forum for negotiations between the two sides, and supports the efforts of the UN Special Representative to Georgia. A peace plan put forward by the German foreign minister as part of this framework was rejected by the Abkhazian authorities, with the support of Russia, in July 2008.

Russia also played a key role in the Joint Control Commission (JCC), established with OSCE support in 1992 as the negotiating mechanism in the South Ossetian conflict, and contributes a battalion (alongside Georgia
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and South Ossetia) to the Joint Peacekeeping Force. The negotiation process had effectively collapsed in recent years, with the Georgian side insisting on a change of format (South Ossetia–North Ossetia–Russia–Georgia), while the Ossetian authorities opposed this vehemently. The situation in South Ossetia was further complicated by the emergence in 2006 of a competing leader of the de facto regime. Dmitri Sanakoev had support in the Georgian-administered conflict zone, and was appointed by the central Georgian government as head of a temporary administration unit for South Ossetia (ICG 2007b). The situation was turned upside down in August 2008 when fighting broke out between Georgian and South Ossetian forces in Tskhinvali. This was swiftly followed by Russian intervention in support of South Ossetia, leading to civilian casualties and displacements perpetrated by both sides. The conflict spread to Abkhazia, where Russian troops entered Georgian territory by land and sea while Abkhaz forces expelled Georgians from the Kodori valley region. The renewal in conflict has effectively turned South Ossetia and Abkhazia into fully fledged Russian protectorates, and prospects for the resolution of the disputes are worse than ever.

The Georgian ENP action plan cites the resolution of the internal conflicts as a key priority for EU–Georgian engagement. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have benefited from EU reconstruction aid, and the EU has also funded programmes undertaken by the OSCE and the UN. The EU has no official dialogue with the de facto leaders because of Georgian objections, and the de facto territories do not welcome the EU’s interpretation of the conflicts as internal to Georgia. The issue of Kosovo independence has accelerated pleas to be recognized as independent entities, but EU officials maintain that there are no parallels between the cases. Russia, on the other hand, has cited the Kosovo example as a reason to extend its relations with the de facto territories, and indeed recognized them as independent states several weeks after the August 2008 conflict.

The EU has been more involved in the Georgian conflicts than in Nagorno Karabakh, and, as a result of the 2008 conflict, is now more actively involved in the conflict resolution process. The French presidency swiftly negotiated a ceasefire between Russian and Georgian forces on 11 August 2008, the EU sent a 200-strong civilian monitoring team, and the EU co-chaired the Geneva peace talks which dealt with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU also appointed a further Special Representative to deal directly with the 2008 conflict. Previously, the European Commission only played a minor role as an observer in the economic meetings of the South Ossetian negotiation body, JCC, and was not involved in the UN-led negotiations in Abkhazia (although three member states are involved in the UN Secretary Generals’ Group of Friends of Georgia – Germany, the UK and France).

Previous to the latest conflict, the EUSR placed much emphasis on confidence-building measures, but there was little evidence of success in this area. In fact, EU actors can be accused of inconsistency in their approach
to the Georgian conflicts. In June 2007, the European Parliament hosted Dmitri Sanakoev, the Georgian-appointed leader of the Georgian-populated zone of South Ossetia, as a speaker at the ninth Session of the EU-Georgian Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. As explained above, Sanakoev was appointed by Georgian President Saakashvili, but is no more recognized as an official leader of the regime than the South Ossetian de facto leaders (Coppieters 2007). Given the isolation of the South Ossetian regime, and their perception of the EU as an unconditional advocate of the Georgian administration, this invite lacked judgement, and undermined EU rhetoric on confidence-building. The tendency for the EU to emphasize its support for the central Georgian government vis-à-vis the conflicts has other consequences too. As Coppieters has argued, the EU’s limited influence in the de facto states may be conditioned by Georgian fears of legitimization of the breakaway regimes, but this simply gives the Russian Federation a ‘free hand’ in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Coppieters 2007: 17). The EU’s normative impact in the de facto regimes is paltry under these circumstances, especially since there is also a lack of information about the EU available to Abkhazian and South Ossetian citizens. The de facto regimes are even more cut off from EU influence since the 2008 conflict, and their reliance on Russia for survival has dramatically increased.

The build-up of Georgian military power should have indicated that EU normative rhetoric on the peaceful settlement of disputes was not being adhered to (Fuller and Giragosian 2007). Georgia may have been modernizing its armed forces to comply with NATO standards, but the government’s decision to maintain defence spending should have led to alarm bells ringing in Brussels. Instead, the EU failed to use its influence to prevent the conflict. Commentators frequently cited Georgian security fears in the wake of Russian aggression as the reason why the country was jeopardizing its much sought-after NATO membership quest (Fuller and Giragosian 2007). From Russia’s perspective, Georgia’s NATO aspirations were provocative, and the lack of clarity in NATO–Georgia relations regarding NATO’s potential role in Georgia’s conflicts served to vindicate Russia’s position (Coppieters 2007: 14). The EU’s impact as a normative power was undermined as a result of this destabilizing situation that EU member states perpetuated through NATO. The endorsement of Georgia’s NATO aspirations at the April 2008 NATO Summit arguably increased tensions and contributed to the outbreak of war four months later.

**Nagorno Karabakh**

The autonomous oblast of Nagorno (or Nagorny) Karabakh was a majority Armenian populated region situated within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. The rise of Armenian nationalism as a result of perestroika led to calls in 1988 for the oblast to be incorporated into Armenia. The dispute escalated, leading to localized violence and the expulsion of Azeris
from Karabakh, and Armenians from Azerbaijan. The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a full-blown war over the region between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Armenian Karabakh, now calling for independence, held the territory, and Armenian forces occupied the surrounding region, as well as a corridor of land linking Karabakh to Armenia proper (the Lachin corridor) (see Cornell 1999). A ceasefire was agreed in 1994, and the OSCE has been the principal mediator through the Minsk Group (composed of representatives from the US, Russia and France) since then. As in the conflicts in Georgia, no progress has been made on a settlement, and the Karabakh Armenians' call for independence continues to fall on deaf international ears. In 2004, the Minsk Group inaugurated a new phase in the Nagorno Karabakh peace negotiations: the Prague process. The process takes a long-term approach, and seeks incremental agreement from the parties over a number of issues, leaving the issue of status to a later date. Unfortunately the President of Azerbaijan (Ilham Aliyev) and (former) President of Armenia (Robert Kocharian) failed to agree on, and sign, a document outlining basic agreed principles at the OSCE Summit in December 2007.

The EU has not been successful in promoting the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in its neighbourhood policies. This can be partly explained by the fact that neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan welcomes EU involvement. Additionally, the EU is careful not to jeopardize the OSCE Minsk Process, which is fragile enough. Nevertheless, the ostrich approach that the EU has adopted towards the conflict is not helpful. Karabakh remains a grey area under the ENP: officially part of Azerbaijan, the territory is not Azeri-administered, and neither is it officially part of Armenia. According to a recent Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) report, Azerbaijan does not want Karabakh to benefit from ENP programmes (Emerson et al. 2007: 25). The EU has done nothing and has no presence in Karabakh or the surrounding Armenian-occupied territories, and has not carried out any needs assessment or fact finding. In the event of any progress towards a political settlement the EU therefore has no information, or any idea, about what it can do to help rehabilitate the territory (ICG 2006). The lack of EU presence and visibility in Nagorno Karabakh reinforces the de facto states’ reliance on their true benefactors, Armenia and Russia (Popescu 2007).

The Union did not push Armenia and Azerbaijan for progress in the Karabakh conflict during ENP action plan negotiations, and while the issue features prominently in the Azerbaijan plan, it is not a priority in the Armenian plan. There are other major inconsistencies in the EU’s approach to the conflicts: for example, the Azerbaijan plan cites the territorial integrity of the state, while the Armenian plan cites the right to self-determination. Admittedly, this inconsistency has much to do with the bi-lateral nature of the agreements: both states insisted on the inclusion of these words to bolster their opposing positions vis-à-vis the Karabakh conflict, and neither state is willing to make concessions. Yet alongside repeated EU support
for the territorial integrity of Georgia, this does not look coherent: the EU refuses to even concede that Armenia occupies Azeri territory. During a German presidency visit to the region in 2007 the German foreign minister called for the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict when visiting Armenia, but not when in Azerbaijan (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008). The fact that neither side is willing to make concessions points to a major problem for the EU: there are few incentives for the conflicting parties to listen to EU rhetoric about resolving the dispute. This evidence suggests that the EU has very little normative influence when it comes to the peaceful settlement of this dispute. Both sides in the conflict have continued to build up arms, and there is a real possibility of the renewal of military hostilities. A disproportionate amount of Armenia’s resources are allocated to the military as a result of the unresolved conflict and the increased belligerence of the conflicting parties (Walker 2008). There has been speculation that Azerbaijan, increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress over Karabakh, is building up its military strength on its oil wealth, and is planning to retake the territory by force (Ismayilov 2007).

The EU has had minimal normative impact in the South Caucasus in the area of conflict resolution, even in Georgia, where it has the most influence. This was clearly demonstrated in August 2008, when the Georgian leadership launched an ill-advised attack on South Ossetia after many promises to the EU that it would not attempt to retake the territory by force. Clearly, the EU cannot claim to be a normative leader in the peaceful settlement of disputes: internal inconsistencies regarding secessionist conflicts are as obvious as external inconsistencies (look, for example, to the Northern Ireland conflict or the Basque separatist conflict). While the EU acts normatively by employing the language of sustainable peace in documents and declarations, there is less evidence to demonstrate the EU’s normative impact. There are clear grounds to question ‘the genuine extension of the democratic peace doctrine to conflict areas outside the EU’s demarcated borders’ (Pace 2007a: 1059).

**Competing with the Russian worldview**

The EU has a further obstacle to its promotion of constitutional and conflict resolution norms in the South Caucasus: the presence of a powerful neighbouring state with fundamentally different notions about democracy and regional order. EU norms compete directly with Russian norms in the South Caucasus, particularly in the de facto states, but also in Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Russian Federation has been a firm supporter of the de facto states since the hostilities began in the 1990s: firstly, by providing covert military support for the regimes in their efforts to break away from Georgian and Azeri rule, and then with (according to the Georgian government) biased peacekeeping troops and in the provision of political and
economic assistance, including the provision of Russian passports and pensions to Abkhaz and Ossetian citizens. Ironically, because of an EU-Russia visa agreement, this makes it easier for citizens of these unrecognized states to travel to Europe than citizens of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008). Abkhazia also benefits greatly from Russian tourism and investment on its Black Sea coast. Russian influence in Georgia’s de facto states has been consolidated by the 2008 conflict: the regimes are now protected militarily by Russia and the chances of their re-incorporation into Georgia proper are slim. Russian actions have led to the suspension of both the OSCE and the UN missions in Georgia, further limiting the influence of the international community in the regimes. Nagorno Karabakh relies more on Armenia than Russia, although Armenia retains close ties with Russia. Armenia provides up to 80 per cent of Nagorno Karabakh’s state budget through an annual ‘loan’ (Lynch 2004: 82), and the enclave effectively survives as a region of Armenia.

The EU’s lack of presence and visibility in the de facto states tends to perpetuate this state of affairs. Citizens of the regimes have little notion of the EU as a relevant actor: the history of the region as a battleground for the interests of larger neighbouring powers can hardly lead to an appreciation of a complex supranational organization based in Brussels. They have good reason to be pragmatic, given that the EU’s reluctance to act in the South Caucasus can partly be attributed to disagreements about how to conduct foreign policy close to Russian borders. EU hesitation led to the discontinuation of the border monitoring mission on the Georgian–Chechen border, as already mentioned. This had serious implications for Georgian security, meaning there was no mechanism for the collection of impartial information about illegal activities and incidents on this dangerous border. The EU is now the only international organization on the ground in Georgia. It has so far failed to gain access to the de facto territories: they are in the full control of local leaders, their borders protected by the Russian military.

Russia’s approach to both domestic and foreign policy is increasingly distinct from the EU’s approach. According to MacFarlane, ‘Russia’s view of order and justice…remains statist, traditional, and conservative’ and its approach to neighbouring states is ‘hierarchical, hegemonic, and interventionist’ (MacFarlane 2003: 206). According to Freedom House, Russia is increasingly presenting its system of ‘sovereign democracy’ as ‘an alternative model for political development’ (Walker and Goerhing 2008: 26).

This claim is echoed by Leonard and Popescu, who argue that ‘Russia seems to be setting itself up as an ideological alternative to the EU, with a different approach to sovereignty, power and world order’ (Leonard and Popescu 2008). It seems unlikely Russia’s new President, Dmitry Medvedev, will divert substantially from former President Putin’s foreign and domestic policy course.
The EU’s challenge is to present itself as a more attractive political location for the South Caucasus states than in Russia’s zone of influence. The issue for Georgia is the reliance of the de facto states on Russia’s protection and support, which lies at the heart of Georgia–Russia antagonisms. Georgia clearly sees its future as within the EU, and despite setbacks in its democratic development, is not likely to follow Russia’s authoritarian lead. The same cannot be said for Armenia and Azerbaijan: Armenia values its alliance with Russia over its relationship with the EU, and Azerbaijan, while no great ally of Russia, is following a similar undemocratic path. Unfortunately for the EU, and as one Russian commentator writes, ‘Russia has legitimate reasons to suspect that the west’s policy of democracy promotion is more interested in promoting western foreign policy objectives than in strengthening democratic institutions’ (Krastev 2008). This perception is compounded by the EU’s energy policy which can be perceived to be prioritized over democracy and human rights issues, particularly in Azerbaijan.

Conclusions

The EU acts normatively in its relations with the South Caucasus countries, but has a limited normative impact with regard to constitutional norms and norms pertaining to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Georgia has been most receptive to EU constitutional norms. However, Georgia has been less receptive to EU norms relating to conflict resolution: partly as a result of inconsistencies in the EU’s approach, and partly because it perceives its internal conflicts as directly linked to national security. The EU’s normative impact is less evident in Armenia and Azerbaijan, where democratic and human rights standards fail to live up to European standards. Furthermore, the EU has failed to have a normative impact on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and there are few incentives for the conflicting parties to listen to EU rhetoric about the peaceful settlement of the dispute. In fact, evidence points to an increase in belligerence, not a move towards reconciliation.

The absence of the enlargement perspective for the South Caucasus limits the EU’s normative influence. This finding concurs with Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008: 187), who argue that without the offer of membership ‘EU incentives such as partnership and cooperation do not reliably promote democratic change’. The lack of a clear and constructive policy towards Russia is also impacting negatively on the EU’s objectives in the South Caucasus. Indecision and division among the EU member states will not persuade the de facto states to turn away from Russia and towards the EU.

Classifying the EU as a ‘normative power’ in the South Caucasus helps to frame EU intentions in the region, but the label does not adequately explain the complexities of the EU’s role. In some ways, the EU’s policy is
over-ambitious, just as our expectations that the EU will ‘do good’ are sometimes unrealistic. The South Caucasus is a cluster of states embarking on a long-term process of transition. The EU’s role could be crucial in helping this process along, but there are no quick fixes. The problems that the EU faces in promoting stability in the South Caucasus are faced by all the international actors working in the region, and the failure to embed constitutional norms and promote conflict resolution in a comparatively short period of time cannot be attributed solely to the EU. The difficulties also reflect problems inherent to the peace-building process: can democracy be promoted successfully by external actors, or rather is it ‘a historical phenomenon, not the result of philosophical or constitutional logic’? (Bracher 1972: 312).

Moreover, we arguably do not know the best way to promote constitutional norms, and international actors, whether states or organizations, have interests that cannot easily be distinguished from the norms they propound. In fact, interests and norms collide in the new neighbourhood, as they do elsewhere. The politics of energy security sit uncomfortably alongside EU democracy promotion and human rights tenets in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, EU internal and external inconsistencies present a confused picture of EU normative intentions that open the Union up to accusations of double standards and ulterior motives. One way that member states could address this anomaly would be to ‘view the choices that they make internally as having a direct effect on their external standing’ (Nicolaidis and Lacroix 2003: 153). A more reflective consideration of the nature of EU power in the neighbourhood would also be a step forward. According to Zielonka, EU power should be based on external empowerment, not coercion. Then, perhaps, ‘the empire by example [can] have a practical rather than merely rhetorical significance’ (Zielonka 2008: 484).

Notes

1. Until the August 2008 conflict, Georgia administered majority-populated Georgian villages in South Ossetia, while the de facto regime controlled majority Ossetian-populated villages. Saakashvili cited the emergence of Sanakoev, which he promoted, as a new hope in the peace process. The Tskhinvali regime saw him as Tbilisi’s pawn, planted to provoke civil war.
2. The Committee was set up as part of the EU-Georgia Political and Cooperation Agreement.
3. ‘Nagorno/y’ is the Russian word for ‘mountainous’.
Power Discourses and Power Practices: The EU’s Role as a Normative Power in Bosnia

Ana E. Juncos

Introduction

If there is one geographical region where the European Union (EU) has been said to have deployed its normative power, the Western Balkans is it. This chapter seeks to unpack the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) and examine its validity in explaining EU activities in the Western Balkans in general, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) in particular. Here the EU has tried to promote the Copenhagen criteria, and above all, the respect of minority rights, rule of law and compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Together with its traditional economic and diplomatic instruments (including the membership carrot), the EU has deployed police and military missions in the region aiming to promote stability, democracy and human rights.

A closer look at the EU’s intervention in Bosnia allows us to make a more nuanced evaluation of NPE. First, and despite recent concerns in the literature about the development of EU military capabilities, the empirical evidence shows that the main threat to the deployment of normative power in Bosnia does not come from the militarization of the EU, but from other ‘softer’ power practices. Military instruments (EUFOR Althea) have been used as a last resort, in accordance with international law, and enjoy broader local and international legitimacy. In other words, the construction of the EU as a normative power has not suffered – and, one could argue, has even benefited – from the deployment of a military force in the country. In contrast, one can single out other power practices that have undermined the normative power of the EU in Bosnia. Apart from consistency problems that affect EU external action more generally (‘double standards’ and consistency among EU actors and policies), the EU’s failure to promote local ownership of the reform process, practices of ‘othering’ and securitization, and techniques of ‘governmentality’ cast a doubt on the normative nature of
the EU’s role in the country. Because of these practices, the EU is less of a benign power in Bosnia than the literature would usually suggest. This account also shows the importance of routines and day-to-day practices in the constitution of power. All in all, the chapter intends to move beyond traditional discussions about ends and means to include processes and practices. The added value of this contribution thus lies in the detailed analysis of normative power ‘in practice’, at the micro level, something that is often missing in the existing literature.

The chapter proceeds as follows. It begins with a discussion of the concept of normative power and argues that any comprehensive examination of NPE requires attention to identities, practices and discourses and their mutual interactions. After a brief introduction to the role of the EU in the Western Balkans, it then moves to the analysis of EU activities in Bosnia. The chapter examines (1) the norms that the EU promotes, (2) the instruments used and (3) the EU’s praxis (i.e. practices of othering, securitization, disciplining techniques and issues of local ownership). In sum, this work scrutinizes the EU’s role in Bosnia and in this way intends to contribute to the debate about how the EU exercises power in international relations.

The concept of NPE

Traditional conceptualizations of the EU as a civilian power, those that focused on its instruments (economic versus military), failed to capture the most important feature of a civilian power: the promotion of democratic values at the international level, that is, its ends. With the concept of normative power, Manners sought to abandon traditional views of the EU as a state-like entity (civilian/military power).1 It was also ‘an attempt to re-focus analysis away from the empirical emphasis on the EU’s institutions or policies, and towards including cognitive processes’ (Manners 2002: 239). He argued that the EU could be better characterized as an ideational power diffusing its model abroad. This normative power might be seen as the ability of the EU to shape the conception of ‘normal’ in world politics. More importantly, the EU’s normative power would derive from what the EU is – a post-Westphalian entity based on a set of democratic values – and not necessarily from what the EU does. In a well-known quote from his original work, Manners (2002: 252) argued that

The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial, but usually overlooked observation, that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is.
The concept of normative power has sparked a lot of debate. Some authors have pointed to the problem of the increasing militarization of the EU as potential danger to NPE; other works have focused on aspects of legitimacy; and others on the inconsistencies between the rhetoric and the practice of NPE. While I share some of these concerns, the chapter sheds light on what at first sight might seem a less obvious danger to the normative role of the EU, that is, the unreflexive use of (any) power, including ideational power and other less visible ‘soft’ practices of power.

From the point of view of this chapter, what the EU is matters, but so does what the EU says and does. Following Diez’ conceptualization of normative power, the discursive dimension of normative power appears very important, especially insofar as it facilitates the construction of a particular EU identity, and more importantly that it allows for the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘others’ (Diez 2005). Diez has highlighted the problems that result from constructing the EU as a normative power, in particular, the negative impact resulting from ‘othering’ and the lack of self-reflexivity associated with this practice. This chapter will analyse the discursive impact of othering practices in the case of Bosnia.

Moreover, what the EU does has an impact not only on the EU’s self-construction, but also on how the EU is perceived by others. Evaluating the external impact of the EU and its day-to-day practices also allows for a better understanding of the negative aspects of normative diffusion. As put by Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2006: 16), the international diffusion of norms is ‘a two-sided process, involving both emancipation from domination and unfreedom and new forms of subjection’. As we will see, EU projects and programmes in Bosnia not only involve the promotion of universal norms such as democracy, human rights and rule of law, but at the same time these ‘projects of improvement’ also carry practices of domination and exclusion. Through these projects, the EU seeks to discipline and normalize the conduct of Bosnians.

An analysis of what the EU actually does is necessary in order to unveil the day-to-day practices and technologies that support the normative and ideological power of the EU. In other words, we need to account for three elements (identity, discourses and practices) and their mutual interactions when evaluating NPE. Before moving to the analysis of the case of Bosnia, I proceed to briefly summarize the overall engagement of the EU in the Western Balkans to show the evolution of its external action from a purely civilian power to one resorting to military instruments when necessary.

The rise of a normative power in the Balkans?

EU engagement in the Western Balkans began in the mid-1990s as a direct response to the war in Bosnia. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the EU assumed responsibility for helping post-conflict
reconstruction in the region. Through various initiatives (the Royaumont Process, the Regional Approach), the EU established political and economic conditionality in the Balkan region for the first time. In other words, economic assistance was provided on condition that the recipients respect, inter alia, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. These norms are also enshrined in the Copenhagen criteria and in the _acquis communautaire_ that the Western Balkan countries have to adopt as a precondition for membership. In addition to the political, economic and institutional criteria established at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the Stabilisation and Association Process, which constitutes the main EU policy towards the region since 1999, added further specific criteria: full cooperation with the ICTY, respect for human and minority rights, the creation of real opportunities for refugees and internally displaced persons to return, and a visible commitment to regional cooperation (European Commission 2003a: 5).

During the 1990s, the main instruments for the promotion of these norms were economic in nature (economic, humanitarian and technical assistance), meaning that the EU remained a civilian power in the classic sense of the concept during this period. However, the crisis in Kosovo served as a reminder of the limitations of the EU’s power in its own neighbourhood, and also prompted changes in the EU’s self-image as a civilian power. Not only had the EU to rethink its strategy towards the region and offer the perspective of membership, but the Union also realized that they could not continue to ‘wait and see’ if the Americans would once again come and save the day in its neighbourhood. According to Solana (2000a), ‘[t]he Balkans has shown that the European Union can no longer remain a force for peace simply through example. It has also to be forthright in defending the basic values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law on which it is founded.’ This critical juncture was a crucial factor behind the Franco-British agreement at St Malo and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy – renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. From then on, EU policy-makers would admit the need to develop military capabilities as an additional instrument in the EU’s toolbox or risk ridicule and impotence.

For many member states, the EU is as a power committed to norms, including the rule of law and respect for human rights, democracy and multilateralism, still privileging civilian means, but ready to use military instruments to promote those norms when necessary (Solana 2000b). Military developments within the EU would not challenge the building of a ‘civilising’ power, since these are seen to be in the service of its foreign policy objectives: ‘restoring good government’, ‘fostering democracy’, ‘establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights’ and developing ‘a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and rule-based international order’ (European Council 2003: 6, 10, 9). What is more, given the reality of armed conflict in the post-Cold War world, the development of the CSDP appears to be a necessary requirement.
The international role of the EU is thus no longer perceived as one of a pure civilian power; yet, for many policy-makers the objective is not to build a military power either. Instead the EU is perceived, and many EU policy-makers take pride in this, as a civ-mil power. The EU is commonly seen to be in a unique position to make a significant contribution to complex crisis management due to the broad range of civilian and military instruments at its disposal (European Council 2003: 11). The deployment of both civilian and military instruments in Bosnia constitutes an example of this civ-mil power in action.

From the above account, normative power can be mapped out in the discourse and the instruments the EU has deployed in the region, but this evidence alone is not enough to support the claim that the EU is a normative power in the region. For this, we need to look in more detail at other facets of this power: the norms that the EU is promoting, the instruments used and the power practices exhibited by the EU. Another important question relates to the impact of this kind of power. To paraphrase Sjursen (2006a: 236), how do we know that acting as a normative power is ‘a good thing’? The analysis of the EU’s activities in Bosnia should help clarify this question.

Power at work: the EU’s engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina

If the Balkans have been important in the imaginary of the EU and in the process of identity construction of NPE, Bosnia can be considered the epicentre of this process. It was there that the EU (then the European Community) experienced one of its most bitter failures, especially given the great expectations created by the negotiations going on at the time on a new Common Foreign and Security Policy and the infamous words of Jacques Poos announcing that the ‘hour of Europe’ had arrived. The involvement of the EU in Bosnia has been very intense since the beginning of the 1990s. The European Community Monitoring Mission was first launched in July 1991 to observe the ceasefire in Slovenia and then deployed to other countries in the region, including Bosnia, to monitor human rights and other security-related issues. For its part, the Commission had maintained various activities in the country since the beginning of the war in 1992 with the provision of humanitarian aid and later technical assistance to the country in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process. In 2003, the EU decided to launch its first ever police mission, along with an EU Special Representative in Bosnia. Finally, in 2004 the EU launched a military operation, EUFOR Althea, with the main task of maintaining a safe and secure environment and supporting the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Although EU policies in Bosnia still constitute a hybrid between enlargement and classical foreign policy, the enlargement element
is gradually becoming more important, increasing the overall leverage of the EU in the country.

Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995 that established the two entities – the Serbian majority Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – the security situation in the country has shown some signs of improvement. Even if it cannot be ruled out, the resumption of ethnic violence among the different entities’ armies does not seem likely to occur. With the defence reform adopted in 2005, the parties agreed to establish a single Bosnian army, an achievement that seemed impossible a decade ago. The record of democratic freedoms in the country has also shown a steady improvement (Figure 5.1). Moreover, Bosnia signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in June 2008, an agreement that brings the country a step closer to its goal of EU membership.

Notwithstanding these positive signs, there are still important challenges that the country has to face in its way to full EU membership. The slow progress of the negotiations over police restructuring in 2005–07 – which resulted in the postponement of the signing of an SAA – and the return of strong nationalist rhetoric to Bosnian politics have caused great concern in EU circles and have shown the limitations of NPE (Chandler 2007; Europa 2007; European Commission 2009).

According to the 2007 Commission Report, published amidst the political crisis over the police reform, the country’s ‘complex institutional arrangements, frequent attacks to the Dayton/Paris peace agreement and nationalist rhetoric have undermined the country’s reform agenda’ (European Commission 2007a: 4–5). The implementation of police reform, full

![Figure 5.1 Democratic freedoms in Bosnia (1992–2006)](image)

*Source: Freedom House (2006).*
cooperation with the ICTY, progress in the areas of public broadcasting and public administration reform were also identified as areas of concern (see European Commission 2007a: 5). In recent reports, the Commission has also put pressure on Bosnian political elites to comply with the Peace Implementation Council's requirements for the closure of the Office of the High Representative and to agree on a constitutional reform 'before the Commission can recommend the granting of candidate country status' (European Commission 2009: 29). Problems with the last enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria have also contributed to the toughening of conditionality towards the region. The member states will be carefully looking at issues of the rule of law, including the functioning of the judicial system and the fight against corruption and organized crime, before a green light can be given (see, for example, European Commission 2007d).

The case of the EU's intervention in Bosnia allows for an in-depth analysis of several issues linked to the concept of normative power, including the issue of how the EU 'actually' uses power and its external impact. The following sections thus look at the norms promoted, the instruments used, practices of 'othering' and techniques of governmentality deployed in Bosnia, as well as issues of ownership.

The norms promoted

At first sight, the Bosnian case would best exemplify the way normative power works in practice. EU activities there aim at promoting the Copenhagen criteria by offering membership as the prime incentive. As summarized by an EU official:

We have now a clear strategy that offers, on the one hand, the prospect of membership of the EU, and, on the other, the need to undertake the reforms that are necessary to join the EU. This is not just about technical reforms; there is also a commitment to the values that the EU embodies... Membership is the most successful, the most effective tool for entrenching democracy.4

From the viewpoint of the EU, the norms that the EU promotes are prima facie universal and aim to improve the conditions in the country by favouring the establishment of democratic institutions, rule of law and a free market. Obviously, one could argue that this is far from an altruistic enterprise, and security interests also motivate the EU, particularly if Bosnia should again become unstable and a source of violence (European Council 2004). Thus, one could argue that the term 'stabilization' that accompanies the main EU policy towards the region, the Stabilisation and Association Process, is testimony of the close links between security and norms. Both maintaining stability in the region and promoting EU norms seems to be
at the basis of the EU’s engagement in the region. As in other contexts, here too it is difficult to distinguish between norms and interests (Diez 2005: 625; Sjursen 2006a: 239).

Furthermore, as several authors have pointed out, the priorities that inspire the EU’s post-conflict intervention in Bosnia coincide with the priorities of global capitalism. They are modelled on the so-called ‘Liberal Peace’ or ‘New York orthodoxy’ (Paris 2004; Pugh 2004) which ‘gives priority to the rule of law rather than social justice, to quick-fix elections rather than political accountability, to neoliberal economics rather than state direction (dirigisme) to increase purchasing power, and to widening external influences rather than strengthening autonomy in the undeveloped world’ (Pugh and Cooper 2004: 6). With its intervention in Bosnia, the EU helps maintain global stability and ‘civilizes’ other parts of the world according to the needs of neoliberal governance. By not questioning the principles that it promotes through its external action, and by not taking into account indigenous values in the reorganization of post-conflict societies (see below), the EU takes part in the reproduction of this hegemonic discourse.

It is difficult, however, to gauge the power of EU norms alone, as they are closely linked to the incentive of membership and EU economic assistance. Bosnia has made progress in terms of democratization and human rights (see Figure 5.1), but it is not clear to what extent Bosnian elites have internalized EU norms as socialization channels are limited to sporadic meetings between EU and Bosnian policy-makers. It is true, however, that the EU’s model has attracted Bosnian policy-makers not only because of the levels of prosperity that it enjoys, but also for what it symbolizes in terms of reconciliation. According to a Bosnian official, ‘reconciliation in Bosnia follows the same logic as French-German reconciliation, which lies at the inception of the EU. Integration into the EU would be the only way to solve the security problem [in Bosnia], providing internal and external security to the country.’ Nonetheless, it can be argued that the power of the EU in the Balkans has not relied on persuasion (and the power of norms), but mainly on coercion, both ideological and physical: ideological, because for Bosnia, as for other Balkan countries, EU integration is ‘the only viable option’, there is no alternative; and physical coercion, in the form of economic conditionality and crisis management instruments, including a military operation. In sum, coercion has been as important in the transmission of EU norms, if not more so, than the power of norms alone.

The power of norms has also been weakened by inconsistencies in the EU’s strategy. A case in point here is the EU criteria requiring cooperation with the ICTY. Cooperation with The Hague has been often used to threaten or to stop the opening of SAA negotiations. That was the case in Serbia and Montenegro, when in May 2006, the Commission decided to put on hold negotiation on an SAA because of lack of cooperation with the ICTY. In
2008, the Netherlands vetoed the implementation of the trade-related part of the SAA with Serbia for similar reasons, a veto that was only lifted in December 2009. In the case of Croatia, non-cooperation with the ICTY also led to a postponement of the opening of membership negotiations in 2005 and might also threaten the closure of the Justice and Home Affairs chapter (European Voice 2010). The EU has used international institutions, and the commitments arising from these institutions for the relevant parties, to pressure for changes in Bosnia. The need for cooperation with the ICTY, an argument allegedly raised by many member states on moral grounds (the Netherlands being one of its most active supporters), however became entangled with domestic concerns regarding the EU’s institutional reform in the wake of the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties and fears about enlargement. Many Balkan elites, including Bosnian ones, believe that conditionality and norms are often trumped by politics. For instance, the decision about opening accession negotiations with Croatia had more to do with a deal among the member states about Turkey’s membership perspective than about Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. Similarly, for many Bosnians, the fact that the EU signed an SAA with Serbia in April 2008, before it did with Bosnia and despite the persistent failure of Serbia to comply with EU conditions, was a reminder that political considerations mattered more than objective compliance with EU conditions. As a result of this inconsistent use of norms, the EU’s image and normative power have been damaged.

‘Double standards’ have also hampered the EU’s normative power. From 2004 to 2008, the EU resorted to ‘objective’, ‘efficiency-based’ arguments to push for the restructuring of police in Bosnia, arguing that ‘functional’ arrangements require, among other things, that all budgetary competencies had to be vested at the state-level and that some of the new police regions would have to cross the official boundary line dividing the two entities in the country (see Juncos 2011). Reform on the basis of these recommendations was intended to lead to a more centralized police force. However, this logic did not work as expected. Bosnian-Serb politicians in particular remained sceptical about such an argument and pointed to the fact that many European countries also had decentralized police forces (e.g. Spain or Belgium). Although given the economic problems that affect the country, no one denied that restructuring the police forces would have saved the country money and boosted the economy, many politicians rejected such lines of reasoning. Instead, they argued that cultural and identity-based arguments justified the existing organization of the police forces in the country and listed other EU countries as examples. They also rightly pointed out that there was nothing in the *acquis communautaire* that required such internal reorganization (an argument that even Commission officials agreed with privately). Thus, a policy of ‘double standards’, one for the EU member states and another for the potential candidates, did not help boost the normative power of the EU in the country.
The instruments used

The channels of norm diffusion have been very similar to those used in other Balkan countries and have been mostly civilian in nature. The promotion of EU norms in Bosnia has been channelled through different factors, but mostly via informational diffusion (declarations by the EU and the Presidency), procedural diffusion (thanks to the institutionalization of bilateral relations between the EU and Bosnia, in particular, through the Stabilisation and Association Process); through transference (i.e. the conditionality attached to the financial assistance to the country); and finally, overtly, by the Commission Delegations in Bosnia, the EU Monitoring Mission and the CSDP operations. The EU’s strategy has also been characterized by the use of positive rather than negative conditionality (Tocci 2007a: 11). The Union has shown a preference for economic and political incentives rather than sanctions even when the conflict parties failed to comply with EU criteria. Yet, there have been a few cases of severe or repeated non-compliance where the EU has suspended economic aid or issued measures to be taken against persons in Bosnia acting against the peace agreements, but these have been relatively exceptional cases (Council of the EU 1997, 1998).

The most powerful tool to promote reforms in Bosnia has been the prospect of EU membership. As Olli Rehn, Commissioner for Enlargement, has put it, ‘enlargement policy is the EU’s most important soft power tool. The power of attraction exerted by the EU has acted as an incentive for stability and democracy’, first in Central and Eastern Europe, and now in the Balkans (Rehn 2008a). However, as mentioned before, progress in adopting the necessary reforms has been slow and the result of constant pressure by the EU and the international community, raising doubts about the ‘effectiveness’ of the EU’s civilizing enterprise.

The use of military instruments by the EU also requires some attention here. In principle, the promotion of norms is not in contradiction with the development of military instruments (Diez 2005; Manners 2006c; Sjursen 2006a: 239). As put by Manners (2006c: 183), the ‘militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power, if critical reflection characterized the process’. Although a normative power will preferably act without resorting to coercive/military means, on some occasions, civilian means might not be enough to support the projected norms, in particular, in conflict situations; military means will then be not only acceptable but essential to NPE. What is more, as Sjursen (2006a: 238–9) warns us, one should avoid simplistic judgements about ‘hard’/‘soft’ instruments: while the use of military instruments might sometimes be justified; at times, civilian instruments such as economic sanctions might be harmful and counterproductive to the exercise of normative power.

However, according to Diez (2005) and Manners (2006c), militarization might raise other problems. Unreflexive militarization, associated to
ambitions of ‘great power’ status might undermine NPE. One way out of this conundrum might be to submit the development of military capabilities to constant internal and external critique, in particular, looking at whether these instruments are used in accordance with the EU’s normative basis. Drawing on Sjursen’s discussion about normative power, a basic criterion to discern whether or not these instruments are used to serve (and not to hamper) normative power would be that military force needs to be bound through law. According to Sjursen (2006a: 245),

To ‘act in a normative way’ would then be to act in accordance with legal principles. This would also mean that it would not matter so much if particular interests coincided with legal obligations, as long as legal commitments would be respected also when the opposite was the case… If coercion were used, it would be so only in consistence with existing legal arrangements and in order to uphold the respect for such arrangements.

In other words, military force, as any other instrument of normative power, should only be exercised in accordance with international law. Only in this way can the EU ensure that the militarization of European foreign policy does not undermine its normative nature. In this regard, military force should only be used as an instrument of last resort, when it is considered to be the only effective means to achieve or protect civilian ends, and when it is internationally legitimate, that is, exercised under the mandate of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution and with a broad international consensus.

Looking at the operation launched in Bosnia, one could say that military instruments have been deployed there as a last resort (a ‘green force’ which is still considered necessary by the locals), with the authorization of the UNSC⁷ and under a broad international consensus, of which its troop composition is testimony.⁸ It seems, therefore, that the build-up of military capabilities has not undermined the normative image of the EU in the eyes of other countries as it has been argued elsewhere (Manners 2006c: 194). The fact that most operations launched by the EU have other non-EU states participating is witness to this. Countries such as Turkey or Morocco have not hesitated to participate in EU military operations like EUFOR. As for its external legitimacy, the mission is widely supported by all the ethnic groups in Bosnia. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports, the approval rates for EUFOR (47.9 per cent) are higher than for any other international actor/institution in the country: 47.1 per cent for the High Representative, 45.5 per cent for the EU and 38.3 per cent for the United States (US) (UNDP Bosnia 2008: 25). Although before its deployment there were some concerns among local authorities and the population about the EU undertaking this mission,⁹ an active public diplomacy exercise on the part of the EU, alongside the actual performance of EUFOR on the
ground, helped alleviate those concerns. Public opinion in Bosnia in general supported the handover from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led mission to EUFOR and the presence of EUFOR in the country (Centre for Security Studies 2004).

Producing and reproducing identities: othering and securitization
After discussing the more visible facets of the EU’s intervention in Bosnia, I now turn my attention to other less visible practices that might well undermine the normative engagement of the Union in the country. The first one relates to the practice of othering by constructing one’s identity as a normative power (Diez 2005). This practice not only shows some of the negative effects that identity construction might have, but also the contradictions between the inclusive character of enlargement and the exclusive one that accompanies practices of securitization.

On the one hand, the enlargement perspective is seen as the main tool to maintain peace and stability in the country and the strongest incentive behind the reforms. By acknowledging their ‘European perspective’, enlargement becomes a tool to extend not only the values of the EU to third countries, but most importantly for candidate countries, it also offers a stake in EU institutions and policy-making. Underpinning the enlargement policies and the reform process in the region is the idea that the EU should serve as a model upon which the Balkans should build. The EU has to ‘civilize’ these countries by promoting democratic and economic reforms and the rule of law. By promoting the adoption of the acquis communautaire, the enlargement process has an inclusive character as it is meant to bring Bosnia closer to the EU and to become, one day, part of the European family.

On the other hand, a process of securitization can also be observed in the EU’s relations with the region which has served as an excuse to build new walls around the EU-27. The recent violent past of the region means that these countries still need the EU’s supervision, in particular, states-in-the-making such as Bosnia. The Western Balkan countries are often portrayed as a nest of organized crime and illegal immigration, something that justifies the intrusiveness of EU policies and operations on the ground. The official picture of the region is still one of instability and criminality, which reinforces the psychological and physical division between ‘us’ and ‘the others’; a ‘safe internal space’ and a ‘threatening external neighbourhood’ (Rees 2005). The inside/outside image is still very effective in mobilizing citizenship and propelling the process of building a European fortress. According to Monar (2000: 5), ‘people from outside which actually or potentially endanger the safe inside must be kept outside or brought under appropriate control’. This is the basis of the idea of ‘Fortress Europe’ that has been much criticized in recent years. More freedom for Europeans means less freedom for foreigners, including those from Bosnia. These perceptions justified the existence of a visa regime for Bosnia and other countries from the region
The EU sees this region mostly as a political and security issue: the bodies that are today present in Bosnia are mostly dealing with security issues ... They have to change their focus ... The disparity in economic development and the lack of real convergence between Bosnia and the rest of Europe, that is the real threat to stability in the region.11

This picture of the region co-exists with the traditional negative stereotyping or ‘Orientalism’ that has been present in the Western discourse about the Balkans. The terms Balkans and Balkanization have often been associated to ideas of violence, chaos and at odds with ‘European’ values and traditions (Todorova 1997). This barrier-building process, in flagrant contradiction with the aims of the enlargement, creates animosities among EU citizens against people from the Western Balkan region. These two discourses of representation of the other as an existential threat and as inferior also legitimate the EU’s disciplinary intervention in Bosnia, although the former is even more dangerous as it might require ‘exceptional measures’ to counter the threat.

Techniques of governmentality: disciplining Bosnia

The EU’s promotion of norms, even when those are to be considered as ‘good’ or ‘universal’ norms, might constitute a double-edge sword. Although it is allegedly inspired by the desire of EU policy-makers to improve the situation in those countries the EU is ‘civilizing’, it also involves practices of domination that need to be scrutinized. These practices can be understood during the 1990s and 2000s. It was only in 2008 that the EU moved towards visa facilitation and liberalization for the Western Balkan countries.

Securitization processes have also added force to the image of ‘danger’ associated with the Balkans. If we take the case of organized crime, it is true that the Balkan region is an important route of origin and transit for organized crime groups. For the Commission, for instance, ‘organized crime remains the single main threat to Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of security and stability’ (European Commission 2005a: 64, emphasis added). However, contrary to what is proclaimed in the official discourse, Europol Reports show that the biggest threat to the EU comes from criminal groups within the EU: ‘Indigenous organised crime groups from the European Union (EU), particularly those with extensive international networks, continue to represent the main threat to the EU’ (Europol 2005: 5). Furthermore, some authors have argued that Bosnians are more concerned with other issues such as the economic situation, petty crime or freedom of movement across Europe (visas) than with organized crime (International Crisis Group 2005). Hence, economic assistance and access to the EU labour markets can be seen, from this perspective, as the best recipes to instability in the country (Glenny 2004). A Bosnian official also argued that...
as part of the techniques of governmentality deployed by the EU in Bosnia, governmentality in the sense described by Michel Foucault as the ‘art of government’, that is, the wide range of control techniques through which the subject is governed (see Burchell et al. 1991). Through their intervention in Bosnia, EU experts will seek to promote their interpretation of what constitutes ‘normal’. This practice is thus based on a discretionary interpretation of norms and involves the subordination of target societies. As Merlingen and Ostraiskaite (2006: 50) argue, ‘the risk of such interventions is that they govern too much, building a new order of liberal peace while at the same time reducing the political capacity of locals to construct a future in their own vernacular image’.

In their analysis of CSDP police aid in Bosnia, Merlingen and Ostraiskaite (2006) examine in detail the small-scale practices used by the EU Police Mission to bring Bosnian policing closer to European standards. These include the co-location of police officers, professionalization and governmentalization. While the first two focus on disciplining the individual (in this case, Bosnian police officers), the third one targets the organization itself, the Bosnian law enforcement agencies. This analysis can be extrapolated to other EU activities in the country that through twinnings and institution-building programmes shape and govern the indigenous practices and impose the EU’s conception of good governance without reflecting on the locals’ traditions and interests. Although one could argue that this pastoral attitude of the EU might rest on good intentions, it carries practices of domination that those engaged in such activities need to be aware of. Thus, Merlingen and Ostraiskaite (2006) recommend that these practices should be constantly interrogated and that EU peace-builders should promote more local ownership to reduce such imbalances of power. It is to this subject that I now turn.

Promoting local ownership

Notwithstanding the admirable intentions of the Union’s intervention in Bosnia, it seems that EU policies often fail to incorporate the interests and values of those who are supposed to benefit from them. Allegedly the principle of ‘local ownership’ guides the relations between the EU and third countries and constitutes one of the foundations of the process of enlargement. According to this principle, Bosnia should assume responsibility and participate on an equal footing in determining the pace and priorities of its relationships with the EU. Local ownership should not be limited to the Bosnian elites, but also refers to the concept of participatory democracy, incorporating civil society actors in the process. In line with this, the European Commission has often underlined that Bosnia should become a self-sustaining state, capable of independently handling the process of integration into the EU without the interference of external actors. In this vein, the Commission has also emphasized the need for Bosnian authorities to
design their own agenda of reforms and has strongly rejected any imposition of the *acquis communautaire* via the Bonn powers.\textsuperscript{13} For its part, the aim of the EU Police Mission (EUPMI) during its initial phase (2003–2005) was ‘to establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia ownership in accordance with best European and international practice’ (Council of the EU 2002: 2). The deployment of EUFOR was also meant to support local efforts to achieve sustainability by helping to maintain a safe and secure environment.

The rhetoric, however, has not always matched the reality. The EU Special Representative/High Representative has been criticized for imposing institutional reforms and bypassing Bosnia’s democratic institutions (see European Stability Initiative 2007). The European Commission has also on some occasions disregarded local demands and needs, not only on issues such as organized crime and visas, but also regarding the support of democratization and as, to date, the main bulk of the EU budget has gone to institutional-building and harmonization with the *acquis*, not to strengthen Bosnian civil society. EUPMI also failed to fully promote local ownership. Although the operation established police boards at different levels to promote ownership of the reforms by local police officers, civil society groups and the Bosnian population in general were kept out of these discussions. The EU Police Mission’s projects neither fully involved the citizens and non-governmental organizations nor gave them an active role in the policing of their communities.\textsuperscript{14} In sum, the EU still has a long way to go to effectively realise local ownership in Bosnia.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter has been to explore EU activities in Bosnia from the perspective of NPE. The EU’s role in Bosnia since the 1990s could indeed be characterized as one of a normative power, concerned with the spread of particular norms in its neighbourhood, using mainly, but not exclusively, civilian instruments. The case of Bosnia, however, has shown that inconsistencies and double standards have undermined the normative power of the EU in Bosnia. Examples include ICTY conditionality and the police reform pledged by the EU. By contrast, the use of military force in Bosnia does not seem to have damaged the normative power of the EU. What the case of Bosnia shows is that a combination of military and civilian instruments is needed to deal with post-conflict situations, at least in the early stages of a conflict. This civ-mil model is the one the EU is actually using when developing its CSDP capabilities. Although one could argue that the years following the St Malo Declaration were characterized by a deep imbalance that privileged the build-up of military capabilities over civilian ones, in the last few years EU policy-makers have redressed that situation. There is a growing conviction among EU policy-makers that the EU
should make the best of the civ-mil structures and capabilities at its disposal, instead of trying to establish a purely ‘military’ power, which would be not only very costly, but also ill-adapted to the nature of modern complex crisis management. In this regard, Bosnia has been a testing ground for the development of the so-called ‘comprehensive’ approach. Obviously, such an approach is not without its drawbacks, but seems more appropriate than the traditional dichotomy between civilian and military instruments.

The aim of the chapter was also to investigate more mundane practices of power in the EU’s activities in Bosnia such as those resulting from discursive practices and governmentality techniques. Despite repeated claims by EU officials that the aim of EU activities in the country is to develop ownership and increase local capacities, a real partnership and a dialogue among equals has not yet materialized. Commenting on this, a high-ranking Bosnian official from the Directorate for European Integration asked for a more equal relationship between the EU institutions and Bosnia authorities (i.e. a real partnership) instead of the existing top-down one. He did not want imposed policies without a proper understanding of the problems in the country: ‘I expect real dialogue and partnership…Let’s work together.’

In other words, there should be a more balanced approach between the objectives established in Brussels and the local realities and local needs. However, one could wonder how much ownership there is when the only thing that local authorities can negotiate is the timing of the reforms, but not the content of those reforms which is very much fixed in the 80,000 pages of acquis. Furthermore, given the hegemonic character of the current neoliberal ideology that animates EU norms and values, why would actors even question something that has become part of their very own identity?

The analysis of these ‘softer’ practices also shows that to understand the real nature of the EU’s power one should shift the focus away from traditional debates about civilian/military/normative power and disclose day-to-day power practices that might be even more important in determining the kind of power the EU might be in international relations. In other words, the discussion of the EU’s foreign policy should move from its internal processes to its external impact (Smith 2006b: 327). In the case of Bosnia, this analysis reveals first, the negative impact of practices of securitization that portray the region as an existential threat to the EU; and second, the coercive nature of governmentality techniques that discipline Bosnian populations through EU institution-building programmes.

In sum, while the concept of normative power coined by Manners in 2002 has undoubtedly contributed to our understanding of ‘what kind of power’ the EU exercises (Sjursen 2006b), based on the empirical analysis of the case of Bosnia, this chapter argues that the concept does not go far enough to grasp the kind of multi-faceted power deployed by the EU. In order to understand how the power of the EU works in practice, we need to expose not only
the norms promoted and instruments used, but also the EU’s discourses and practices, ‘what the EU says and does’. This approach shows that normative power can carry discourses and practices of securitization, domination and inequality. Not such a ‘good thing’ after all.

Notes

1. As Manners (2002: 239) acknowledges, Duchêne had already talked about the European Community as an ‘idée force’: ‘the European Community must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards’ (Duchêne 1973: 20).
2. For an overview of these diverse themes, see Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2).
3. The Feira European Council confirmed the European perspective of the Western Balkans in June 2000. The Brussels European Council of March 2003 reaffirmed that ‘the future of the Western Balkans [lies] within the EU’ and that ‘[t]he unification of Europe will not be complete until these countries join the European Union’.
4. Interview with an EU official, Sarajevo, July 2005.
7. On 22 November 2004, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1575 authorizing the EU member states to create EUFOR as a legal successor to SFOR, an operation in the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
8. Twenty-two EU member states and 11 other non-EU member states contributed to EUFOR Althea. In May 2007, EUFOR Althea was downsized. As of April 2010, around 2000 troops remained in the country (EUFOR 2010).
10. See, for example, the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003: 5).
13. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Conference in Bonn in December 1997 strengthened the mandate of the High Representative by granting him the power of removing from office public officials who fail to comply with the Dayton Peace Agreement, and imposing laws when Bosnian legislative bodies failed to do so.
14. Maybe the only exception here is the establishment of a hotline called ‘Krimo-Lovci’ (‘Crime-Catchers’) that allowed citizens to make anonymous calls informing about possible crimes.
15. Interviews in Sarajevo and Brussels, 2005–06.
16. Interview with a Bosnian official, Sarajevo, June 2005.
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Part III
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Normative and Military Power in EU Peace Support Operations

Annika Björkdahl

Introduction

This chapter challenges the understanding that the European Union’s (EU) ability to exercise soft, normative powers to influence international relations rests on its lack of military capability. Recent peace operations conducted by the EU reveal that the Union now is prepared to extend traditional soft foreign policy methods to also include hard powers, such as military threats as well as military force to successfully manage conflicts and promote peace. To what extent is this compatible with the Normative Power Europe (NPE) self-images of the EU? How can normative and military power co-exist and be exercised in parallel? Is it possible for the EU to continue to exercise ‘normative power’ when using military means in international peace operations? The EU’s experiences in the Western Balkans, Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur compel us to think anew about the use of different kinds of power in conducting peace operations, that is, the use of military means in combination with defending, upholding and even promoting international norms pertaining to human rights, democracy and sustainable peace.

The argument put forward here is that the EU can be both normative and powerful but it needs to couple its traditional normative powers with its newly developed military capacity in order to meet the security challenges and expectations from conflict-ridden societies around the world. In most violent conflicts human values and norms, promoted by among others the EU, are threatened and violated. In order to be a credible normative power, this chapter claims that the EU ought to be able to defend and uphold the norms it champions, such as norms pertaining to human rights and sustainable peace. In this aspect, it is conceivable that military forces may become a useful tool also to promote norms, in addition to deter norm violations and ensure compliance. Peace support operations therefore provide a potential for combining the use of both military and normative powers within Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework.
The ambition of this chapter is to move beyond the ‘Normative Power Europe’ as it does not uncritically accept and reproduce the idea that the normative influence of the Union rests on its lack of military capability. Rather than rejecting the concept of normative power outright, it will be explored in this chapter in order to provide an understanding of how various forms of powers can be coupled in international peace operations. First, we need to problematize power and how it is exercised, since this is one of the weaknesses of the NPE concept. The common distinction between military and civilian/normative means of power is often simplistic and fails to understand how military and civilian instruments of foreign policy interact in ESDP missions. Furthermore, the concept of NPE is based on an understanding of the declining role of the military power in international relations, and is hence unable to capture the changing role of the use of military force and militaries in contemporary peace operations. The key to understanding the EU’s potential and possible role in preventing violent conflict and preserving international peace is to investigate whether the ‘soft model of hard power’ now developed by the EU is a contradiction in terms, or if there are potential synergies to be gained by exercising normative power and military power in parallel, simultaneously or sequentially (see Matlary 2006). This raises a number of interesting theoretical research questions concerning if and how humanitarian values may guide the use of military force. What are the advantages and the disadvantages? Can the EU use peace operations as a means to externalize the values that guide EU’s internal relations such as peaceful conflict resolution, democracy, rule of law, human rights and sustainable peace and thereby contribute to the establishment of an international order based on these normative convictions? This chapter maps out five dimensions where the EU efficiently may couple values and military means in peace operations, that is, use of ethical motivations to ensure the appropriate use of military force to defend and uphold highly respected norms and the use of military forces as a channel for norm diffusion and thereby contribute to establish sustainable peace.

Selling normative power short?

Historically, the EU has exercised an economic, civilian and normative power to influence world affairs. Because history supported it, political will dictated it and lack of capability in any event necessitated it, the EU has been committed to contributing to international peace and security by non-military means (Cooper 2002; Kagan 2003). In fact, it was regarded as a paradox that the ‘the continent that once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms’ (Rosecrance 1998: 22). The strong self-image of the
EU as an ethical power ‘doing good’ is well established. According to Diez (2005: 620), the representation of Europe as a force for peace is nearly consensual. Clearly, the EU has provided a model of democratic, peaceful relations that has inspired other regional groupings. It has also been eminently successful in exporting the values and norms that guide the EU’s internal relations and structuring the new democracies of Eastern Europe through political conditionality, with either membership or close trade and cooperation agreements as incentives (see Carlsnaes et al. 2004; Tonra and Christiansen 2004).

Yet, the lessons from the secessionist conflicts of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were that diplomacy, economic sanctions or moral condemnation were of little value without the backing of decisive military power (Bildt 2000). Consequently, it is important to think anew about the use of military force as an instrument of statecraft within a comprehensive approach to the evolving EU security agenda. Increasingly, the Union demonstrates a readiness to extend traditional, soft foreign policy methods such as persuasion, offering and granting awards, and norm diffusion to also include hard powers, such as military coercion, the threat of punishment as well as deployment of military force in its efforts to contribute to international peace and security. Yet, the EU needs to develop a coherent approach to how to use both values and weapons in its external relations. On the ground, the ethical ambitions, declaratory policies and normative powers of the EU have created expectations that the EU would be prepared to defend the norms and values it so resolutely attempts to spread. In practice, there has been a wide gap between what conflict-ridden societies have expected from the EU and what the EU actually has been able to do in terms of conflict management. The previous lack of military capacity to support its normative approach weakened the influence the EU could exert in crisis situations and limited its ability to manage violent conflicts and defend threatened human values. Developing a capacity to conduct independent peace operations, or to contribute to the United Nations’ (UN) operations may therefore also contribute to closing the gap between the rhetoric and the actions of the EU.

Even if one assumes the position that European peace operations by necessity require both normative and military power, this in itself does not solve the tensions between these two kinds of power. This tension is present between the various kinds of powers and the question of their legitimacy, between the internal developments of the CSDP and its external impact in the international arena, and between the ideas, norms and discourse of European foreign policy and the Union’s actions. European peace operations are subject to a number of contradictions and tensions about the boundaries of normative and military power brought to the fore by the actual or impending acquisition of military capacity and the use of this capacity in peace operations. Among the many questions prompted by the new
thinking on European foreign policy, the following stand out: What kind of ‘power’ is the EU and how is this power articulated, exercised and perceived in the world? The EU and its member states will increasingly have to confront the implications of the EU’s power, international status, impact and role in international peace and security.

Tensions between normative and military power

There is a need to continue to critically evaluate how we think about power in world politics in general, and in peace support operations in particular. To do so, the analysis of the power of the EU needs to be positioned within a wider theoretical context (see Manners 2002, 2006c; Hyde-Price 2006, 2008; Sjursen 2006a). This, however, does not mean that an elaborated discussion on conceptualizations of power or an in-depth meta-theory of power will be provided here (see Guzzini 2005). Instead, the ambition is to confront the distinction between normative and military power and explore alternative understandings of these powers, their boundaries, relationship and means. This analysis will be conducted by dividing the discussion concerning power into three subcategories. First, power will be explored from an identity perspective, that is, as describing a particular type of actor as a small power or superpower. Second, power will be discussed from a relational perspective, that is, how power characterizes a relationship between actors. Third and finally, power will be examined in terms of the means of exercising various types of powers (see Diez 2005).

Normative and/or military power Europe

The EU has been described as an economic giant and a political dwarf on the international arena. The concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ was developed in the 1970s to describe the EU during the Cold War era. Manners (2002) coined the concept ‘Normative Power Europe’ to describe how the ‘creative efforts of the European integration process have changed what passes for “normal” in world politics’ (Manners 2008b: 45). These two concepts of power could be seen as part of the same discourse, a discourse that establishes the EU as a positive force in world politics (Diez 2005). The self-image of the EU is articulated in the ‘discourse of universal ethics which defines the EU as a “power for good” and a “peacebuilder”’ on the international scene (Aggestam 2008: 1; Richmond et al. 2011). These discourses construct a particular international identity of the EU based on the ‘soft’, civilian power of attraction and lack of military capability. The most important factor providing the EU with an influence in world affairs, it has been argued, ‘is not what it does or what it says, but what it is’ (Manners 2002: 252). The normative power concept also connotes the characteristic of the EU as an actor, similar to the use of concepts such as ‘superpower’ to characterize the US in contemporary world politics. In that sense, normative power carries connotations of the EU’s moral superiority based on the understanding that the ‘soft’ powers of
the EU are to be preferred to the ‘hard’ powers of the US. Manners (2008b: 45) makes the strong claim that ‘the EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics’, but this he clearly states is not the same as making the argument that the EU is acting in an ethically good way. The NPE is founded on the values and norms, codified in Articles 3-5 and 10-1 of the Amendments to the Treaty on European Union. These norms and values are to guide the EU in its external relations, and according to Manners (2008b: 46) the EU promotes these norms through the principle of ‘living by example’. For example, the EU strives to contribute to peace, security, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, to the protection of human rights as well as to strictly observe international law including respect for the principles of the UN Charter. A recent articulation of the international role of the EU conceptualizes and explores the EU as the ethical power Europe in an attempt to shift the focus from what the EU ‘is’ to what it ‘does’ and to critically reflect upon the role of the EU in world politics (Aggestam 2008: 1).

Most existing conceptualizations of the EU as a normative, civil or civilizing power are contested on the grounds that they ‘lack precision and are normatively based’ (Sjursen 2006a: 235). Clearly, when discussing the distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power one cannot take for granted that one is bad and the other is good for the EU or for the international community. Second, as normative power has been seen to embody the core values, many of us believe in it has been difficult to achieve the necessary critical distance to the object of study according to Hyde-Price (2006: 218). Third, the notion of normative power suffers from ‘almost total neglect of power’ (Carr 2001, cited by Hyde-Price 2006: 218). The normative power concept is perhaps a contradiction in terms because the influence exerted by the EU is conditioned upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of other states, such as the US, or by the member states of the EU acting unilaterally or collectively outside the EU framework.

Despite the criticism, many scholars and practitioners alike have been hesitant or sceptical to the new trend towards a ‘military power Europe’, which represents a reconstruction of the international identity of the EU that challenges the self-image of the EU as a civilian, normative power. The new developments termed the ‘military turn of the EU’ have been criticized as weakening the EU’s ‘distinct profile’ on the international arena (Zielonka 1998). In fact, the lack of military capability is often regarded as constituting the very source of EU’s normative power (see Manners 2002). The ambitions of the EU are found in the commitment to forging a common Security and Defence Policy and in the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS). Through the EU, the European governments are becoming a collective military actor.

Power and the relationship between the EU and others

The concept of power also characterizes a relationship (i.e. that actor A has the power to make B do what A wants). In this sense the EU may serve as an
instrument of ‘collective hegemonic power’ of the EU member states, where the more powerful member states use the EU to enhance and project their individual external influence in international politics. Alternatively, normative power is ‘a kind of hegemonic power’, that is, the power to change the normative convictions of others (Diez 2005: 614, 616). This can roughly be done in three ways: through providing an attractive model to be imitated (Manners 2002), through a process of ‘Europeanization’ (Olsen 2002) and through promoting appealing norms that resonate with others (Björkdahl 2005). The EU’s influence on others was traditionally based on exercising the ‘soft’, civilian, normative power and on the power of attraction and the unwillingness to develop and deploy military means to project its power on a global scale (Wallace 2007). The ‘NPE’ attempts to alter the identity of others by providing an attractive model of good governance and peaceful relations to be imitated by others. Over the past 50 years the EU has successfully been able to diffuse and institutionalize peace norms among its members, and according to Sjursen (2004: 59), the EU has ‘successfully domesticated security within the Union’ and it is therefore highly unlikely that a member state would use military force against another member (Waever 1998). Here the source of the EU’s normative power or the ability of the EU to exert a normative influence in world politics is derived from what it is – a security community and a model of good, democratic governance, cooperation and prosperity (see Manners 2002: 252). Furthermore, the EU also attempts to externalize these values that guide the internal interaction of the EU member states and works actively to spread its particular norms through its various external policies. Peace and security are now generally promoted by these external policies including the CSDP.

By developing a military capability and an operational capacity, the EU’s ability to exert an influence on peace and security is altered. In a broad peace support perspective the EU may, for example, be able to export its successful model of reconciliation to previously conflict-ridden societies through various peace-building initiatives. In this sense the EU, here represented through its CSDP missions, is a unique security actor and provides an added value to the discussion about peace support operations. In reconsidering NPE, Manners (2006c: 183, 194) argues ‘that militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power’, but ‘it is increasingly risking its normative power’. What is significant to the NPE conceptualization of power is the absence of physical force. In general, there is a limited understanding of hard power and the military dimension present in the EU literature. Cooper (2002), however, has discussed the need for military force in his vision of the EU as a post-modern security order based on cooperation, shared values and peaceful relations. His argument is that as long as there are a modern and a pre-modern world outside the EU’s post-modern zone of peace there will be a need for military power to defend the values of this order.
Clearly, the effectiveness of any kind of power depends first and foremost on the context. While maintaining scepticism towards the ‘militarization’ of the EU, Manners rightly insists that normative power is not the opposite of military power. From a different perspective, Youngs (2004: 415) observes that ‘security concerns and normative values inform each other’, and he is concerned that ‘the focus on the ideational dimensions of the EU’s international presence has… diverted attention away from the persistence of power politics… despite the general recognition that these elements co-exist’. Although focusing on combining normative and military power, it is important to note that normative power is a separate category of power and it is something different and irreducible to economic or military power. Machiavelli’s observation that it is safer to be feared than loved is challenged by contemporary international relations, which frequently demonstrate that it is better to be both, depending on the issue and the context.

The means to exercise power

We can also regard power to refer to certain means. Normative and military powers are to a large extent exercised through different means. According to Manners (2008b), a normative power should engage in normative practices and that could mean using appropriate and legitimate means. The instruments of normative power are often defined as soft, non-coercive and positive, in contrast to hard, coercive and negative military tools. Normative power is neither military nor purely economic but one that works through ideas, values and norms (Manners 2002). These ideational phenomena are in themselves able to achieve what otherwise are accomplished by military actions or economic incentives. Norms are here perceived to have independent power to alter the interests, identity and actions of other actors. According to Manners (2002) normative power can be described as an ability ‘to shape conceptions of the “normal”’, that is, to define what is normal. One strategy to exercise normative power is to construct and diffuse norms in order to change the normative convictions of others (Björkdahl 2005).

In the EU context, hard power and its military means such as military force is a relatively under-explored and inadequately theorized phenomenon among EU scholars. Clearly, the use of military force has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. To a large extent this evolution has motivated the governments of the EU to develop a military capability through the ESDP and later the CSDP to strengthen the EU’s capacity to act in international peace and security matters. In 1999 the governments of the EU member states agreed to the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’ to establish a force of 60,000 troops deployable outside the EU for conflict prevention and crisis management purposes by 2003. Although the target was not met, this process has since been supplemented by the development of some 13 battle groups where 1200–1500 troops are to be organized and ready for deployment in
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2007 (Wallace 2007). Under the Headline Goal 2010, the EU member states are focusing further on the development of the EU military capabilities (Toje 2008). The development of the ESS, the battle groups and the European Rapid Reaction Corps demonstrates the EU’s greater political willingness to exercise also hard military power and the Union has proved its capability by conducting some 20 military and civilian crisis missions mobilized as part of the ESDP since 2003 (Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008). Although the ESS outlines that the EU should take on new tasks such as crisis management, peacekeeping, state-building and post-conflict reconstruction to complement its development aid and humanitarian assistance policies, it is not explicit in how to do this. Despite the adoption of the ESS in Thessalonica in 2003, the EU lacks a coherent approach to the use of force and often its actions are decided on an ad hoc basis.

Clearly, normative and military means are possible to combine. Diez (2005: 616) argues that normative power can work alongside other forms of power in international relations, ‘notably military and economic forms of power. Indeed, the latter two may underpin normative power.’ According to Diez (2005: 621) it is ‘entirely conceivable that military force is used to back up the spread of civilian values’. Yet, the more normative power relies on military force, the less it becomes distinguishable from other forms of power as it no longer builds on the independent power and attraction of the diffused norms (Diez 2005: 621). Others have observed that ‘norms established through coercion lack legitimacy’ and do not reflect authentic norm adoption, because in the absence of forced compliance the actors would not adhere to the norm (Crawford 1993: 52; Björkdahl 2002). Indeed, the imposition of norms through military force cannot be equated with successfully changing the normative convictions of others. It is often said that militaries are well suited to defeat opposing armies, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas. Yet, there are times and circumstances when militaries and military force are useful in exercising normative power.

One attempt to move the debate one step further is to suggest that the common distinction between, on the one hand, military means associated with exercising military power and, on the other, normative means to exert normative influence is restraining. Instead, means traditionally utilized for projecting military power, such as militaries, may be utilized for exercising normative power. Deployment of military troops in peace operations, for example, can actually be regarded as a way to exercise normative power. In such operations, the use of military force is heavily restrained and deployed for humanitarian purposes. By acting guided by, in accordance with and/or in defence of EU norms also outside the EU territory militaries may strengthen the robustness of these norms within the EU as well as around the world and contribute to their evolution (Björkdahl 2006). In this sense military forces may be ‘forces for good’.
Towards an EU approach to peace support operations

Only gradually has the EU begun to recognize the challenges posed to NPE by issues such as peace operations, humanitarian disasters, post-conflict reconstruction and international terrorism. Consequently, the EU – the archetypal civilian power, as Hyde-Price (2006) puts it – has equipped itself with a capacity to undertake autonomous peace support operations and it now possesses the operational capacity and the political will to intervene abroad for humanitarian, peacekeeping, crisis management and peace enforcement purposes (Duke and Ojanen 2006). Most of these new missions are not classical humanitarian military interventions, even though they tend to fall in a grey zone between peace and war. Traditional peacekeeping tends to emphasize stability before human rights, and military intervention tends to place military victory before human rights. The distinguishing features of contemporary peace support operations are that they involve both the appropriate and the robust use of coercive military power short of war for the purpose of protecting civilians and establishing order (Hyde-Price 2004: 333; Kaldor 2007).

In 2003 the EU launched its first military operation Concordia to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), followed by EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004 (Björkdahl 2006). In addition, the French-led EU operation Artemis in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the summer of 2003 and the EUFOR RD deployment in support of the UN mission MONUC in 2006 demonstrate an expanding capacity of the EU (Duke and Ojanen 2006; Kaldor et al. 2007). At the time of writing the EU has around 10,000 personnel deployed in some 20 civilian and military missions on three continents, with Somalia and Libya added in the past years and the major engagement in Kosovo.

These peace operations clearly have both an ethical side that is of significant political importance and a traditional realpolitik side that involves national interests and strategic choices, making the two sides at times difficult to unify. This has posed a challenge to the development of the ESDP/CSDP, and a major problem has been the lack of a clear conceptual framework and a practical approach to guide the EU’s use of both values and weapons in peace operations (see Kaldor et al. 2007). The ESS adopted by the European Council at Thessalonica in December 2003 constituted an important first step on developing a guiding framework for the EU’s role on the world stage and on outlining concepts governing when, how and where the EU will use military force. Yet, it leaves unanswered key questions about why the Union should intervene beyond its borders and according to what criteria and how to couple normative and military powers.

Obviously, the EU cannot simply ‘borrow’ the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) doctrine for peace support operations or ‘copy’ the UN’s peacekeeping policy. Instead, a Human Security doctrine for Europe has been
brought to the fore by the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, presented to the High Representative for the CFSP in 2004. It has been suggested that the notion of human security could work as an umbrella under which central concepts and ideas developed in the CFSP and the ESDP such as conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building can be combined in a coherent manner to provide guidance for EU peace operations (Kaldor et al. 2007). However, in assessing whether the human security concept plays a role in formulating and executing EU peace support operations and whether these norms guide the use of military force in the name of the EU, Matlary (2008) concludes that the EU operations rarely happen for human security reasons alone. This chapter takes the notion of ‘sustainable peace’, which emphasizes the stress the EU places on addressing the root causes rather than just managing the symptoms of conflict as a point of departure for a doctrine on peace support operations (see Manners 2006c: 186). According to Manners (2008b: 48–49) sustainable peace is the prime EU normative principle as it mirrors ‘the European experience of ensuring that war “becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”’. Any doctrine on how to conduct European Peace Support Operations, however, needs to consider how to translate this unique experience into policies. This chapter suggests that the emerging norm pertaining to the responsibility to protect (R2P) could guide the EU’s appropriate use of military force for humanitarian purposes. Here, five key dimensions where normative and military powers may effectively interact are mapped out and a discussion of how to gain synergies when exercising military and normative power in parallel are presented: projecting EU power in defence of its core values; the timely deployment and appropriate use of military force for humanitarian purposes; the avoidance of casualties and respect for human rights; multilateralism and CSDP operations as channels for norm diffusion; and defence of highly respected norms.

**External projection of power in the name of EU core values**

The CSDP is not about national defence, mutual defence guarantees or creating a ‘European Army’ for the collective territorial defence of Europe. Instead, the EU’s newly developed military capability will be used to manage security threats that will emanate from outside Europe (see Hyde-Price 2006). For this there is massive public support within Europe. Eurobarometer polls suggest that Europeans are supportive of EU military operations and the public also in the most EU-sceptical member states are supportive of costly and risky interventions carried out as EU operations in defence of European core values (Youngs 2004: 417). The ESDP has been interpreted as a further component of normative legitimation of the EU’s role in world politics, which in turn is crucial to the European identity formation (Youngs 2004: 418). To some these operations reflect the global solidarity and ‘collective conscience’
of the EU (Aybet 2000: 10, cited by Youngs 2004: 417). Hence, the military dimension gains legitimacy mainly from the external projection of military power in the name of certain values rather than defending European territory.

The EU’s ability to reach beyond Europe and conduct peace support operations in Africa demonstrates that the EU is a global actor also in terms of military power. The three consecutive operations in the DRC (Artemis, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUFOR RD Congo) also demonstrate the combination of exercising EU’s normative and military power in parallel (see the Appendix). The deployment of military force in Operation Artemis and in EUFOR RD Congo, it can be argued, was guided by and in defence of some of the core values of the EU such as sustainable peace, peaceful conflict resolution and democracy. Artemis, led by France as a ‘Framework Nation’, was to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and to the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003. Although geographically limited and of short duration, Artemis successfully established a secure environment for refugees’ return (Martinelli 2006: 384). This operation was an effort guided by the ambition to prevent human suffering and contribute to establish sustainable peace in this conflict-torn country. Efforts like these can be perceived to increase the credibility of the EU as a normative and military power.

‘Forces for good’ and responsibility to protect

When exercising military and normative power in parallel, the use of military force is radically different from the classical use of military. The role of military force in peace operations is neither war fighting nor peacekeeping. It should rather be seen as civilian protection as framed under the concept ‘responsibility to protect’ (Kaldor 2007). Military and civilian elements need to be integrated in order to achieve the extensive goals of contemporary peace support operations. The EU is rarely, if ever, engaged in conflict, prevention, management or post-conflict peace-building with only military means. It is obvious that the strength of the EU in international peace support operations is its ability to pool its military capability with its traditional economic and diplomatic capabilities. Hence, the EU will therefore continue to deploy its military capabilities within a broader framework of integrated mission, that is, constructive engagement and critical dialogue. Here, there are obvious synergies to be found as the use of military force may create a space for political dialogue and diplomatic efforts to negotiate sustainable peace agreements. Appropriate use of military force is therefore norm-guided and relies on a clear ethical or humanitarian goal and could mean deployment to prevent not only ethnic cleansing or genocide, but also gross human rights abuses and large-scale
human suffering. These goals can be framed within a Peace Support Oper-
ation doctrine for the EU, as suggested by the study group that produced the
Barcelona report, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*. In order to successfully
combine military and normative power, the EU’s use of military force must
be regarded as ‘forces for good’, guided by just cause and right intentions.
The emerging norm pertaining to the ‘responsibility to protect’ promoted by
the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel and endorsed by heads of state
and government at the UN Summit in 2005, it can be argued, provides such
a just cause. According to this rising norm military force may, if necessary,
be used by the international community in order to protect civilians where
a state fails to protect its citizens from large-scale violence and widespread
suffering (United Nations 2005). The EUFOR Libya operation, for example,
aims to underpin the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1970 and 1973 regarding
protection of civilian populations. The ‘responsibility to protect’, however,
seems to clash with just war theory’s emphasis on military as a last resort.
Postponing military action until all other means have been tried may be a
recipe for disaster and incompatible with the objectives of the normative
power. However, if we interpret last resort as when other options are judged
unlikely to succeed and not after trying all other preferred options, it is pos-
sible to discuss the appropriate use of military force for preventive actions as
well, such as to protect civilians from suffering and loss of life. Fisher (2007:
113) argues that if the grounds for military action ‘are humanitarian – for
example, to prevent the widespread suffering being carried out by a brutal
dictator – that might suggest the need for action sooner rather than later’.

The belated response by the EU and the international community to the
long-standing humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, Sudan, demonstrates the
weakness of the emerging norm pertaining to ‘responsibility to protect’ and
the strength of the principle of non-intervention. In addition, it also illus-
trates the discrepancy between the EU’s declaratory politics and its practices.
The ambition to prevent the crisis through the use of alternative means has
proved inadequate and military force is now perceived as the last resort,
which cannot be regarded as coherent with the preventive aspect of the
‘responsibility to protect’ notion. The passivity also illustrates the EU’s lack
of political will to provide appropriate military force to limit and deter what
has been defined by some as genocide. The EU Council managed to adopt a
joint action in 2005 that established the AMIS EU support action that was to
support the African Union’s (AU) mission AMIS II (Council of the EU 2005a).
In Darfur the credibility of the EU as a normative power prepared to defend
humanitarian values and human rights were challenged, as the EU so far has
not been allowed, willing and ready to deploy sufficient military forces to
back up its normative agenda (Toje 2008). Yet, whether the EU lives up to
such high standards of altruistic and ‘pure’ intent including concerns about
human rights, peace, human security and so on is a very interesting assess-
ment exercise, but not part of this chapter (see Bailes 2008; Matlary 2008).
Human security and human rights

In peace operations fought for explicit humanitarian and moral motives, there is little public acceptance for non-combatant casualties and human rights abuses, and there is a reluctance to expose European soldiers to danger risking military casualties. This is mainly due to the values attached to human life and human rights in EU member states. In general, military actions need to bring about more good than harm if they are to be compatible with the ‘normative power’ self-image of Europe and if it is to strengthen rather than weaken its influence. Consequently, the EU will use coercion, not brute force, in peace operations, that is, force that is in proportion to the goal of defending and protecting civilians and of apprehending those accused of committing gross human rights abuses and war crimes. Under these circumstances, the appropriate use of force means respecting human rights and humanitarian values. If CSDP operations are perceived to act against these norms and use more force than necessary, the applicability, robustness and universality of these norms will be eroded.

Furthermore, some peace operations may be more risky than traditional peacekeeping and crisis management, as the core values of the EU pertaining to human rights, broadly speaking, entail minimizing all loss of life. Although fighting for a higher moral cause, public opinion in most European states will be sensitive to national, military casualties in peace operations and body bags will be hard to justify in operations initiated for the purpose of ‘saving strangers’ (Wheeler 2000). Force protection will therefore be imperative in peace operations. The operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003 was authorized under the UN Charter Chapter VII. Consequently, the EU peacekeepers were allowed and proved capable to use force to restore a secure environment. Evaluations of operation Artemis suggest that decisive, yet not extensive military, force was used to achieve the objectives of the UN mandate, such as ‘promote the national level peace process’ and ‘facilitate the early establishment of an inclusive transitional government’ in the DRC (United Nations 2003; Interview May 2007 ESDP desk officer at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs). Yet, the low-intensity violence in the mission area, the limited geographical scope of the mission and the short duration facilitated the undertaking and may have contributed to the limited civilian and military casualties. A general trait that distinguishes the EU from other actors conducting peace support operations is that the EU clearly favours low-risk, small-scale, low-intensity pre- and post-conflict management (Toje 2008: 127).

Multilateralism and legitimacy

Effective multilateralism is a key term in the EU discourse and crucial in combining the normative and the military dimensions of power since multilateralism is closely related to legitimacy. Multilateralism is key to what
distinguishes EU peace support operations from national-led, self-interested interventions, as well as from historic, European colonialism and contemporary neo-imperialism. The collective use of force by the EU member states will be given greater legitimacy and be acknowledged by Europeans as well as others lacking the kind of ‘dubious national interests’, driving some previous nationally led interventions (Ortega 2001: 117). It has been pointed out that the contemporary constraint on the EU foreign policy is not due to the lack of capability, but rather to the lack of consensus in the decision-making process (Toje 2008). Although consensus on foreign policy is often difficult to arrive at, it is surprising that the main stumbling block has not been the decision-making process but rather the force generation process that hinders efficiency and rapidity in multilateral peace operations (Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008). In addition, the interpretation of ‘effective multilateralism’ coined by the former High Representative and the Secretary-General for the CFSP, Javier Solana, in the ESS provides a new dimension of inter-institutional collaboration to multilateralism. Operation Artemis was deployed and EUPOL was set up at the request of the UN Secretary-General. Operation Artemis as well as EUFOR RD in the DRC also demonstrated the quest for ‘effective multilateralism’ as these operations can be regarded as a sign of successful EU–UN cooperation. It is a testimony to the tangible collaboration between the two institutions in accordance with the EU–UN joint declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management. EUFOR RD was an autonomous EU-led operation conducted within the framework of the ESDP, but it was deployed for the explicit purpose of supporting the UN mission MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in the DRC. An examination of EU peace support operations demonstrates that the EU in general respects the authority of the UN and the consent of the conflicting parties. No operation under the ESDP/CSDP framework has been undertaken without the authorization of the UN Security Council Resolution or without the consent of the conflicting parties through a formal invitation, Agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (see the Appendix).

**Peace support operations as channels of norm diffusion**

EU peace support operations in the field need to translate the declaratory politics of the EU into action, in order to close the gap between the EU’s rhetoric and practice. In order for the EU to be true to its internal norms, also in its external actions these operations must reflect the values of the EU. If the military forces’ and the individual peacekeepers’ actions are guided by and are in compliance with the norms championed by the EU, and the peacekeepers provide an example of norm-guided practice, they may function as a channel for norm diffusion by setting an example for others to follow (Björkdahl 2006). The EU crisis management operation Concordia illustrates this additional function of peace support operations. Concordia was mandated to prevent the escalation of inter-ethnic tensions
and instability. By creating a stable and secure environment, this EU operation created the conditions for the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) to negotiate the Ohrid Framework Agreement for Peace in Macedonia that has managed to prevent the re-emergence of violence between the ethnic groups. Conflict prevention was at the core of the mission’s mandate and practice. By acting in a preventive manner, the military force demonstrated one of the core norms of the EU in practice. In that sense Concordia provided both a model to be imitated and a channel for promoting and spreading the norm pertaining to the prevention of violent conflict to the Macedonian society (Björkdahl 2006). EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPAT in Macedonia are interesting illustrations of police missions as channels for norm diffusion where individual police officers contribute to the spread of human rights norms as they monitor, mentor and advise the Macedonian police and the Congolese Integrated Police Unit (IPU) according to international best practice. This illustrates norm diffusion as a process of mutual teaching and learning (Council of the EU 2004).

Concluding reflections

The balance between normative and military power – between the use of values and weapons – in EU peace support operations will become clearer as lessons learned in the field are gathered. Practical experiences from conducting independent crisis management operations and from collaborating in international peace operations have brought important insights and lessons have been learned from the diversity of mission ranging from EU Border Assistance Mission (BAM) monitoring borders in Rafah, Gaza, to monitoring a peace process in Aceh, Indonesia, and support for the AU and the UN in DRC, Sudan and Somalia. These experiences, insights and lessons learned are building a foreign policy capable of informing future external security policy and conduct of peace operations, where relevant historical experience is lacking and the European heritage may contribute to perceptions of neo-colonialism and ‘mission civilicatrice’. The EU and its member states are increasingly coming to understand that peace support operations imply a need to improve coordination and coherence between the use of military means and the normative tools to establish sustainable peace in conflict-ridden societies. Yet, there are a number of outstanding issues. In peace support operations, military and normative powers are closely coupled: how may we disentangle the effects of these in order to evaluate the effect and consequences of normative versus military means? How can we assess the potential for synergies when exercising the various kinds of powers in parallel? To what extent will the EU’s development of a military capability affect other issue areas? More research is needed to explore the reconstruction of the self-image of the EU but also on how the deployment of CSDP missions will affect others’ perceptions of the EU.
## Appendix: Normative and military power in EU peace support operations

*Annika Björkdahl*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSDP operation</th>
<th>Nature of Power</th>
<th>Council Joint Action</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Budget*</th>
<th>Number of personnel*</th>
<th>Key Objectives</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Police Mission in Bosnia</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative</td>
<td>2002/210/CFSP of 11 Mar. 2002</td>
<td>1 Jan. 2003–31 Dec. 2011</td>
<td>€17,6 million annual budget</td>
<td>170 police officers + 28 civilian experts</td>
<td>Established after an invitation of the BiH authority and UNSCR 1396, to monitor, mentor and inspect Bosnian police and support the police reform process in order to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with the best European and international practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Herzegovina (EUPM)</td>
<td>power</td>
<td>2005/824/CFSP of 24 Nov. 2005</td>
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<td>2007/749/CFSP of 19 Nov. 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Military Operation in the FYROM</td>
<td>Military means to exercise normative</td>
<td>2003/93/CFSP of 27 Jan. 2003</td>
<td>31 Mar. 2003–15 Dec. 2003</td>
<td>€4.7 million annual budget</td>
<td>400 troops</td>
<td>Established at the explicit request of the FYROM government, and through UNSCR 1371 as a follow-up to NATO’s mission to contribute to stabilize the security environment in order to allow for the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement</td>
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<td>(Concordia)</td>
<td>and military power</td>
<td>2003/563/CFSP of 29 Jul. 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Military Operation in the DRC</td>
<td>Military means to exercise normative</td>
<td>2003/423/CFSP of 5 Jun. 2003</td>
<td>12 Jun. 2003–1 Sept. 2003</td>
<td>€7 million Approx. 1500 troops</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interim emergency force to contribute to stabilize the security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia established through UNSCR 1484</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Artemis)</td>
<td>and military power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Annual budget</td>
<td>Police and experts</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST Themis)</td>
<td>2004/253/CFSP of 28 Jun. 2004</td>
<td>16 Jul. 2004–14 Jul. 2005</td>
<td>€2.1 million</td>
<td>9 legal experts</td>
<td>Invited by the Georgian government to support, mentor and advise ministers, senior officials and appropriate bodies at the level of the central government in reforming the criminal justice system and to develop a co-ordinated overall approach to the reform process</td>
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<td>ESDP operation</td>
<td>Nature of Power</td>
<td>Council Joint Action</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Budget**</td>
<td>Number of personnel*</td>
<td>Key Objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX)</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2005/190/CFSP of 7 Mar. 2005, 2006/413/CFSP of 12 Jun. 2006, 2007/760/CFSP of 22 Nov. 2007</td>
<td>1 Jul. 2005–30 June 2012</td>
<td>€22.3 million for 2010/2011</td>
<td>Member states (approx 60 staff) provide the training</td>
<td>Following an invitation of the government of Iraq, EUJUST LEX was established to strengthen the rule of law and promote a culture of respect for human rights in Iraq. EUJUST LEX provides training activities for Iraqi rule of law professionals to improve the capacity of the justice system</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU civilian–military supporting action to the AU in the Darfur region in Sudan (AMIS EU supporting action) EU supporting Action for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td>Civilian–military means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2005/557/CFSP of 18 Jul. 2005, 2007/245/CFSP of 23 Apr. 2007</td>
<td>18 Jul. 2005–ongoing</td>
<td>Approx. 31 police officers, 6 military experts, 2 military observers, 3 military staff (in 2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Established at the request of the President of AU and authorized by UNSCR 1547, 1564, 1575, 1590 to ensure effective EU assistance to support AMIS II and the African Union’s political, military and police efforts to address the crisis in Darfur region of Sudan. Recent addition includes a military support element to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (AMM)</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2005/643/CFSP of 9 Sept. 2005.</td>
<td>15 Sept. 2005–15 Dec. 2006</td>
<td>Total budget for the mission €9.3 + €6 million</td>
<td>80 (36 in Sept. 2006) civilian unarmed personnel Based on a formal invitation from the government of Indonesia and with the support of the GAM to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the Peace Agreement, such as decommissioning to contribute to a peaceful comprehensive solution to the conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah)</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2005/889/CFSP of 12 Dec. 2005</td>
<td>24 Nov. 2005–24 May 2011</td>
<td>€7.6 million for May 2010–May 2011</td>
<td>Approx. 13 EU staff and 10 local staff Based on an agreement on Movement and Access and an invitation from the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government to monitor, verify and evaluate implementation by the Palestinian authority of the Framework Security and Customs agreement; contribute to monitor the building up of the Palestinian capacity in all aspects of border management of Rafah Crossing Point</td>
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<td>ESDP operation</td>
<td>Nature of Power</td>
<td>Council Joint Action</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Budget**</td>
<td>Number of personnel*</td>
<td>Key Objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine)</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power and military power</td>
<td>2005/776/CFSP of 7 Nov. 2005</td>
<td>30 Nov. 2005 – 30 Nov. 2011</td>
<td>€24 million for 2007–2009</td>
<td>Over 200 international customs and border officials</td>
<td>Established at the joint request of the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine to contribute to enhance the Ukrainian and Moldovan capacity for border and customs control and develop better cooperation along the Transnistrian border to reduce illicit cross-border flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Police Advisory Team in FYROM (EUPAT)</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2005/826/CFSP of 24 Nov. 2005</td>
<td>15 Dec. 2005 – 14 Jun. 2006</td>
<td>€1.5 million</td>
<td>30 police advisors</td>
<td>Continuation of previous mission based on UNSCR 1371 to monitor and mentor the police on priority issues in the field of border police, public peace and order and accountability, the fight against corruption and organized crime, and to contribute to the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2005/797/CFSP of 14 Nov. 2005</td>
<td>1 Jan. 2006 – 31 Dec. 2011</td>
<td>€8.25 million annual budget for 2011</td>
<td>53 staff (max. 33 local staff)</td>
<td>Based on an invitation from the Palestinian authority to focus on long-term reform and support, advice and mentor to the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Civil Police in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements</td>
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Taking UNSCR 1244 as its point of departure, EUPT is to plan for a smooth transition between the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and other areas that might be initiated by the Council in the context of the future Kosovo status process.

Based on UNSCR 1672, UEUFOR RD Congon is to support the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to secure the region during the election process.

Invited by the Afghan authorities, EUPOL Afghanistan is to monitor, mentor, advise and train officials at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces and to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards.
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<tr>
<th>ESDP operation</th>
<th>Nature of Power</th>
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<th>Duration</th>
<th>Budget**</th>
<th>Number of personnel*</th>
<th>Key Objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU Police Mission in DRC (EUPOLRD Congo)</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2007/405/CFSP of 12 Jun. 2007</td>
<td>1 Jul. 2007–30 Sept. 2011</td>
<td>€6.4 million annual budget</td>
<td>39 police, law enforcement and justice experts</td>
<td>The mission takes over from EUPOL Kinshasa to assist the Congolese authorities to reform and restructure the Police Nationale Congolaise and to the overall Security Sector Reform Process. It is based on UNSCR 1756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU bridging military operation in Eastern Chad and Northeastern Central African Republic (EUFORTCHAD/RCA)</td>
<td>Military means to exercise normative and military power</td>
<td>2007/677/CFSP of 15 Oct. 2007</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>€99.2 million (financial reference for 12 months)</td>
<td>3.000 troops have been deployed June 2008 (aim is 3.700 troops)</td>
<td>In accordance with UNSCR 1778, the mission is an interim operation to support the multi-dimensional United Nations presence in the East of Chad and in the North-East of the CAR in order to improve security in those regions</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU mission in support of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau)</td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2008/112/CFSP of 12 Feb. 2008</td>
<td>12 months–31 May 2009</td>
<td>€5 650 000 (annually)</td>
<td>21 internationals and 18 locals</td>
<td>In partnership with the local authorities, to provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy that is assisting in downsizing/restructuring the Armed Forces and security forces, and developing and articulating capacity-building needs, including training and equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EULEX Kosovo</strong></td>
<td>Civilian means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2008/124/CFSP of 4 Feb. 2008</td>
<td>€165 million 2011/2012</td>
<td>1650 international police officers, judges, prosecutors and customs officials and approx. 1100 local staff</td>
<td>To assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies to develop an accountable and independent multi-ethnic justice system, police and customs service, free from political interference in line with internationally recognized standards and European best practices. To monitor, mentor and advise Kosovo institutions on the rule of law. To enhance public order and security whilst retaining certain executive responsibilities, and in the broader field of rule of law, in particular to investigate and prosecute serious and sensitive crimes. In accordance with UNSCR 1244</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU Monitoring Mission</strong> (EUMM) in Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Oct. 2008–14 Sept. 2011</td>
<td>€26, 6 for 2011</td>
<td>300 staff in HQ and field offices</td>
<td>To support humanitarian assistance in the region</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUFOR Libya</strong></td>
<td>Military means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2011/210/CFSP of 1 April 2011</td>
<td>if requested by UN OCHA</td>
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<td>ESDP operation</td>
<td>Nature of Power</td>
<td>Council Joint Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Naval operation against piracy EUNAVFOR Somalia operation Atlanta</td>
<td>Military means to exercise normative power</td>
<td>2008/851/CFSP of 10 Nov. 2008, 2010/766/CFSP of 7 Dec. 2010</td>
<td>Dec. 2008–12 Dec. 2012</td>
<td>€8.3 millions + individual contributions from contributed states</td>
<td>20 vessels and aircrafts i.e. more than 1.800 military personal</td>
<td>To protect vessels chartered by WFP, merchant vessels and employ necessary measures, incl. the use of force to deter, prevent, intervene to end acts of piracy and armed robbery</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* The mandated number of personnel, but in practice this varies during the operations.
** The budgets are mostly the estimated budget to monitor compliance with six-point agreement including troop withdrawl, support normalization and confidence-building.
The European Union, the United States and Global Public Goods: Competing Models or Two Sides of the Same Coin?

Michael Smith*

Introduction

As readers may well already know, much of the debate about the relationship between the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and world order has recently been conducted in terms of dichotomies. The EU, it appears is Venus and the US is Mars; the EU is multilateral, the US unilateral; the EU is a ‘trading state’, the US a ‘warrior state’; similarly, the EU is a ‘civilian power’ and the US a ‘martial power’ (Kagan 2003; Pollack 2003; Smith 2004; Lindberg 2005; and many others). Life leads us to expect that the contrasts in theory and in rhetoric are likely to be more stark and unqualified than they are in reality, and that EU and US self-understandings and role performance are likely to intersect and overlap in the development and conduct of policy, but these devices are useful as analytical prompts that lead us to sharpen our questions and to apply them to empirical cases.

The purpose of this chapter is to take another set of stark contrasts, and to explore their value as ways of probing the EU–US relationship to world order and global public goods. It takes recent writing about the EU as a normative/civilian/civilizing power, which emphasizes the value content and deliberative nature of ‘European foreign policy’, and juxtaposes it to one of the more provocative interpretations of recent US foreign policy, that undertaken by Mandelbaum in his book The Case for Goliath (Mandelbaum 2005), which presents the US as a global provider of government services and thus as ‘the world’s government’. The former approach can be labelled broadly post-modernist or post-sovereign, the latter broadly modernist and sovereignist, although I recognize the limitations of this dichotomy, and one of the purposes of the chapter is to explore it. For each of the approaches (labelled ‘normative power’ and ‘the case for Goliath’ in shorthand terms), the chapter identifies the elite perceptions, roles and
behavioural characteristics that are said to align with it. The chapter then goes on to argue in each case that the approach or self-representation encapsulates a corresponding view of the ‘good world’ or world order, and of the kinds of values, institutions and activities that sustain the ‘good world’, giving it operational effect through the provision of global public goods (here taken to include stability, prosperity, development and security). As a consequence, it is argued, it is important for each approach to explore the relationship between ‘vision’ and the issues surrounding the implementation of the ‘good world’ by the EU and the US. Having thus explored the two approaches separately, the chapter then goes on to evaluate the extent to which they are separated, and to assess the ways in which they might intersect and overlap in the practices of EU and US policy. Finally, the chapter explores the possibility that the ‘labels’ in both cases are means of diverting attention from the substance of policy, from difficult choices and from the ways in which EU policies are ‘harder’ and US policies ‘softer’ than might be assumed; this in turn has implications both for the analysis and for the practice of ‘world order’ policies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The key questions addressed by the chapter are thus:

- First, how does the idea of the EU as a normative/civilian/civilizing power express a view of the ‘good world’ and the provision of global public goods? How is this supposed to be implemented?
- Second, how does the idea of the US as a ‘global service provider’ express a view of the ‘good world’ and the provision of global public goods? How is this supposed to be implemented?
- Third, where do these visions and programmes overlap, can they be made to work together and what policy prescriptions for the EU and the US might follow?

The European Union: the power of ‘normative power’

Let us first examine the EU and its pretensions to be and to operate as a normative/civilian/civilizing power. This approach has been subject to substantial debate and criticism since it was initially put forward by Manners (2002), but Manners would be the first to admit that he also drew on strands in thinking about European foreign policy that had been around since the 1970s if not earlier, and which link to aspects of the ‘English School’ in international relations theory as well as to aspects of continental reflectivist thinking (see, for example, the study in Linklater 2005). Manners’ approach has also recently been subject to criticism and revision in light of developments since 2002, and no doubt will continue to be so (Sjursen 2006b; Aggestam 2008). The intention here is not to repeat the debates that have unfolded, but rather to try and identify some of the key characteristics of the self-understanding, role conception or ‘vision’ that are core to the idea
of Normative Power Europe, to assess their implications for the idea of the ‘good world’, and to see how the vision and EU practice match up.

Let us first look at the ‘vision’. I would argue that the idea of the EU as normative power has three core elements. First, it is secular, and at the same time critical and self-reflexive. This means that the self-understanding is centred on sensitivity to difference, to cultural diversity and to the effects of discrimination between ends, means and targets in the world arena. Second, it is non-coercive, focusing on norm diffusion, norm export and deliberation, and on the use of incentives and rewards. This means that the emphasis is on what others have termed ‘soft power’, the use of ‘civilian’ means and the pursuit of ‘soft security’. Third, it is post-sovereign, taking as a central assumption the penetrated and contested nature of contemporary sovereignty and the ‘softness’ of governmental institutions.

I realize that one could elaborate this brief presentation extensively, but what I am trying to do at this stage is to establish some working assumptions that can then be subjected to evaluation. The second leg of my analysis here is to investigate the implications of these central features for the EU’s view of the ‘good world’, taking the term ‘EU’ to reflect the positions and perceptions of policy elites at the European level. Here, it seems to me, there are again three core elements. First, the EU is broadly in favour of a world that is governed democratically and effectively. Such forms of governance are seen as integral to the achievement of relations between societies (involving not only governments but also a range of other sub-national and transnational actors) that are based on rules, negotiation and orderly conduct. The EU is thus cast by itself as part of an increasingly governed world in which the process of governance is international as well as national or regional (Ortega 2007). Second, the EU focuses its vision of the ‘good world’ on the pursuit of a comprehensive version of security, a positive view of peace and conflict prevention, and the use of non-coercive means. This is, of course, what some commentators would regard as the rationalization of weakness (e.g. Kagan 2003), incapacity to translate norms into material ‘European’ interests, or simple risk aversion, but it can be cast in much more positive terms as the pursuit of a non-coercive world order (K. E. Smith 2003). Third, the EU bases its case for good governance and for the pursuit of a non-coercive world order in significant part on commercial imperatives. The EU’s ‘good world’ focuses on the benign implications of exchange and interdependence, and on the practices of multilateralism in pursuit of this view of the world order. This is, of course, partly the case I have made elsewhere for the idea of the EU as a ‘trading state’ (Smith 2004; see also Rosecrance 1986, 1993).

This set of qualities is not unproblematic, and a number of commentators have provided insight into the contradictions and limitations it conceals. One set of problems attaches to the apparent contradiction between the search for a ‘hardening’ of European foreign policy and the continued profession of ‘soft’ or civilian power priorities in a world where the tension
between them is often severe (Manners 2006c, 2008b; Smith 2006c; Dunne 2008; Hyde-Price 2008). Another set of problems attaches to the impact rather than the conception of the policies that are produced through Normative Power Europe; as conceived in Europe they may be ‘soft’, but as received elsewhere they may be anything (Manners 2006c). Nonetheless, it is reasonable for the purposes of this analysis to take these qualities of international governance, a non-coercive order, and the commercialization of international order as being key to the EU’s vision.

Finally, let us look at the ways in which the self-conception, the vision of the ‘good world’ and international reality are brought together in EU policies. To put it crudely, how does the EU get from vision to implementation – or does it? Here, I would point to four elements for an analysis. First, there is the question of institutions. Does the EU’s institutional set-up enable it to pursue its vision of world order in a consistent and effective way? Many commentators have pointed to the contradictions in EU policies, emanating at least in part from the need to bring together a number of institutional constituencies ranging from the member states through the ‘European’ institutions, with the possibility of organizational capture or organizational paralysis. Reforms of the EU institutions have of course focused on the need to do something about this for a long time, but it is not altogether clear that current proposals will resolve the institutional dilemmas; indeed, they may accentuate them by raising the stakes and ‘hardening’ EU policies themselves (Smith 2006c).

Second, there is the issue of resources. Can the EU extract resources from its member states and elsewhere (but especially from the member states) at the level required to put into operation its vision of the ‘good world’? The term ‘resources’ here relates both to tangible resources in the form of finance or human resources, and to less tangible resources in the form of commitment to agreed courses of (collective) action on the part of member states and European institutions. Experience suggests that the extraction of resources is both time-consuming and unpredictable, and this again has been the focus of reform efforts over many years. The contradictions between commitment and the willingness to provide the necessary resources do not need much elaboration in this context.

Third, there is the issue of operational effectiveness. In some ways, of course, this is an extension of the problems of institutions and resources, since the effective pursuit of operations (construed very widely as extending from diplomatic or commercial representation through to potential military action) is inherently linked to the institutional base and the resource base. But it is difficult to avoid the further complications that arise for EU operations ‘in the field’ from divided control and divided attention, and from the need for deliberation and coordination as part – indeed as the core – of the normative power concept. As Karen Smith has pointed out, this can place severe limitations on the ability of the EU to achieve agreed goals in
the world arena (Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Smith 2006a; for discussion of similar issues in relation to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), see Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008).

Finally, there is the issue of outcomes. Perhaps as a consequence of the normative power self-conception, the EU is not built as an organization that can focus on results at the expense of process; indeed, without pre-empting later discussion, it is often argued that a key difference between the EU and the US is between a process orientation and a results orientation. As a consequence, the EU can easily be subjected to the criticism that it is largely about ‘cheap talk’, and that any results from EU initiatives are unlikely to be felt in a material way in the short term. Of course, it can be countered that this is precisely the way to build a robust and sustainable world order, and that this is the way to avoid premature use of ‘hard power’.

Where does this leave us in terms of the normative power concept? I have argued that the self-identification of the EU as a normative/civilian/civilizing power leads to certain characteristics in its assumptions and behaviour; this in turn leads to a certain vision of the ‘good world’, based on international governance, comprehensive security and commercial exchange/interdependence; and this in its turn leads to a certain set of problems in translating the vision into operational policies, most obviously those problems arising from continuing debates and tensions both within EU policy elites and between the ‘European’ and the member state institutions. Clearly, in order to do full justice to this argument, extensive empirical evidence would be needed. This is beyond the scope of this chapter, which must now turn to the case of the US: the ‘case for Goliath’.

The United States: the ‘case for Goliath’

As noted earlier, the position of the US in respect of world order has frequently been cast as the opposite end of the spectrum from the EU. Many US commentators, and not a few from Europe, have emphasized the ways in which the US – not just under the presidency of George W. Bush – has represented positions based on the pursuit of ‘hard power’, the assumption of ‘American exceptionalism’ and the adoption of unilateralist policies (Daalder and Lindsay 2003; Lieven 2003; Halper and Clarke 2004; and many others). One thing that seems common to all of these approaches is that they see the US as far more interested in material interests, material power and material outcomes than is the EU; ideas, in this context, have at least partly an instrumental function rather than a normative one. In this section, I set out to test these initial preconceptions by references to one of the most provocative analyses of the US role in world order that has appeared in recent years: the analysis of Mandelbaum in The Case for Goliath (2005). This treatment is interesting because it sets out to explore the ways in which the US can be conceived of as a provider of ‘governmental services’ to the world,
and thus as the essential element of world order; it is not by any means a crudely neo-conservative perspective (see also Mandelbaum 2002). It is also relevant here because it explicitly addresses the types of questions which were posed above in respect of the EU.

Mandelbaum’s argument begins by asserting that the US is a ‘benign Goliath’ whose predominance is accepted by others in the world arena and that this together with its material assets allows it to be the provider in the international context of services that (typically) governments supply domestically: security, economic stability and access to resources. In this respect, Mandelbaum argues, the Clinton and the George W. Bush administrations were more alike than they were different; the difference came in respect of means, not ends. How does this relate to what we have already described as the self-understanding lying behind the US approach to world order? In the terms we used earlier Mandelbaum makes some strong and relevant assertions (2005: 153–7). First, the US self-perception is informed strongly by religion, which in some instances can take an absolutist or Manichean form. This means that US policies are unlikely to be characterized by a reflectivist or relativist orientation; more likely the policies will be reflective of underlying moral positions that do not allow for compromise and that give rise to essentialist conceptions of interlocutors and adversaries. Second, the US self-perception is typically coercive, based on the ability and the need to actualize ‘hard power’ and an action orientation. This aspect of the US position has deep cultural roots, but also has a direct relationship to perceptions of current capabilities and their relationship to the capabilities of others. In other words, capabilities have a strong influence on perceptions of the possible and the desirable (Smith 2004). Third, the US self-perception is ‘sovereignist’, based on the strong assertion of a Westphalian version of sovereignty and its pursuit. This aspect of the US self-understanding has been pointed out by other commentators (e.g. Keohane 2003); it has also been pointed out that the untrammelled pursuit of sovereignty by the US can be seen as an almost automatic limitation on the sovereignty of others. But as Mandelbaum also points out, one strange aspect of the US position is that it has not generated strong rival coalitions anxious to contest this version of the world (I will return to this later).

The upshot of this set of factors is a view of the world that is distinctive and of course very different from that encapsulated in EU self-understandings – at least on the face of it. The US position, as might be expected, leads directly into a vision of the ‘good world’, which is partly implicit and partly explicit in Mandelbaum’s treatment (and I take Mandelbaum here as representing broader currents in US thinking). First, the US vision of the ‘good world’ gives a central place to democracy and good governance. Mandelbaum sees the emphasis on democracy as a domestic form leading directly to the need to protect and promote democracy at the global level. But I think it is fair to say that neither Mandelbaum nor other commentators see the global
promotion of democracy as being pursued by democratic means. Rather, the
global promotion of democracy is seen as a service provided by the US for
the rest of the world, with the active or passive consent of those who receive
it but not with a connotation of accountability. The pursuit of democracy,
that is to say, is seen as a responsibility or a prerogative of hegemony; and
the complaints of others when this responsibility is exercised in a cavalier
or destabilizing way are defined as a means by which governments else-
where in the world deflect attention from their own failings (Mandelbaum

Second, the vision of the ‘good world’ held in the US relies heavily on the
availability of coercion and the need to preserve security, defined usually as
‘hard security’. According to Mandelbaum, the US is able to provide ‘reas-
surance’ at the global level at the same time as pursuing its own security
goals, since the two elements are seen as mutually reinforcing. The security
perimeter for the US is thus the world itself, although at times it is difficult to
convince the US public of this (Mandelbaum 2005: 72). The ways in which
the security perimeter is policed will vary according to regional priorities and
the level of active threat, but the availability of ‘hard power’ is essential to
the process (and in this area, the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s
are seen as essentially the same as the Bush interventions between 2000 and
2008). As with the issue of sovereignty noted above, it is seen as extremely
unlikely that any individual power or group of powers will arise to change
the calculus of US policy elites in this respect, and thus this US vision of
the ‘good world’ in terms of security is likely to persist unless the US public
withdraws its support.

Third, the US vision of the ‘good world’ is built on a specific image of
desirable patterns of exchange and interdependence. To put it simply, the
US is seen as the guarantor of the ‘open world’ and thus of the growth and
spread of free markets. Coincidentally, these conditions are seen as good
for the US economy (although again, the US public does not always seem
convinced of this). The US acts as the banker of last resort (as in the Asian
and other financial crises of the late 1990s) and as the consumer of last resort,
providing demand that then fuels the economies of others. This position
does admit of the development of international rules, but it also gives a key
role to the domestic management of the US economy in a globalizing world.

This vision of the ‘good world’ is one of a world open to the influence of
US power and accepting of the exercise of US leadership. Mandelbaum points
out that there is a paradox inherent in the coexistence of widespread anti-
Americanism with the equally widespread acceptance of the services that the
US provides, and this paradox might benefit from further exploration. In
particular, it might be argued that Mandelbaum’s puzzlement is a reflection
of the ways in which American leaderships do not reflect on the ways in
which their actions are received by others – whether or not they have benign
or malign intent.
This brings us to the final leg of our analysis here: evaluation of the ways in which the vision is implemented. It should not surprise us that there are tensions between the US vision of the ‘good world’ and the extent to which and the ways in which it is carried into action. To be specific, the pursuit of the ‘good world’ as defined by US self-understandings depends first upon a certain institutional configuration in the US itself. Since the days of the Cold War, it has been pointed out that the growth of the ‘national security state’ carries with it the risk of distortion of domestic decision-making, and the tendency towards the ‘imperial presidency’ with cumulation of power in the White House has also been argued on a historical basis (Schlesinger 1973; Yergin 1977). In this sense, the latest episode under George W. Bush is just that – the latest episode in a historic tendency for national security policy to create an accretion of power in the White House. Under George W. Bush it was given an added twist by the influence of a powerful vice-president, but it was essentially the same tendency transported into the post-‘9/11’ era. A corollary of this tendency is a tendency to play down the influence of countervailing institutions in the US itself and in the broader international arena, and thus a further reinforcement of a certain view of sovereignty (see above).

Second, and as already hinted, the US view of the ‘good world’ relies implicitly on the availability of resources, and especially ‘hard power’ resources. The growth of the ‘national security state’ had as part of its consequences the capacity to extract vast resources from the dynamic US economy (although there have been arguments about the extent to which this process actually constrains the dynamism of the economy over the long term). All of the ‘services’ seen by Mandelbaum as being provided to the world demand high levels of resources – financial and military, especially – and the provision of some of the services is itself seen as being directed towards the securing of external resources, especially energy. So there is a direct link between the availability of immense resources, their provision through services to the rest of the world and the securing of resources from external suppliers. In this process, the demands of democracy and accountability may need to be sacrificed to commercial or strategic interests (the commercial and the strategic often coinciding).

Third, the operational implications of the pursuit of the ‘good world’ mean that even in the presence of vast resources, the relationship between institutional capacity, resource availability and strategic objectives needs to be considered. Kennedy in the late 1980s pointed to the dangers of ‘imperial overstretch’ for powers in the historical context (Kennedy 1988) and although Mandelbaum explicitly rejects the description of the US as a form of ‘empire’ he cannot avoid the tensions that are set up by the pursuit of an expansive version of the ‘good world’. In particular, he focuses on the resources demanded by processes of nation-building or state-building, and points out that these are areas in which the US has (a) done badly since the end of the Cold War and (b) strained the domestic support that is vital to the
continued notion of the US as a provider of ‘world governmental services’ (Mandelbaum 2005, Chapter 4). There must come a point at which the costs of this course of action outweigh the perceived benefits, but Mandelbaum also points to the costs of a ‘retreat’ by the US in terms of the undermining of security, economic and institutional structures. This issue has been put into sharp focus by the economists Stiglitz and Bilmes, with their analysis of the ‘trillion-dollar’ war in Iraq and Afghanistan (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). One possible response to this escalation of risks and costs is of course a move to forms of limited multilateralism and thus the sharing of the burden; but this carries with it the less acceptable implication (in the eyes of US elites) that responsibility and power might also have to be shared.

Finally, the question of outcomes. The vision of the ‘good world’ in US foreign policy (and domestic opinion) is one characterized by peace, democracy and free markets. And the US position is centred also on a ‘results orientation’ which looks for explicit targets to represent the extent to which these outcomes have been achieved. It might be argued that this predisposes US policies towards the short term and to the material, in contrast to the long term and the structural. Indeed, the intense criticism of the aftermath of the Iraq invasion encapsulates precisely this search for targets, for indicators and for ways of being able to say ‘mission accomplished’ at different stages of the episode. It is fair to say that this is not the only dimension of the problem, though, as Ikenberry has pointed out, there are important ways in which generations of US policy-makers have underpinned the multilateral system with all of its short-term costs in terms of autonomy and perceived loss of sovereignty (Ikenberry 2002, 2006).

In terms of the argument in this chapter, it can be seen from the discussion above that the US approach to the ‘good world’ as presented by Michael Mandelbaum and others is focused on material resources, material activities and material outcomes. Although there are clear variations, it seems fair to say that the central tendencies are towards a self-perception based at least to a degree on quasi-religious axioms about the world arena, on the availability of coercion and the need to defend a Westphalian version of sovereignty. This leads in turn to a view of the ‘good world’ based on the extension of specific democratic forms, on the need to ensure security, and on the attainment of particular patterns of exchange and interdependence. It seems like a different world from that of the EU. Is it?

**Implications**

Mandelbaum (2005: xx–xxi) himself is in no doubt about the contrasting positions of the EU and the US in relation to world order:

> The most consequential problem [emerging from what he describes] in European-American relations is not the failure of the United States to
consult with European governments but rather the failure of those governments to muster the resources to make major contributions to global governance. Their failure means that when the United States acts unilaterally, it does so as much by default as by design. The Europeans endeavour to produce good behaviour on the part of potentially dangerous countries by the force of their example, not by force of arms. They see their global mission as embodying civilisation but not defending it.

Likewise, European commentators have compared the unilateralist, bullying behaviour seen as emanating from the US view of world order and the ‘good world’ as crude and unsophisticated, as well as dangerous to the long-term order that Europeans tend to privilege (Todd 2003; Smith 2004). But is this really such a stark contrast, and are the impacts of the EU and the US on world order so fundamentally opposed? In this chapter I am unable fully to explore this question, but there follow some indicators of the kinds of arguments that might be made in this area. Importantly, these are also arguments that help us to think about the impact of the ‘Obama factor’ and the ways in which relations between the EU and the Obama administration might or might not differ from those of the George W. Bush era.

One set of arguments relates to the ways in which the EU and the US self-perceptions and visions of the ‘good world’ compete and/or overlap. Although up to now this chapter has presented them in rather dichotomous terms, it is possible from the discussion to propose some other conclusions. First, is what we see two competing self-perceptions or two versions of ‘exceptionalism’? The term has historically been used in relation to US foreign policy, both by analysts and by political leaders making political claims. But it seems to me that the idea of European normative/civilian/civilizing power is in itself a claim to exceptionalism, to the idea that this is a power unlike others. So maybe the way of framing this discussion is in terms of two exceptionalisms and the ways in which they respond to each other within their mutual relations and in respect of the rest of the world. This does not rule out basic contrasts between the contents of the two exceptionalisms, but it puts the discussion into a different context. And it might allow us to (for example) include in our discussion the fact that in the EU there are those who would argue strongly for a Christian mission and for a clear distinction between a Christian EU and the rest of the world, just as there are those in the US who argue for a foreign policy in which the influence of the religious Right is reduced. Such questions link in turn to the broader issue of ‘grand strategy’ in both the EU and the US, and to debates that are connected with a search for identity on both sides of the Atlantic.

Second, maybe what we are seeing is (also) two overlapping and competing hegemonies, or claims to hegemony. Mandelbaum’s arguments certainly
embody a rationale for a kind of benign US hegemony (and Gramscians could make much of his view that US dominance is accepted as a matter of practical politics by those subordinated to it). As noted earlier, those who have been subjected to EU demands in relation to political conditionality or the securitization of ‘civilian’ relationships might also feel that there is an element of European hegemony – or hegemonial practices – in what they are experiencing, and the analysis of EU structural power in relation to enlargement or the ENP is something that might well benefit from a more systematic application of concepts of hegemony or dominance. In this context, the contest for acceptance of ideas is also something that might be investigated. The notion of ‘normative power’ itself thus becomes linked to hegemony and can be investigated as a reflection of hegemonial practices on the part both of the EU and of the US.

Third, it seems to me that we need to be careful about the assertion that EU = soft power = civilizing power, and the parallel assertion that US = hard power = subordinating power. It is clear that EU power has at least some ‘hard edges’ and that a process of continued hardening is sought by some in respect of European foreign policy (Manners 2006c; Smith 2006c). This course of development, as I have argued elsewhere, carries with it risks and a new calculus for foreign policy action and its consequences; it might be argued that it is when the EU starts using hard power as a consequence of the entanglements created by a ‘real’ foreign policy that the contradictions and new forms of policy debates will be generated (Smith 2006c). Likewise, it should not be taken for granted that the US has not and will not have anything to offer in the realm of ‘civilizing’ power; whilst this might seem heretical to a European audience, it seems to me to be a researchable question which might come up with some surprising answers, especially when applied to any administration other than that occupying the White House between 2001 and 2009.

This means to me that we have to look beyond dichotomies in exploring EU and US visions of themselves as well as their views of the ‘good world’. In particular, it might be suggested that the notion of Normative Power Europe and of the ‘US as Goliath’ encapsulate what might be described as a politics of escapism on both sides of the Atlantic: is the notion of normative power a device to avoid hard questions about the provision of public goods in the world arena, and should we explore the extent to which the EU has collectively moved towards an acceptance or resolution of this tension? Is the notion of the ‘US as Goliath’ and of the US as a provider of global public goods similarly a device to avoid thinking about normative issues and the extent to which the US might be or become a normative power?

Beyond this, we should investigate the ways in which the EU and US visions of the ‘good world’ really encapsulate dichotomously opposed views
of world order. In particular, we might investigate the following. First, we might pursue the argument (implicit in much of what has been argued here) that the kinds of debates I have outlined about the status and roles of the EU and the US are not really separate at all; that, in fact, they are part of a continuing transatlantic discussion in which the discourses and actions of EU and US policy elites intersect, with each continually modifying the other. Next, we could interrogate the notion that the purpose of both EU and US visions of the ‘good world’ is essentially to set out the conditions in which each might best flourish; in other words, not just a good world, but an accommodating world for the EU and the US. Third, we could pursue the idea that both the EU and the US are capable of providing essential services to the world, and that it is important to look for the overlaps between their visions of democracy, of peace and of economic exchange and interdependence so that areas of mutual reinforcement or of division of labour can be identified. This of course requires rather more vision in the broad sense than has been available in transatlantic relations during the past eight years. We could also explore the proposition that in this context we are not faced with the demand for (or the likelihood) of a US retreat from global engagement, but rather a reappraisal of global engagement in which the possibility of an orderly devolution of power might be both possible and profitable. This may sound (indeed, it does sound) utopian, but it is founded on the perception that if no rethink takes place in US foreign policy, then there is the possibility of a very disorderly retreat from engagement and an untidy period of transition into a multipolar disorder with several competing proto-Great Powers. Maybe that is inevitable anyway, but there is the possibility that Europe could play a role in mediating this process of transition and mitigating the effects of disorderly US retreat. In a sense, the US has been responsible for producing normative and civilian powers, in Europe and elsewhere, through its domination and its reluctance to devolve security responsibilities. Maybe – just maybe – those civilian powers can take a role in enabling the US to resolve the existential tensions in its role as ‘Goliath’.

Finally, the chapter has exposed in both the EU and the US a number of gaps in the implementation of the visions of the ‘good world’ held and presented by policy-makers. These gaps can be seen in the institutional, resource-extraction and operational domains and lead to questions that have a great deal in common about the capacity of both the EU and the US to realize their visions. Thus, both for the EU and the US, there are questions about the extent to which their institutional set-ups allow them to pursue and achieve their visions of the ‘good world’. Each also faces questions about the extent to which the resource implications of their visions of world order can be fulfilled on the basis of the resources that can realistically be extracted from both domestic and external constituencies. Both find that the projection of their visions of the ‘good world’ leads to operational gaps and the
incapacity to sustain policies once initiated. Finally, on both sides, it is clear that the outcomes of the pursuit of the ‘good world’ are suboptimal, and that this reflects not only external constraints but endogenous limitations, as outlined above. A simple-minded logic might suggest that these issues are the basis of a potential deal based on the kind of devolution that was described above – but there is many a slip between simple-minded logic and international policy coordination.

There is no answer here, just a set of questions that has hopefully been sharpened and focused by the discussion. But those questions arise out of a concern for the ways in which EU and US roles have been defined in recent foreign policy, and for the ways in which they might be made to speak to each other in a more constructive way in the post-George W. Bush period. The need for the provision of global public goods did not disappear with the passing of the Bush administration, nor did the tensions that have been explored in this chapter.

This conclusion is rendered if anything more powerful by the experience of transatlantic relations during the early parts of the Obama administration. At the same time as there was a new administration in Washington, driven at least partly by a desire to reconfigure the US place in the changing world arena, there was intense internal debate in the EU about the nature of its external policies and external presence in a post-Lisbon world. There is substantial evidence to show that a new US search for partners in leadership and the quest for an orderly devolution of power was taking place; but this has to be set alongside the persistent assumption in Washington (and to a surprising degree in Brussels and EU capitals) that it was for the US to lead in matters of global governance or international cooperation. On the other side, it is clear that the combination in the EU of internal institutional concerns and persistent divergences between the views of key groups of member states imposed significant limitations on the capacity of the Union to respond effectively to US requests for help. When this was coupled with the rise of new ‘emergent powers’ such as China and India, and an incipient multipolarity in the world arena, it was clearer than ever that transatlantic relations reflect not a simple dichotomy but a series of cross-cutting and intersecting differences that will remain an important element in the quest for global public goods.

The implication of the argument in this chapter is that both Europeans and Americans would benefit from critical introspection into their assumptions about the ‘good world’ and their places in it. In turn, I would argue that the study of EU–US relations would benefit substantially from empirical work conducted within the kind of framework developed here, including the selection and investigation of relevant case studies. Such work is bound to qualify the ‘ideal types’ presented here even further, but that is in many ways their purpose.
Note

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The EU’s Development Policy: Empirical Evidence of ‘Normative Power Europe?’

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Introduction

In one of his most recent publications, Ian Manners boldly states: ‘The EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics’ (2008b: 45). Acknowledging the critical theoretical precept that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981: 128), Manners enjoins scholars to pursue normative approaches to the study of the European Union (EU) in world politics. Interestingly, in this piece examining the normative ethics of the EU, Manners has arguably come the closest yet to positioning Normative Power Europe (NPE) as a theoretically grounded, empirical framework of analysis, and in the spirit of critical and reflective scholarship, it serves as a useful reminder that normative and empirical approaches are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is important to recall that his seminal article of 2002 presented an extensive empirical case study to substantiate his claims about the normative power of the EU – namely, the diffusion of norms opposing the death penalty and its resultant abolition in the EU and candidate countries such as Turkey. Nonetheless, much of the commentary and discussion of NPE has centred on its further conceptual and theoretical articulation as well as critiques and contestation of it rather than its empirical validation. Now, with Manners’ proposal of a tripartite method for assessing the EU’s principles, actions and impact, it is arguably the case that NPE is evolving towards a more rigorous analytical framework and perhaps one of the most innovative and holistic research programmes in EU studies. The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate as much by drawing from Manners (2002, 2006c, 2006e, 2008b), Manners and Whitman (2003) and Whitman (2006a) and then deploying these cumulative analytical insights to empirically investigate the concept of NPE as it applies to a relatively understudied area of the EU’s external relations: development policy.

The EU is the world’s largest aid donor to developing countries purportedly spending 500 million euros per month on assistance projects that span
the globe from its immediate neighbours, to the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America. Collectively, EU member states and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Development account for 57 per cent of Official Development Assistance (ODA) compared to only 22 per cent for the United States (US). Unlike the US and many other rich countries, the EU appears to be living up to its pledge for the United Nations’ (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and is, in fact, on course to double its ODA by 2015, the target date set for achieving the MDGs and the commitment to the eradication of extreme poverty. Despite this area of notable global leadership, there has been only scant attention paid to this dimension of the EU’s external policy. The vast majority of scholarship on the EU’s external relations tends to focus primarily on the construction (and often the weaknesses) of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), but both development aid and humanitarian assistance represent a significant area of EU external action and therefore warrant much greater analysis and empirical scrutiny, particularly as we seek to define and assess the nature and character of the EU’s international identity. As this chapter seeks to illustrate, the existing scholarship on the role of the EU as a global actor misses an important dimension of European power and influence in the world by neglecting its approach to foreign aid and development policy.

Examining both normative discourse and specific policy actions allows a more comprehensive answer to the following question: Is the EU’s approach to development consistent with its values, principles and norms, as well as effective and beneficial to the goals of development and global poverty reduction? A normatively grounded, empirically supported answer to this question may have significant implications for both the theoretical and empirical debates regarding the utility of the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ as well as policy debates and strategies for combating global poverty and growing inequality between the North and South. The chapter is organized along the following lines. The next section sets up the analytical framework building on a selection of work by Manners and Whitman which I believe offers significant theoretical and methodological guideposts that help to move NPE from concept to research programme. Applying this framework, I then examine the EU’s development policy by first situating the development dilemma and the current North–South economic divide highlighting the nature and role of the EU therein. Next, I investigate how the EU has approached development both discursively and institutionally through the specific declarations, stated positions and policy instruments related to trade and aid. This part of the chapter is concerned with the first two elements of Manners’ tripartite method – judging the EU in terms of its principles and actions. Comparing NPE with various other characterizations of the EU’s power and role as a global actor, we can also assess which formulation best captures the essence of the EU in terms of how its principles align
with its actual discourse and policy strategy. The third dimension of the tri-partite method considers impact, therefore the final portion of the chapter weighs the NPE construct against the empirical evidence – that is, the actual behaviour and policies of the EU towards the developing world.

From concept to analytical framework to research programme

Concepts form the building blocks of theory; theories allow us to simplify, interpret and analyse complex social phenomena; and research programmes facilitate advances in knowledge deriving from theoretical understanding and empirical verification. I would argue that the NPE approach is moving towards this latter stage and in this section, drawing on the work of Manners and Whitman, I lay out the framework of analysis that constitutes its theoretical and empirical core. First, we must sketch out and clarify the theoretical foundations of NPE. When Manners claims rather categorically that the EU ‘is, has been and always will be’ a normative power, he is not making a judgement about the ethical behaviour of the EU as a collective actor, but merely reasserting what multiple publications and ensuing debates have led him and numerous scholars employing the concept to affirm: The EU is both a product and expression of something fundamentally different in world politics and therefore traditional theories of international relations derived from state-centric premises and assumptions will always obscure more than elucidate when it comes to interpreting the institutional and ideational character of the EU. In essence, just by virtue of its founding conception articulated as an ‘abnegation of sovereignty’ in the Schuman Declaration, the process of European integration transcends Westphalian conventions of international politics. In fact, in their joint work, Manners and Whitman clearly make the case that the EU ‘represents the antithesis of the state in the post-Cold War world’ (2003: 399).

Therefore, a core theoretical premise of the NPE framework is that the EU is a normative power not so much by the standards of its actual behaviour nor its official declarations and rhetoric, but merely by virtue of what it is: a construction and a process as much as a concrete and creative new entity in the international system. In his original formulation, Manners asserts:

The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial and usually overlooked observation that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is. Thus, my presentation of the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a
normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into
the international system. (Manners 2002: 252)

Arguing that the EU is a normative power is emphatically not a contradiction
in terms, Manners and others have shown that NPE is rather a conceptual-
ization that can in fact accommodate other conceptions both civilian and
military. Manners’ intention was not to displace or argue against those char-
acterisations but to add to them and to underscore the crucial component
of the EU’s fundamental, ideational nature. In sum,

The idea of pooling sovereignty, the importance of a transnational
European Parliament, the requirements of democratic conditionality, and
the pursuit of human rights … are constitutive norms of a polity which is
different to existing states and international relations. Thus the different
existence, the different norms, and the different policies which the EU
pursues are really part of redefining what can be normal in international
relations. (Manners 2002: 253)

Thus, the extent to which the EU has been able to project power and
influence and diffuse its norms is one test by which scholars are able to
demonstrate the conceptual and theoretical advantages of the NPE concept
vis-à-vis other approaches to understanding the EU’s international ‘actor-
ness’. Yet, accepting the normative basis of the EU does not mean that the
EU always acts in a normative way, nor that the norms it seeks to pro-
mote are necessarily or always consistent with its own, very unique internal
principles. This is precisely why NPE is more than a concept; it is a the-
oretical grounding that guides analytical work attempting to make sense
of and explain the role of the EU as a global actor. In other words, we
need to take care in understanding the distinction between the theoretical
and empirical functions of NPE and avoid conflating NPE as an analytical
construct with NPE as an uncontested interpretation of what the EU says
and does.

Manners and Whitman (2003) developed more extensively the notion
of the EU’s international identity by elucidating what they refer to as the
‘reflexive dimension’ and illustrating how the distinctiveness of the polity
and the role representations of the EU should be thought of as a ‘differ-
ence engine’ meaning the addition of international elements to the already
complex and multifaceted identities extant among Europeans. What is of
significance here is the very notion that reflexivity plays an important part
of the construction and representation of the EU’s international identity. In
almost every international action undertaken or any attempt at a common
foreign policy position, the EU seemingly undergoes an exercise in what
Holland (2002) describes as an identification and legitimation internal pro-
cess coupled with an external process of justification and projection. Soft
power, civilian power, ethical power or even military power conceptions completely miss this critical, cognitive dimension that is inherent in the NPE construct. As I will argue below with the example of its approach to development, this capacity for reflexivity and policy change derives from and affirms the EU’s unique nature as a normative power in world politics. Thus, it is necessary to anchor this ideational interpretation with empirical referents. Pushing beyond conceptualization towards a rigorous analytical framework, both Manners and Whitman have presented helpful guideposts in this endeavour.

Before discussing Manners’ tripartite analytical method, it is useful to consider Whitman’s analysis of the European Security Strategy and its implications for the analytical concept of civilian power. There are at least three pertinent insights we may extrapolate from his argument that also shed light on the empirical and evaluative potential of the NPE analytical framework. Despite what Whitman describes as the ‘threadbare nature of the concept’ and 30 years after its emergence, the notion of Civilian Power Europe (CPE) appears ‘to continue to discursively delineate the parameters for advocacy and future thinking on Europe’s international role’ (Whitman 2006a: 15) and by this he suggests that the idea resonates with the public as well as finds its way into official documents – even within the European Security Strategy itself. In other words, it is important that there is instantiation of the concept both from an elite and mass public perspective. Second, despite the criticism that many analysts lodged against the Security Strategy as a violation of the commitment to the idea of Europe as a civilian power, Whitman demonstrated that there is in fact a credible civilian power reading of the strategy itself. Though not explicit, it is possible that this discernment is equivalent to those who would defend the use of NPE as a valid analytical concept even when the EU fails to act in a normatively coherent or principled way. Finally, and very much consistent with Manners, Whitman urges critical reflection when the concept is utilized. He identifies the following contours of the civilian power notion as: (1) the context within which the EU operates in relation to understanding its own significance; (2) the function of the EU’s pursuit of a distinctive diplomacy and the civilianizing of its relations by creating forms of institutionalized association, partnership and cooperation; (3) the impact of normative values projected beyond its own membership; and (4) the necessity of assessing CPE in terms of the form of power exercised by the EU. Whitman concludes that pursuing inquiry along these lines would be ‘a different undertaking from the starting point of questioning the degree to which the EU is/isn’t a civilian power, but rather how the EU’s practices of handling power are apparent through subsequent empirical work’ (2006a: 15). Although Whitman did not address the NPE debates in this article, nor juxtapose the development of the NPE concept with that of CPE, by comparison, NPE seems much more robust as opposed to a ‘threadbare one’ – all the more so given its relatively short life; and unlike his observation that CPE
has been disproportionately concerned with futurology, the NPE approach has been almost entirely oriented towards the here and now of the EU as a global actor. In this vein, these two factors combined with the insight of both Whitman and Manners that NPE is not meant to dismiss other conceptualizations, but to add to them, Whitman’s fourfold schema appears to be equally applicable to the NPE framework. We will now see the congruence of this suggested mode of empirical analysis with that of Manners’ recent proposal of the tripartite analytical method.

Manners admonishes scholars attempting to analyse EU policy and influence empirically without posing the questions of why the EU is or is not acting or ‘how we might judge what the EU should be doing in world politics’ (2008b: 45). In contrast, the normative power approach seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the principles promoted by the EU – those recognized within the UN system as universally applicable – how it acts, and its impact. He argues that ‘we must judge the EU’s creative efforts to promote a more just, cosmopolitical world in terms of its principles, actions and impact’ (2008b: 47), which he suggests translate into the maxims of ‘living by example’, ‘being reasonable’ and ‘doing least harm.’ These three elements comprise the empirical core of NPE and the tripartite analytical framework. First, one must ‘examine the constitutive principles of the EU and how these become promoted as aims and objectives of the EU in world politics’ (2008b: 55); second, the tripartite analysis must ‘look at how the EU promotes its constitutive principles as actions and policies in world politics’ (2008b: 57); and the third and final part of the tripartite analysis is ‘to consider the impact and outcomes of EU actions taken to promote its constitutive principles in world politics’ (2008b: 58). This methodological innovation serves to unify the normative, theoretical foundations and the empirical imperatives of the NPE approach and if more broadly and systematically carried out could quite possibly culminate in a holistic research programme. Both Manners and Whitman have been concerned to show that what matters more than determining what kind of power the EU is or is not is a conscious effort on the part of analysts to evaluate the motivations for, the principles and values behind, and the consequences of the exercise of power by the EU in the world. The remainder of this chapter applies Whitman’s schema (context, function, values and form) and Manners’ method (principles, action and impact) to the case of the EU’s development policy.

Context: the development dilemma and the EU’s role in the North–South economic divide

Well over three decades have passed since the Pearson Commission proclaimed the widening gap between the developed and developing countries to be the ‘central problem of our times’. Today global inequalities in income
and standards of living have reached obscene proportions. The following stylized facts presented by Timothy Garton Ash capture the scope of the problem of global poverty and the divide between the ‘rich North’ and the ‘poor South’.

In round figures, roughly 1 billion of the world’s 6 billion inhabitants are rich. They have an average income of approximately $70 a day. They live mainly in Europe, North America, Japan, and a few other prosperous countries. In the mental geography of development rather than geopolitics, the West of the free is the ‘North’ of the rich. (Thus Australia, though in the Southern hemisphere, is part of the ‘North’.) At the other end, in the poor ‘South,’ more than 1 billion men, women, and children live on less than $1 a day. Only slightly better off are another 1 to 2 billion people living on less than $2 a day. According to U.N. figures, between 1999 and 2001, some 840 million people went hungry; one in every seven people in the world. At the same time, nearly one-third of Americans suffer from the serious health problem of obesity. Who needs a parable? In the South, men women, and children are dying because they don’t have enough to eat; in the North, they are dying because they eat too much. (Garton Ash 2004: 149)

Attention to the growing divide between the rich and the poor in the wake of an ever expanding global economy provides an important backdrop and the context necessary to attempt to establish how the North’s foreign economic practices and development policies may or may not be contributing to it.

In the final decade of the twentieth century, the cover of the Human Development Report dramatically captured the magnitude of global inequities. The champagne coupe that figured on the front cover dramatically illustrated that the richest 20 per cent of the world’s population possesses 82.7 per cent of total world gross national product (GNP) while the bottom quintile has only 1.4 per cent. The 1999 Human Development Report claimed that the gap in GNP between the richest fifth of the world’s population and the rest had widened from 30 to 1 in 1960, to 60 to 1 in 1990, to 74 to 1 in 1995 (1999: 104–5). Though the simple measure of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita reveals a great deal about overall income differentials in the North and the South, the rationale behind the concept of human development is much deeper and more comprehensive than a single statistical indicator. The Human Development Index (HDI) examines basic human capabilities as measured through life expectancy, educational attainment and income. Of the 174 countries for which the HDI had been constructed, 45 are in the high human development category, 94 in the medium and 35 in the low human development category. Sixteen countries experienced reversals in human development since 1990 due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic – mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) (Human Development Report 1999: 128). The growing polarization of income is starkly captured in the following statistic: over a four-year period (1995–99), the world’s richest 200 people doubled their wealth to over $1 trillion, while the number of people living on less than one dollar a day has remained steady at 1.3 billion. Finally, according to World Bank data, the average income in the 20 richest countries is 37 times the average in the poorest 20, doubling the gap over the last 40 years.

This leads us to the question of what role the EU, as a major economic bloc, exercises in the global economy. First of all, the EU ranked as the second largest economy in the world (after the US) with an aggregate GDP of $11.65 trillion in 2004. It is obvious that such economic strength provides a huge opportunity to project and wield power in the international system and one aim of this chapter is to investigate how the EU uses its economic prowess and the political leverage flowing from it to the betterment or detriment of the developing South. Considering the history of European colonialism during the nineteenth century, no historically conscious claim could be made that such wealth accrued in splendid isolation or without long-term repercussions for the subjugated, exploited or acquiescent societies brought into the web of the foreign economic relations of Europe. Since its inception and over the course of 50 years of development, what has the EU done to reverse the trend of exploitation and tackle massive social and economic inequalities?

**Discourse and development policies in the European Union**

_The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. (Article 3-1, Reform Treaty 2007)_

Both internally and externally the EU has undergone a fairly significant transformation in the way that it conducts its development policies. Internally, the European Parliament has recently offered a strong critique of this policy area and as a result, attempts are being made to close the gap between rhetoric and reality by offering a more coherent vision of development that is consistent with its core values. The new approach is based on partnerships with the receiving countries and a focus on improving the quality and efficiency of the various funding instruments and mechanisms to work more closely with each country and their own particular strategies to reduce poverty. The Parliament’s critique and the resulting overhaul of the EU’s development policy is reflected in the Reform Treaty (Article 10a-2d)
where it expressly vows to foster ‘the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty’. I would argue that this capacity for reflexivity and policy change derives from and affirms its unique nature as a normative power in world politics. Part of what constitutes this claim to uniqueness or the *sui generis* character of the EU may be the simple observation that it is the sole global actor that is subject to oversight from a supranational, transnational parliamentary body. Moreover, despite its lack of coercive capability and its perceived political weakness vis-à-vis the Commission, the EU Parliament contributed in a fundamental way to the reframing of one of the core external policies of the EU – that of trade and development.

In considering the values and principles of the EU and their bearing on the question of development policy, it is notable that the excerpt quoted above from the Lisbon Treaty explicitly states that the EU’s external actions shall be guided by their own principles. In the context of development policy, the key principles are equality and solidarity. Maintaining the integrity of the framework as distilled from Whitman and Manners’ work, the first objective in any empirical evaluation is to consider these principles directly as they relate to the EU’s identity and international actorness. The centrality of the equality principle enshrined in the EU’s founding treaties is of vital importance as it highlights the potential NPE wields as an effective agent of redistribution in all three of its spheres of influence – internal, regional and global. While external development aid is the main thrust of this chapter, internal and regional programmes deserve mention here in order to demonstrate the consistency between EU policies at all levels of governance. Internally, the EU promotes development through its structural funds, which channel aid to less developed regions of the EU. In so doing, the EU promotes the inclusive equality of member states and of regions. Regionally, the EU diverts significant development aid through its cohesion funds. Cohesion funds are granted to European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) states and to candidate countries in order to offset the economic costs of transition. Externally, the EU has projected its norms and values by emphasizing the humanitarian and civilian nature of its external relations and by linking its development policies to the broader aims of promoting fundamental freedoms, consolidating democracy and strengthening respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The effort to precisely and explicitly define a common European identity has proved quite elusive to say the least and the problem is even more challenging when speaking about an EU foreign policy identity in relation to the developing world. Obviously the EU is a single actor when it comes to trade policies as the 27 members negotiate as a single bloc within the World Trade Organization (WTO), but a coordinated multilateral trade policy has not prevented the individual member states from having other bilateral economic relations with other countries of both the North and the South. Furthermore,
the emphasis here is on both trade as well as development policies such as aid and humanitarian assistance where the EU does not currently exercise exclusive competence. For this examination of normative discourse, however, it is critical to identify how development policy fits into EU external relations and what the EU has projected as its common policy goals in this area. When we examine some of the empirical data it will be necessary to disaggregate the member states from the EU as a whole as some of the data are necessarily based on the national level policies as opposed to a common EU policy.

Manners (2002) argued that the EU is a unique entity whose identity in world politics is based on normative, ideational values that transcend narrow national interests – whether civilian or military – which are based primarily on capabilities. The EU’s approach to development may be an important validation of this conceptualization of ‘Normative Power Europe’ as well as a significant pillar of the EU’s external policy as it goes beyond the instruments only approach to EU external action. Whereas bilateral aid policies of each member state may still be associated with elements of national interest that are pursued through forms of economic blackmail and political coercion, collectively the EU is much less susceptible to such charges. For instance, the most recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report that scrutinized EU development policies did not make any such accusations, though it did not fail to mention that Commission aid practices are slow, bureaucratic and incompetent – though improving (see Beattie 2007). The very fact that an international organization like the OECD is assessing the EU’s collective effort at development policies indicates this is indeed a significant area of EU-level international action and therefore one that warrants greater analysis by scholars interested in exploring various forms of the EU’s ‘actorness’ (Bretherton and Vogler 1999). What is particularly compelling about the need to more carefully consider the EU as an actor in the field of international development is the opportunity to evaluate both the normative and empirical dimensions of its commitments. Addressing the critique of Diez (2005), Manners claims that his original articulation of NPE was ‘a statement of what is believed to be good about the EU; a statement which needed to be made in order to stimulate and reflect on what the EU should be doing in world politics’ (Manners 2006e: 168). Development assistance appears to be a solid case for what the EU should be doing as it also serves as a strategy for promoting the norms and values of international cooperation, human security and sustainable development beyond its own borders. An examination of another concept that has been used to characterize the nature of the EU as it engages in world politics will lend further support to the argument that the application of the NPE framework to the EU’s development policies elucidates its comparative advantages and underscores its potential as a full-fledged research programme as opposed to a mere concept.
As Kalypso Nicolaïdis notes, Europeans know all too well the significance of power in world affairs and the EU increasingly represents and shapes Europe’s role in the world.

The rest of the world, far from being Hobbesian is attuned to the European choice because both power and purpose matter in international relations; legitimacy translates power into effectiveness. In such a world, the promise held up by the ‘European difference’ is great and lies in the legitimacy of the narrative of projection that the European Union seeks to deploy that is the consistency between its internal and external praxis and discourse, EU-topia is relevant beyond the shores of its own paradise. (Nicolaïdis 2005: 96)

This narrative of projection conceptualization appears to be congruent with the ‘normative Europe’ perspective and helps us to make sense of the EU’s complex, ever evolving, identity as a global actor. In direct relation to how this narrative of image projection helps us to theorize the EU’s legitimacy and capacity to act collectively in the area of development policy and relations with the South, it is significant to further consider the following argument made by Nicolaïdis:

How can its narrative of projection be reconciled with the postcolonial character of the EU project? In part by systematically banishing the kind of dual standards that underpinned colonialist thinking... The European Community both inherited the postcolonial guilt of its member states and provided an institutional venue to assuage that guilt, a venue that would be less vulnerable to accusations of neocolonialism than individual member states’ diplomacy. (Nicolaïdis 2005: 101)

For Nicolaïdis, this narrative of projection requires that Europe – and presumably scholars seeking to understand EU foreign policy identity in these terms – define power as ‘the capacity to empower others’ (2005: 114). In defending this view of power, Nicolaïdis points out that while the US may outspend the EU on the military by factor of 4, the EU and member states combined outspend US on development aid by factor of 7.1 Though a useful comparative statistic, we should not be satisfied that just by virtue of such spending the EU is necessarily ‘empowering others’ and moreover this conceptualization smacks a bit of ‘othering’ – especially problematic when addressing the already complex asymmetries between the developed and developing worlds and in light of the EU’s colonial past. While the spirit of Nicolaïdis’ approach is otherwise quite compatible with that of the NPE concept, and the above quote provides a compelling, normatively based rationale for transferring development policies to the Community level, we need to move beyond the realm of narrative to that of actual practice, and
this underscores the key distinction between Manners’ notion of NPE and both the civilian power and ‘narrative of projection’ approaches to understanding the EU’s identity and role in the world. As Manners has put it we need to ‘[a]ttempt to escape civilising missions by countering the neocolonial discourses of claims implicit (or explicit) in civilian power’ (Manners 2006e: 175). Again, as argued earlier, this is precisely why it is incumbent upon scholars to assert NPE as a tool for analysis as opposed to a mere descriptive or conceptual device. Examining EU policies towards the developing world provides a felicitous way to illustrate the analytical value and appeal of such a shift. This leads to the second element in Manners’ tripartite method, actions or what Whitman refers to as ‘functions’.

What are the institutional parameters and the legal basis within which the EU operates in the area of development policy? As Martin Holland (2002) has pointed out, Europe’s formal relations with the developing world are as old as the European Economic Community (EEC) and Treaty of Rome (1957), and the European Commission has provided international development assistance since its founding. The Lomé Conventions (1975–2000) preceded by Yaoundé and succeeded by Cotonou in June 2000 were long considered a hallmark of the EU’s policy with the developing world or more specifically the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries representing the former colonies of Western Europe. The foundation of these agreements was the recognition of partnership and preferential trade arrangements. Manners identifies six factors shaping norm diffusion in international relations and from which the EU’s normative power stems – contagion, informational, procedural, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filter. Transference refers to diffusion taking place

when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means. Examples are Phare and Tacis programmes as well as the European development fund to the Cotonou states. Both procedural and transference diffusion are now facilitated by the conditionality which is required in all EC agreements with third countries. (Manners 2002: 244–5)

Nonetheless, some critics suggest that these arrangements perpetuate neocolonial dependencies and studies have shown they have done little to ameliorate the economic situation of the ACP countries. Furthermore, the treaty-based, contractual nature of the relationship also clearly discriminated against other developing states and violated General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO principles of non-discriminatory practices in an open trade system. But trade is only one aspect of the EU’s development policies. Article 130 of the Treaty on European Union states the Community policy in the development sphere is complementary to the policies pursued by member states and should: (1) foster sustainable economic and social development; (2) facilitate the integration of the developing countries into
the world economy; and (3) fight poverty in the developing world (Holland 2002: 2–3). Admittedly, enhanced trade access for developing states will help these states to help themselves, but improved trade access alone is not sufficient to help the poorest countries move out of extreme poverty (Pooley 2002).

The 1992 establishment of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) extended supranational level development aid from the regional level to the global level (Bretherton and Vogler 1999). ECHO ‘is responsible for the preservation of life during emergencies and longer-term assistance thereafter, including rehabilitation and reconstruction, and the welfare of refugees and returnees’ (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 131). The two primary criticisms of ECHO are that it overlaps with other EU development programmes and that funding would be better used in crisis prevention than in crisis management (Bretherton and Vogler 1999). According to Bretherton and Vogler (1999), the overlapping nature of ECHO’s aid with other Community level initiatives demonstrates a disconnect between EU level programmes and thus undermines the EU’s ‘actoriness’.

However, the relationship between principles and actions is the salient issue here when it comes to the empirical assessment of NPE and its ability to apprehend to capture the full complexity of the EU’s external policy evolution. The rising and independent role of the European Parliament has led to a thorough and reflexive evaluation of the EU’s 50-year history of development policies. Essentially the Parliament obliged the Commission to fundamentally revise its policy and elaborate a new framework for development policy of which the principal aim is the eventual eradication of poverty. Reflecting this change in discursive terms, the most important and recent joint statement by the Council and the Commission issued in July 2005 declared that Community development policy was grounded on the principle of sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social development. Promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance are also an integral part of the EU’s development policy strategy. One of the remaining issues on the reform agenda is better coordination between the member states and the EU Commission as well as among the four Directorates-General that deal with development. As has been argued elsewhere, greater coordination between the national and supranational levels of European development would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of development aid originating from the EU (Bretherton and Vogler 1999).

One thing is clear: the EU member states are incrementally channelling a growing proportion of their total aid programmes through the EU up from 13 per cent in 1990 to 17 per cent of development assistance now transferred from the member states to the EU itself. These pooled resources alone make the EU assistance efforts among the world’s five leading donor programmes managing approximately $6 billion of development aid annually, roughly the same amount of assistance managed by the UN and the Office of Development Assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary
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Fund (IMF) (Lennon 2001: 127). It is interesting to note that Europeans are fully cognizant and supportive of the leading role their societies play in development assistance. Europeans now provide more than 50 per cent of all civilian development assistance in the world and 47 per cent of humanitarian assistance in the world (Rifkin 2004: 304–5). The trend to move foreign aid policy under the purview of the EU, thus to the supranational as opposed to the national level, makes sense given the gradual coordination of more foreign economic and commercial policies. Though there may remain difficult issues to resolve regarding further enlargement, protecting cultural identities, and the harmonization of immigration and taxation policies, European citizens show firm support for a growing European foreign policy identity of which an important component is strengthening humanitarian and development assistance.

In 2005 the European Commission issued its latest statement regarding the reinvigorated commitment and the collective or ‘community’ approach to development. The following four fundamental concepts define the EU’s new development policy:

• Harmonization: seeks to harmonize aid procedures with other donors and partner countries.
• Results-orientation: evaluates success in terms of concrete achievements not inputs and particularly those measured against the UN MDGs.
• Ownership: aligns EU aid with the national budget process and its implementation mechanisms. Encourages recipient countries to ‘take ownership’ of the assistance programme.
• Coherence: ensures coherence with other policy areas with a view to reaching MDGs – environment, climate change, security, trade, fisheries, agriculture, research, information society, transport and energy.

Source: EU Focus (2005).

What is most striking about these concepts underlying the EU’s development policy (in addition to succinctness, which is altogether rare for any EU policy) is that two of the four principles imply the alignment of the EU’s values with those of the UN and more specifically, the UN MDGs. Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not the discourse and official policy declarations are consistent with actual practice and policy commitments, which we will now evaluate in line with the third part of the tripartite analysis: impact, with an eye on what Whitman called the form of the EU’s exercise of power.

Empirical evidence of congruence between discourse and policy

The Doha Development Round

After more than seven years of negotiations, the Doha round of trade talks launched in 2001 has reached what appears to be an intractable impasse.
Officially labelled as the ‘development’ round, the talks were intended to lure developing countries as well as globalization backlashers back to the table after the collapse of the WTO talks in Seattle in 1999. Responding also in part to the terrorist attacks of September 11, rich countries were sending a message of solidarity with poorer countries by addressing the root causes of terrorism – the poverty and lack of economic opportunity that purportedly breeds it. Manners has recently suggested that this notion informs the EU’s normative principle of sustainable peace and the related development aid and trade are ‘elements of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention’ (2008b: 48). The talks were also meant to pick up where the Uruguay Round left off – mainly further liberalization of agricultural and service sectors. The conflict over the agricultural sector specifically has come to symbolize all of the contradictions and hypocrisy behind the many grandiose declarations about ‘aid for trade’ and eradicating global poverty. Not only does agricultural trade represent the biggest area of conflict between the EU and the US (in the form of competing export interests as well as protecting domestic producers) with each blaming the other for not compromising or making adequate concessions to developing countries, it has also revealed divisions among the developing nations who would have very uneven benefits from new trade rules and true liberalization of the sector.

Large developing countries such as Brazil and Argentina clearly stand to gain from deeper cuts in EU and US farm tariffs and subsidies, but these very cuts would certainly harm the poorest countries, particularly those that currently benefit from preferential treatment for their imports in EU markets. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, both the Cancun (2003) and the Hong Kong (2005) ministerial meetings ended in stalemate. No easy conclusions can be made about who the biggest culprit is or whose practices are more harmful to the larger cause of promoting economic development and ending practices that are so directly inequitable to the global South. At the Hong Kong meetings, the US made a vague pledge to reduce its domestic cotton subsidies after being embarrassed by the EU and painted as an enemy of the poor – especially those of West Africa. In retaliation, the US charges that protectionist policies of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) pit the narrow interests of a small number of European (mostly French) farmers against the economic well-being of the vast majority of the population in the developing world. Brazil, leader of the Group of 20 – the group of developing nations negotiating agriculture – has aligned with the US to paint the EU as the real roadblock to progress. Brussels has made a commitment to reduce farm tariffs by only 39 per cent compared with the Group of 20 with a proposal of 54 per cent and the US proposed cut of 75 per cent. In return, the rich countries are also demanding that the big emerging economies such as India and China drastically cut their industrial tariffs, and this is where the rubber hits the road so to speak as these countries refuse to budge on market access and tariff reduction unless greater progress is reached on agriculture.
Though the EU has been cast as the biggest obstacle, the joint World Bank and IMF Global Monitoring report of 2004 judged the EU both as the most open major market for exports from developing countries and the trading partner which has made the greatest efforts to reduce its average protection levels in their favour. Ironically, a recent study by Thomas Hertel has found that a reduction in poverty as a result of full liberalization of agriculture and goods trade would only be half or a third of previous estimates and the limited package presently offered under Doha would lift only 20 million out of 1.1 billion living in destitution rather than the initial estimate of 127 million. Such findings reinforce the need to consider development dilemma and the North–South economic divide from multiple perspectives.

United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals

In September 2000, at the dawn of the new millennium, the General Assembly of the UN unanimously adopted the UN’s Millennium Declaration that vowed to make considerable strides towards eradicating global poverty. More specifically, the declaration contained eight proposals to cut the proportion of people in extreme poverty by half by the year 2015. One calculation puts the cost of meeting the non-environmental targets at $40 to $70 billion a year above the current $50 billion in development assistance. Another estimate puts costs of environmental goals over a longer period at $25 billion per year. The 2002 conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey confirmed the need for more aid, trade and debt forgiveness by industrial countries and the EU made lofty statements about living up to their pledges to meet the UN MDGs. So how well has the EU fared six years into the campaign?

EU undertakings

Presently, the EU (Commission and member states) accounts for 55 per cent of world aid. As President Barroso has publicly stated: ‘to achieve the MDGs, it is necessary to do more, better and faster. The European Commission has made and will make proposals to strengthen the level of ambition and to consolidate its world leadership in Development Policy’ (Europa 2005).

At the UN World Summit 2005, Commission President Barroso challenged others to match the EU’s commitments on development goals such as the firm determination to reach the long-standing target of 0.7 per cent of GNP to ODA by 2015. The EU has set itself the interim target of 0.56 per cent gross national income (GNI)/ODA by 2010. These EU commitments translate into 20 billion euros more ODA per year by 2010 and 45 billion euros more per year by 2015. Half of the increase is earmarked for Africa, the continent most in need of additional support in their efforts to reach the MDGs.

Overall, the OECD study has found that while aid as a share of GNI has declined over the period 2001–03 in most countries, and most notably in
Table 8.1  Net value of the ODA provided by the EU, in million € (current rate)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>22,313</td>
<td>24,023</td>
<td>27,497</td>
<td>31,875</td>
<td>33,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>2255</td>
<td>4130</td>
<td>5330</td>
<td>5781</td>
<td>6349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the US, ODA shares have increased in Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland and the UK and, from low initial shares, Austria, Greece and Ireland. Only Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway (a non-EU member state) and Sweden have consistently met the UN 0.7 per cent target over the whole period covered in Table 8.1, but Luxembourg has been meeting the target since 2000. Since ODA shares of GNI reached their low point in 1997, 15 of the 22 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members have increased their shares and 11 have committed to remain at or to attain the 0.7 per cent target (OECD 2008). Louis Michel, the EU’s development commissioner, has requested that ‘road maps’ be drawn up for individual countries to ensure that each EU member state meets new targets and another Commission official also underscored that even without including debt relief, overall EU aid increased by 6.1 per cent this past year. The EU has pledged to lift aid to 0.5 per cent of GNP by 2010 and the UN-recommended level of 0.7 per cent by 2015. Unlike in the US or Canada, the Europeans experience the additional layer of pressure to bolster contributions to development. The EU Commission and particularly the current commissioner, Louis Michel, former Foreign Minister of Belgium, acts as a sort of external conscience on member states to live up to their promises. Unlike other aspects of external relations, this policy area does not require a significant loss of national sovereignty but rather a shifting of resources from national to community level efforts. In sum, the EU has demonstrated significant collective leadership and commitment to the UN MDGs and in May 2001, for the first time, the EU hosted a major UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries emphasizing the effort of the EU to link its foreign policies firmly within the UN system giving its approach and attempt to diffuse its norms a wider universal appeal.

Commitment to Development Index

It is not just the amount but the quality of the assistance that matters for producing positive change in economic development. Pursuing this goal, the Center for Global Development and Foreign Policy has constructed a new and more comprehensive assessment tool for understanding the North–South economic divide which provides more holistic analyses of development policies to uncover the sources of the growing disparities
and persistent global poverty. In 2003, the organizations jointly published results of the first study ranking the world’s richest countries according to how much their assistance helps or hinders the economic and social development of poor countries. The Commitment to Development Index (CDI) is designed to examine a range of factors beyond foreign aid programmes and generosity of aid, to other practices such as immigration policies, peacekeeping operations as well as foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. The index penalizes financial assistance to corrupt regimes, environmental harm and barriers to imports from developing countries. Sixteen of the top 19 countries are all European. Nine European nations rank in the top ten countries in the index.

The CDI shows fighting poverty and addressing the disparity between the developed and developing worlds involve more than giving money. The index ranks 21 rich countries according to their policies in seven areas: (1) quantity and quality of foreign aid; (2) openness to developing country exports; (3) policies that influence sinvestment; (4) migration policies; (5) environmental policies; (6) security policies; and (7) support for the creation and dissemination of new technologies. Scores on each component are scaled so that an average score in the CDI’s first year, 2003, is equal to 5.0. A country’s final score is the average of those for each component (see Center for Global Development 2007). Though this is only a cursory analysis here, the CDI shows promise for offering a more comprehensive empirical yardstick by which we might gauge the effectiveness and fairness of policies that link the North and the South.

Based on the 2003 findings, it appears the EU is fulfilling its ambition to become a leader in the realm of development policy despite its remaining shortcomings in the trade arena. The Commission, however, has recently begun a new campaign of trade assistance measures such as customs improvements and support for infrastructure. Combined the Commission and member states have promised a billion euros annually by 2010 to entice poorer countries to sign trade agreements. The current average is 840 million euros from the EU level and an average of 300 million euros from national governments. This attempt appears less altruistic than other forms of assistance such as debt relief and direct aid and it may contradict or blur the line between the EU’s normative goal of promoting human development and the actual practice of coercion and promotion of its own economic interests. These new trade tactics alongside the strict hygiene and product standards that some criticize as unfair and protectionist trade barriers coupled also with the complicated ‘rules of origin’ restrictions point to a less than clear success story of the EU as a benefactor of developing countries. More sustained and systematic empirical investigations that link both aid and trade practices would be needed to fully substantiate the claim that overall the EU acts in a consistent and normatively principled way when it comes to its vision and implementation of development policies. Drawing this inference,
However, lends strong support for the claim that the NPE framework allows for a more systematic and comprehensive understanding and explanation of the EU’s complex and evolving international identity and shape of global norms.

Conclusion

The chapter has sought an empirical validation of the concept of NPE by examining one often neglected area of the EU’s external relations: development policy. The question set forth at the beginning of this chapter was whether or not the EU approach to development is consistent with its values and norms as well as effective and beneficial to the goals of development and global poverty reduction. With the exception of two areas, the need for greater efficiency in aid delivery and new trade assistance measures, overall the bulk of the empirical evidence suggests a tentative affirmation of the congruence between the notion of the EU as a normative power and the reorientation and execution of its development policies.

The EU member states and the Commission (prodded by the EU Parliament) have undergone self-critique and concrete reform, by virtue of gradually transferring development policies to the Community level away from the temptations and perils of pursuing narrow national interests that may come at the expense of the broader interest of sustainable human development consistent with the values enshrined in the EU’s founding treaties. Though these changes are still incremental and incomplete, the energy and commitment shown by the Directorate-General for Development and the growing interest and involvement of the European Parliament bode well for greater coherence and oversight which should produce more efficient and effective development policies in the near future.

As Maxwell and Riddell (1998) point out the European model of development is explicitly couched in terms of ‘partnership’. Partnership denotes equity and cooperation (Lister 2003), which directly challenges the notion of hierarchy. The 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement (and its predecessors) with 79 ACP countries is a prime example, combining aid, trade and political dialogue. Inter-regionalism denotes agreement between distinct but equal regions based on the promotion of good governance and development through dialogue going beyond economic governance to embrace political and institutional reform and social inclusion. In this regard, EU aid is tied to institutional reforms and the recipient country’s own long-term development goals and achievements. Thus, the EU sees ownership by EU partner countries as pivotal for the efficiency and sustainability of its initiatives. At the same time this strategy seeks a discursive mediation of inequalities between Europe and the South. From this perspective it is arguably the case that EU development policies represent the normative form and the empirical function of the concept as well as the praxis of NPE.
Notes

2. The study was conducted for the World Bank and discussed in the *Financial Times*, 16 November (Beattie 2005).
3. The eight goals range from eradication of hunger and poverty to combating HIV/AIDS and achieving an environmentally sustainable, global partnership for development. For more information on the goals, see United Nations (2010).
4. For more background information on the 0.7 per cent target, see also Millennium Project (2006).
5. This is a significant point given that the recent one-off debt relief to Nigeria and Iraq represents a quarter of the total 48 billion euros in reported aid. See Bounds (2007).
Introduction

Since the beginning of the millennium, the European Union (EU) has committed itself to promoting the social dimension of globalization. European policy-makers argue that the ‘European social model’ should be promoted and that basic labour standards should be advanced in the world through a broad range of external activities (Orbie and Tortell 2008). This chapter addresses the EU’s contribution to a social globalization through its most powerful external instrument, namely its trade relations with developing countries. I first indicate why the focus on core labour standards and common commercial policies provides an interesting case study for analysing the Union’s normative power. The subsequent section elaborates on the social dimension of EU unilateral and bilateral trade policies from 1995 onwards. Then, the implications of this empirical case are considered from a Normative Power Europe (NPE) approach, arguing that the Union’s principles, and to some extent also its activities, do indeed increasingly correspond with what would be expected from a normative power, but that its normative impact remains unclear. In conclusion, I problematize the link between the EU’s institutional set-up as a ‘regulatory state’ and the normative content of its trade policies, suggesting that NPE accounts should also consider the ideological dimension of Europe’s global role.

Normative power through trade: exporting core labour standards

The normative power of the discussion introduced in Manners’ seminal article (see Manners 2002) cannot be underestimated. Reflecting a broader trend towards examining the less tangible, ideational and ethical aspects of European foreign policies (e.g. Manners and Whitman 2000: 4–6), the social constructivist turn in EU studies (e.g. Jørgensen 1997), as well as
the emphasis on ethical foreign policies by European policy-makers (e.g. Chandler 2003; Hill 2003), the NPE idea has acquired a distinctive place in the debate on Europe's global role. The burgeoning literature on the EU as a normative power (e.g. Sjursen 2006b; Aggestam 2008; Laidì 2008), including critiques from various corners of the academic world (e.g. Diez 2005; Hyde-Price 2006; Storey 2006), have given fresh oxygen to the debate on Europe's foreign policies. The NPE concept has enabled the EU studies community to escape the focus on specific institutions, policy domains and case studies, by engaging in a critical account of ‘what the EU is and should be doing in world politics’ (Manners 2006e: 179). It has shifted attention to cross-cutting objectives pursued by the EU such as democracy and human rights (Szymanski and Smith 2005; Brantner and Gowan 2008), peace (Björkdahl, this volume), sustainable development (Lightfoot and Burchell 2005), conflict prevention (Manners 2006c) and children’s rights (Manners 2008a), while also sparking a meta-theoretical debate on the nature of the EU and its power in the world (Diez 2005; Part I of this book). The NPE idea forces us to consider questions that, while most difficult to answer, are very much worth raising.

Whether the EU’s normative power in the world has increased in parallel with the literature on it is, however, less clear. This chapter aims to contribute to this debate by looking at the promotion of social solidarity through European trade policies. More specifically, the integration of core labour standards in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and bilateral trade arrangements between the EU and developing countries are examined. But first, I explain why this is an interesting case study for the NPE hypothesis, indicate how an NPE can be expected to deal with the social-trade nexus and which factors may complicate Europe’s normative power role.

The promotion of core labour standards

One difficulty in analysing the NPE hypothesis has been the absence of clear criteria for assessing Europe as a normative power. In a comprehensive review, Sjursen (2006b: 173) highlights the need for explicit standards to evaluate Europe’s normative objectives. The EU’s normative basis as identified by Manners (2002: 242–3) was relatively concise and abstract, consisting of five ‘core norms’ (peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms) and four ‘minor norms’ (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance). Despite the EU’s broad definition of the social dimension of globalization – involving external policy objectives such as decent work, sustainable development, democracy and accountability, and gender equality – European initiatives in this area have mainly focused on the promotion of core labour standards (CLS) (Orbie and Tortell 2008). This chapter focuses on these CLS, which encompass four principles: (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of
all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child
labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation. They correspond with the EU’s minor norms of social soli-
darity and non-discrimination and, importantly, also with the core norm of
human rights (see Manners 2008d: 28–30).

These four principles constitute the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental
Rights and Principles at Work, established within the International Labour
Organization (ILO). There is a broad international consensus among devel-
oping and developed countries, as well as employers and workers, on the
universality of these principles. Each principle is recognized as a human right
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, that on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and many other international legal standards. The principles are also referred
to in numerous international initiatives such as the United Nations (UN)
Global Compact and the revised ILO and Organization of Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) guidelines for multinational enterprises,
as well as in private sector codes of conduct. In short, the ILO Declara-
tion places the CLS at the centre of international human rights law (Alston
2005: 3).

In addition, the CLS have been given a solid formulation in specific ILO
conventions. Each of them is reflected in two ‘fundamental ILO conven-
tions’: Conventions Nos 87 and 98 (the right to organize and collective
bargaining), Nos 29 and 105 (the prohibition of forced labour), Nos 138
and 182 (the minimum age of employment of children and the abolition
of the worst forms of labour) and Nos 100 and 111 (non-discrimination
in employment and occupation). An innovative feature of the 1998 Decl-
laration is that the obligation of member states to promote and realize
these principles stems from their mere membership of the ILO, regardless of
whether they have ratified the corresponding conventions. The Declaration
also established new follow-up mechanisms, including an annual review of
the non-ratified fundamental conventions.

Thus, the promotion of these four CLS and the concomitant ILO con-
ventions clearly corresponds with what would be expected from the EU as
a normative power. The principles are in line with the normative basis of
the EU and they can be linked to cosmopolitan international law treaties
of the ILO. In this chapter, I attempt to gauge, from an NPE perspective,
whether and to what extent the EU contributes to the ratification and
implementation of these fundamental ILO conventions.

Inversely, the normative power quality of the EU’s international policies
promoting labour standards would be jeopardized if the relevant ILO con-
ventions were discarded, or if they were used in a selective and arbitrary
way, for example, for protectionist, commercial or geopolitical purposes.
European policy-makers’ discourse on the social dimension of globalization
has emphasized the importance of the CLS as defined by the ILO, but they
have also pointed to the need to ‘export the European social model’ to the world. The idea that a particular European model and specific EU labour standards should be promoted abroad, without international treaty reference points but exclusively rooted in the domestic politics of the EU and its member states, would hinder the Union’s normative power. In such a scenario, the EU’s demands would not be considered legitimate or feasible by developing countries. This point is illustrated in Kissack’s (2009) analysis of the EU’s negotiations on international labour conventions in the ILO. Analysing the negotiation and ratification of the 50 ILO conventions adopted since 1973, Kissack comes to the paradoxical conclusion that the more active the EU is during the drafting of an ILO convention, the lower the number of ratifications it receives from ILO members. When the EU attempts to shape future norms through influencing the content of ILO standards, those standards remain largely unsupported by other states. These conclusions qualify the often assumed natural synergy and harmony of interests between the EU’s social model and the ILO’s objective of improved global working standards. Uploading the EU model into the ILO creates ‘a lose-lose scenario, where the ILO gets a widely ignored maximal standard, and the EU gets a negligible extension of its own standards internationally’ (Kissack 2009: 105).

A second caveat concerns the inconsistency between internal and external EU policies. The EU’s competence to negotiate, ratify and enforce ILO (core) labour standards inside the EU is limited. In view of these difficulties faced by the Union in stimulating and enforcing the fundamental ILO conventions internally and its inability to guarantee member states’ compliance, attempts by the European Commission to do so in developing countries could be seen as hypocritical. One such case was the EU’s introduction of GSP trade conditionality based on developing countries’ compliance with ILO conventions in 1998, even though not all the EU member states had ratified the relevant conventions at that time (Novitz 2002: 261; Clapham and Martignoni 2006: 235). In fact, it took until 2007 before all EU members ratified the eight fundamental ILO conventions. In general, EU member states remain reluctant to cede social competences, an attitude which can be explained by the considerable variation in social preferences among European countries (see Manners 2008d: 36). The diverging European views on the international promotion of CLS have clearly surfaced in the discussions on the social-trade nexus, with ideological disagreements between free traders and more interventionist governments. For example, during the crucial discussions on a social clause at the Singapore Summit of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Council Presidency was unable to come up with a common European position (Orbie et al. 2008: 153–6; see below).

A third caveat concerns the possibility of a hidden consistency between EU internal and external policies, which can be perceived by considering Europe’s essential market-led orientation. The pursuit of a neoliberal agenda, where social solidarity is subordinated to economic integration, does not seem consistent with an NPE. However, there is some room for confusion
about the ideological tendencies of a normative power in socio-economic issues. While it seems obvious that an NPE would not pursue neoliberal norms and unbridled market integration, it is unclear how it would deal with the tension between market-making policies (economic freedom) and interventionist or redistributive policies (aiming at social solidarity, equality and sustainable development). When analysing the Union’s normative power in socio-economic cases, one inevitably touches on difficult ideological discussions. Manners (2006e: 179) has indicated that different normative objectives can lead to contradictory results, but he has not elaborated on the ideological tensions inherent to an NPE’s policies. Nor have NPE accounts addressed the question of whether the Union’s institutional structure – its ‘hybrid polity’ (Manners 2002: 240) – favours economic liberalization over social regulation. ‘Social freedom’ including trade liberalization forms one of the Union’s core norms, but a clash between the norms of market integration and social solidarity seems inevitable. For example, in an examination of the EU’s internal and international approaches to collective labour relations and gender equality, Novitz (2008) argues that the EU is exporting a ‘market model’ rather than a ‘social model’, reflecting the particular role that labour standards and gender norms can play foundationally within a European labour market structure. Simply summarized, market objectives usually take priority over social aims. When examining the EU’s global social policies through trade instruments, the possible prioritizing of market goals stemming from the EU’s political system will be kept in mind, and reconsidered in the conclusions of this chapter.

Thus, the EU’s normative principles can be evaluated against the role played by the fundamental ILO conventions in its external policies. However, to the extent that the EU makes reference to particular features of the so-called ‘European social model’ and/or its competence to act in external social affairs remains limited and/or the social preferences of its member states diverge and/or market considerations take priority above social solidarity, the Union’s normative power is harmed. If the EU manages to overcome these hurdles in the international promotion of CLS, it will be able to ‘live by virtuous example’ (see Manners 2008b: 56).

The leverage of trade conditionality

Although the EU has developed a broad approach to the promotion of the social dimension of globalization, it has to a large extent relied on the leverage of its trade instruments. NPE accounts have scarcely focused on the EU’s external trade policies. More generally, academic work on the EU’s international role seems to presume that the objectives pursued in this area are restricted to ‘selfish’ or ‘self-interested’ economic goals. It is indicative that Youngs’ (2004: 416–9) comprehensive review of the NPE literature has no single study explicitly focusing on EU trade policy. To some extent Van den Hoven’s (2006) analysis of the EU’s ‘regulatory capitalism’ and
multilateral trade negotiations, Szymanski and Smith’s (2005) account of
the Commission’s ‘rhetorical action’ on democracy and human rights in the
EU–Mexico agreement, and Storey’s (2006) perspective on Economic Part-
nership Agreements are exceptions. Conversely, EU trade literature has been
dominated by political economy and rational choice institutionalist perspec-
tives that either neglect the normative dimension of EU commercial policies
or reduce this issue to the traditional protectionist/free trade dichotomy
whereby social considerations are seen as protectionist sentiments spurred
on by trade unions, vulnerable industries and short-sighted policy-makers.
To some extent the analyses by Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2005) of the EU’s
‘power through trade’, Elgström’s (2000) research into norms in the Lomé
reform and Young’s (2007) considerations of the EU’s ‘social trade policies’
are exceptions. Some anecdotal evidence of the high walls between these
two academic strands surfaced at one workshop in 2004 on the EU’s interna-
tional role during which participants started to identify themselves as either
‘norm people’ or ‘trade people’.4

Obviously, there are good reasons for bridging the two perspectives and
considering European trade relations from a normative perspective (see
Orbie 2008: 51–5). For one thing, the constitutive principles which char-
acterize the EU as a normative power are also, and increasingly, present
in its trade policies. Since the second half of the 1990s, EU trade policy
discourse has devoted much attention to the promotion of the develop-
ment of the South, human rights and sustainable development (Van den
Hoven 2006: 188). Before this time, Europe’s trade objectives were basically
translated into economic interests. Trade policy was the ‘core business’ –
in both senses of the word – of EU external policy. Then, instigated by
Directorate-General (DG) Trade and Northern member states and influenced
by the increasing politicization of trade relations, the Commission deliber-
ately put ‘sustainable development’ and ‘social solidarity’ at the heart of EU
trade policy discourse. This pursuit of normative objectives is at the centre of
the overarching trade objective of ‘harnessing globalization’ – the favourite
motto of former Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy.

It is no longer only economic interests that are in question, but also
values, the concept of society, of what is desirable and of what is risky.
Health, environment, the quality of life, culture are henceforth stakes
that must be reconciled with open and competitive markets. Regarding
development, human rights, social and environmental standards, the
European Union brings with it values that have the aim of becoming
universal. (Lamy, cited in Agence Europe 1999)

The Union’s normative principles have also been institutionalized in its
legal framework. Whereas the trade articles in the Maastricht Treaty did
not explicitly mention normative objectives besides ‘the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers’ (Article 131 Treaty on European Communities (TEC)), the consistency requirement (Article 3 Treaty on European Union (TEU)) implied that the EU’s foreign policy principles of ‘democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Article 11 TEU) also apply to trade policies. The Lisbon Reform Treaty strengthens the consistency requirement in two ways. On the one hand, it adds to the Title on ‘trade’ the stipulation that Europe’s common commercial policy ‘shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action’ (Article 207(1)). On the other hand, the Treaty’s Article on the EU objectives in the wider world explicitly refers to trade; alongside ‘free trade’, Article 3(5) speaks of ‘fair trade’. Although the exact meaning of this latter phrase is unclear, it cannot be seen as a veiled reference to protectionism, but rather fits in with the other normative foreign policy objectives listed in this Article such as peace, sustainable development, solidarity, eradication of poverty, human rights and the rights of the child (Eeckhout 2004: 53).

These evolutions have also manifested themselves in the EU’s trade activities. Since 1995, all EU trade and cooperation agreements with third countries contain an ‘essential elements clause’ on democratic principles and human rights; the EU’s GSP trade preferences include labour conditionality, and its bilateral trade agreements contain provisions on social cooperation; since 1999, DG Trade uses trade sustainability impact assessments (Trade SIAs) to analyse the economic, environmental and social impact of trade agreements, both in Europe and among its trading partners.

A second reason for studying trade policy from an NPE approach is that this is the oldest, most integrated and most powerful EU external policy domain. The conditioning of access to the vast and prosperous European market provides the EU with a considerable leverage in the world (Smith and Woolcock 1999). Because the EU’s trade activities occupy central and influential position in its foreign policy machinery, analysing their normative dimension allows us to go beyond what the EU says and to analyse what the EU does. In other words, trade policies are an interesting area in which to consider the translation of European principles into external policy activities. Because trade negotiations by definition involve trade-offs between various policy objectives, they make it possible to assess the relative importance attached not only to specific aims such as labour standards but also to agricultural interests, environmental issues, intellectual property rights, investment rules, industrial tariffs and other factors. Europe’s commitment to social norms can also be ‘measured’ by analysing the extent to which the EU is willing to open its markets to products from developing countries where CLS are observed.
Thus, focusing on trade policy may lead to a ‘best case’ approach for analysing Europe’s normative power, since this is an area where normative objectives tend to compete with offensive and defensive economic interests. For example, Lightfoot and Burchell’s (2005: 83, 90) research on the ‘sustainable development’ norm of the EU found that when it comes to trade, the Union finds it difficult to behave as a normative power and gives priority to ‘free market liberalism’. Given the commercial interests at stake and the broad trade agenda of the EU (Young 2007), social norms will easily come into conflict with other external policy objectives.

However, simply incorporating a social clause into trade relations would not necessarily confirm the NPE hypothesis. International discussions on trade-labour linkages have always raised fears of protectionist interest behind a normative smokescreen. Free traders and developing countries resist the idea of a social clause, arguing that the pursuit of lofty ideals such as the elimination of child labour would be used to impede developing countries’ market access to Europe, and thus undo their comparative advantage in low-wage production. This explains why the discussions on a labour-trade linkage in the WTO during the 1990s were not successful (see below). Many developing countries have ratified the fundamental ILO conventions and agree with their contents, but they prefer the ILO’s soft governance approach to the binding trade regime of the WTO. Therefore, a major challenge for the achievement of social objectives through trade is overcoming the resistance of the developing world by making clear that protectionist motives are not in play. This may be particularly difficult for the EU, given its image as a protectionist trade actor towards the South (Elgström 2007: 959).

From an NPE perspective, social trade arrangements would be based on dialogue, persuasion and positive conditionality, and provide substantial incentives in terms of market access and development assistance. Given the legitimate fears for protectionist misuse, sanctions against developing countries would only be invoked after extensive dialogue and deliberation, and when there is an international consensus about the persistent violation of fundamental ILO conventions. When applying positive or negative social conditionality, it seems necessary to involve civil society organizations and third country governments into the decision-making process and to take the ILO’s follow-up procedures on the core labour conventions into account. Overall, such an approach seems to follow the ethics of ‘being reasonable’ and ‘doing least harm’, as Manners (2008b: 58–9) calls them.

In addition, if the EU meets these conditions, a normative impact outside Europe may be expected. An expected empirical outcome would be increased compliance with the ILO fundamental conventions in the domestic setting of Europe’s trading partners. Although compliance with CLS depends on various factors beyond the EU’s control, an NPE through trade would need to have some measurable influence on the ratification and implementation of the relevant ILO conventions by using its trade leverage. Ultimately, and
more importantly, an NPE should be able to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations (Manners 2002: 239, 2008d). Applied to the topic of this chapter, this means that the EU’s activities would re-legitimize the idea of a linkage between trade and social norms. If the Union’s trade policies manage to promote CLS based on ILO treaties, in a coherent and consistent way, with a focus on dialogue and incentives, and without resorting to protectionist abuses, the artificial division between social and trade regimes might be transcended. When the integration of social and trade issues is again considered a ‘normal’ thing in international politics – as it used to be in the post-war consensus of ‘embedded liberalism’5 – the impasse over the social-trade nexus in the WTO can be broken (see also Manners 2009b: 798–800). This would make an end to accusations of hidden protectionism, and might lead to more fruitful discussions on the interaction between trade and social policies, paving the way for a more sustainable trading regime.

**Labour standards in unilateral and bilateral trade policies**

Bearing this NPE perspective in mind, this section elaborates on the social dimension of the EU’s unilateral and bilateral trade policies. The EU’s role in the debate at the WTO is not addressed because, as explained in this and the following paragraph, labour standards are excluded from the multilateral trade discussions. By the end of the Uruguay Round, the United States (US), most European governments as well as the Commission and the European Parliament argued that internationally recognized labour standards should be included in the new multilateral trade regime. A last-minute compromise meant that the issue could be put on the WTO agenda at a later stage. During the subsequent years, the debate on a social clause became increasingly politicized, culminating in the WTO Singapore Conference in 1996. The Singapore Declaration de facto relegates the issue to the sidelines, referring to the ILO as the competent organization to deal with international labour standards, thereby consolidating the idea that social issues are not to be dealt with in the multilateral trade regime (see Wilkinson 2001: 402, 411). EU and US attempts to put this on the agenda at the Millennium Round failed with the collapse of the 1999 WTO Summit in Seattle, partly because of the growing assertiveness among those developing countries which strongly rejected US President Clinton’s suggestion of introducing a sanctioning social clause in the WTO. When a new trade round was finally launched in Doha (2001), the agenda simply referred to the Singapore text. As a consequence, labour standards are not on the negotiating table.

Although the EU has favoured the inclusion of labour standards in the WTO talks since the end of the 1990s, this idea has not been enthusiastically supported by all the member states, and other trade-related issues seem to take priority (Orbie et al. 2008). In addition, the EU also encountered strong resistance from developing countries in this matter. For both these reasons,
it remains difficult to analyse the Union’s commitment to a social clause in the WTO. It is easier to distil the ‘EU factor’ in unilateral and bilateral trade policies, where the European influence is considerably stronger. In addition, these trade arrangements offer a possibility for the EU to evade the stalemate in the WTO. As argued by Grynberg and Qalo (2006: 651), they could be seen as ‘a sort of Trojan horse, a precedent setting means of introducing new issues into the WTO negotiating process’.

Social conditionality in the European GSP system

The GSP was established under the Enabling Clause of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 1970s, as an exception to the Most Favoured Nations (MFN) principle. It allows industrial countries to grant more favourable and non-reciprocal tariff preferences to developing country imports. GSP regulations are approved by qualified majority vote in the Council based on a European Commission proposal; the European Parliament is not formally involved. Third countries do not participate in the discussions on a new GSP, but the regulation must be in line with WTO rules.

The EU’s first social conditionality system, introduced in 1995, was limited to trade sanctions. The legal basis for temporary withdrawal of GSP preferences was ‘practice of any form of forced labour’ or ‘export of goods made by prison labour’. The European Commission had wide powers of discretion in the suspension procedure, although the final responsibility lay with the Council (Brandtner and Rosas 1999: 715). ILO findings were not mentioned in the sanctioning process. This new system soon resulted in two complaints by the international trade union movement against alleged abuses of labour rights. In the case of Burma (Myanmar), the Commission decided to investigate practices of forced labour and hearings were held with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), journalists, medical personnel, specialists in international law, Burmese individuals and other parties. Whereas, as a result of this procedure, Burma was sanctioned in 1997, a complaint against child labour in Pakistan in the same year never even got as far as an investigation, allegedly because the social GSP clause did not yet allow for a suspension on the basis of child labour. In 2001 the reasons for temporary withdrawal were extended to include ‘serious and systematic violation’ of any standards referred to in the 1998 ILO Declaration. In addition, the ‘available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions’ of the ILO have since served as the ‘point of departure’ in any investigation as to whether temporary withdrawal is justified. Under this system Belarus was sanctioned because of violation of ILO Conventions Nos 87 and 98 in July 2007.

Since 1998, developing countries have been entitled to apply for the social incentive regime. Again, the Commission plays an important role in decisions on GSP preferences, while no reference is made to the ILO’s findings.
This sparked criticism that the Commission lacked the means and expertise to make such evaluations and to carry out fact-finding missions and that, once an incentive tariff had been granted, the monitoring of labour rights depended largely on Europe’s confidence in, and cooperation with, the beneficiary country’s authorities (Dispersyn 2001: 103). Substantively, the GSP regulation of 1998 referred only to a limited number of the core ILO conventions: beneficiaries of the additional trade preferences had to comply with Conventions Nos 87 and 98 concerning freedom of association, and Convention No. 138 concerning child labour, but it did not extend to any of the conventions concerning forced labour or discrimination. This provoked remarks that the EU was adopting ‘double standards’ compared with the punitive regime for the violation of forced labour. Tsogas (2000: 363–4), for example, castigated the dual character of the EU system for going against the universality of the ILO fundamental rights: ‘It seems that, according to this peculiar EU “carrot and stick” approach, exploiting children and organizing death squads against trade unionists are less serious breaches of human rights than running forced labour camps!’

Consistency with the ILO Declaration was brought a step closer in the 2002 reform. The new GSP stated that the EU must take the findings of the ILO into account when examining applications for GSP incentives. Moreover, the legal basis of the incentive clause was extended to all eight of the core conventions. However, the GSP regulations only talked about the incorporation of the ‘substance of’ the relevant ILO conventions in national legislation, and about their effective implementation. It was not until 2005 that the ratification of these conventions was required. At this time, a more fundamental reform of the EU’s GSP conditionality system was implemented. One reason for the overhaul of the system was its limited success: only Moldova (2000) and Sri Lanka (2004) had successfully applied for social incentives. This disappointing result was partly explicable by the cumbersome administrative procedures, the relatively limited preferential benefits compared with the standard GSP, the availability of alternative trade systems for exporting to the EU market and ideological resistance to the idea of a social clause. But the immediate impetus for the reform was a case brought before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO against the EU’s GSP system.

Shortly after 9/11 the EU added Pakistan to the beneficiaries of the GSP drugs system, which provided additional trade preferences to Latin American countries8 fighting drug trafficking and production. This addition provoked a fierce reaction from the Indian government, which argued that the EU’s decision was motivated by foreign policy and geopolitical motivations and not justified under the GATT Enabling Clause. The WTO Appellate Body ruled that developed countries are entitled to grant additional preferences if these are based on objective and transparent criteria (see Bartels 2005). In other words, the introduction of labour standards
in GSP is in itself not illegal, nor does it run counter to the consensus at the WTO, but the problem in this case was that the EU had granted incentives in a discriminatory way (Grynberg and Qalo 2006: 648). As a consequence, Europe’s social GSP had to be reformed in line with this ruling. The new GSP regulation abandoned the separate social clause and incorporated labour provisions into a broader ‘sustainable development and good governance’ regime. All vulnerable countries were eligible for these ‘GSP-plus’ incentives, provided that they ‘ratify and effectively implement’ 16 human rights conventions, including the fundamental ILO conventions and at least seven (out of 11) conventions on environment and governance by the end of 2008. The regulation also makes clear that the Commission’s examination of countries requesting special incentives shall take into account the findings of the ILO and that the Commission will monitor the compliance of beneficiary countries making use of the ILO assessments.

Thus, the relevance of the ILO has increased considerably through successive reforms of Europe’s GSP conditionality system, both in relation to decision-making procedure (taking ILO findings into account) and substantive content (ILO conventions). In the first GSP regulation the ILO was barely mentioned (1995), then the contents of some (but not all) conventions was mentioned but without a ratification requirement (1998 and 2002), and finally the ratification and effective implementation of the eight fundamental ILO conventions became a necessary condition for GSP-plus applicants (2005). The provisions on GSP-plus in the new GSP regulation (2009–11) remain unchanged.

Fifteen countries were included in the GSP-plus scheme from 1 January 2006. The GSP-plus has been successful in ensuring the full ratification of the eight fundamental labour standards among the beneficiary countries. Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Mongolia and El Salvador each ratified one or more of the core labour conventions during the period 2005–06, seemingly because, without those ratifications, they would have lost their beneficiary status. However, critics have argued that ratification is cheap. Members of the European Parliament and civil society organizations point out that some GSP-plus beneficiaries have received sharp criticism from the ILO bodies, raising the question of whether the new system is more than simply a ‘tick the box’ exercise in ratifying international conventions. The impression that implementation of the relevant ILO conventions has not been considered is reinforced when looking at the list of GSP-plus beneficiaries, which reveals that all former drugs beneficiaries from the Andean Community and the Central American Common Market successfully switched over to GSP-plus incentives. It seems that the GSP reform merely amounts to a recycling of the former drugs system, whereby ratification of the relevant conventions constitutes an easy way to continue preferences already granted to Europe’s Latin American partners.
Does this allegation make sense – to what extent is the EU’s practice of social conditionality consistent with ILO findings? A study of reports on these Latin American countries by authoritative ILO committees (see Orbie and Tortell 2009) reveals considerable divergence with regard to implementation of the CLS. Some GSP-plus beneficiaries have received serious condemnation (e.g. Colombia, Guatemala, Venezuela) whereas others have been evaluated more positively (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras). At the time of writing, the EU has not withdrawn GSP-plus preferences on the grounds of insufficient implementation of ILO core conventions. In contrast, the EU’s application of GSP sanctions has been more consistent with ILO assessments. Since the system was created in 1995, only Burma and Belarus have been sanctioned under GSP conditionality; and these are the only two countries that have faced an ILO Commission of Inquiry in a period of 15 years. The Union has clearly been reluctant to impose trade sanctions, these having been limited to two cases involving condemnation by the international community in general.

Another restraint on the impact of social incentives is that many developing countries are de jure or de facto not eligible for GSP-plus preferences. For example, the least-developed countries already enjoy free access to the European market under ‘Everything but Arms’. By introducing this initiative in 2001, the EU allowed the poorest countries to bypass the GSP incentive system. More prosperous developing countries such as Thailand, Pakistan, India or Indonesia also remain out of the scope of positive social conditionality, because only ‘vulnerable’ countries are eligible for GSP-plus. The definition of ‘vulnerable’ has been criticized for being based on a developing country’s share in imports into the EU, and not on development criteria (Bartels 2005). Moreover, several developing countries such as Mexico, South Africa, Chile and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries have concluded, or are in the process of negotiating, free trade agreements (FTAs) with the EU, so that their exports to the European market no longer fall under the GSP. Peru and Colombia will probably sign a trade agreement with the EU in March 2011, while the other members of the Andean Community (Ecuador and Bolivia) and the Central American region (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama as observer) are negotiating an association agreement. When all these countries conclude a bilateral trade arrangement with the EU, the relevance of the GSP social conditionality system will be significantly downgraded. This brings us to the question of the next section, namely the extent to which labour standards are integrated into bilateral trade arrangements.

Labour standards in Europe’s bilateral trade agreements

Although multilateral trade negotiations have been a priority for the EU since the creation of the WTO, the Union has also continued to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with developing countries (Lamy 2002), and this
bilateral track has received a new impetus with the ‘Global Europe’ strategy (European Commission 2006c). One might expect that bilateral agreements would be more normatively inspired than the GSP because the European Parliament is more involved and because the Commission plays a central role as the EU negotiator (see Szymanski and Smith 2005: 186–7). However, these agreements generally involve countries where important commercial interests are at stake and such countries are typically reluctant to accept labour provisions.

The EU–Mexico agreement concluded in 1997 has only one Article on ‘cooperation on social affairs and poverty’ (Article 44). It states that both parties will conduct a dialogue on social issues of interest to both parties, but does not refer to the ILO. Social standards in the agreement with Chile (2002, Articles 43–44) are equally limited to dialogue and cooperation, but the wording is more extensive and both parties commit themselves to promoting the fundamental ILO conventions. The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement signed with South Africa in 1999 also mentions the ILO CLS, not only in the provisions on cooperation (Article 86) but also in the preamble.

The Cotonou Agreement (2000) seems more ambitious and might lead to a binding social conditionality. The preamble states that the EU and the ACP are ‘anxious to respect basic labour rights, taking account of the principles laid down in the relevant conventions of the International Labour Organization’. Article 50 was seen at the time as a model in promoting CLS through bilateral trade, to be extended to other agreements (European Commission 2001: 18). Its title is ‘Trade and Labour Standards’, though in effect it only contains both parties’ intention to cooperate on social affairs. This Article also confirms the parties’ commitment to ILO CLS and states that ‘labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes’, echoing the Singapore Declaration. More importantly, in Article 9 the ‘fundamental social rights’ are explicitly considered as part of the ‘essential elements’ of the agreement, standing on an equal footing with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This implies not only that ILO CLS can be the subject of a structured political dialogue between the EU and an ACP country, but also that substantial violations of these principles could lead to consultations and, eventually, ‘appropriate measures’ in line with Article 96 procedures.

At the time of writing, the social provisions of Cotonou have not been implemented. An internal European Commission evaluation in 2007 concluded that ‘we could have done more’.16 Research by Kerremans and Gistelinck (2009) shows that the promotion of CLS through Article 50 has been overwhelmed by other foreign policy and trade priorities such as weapons of mass destruction, the International Criminal Court, the fight against terrorism, Economic Partnership Agreements, climate change and the political situation of individual ACP countries. Similarly, the possibility
of including CLS in the political conditionality system has not been tested in practice. ‘Article 96 consultations’ have mainly dealt with violations of democratic principles, good governance and the rule of law.

However, in 2007 a more far-reaching agreement was signed with the Caribbean ACP countries. The EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement includes a commitment to upholding the existing levels of social protection, which minimally reflect the CLS of the ILO. It refers to labour standards in the context of foreign direct investment, with respect to trade overall, and with respect to the dispute settlement procedure, and stresses that labour standards cannot be used for protectionist purposes. For example, the agreement stipulates that foreign direct investment should not be encouraged if it leads to lowered domestic environmental, labour or occupational health and safety standards. The dispute settlement procedure contains specific references to labour standards and non-compliance with the panel’s findings can lead to ‘appropriate measures’. However, when the dispute concerns labour standards, the agreement does not allow the suspension of trade concessions or financial compensations. Although this is a step forward compared with other EU agreements, it seems that ‘beyond blaming and shaming as a consequence of a negative panel outcome, there is not much else available to pressurize the parties to the agreement to comply with its labour and environmental provisions’ (Kerremans and Gistelinck 2009: 310).

Meanwhile, the EU is negotiating association agreements with the Central American region and with Bolivia and Ecuador (see above), and free trade agreements with South Korea, India and some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (negotiations with Vietnam and Singapore were launched in 2010). The European Commission underlines that this is the first time that EU trade negotiation mandates so extensively cover social and environmental concerns in a separate sustainable development chapter, and that these issues constitute a key element of the Commission’s new trade agenda. DG Trade has announced that the new generation of European Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) should constitute a step change in how the EU integrates its sustainable development agenda with trade policy (Bossuyt 2009: 703). However, although the Commission managed to rally the EU member states behind the inclusion of social issues in the pre-negotiation phase, it is still unclear if this unanimity will hold up when difficult trade-offs have to be made during the final stages of the negotiations with Asian and Latin American partners. It should be noted that CLS provisions are not a priority for EU member states, although some governments (e.g. the UK, France and Denmark) attach more importance to it than others (e.g. Spain, Poland and Germany) (Bossuyt 2009: 713–18).

The labour standard provisions in the free trade agreements with South Korea and Peru/Colombia (not yet ratified at the time of writing) are at a somewhat similar level of ambition as the EU–CARIFORUM agreement.
The case of Colombia is particularly interesting because the EU has been criticized for not invoking GSP sanctions as a response to violations of trade unions rights (see above). Although the agreement includes a democracy clause, which is exceptional for an FTA (as opposed to association agreements), there are no enforcement mechanisms under the sustainable development chapter. Instead, a ‘Council on Trade and Sustainable Development’ would be established in order to oversee the implementation of the chapter and engage in a dialogue on social and environmental issues. Compared with the GSP system, there may be more opportunities for dialogue and for a cooperative approach, but the labour standard provisions also seem more difficult to enforce legally.

However, the negotiations with India will be a major test. India has always been among the most hostile opponents of a social clause in the WTO, and it has already rejected the incorporation of an essential elements clause in the agreement. The Commission wants to convince India that CLS are not a protectionist tool, but rather a guarantee of fundamental rights; it emphasizes that none of the social provisions will be binding. It is also encouraging the ratification by India of ILO Conventions Nos 138 and 182 on child labour (Bossuyt 2009: 720).

Although the EU has taken an essentially ad hoc approach tailored to the trading partner at the negotiation table, some general conclusions can be drawn. The core ILO conventions have become increasingly relevant principles in the EU’s bilateral agreements. However, labour standard provisions have been formulated in the context of development cooperation and political dialogue, rather than trade measures. There are no enforcement mechanisms, except perhaps through the essential elements clause in Cotonou. In addition, the social provisions have scarcely been implemented in practice. The incorporation of the ILO’s CLS into the ‘essential elements’ of new agreements is an important confirmation of their human rights status, and a potential reason for conditionality including dialogue as well as sanctions. But the EU’s conditionality practices based on violations of the essential elements clause shows a preference for the first generation (civil and political rights) over the second generation (social and economic rights) of human rights (see Clapham and Martignoni 2006: 291). One might argue that the prominence of ILO conventions and the non-binding, deliberative and developmental approach fits in with the NPE thesis; but it remains to be seen whether the EU’s actions in this area will have any normative impact, and whether they are put on an equal footing with other trade-related objectives.

What the EU says, does, achieves . . . and is

In the past decade, the EU has pledged to promote the social dimension of globalization, pursuing a wide range of objectives and using a variety of
external policy instruments. This chapter has focused on a central aspect of the EU’s global social agenda, namely the integration of core labour standards into European trade relations. More specifically, I have analysed the social dimension of the EU’s unilateral and bilateral trade arrangements between 1995 and 2008. It has been argued that this case study could shed light not only on what the EU says, but also on what it does and what impact it has from an NPE perspective. In terms of Manners’ ‘tripartite analytical method’ (2008a: 239, 2008b: 47, 2009b), it can be concluded that normative principles have become an important part of EU trade policies, that despite some shortcomings the EU has also started to engage in normative trade activities and that it remains to be seen whether the EU will have any normative impact in this respect. In this concluding section I briefly summarize these conclusions and raise some questions about the link between the EU’s institutional architecture and the ideological substance of its normative power.

The importance of cosmopolitan international law treaties in the EU’s social trade relations has noticeably increased. While the first GSP regulation did not refer to ILO conventions or procedures, the GSP-plus system now explicitly requires the ratification and effective implementation of the fundamental ILO conventions and aims to take the ILO’s findings into account when granting or withdrawing trade incentives. In 2008 the European Commission (2008a) prepared an extensive report on the ratification and implementation of the GSP-plus conventions as evaluated by the international monitoring bodies such as the ILO.

A similar evolution has taken place in the EU’s bilateral trade agreements. In contrast with the agreements that were signed halfway through the 1990s, the EU’s new bilateral agreements include a commitment by both parties to promote core labour standards, as defined by the ILO. As argued in the first section of this chapter, the universality of these social principles is widely acknowledged. Thus, it seems that the EU has successfully avoided the temptation to promote a particular ‘EU model’ involving specific social regulations, for example, by seeking a harmonization on wages or safety standards at the workplace. Unlike the free trade agreements negotiated by the US (Grynberg and Qalo 2006: 651), the EU does not require the parties to include in their domestic laws labour standards which go beyond those listed as CLS by the ILO. Neither has it defended the promotion of CLS in terms of ‘social dumping’: the European Commission’s discourse has always stressed that this is a matter of basic labour rights as human rights, rather than economic competitiveness. It should also be noticed that while these rights were initially pursued through trade instruments only, trade strategy has now become part of a wider EU approach to the social dimension of globalization (Orbie and Babarinde 2008: 464–5).

It is more difficult to assess how these normative principles have shaped the Union’s normative trade activities. The implementation of social trade
conditionality by the EU has often been limited and sometimes even dubious. The GSP-plus seems more successful than its predecessor, granting trade incentives to 15 developing countries that have ratified the fundamental ILO conventions and a number of other multilateral treaties. However, many developing countries have been excluded as potential beneficiaries of social incentives through alternative trade arrangements of the EU. For example, the GSP-plus does not apply to the poorest or to more prosperous developing countries. There are also suggestions that the GSP-plus conditionality system boils down to a recycling of the drugs preferences that were ruled illegal by the WTO and that some Latin American beneficiaries have merely ratified but are not implementing the relevant ILO conventions. According to the European Commission (2008a: 6), the international bodies such as the ILO reveal ‘various shortcomings in the implementation process but in general demonstrate a satisfactory state of play’ (however, see Orbie and Tortell 2009). The difficulties in implementing social trade provisions have become even more obvious in the EU’s bilateral agreements. Cooperation and dialogue on social affairs under the Cotonou Agreement have barely taken place, and procedures following violations of the ‘essential elements’ of the agreement have not dealt with socio-economic human rights. If we look at what the EU does, there is still a disparity between the first and second generation of human rights, whereby basic labour rights seem to be considered under the minor norms of social solidarity and non-discrimination, rather than under the core norm of human rights.

Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the EU’s normative impact has been limited. However, the EU’s policies in this area might have set the stage for more substantial results in the future. First, the GSP-plus regulation has influenced the European trading partners’ compliance with CLS. An important symbolic achievement has been the ratification of some fundamental ILO conventions in Latin American countries, stimulated by the prospect of GSP-plus beneficiaries. However, this has not yet gone together with an improvement of these countries’ implementation records. The reaffirmation of both parties’ commitment to the 1998 ILO Declaration and the concomitant core labour conventions in recent bilateral agreements should be welcomed, but these provisions basically confirm commitments already made in the ILO by Europe’s trading partners.

A second aspect is that the EU’s activities could, in the longer term, increase the legitimacy of the ILO regime. Through its trade arrangements the ILO has been recognized by the EU and its trading partners as the most competent organization to address social issues worldwide. In the second half of the 1990s the ILO, after a period of self-reflection on its new role in the post-Cold War era, managed to reinvent itself by focusing attention on the eight fundamental labour standards. While some critical reflections can be made on the normative motives and consequences of the EU’s increased proactiveness in the ILO (Kissack 2009) and on the ideological nature of
the EU’s influence in it (Novitz 2008: 239–41), it cannot be denied that the Union has facilitated the ILO’s resurrection.

Given this development, the question now emerges of whether social issues will always remain locked up in the ILO or whether the artificial distinction between the global trade and social regimes can be transcended. This brings us to a third possible normative impact. In the long term, the EU’s promotion of labour standards through trade could contribute to more constructive and creative thinking about the linkage between trade and labour. If the EU indeed manages to present the trade-social nexus as something ‘normal’ in international relations, without provoking fears of hidden protectionism, it will truly assert itself as a normative social power in the world.

The EU’s success in this regard will depend on the way in which the EU promotes normative objectives in the context of trade relations. Contrary to those who feared that the Union would behave like a protectionist wolf in social clothing, and to the practices of social conditionality in US trade policies, the EU has hardly ever resorted to trade sanctions. Only in two cases have GSP trade preferences been withdrawn, namely Burma and Belarus. These two countries also received the highest level of condemnation by ILO bodies and were criticized by the international community for severe violations of human rights and democratic principles. GSP sanctions have only been applied after lengthy procedures involving consultation with several actors. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy characterized the GSP-plus as ‘a distinctive type of foreign policy built around persuasion and incentives rather than threats and demands’.17 The EU has clearly lived up to this intention by relying almost exclusively on positive conditionality in the form of increased market access. For example, in the debate on GSP sanctions against Colombia (see above), the Commission emphasizes that it wants to ‘use the incentive to the maximum’ and claims that the GSP-plus has already encouraged progress on labour rights and human rights.18 Similarly, social provisions in bilateral agreements have never led to trade sanctions. They essentially focus on development cooperation and political dialogue, as well as declaratory commitments to the ILO CLS. Trade or financial sanctions have been ruled out. Referring to the Singapore Declaration of the WTO, the EU’s new bilateral agreements emphasize that labour standards cannot be used for protectionist purposes. In his reflections on the social dimension of EU trade policies, Manners suggests that this non-coercive approach ‘illustrates the lengths at which the EU goes to avoid claims of protectionism despite the way this undermines its impact, particularly in terms of conditionality, compliance, and implementation’ (Manners 2009b: 797). Further on, he points out that the long-term institutionalization of opportunities for dialogue is perhaps more important than the short-term success or failure of EU promotion of ILO CLS (Manners 2009b: 801).
Given that its trade-social policies have been constructed around the universal principles of the ILO, and that these have been pursued through positive conditionality, incentives and dialogue, it may be said that to a large extent the EU meets the ethical criteria about ‘being reasonable’ and ‘doing least harm’. This approach might eventually lead to a normative impact on the thinking around a more sustainable multilateral trading system. However, the EU has only recently embarked on normative principles and activities in its trade relations, and their normative impact in the long run remains to be seen. As pointed out by Manners (2008d: 37): ‘The diffusion of ideas in a normatively sustainable way works like water on stone, not like napalm in the morning.’

However, some other elements of the EU’s approach could hinder its normative impact. The capacity of the EU to ‘live by virtuous example’ has indeed been qualified by the obstacles identified in the first section of this chapter. To some extent the EU has made progress. Divergences between the EU’s internal and external policies have been reduced because all the EU member states have now ratified the fundamental ILO conventions. In contrast with the debates of the 1990s, the EU generally manages to speak with one voice on the trade-social nexus. However, the capacity of the European Community to negotiate, ratify, implement and enforce labour standards internally remains limited, and its member states are still largely in charge of these issues. This could fuel developing countries’ critique that Europe is using double standards in ‘imposing’ social norms. There have also been concerns about the lack of transparency in the EU’s unilateral decisions on sanctions or incentives, for example, in the case of Pakistan.

Finally, there are strong indications that other trade-related objectives have taken precedence over the fundamental labour standards of the ILO. Considering normative power through trade is a hard case because trade-offs with other external policy goals inevitably emerge. Applied to this case, it seems that a more ambitious social agenda has been hindered by the EU’s pursuit of free trade. The scope and impact of the positive social conditionality system under the European GSP has been undermined by other EU trade initiatives that are aimed at trade liberalization and do not provide social trade incentives, such as ‘Everything but Arms’ for the least-developed countries and free trade agreements with several Asian and Latin American countries. Labour standards have been pursued even less vigorously in Europe’s bilateral agreements (see Gryenberg and Qalo 2006: 625), which are mainly aimed at the reciprocal liberalization of market barriers and behind-the-border issues. The latter involve regulatory disciplines in areas such as investment, competition, government procurement, intellectual property rights and services. They occupy a central place in the ‘deep trade’ agenda of the EU (Young 2007), while more interventionist and redistributive trade issues tend to be pushed to the periphery (Orbie and Faber 2009: 370). For example, it has been suggested that EU member states
are less enthusiastic than the European Commission about a far-reaching sustainable development chapter, including ILO CLS, in the new bilateral agreements with Asian countries. The EU’s main priorities are in the areas of market access and regulatory disciplines.

EU preferences for free trade and deep trade are inspired not only by economic interests but also by ideological beliefs about the purpose of trade policies (see Orbie 2008: 47–51, 62). Since halfway through the 1990s, a consensus has emerged among EU policy-makers about the positive impact of free trade on economic and social development. In this context, it has also been argued that the European model of regional integration could be exported to the international scene (see Lamy 2002). However, this model is to a large extent based on economic liberalization and regulatory integration. This brings us to the fundamental question about the nature of the EU. The NPE thesis makes a direct linkage between the EU’s sui generis architecture and its normative power status, suggesting that ‘the EU is a normative power by virtue of its hybrid polity consisting of supranational and international forms of governance’ (Manners 2008b: 45). However, if one conceptualizes the EU as a ‘regulatory state’ entrusted with correcting the market failures that accompany liberalization (see Majone 1994), or if we look at the ‘constitutional asymmetry’ between market-enhancing and market interventionist instruments (see Scharpf 2002), a different picture emerges. The Union’s institutional machinery may be better equipped to pursue economic integration, while the EU’s pursuit of social corrections and redistribution has been more problematical. This inherent bias into the EU’s internal policies may also cast a shadow on its global role. The EU is particularly well equipped to promote a deep international trade agenda because of its internal market experience, but this still falls short of a more ambitious approach in line with the idea of ‘embedded liberalism’. Paraphrasing Christopher Hill’s concept, we may be noticing a widening gap between the EU’s capabilities of a regulatory state, and the expectations of an NPE (Orbie 2008).

When elaborating on the way that normative objectives are pursued, normative power accounts barely touch on ideological questions. Nevertheless, it seems that the EU is institutionally designed to promote market-enhancing policies. A major reason for delegating trade policy to the European Commission is precisely that ‘agents’ generally favour neoliberal options compared with their ‘principals’ (see Meunier 2005: 8). As indicated in the first section, the pursuit of free trade and deep integration could also be considered as normative objectives, but it remains unclear how the tension between liberalization and interventionism should be approached from a normative power perspective.

Further research should investigate the relationship between Europe’s institutional structure and its normative power qualities, possibly in comparison with US foreign policy. Based on this case study, it can be argued that
the references to cosmopolitan norms and preferences for a non-binding approach stem from the nature of the EU. The sum of the 27 EU member state trade policies in the absence of the EU would probably be more protectionist and less embedded in international treaties. The EU’s hybrid polity makes it more difficult for European policy-makers to engage either in protectionist practices, because trade policies are delegated to the Commission and less influenced by domestic constituencies, or in the imposition of trade sanctions, because this requires unanimity and touches on second pillar policies. But at the same time, the peculiar set-up of the EU also facilitates the creation of a ‘neoliberal power Europe’, whereby a non-binding and cooperative approach to social issues illustrates a limited commitment to achieving social norms in comparison with a more straightforward and enforceable market-making agenda. A normative trade actor would abstain from protectionist misuse of normative principles, without limiting its activities to the promotion of neoliberal norms. It is still unclear whether this can be achieved by the EU as it currently stands. This case showed that the principles and activities of European trade arrangements have certainly become more normative in the past decade, but the EU (at least as it is presently constituted) may soon be facing the limits of what it can achieve.

Notes

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1. However, see a more extensive elaboration in Manners (2008b: 47–55).
3. Following a conflict between the Council and the Commission on the ratification of ILO Convention No. 170 on Chemicals at Work, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), Opinion 2/91, argued that the existence of Community legislation on certain labour standards does not necessarily imply an exclusive Community competence to negotiate related conventions within the ILO. When the Community limits itself to setting minimum labour standards, external competence is shared by the Community and member states. As a consequence, there are many facets of social policy in which the EU does not have external competence, especially in respect of pay, the right of association, the right to strike and the right to lock-out (see Novitz 2002; Clapham and Martignoni 2006). However, it appears that coordination of European positions at the ILO has been more successful in recent years (Orbie and Tortell 2008: 13).
5. The term ‘embedded liberalism’ was introduced by John Gerard Ruggie in 1982, in reference to the ideas outlined in Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1944)
and characterizing the post-war ideological consensus. Briefly summarized, this notion indicates that reliance on the forces of the free market cannot guarantee goals such as development and social progress, and that social values should be embedded in the economic system. Interestingly, the Havana Charter (1948) resulting from the UN Conference on Trade and Employment (emphasis added) foresaw an International Trade Organization (ITO) which included an institutional linkage between trade and labour standards. It also provided for cooperation with the ILO, and made it possible to bring complaints about unfair labour conditions before the ITO’s dispute settlement procedures (see Drache 2002). However, after a coalition of ‘protectionists’ and ‘perfectionists’ in the US Congress had rejected the ITO, the provisional GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) chapter of Havana became the main pillar of the post-war international economic architecture. Labour standards became disconnected from the world trade regime, with the notable exception of an ‘ITO remnant’ in GATT Article XX(e), which permits governments to ban trade in goods produced by using prison labour. The breakdown of the ITO created a path-dependent process whereby labour standards were seen as incompatible with, and thus separated from, the multilateral trade regime (Wilkinson 2001).

6. This section draws mainly on Orbie and Tortell (2009).

7. Other reasons have been advanced, for example, that the EU was inspired by commercial considerations, that it acted out of development concerns for families in Pakistan, that the EU preferred an incentive-based approach and that the Pakistani authorities were cooperating with the EU (see Brandtner and Rosas 1999; Orbie and Tortell 2009). Apart from substantial considerations, this case shows the ambiguity of the EU’s decision-making process: ‘the whole procedure has been conducted not only way from public accountability, but in deep secrecy’ (Tsogas 2000: 364).

8. This system granted additional market access to Andean Community members (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) and to members of the Central American Common Market (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama).


10. Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal; Stockholm Convention on persistent Organic Pollutants; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species; Convention on Biological Diversity; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961); UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971); UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988); Mexico UN Convention Against Corruption.

11. See, for example, European Parliament (2006).
12. See, for example, DG Trade (2007).
13. The other GSP-plus beneficiary countries are Georgia, Mongolia, Moldova and Sri Lanka.
14. No noticeable changes in implementation performances between 2005 and 2008 can be noticed.
15. The Commission investigated the implementation of labour rights in El Salvador in 2008–09 and found that temporary withdrawal of the special incentives was not justified, although it continues to monitor the situation. The GSP-plus incentives of Venezuela (2009) and Sri Lanka (2010) have been withdrawn but not because of violation of the labour standard conventions (non-ratification of the Convention against Corruption in the case of Venezuela, and insufficient implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the case of Sri Lanka). An investigation of the implementation of core labour standards in Colombia has not been started.
Part IV

Future Orientations
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Does normative Europe need a new narrative? Alongside a sustained debate about the role of the European Union (EU) in the international system, and the nature of its power as an external actor, European foreign and security policies continue to reflect an awkward mixture of civilian, military and normative instruments, and ambiguous goals. The EU lacks a conceptual framework for its international presence, capable of organizing and improving the integration of its civilian and military characteristics, of justifying and explaining its external policies and last but not least of motivating support for its role.

The 50th anniversary of its founding in 2007 saw the EU still unclear about its power and how, when and where to exercise it. A struggle to introduce institutional reforms, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the troubled passage of its successor, the Lisbon Treaty, created a paradoxical state of affairs in European foreign policy (EFP).¹ Between 2003 and 2008 rapid developments in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and a heady sense of progress and achievement were tempered by doubts about a collective EFP – what was it for and could it be effective? After 2008 EFP looked less assured, assailed by policy setbacks in Afghanistan, and institutional uncertainty as a result of treaty reforms.²

The EU has never lacked labels to characterize itself although many point to the contradictions and tensions of its self-appointed role: in 1972 the label was ‘civilian power’ (Duchêne 1972; Maull 2001), in 1999 it was ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002), in 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) phrase was a ‘(formidable) force for good’, with the Union urged to adopt an ‘active’ foreign policy (EU 2003). Others have coined ‘gentle power’ or suggested that what the EU does is ‘structural foreign policy’, which seeks medium- to long-term goals rather than pursuing short-term interests (Paddoa-Schioppa 2001; Telò 2001). ‘Smart power’, the concept proposed by Joseph Nye, has also been suggested as a characterization of EU external relations, and is
defined as combining hard and soft power through the use of a spectrum of policy instruments and economic resources (Nye 2006; Rehn 2008b).

The problem with such conceptualizations is that while they provide fuel for an academic debate about the EU, and are useful lenses through which to see and understand its development as a foreign policy actor, they are less helpful in a political sense of operationalizing the EU’s external role or for mobilizing foreign policy initiatives. As self-reflexive tools they emphasize rather than resolve the contradictions and chronic dilemmas of EFP. They help us recognize the limitations of a new kind of foreign policy actor-ness but leave unanswered questions about how to overcome them. Can the EU be normative, and at the same time get others to take notice of its norms? Can it promote peace but also be powerful? If the EU’s self-proclaimed purpose is to assert its identity and presence on the world stage through an ‘active’ foreign policy, how can it rely on a consensual policy process which results in it frequently being gripped by paralysis and stalemate? How can one translate a certain (or more often an uncertain) idea of the EU as a foreign policy actor into a political dynamic, and concrete practices?

In this chapter, I consider the possibilities for developing a coherent narrative of EFP which builds on the conceptualization offered by the normative power thesis, but which is also able to proceed beyond classification and identification to assert an ethos and purpose of foreign policy, and provide operational guidance for the EU’s external role. The aim is to explore a strategic narrative for normative power, which contains a representation and self-characterization of EFP actorness, and which is also constitutive of it.

In essence, this is about the articulation and practice of a particular kind of power. Since Manners coined the normative power characterization, a tension between the concept of power as the ability, on the one hand to shape international opinion and redefine what is normal, and, on the other, to *impose* its views through various coercive means, has become more pronounced, and not just for the EU (Sjursen 2006a). The failure of conventional military might to prevail in twenty-first-century conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as constraints on its usefulness in conflict prevention and conflict resolution in Africa, have produced a crisis of confidence in conventional security thinking, institutions and instruments. The search for an EFP rationale to substitute for the absence of the nation state’s classic defence of territory, or the pursuit of a more or less well-defined ‘national interest’, has unfolded in this environment. It is made more pressing by a desire on the EU’s part to be distinctive, yet still part of a recognizable pattern of behaviour in the international system; to be *sui generis*, and non-state like, but at the same time to play in the premier league of global politics, just at the time when the demands of global politics are both shifting and increasing.
A crucial insight of Manners’ thesis is that the symbolic components of the EU’s international identity deserve attention. The challenge is how to express this identity in a form which embeds and constitutes normative power, and moves it from the theoretical to the practical. In concretizing normative power beyond just a conceptual/analytical level, there is a need to address the difficulties of not only defining and implementing a vision for EU foreign policy, but also situating it within a changing landscape of international relations. This chapter explores a security narrative based on normative power, for use as a strategic tool. In line with Beck’s (1997) ‘reflexive modernisation’, a process of creating spaces within which foundational norms and narratives may be questioned and redefined, the aim is to formulate a narrative which engages a perception of difference and which itself is also instrumental in creating different ways of seeing and doing things in EFP.

Firstly, I will consider the role of a narrative in terms of what purpose it might serve, and whom it might inspire, attract and mobilize. This can be framed in two ways: firstly, according to the internal demands on EFP, from domestic audiences; and secondly, for external, third-party demands, whether by states, non-state actors or international organizations. Next, the chapter deals with the question of content, or what kind of narrative might serve as both a reflexive tool and tactical guidance for normative power. What I will suggest is that human security provides the most suitable narrative for the articulation and instrumentalization of Normative Power Europe. It is one which addresses issues of consistency, coherence and effectiveness which are necessary in order to give effect to EU power. The chapter ends with an illustration of how such a human security narrative might operate looking at the example of the EU’s engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

**Driving forces and discordant discourses**

Normative power is a way of understanding EFP through its basis in values and principles, and its ideational capacity to diffuse norms in the international system. It is an addition to rather than a contradiction of previous characterizations such as civilian or military power, and seeks to add a cognitive dimension to considerations about what kind of actor the EU is, and away from a purely empirical analysis (Manners 2002: 239).

Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002: 770) suggested that normative power, as the ‘ultimate form of soft power’, required narratives of projection, whose function was ‘to assert some form of control over the rest of the world’. This proposal highlights exactly the dilemma over operationalizing normative power. Which matters more: norms, including a preference for persuasion rather than coercion, and for diplomacy rather than force, or the ability to ‘assert some form of control’? By narratives which ‘control’ do we
understand that the EU relies on its persuasive rhetorical power for its influence in foreign affairs? In the absence of a sharp sword, does the EU possess something equally pointed, in which norm diffusion can create more than feelings of attraction towards the EU, but is carried out in ways which are less benign and consensual? At the very least this ambiguity suggests that narrative is a key component of normative power whose mechanics deserve closer examination.

The proposition is that what is going on with EU normative power involves more than projection. The presence of a cognitive dimension is significant and requires a means through which the EU is able to define and shape norms, partly by constructing a plausible story. The key elements of this story are the choice of foreign policy goals, the selection of appropriate instruments, the motives behind policy priorities and the presumed consequences of those choices. The packaging and presentation of this story has to make sense to many different types of audience, some of whom have barely been considered in the development of CFSP/ESDP as it evolved in its early years. They include those who take part in projecting such a narrative (policy-makers and other elites), those in whose name and money foreign policy is carried out (European citizens), and those on the receiving end such as multilateral partners, and elites and civil society in countries targeted by EU external relations. Yet neither the EU story nor its projection are straightforward for many reasons. The ideational force at the core of normative power is mitigated by the proliferation of different ideas among Europeans themselves about what it is to be European and what are distinctive European norms. The EU draws on its common symbolic history as a peace project (although of course with different paths to peace depending on where in Europe you sit), but must extrapolate forwards onto a terrain of contemporary threats which are viewed differently across member states, and any account of foreign policy must also navigate many different layers of governance. Diversity – for which we might plausibly read incoherence – is part of European DNA, but it poses problems for any attempt to fashion a consistent narrative of normative power, even if there may be consensus for the idea that a narrative is indispensable for such power to function. While there may be agreement on narrative as process, content may prove to be more divisive.

Moreover, if there were sharp edges to the discrete characterizations of the EU’s foreign policy personality, they have been rubbed away in recent years as the EU has developed its range of foreign policy instruments, expanded the spectrum of situations in which it chooses to intervene and raised the ambitions of its interventionism. It now deploys both civilian and military techniques for managing crises and has an expansive definition of the EU ‘interest’ in foreign affairs, derived not only through a set of ‘shared’ values, but also from threats to those values, which may be diverse in their nature, source and location (EU 2003). Furthermore the development of CFSP/ESDP
means greater complexity in the number of institutions, and policy paths involved in processing EFP, not to mention individual careers of EU officials involved with it.

The degree to which values determine EFP is not clear. Lucarelli (2006: 5) points out that the EU is most obviously value led in spheres where foreign policy decisions are made by the Community method and where supranational institutions are the prime movers. Intergovernmental processes under CFSP tend to produce less explicit normative behaviour. Such a claim needs further empirical testing, but many ESDP missions, particularly those in Africa and Indonesia, do not bear this out. One example is the military and police missions to the DRC, to which I will return later in this chapter. It appears that normative behaviour co-exists with instrumental rationality, including strategic geopolitics, even on issues which appear to be most obviously normative such as the promotion of human rights (Youngs 2004).

The cognitive and symbolic dimension of EFP covers many permutations of behaviour thrown up by the development of CFSP/ESDP. It has to make sense of the ‘no-pattern’ pattern of EU external intervention and attempt to aggregate policies and actions which are individually and collectively labelled *sui generis*, thereby denying any consistent categorization. Fine nuances of policy crafted by EU elites may be a pragmatic response to contexts and circumstances but offer scant material from which to elaborate a general sense of identity or purpose.

**Telling security**

Narration is an obvious mechanism for influencing discourse and constructing identity. A desired or speculative outcome is interwoven with actual events, past and present. In Anderson’s imagined communities, narrating foundational fictions or traditions is a way of stimulating social and political imaginings and building identity (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1983). Narratives can be individual and/or collective stories which reveal someone’s experiences; they communicate human knowledge, sensations of or reactions to events and the social environment, and they also help to produce shifts in that environment.

A historical perspective on narrative suggests that in serving as a representation of the real, it has a social role as a form of ideology (White 1975). Rather than being a neutral articulation of human experience it imposes closure on the disorder of the real world – both contemporary and historic, and thereby provides the reader with a ‘reassuring sense of her identity and integration in the social order’ (Callinicos 1995: 210). It is also highly malleable depending on historical context and on subject positioning. We know from Barthes’ work on myths that even deeply embedded narratives only take on meaning when combined with how and when specific readers refer and relate to them (Barthes 2000: 128).
Some EU security literature focuses on the need for a common strategic ‘culture’ (Cornish and Edwards 2001; Hyde-Price 2004), but the term is often used loosely without investigating what the process of embedding a culture would actually entail. The creation of strategic culture may be less susceptible to management or conscious initiative, and is both more dense and complex, and less susceptible to manipulation than the production of narratives. Narratives are less ‘thick’ forms of identity but they are important in sharing and bonding, by connecting elite discourses with more widespread understanding of issues, interests and values. They also contribute to a common process of ‘sense-making’ which helps to circulate information among wider publics as well as narrow elites.

Narrative treat events as signposts pointing beyond themselves to states of affairs to which we have no direct, immediate access – traces of a buried past, pointers towards an understanding of hypercomplex conditions, signs from which the future can be predicted. (Heins 2002: 129)

Garton Ash (2007) places the idea of a new European narrative in even more concise terms, as a *storyline* through which Europeans will be able to regain a lost ‘plot’:

> Europe no longer knows what story it wants to tell. A shared political narrative sustained the postwar project of (west) European integration for three generations, but it has fallen apart since the end of the cold war. Most Europeans now have little idea where we’re coming from; far less do we share a vision of where we want to go to. We don’t know why we have an EU or what it’s good for. So we urgently need a new narrative.

Garton Ash’s proposal for a new European story is founded on six value-based strands such as solidarity, peace, prosperity and which produce a concrete identity or sense of self, but which dwell in the present rather than being only reworkings of old myths.

There is also importantly, a highly public character to his narrative: it is something to be debated on the web and in print or on television and radio. It is a means by which the European grass roots – Polish plumbers and students on Easyjet – can openly and explicitly share a sense of commonality about their prosperity, freedom and diversity.

‘Whose narrative?’ is an important question related to the appropriateness and usefulness of an EU strategic narrative. Such a narrative has to operate among different types of public. Janus-like, its storyline resounds in two directions, responding to both internal and external audiences and their various dynamics. The internal/domestic dimension is about making sense of what EFP is for to those inside the EU who implement it, fund it and lend it credibility. It informs national and EU policy-makers and planners, it appears
within military and civilian doctrines, rules of engagement, operating manuals and organizational frames for policy initiatives. It also supplies the fabric for building public knowledge and views about EFP, and is the means by which public support for the EU’s external activities might be won, lost or recaptured.

Eurobarometer polls suggest that foreign policy is one of the most popular areas of EU integration, although traditionally this has also been an area where member states, and EU institutions, have avoided public scrutiny through opaque processes which discourage citizen involvement in decision-making (European Commission 2003c). ESDP missions have low public visibility and status, with notable exceptions such as the vigorous debates in the German parliament over the 2006 deployment to the DRC, and its contribution in Afghanistan.5 A reflexive dimension would be one means of sustaining public interest in EFP and would allow Europeans beyond a narrow political elite to engage with its ideas and ideals.

The external factors to which a strategic narrative must respond are its capacity to express and project the Union’s intentions towards third parties – most usually, although not exclusively, states. A strategic narrative can articulate a rationale for intervention, and for acting in concert with others. It can help make sense of the EU’s international presence for outsiders and has the potential to determine the terms of communication with them, and in doing so, define and change relationships. In this sense a strategic narrative would be quite different to the model of a ‘control’ narrative, proposed by Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002). A normative narrative can be a vehicle for constructive interaction, rather than a take-it-or-leave-it set of European values to be presented to others.

While we can attempt to divide neatly the demands placed upon a foreign policy narrative into those which fall into the internal and the external dimensions, increasingly these lines are blurred. The appeal of having an orderly bounded sense of ‘we’ and ‘our’ narrative is disrupted by the practical reality that the division between external and internal in a globalized world becomes harder to draw. Narrative boundaries, like territorial borders, are permeable and are no guarantee of either inclusiveness or exclusivity – it is just as likely that those inside the desired circle will contest a given narrative as that those outside will embrace it.

With this caveat in mind, the crucial feature of a strategic narrative is that it represents an explicit attempt to define and enact two processes central to both internal and external logics of foreign policy: identification and legitimation. Not only does it offer an explanation of who ‘we’ are and what ‘we’ aspire to be, it also seeks to supply a rationale for what ‘we’ do. In Table 10.1 I set out how these logics interact with processes of self-characterization and validation. Identification and legitimation are staged for internal audiences, while the projection of personality and justification of actions occur towards external non-EU audiences. For the EU, a strategic narrative also has
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Table 10.1  Foreign policy narrative logics

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to satisfy a third process, that of integration. Although there may be variations of the European story, it should be flexible enough to accommodate cultural nuances, and robust enough to draw together the ambitions and intentions of 450 million Europeans with different historical and geographical backgrounds. The 2010 eurozone crisis demonstrated the absence of a convincing contemporary account of why the EU exists. Monetary union was not only under threat substantively but it also lost its narrative power to explain the European project for a generation for whom the post-World War II reconciliation or even the 2004 enlargement no longer resonated as an EU *raison d’être*. External relations and the EU’s alternative vision of international politics present Europeans with an alternative possible narrative, but one which is currently weak.

Garton Ash (2007) is clear about the integrative possibilities of a European narrative. He dismisses the ‘negative stereotyping’ involved in Othering, for example, towards the United States (US) or Islam. Also unsatisfactory are traditional discourses which frame EU power as a function of member state unity and collective action, as they tend to echo and reproduce nationalist rhetoric. They also produce another problem, of idealizing the narrative: narratives can themselves be forms of Othering, and may also tell or re-tell stories of national myths and/or power. Thus the question to consider is not just whether integration needs to be articulated in new ways, but what kind of story will be convincing.

The complex mosaic of EFP, with national, intergovernmental and community institutions and initiatives, means that a narrative has to integrate not only across national borders, and between national and supranational levels of decision-making but across EU institutions and the bureaucratic divisions erected within foreign policy-making, and also across different professional cultures and capacities such as military, civilian, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), hard security, humanitarian aid, economics, trade and so forth. To function properly it relies on organizing these diverse elements into some form of coherent whole. The aim is to present a picture of EFP in contrast to a ‘chaos of fragments with no particular pattern’ (Callinicos 1995: 204). In addition to providing symbolic resonance through identification and legitimation, narrative is an organizational tool, imposing
order and consistency on diverse foreign policy actions. It is more than a ‘poetic act’, it is a ‘focusing of content into a single coherent story’ (Stone 1979: 3).

The diffusion of norms is problematized elsewhere in this volume by Diez and Pace. How they are spread and delivered is relevant to the proposition that narrative is an essential component in normative power. Would a narrative improve the transmission of messages and their chances of being understood? In the case of democracy promotion, Bicchi highlights a related problem that long policy chains for implementing external policies offer opportunities for unintended outcomes, and a dilution of political will (Bicchi 2010). Another issue is how a normative narrative can avoid the trap of becoming part of a hegemonic discourse. The imposition of EU norms, whether they are labelled universal or not, and whether they are diffused through conditional trade deals and membership, aid assistance or military force sits uncomfortably alongside a preference for persuasion and natural attraction, rather than coercion as the modes of EU intervention. Can a narrative resolve the dissonance between normative goals and non-normative means in EFP? The flexibility of narratives may be an advantage here – the fact that they are easily contested and challenged, taking on different shapes according to who is telling and who is listening. They may be more deft to embrace the awkward disjunctures of EFP than other discursive elements such as policies or doctrines. They can be adapted in ‘real time’ so that both proponents and opponents can use them as vehicles to support their position. Their malleable quality offers scope for constructive ambiguity which has been typically as much a part of the normative toolkit as more obvious instruments of diffusion such as conditions and incentives. However, ambiguity also serves a hegemonic purpose: a lack of precise definition often favours the dominance of prevailing terms and discourses. For example, the discourse of crisis management assumes that all cases of EU intervention are those occasioned by humanitarian need, and therefore justified normatively (Lucarelli and Menotti 2006). Yet the move to term any given situation a ‘crisis’, and thus trigger intervention is made in the first instance by the EU, rather than those targeted by it.

The most significant ambiguity at the heart of CFSP/ESDP stems from the decision to move beyond civilian instruments, and under a rubric of crisis management, make the EU a normative power which resorts where necessary to kinetic force. In the starkest terms, the EU has made itself capable of killing in defence of its values. Where power was once clearly subordinate to ideals such as democracy promotion and the observance and respect of human rights, and these ideals were pursued through the choice of particular tools, the hierarchy of different potential kinds of power is now unclear. The certainty that traditional power, conceived as ‘high politics’ or ‘hard security’, constituted a negation of what the EU stood for has been replaced by a desire to be able to choose from a more extensive list of possible instruments.
Another source of narrative confusion concerns the voluntary nature of the EU’s powerfulness. One version represents the EU’s denial of classical power as something which is forced upon it in the absence of an ability to deploy might or statecraft in international relations. Caught naked in the brutal state of nature of interstate politics, the EU has fallen back on a Hob(be)son’s choice of having its way by other means. Metaphors such as ‘America cooks and Europe does the dishes’, referred to in Kagan’s (2003) Venus and Mars analogy have chipped away at the pure symbolism of its ideal foreign policy, placing normative power in a less flattering light, although as Hyde-Price (2004) points out, the correlation between relative power capabilities and a ‘civilian’ strategic culture is either poor or negative, suggesting that it is not only the lack of power that drives the nature of EFP.

Nevertheless, Kagan’s (2003) thesis has perpetuated a view that EU normative power is a sub-standard category of power in international relations and that Europe has failed to shape ideas of what is normal in the world because the nature of its power is insufficient to the task.

This strategic and conceptual muddle about EU power confuses attempts to tell EFP ‘as it is’. An alternative foreign policy discourse has emerged which seeks to overcome the spectre of failure through an emphasis on effectiveness rather than norms. The effectiveness discourse reflects more closely the culture of intergovernmental policy-making which governs CFSP, and which has grown progressively since 1999 with the development of the ESDP. As ESDP has grown in size, scope and ambition, this discourse has become more dominant. It focuses on generating evidential experience of collective policy-making, drawing causal relationships between the resources available to the EU, on the one hand, and the functioning of CFSP/ESDP, on the other. It can be discerned in three distinct forms: firstly, the emphasis on the EU as an ‘active’ foreign policy player, where active is equated with being positive, not passive, and autonomous, rather than at the behest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the US (EU 2003; Biscop 2006); secondly, the concern with coherence in the range of policy instruments and initiatives in both the Community pillar and the Council, and attempts to address gaps in EU security capabilities on both a thematic and geographic level, by improving inter-pillar coordination (Solana 2005; European Commission 2006b; ISIS and CeMiSS 2006); and thirdly, of longer standing, the effectiveness discourse can be discerned in the drive to increase the Union’s capabilities particularly in the area of security and defence, expressed in the 2008 and 2010 Headline Goals for, respectively, civilian and military resources, and referred to in the ESS.

The effectiveness discourse challenges the primacy of symbolism in normative power. Indeed symbolic ideals may be disparaged as conventional forms of power make a bid for reconsideration. Military force and other forms of coercive capacity are necessary in order for the EU to play the role
it desires on the world stage. This was the lesson of the conflicts which followed the break-up of Yugoslavia through to both Iraq wars. At the same time, geopolitics, particularly where linked to questions of competition for natural resources, territorial issues and spheres of influence on the EU periphery, also compete with a discourse of norms.

Feeding this uncertainty is the 2003 ESS, which is vague about the issue of EU power and its purposes. It concentrates instead on ensuring that Europe feels good about having power in the first place. While the term ‘power’ does not appear, references to the EU as a ‘global player’ are synonymous with it, and point to the same kind of ambition. The strategy provides a self-justification of the EU’s world role, reflected in its claim to be present at moments and locations of global crisis (Whitman 2006a). There is little, however, in this rhetoric of presence and effectiveness to indicate what constitutes a successful outcome of EU intervention, and whether this is consistent with being a normative power or some other kind of actor. If norm diffusion is the guiding principle of EFP, how do we know, at the operational and strategic level, whether this has been achieved and with which consequences?

For the moment, the effectiveness and the normative discourses bump along together, although both demand further qualification, and there are calls to strengthen one or other (Biscop 2006; Sjursen 2006a). Without suggesting that the EU has to choose between norms and effectiveness, an awkward juxtaposition of these two discourses weakens the Union’s identity, and particularly its self-confidence and presence as an international actor. For example, civil–military co-operation is seen by the EU as a way of addressing the dichotomy between hard and soft power, it remains unclear how comprehensive approaches to security work in practice, and what the underlying philosophy behind such co-ordination/co-operation is (Gowan 2005; Martin 2009a). While the friction between the effectiveness discourse and the normative agenda of the EU has already been noted (Heisbourg 2000; Smith 2003; Lindley-French 2004; Whitman 2006a) there is more to be done to consider how these two discourses can be reconciled, or indeed any overlap between them exploited. If existing designations of soft or civilian power no longer quite fit EU ambitions, and normative power is indeed a paradox, and both raise serious contradictions and tensions, how can the EU resolve these, to be both ‘good’ and ‘forceful’, as suggested by the ESS?

The crucial point here is not an analytical challenge of how to explain the paradoxes of the EU’s external identity, and policy-making, but the operational implications of a lack of clarity and the disjuncture between different forms of foreign policy personality. The substantial increase after 2003 in the number of ESDP missions requiring large numbers of personnel – both civilian and military – has raised the stakes in this debate. So indirectly have the successive failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the difficult passage of the Lisbon Treaty, both of which provided institutional reforms such as a
new post of EU High Representative and a European External Action Service (EEAS). Arguments over the design of the EEAS prior to the start of operations in 2010 suggest that without an articulated set of principles, confusion over details such as organizational hierarchy and budgets create uncertainty over how new treaty-based competences are to be realized (Martin 2009b; Gavas and Koeb 2010).

Europe’s strategic storyline

This brings us to content and whether there is a narrative account which can perform the functions noted above and translate normative power into a workable strategy for the EU. In particular how can norms be positioned clearly as the driving force behind EFP, and made explicit rather than implicit in operationalizing it?

The ESS was an essential first step towards providing a reflexive account of EFP personality, but it leaves unanswered key questions about how the EU should enact the values it proclaims – why it would choose to intervene beyond its borders, where it should do so and according to which criteria. There is a growing corpus of knowledge and experience from the more than 20 interventions undertaken between 2003 and 2010, but without a strategic overview to exploit these experiences for future action, this knowledge is fragmented. Thus to some critics, the ESS is only a ‘pre-strategic concept’ (Lindley-French 2004). Moreover, it is hardly the kind of populist account, capable of touching those beyond policy-making elites or which could, for example, inspire European citizens to accept being placed in harm’s way. It was for some of these reasons that member states asked Javier Solana with the European Parliament and the Commission, to re-examine the implementation of ESS during the French presidency of 2008 (Missiroli 2008). The report elaborated a ‘distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy’, citing as evidence EU interventions ranging from post-tsunami peace-building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad. For the first time the Council of the EU, which authored the document, also explicitly referred to human security as central to the EU’s particular strategic goals. Just as the EU does not lack conceptual/analytical labels for its external action, so there is an even greater proliferation of policy labels: ‘civilian crisis management’, ‘conflict prevention’, ‘civil–military co-operation’, ‘small arms and light weapons’ (SALW). These descriptions tell partial stories about the EU as an international actor. As well as the ESS, the EU’s Strategy for Africa, published in 2005, encompasses a range of regionally focused, cross-pillar initiatives in areas like development, security and governance, education and health. The Strategy, drafted by the Commission and adopted by the European Council, is a framework initiative which exemplifies how an ideal-typical EFP should function (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2006). As well as describing EU-African relations in new terms, it is also meant to be the basis for a structured dialogue between the EU and African states which puts their
relationship on a new footing, and in this sense, it is a consciously reflexive tool as well as a normative, organizing frame. This shift is justified in the Strategy by the fact that Africa has changed and become something different. Yet there is no accompanying narrative which describes for both sides what sort of actor the EU now is (European Commission 2007e).

The flaw in such strategies-as-narratives is that they become empty rhetoric, where what is said diverges from what is done. They deliver a series of meaningless phrases on the pages of policy texts or operational guidelines but are neither adhered to nor given credibility by those most affected by them. This happens despite good intentions, because the EU has so far failed to buttress them with processes which ensure that they are filled with meaning. For example, there is no consistent evaluation methodology, nor any reliable assessment of impacts upon third parties. Consultation mechanisms are patchy and often unable to detect problems with how the EU is perceived on the ground. Lack of consistency between multiple EU instruments and between EU internal and external behaviour gives rise to criticisms of double standards where the EU is seen to insist on more stringent norms externally than it is prepared to live up to in its domestic policies.

One way forward is for the EU to build on the historical meta-narrative of European integration itself as the guiding force behind its foreign policy. For many outside the EU, the European peace project is still a persuasive ideal and exporting it into third countries represents a powerful story on which to base external policy. One drawback is that it is insufficiently concrete to mobilize action at the operational and tactical levels of EU policy. At the same time, the idea of a ‘grand narrative’ of EFP worries those who believe it is hubristic and ultimately meaningless (Howorth 2009).

A project which is both more ambitious but which dwells less exclusively on the European need for self-justification is the proposal that the EU adopt human security as a strategic narrative. This explicitly puts principles alongside capabilities and effectiveness as essential for the development of CFSP/ESDP. In 2004, the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, convened by the High Representative Javier Solana recommended that the EU adopt a human security approach to realize its ambitions to play a global security role, while also reflecting its distinctive character as a polity committed to foundational ideas of peace, democracy and human rights rather than the classic nation state defence of territory. The group concluded that ‘the most appropriate role for Europe in the twenty-first century would be to promote human security’. In 2006, the Study Group, reconvened by the Finnish presidency, elaborated this claim further by proposing that human security should form the basis of a European strategic narrative:

Human Security is not simply a ‘leitmotif’ for EU security policies (Werthes and Bosold 2006), or an analytical label which categorises the EU’s international role in the way that concepts such as normative power or civilian power have done. Rather, it provides an ongoing and
dynamic organising frame for security action, which is currently absent from European foreign policy texts and practices. For this reason Human Security can be seen as a pro-active strategic narrative which has the potential to further European Union foreign policy integration. (Kaldor et al. 2007: 273)

The precise terms of this narrative remain open: for example, the degree to which it might represent a radical reworking of current security policies, or a rebranding of existing policies, or something in between the two. Is it a narrative for conflict and crisis, or can it be taken to encompass foreign policy in toto, and to what extent is it a discrete European narrative, or, on the other hand, an inclusive mechanism which makes it possible, even easier perhaps, for the EU to work with other organizations and states? The potential for a human security narrative to articulate the blurring of lines between domestic and foreign policy and to apply to both is also an area which at the current time of writing remains underexplored.

What is clear is that Kaldor’s proposition in a human security doctrine for Europe (HSSG 2004) seeks to address the need for a self-reflexive element to EFP, to promote political and conceptual coherence, articulate better the goals and methodology of external relations, and raise the visibility of ESDP in particular, to bring European publics on board. Thus an important aspect of the human security doctrine is not just that it shifts the referent point for EU security policies, and calls for a reconceptualization of European security, but that it has the potential to be a more instrumental code than previous terms such as civilian or normative power.

A human security narrative, argues Kaldor, is required precisely because it would reanimate EU external relations without the need for institutional innovation, and it would do so in a way which reflects the self-identity of Europeans, reiterates and reinforce the foundational ideas behind European external relations, of projecting peace and co-operation beyond the Union’s boundaries (Kaldor et al. 2007). Potentially, it could also offer a means to bring together crisis policies under ESDP including responses to natural disasters, with broader security and foreign policy initiatives including the European Neighbourhood Policy and migration policies.

While such claims require more research to test them empirically, there are grounds to suppose that a human security narrative draws on an established well of normative discourse in EFPs, and that it exists ‘between the lines’ of current practices, so that there is indeed something ‘European’ about such a narrative. The 2007 Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group, entitled A European Way of Security spelled out in more detail the elision of European identity and human security:

For the European Union, Human Security (sic) is more than just another security concept or label. It can be seen as a narrative that encapsulates
the goals and methods of a highly diverse foreign and security policy system, ... it is about how Europeans describe their approach to external security. (HSSG 2007)

The report goes on to say that human security, as a term, can be understood to encompass EU concepts of conflict prevention, crisis management and civil–military co-ordination, but it takes them further. It draws on the debates generated by these concepts as well as other terms used more broadly in the current global discourse such as ‘responsibility to protect’, ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘human development’.

Human security is about what to do in a crisis but it combines this with the analytical perspective of what constitutes crisis, by articulating the complex and interrelated conditions which produce and precede crises, and by defining appropriate responses to them. For example, from a human security perspective, the aim is not just political stability; it encompasses a notion of justice and sustainability. Whereas stability or ‘management of crisis’ tends to be about the absence of overt conflict or, in economic terms, about halting a downward spiral of gross domestic product (GDP) or the value of a currency, human security extends the reach of policies to deal with crime, human rights violations and joblessness. The parlance of crisis management, especially on the civil side, within the EU emphasizes some of these ‘vulnerabilities’, and its focus on strengthening the ‘rule of law’ embraces distributive and justice issues. However, the contention is that a specific language of human security would further entrench this kind of thinking and would help to underline the need to address ‘vulnerabilities’ in ways which reduce the risk of renewed crisis.

Similarly, human security capabilities require civil–military co-ordination. But it is more than just a matter of co-ordination, or ‘integration’ or ‘synergies’, human security is about how and why civil and military capabilities are combined, rather than a reflex action to use them as part of a standard conflict toolkit. Thus a human security narrative would represent a qualitative shift, not just at a rhetorical level, but in organising EFP actions at an operational level also. The criticism levelled at this kind of normative narrative is that it is based on a concept which is too wide and vague to be of practical use. The term human security was first put into the policy domain by the United Nations (UN) in 1994, and has come to represent a broad spectrum of threats and challenges which fall into the ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ categories (Glasius 2006). The task for the EU is to define human security in a way which is characteristically European, and distinct from Canadian or Japanese, to take two of the leading versions of a human security policy.

The basis and originality of the human security doctrine first proposed by Kaldor is a set of five principles: the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism and a
regional focus (HSSG 2004). The Madrid Report added a sixth principle, that of clear and transparent strategic direction, which emphasizes civilian control in external interventions, including military ones, as well as transparent mandates and a coherent strategic plan to bring together all the EU’s instruments in cases of crisis management (HSSG 2007).

By using these principles as a cognitive and operational framework, the EU would add to what it already does in the area of a normative foreign policy in a way which promotes more explicitly its distinctive vision. There are specific consequences for EFP from this kind of strategic narrative:

(a) **Coherence.** Rather than succumbing to turf-fighting and bureaucratic competition or adding to the layers of administration with new institutional mechanisms, conceptual coherence, being clear about shared goals and principles, would address the inter-pillar and inter-professional fragmentation which dogs EU external relations.

(b) **Effectiveness.** The principles of human security would provide a focus for external mandates. They offer a framework for standardizing doctrines and rules of engagement. Essentially, the principles, adapted to each situation, could be expressed as modus operandi and as a checklist for those involved in planning and evaluating operations. They would provide a reference point for EU intervention, and could help address resource allocation and generation issues and ‘value for money’ arguments which have barely been broached yet in the rapid development of CFSP.

(c) **Visibility.** An understandable policy concept could help increase the public impact of EU missions, and raise debate about both the internal and external legitimacy of intervention, underpinning it with a set of norms and values, and offering both EU citizens and those in target countries with clear principles and justifications for security policy.

Matlary (2006, 2008) sees a human security model as offering the EU a way through the theoretical, if not the operational, thicket of the use of force, and which would denote it as a strategic actor, rooted in norms such as respect for human rights and the use of legal instruments. ‘The concept (of human security) “weds” human rights to security, including military security’ (Matlary 2006: 118). For Liotta and Owen (2006: 94) a European human security doctrine is the ‘most direct document to date to openly declare Europe’s responsibility to act, independently if necessary … beyond its borders’. At the policy level, the EU has entrenched its support for human security since 2004, and the publication of the original Barcelona Report. In her capacity as EU Commissioner for external relations from 2004 to 2009, Benita Ferrero-Waldner emphasized the value of human security as a normative benchmark for EU policies, which could provide a common theme to a
range of initiatives on security sector reform, landmines and gender issues. In 2005 she stated:

The idea is to put people, their human rights and the threats that they face at the centre of our policies. The EU has moved in this direction and I am determined to push it further. (Ferrero-Waldner 2005)

The European Parliament also reflected this shift to human security. In 2008, two parties in the Parliament proposed an amendment to the Committee of Foreign Affairs’ Kuhne Report on the implementation of the ESS, to include an emphasis on the concept of human security, with the objective of initiating ‘a robust political mandate enabling it to act effectively in crises’ (European Parliament 2008).4 In 2008, the Council of the European Union explicitly referred to human security as central to the EU’s particular strategic goals in the Implementation Report of the ESS while talking of a ‘distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy’ (European Council 2008). Yet policy-makers’ adoption of the concept has been ambiguous about what human security means, and diverse in terms of the purpose of it as a foreign policy theme. The Implementation Report suggests that human security is one of several guiding themes, along with other procedural norms such as effective multilateralism or good governance. Unlike the UN’s responsibility to protect (R2P), a human security agenda commits member states to no specific obligations, so rather than a narrative it features more as a wish that is more ‘normative than positivist, more ideal than pragmatic’ (Martin and Owen 2010).

While there is both interest in and scepticism about human security as a new policy approach, particularly as the US and NATO have moved in this direction since 2008, with US and United Kingdom (UK) military doctrine reflecting this turn (USDoA 2006; Ministry of Defence 2008), the added value of human security for the EU is in its communicative potential to bridge between power and principles, and to generate a two-way dialogue about foreign policy based on the EU’s normative values. It is this dialogue, engaging constituencies in international politics in debates about power and policy, and its potential to transform foreign and security policy from a deliverable supply-side phenomenon to a relationship concept which engages both the givers and the receivers of EU actions, which could give real effect to normative power.

The EU in the Democratic Republic of Congo – a tale of human security?

How might a human security narrative work in practice, and how might it advance the operationalization of normative power? In 2006, the DRC sought to bring an end to its civil war with the first free elections in 46 years since its independence from Belgium. Presidential and parliamentary
elections were to be the culmination of a transition process to democracy in which the EU was the largest single financial backer.\textsuperscript{5}

The decision to dispatch an ESDP force to the DRC to assist the UN peacekeeping force already present in the country during the election period and give both military weight and civilian support for transition was approved by the European Council on 27 April 2006, following a UN Security Council Resolution (1671). From the outset EUFOR RDC was a highly political, military mission. For the EU, the mission broke new ground in engaging the Union as a hard security actor, with military force at its disposal, in an African country with no prior or accompanying NATO involvement. Although the decision had international legitimacy, including the full backing of the Congolese transitional government, it was particularly controversial in Germany which was the host nation of the operational headquarters of the mission (in Potsdam) and which supplied its commander, General Karlheinz Viereck and over 700 troops. The German parliament was particularly nervous about involving its military in African security, and struggled to answer the fundamental question of what it was doing in the Congo in the first place. German concerns centred on the risks that its soldiers might incur, and on the political exposure the mission represented for a country which was still wary towards ‘out of area’ engagements. A heated debate in the Bundestag which had to approve the troop deployment echoed wider questions in the EU about what was ESDP for and what was meant to be the role and purpose of European soldiers in a remote country in Africa (see, for example, Amann 2006a, 2006b). Among those involved in planning the mission, several military and civilian personnel articulated a ‘nightmare scenario’ of (white) ‘European troops opening fire on African civilians’\textsuperscript{6}

Public perceptions of EUFOR RDC beyond Europe were also lukewarm. In Africa it was criticized for having the majority of its troops based in Gabon hundreds of miles away from any potential conflict.\textsuperscript{7} To observers, this looked like another example of European tokenism – a paper tiger to vaunt the Union’s pretensions as a serious security actor. Apart from German troops, the force consisted of 18 different national contingents, posing an integration challenge to commanders who in the short, four-month time span of the operation had to forge a common ethos and negotiate the complex national caveats and operating constraints governing each member state’s involvement.

The mission was groundbreaking in the way it fulfilled its mandate, and the methods it deployed, combining robust military force with carefully planned initiatives to make the intervention acceptable to the local population. There had been few examples until then of the EU deploying hard power in favour of the so-called ‘soft goals’ of human development, although the build-up of military resources for autonomous missions was designed to do just that. EUFOR RDC was the clearest case to date of how
the EU can use a mix of external instruments from military force to civilian assistance to pursue a normative agenda, including specific human security goals.

Despite the misgivings in Berlin, the mission was deemed a success, and as a result probably paved the way for further EU military expeditions, including more to crisis regions in Africa (Solana 2007). Subsequent interventions in Chad and the Central African Republic bear this out, although the far bigger challenge of conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan has frustrated the deployment of a mixed EU intervention. In both its original design and implementation, EUFOR RDC was human security in action, demonstrating that a military mission could be used normatively to promote the long-term well-being of individuals with no ambition to control or defend territory, and to treat them as if they were citizens rather than an alien population. While not resolving the problematic ambiguity of EFP, the Congo intervention did suggest ways in which the EU’s civilian and military personalities could be integrated, and made to operate alongside actors such as the UN (which also has both types of instrument) to make a distinctive contribution to peace-building.

It is particularly useful to assess the intervention using human security principles to analyse what the EU was doing on the ground in the DRC and to evaluate its effectiveness. It was important that each principle was embedded within an overall approach as the six are interlinked, with shortcomings applying one principle having consequences for the others. Failure to give primacy to human rights, for example, could easily undermine the legitimacy of the mission. Instead, the military was most successful in terms of winning most local support when it was seen to be acting as a neutral guardian of fair elections.

The mission had a well-defined human rights focus, with a permanent advisor attached to the force on the ground in Kinshasa for much of the mission. Troop patrols were often accompanied by human rights specialists and/or medical staff. Soldiers carried a specially designed card setting out their rules of engagement in terms which emphasized how to deal with child soldiers, women and evidence of human rights abuses, as well as their own general behaviour towards civilians. The mission also adopted a focused bottom-up approach, and developed an innovative outreach programme to link the presence of the military force to the electoral process, with the publication of specially produced newspapers, radio slots and public meetings to explain, in neutral terms, the progress of the presidential campaign.

Yet arguably the most successful aspect of the military mission was its use of force to impose order in the capital during the most tense moments of the election period. When fighting broke out between rival militias in August 2006, EUFOR RDC helped to break up the fighting, protect the opposition candidate and re-establish peace. Restrained use of Mirage jets overflying
Kinshasa, coupled with a willingness to intervene decisively when required established the force as an impartial yet effective actor.

The human security implications of the EUFOR mission can be viewed along two trajectories, which reflect the internal and external logics outlined above. The internal/domestic aspects of the mission were highly significant in view of the differences with previous ESDP engagements and the controversy it caused, particularly in Germany prior to deployment. EUFOR RDC has been described as a ‘big step for the EU, a small step for Congo’ (Hoebeke 2007). A narrative to articulate and explain why the EU should intervene in the DRC and the clear goals of the mission would probably have helped in the public discussion of the deployment, both in the Bundestag and European Parliament debates. As it was, opposition to the mission resulted in the mandate being severely restricted, and in particular a time limit placed on the operation, which had the effect of curtailing it prematurely while there was still a realistic threat of violence marring the democratic process.9

A human security narrative would also have served an integrative function in providing additional glue for the operational personnel from across EU member states, who arrived in Kinshasa with different perceptions of their mission and drawing on different professional and cultural experiences. In a short-duration ESDP mission, valuable time was lost in forging a common force, with a shared ethos.

The most serious shortcoming of the mission was the lack of coherence and integration with other EU initiatives, both those by the European Commission under Directorate-General (DG) Development and DG Relex, and two other civilian ESDP missions dealing with police and security sector reform. Rather than seeing the total EU engagement, and particularly the substantial measures to support the electoral process, as one piece, the different initiatives were pursued independently with little overlap, or leverage from one to another. The EU lacked an overarching ‘mission statement’ to define its broad goals in the DRC and as a result much of its subsequent work has been plagued by bureaucratic competition, and missed opportunities. The absence of clear strategic direction in which ultimate command of the military mission lay with a civilian plan – not to decide military tactics but to ensure that the fighting force was seen as part of a larger, longer term picture of EU assistance – showed the importance of this principle being articulated and practised on the ground.

The external logic of a human security narrative is that Congolese acceptance of EUFOR RDC would also have been made easier by a better understanding of what the EU mission was. During its first two months in Kinshasa, the force struggled to overcome local hostility which was centred on a number of ‘myths’ such as the Europeans had come to secure the victory
of Joseph Kabila, the interim president and eventual winner of the election, who is unpopular in Kinshasa; that they had come to plunder DRC natural resources, and that the Congolese were paying for the mission themselves. The legitimacy of EUFOR RDC, although underwritten by a clear legal mandate at the international level, could not be assured at the local level, and was probably jeopardized by the poor regard of the Congolese for the UN peacekeeping force in the country. A human security narrative could in this respect help the EU to justify its presence in out of area engagements, with a clearer definition of its normative objectives.

Moreover, although EUFOR managed to raise its local profile by being seen to suppress the eruption of violence in August 2006, the EU’s overall visibility and effectiveness in the DRC remains below par, largely because there was little follow-through or even a common set of articulated goals shared with other ESDP and Commission instruments when the soldiers went home, leading to a failure to translate success in one area – the military mission – into a sustained impact.

What the DRC experience showed is that, even when acting with military instruments, the EU can pursue normative behaviour and act to promote its values, but that the choice of kinetic power sharpens the requirement to act in a coherent way and not merely show off EU might and resource, but deliver real benefits on the ground. Many of the shortcomings of the DRC intervention could have been helped by a more explicit enactment of key principles and a narrative which projected these both within the EU and in the DRC itself.

Conclusion

The EU intervention in the DRC showed that it takes seriously its ambition to use coercive force in support of core norms such as human rights and democracy.

However this combination is both novel and controversial. In the absence, for the moment, of sufficient precedents or a fully elaborated doctrine as to how this mix works, the EU risks becoming stranded between a past where it was more clearly a normative power, relying on soft techniques of persuasion, and a future in which it assumes a more strategic role in international politics with a full range of military and civilian instruments. The juxtaposition of discourses about norms and effectiveness illustrates this tension at the heart of the EU’s foreign policy identity.

This chapter has sought to identify two considerations regarding normative power: firstly, that a strategic narrative is one way in which the EU can address the need for greater clarity about its goals and methods as a global actor. At the analytical level it can be argued that something else is required to explain and encapsulate the hybrid character of the EU as an
international actor if normative power by itself does not fulfil this function (Sjursen 2006a), but more urgently, at the strategic and operational levels, there is a need for better articulation and focus about the EU’s proliferating range of initiatives and methodologies. The targets of greater operational reflexivity within the EU’s foreign policies would be not only its own citizens but those in countries where it intervenes. In order to realize the gains hoped for from the institutional reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU requires both a clear motivational philosophy and a way of codifying its normative tendency.

Secondly, I have argued that a human security approach could be the basis for such a narrative, in that it draws on what is already being done by the EU, but goes further in bridging the apparent divide between an emphasis on norms and a readiness to use coercive force. Such a narrative could also provide a more nuanced explanation and justification for how these two types of instrument can and should be combined, and would reinstate principles and normative behaviour at the heart of European security actions. While a public language of foreign policy is beginning to emerge from the EU’s experiences of collective action, particularly as a result of the rapid growth of ESDP capacities since 2003, official documents such as the ESS, and policy texts offer only partial guidance as to the evolving nature of EFP.

Meanwhile EFP discourse is stranded in fragmented rhetoric and multiple policy labels. These add to the confusion of purpose behind CFSP/ESDP and contribute to a lack of transparency and visibility. Human security, already implicit in EU practices and policies, could provide a narrative dimension to the Union’s foreign policy which would enact and enhance normative power.

However, human security will only be able to reinforce normative power if it is given more precision in terms of defining why, how and when the EU will use its increased capabilities to intervene beyond its borders.

Notes

1. In this chapter I use EFP as a term to encompass the full spectrum of instruments and policies of EU external relations. The points made relate to both foreign policy in general and security policy more specifically.
2. As well as the replacement of Javier Solana with Baroness Ashton, the treaty meant changes in competences, most notably via the introduction of the External Action Service.
3. The debates are also an example of a renationalization of EFP. Public controversy centred on Germany’s role in the missions. See speech by Angela Merkel to Bundestag (Die Bundesregierung 2006) and Deutsche Welle (2010).
4. The amendment was defeated by 12 votes.
5. The Commission plus member states provided half of the $400 million estimated costs of the electoral process, including a monitoring mission.
8. Evidence of Lt-Gen Jean-Paul Perruche, Director-General EU Military Staff to European Parliament, Brussels, 9 October 2006.
9. This argument was reinforced by human rights abuses and violence in the month after the European troops left Kinshasa.
Introduction: normative power and conflict transformation

The European Union (EU) is increasingly getting involved in conflicts and post-conflict settings outside its own boundaries. A lot of the discussion of the EU’s engagement has focused on the question of an increasing ‘militarization’ and the legitimacy of interventions involving military force. Yet the engagement of the EU in conflict and post-conflict settings does not often rely on such force, and is better treated as an attempt to act as a normative power. In this contribution, we explore an aspect of this ‘normative power’ that has so far been largely neglected: is this discourse of EU normative power shared by other actors in international society, and does this make a difference in the chances of the EU to help bring about conflict transformation?

In his seminal article on the EU as a normative power, Manners (2002; see also Diez and Manners 2007) sees the difference between the power of the EU and traditional military forms of power, first in that the EU does not rely solely on military force or capabilities to achieve its aims, second that its aims are linked to universal goods rather than being in the narrowly defined self-interest of the EU, and third that it realizes these goods by defining what should be accepted as ‘normal’. At least in the initial piece, Manners does not exclude the possibility that military power can at times reinforce normative power, but his central argument is that the EU as a normative power does not rely on military power to set the agenda and the standards of international politics. In contrast to earlier conceptualizations of EU civilian power, it is not even economic means that are at the core of EU power. Instead, power becomes an effect of norm leadership and persuasion.

In contrast to Manners and most of the literature, we have in the past argued that ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) is a discursive construction rather than an objective fact, and that the ‘power of normative power Europe’ rests in the identity it provides for the EU and the changes it imposes on others, partly through its hegemonic status (Diez 2005; Pace 2007a).
Following our Foucauldian understanding of power, however, such a power is not necessarily a bad thing. Power, as Foucault reminds us, is first and foremost a productive force (Foucault 1981: 73). Whether the reality that is enabled by this power is a good or a bad one depends on the normative stance of the evaluator. It is in this context that in this chapter we explore the possibility that the self-construction of the EU as a normative power enhances its potential influence to bring about positive conflict transformation, while at the same time it remains problematic in the Othering that it performs.

The idea that European integration and the EU itself are a positive force to resolve and transcend conflict is an old one, and we have explored this further in the context of another project (see Diez et al. 2006, 2008). One of the findings of this project was that EU actors see themselves and the EU as a whole as a ‘force for good’ in conflict situations, and indeed in world politics generally speaking (Pace 2008). ‘NPE’ therefore is first and foremost a discourse in which EU actors themselves construct themselves as ‘model citizens’.

Does this self-construction of EU actors enable them to play a positive role in conflict transformation, or is it rather a hindrance? If it does play a positive role, should one on this basis not happily partake in this discourse, as Manners (2006g) suggests in his defence? These are the questions that we will address in this chapter. We begin by setting out the core concepts that we use, the theoretical debates we draw upon and by examining the EU’s power in terms of reputation (the second section). In the third section, we proceed to assess the impact of the EU’s self-portrayal as a ‘force for good’ in concrete conflict situations, where we draw primarily on our work on Cyprus and the Middle East. Finally, in the fourth section, we conclude that while there are instances where the NPE discourse may allow EU actors to have some positive influence in conflict situations, this should not lead us to uncritically accept this self-representation. Instead, as critical analysts, we must always point to the hegemonic constructions that come with normative power, even if it appears to be a force for good.

**The power of reputation**

Third-party interventions in conflicts are the subject of extensive studies in conflict research, which has produced a number of arguments about the conditions for success of mediation in particular. Among these are both factors that characterize the conflict or the conflict parties and factors that relate to the mediator. Zartman (1989), for instance, has argued that resolution attempts are most likely to be successful if a conflict is ‘ripe’ in that it has reached a ‘hurting’ stalemate that the parties cannot maintain without huge cost, and where neither party sees itself as likely to achieve victory. As far as the mediator is concerned, the literature suggests that such actors should
ideally be powerful, respected and impartial, although not necessarily in a combination of all of these qualities (Smith 1994; Siniver 2006: 809). Before exploring these further in relation to ‘normative power’, let us first address several other aspects of this literature that are of relevance to our argument.

Firstly, the literature is at odds about when exactly a mediation attempt can be counted as successful. Some regard the conclusion of a peace agreement as sufficient; others focus on broader changes of attitude (Siniver 2006: 808). We side with the latter. While this makes the measurement of success more difficult, the mere signing of an agreement is not sufficient to count as a mediation success unless this agreement turns out to be a milestone towards lasting peace. To achieve lasting peace, however, the incompatibilities at the heart of a conflict need to be transformed. This requires broader societal changes in terms of the definition of identities and interests. We also, however, maintain that success does not have to be characterized by the disappearance of conflict. Rather, conflict will remain in any society – the crucial question is how conflict is dealt with, and how other conflict parties are seen within society. We therefore speak of conflict transformation as the ultimate aim of third-party intervention: which if such intervention is successful, conflict will persist, but the way actors see themselves and relate to each other will have been transformed to such an extent that they will not resort to violent means, and ideally will change their identity so that conflict is fundamentally altered (see Diez et al. 2006: 565–6). The ‘measure’ that we apply to assess transformation is the degree to which actors make their claims in the form of securitizing moves, that is, the extent to which they invoke the other party or parties as an existential threat to legitimize their actions, and ultimately violence (Diez et al. 2006: 566–7; on securitization, see Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998: 21–4).

The literature secondly focuses on mediation through a particular actor. We use the broader concept of intervention here, by which we do not mean military intervention but any involvement of a third party in a conflict, which can include support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), conflict resolution workshops and other such activities aimed at conflict transformation but not necessarily fitting the category of ‘mediation’. Furthermore, while the literature usually distinguishes between mediating actors and institutional contexts, the EU plays a role both as a classical third-party actor and as an institutional context insofar as it has been using integration and association as means to achieve conflict transformation (see Higashino 2004; Diez et al. 2006; Tocci 2007a). The effect of the institutional context that the EU provides on conflicts is often described as a form of Europeanization (Coppetiers et al. 2004). Thus, we also introduce the importance of process (in terms of association and/or integration), in addition to context, in our analysis.

Normative power does not presuppose an actor that consciously exerts this power; it can also emanate from an institutional structure (in the EU context,
the *acquis communautaire*), or from a broad discourse associated with the EU. However, there is an ambiguity in the way that Manners uses the concept of power. On the one hand, power, as just outlined, is the property of a relationship. On the other hand, power is also the property of the entity that is associated with the more powerful position in the relationship. To that extent, the EU both *has* normative power in the sense of specific ‘abilities’ in Manners’ terminology (2002: 240), and *is* a normative power in the sense of a particular kind of actor in international politics.

Most of the literature has now engaged in a dispute about whether the characterization of the EU as a normative power in this sense is accurate (see, for example, Storey 2006; Haukkala 2007a; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2008). Leaving aside whether this is a question that can be settled on the basis of empirical observation (for a discussion, see Diez 2005: 625–6), we want to argue that the far more interesting question in our context is to what extent the EU is *constructed* as a normative power, or to what extent the EU *is seen as* setting standards and leading by example. This construction takes place both outside the EU as well as within the EU, where there is a widespread self-representation as a ‘force for good’, especially in the Commission and the Parliament, but also in the Council (see also Pace 2007a, 2008).

On this basis, the question becomes whether this construction of the EU as a normative power makes it more likely that the EU is successful when intervening in conflicts in the sense of being able to contribute to conflict transformation with a decreasing presence of securitizing moves. As mentioned above, we define intervention in this context broadly to include mediation efforts as well as less formal engagements with conflict parties. The construction of the EU as a normative power can be related to the EU as an actor or to the EU as an institutional presence in international politics.

Normative power in this sense becomes part of the reputation that an actor has in international politics. In Nye’s terms (2006, 2008), such reputation is part of the ‘soft’ power of an actor, that is, power that works by way of attraction rather than carrots or sticks. Nye (2008: 104) takes up the example of Norway as a ‘small country’ that ‘enhances its image and role’ through the consistent promotion of a particular self-image. Indeed, Norway is said to pursue a self-image that is not unlike a core aspect of the NPE discourse in that it has at its core the notion of Norway as a ‘force for peace in the world’ (Leonard 2002: 53). Likewise, the Nordic countries’ biggest asset in international politics has been described as their normative power (Björkdahl 2007). That is not to say that the EU is simply a greater Norway – the very size of the EU makes it an entirely different beast and will often prevent it from operating behind the scenes, as Norway tends to do. Given its large number of member states, the EU will also often have a history in relation to the conflict (see our scenario six below) and some member states may quite possibly have an active interest in supporting one conflict party rather than another. Last but not least, the EU’s much more complex political structure, compared
to that of Norway, will make a consistent role, playing the reputational card, much more difficult.

Yet all of this does not undermine the principal possibility that the construction of the EU as normative power can be shared by conflict parties. And such ‘soft’ power by way of reputation is seen as one factor influencing the success of third-party interventions, broadly conceived. Matlary (2001), for instance, shows how the Holy See carries particular influence on peace processes because of its normative commitments that are accepted by conflict parties. In the case of Norway, Palihapitiya (2007: 50) observes that it has ‘put its international reputation for problem-solving to good use’ in both facilitation of and mediation in conflict resolution. It is therefore logical to assume that if the discourse of NPE, and as part of this the construction of the EU as an actor promoting peace, was shared by conflict parties, the EU would be in a good position to influence conflict transformation either as a mediator or facilitator, or through less direct means.

It goes without saying that such a straightforward relationship between reputation as a normative power and impact on conflict transformation is unlikely to occur. Indeed, we expect that there are a number of qualifications that directly impinge on such an impact. As a starting point, we put forward six different scenarios for the ‘soft power of the normative power Europe discourse’:

1. The construction of ‘Normative Power Europe’ is not shared by conflict parties, in which case we would expect no or a negative effect if the EU’s role in international politics is ridiculed or at least challenged.
2. The construction is shared by conflict parties but the specific norms espoused by the EU in relation to a particular conflict are not, in which case we would also expect no or a negative effect if the EU’s role in international politics is ridiculed or at least challenged.
3. The construction is shared by conflict parties, in which case we would expect that they are inclined to accept the EU’s role in the conflict, and would be more likely to follow EU advice or take the integration experience as an example.
4. The construction is shared only by some conflict parties, in which case we would expect at least a positive influence over the behaviour of this party.
5. The construction is shared at least by some conflict parties, but at least one conflict party uses EU norms to strengthen its own position against the adversary, with the consequence of reinforcing rather than transforming conflict. While we assume that most actors will not make reference to EU norms if these significantly undermine their own positions, this does not mean that in all of these cases, the invocation of an EU norm is also automatically detrimental to other conflict parties.
6. The construction is shared by at least some conflict parties, but there are other aspects of the EU’s reputation that make the normative power reference
less effective. These could include the distrust in the power of norms and the overreliance on external military power in a given conflict case, or aspects of the history of EU member states that had a negative impact on the conflict.

Whenever we say that the construction of the EU as a normative power ‘is shared’ by conflict parties, we merely imply the discursive acceptance of NPE and do not make a judgement on whether or not actors seriously believe in this conception. We cannot address this ontological debate here in detail; suffice it to say that we agree with those who argue that such a discursive acceptance cannot be constrained to mere rhetoric and it is politically decisive (similar: Wæver 2002: 27). In addition, we know from the study of norms in international relations that once norms are accepted in discourse, they provide reference points for other actors and so the ghost cannot easily be put back into the bottle again (see Risse et al. 1999).

In the remainder of this chapter, we will provide some illustrations for how our framework works out empirically in two cases, Cyprus and Israel/Palestine. We need to stress that we do not offer a comprehensive study that would sufficiently test these hypotheses, which would require a larger study than we can pursue here, and which would at this stage need further reflections on operationalization. We also need to make clear from the start that the selection of the two cases we investigate has been guided primarily by our own empirical expertise rather than an ideal selection strategy. Thus, a proper analysis of our six scenarios would require the incorporation of cases further afield, such as the EU mission in the Congo or the involvement of the EU in East Timor, where the EU has acted as a ‘proper’ third party. Instead, our cases are ‘closer to home’, and incorporate the integration (Cyprus) and association (Israel/Palestine) dimension. At least in Cyprus, the EU undoubtedly is expected to have greater normative power than in areas further afield where membership is not even on the cards in the long run, as in the case of Israel/Palestine, strong advocates for Israel’s integration into the EU as a full member state (e.g. Tovias 2002) notwithstanding. Nonetheless, the discussion of these two cases should provide some useful insights in the way the NPE discourse plays out in conflict settings.

The impact of the EU’s self-representation on conflict transformation

The case of Cyprus

In the case of Cyprus, the construction of the EU as a normative power has played a predominant role in the influence the EU has had on the conflict in the island, although not always a positive one. A core justification for
starting membership negotiations with Cyprus was that these would have a ‘catalytic effect’ on the conflict (see Diez 2002a), eventually leading to conflict transformation and the unification of the island. Partly, this catalytic effect was to come about because membership was seen to be in the interest of ordinary Turkish Cypriots and would force Turkey to change its policy if it did not want to jeopardize its own membership prospects. However, there was also the expectation that membership would bring with it the hope for a redefinition of identities on the island, as well as the respect of fundamental rights of all Cypriots, whether Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, so that the atrocities of previous decades could not be repeated (Diez 2002b; Tocci 2005). It is in this latter sense that the EU was supposed to be important as a normative power.

This view was initially advocated by the Greek Cypriots, but soon shared by many in the EU institutions. That Cyprus was accepted as a membership candidate in 1994, despite earlier hesitations by the Commission who had initially insisted on a resolution to the conflict, is often put down to a package deal with Greece, which also involved the end of Greece vetoing the customs union with Turkey. However, there is also a normative power aspect to the story. A core part of the normative power construction is the observance of international law – the EU as a ‘good international citizen’. Until recently, however, the international jurisdiction from Security Council resolutions to European Court of Human Rights rulings was firmly and unequivocally on the side of the Greek Cypriots, and attributed all, or at least most, of the blame for the conflict and the partition of the island to Turkey. Under these circumstances, the argument that the Greek Cypriots should not be penalised for Turkey’s violation of international law became a forceful one that was hard to counter by those who would have preferred to stick to the condition of resolution before membership. This makes clear that the self-representation of the EU as a normative power is not only enabling, but also restricting the EU in its engagement with conflict parties, and indeed more widely, as similar effects have been shown in relation to EU enlargement in a broader sense (Fierke and Wiener 2001; Schimmelfennig 2001; see also Pace 2009).

Indeed, this aspect of the normative power construction has made the EU problematic as an independent third party from the start. In addition, the fact that Greece had already been a member state when Cyprus applied for membership and the British colonial history of the island also contributed to the EU’s problematic involvement in the conflict. This is one of the reasons why it has never attempted to be a mediator in the classic sense of the term and left this task explicitly to the United Nations (UN) (see Richmond 2002). Even when, in line with the normative power construction, the EU provided funds for bi-communal projects such as the Nicosia Master Plan, it did so through the UN Development Programme rather than directly, until Cyprus became part of the EU.
These circumstances also led the Turkish Cypriot leadership under Rauf Denktash to reject the EU membership bid as ‘enosis [unification with Greece] through the back door’ (quoted in Diez 2002b). Denktash did not see the EU as a ‘force for good’, at least not in the Cyprus context (Diez 2002b). Many Greek Cypriots, however, unashamedly saw the prospect of EU membership as a tactic to strengthen their political position in the conflict, which had reached a ‘comfortable’ rather than a ‘hurting’ stalemate (Diez 2002b). From the start, therefore, hypothesis five is applicable to Cyprus, and we would have expected the reinforcement of the conflict rather than decreasing securitization.

On an official level, this expectation held initially, and there were threats of fully integrating northern Cyprus into Turkey if the south became part of the EU (see Ugur 2003). Yet one of the mistakes in much of the literature on Cyprus was to underestimate the dissatisfaction among Turkish Cypriots with their leadership. While the mass demonstrations in 2001 were sparked by a banking crisis and anger about economic measures imposed by Turkey, the EU became a central reference point for demonstrators to articulate claims against the Denktash regime in the attempt to construct a ‘non-exclusive Turkish Cypriot identity within the EU’ (Lacher and Kaymak 2005: 159). In that sense, EU normative power played a crucial role in shaping the political landscape among Turkish Cypriots, not as a catalyst but as a framework to draw upon once the banking crisis catalysed the situation. Ultimately, the developments led to the opening of the border between the two sides, the moderate Mehmet Ali Talat taking over first as Prime Minister, then as President, and to the Turkish Cypriots, in contrast to the Greek Cypriots, accepting the Annan Plan for a resolution and the foundation of a United Cyprus Republic.

There is now a widespread understanding of the EU as a normative power in Cyprus. However, hypothesis five still applies, as ‘Europeanization’ in the dominant Greek Cypriot view is taken to mean the unrestricted implementation of the four freedoms (of goods, services, capital and labour) and the notion that a divided island would not be in the spirit of the integration project (see Gürel and Özersay 2006: 366; Demetriou 2008). The construction of the EU as a normative power therefore makes EU involvement problematic because one conflict party has used this construction to reinforce its own position. As in the acceptance of the bid for membership, this has made it difficult for other EU actors to argue against the Greek Cypriot position, now strengthened by the fact that as a member state, Cyprus can obstruct and veto policies that it sees as interfering with its sovereignty, and has the option of direct recourse to the European Court of Justice. This is problematic in itself, but also because it leads to disillusionment among Turkish Cypriots with the idea of the EU as a ‘force for good’. Symptomatic are the desperate attempts by the northern Cypriot Eastern Mediterranean University to be allowed to take part in the Bologna Process.
While the Republic of Cyprus is vetoing such a step as recognizing an ‘illega{l entity’, the university invokes European norms of equality and a right to education to get access (Güven 2007).

These disputes also demonstrate one further problematic aspect of the construction of the EU as a normative power: the norms that the EU is supposed to espouse are not necessarily in line with each other, and depending on the context can be seen as competing (see Powel 2009). In Cyprus, the norm of cooperation and peace recommends action different from the norm of sticking to international law, or the Greek Cypriot interpretation of the acquis. This is surely a situation of special circumstances, but it does indicate that normative power may be self-defeating if it contains norms that are seen as contradictory.

At the time of writing, the political context in Cyprus is in a process of change. Following the election of Dimitris Christofias, leader of the communist AKEL party, as President of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2008, Greek and Turkish Cypriots are again negotiating, and the prospects for a solution are perhaps better than ever. The role of the EU in the changing mood in Greek Cypriot politics needs to be further explored, although it is clear that the electorate was unhappy with Papadopoulos’ hard-line international stance (Faustmann 2008). Crucially for our argument, however, if the EU was to play a more positive role as a normative power in the Cyprus conflict, it would be because the Greek Cypriot official position would no longer use its membership to strengthen its one-sided interests, but would refer to the value of EU norms for both parties. Cyprus would then move from scenario five to scenario three, presupposing that the frustration among Turkish Cypriots about the aftermath of the Annan Plan does not bring their government down and leads to a change of their official position.

All in all, the Cypriot picture as far as the impact of the normative power construction is concerned is mixed. The fact that one conflict party has used the construction to strengthen its position over the other party has not made it ineffective. Indeed, the notion of clear-cut conflict parties is itself misguided, and EU normative power played a crucial role in the transformations of the political landscape in the north. One cannot therefore say that there has been a reinforcement of the conflict, as scenario five would suggest, but while there have been many changes in conflict behaviour, there has also not been a transformation to the extent that one could see EU engagement in present circumstances as successful.

The case of Israel/Palestine

The EU has articulated its normative goals in the Middle East conflict quite clearly in terms of rights: Israel’s right to statehood as well as a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, and the self-determination rights of both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. Moreover most European declarations on
the Middle East conflict denounce violence from either side: whether Israeli military incursions or Palestinian suicide bombings.

Applying a normative lens to the Middle East conflict has however landed the EU right in the middle of Israeli as well as Palestinian internal political fractions and rivalries. Seen from a historic point of view, Europe symbolizes strong cultural bonds (Ben Israel 2003), on the one hand, with Israel but emotively embedded negative memories of Jewish persecution and anti-Semitism, on the other. For Palestinians, Europe is to blame for their destiny as an occupied people, on the one hand, but it is also the external actor most trusted in having a real interest in resolving the Israel–Palestinian conflict. Contemporary Israeli and Palestinian perceptions about the EU remain divided within each society.

From an economic perspective, the EU is much admired as a model and is Israel's main traditional partner while Palestinians depend to a very large extent on EU aid and assistance. Yet, the EU still suffers from a serious legitimacy deficit in the eyes of both parties to the conflict. To comprehend this, we need to look at the more recent events which adversely affected the EU’s normative role in the Middle East conflict.

During 2005, the EU, together with the United States (US), issued a series of announcements encouraging the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to hold elections in the belief that the obstacles facing the peace process would become unblocked and that Fatah (the main secular-nationalist faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation or PLO) would win another endorsement from the Palestinian electorate to continue ruling the Palestinian Authority (PA). The EU, as well as the so-called ‘international community’, had a specific belief that the transformation of the conflict in the Middle East lay in the export of a blueprint for democracy in Palestine (a proto-state and an experiment in limited autonomy, see Sadiki 2004; Hovdenak 2009; Pace 2009).

Despite these statements, emphasizing the importance of free, fair and transparent elections, the results of the January 2006 election have been considered by the EU and ‘the international community’ as unacceptable in terms of the wider linkage to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Although the EU sent its own mission to observe these elections – which were declared as fair, free and transparent (although how an election process can be ‘fair’ under occupation may be disputed) – the organization reacted by freezing direct aid to the PA, since the elected Hamas was put on the EU’s black list of outlawed terrorist organizations. During the same month, the Quartet issued a statement announcing a series of conditions on an internal arrangement for governance in Palestine: recognition of Israel, cessation of violence and acceptance of previous agreements, as conditions for assistance to the Palestinian people – through the PA – on the Hamas government.

What the EU failed to acknowledge was the fact that the discourse of democracy it has been attempting to export to the Middle East and North
African (MENA) region, and more specifically to Palestine in this case, was also falling on the ears of the region’s Islamists including the Palestinian Hamas movement. The transition of power in Palestine from Fatah to Hamas offered an opportunity for the renewal of Fatah, given its history of corrupt practices. With its clean reputation in the governance of municipalities, Hamas could have provided the much needed test for reform efforts in the Occupied Territories as espoused so forcefully by the EU (Tocci 2007b). The EU’s reaction to the January 2006 election was thus interpreted in the Middle East as a sign of the EU ignoring the democratic expression of the Palestinian people (even though it had made democracy one of the conditions for its help) and depriving many Palestinians of their livelihood. Therefore, although Palestinians appeared to take their first steps towards pluralism, the EU’s reactions to the electoral victory by Hamas stand in stark contrast to EU actors’ self-construction of the EU as a normative power in the region and its associated mediation and conflict transformation agenda for the Middle East (Pace 2009). With the rising force of modern Islamism in the southern Mediterranean neighbourhood the misreading of the EU’s efforts at exporting democracy to these societies has therefore come at a very high price, both in relation to the MEPP and the nature of how the politics and societies of the MENA region are developing – a price the EU and the international community, have, so far, not been willing to pay.

As a way of breaking the position adopted by the Quartet members in March 2006 (when they severed relations with the Hamas-dominated PA over a demand on the conditions set), in February 2007, Fatah and Hamas (the main protagonists in the Palestinian experiment of democratic governance) agreed to a new accord on power-sharing and political relations. The ensuing ‘Mecca Agreement’ highlighted the formation of a national unity government (NUG) and President Abbas insisted that the Palestinians had now met the conditions of the Quartet. However, the EU’s response to Mecca was once again – at least for most Palestinian observers – disappointing. Although EU actors welcomed the formation of the NUG, they announced that they would have no contact with Hamas ministers in the government. In private, EU officials have been holding ‘informal’ meetings with Hamas representatives, in spite of their official rhetoric to the contrary.

Since its democratic election to power, Hamas has had to deal with a number of internal factors of governance including its members’ lack of capacity in doing governance. Hamas had won the election on a platform of ‘Change and Reform’ and its representatives’ determination to ‘serve the Palestinian people’ by ensuring their rights. But they had no previous experience to fall back on when they found themselves in a position of power within the PA. Given the EU’s previous efforts at encouraging good governance in the southern Mediterranean neighbouring partners (not least through all its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) as well as its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) instruments) it is ironic that such a window
of opportunity for the EU’s discourse of a ‘force for good’ was not taken up through the option of training Hamas elected officials in governance capacity-building. The other party to the conflict, Israel, together with the US, reacted with caution to the Mecca Agreement, claiming that any new government must reject terror, recognize Israel and honour past accords, but stopped short of making clear whether it was satisfied by the deal. It was, however, hoped that the deal brokered in Mecca would end weeks of factional unrest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the EU did not lift the aid sanctions against the Palestinians, the issue of contact with non-Hamas members of the government was a departure from the Israeli and US position regarding the NUG (the US and Israel decided to boycott the NUG in its entirety). Perhaps because of its discourse as a force for good, the EU thus emerges as slightly more flexible in its response in this context than either Israel (a party to the conflict) or the US (a key external actor in the conflict). But from the Hamas viewpoint, it seems that its representatives’ expectations from the EU’s image as a force for good were a serious miscalculation in that they had entered into the NUG thinking that the EU would eventually be more lenient and cooperate with the new government. In an interesting twist to our theoretical discussion on normative power in the first section of this chapter, Norway was the only European country that sought engagement with the Hamas leader and Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh. Raymond Johansen, Norway’s Deputy Foreign Minister, called on other governments to follow suit. Although it is a European Economic Area (EEA) member, as a non-EU member Norway’s calls for engagement by the international community with the NUG and all its ministers fell on deaf ears.

In refusing to engage the political leadership of Hamas, the EU refused to test the impact of its ‘force for good’ rhetoric as well as the simultaneous claims the Islamic movement makes to be both a negotiator for Palestinian rights and liberator of Palestinians (norms that the EU – albeit rhetorically – upholds very dearly). In such a limited vision of normative power, important forms of social exclusion are overlooked and the careful analysis and engagement with the conditions of possibility of what it means in practice to be a ‘force for good’ is placed to one side. Despite the lack of impact of the EU’s normative power discourse, and internal power struggles in Israel, Israel and Hamas agreed to a truce in June 2008 through Egyptian mediation. At the time of writing, this ceasefire agreement has thus far managed to keep on hold Palestinian rocket attacks on southern Israel and Israeli military attacks on Gaza. There is hope that this truce could lead to an end of Israel’s year-long economic blockade of Gaza and a prisoners’ release/exchange in terms of the captured Israel Defence Forces soldier Gilad Shalit and Fatah/Tanzim (a faction of the Fatah movement) leader Marwan Barghouti. However, the Palestinians remain divided with Hamas officials accusing Fatah representatives of acting as puppets of the Americans and Europeans, in particular
following Abbas’ decision to form a caretaker government. On its part, the EU’s decision to have formal contact only with Fatah officials and its unelected Fayyad government helps create further divisions between Fatah and Hamas. The EU’s stance has also clearly perpetuated the political, economic and physical separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. With the Palestinians divided, and Israeli internal politics in flux as at the time of writing, the peace process in the Middle East appears to have reached a cul-de-sac.

Therefore, hypothesis six is applicable to the Israel/Palestine case, where, although EU actors’ construction as a force for good is shared by at least some conflict parties, other aspects of the EU’s reputation make the normative power reference less effective and which in turn has a negative effect on possibilities for conflict transformation due to the contradictions and double standards in the EU’s rhetoric as a force for good, on the one hand, and its actual praxis, on the other.

**Condition or contradiction? A critical assessment**

The EU is not only discussed as but also sees itself as a normative power, a ‘force for good’, in international politics. If accepted by other actors, we have argued in this chapter, this should put it in a good position to intervene in conflicts to transform them so that violent action no longer dominates or is at least prevented in the future, and that conflict issues are dealt with not in terms of security but under ‘normal’ democratic procedures. However, the two cases that we drew upon to illustrate our argument paint a different picture. In both of them, the conflict has not taken an undisputedly positive turn even though or perhaps even because the EU is involved, albeit to various degrees. It seems then that EU normative power in conflict situations, at least as long as they are not formally and unambiguously part of the integration process, remains largely an unrealized potential. In our two cases, this has as much to do with the EU itself and how it interacts with the conflict parties, often in contrast to its self-construction as a ‘force for good’, as it has with the way the conflict parties see the EU. Moreover, we have highlighted instances when, even if the internal discourse of EU normative power is shared by external parties to a conflict, that is, when conflict parties see the EU as a force for good, this acceptance raises expectations of the EU. Such expectations thereby impinge upon the EU’s chances of helping or worsening a conflict situation, particularly when expectations raised are not met in practice.

To the extent that there have been transformations in these two conflicts, and that one can arguably link them to EU involvement, the impact has been ambiguous or negative rather than leading to positive conflict transformation in the form of de-securitization. In the Cyprus case in particular, the normative power of the EU was effective after the banking crisis that
led to a change in political leadership and the acceptance of the Annan Plan in the north. However, this normative power has faded at least until Christofias’ election, to the extent that northern Cyprus is hardly closer to the EU than it had been before the accession of the Republic of Cyprus and the Annan Plan referenda. Indeed, as we have seen, EU normative power has also enabled forces on the Greek Cypriot side to strengthen their claims and to articulate the conflict with further securitizing moves, even though this ultimately did not prevent the election of a president who is more favourably inclined towards a settlement.

In the Israel/Palestine case, the November 2007 Annapolis meeting, endorsed by all the members of the Quartet of which the EU is a key part, promised to set in motion a dynamic leading to a peace agreement on the Middle East conflict by the end of 2008. While the EU has in theory been committed to a normative agenda through its support for the establishment of democratic Palestinian institutions, in practice it has enhanced undemocratic, non-transparent and corrupt practices by routing all its funding assistance through Fatah agents who in turn deny funding to any genuine independent groups. If the EU were to put its normative discourse into practice it would seek to focus its efforts on building Palestinian civil society rather than backing Abbas and his Fatah elites. In this way it would help in creating the necessary checks and balances, transparency and legitimacy that is much needed in the Palestinian political landscape. Instead, the EU and its Western allies are apparently encouraging Abbas to remain in office despite the imminent expiration of his legal term in office.11 Thus, as we have insisted, EU normative power claims have enhanced internal Palestinian divisions and made the death of the Middle East Peace Process look like a foregone conclusion.

We therefore found that in our cases, our initial propositions five and six prevailed, with a possible but by no means certain change in Cyprus towards scenario three: While some, and at times all, of the conflict parties accepted the construction of the EU as a normative power, they either did so to strengthen their own position, or, as in the case of Israel/Palestine, they also held other views of the EU that counteracted and overrode any potential positive impact flowing from the normative power construct. Of course, our cases serve an initial, illustrative purpose and cannot count as a systematic evaluation of our argument, but we suggest that similar findings will emerge from other studies. EU normative power is not simply able to shape conceptions of what is seen as normal; its effectiveness rather relies on the extent to which other actors accept the role that EU actors themselves project for themselves in international politics.

The failure to act consistently in the Israel/Palestine case in particular also reinforces our previous argument that much of the normative power discourse is not about an ‘objective’ analysis of EU behaviour but rather about the construction of an EU identity. While Manners (2006e: 168, 2006g) sees
this as a positive political move of the original normative power argument, we would like to point to the dangers that this involves. Such an identity construction blinds actors from their own failings and deficiencies both in internal affairs as well as in their engagement with others. To the extent that it enables practices that undermine the construction itself, the notion of an identity of the EU as a normative power not only has problematic consequences, but may also be self-defeating. In this chapter we have shown how, although the EU’s aims of its external policies are often dressed in ‘universal goods’ clothes, in practice, these mask the short-term focus of the EU’s self-interests (see also Pace 2007b, 2009).

All of this does not deny the potential that there is in the normative power discourse for a positive role that the EU can play in conflict transformation. The current evidence from an external actors’ perspective, however, provides a much more ambiguous and patchy picture. As with other aspects of NPE, such power will only be a positive force to the extent that others accept it, and if it is consistent. Therefore we hope that our contribution to this volume has shed some light on the strong linkage between the EU’s internal as well as its external legitimacy, which in turn rests quite heavily on its external reputation, particularly in cases of conflict. Once the EU raises expectations of its discourse as a normative power, its legitimacy is put to test. Thus more reflexivity on the part of EU actors is called for given that NPE as an internal, legitimizing force is one thing but quite another when viewed from the point of view of its external legitimacy in the eyes of its beholders in conflict situations.

Notes

∗We have presented earlier versions of this chapter at numerous workshops and conferences during 2007 and 2008, and we are grateful for all comments we have received. Particular thanks go to Caroline Hughes, Jocelyn Mawdsley, Hugh Miall, Mike Smith, Ole Wæver and Richard Whitman.

1. This is what Norwegian analysts, including Jill M. Loga of the University of Bergen, refer to as the ‘goodness-regime’ discourse (Loga 2003). We would like to thank Egil Bjørnsen for translating this from Norwegian. See also Norway.org.uk (n.d.).
2. Hamas had also received much international condemnation for using suicide attacks to pursue its resistance strategy. In the eyes of the EU, Hamas challenges the notion of a democratic political party.
4. Communications in confidence with Michelle Pace, Brussels, April 2008 and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, September 2007. See also Abu Toameh (2007).
5. Hamas’ decision to take part in the 2006 elections had a profound impact on the nature of the movement as well as on the Palestinian political scene and on the peace process at large. At the level of its internal composition, participation in
the election was perceived as a step towards politicizing the movement – at the expense of its well-known militarism. See Chehab (2007), Hroub (2006), Levitt (2006) and Tamimi (2007) for more on this.


8. Private communications held by Michelle Pace with a Palestinian official, Birmingham University, September 2008.

9. A major source of division between Fatah and Hamas lies in the control of the Palestinian security services. In mid-June 2007, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip and President Abbas formed an emergency government in the West Bank.

10. Following Olmert’s resignation, former Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni won the Kadima party’s primaries and was thereafter given 42 days by President Shimon Perez to form a new coalition government. See BBC News (2008).

In spring 1994 I first heard Richard Whitman ask the question, ‘what is the international identity of the European Union?’. The end of the Cold War, the Treaty on European Union, and wars in Kuwait and the Former Yugoslavia all raised methodological, theoretical and empirical questions over the study of the European Union’s (EU) ‘international identity’ (Whitman 1994, 1996, 1998; Manners and Whitman 1998, 2003). In the 1990s and early 2000s I worked on projects studying the EU’s international identity, the foreign policies of EU member states, and the interplay between ‘English School’ international theory and European integration during the 1990s with Whitman and latterly Diez (see Manners and Whitman 2000; Diez 2001; Manners 2001, 2004; Whitman 2001; Diez and Whitman 2002). During this period it became increasingly clear to me that the study of the EU in world politics needed to engage with both critical social theory and normative international theory. My work on symbolism in European integration during the early 1990s suggested that EU studies needed to engage with social theories that took physical, performative and discursive symbolism seriously (Manners 2000b, 2005, 2011b). Here the work of Berger and Luckmann, Cohen, Searle and Calhoun is important in coming to terms with both social construction and critical social theory (see, for example, Cohen 1985; Calhoun 1995; Searle 1995; Berger and Luckmann 1996). At the same time, sharing an intellectual milieu with international political theorists such as Devetak, Cochran, Mandaville, Frost and Kinnvall suggested that EU studies also needed to engage with normative theories that took international, supranational and transnational politics seriously (see Kinnvall 1995, 2006; Frost 1996; Cochran 1999; Devetak 1999; Mandaville 2001).

Critical theory seeks to provide a ‘critical theory of society as it is, a theory dominated at every turn by a concern for reasonable conditions of life’ (Horkheimer 1972: 198–9). Critical theory is ‘critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how
that order came about’ (Cox 1981: 129). Critical social theory should be seen as an ‘interpenetrating body of work which demands and produces critique…[which] depend[s] on some manner of historical understanding and analysis’ (Calhoun 1995: 35). This critical understanding of the role of theory leads to the observation that ‘theory constitutes as well as explains the questions it asks (and those it does not ask)’ (Hoskyns 2004: 224). In the study of the EU, critical social theory maintains ‘a concern for understanding and challenging the social production of knowledge; historicizing and contextualizing subjectivity; and a commitment to progress and emancipation as the goals of research’ (Warleigh 2003: 52; Manners 2007a: 81).

Normative international theory begins from the statement that ‘all theory in International Relations is normative theory’ (Cochran 1999: 1). By this Cochran means that ‘even those engaged in positivist approaches, who aim to study world politics in a manner that resembles as closely as possible the methods of natural science, cannot avoid normative assumptions in the selection of what data is important, in interpreting that data, and in articulating why such research is significant’ (Cochran 1999: 1). The problems of international relations ‘are all normative in that they require of us that we make judgements about what ought to be done’ (Frost 1996: 2). Normative international theory emerges from the way that ‘making the moral case for new forms of political community is an important trend in recent international relations theory’ (Linklater 1998b: 2). In this respect ‘critical international theory…must distance itself from uncritical promotion of humanitarian intervention just as it must distance itself from uncritical acceptance of the sovereign state’ (Devetak 2007: 153). Mandaville (2001: 2) goes further to suggest that ‘critical approaches to international theory’ should engage with other disciplinary projects that ‘have been able to provide sophisticated accounts of how post-national, post-territorial and translocal idioms of the political are emerging out of globalising process’. Such disciplinary projects include Kinnvall’s work on ‘cultural diffusion and political learning’ in political communities under conditions of globalization, transnationalization and increased international interaction and comparison (Kinnvall 1995: 205–6). Kinnvall argues the need to understand the ‘multifaceted nature of globalisation…in terms of a global-local nexus of dominance and resistance’ using post-colonial, post-structural political theory and political psychology (Kinnvall 2006: 11–35).

**Three meanings of normative power**

The infusion of critical social theory and normative international theory into discussions of the post-Cold War world led to a project to interrogate the EU’s international identity through the deployment of critical and normative theory, concepts and methods. The initial plan was to complete a book-length project reflecting on developments throughout the 1990s but
the nature of the academic ‘profession’ being what it is, an article was first to emerge followed by a further decade of research and reflection (Manners 2000a, 2002, 2004). The 2002 article in the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) had the merit of being quickly published and having an immediate impact, but the drawback of compounding three differing meanings of normative power, as well as only briefly including one out of nine case studies. The three meanings of normative power come from the crucial analytical issues of theory, concepts and methods in the social sciences.

**Normative theory**

The first meaning of normative power is the emphasis on normative theory, that is, how we judge and justify truth claims in social science. Normative theory is commonly believed to lie in opposition to empirical experience or positive description, but following Cochran the justification of the selection of empirical data, the value given to a particular interpretation of data and the claims regarding why such research should be judged important all involve normative truth claims (see May 2003: 46–68). The emphasis on normative theory in the study of the EU’s normative power makes clear that simply focusing on empirical truth claims is unsustainable – analysis needs to also account for how we judge and justify such claims, as well as engaging in critique. This aspect of normative power was captured in the 2002 JCMS piece in the statement that ‘my presentation of the EU as a normative power has … a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system’ (Manners 2002: 252). Later pieces argued the need for ‘a wider and more appropriate approach in order to reflect what [the EU] is, does and should do’ by rejecting ‘unreflective and uncritical analysis’ and instead ‘attempting both to analyse and to judge the EU’s normative power in world politics’ (Manners 2006c: 184–5, 2008b: 45–6).

The contributions to this volume reflect normative theory in a variety of ways, ranging from political theory and international theory to neo-Gramscian theory and post-structural theory. In addition, the contributions tend to take quite different approaches to the study of the norms at work in EU external actions, reflecting a variety of understandings of social theory. The original 2000 Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) working paper drew on four different social theories in its typology of international norms: positivism and the role of ‘utilitarian norms’; interpretivism and the role of ‘social norms’; critical theory and the role of ‘moral norms’; and postmodern science and the role of ‘narrative norms’. In the paper this typology was applied to the case study of the EU’s pursuit of the international norm of death penalty moratoria and abolition in order to illustrate the way in which different understandings of social theory shape the evaluation of EU external actions (Manners 2000a: 42–3).
This variety of normative theory and social theory can be seen throughout the various chapters in the volume, as five examples illustrate. Bickerton contrasts two different normative theories, cosmopolitan law and communitarian social preferences, in the study of political legitimacy. Bickerton’s discussion of cosmopolitan law draws on a Habermasian framework of three sources of legitimacy: pragmatic justification related to ‘utilitarian norms’; ethical-pragmatic justification related to ‘social norms’; and moral justification related to ‘moral norms’. In contrast, his discussion of communitarian social preferences focuses on a means of combining theories of ‘social norms’ with those of ‘utilitarian norms’ found in ‘interests’. Smith explores and juxtaposes the EU as a post-sovereign ‘normative power’ and the United States (US) as a sovereign ‘goliath’ in terms of international theory in his study of global public goods. Smith suggests a number of implications of the juxtaposition, including the social role of ‘self-perception’; the Gramscian perspective on hegemony; and a more utilitarian suggestion for the investigation of the provision of global public goods.

Haukkala examines the question of EU regional role in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) using Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and focusing on Ukraine. Haukkala argues that while attempting to deploy utilitarian and social norms, its current inability to grant membership is problematic. Diez and Pace’s study of EU conflict transformation identifies with a ‘Foucauldian understanding of power’ involving the study of the discursive construction of the EU. They focus on the notion of the ‘power of reputation’ and the way in which the ‘discursive acceptance’ of EU reputation is shared with conflict parties. Diez and Pace place their emphasis on the role of ‘narrative norms’ and the impact that a discourse of EU normative power has on conflict situations. Juncos uses a combination of normative theories to study EU discourses and practices in Bosnia, drawing on Diez’s discursive approach; Merlingen and Ostraiskaite’s (2006) use of Foucauldian ‘governmentality’; hegemonic understandings of neoliberal ideology; as well as Barnett and Duvall’s (2005a) constructivist approach to power as a product of social relations.

As all the chapters illustrate, engaging with normative power ensures, first and foremost, that the analyst needs to think about their understanding of normative theory, regardless of whether it is more empiricist or more critical in orientation. In this respect, as Orbie clearly states, the normative power ‘idea forces us to consider questions that, while most difficult to answer, are very much worth raising’. This grounding in normative theory provides the foundation for the next two meanings of normative power – the concept of normative power as form of power and the characterization of a type of actor (see Keene 2008; De Wekker and Niemann 2009; Forsberg 2009; Manners 2009a; De Zutter 2010). As Diez and Pace astutely point out in their chapter, ‘the EU both *has* normative power in the sense of specific “abilities” in Manners’ terminology (2002: 240), and *is* a normative power in the sense
of a particular kind of actor in international politics’. Björkdahl similarly differentiates between the means to exercise power and the characteristic of an actor.

**Normative form of power**

The second meaning of normative power is as a form of power that is ideational rather than material or physical. As a normative form of power, the emphasis is on the ability to use normative justification rather than an ability to use material incentives or physical force (see discussion of the normative form of power in Manners 2009a, 2009b, 2010a). In this respect, relations and policies with the rest of the world should be ‘normatively sustainable’ – that is, ‘normatively’ explicable and justifiable to others; ‘sustainable’ into the next generation. But this ability or form of power should also be understood as a conception of social power where ‘power to is prior to power over’, in contrast to most traditional political theories (Barnes 1993: 208).² This second aspect of normative power was, as Diez and Pace identify, captured in the ‘focus on normative power of an ideational nature’ where ‘the EU acts to change norms in the international system’ (Manners 2000a: 29, 2002: 239, 252). Later pieces also argued the centrality of such ability and form of power to establish principles and apply them to different realities, and to do so in a way that prioritizes normative justification over material incentives and physical force (Manners 2008b: 59–60, 2009a: 4, 2009b: 792, 800).

The contributions to this volume understand normative forms of power in differing ways, stretching from the analysis of norm promotion, including development assistance and trade relations, as well as strategic narratives and military force. Thus the chapters analyse the interplay between normative justification, material incentives and physical force, as five examples illustrate. Birchfield approaches the study of EU development assistance using normative power as ‘theoretically grounded, empirical framework of analysis’ concluding that, with the exception of two areas, the policies ‘represent the normative form and the empirical function on the concept as well as the praxis of normative power’. Birchfield explores how material development assistance is related to processes of internal and external normative justification, suggesting that ‘the EU seemingly undergoes an exercise in what Martin describes as an identification and legitimation internal process coupled with an external process of justification and projection’. Martin argues that a human security approach could provide a strategic narrative for the EU in order to bridge ‘the apparent divide between an emphasis on norms and a readiness to use coercive force. Such a narrative could also provide a more nuanced explanation and justification for how these two types of instrument can and should be combined.’ Martin’s analysis examines the interplay between normative justification and physical force as part of developing a human security, with a case study of the EU’s engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Stewart and Björkdahl both analyse the ways in which normative justification (conflict resolution and peace support operations), material incentives (accession and economic agreements) and physical force (military force and coercive capacity) are deeply interdependent in the EU’s ‘neighbourhood’. Stewart focuses on EU actions in the South Caucasus, in particular on the promotion of ‘constitutional norms and norms pertaining to the peaceful settlement of disputes’. She argues that ‘the incentives for reform are lacking without the offer of accession’ and concludes that ‘a more reflective consideration of the nature of EU power in the neighbourhood’ should be based on ‘external empowerment, not coercion’. While Björkdahl examines EU experiences in the Western Balkans, she also looks further afield to peace support operations in the DRC and Sudan. She puts forward the argument that the EU ‘can be both normative and powerful but needs to couple its traditional normative powers with its newly developed military capacity’. Orbie looks at the interaction of normative justification and material incentives with an emphasis on the ‘promotion of social solidarity through European trade policies’. He suggests that the EU has relied almost exclusively on persuasion and incentives in the shape of positive conditionality rather than trade sanctions.

All the chapters illustrate the ability to use a normative form of power, in the shape of normative justification, has to constantly come to terms with the intersection and interaction of other forms of power (material incentives or physical force). In all the chapters, whether focused on norm promotion, trade practices or peacekeeping missions, this dilemma of combining normative power with material or physical forms of power arises. My emphasis on normative forms of power assumes that the prioritizing of normative power may help ensure that any subsequent or parallel use of material incentives and/or physical force is thought about and utilized in a more justifiable way. The foundation in normative theory and emphasis on a normative form of power provide the basis for the third meaning of normative power – the characterization of a type of actor. Forsberg (2009: 10) has usefully drawn on Raymond Aron to distinguish between these two meanings of power – pouvoir as the ‘ability to cause effects’ and puissance as ‘a powerful actor’ (see Aron 1986). Such a distinction between ‘une nouvelle forme de pouvoir normatif’ (a new form of power) and ‘une grande puissance régionale’ (a type of regional great power) facilitates a discussion of a normative type of actor (see distinction between ‘pouvoir normatif’ and ‘puissance régionale’ in Manners 2006b: 48).

**Normative type of actor**

The third meaning of normative power is as a characterization of a type of actor and its international identity. Rather than an emphasis on the ability to use normative justification (pouvoir), the weight here is placed on the extent to which any actor in world politics is on a ‘normative heading’
towards an ‘ideal type’ normative actor (*puissance*) (see discussion of ‘normative heading’ in Manners 2006a: 130–1). Forsberg (2009) has also suggested that normative power can be comprehended as a Weberian ideal type without idealizing the EU (or any other actual actor in world politics) (see also De Zutter 2010). In this respect, a *more* normative type of actor would be one on a normative heading towards an ideal type of a normative power. An ideal type of a normative power would use normative justification to ‘normalise a more just, cosmopolitical world’ (Manners 2008b: 47). A more just, cosmopolitical world would be one in which communitarian, social rights of the self accommodate cosmopolitan, individual rights of others; where local politics and global politics commune (Manners 2008b: 47; see more extensive discussion of cosmopolitical theory and foreign policy in Manners 2011a). This third aspect of normative power was captured in the emphasis on the ‘ontological quality [where] the EU can be *conceptualised* as a changer of norms in the international system’ (Manners 2002: 252).

As would be expected from the reflective contributions to this volume, none of the chapters make absolutist claims about whether the EU is or is not a normative type of actor. All the chapters make more qualified observations regarding the character of the EU as a type of actor in world politics. For Bickerton the EU’s ‘quintessentially “post-national” legitimacy claim’ is a part of its ‘autonomy from the traditional political orders of nation-states’. Haukkala sets out how the ‘character of the EU as an actor’ includes almost a monopoly on ‘its most essential characteristic, European-ness’. Stewart establishes the ‘key EU internal characteristics’ as based on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and freedom, although she also observes how the ‘EU is reluctant to tout itself as an actor in mediation, preferring a softer approach’. Juncos proposes that ‘the EU’s role in Bosnia since the 1990s could indeed be characterized as one of normative power’, however in the case of Bosnia this characterization has been undermined by inconsistencies and double standards. Björkdahl explores normative power from an identity perspective ‘as describing a particular type of actor’, insightfully recognizing that ‘the normative power concept also connotes the characteristic of the EU as an *actor*’.

Smith presents the EU as an ‘ideal type’ involving ‘certain characteristics in its assumptions and behaviour … based on international governance, comprehensive security and commercial exchange/interdependence’, but concludes that such an ideal type needs qualifying with empirical work. Birchfield advocates comparing the EU as a normative type of actor with ‘various other characterisations of the EU’s power and role as a global actor’ in order to interpret ‘the institutional and ideational character of the EU’. Orbie suggests that ‘the constitutive principles which characterise the EU as a normative power are also, and increasingly, present in its trade policies’. Martin argues, following Javier Solana, that the EU adopts a human security approach ‘reflecting its distinctive character as a polity committed to
foundational ideas of peace, democracy and human rights rather than the classic nation-state defence of territory. Lastly, Diez and Pace seek to move beyond the question of ‘whether the characterisation of the EU as a normative power’ is empirically verifiable to argue that ‘the far more interesting question . . . is to what extent the EU is constructed as a normative power’.

All the chapters illustrate the extent to which characterizing the EU as a normative type of actor raises many methodological challenges. Clearly such a question is not one that can be answered without attempting to define and delimit a working understanding of what an ‘ideal type’ normative actor would be. Secondly, the chapters all sensibly focus on just one aspect of EU external actions, ranging from near relations to trade and development to security and conflict issues. Attempting to judge whether the EU can be characterized as a more normative type of actor would clearly be beyond the possibility of any one chapter, perhaps even book, given the wide range of principles which the EU appears to advocate (see next section). Thirdly, any such judgement of the EU as a normative type of actor would need to have a critical understanding of the differences between causal and constitutive analysis of EU external actions, as well as deploying a long-term analytical time frame capable of studying norm shifts rather than momentary fluctuations. Finally, it may also be the case, as Diez and Pace suggest, that trying to definitively settle the question of whether or not the EU is a normative type of actor is really missing the point. If the notion of normative power is genuinely situated in critical social theory, then its purpose would not just be to analyse and reproduce traditional power structures as a form of problem-solving theory – its purpose would be to change existing structures of power and injustice by opening up the possibilities of different perspectives. One way of doing this is, as Birchfield and Orbie do, to deploy a tripartite analytical framework for understanding the principles, actions and impact of actors such as the EU in world politics (Manners 2008a: 239, 2008b: 47, 55, 2009b: 785–6).

**Principles in normative power**

The first part of any normative power analysis is to examine the principles at work in the understanding of a normative form of power. As Bickerton convincingly set out in his chapter, normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles being promoted. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the principles being promoted must be seen as legitimate, as well as being promoted in a coherent and consistent way (on coherence and consistency, see European Commission 2006b; Portela and Raube 2009). Legitimacy of principles in world politics may come from previously established international conventions, treaties or agreements, particularly if these are important within the United Nations (UN) system. Coherence of principles comes from the extent to which
differing principles, and practices to promote them, can be seen to be sound and non-contradictory. Consistency of principles comes from the extent to which differing principles, and practices to promote them, are uniform both within and without the promoting entity, and are applied uniformly.

Principles in the EU and its relations with the rest of the world draw upon the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Covenants, and the Council of Europe/European Convention on Human Rights. In practical terms such principles can be differentiated into the prime principle of sustainable peace; core principles of freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law (as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, after the Lisbon Treaty); as well as the objectives and tasks of equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (as set out in Articles 2 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 8–11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, after the Lisbon Treaty). Coherence and consistency in the international promotion of these principles is intended to come from the role of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, set out in the Lisbon Treaty.

All the chapters in this volume illustrate the role of principles in EU external actions. Bickerton’s study of legitimacy contrasts cosmopolitan legal principles with communitarian social preferences based on principles of equality, institutionalization and general applicability that emanate from the EU’s political experience. Haukkala identifies the way that membership of the EU based on respecting founding values and principles was seen as legitimate across Europe as long as enlargement was geographically open ended. Stewart’s consideration of the three South Caucasus ENP action plans emphasizes the prominence given to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as the importance of compliance with European and international norms and principles. Juncos pays particular attention to the principle of local ownership in Bosnia, but is critical of the roles of the EU Special Representative/High Representative for imposing reforms over Bosnia’s democratic institutions. Björkdahl’s analysis of EU peace support operations pays particular attention to the principle of ‘living by example’ (including respect for the principles of the UN Charter) by focusing on the ‘prime EU normative principle’ of sustainable peace.

Smith looks at the principle vision or idea of EU normative power to argue for three core elements: secular, critical, self-reflexivity; non-coercive; and post-sovereign. Birchfield’s examination of EU development policy identifies the ‘key principles’ as equality and solidarity, although she also identifies the way the EU’s new (2005) development policy concepts of harmonization, results-orientation, ownership and coherence align EU principles with those of the UN. Orbie’s work on trade relations suggests that ‘the EU’s foreign policy principles of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms’ also apply to trade policies. Martin’s advocacy of human security principles has much in common with EU principles such as the need for legitimacy, human rights, effective multilateralism found in good global governance, a bottom-up approach to ownership and the need for prioritization of normative justifications over physical force. Lastly, Diez and Pace study the impact of the EU’s self-representation as a normative power on conflict transformation in the context of the principle of lasting or sustainable peace.

Almost all the chapters address the challenges of legitimacy for the principles promoted through normative power, in particular with reference to questions of coherence and consistency. Bickerton focuses on the question of the search for legitimacy in the promotion of principles, concluding that ‘the primary obstacle to the legitimacy of the EU as a normative power thus lies precisely in the lack of political development which scholars pointed to in the first place as the reason for the EU’s predisposition to act normatively’. Similarly Haukkala also focuses on the challenge of legitimacy, concluding that ‘at least in its present form the Neighbourhood Policy is far from a panacea. It suffers from a lack of legitimacy as a result of its inability to answer the neighbours’ calls for full political and institutional belonging in Europe.’ In arguing for a human security narrative, Martin suggests that it provides ‘symbolic resonance through identification and legitimation’ while addressing ‘issues of consistency, coherence and effectiveness’.

**Actions of normative power**

Normative power should secondly be perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to promote such principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation and the conferral of prestige or shame. As Keene (2008: 3) has argued, ‘normative power could be understood as moral, political or social: as a function of virtue, persuasion or prestige’. Persuasion in the promotion of principles in world politics involves constructive engagement, the institutionalization of relations, and the encouragement of multilateral and plurilateral dialogue between participants. Within these international and domestic venues for dialogue, debate and argumentation can involve reference to international principles as well as encouraging understanding and agreement (although also misunderstanding and disagreement). Similarly, such engagement and debate can also involve the conferral of prestige or shame by participants. The attribution of prestige may range from public declarations of support to membership of an international community, while the attribution of shame may involve public condemnation or the use of symbolic sanctioning.

EU actions in the promotion of principles cover a full spectrum of practices and policies, encouraging a more holistic, or comprehensive approach
to the many challenges of world politics. The EU has historically been better at addressing more structural challenges through development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement. In the past decade the gradual evolution of conflict prevention and crisis management policies has helped improve EU ability to deal with more immediate challenges, such as humanitarian crises and post-conflict reconstruction. This combination of EU actions marks a first step towards a more sustainable peace strategy where the EU is able to address both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict. However, the EU approach to the promotion of principles does not emphasize structural capacity or crisis ability, but focuses on the encouragement of processes of engagement and dialogue. Such EU engagement entails initiating and institutionalizing regular patterns of communication or partnership, for example, through accession procedures, stabilization and/or association agreements, the ENP, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) relations, and Strategic Partnerships.

All the chapters also illustrate the types of actions taken to promote principles in EU external actions. Bickerton contrasts Eriksen’s (2006: 265) cosmopolitan discussion of how EU ‘enforcement mechanisms – namely capacity to make threats credible – can rightly do so only in so far as its actions are democratically regulated’ with Laidi’s (2005: 265) communitarian discussion of normative power as ‘disciplining the game of its [global] actors, introducing predictability in their actions’. Haukkala suggests that ‘to argue that the Union’s normative power is dependent on the perceived legitimacy of its actions and policies in the eyes of its partners is hardly a groundbreaking finding’. He argues instead that ‘it is worth emphasising that at least in Europe the EU has an additional structural constraint [that]… the Union is not a state actor… but is a regional integration process to which the “objects” of that power can, and often do, aspire to join before accepting its norms and values as entirely legitimate’. Stewart sets out how struggles with institutional reform (leading to the Lisbon Treaty) during 2002–09 had impacted ‘negatively on the EU’s ability to formulate and implement coherent external action’, although she also identifies how EU preference for normative mediation and persuasion ‘gives the impression that the EU’s enthusiasm for confidence-building is an easy substitute for more robust action’. Juncos follows Stewart in suggesting that ‘consistency problems… affect EU external action more generally (“double standards” and consistency among EU actors and policies)’, both also emphasize how ‘the deployment of both civilian and military instruments in Bosnia’s constitution is an example of this civ-mil power in action’. Björkdahl places considerable emphasis on the way ‘ESDP peace support actions in the field need to translate the declaratory politics of the EU into action’ where ‘military forces and individual peacekeepers’ actions are guided by and in compliance with the norms championed by the EU’.

Smith differentiates between tangible resources (in material form) and ‘less tangible resources in the form of commitment to agreed courses of
(collective) action’, as well as between resources and operational effectiveness ‘extending from diplomatic or commercial representation through to potential military action’. Birchfield stresses both the significance of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) assessment of EU-level international action in development policies, and the importance of non-instrumental aspects of development policy that ‘goes beyond the instruments-only approach to EU external action’. Orbie argues that ‘the prominence of ILO [International Labour Organization] conventions and the non-binding, deliberative and developmental approach fits in with the [normative power] thesis; but it remains to be seen whether the EU’s actions in this area will have any normative impact’, reinforcing a deliberative reading of trade policy actions. Martin’s human security narrative seeks to provide ‘order and consistency on diverse foreign policy actions’ and to also organize ‘foreign policy actions at an operational level’. Diez and Pace bring an innovative approach to the study of EU actions by assessing ‘the extent to which actors make their claims in the form of securitising moves [that] … invoke the other party or parties as an existential threat to legitimise their actions’, thus developing a discursive understanding of EU conflict mediation actions.

Many of the chapters look at deliberative practices, persuasive actions, as well as symbolic rewards and sanctions in the promotion of principles. Smith and Orbie both emphasize the ‘deliberative nature’ and ‘deliberative approach’ in EU foreign policy and external actions. Diez and Pace clarify that ‘in contrast to earlier conceptualizations of EU civilian power, it is not even economic means that are at the core of EU power. Instead, power becomes an effect of norm leadership and persuasion.’ Similarly, quoting Pascal Lamy, Orbie emphasizes EU GSP-plus (Generalised System of Preferences) trade policy as ‘built around persuasion and incentives rather than threats and demands’. However, Björkdahl argues that ‘increasingly, the Union demonstrates a readiness to extend traditional, soft foreign policy methods such as persuasion, offering and granting wards, and norm diffusion to also include hard powers, such as military coercion, the threat of punishment as well as deployment of military force in its efforts to contribute to international peace and security’. A third perspective is provided by Juncos, who argues that ‘the power of the EU in the Balkans has not relied on persuasion (and the power of norms), but mainly on coercion’. For Stewart it is not norm leadership, persuasion or coercion that is the problem in the South Caucasus, but that ‘indecision and division among the EU member states will not persuade the de facto [breakaway] states to turn away from Russia and towards the EU’.

**Impact of normative power**

Normative power should ultimately be envisaged as socializing in the impact of the actions taken to promote such principles. If normative justification is
to be convincing or attractive, then its impact must involve socialization, partnership and ownership. Socialization as an impact of the promotion of principles in world politics should be seen as being part of an open-ended process of engagement, debate and understanding. Partnership as an impact of the promotion of principles may be the result of institutionalized relationships created by the participating parties whether multilateral or plurilateral, international or transnational. Ownership as an impact of the promotion of principles involves practices of joint or local ownership as a result of partner involvement and consultation. However, such impacts of normative power should be based on the recognition that while international diplomatic socialization is largely a mirage, the nurturing of domestic, transnational and international support for international principles can be helped by the three-part processes of normative justification conceived here.

EU impact in promoting principles can be extraordinarily difficult to judge. One way of making this judgement might be on the basis of empirical evidence, as Patton (2009) has done in her path-breaking study of EU neighbourhood and energy policies using data from a wide range of independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Another way is to analyse the impact of the construction of the EU as a normative power, as Diez and Pace do in this volume (see also Pace 2007a; Diez et al. 2008). The book-length normative power project will use comparative, immanent and pragmatic means of judging and critiquing the impact of normative power (see discussion of judgement and critique in Manners 2009b: 786, 2010a). Beyond these practices, clarity of principle is important in ensuring others understand what the EU is trying to promote, as with the idea of ‘never again’ in the post-Yugoslav space. Simplicity of action space is important when the EU, albeit very rarely, is the only or predominant actor, as with the pre-accession processes of the 1990s. Consistency of promotion is crucial to ensure the EU avoids claims of ‘double standards’, as is often the case in state recognition (such as Kosovo) or UN resolutions (such as the Middle East). Holistic, ‘joined-up’ thinking is important in the broader promotion of principles through the multilateral system, such as the many challenges of the Doha Round of trade liberalization, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and addressing climate change at the Copenhagen CoP15. Partnership, not EU unilateralism, is important for building global consensus and ensuring success in multilateral institutions. Finally, timescale is important when attempting to judge EU principles, actions and impact in any normatively sustainable way.

As would be expected, given their differing empirical foci, the chapters also illustrate the varying impact of EU actions taken to promote principles. Bickerton emphasizes a very broad interpretation of the EU’s transformative impact on the ‘global community’ and ‘the very dynamics of international politics’, in many ways capturing the discourses of ‘international society’ and ‘world society’ within the ‘English School’ of international
theory (see Manners 2004). Haukkala concludes on an equally broad observation regarding the limits of EU enlargement and ‘the question of how to alleviate the negative impact of relinquishing the most effective foreign policy tool at the EU’s disposal’. Stewart places considerable importance on analysing impact and outcome, concluding that ‘the EU acts normatively in its relations with the South Caucasus, but has a limited normative impact with regard to constitutional norms and norms pertaining to the peaceful settlement of disputes’. Juncos also emphasizes studying the external impact, focusing on the importance of economic assistance, visa access to EU labour markets, the EU police mission and the role of the EU Special/High Representative, including suggesting that ‘if the EU really wants to have an impact in Bosnia’ it should be talking about visas not crime. Björkdahl identifies increasing tensions between power and legitimacy; between internal developments and external impact; and between norms and actions.

Smith identifies a relationship between ‘the impact rather than the conception of policies that are produced through normative power’ and the ‘qualities of international governance, a non-coercive order and the commercialisation of international order’ in EU external impact. Birchfield explicitly applies the normative power tripartite analytical framework to conclude that ‘overall the bulk of the empirical evidence suggests a tentative affirmation of the congruence between the notion of the EU as a normative power and the reorientation and execution of its development policies’. Orbic concludes that ‘the Union’s principles, and to some extent also its activities, do indeed increasingly correspond with what would be expected from a normative power, but that its normative impact remains unclear’. Martin raises the critical issue that ‘there is no consistent evaluation methodology of external action, nor any reliable assessment of how action impacts upon third countries’. Finally, Diez and Pace directly address the ‘impact of the EU’s self-representation on conflict transformation’, gauging that the impact is mixed in Cyprus and negative in Palestine.

A number of the chapters discuss socialization, partnership and ownership in the context of the impact of EU actions taken to promote principles. Juncos places considerable emphasis on the importance of promoting local ownership in Bosnia, arguing that ‘a real partnership and a dialogue among equals has not yet materialised’ (presumably because of concerns for the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, she does suggest that while ‘ Bosnia has made progress in terms of democratisation and human rights’, it is ‘not clear to what extent Bosnian elites have internalised EU norms as socialisation channels are limited’. Birchfield also discussed the question of ownership as a ‘fundamental concept’ of new EU development policy, concluding that ‘the EU sees ownership by EU partner countries as pivotal for the efficiency and sustainability of its initiatives’. Stewart, drawing on Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008), argues that EU incentives such as
partnership and cooperation do not reliably promote democratic change without the offer of membership.

**Conclusion: perspectives on the critical**

The deployment of a tripartite analytical framework for understanding the principles, actions and impact of the EU, at least as found in the contributing chapters, helps illustrate how analysing different forms of power might contribute to studying the EU as a type of actor. But the chapters also raised critical questions about how we analyse and understand both the EU’s form of normative power and the EU as a normative power, in the context of normative theory. Such critical questioning is part of critical social theory’s commitment to contextual opening and changing and will be addressed in this concluding section of perspectives on the critical.

In order to conclude with perspectives on the critical questions raised in the book, I will begin by using the framework provided by Hay’s (2002) critical introduction to political analysis. Hay (2002: 63) set out how the philosophy of social science has a directional dependence where ‘ontology logically precedes epistemology which logically precedes methodology’. Hay (2002: 63) summarizes that ‘ontology relates to the nature of the social and political world, epistemology to what we can know about it and methodology to how we might go about acquiring that knowledge’. The contributions to this book, and much wider engagements with beliefs about ‘normative power’, all open up for ontological, epistemological and methodological perspectives.

**The ontology of shared union**

For Hay (2002: 61–2), the question of the ‘political’ is an ontological issue in political analysis – ‘what is the nature of the social and political reality being investigated?’. As a first step in the analytical process, there is a need to clarify just how can we understand the EU in world politics? Bickerton places this question at the centre of his study of legitimacy, contrasting the ‘traditional political order of nation-states’ with the ‘lack of a unified political order’ in the EU. Here there is a potential risk of a return to the ‘supranational–intergovernmental dichotomy’ between an emphasis on the construction of the EU as a type of supranational ‘state’ and as a type of intergovernmental ‘regime of states’ that so debilitated EU studies during the twentieth century (see discussion in Manners and Whitman 2003: 392–3). The traditional response to Bickerton’s lack of unified political order is to replicate the perceived legitimacy and constructions believed to exist in state-like polities, as discussed in Morgan’s treatment of ‘the idea of a European superstate’ (Morgan 2007). The idea of recreating the EU as a superstate might possibly address legitimacy questions, but not the many challenges of twenty-first-century world politics, as
Monnet, Wight and Diez have long argued (Monnet 1962; Wight 1966; Diez 1997; Manners 2006c: 182–3, 193–4). The desire to return to the nineteenth-century popularity of ‘statehood’ is a psycho-social response to twenty-first-century transnational challenges such as global economic crises, global warming, accelerating economic injustices and failures of global governance (for discussions of the psychology of globalization and the return of nationalism, see Kinnvall 1995; Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2011). However as Devetak has argued, such ‘statist anti-cosmopolitanism’ places ‘too much metaphysical comfort in the sovereign state’ and proceeds from a dichotomization of ‘politics/morality, facts/values’ (Devetak 2007, p 166).

My reading of Bickerton is that he does not explicitly suggest statehood, but instead suggests that the EU needs to develop ‘the political resources necessary to introduce into the process of norm definition a set of democratic procedures’, and leaves the question of polity formation open. As discussed extensively elsewhere, the EU is constructed as a polycentric, hybrid polity in which state, supranational and transnational politics coexist and compete (see previous discussions in Manners 2000b, 2006d, 2007a, 2008c: 12–15; Manners and Whitman 2000). These characteristics can be seen to be shared to a lesser or greater extent with all actors in world politics, including international organizations, NGOs, regional organizations and state-like organizations. One of the challenges for the study of world politics is to find methods for understanding the constructions of such political organizations without reifying their particularities. As set out in the 2002 article, the analytical question is to what extent ‘this particularly new and different form of hybridity’ constitutes a type of normative power, without confusing particular or different for unique or sui generis (Manners 2002: 240).

As an actor consisting of other actors (such as member states, transnational political parties and transnational interest groups) the EU is constituted both through its interactions with these ‘internal’ groups and with other global actors. In this respect the EU is not so analytically dissimilar to other global actors, for example, as states consisting of other actors (such as local-regional authorities, political parties and interest groups) that are constituted both through their interactions with these ‘internal’ groups and with other global actors. All of these relationships between the structures of international society, the structures of the international society of the EU, the structures of states and the agencies of interest groups, parties, local-regional authorities, member states and the EU all constitute the EU in world politics. These are dynamic social and political relationships that are evolving historically, politically and legally, thus necessitating an understanding of the EU’s reality located in a social ontology. All of these questions of polycentricity, hybridity, interaction, constitution, structure and agency, and social ontology are implicit in the normative power approach, as would be expected of any critical social theory.
The epistemology of social power

Secondly, Hay (2002: 62–3) suggests that the ‘science question’ is an epistemological issue in political analysis – ‘what are the conditions of acquiring knowledge of that which exists?’. As a second step in the analytical process, there is a related need to clarify just how can we know the EU in world politics? All the contributors to the book focus on one case study with empirical evidence in their chapters, although two contributions are particularly interesting because of their differing approaches to the epistemological question. Birchfield’s chapter explicitly discusses the normative power approach as ‘a theoretically grounded, empirical framework of analysis’ and proceeds with a systematic analysis of the empirical evidence from EU development policy. In contrast, Diez and Pace’s chapter leaves aside the question of analysing the EU as a type of actor ‘on the basis of empirical observation’ and instead engages in an analysis of the discursive construction of normative power. Some contributions to the book emphasize the importance of an empirical analytical framework, such as Orbie’s chapter (but also the work of Patton (2009) and De Wekker and Niemann (2009)), while others place more emphasis on discourse and discursive analysis, such as Juncos and Martin’s chapters (but also the work of Merlingen and Ostraiskaite 2006). As thoughtful, critical analyses of normative power, all the contributions bring a mix of analytical and epistemological positions to the empirical analysis, for example, the chapters by Bickerton, Björkdahl, Birchfield and Orbie all discuss both empirical evidence and discourse surrounding the EU.

Epistemologically (and ontologically) all the chapters stand in opposition to more problematic attempts to separate interests and norms in the study of politics. In this respect interests and norms of normative power are two sides of the same coin, whether that coinage is labelled ‘bounded rationality’, ‘social preferences’, ‘cultural hegemony’ or ‘discursive construction’ (see Manners 2000a, 2004, 2007a for discussion of these four epistemological labels). But what is important is a thorough understanding of ontological and methodological suppositions of any such interest/norm distinctions. It is here that the importance of Hay’s (2002) ‘directional dependence’ becomes crucial in the study of normative power. Outside of this volume there have been a number of studies attempting to separate interests and norms in the study of normative power. What becomes clear in most of these attempts is that they are ontologically presupposed by either a belief in the importance of the physical, objective world and the unimportance of the social, subjective world, or they are founded on a belief that it is analytically possible to separate these two human worlds. The problem of such distinctions is briefly raised in the discussion of the difference between ‘discursive acceptance’ and ‘serious belief’ as an ‘ontological debate’ in Diez and Pace’s chapter. Diez has previously addressed this distinction more directly in arguing that ‘the point is not that normative power is not strategic, but that
strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished, and that the
assumption of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical’
(Diez 2005: 625).

It is here that there are often problematic attempts to portray the study
of normative power as separating norms from interests, when the ques-
tion really involves understanding differing constructions of short-term
self-interest, long-term intelligent self-interest, valued beliefs and identity.
Similarly problematic is the tendency to compound discourses of ‘force for
good’ with ‘normative power’, without too much reflection on how these
have been differently constructed and by whom (see Barbé and Johansson-
Nogués 2008; Pace 2008; Manners 2010a). Transatlanticist discourses of the
EU as a ‘force for good’ emanated from the New Transatlantic Agenda (EU-
US Summit, Madrid, 3 December 1995), and were incorporated into the
2003 European Security Strategy (European Union 2003) as well as subse-
quent prioritization of short-term security issues.9 All these epistemological
challenges of empirical evidence, discursive construction and interest/norm
distinctions necessitate an interpretive understanding of the social nature of
power in the normative power approach, as would be expected of any critical
social theory.

The methodology of normative power
Thirdly, Hay (2002: 63–4) sets out how responses to ontological and
epistemological questions have methodological consequences in political
analysis – ‘how can we go about acquiring knowledge of that which exists?’.
As a third step in the analytical process, there is an additional need to
clarify just how we can research the EU in world politics. Although all
of the contributions to the volume clearly have an implicit understand-
ing of methodological issues, four of the chapters raise explicit questions
of method. Bickerton and Martin both seek stronger and more consistent
methodological approaches to analysing and assessing EU external actions,
whether involving objective standards or subjective consultation mecha-
nisms in order to judge actions and impacts. Birchfield and Orbie both
respond to this call by drawing on the normative power tripartite analyti-
cal method in order to interrogate the principles, actions and impact of the
EU in development assistance and trade relations. Birchfield suggests that
this method may move the normative power approach ‘from concept to
analytical framework to research programme’.

As an analytical framework the tripartite method makes it possible to
analyse the EU’s normative power both causally and constitutively. Equally
important, the method encourages the use of different forms of critique –
by comparing the EU with other examples at all three stages of the tripartite
analysis, as well as comparing claims of principles against the aims of actions
and the consequences of impact. In terms of methodological practice and
technique, the tripartite method opens up the possibility of using mixed- or
multi-method analysis, although the practice of ‘longitudinal interpretation’ is considered most appropriate for a fuller understanding of the nature of power in world politics. The practice of longitudinal interpretation is important in normative power analysis as it recognizes that time and technique are determining factors in our understanding of the EU in world politics. A long analytical time frame ensures that analysis captures generational change rather than momentary fluctuation – ideally any study would include at least the origins of principles, their translation into actions, and the impact and consequences of these actions (Manners 2009b: 785–6). Unfortunately, the demands of time, funding and publication often result in short time horizons and observational rather than interpretive analysis.

Birchfield also suggests that the normative power approach may be evolving beyond an analytical framework towards a ‘holistic research programme’ in EU studies. As I have discussed previously,

the first and most obvious implication for all the sciences in the era of globalisation, is that a holistic approach is really a pre-requisite for our understanding of contemporary Europe … [this] forces us to move beyond the conventions and conformities of linear thinking with their analyses of self interest, narrow context, isolation, and discrete questions, in order to think about holistic, contextual, inclusive, and global European studies. (Manners 2003: 78–9)

Again, the demands of time, funding and publication have meant that most studies of normative power study one empirical case and often one EU principle. Rather than holistic, most studies are therefore focused on single examples with the methodological advantage of singularity but the disadvantage of atomism. Whether the focus of empirical research is in one of the five fields of economy, society, environment, conflict or politics, or on one of the nine principles of sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development or good governance, the methodological risk is that the other four fields, or other eight principles, will be overlooked.

Such a tendency to singularity and atomism often means that the political hierarchy and contestation within and between principles is frequently overlooked. While the assertion that there are nine principles at work in the EU is still subject to confirmation, for me there seems little doubt that sustainable peace is the ‘prime principle’ which leads to its prioritization over the other eight principles. Similarly, it is the case that liberal principles such as freedom, the rule of law and good governance have been in the ascendency over the past decade, despite the strengthening of social principles such as equality, social solidarity and sustainable development in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. Such political contestation between liberal and social principles can only be understood if more than one principle is
studied through normative power. Such methodological challenges of tripartite method, critique, longitudinal interpretation and holistic analysis necessitate a normative power approach which is holistic, contextual and inclusive, as would be expected of any critical social theory.\textsuperscript{10}

**Normative theory and normative power**

Hay's (2002) framework of directional dependence and my three brief perspectives within this framework illustrate the determinist aspects of responses to questions of social science philosophy. Hay usefully summarizes his discussion with a final question – ‘what is the nature and purpose of political science?’ (2002: 64). In this final section of the conclusion, I return to my opening emphasis on normative theory in order to briefly reflect on the nature and purpose of normative power. Following Cochran (1999), if all theory is normative theory then the challenge is really to reflect on how we judge and justify truth claims about the nature and purpose of normative power in world politics. Clearly this places the emphasis on moving from absolute claims to relative judgements about how we might understand normative power. The immediate temptation would be to move to finding a definition of what ‘normative’ is, but this is no easy move. Normative political theory is broadly divided between two differing understandings of how ‘normative’ might be defined using communitarian theory and cosmopolitan theory, both of which are contestable (for a more extended discussion of how these positions relate to EU external actions, see Manners 2011a). As briefly raised in the section on principles in normative power, communitarian theory tends to be seen as involving social values, while cosmopolitan theory tends to be seen as involving concerns for humanity.

In the study of normative power, both communitarian and cosmopolitan approaches raise certain concerns. A communitarian emphasis on normative power as promoting European values raises concerns of neo-colonial hegemony. As I have discussed elsewhere, post-colonial theory and concerns for neo-colonial practices must be explicit in attempts to understand how to judge and justify normative power (see Manners 2006c: 184, 2006e: 175, 177). But as Spivak emphasizes it is not just Eurocentric communitarian strategies that are problematic, but also the ‘culture of capitalism’ which evokes a wider critique of neoliberal cosmopolitanism (Spivak 1999: 93; Manners 2006c: 184). A cosmopolitan emphasis on promoting universal values runs the risk of entangling itself in the neoliberal culture of capitalism. As I have also suggested elsewhere, critical social theory and concerns for neoliberal practices must also be explicit in attempts to understand how to judge and justify normative power (Manners 2011a). Calhoun (2003: 111) emphasizes the need for cosmopolitanism ‘to disentangle itself from neoliberal capitalism’ and move towards a more normative heading. In this respect the nature of normative power is more clearly set within the normative political theory of critical social theory and its emphasis on the
‘cosmopolitical’, that is, a ‘strong sense of cosmopolitanism [which] calls for confrontation with deep and necessarily contentious differences between ways of life’, involving both cosmopolitan ethics and communitarian politics (Calhoun 2003: 106; Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2011). Here then is the return to critical social theory – a holistic research programme that works within a cosmopolitical understanding of normative theory; that seeks to work ‘within categories of existing thought’ regarding EU external actions, radicalize them and show ‘in varying degrees both their problems and their unrecognised possibilities’ (Calhoun 1995: 23).

Notes

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1. See discussion of ‘What is Normative Power’ in Manners (2000a: 31–2); see also discussion of Linklater and Habermas’ critical theory on page 6.
2. For more traditional treatments, see the work of Robert Dahl or Steven Lukes.
5. The EU’s political experience comes from its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution that gives rise to principles such as equality, institutionalization and general applicability. See Manners (2002).
7. Besides the contributors to this volume and works discussed in this chapter, see engagements by: Emanuel Adler, Lisbeth Aggestam, Federica Bicchi, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, Jon Burchell and Simon Lightfoot, Robert Falkner, Orfeo Fioretos, Catherine Guisan, Guy Harpaz, Adrian Hyde-Price, Elisabeth Johansson-Nougues, Emilian Kavalski, R. Daniel Kelemen, Zaki Laïdi, Marika Lerch and Guido Schwellnus, Andrew Linklater, Sonia Lucarelli, Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, Jennifer Mitzen, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Gergana Noutcheva, Tonia Novitz, Karoline Postel-Vinay, Sybil Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli, Andy Storey, Nathalie Tocci, Antje Wiener, Richard Youngs and Hubert Zimmermann.
8. See discussion of the evolution of the EU’s social constitution during the 1990s, including ‘its historical context, hybrid polity, and political-legal constitution’ in Manners (2002: 240–2).
9. The 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda stated ‘we are determined to reinforce our political and economic partnership as a powerful force for good in the world’, while the 2003 European Security Strategy stated that ‘the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States
can be a formidable force for good in the world.’ These different constructions may be seen as embodied in the symbolism of Clare Short’s (former British Secretary of State for Development) discourse of good global development and her resignation over the invasion of Iraq. See Manners (2008e: 144).

10. The book-length normative power project aims to be holistic in its breadth of analysis, contextual in its longitudinal interpretation and inclusive in its outside-in/bottom-up technique.


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