Review
Reviewed Work(s): France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno. by Piotr S. Wandycz
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"a theory of Russian foreign relations" in which he argues that much of this aspect of Russia's history has been a response to the invasion of the sovereignty of her native traditions by Western models. The sense of humiliation aroused by this intrusion and Russian efforts to escape invidious comparisons between her own backwardness and Western achievements during the past century explain a great deal of both tsarist and Soviet actions abroad and at home.

The relation between domestic and foreign affairs, the meaning for foreign policy of the autocratic tsarist and oligarchic Soviet regimes, and the role of the Foreign Ministry are subjects covered in the next section by Richard E. Pipes, Robert C. Tucker, and Robert M. Slusser. Following this are articles devoted to a consideration of the instruments of foreign affairs. Raymond L. Garthoff reviews the influence and importance of military policy; Frederick C. Barghoorn, the use of propaganda, particularly during the Soviet period; Alexander Dallin, the use of such international movements as Pan-Slavism, the religious appeal of Eastern Orthodoxy, and international communism; and Gordon A. Craig, the techniques of negotiation.

The fourth part of the book deals with Russia's diplomatic history in the more traditional sense. Hajo Holborn presents a superb resumé of this vis-à-vis the European political system, extending his time coverage back to Peter I. Ivo J. Lederer deals with Russian experience in the Balkans, Firuz Kazemzadeh does the same for the Middle East, and Donald W. Treadgold for the Far East. And Sergius Yakobson gives a delightful and revealing account of Russia's century-long relations with Africa, a subject seldom considered prior to the Soviet period. In the final section Henry L. Roberts discusses Russia and America, and George F. Kennan comments on what he terms "Contemporary Perspectives." Since Mr. Kennan gave his views to the symposium only a few hours after his appointment as United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, his remarks had then and have now a particular and practical relevance to the subject at hand.

Viewed as a whole, the book suffers, as must any collection of articles, from the lack of depth in its separate parts. But this is much more than made up for by the fact all the authors have related their particular subjects to the general topic of Russia's foreign affairs and, within that context, to a consideration of the continuity and change theme within a manageable time period. The book is thus remarkably homogeneous to say nothing of the tremendous wealth of factual material presented. No other single volume in English throws so much light on the subject of Russian foreign relations. Although the advent of the Soviets has done much to confound Talleyrand's dictum, "Foreign policy is never original," it is clear from this book that the October Revolution was not quite the watershed that many have thought.

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Because scholars have been denied access to the diplomatic archives of most of the great powers for the period 1919-39, the number of reliable monographs on the origins of the Second World War has been disappointingly small. Professor Wandycz has sought to fill one of the more important gaps in this spotty picture by analyzing the French effort to forge an Eastern alliance in order to check a resurgent Germany and isolate Bolshevik Russia in the first six postwar years. As a result of his detailed and well-documented study, he concludes that this was "a worthy and in many ways important undertaking" which, had it succeeded, would have enabled France to throw away its British crutch and embark on a firm and consistent policy toward Germany and Soviet Russia. Thus the author lines up with the supporters of French preponderance and against the advocates of European cooperation as the best guarantee of peace between the wars.

From the outset the author makes it clear that a Franco-Polish-Czech alliance faced an uphill battle against British, German, and Soviet opposition. More important, he also shows how influential and determined men in Paris, Prague, and Warsaw fought to weaken or topple from power the champions of the alliance. However, and this is the major shortcoming of the book, the author never demonstrates that the proposed alliance could have rallied the necessary moral, military, and economic strength to persuade or force the rest of Europe to accept its leadership. In fact his able and often brilliant concluding appraisal (pp. 369-87) convinced this reader of quite the opposite conclusion.

Beginning at the Peace Conference in 1919, all-out French support of Polish territorial claims faltered in the face of Lloyd George's opposition. The British helped block General Haller's troops from landing in Danzig. The uncertain future of Russia and exaggerated hopes in the cause of the White armies restrained France from backing Pilsudski's federative scheme in the East. The Czechs were more successful because their army was allowed to return intact from Russia. They claimed territory at the expense of the defunct Austro-Hungarian empire, which unlike Germany and even Russia had no sympathizers at the conference. Poland lost ground to Czechoslovakia in the Teschen dispute, according to the author, because France sought to free Czechoslovakia from the need to import coal. Besides, sandwiched between Russia and Germany, even a disappointed Poland had nowhere but France to turn for protection. But deprived of Teschen coal an embittered Czechoslovakia could have spurned France for other allies.

Viewing Polish-Czech cooperation as "the key to an effective security system in East Central Europe," the author blames both the French and Beneš for creating and preserving the Little Entente and for foiling two major attempts to achieve a Polish-Czech rapprochement, the unratified Beneš-Skirmunt pact in 1921 and the efforts of Polish Foreign Minister Aleksander Skrzynski in 1924.

According to the author, after Locarno the concept of an "eastern barrier" lost its meaning. Consequently Pilsudski seized power in Poland, and France gradually abandoned its offensive strategy.

The narrative is occasionally marred by the author's personal prejudices, his intense dislike of Lloyd George, his suspicions of Beneš. His views on the Maginot Line are no longer acceptable. Although he subjects French
and Czech proposals to close and often revealing criticism, he says little or nothing about the sense of such debatable Polish plans as Dmowski's "Note on the Western Frontiers of the Polish State," which aimed to include over two million Germans in Poland, or Piłsudski's federative scheme, which the author maintains was the only guarantee of Poland's security.

An excellent eighteen-page annotated bibliography deals with all the relevant sources except the Russian and includes many unpublished documents, much new and rarely used material from private archives, especially from the Polish aide. Until state archives are thrown open, this will remain the standard work of an important chapter in the history of the vacillating and futile French policy in Eastern Europe between the wars.

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Over six hundred documents were selected from among official records held by Poland's government-in-exile, first in Angers and then in London after the collapse of France. These records are reproduced in full and include diplomatic notes, memoranda and reports, records from conferences, and personal notes based on conversations. Since very little of this material has been published, this volume represents a welcome addition to the source material on the Second World War, especially for the scholar who does not read Polish. Some extracts from Allied and Soviet diplomatic papers are also included.

In his preface, the former Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Count Edward Raczyński, provides an excellent summary of what is to follow. He places this in perspective and mentions some of his own conversations with Allied statesmen during World War II. The list of scholars who worked on this volume is in itself impressive. An editorial note by Colonel Stanisław Biegański indicates the sources used, explaining that some of the work had already been done in a two-volume publication comprising 450 documents, entitled *Stosunki polsko-sowieckie (Polish-Soviet Relations)*, which was mimeographed in 1946 in London. This earlier compilation covered the years 1918-45. Unfortunately, it was difficult to obtain much documentation for the period 1939-40, when the exiled government functioned initially in France.

The first forty-one pages of the book provide an introduction to subsequent material. Despite its title, the volume includes thirty-five documents issued between August 29, 1918, and August 31, 1939. They begin with the Russian abrogation of the eighteenth-century agreements partitioning Poland, include the Treaty of Riga, the Nonaggression Pact and protocol extending it to 1945, and end with Nazi-Soviet negotiations as well as Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet (translated as "Council") on the pact with Germany.

Much space is devoted to tracing Soviet duplicity. One example is the offer of military supplies to Poland after the Wehrmacht's surprise attack.