That the Peace Settlement of 1919 was a compromise, dependent upon the continuing involvement of the United States in the affairs of Europe for its success, is a fact widely accepted by students of contemporary history. The nature of that compromise is perhaps nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the colonial aspects of the Treaty of Versailles. Under the terms of Articles 22 (League Covenant), 119-27 and 257, Germany unconditionally renounced ‘all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions’ ‘in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers...’ and the ‘tutelage’ of the inhabitants of these territories was to ‘be entrusted to advanced nations’ and ‘exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League’. The Treaty of Versailles, therefore, contained within it the legal basis for the Mandates System, which was to be applied to Germany’s former colonies and the former Arabian provinces of the Ottoman Empire during the inter-war years and which was in the years after 1945 to be transformed into the Trusteeship System of the United Nations.

The compromise represented by the Mandates System was that between the idealism of British radicals and socialists, given practical political force by the entry of the United States into the first world war, and the desire of the British, French and Dominion governments to retain unfettered possession of the colonial and Middle-Eastern territories that they had conquered. Undoubtedly

the outstanding contribution to the creation of the Mandates System was made by the British Labour movement. Animated by the conviction that the war had its roots in the imperialist struggle for the world’s economic resources, its members ‘conducted a public debate designed to arrive at the most effective techniques for international control of colonial areas in the interests of European peace and the protection of colonial inhabitants.’ Consequently, ‘the letter, if not the spirit, of some of the official and unofficial Labour recommendations found expression in the mandates articles of the League Covenant’. The British, French and Dominion Governments were, however, largely unaffected by this debate until the United States entered the war: even then the British Government privately ‘continued to pursue a straightforward annexationist policy’. But by the end of 1917 President Wilson’s known aversions to imperialism and annexations, coupled with the publication of the so-called Secret Treaties by the Bolsheviks, began to have an impact on British policy regarding the post-war colonial settlement. In December Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s private secretary, warned Smuts: ‘It is absolutely fatal to suggest that the German colonies must be retained because they are essential to British communications. The USA won’t look at that for a moment...’ Similarly, Sir Mark Sykes, in March 1918, informed Picot that the arrangement of British and French interests in the Middle East that they had agreed in 1916 was no longer tenable. He wrote: ‘The consent of the governed and the consent of the world are essential to any form of foreign influence or control over an emancipated people... President Wilson’s voice is now the important one and the ideas that do not fit in with his speeches won’t have much influence on the peace conference.’

That Wilson’s views on the future colonial settlement were in fact by no means rigidly defined by the beginning of 1918 is clear if one examines the fifth of his Fourteen Points which called for a ‘free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims...’ As one writer has suggested, under this formula ‘Annexion ist dabei keineswegs ausgeschlossen’. What, however, is important is that the British and Dominion Governments considered Wilson’s views to be more fixed than they were. Equally it is evident that immediately prior to the opening of the Paris Peace Conference the American President seems to have envisaged more definitely the conversion of the German colonies into common property of the League of Nations, thereby providing ‘cement’ for the
new international organisation. Their day-to-day administration, he considered, should be undertaken by ‘small nations’ to prevent any possibility of their ever being ‘absorbed into the old empires’. Such aims, real or imagined, were, of course, in conflict with the ambitions of the Allied and Dominion Governments who wished to retain possession of their conquests. In this situation, and before the Peace Conference convened, the broad outlines of a colonial settlement were worked out by the British in collaboration with the Dominions, which it was hoped would be generally applicable to territory conquered in the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific Ocean and acceptable to the American President. The main features of this were that colonial conquests would be retained under an international supervisory system. Nevertheless, by the end of 1918, neither the Dominion Governments nor the French had consented to participate in the contemplated Mandates System as far as the colonial territory which they themselves wished to acquire as a result of the war was concerned.

The colonial issue was the first to be determined once the Peace Conference opened. In the end it was agreed that the Mandates System would be applied to all the conquered German and Turkish possessions outside Europe, but only after a fierce contest of wills between Wilson and William M. Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister, and the decision to grade the various mandates in such a way that the southern Dominions (South Africa, Australia and New Zealand) would escape virtually all the provisions of mandatory administration, except that of furnishing an annual report to the Permanent Mandates Commission, in the territories they confidently expected to be allotted to them. The French also received a concession: they were to be allowed to raise volunteer troops in mandates under their control in time of war.

So great was the divergence of opinion between the parties involved that their views were only imperfectly reconciled in the Mandates System. In the haste to secure agreement a number of matters, such as the problem of sovereignty in mandated territories and the nationality of their inhabitants, were passed over, raising, in effect, ‘...serious political and legal questions to which no one had satisfactory answers.’ From the point of view of the Powers who were to become Mandatories these issues were to some extent irrelevant: the object of their policy was to annex the territories they had conquered and so long as no other Power or group of Powers had full legal title to them the problem of sovereignty did not really
matter. However, from the point of view of those Powers, private organizations and individuals who subscribed to the concepts underlying the system of mandatory administration, sovereignty and cognate issues were of substantial importance. Addressing the American Bar Association in 1919 Robert Lansing, the United States Secretary of State, emphasized:

It is not an overstatement to state that nine-tenths of all international controversies arise over questions pertaining to the possession of sovereignty and the conflict of sovereign rights... The system of mandates must be philosophically and logically worked out from the legal point of view or it will result in confusion.14

But with the decision of the United States Congress in March 1920 not to ratify the Treaty of Versailles nor join the League of Nations it became certain that such matters would at least continue to remain fudged and that the Mandates System in the period of its establishment would be interpreted in a manner most advantageous to the interests and intentions of the Allied and Dominion Governments.

By August 1919 three steps had been taken towards the creation of the Mandates System: its outline had been approved during the January meetings of the Council of Four and then enshrined in Article 22 of the League Covenant; on 7 May the same body had selected the Mandatory Powers; and in July and August the Milner Mandates Commission, appointed by the Peace Conference, had discussed the terms of the Mandates in draft. It thereafter remained for the League Council to confer the 'formal legal title to the necessary rights of authority and administration... on the respective Mandatory Powers' and to define the 'terms of the various Mandates... in specific charters, applicable to each of the territories concerned.'15 That the sanction of the League to the new Mandates System was to take far longer than could reasonably have been expected was the result of the doubtful attitude of the United States towards the League of Nations in the immediate aftermath of the Peace Conference and, once the Senate had refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, the efforts made by the United States Government to ensure that it would have the same rights in mandated territories as League Members.

The delay was clearly resented most by the Dominion Govern-
ments. Unrest in their newly acquired territories over the continuing uncertainty concerning their future status seems to have been their main source of anxiety together with the problem of whether or not the Dominion Parliaments were competent themselves to inaugurate the mandatory regime in the lands assigned to them. On 15 August 1919 Lord Buxton, the Governor-General of South Africa, informed Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, that the Union Government wanted full confirmation of its mandatory status by 5 September and in messages of 26 September and 13 October the Australian Prime Minister, Hughes, stressed the need for urgency in completing the settlement of Mandates. Celerity of the order required by the Union Government was out of the question, Milner informed Buxton, although he had been doing his 'utmost to expedite the issue.' In responding to Hughes, Lloyd George agreed that the 'issue should be expedited in every way possible', but continued:

You will remember, of course, that Mandates have to be submitted to Council of League of Nations under Article 22 of Treaty and that Council not yet formally constituted until after the formal ratification of the Treaty of Peace. Pending approval by Council of form of Mandates and their issue, I do not think you can do more than carry on administration of territories to be mandated to Australia in accordance with the terms of the draft telegraphed to you... which must be regarded as provisionally authoritative.

Milner offered much the same explanation to Ferguson, the Governor-General of Australia. The attitude of the United States Senate towards the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was retarding the setting up of the League Council, which body was charged with the duty of ratifying the Mandates. It seemed to him, however, that it was 'just possible... in view of long vista of uncertainty caused by American situation the four other Principal Allied and Associated Powers may be induced to go ahead by themselves and issue Mandates without waiting for constitution of League...' This would obviously have been tantamount to a colonial rather than mandatory solution to the problem and Milner did not regard it as 'altogether suitable.' But it 'would be better than the present position' and as a 'last resort' he was prepared to try it. He was not successful: two days before the United States Senate finally rejected the peace treaty and with it the League Covenant, he informed Lord Liverpool, the Governor-General of New Zealand, that it was the uncertain position of the United States that continued to com-
plicate the formal and final issuance of the Mandates.\textsuperscript{17}

The decision of the United States not to join the League of Nations effectively left the issuance of the Mandates in the hands of the Mandatory Powers themselves, for as they dominated the League Council it was unlikely that that body would obstruct their wishes to any substantial degree. At the same time it was still necessary to define the 'legal title' that a Mandatory Power would possess in regard to a mandated territory: in other words the relationship between one another of Mandatories, Mandates and the League. The Hymans Report, adopted by the League Council on 5 August 1920 and therefore accepted by the British Government, commented that this was 'a mere matter of form perhaps, but one which should be settled, and the consideration of which will help towards a clear understanding of the conception of Mandates.' It continued:

It must not be forgotten that, although the Mandatory is appointed by the principal Powers, it will govern as a Mandatory and in the name of the League of Nations.

It logically follows that the legal title held by the Mandatory Power must be a double one: one conferred by the Principal Powers and the other conferred by the League of Nations.

The question of sovereignty, however, was specifically avoided: Hymans would 'not enter into a controversy...as to where the sovereignty actually resides.' He stated: 'We are face to face with a new institution. Legal erudition will decide as to what extent it can apply to this institution the older juridical notions.' In these circumstances the League's right of control, he frankly admitted, remained vague. It appeared to be 'a moral rather than a legal question.' That the League had a responsibility towards the inhabitants of mandated territories was a debatable point, but it was 'difficult to see in what way this responsibility would be organized, or what measures could enforce it.' The Report thus concluded that: 'The responsibility of the League before public opinion of the civilized world will be a moral one.'\textsuperscript{18}

On the basis of the Hymans Report, the League Council was able to proceed to the approval of the various Mandates and the constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission. As constituted on 1 December 1920 the Commission had the right to examine the annual reports of Mandatory Powers, to make observations on
them and to communicate both to the League Council. It had no other rights or powers. This was very much in line with the wishes of the Mandatories and particularly the British who 'took the lead in defining the purpose and function of the Permanent Mandates Commission.' British officials were strongly against anything like a 'roving commission' and believed that the Commission's role should be confined to the examination of annual reports and ascertaining that the Mandatory Powers were fulfilling their commitments. In the words of Lord Robert Cecil, it should not be able to 'do more than call the attention of the public' to abuses. It was also established at the first League Assembly that the Mandates System should be exclusively within the purview of the League Council. It had been suggested that the Assembly should have the right to discuss the Mandates, but Balfour (who was Lord President of the Council in the British Cabinet 1919-1922), had vigorously opposed this, claiming that it would have 'momentous' and 'appalling' consequences which would endanger the future of the League itself. The result of this dispute was that the Assembly retained the right to make suggestions to the Council regarding Mandates, but rarely did so. The action of the Assembly was subsequently limited to consideration of the section of the Council's annual report dealing with Mandates. It occasionally expressed wishes and even passed resolutions, but possessed very little real power.

The Mandates System as it had evolved by the end of 1920 was one with which most of the Mandatory Powers could feel reasonably content. They had not been able to annex the territories concerned, in that they had not been vested with sovereignty over them, but they possessed them legally and securely for all that. Moreover, and more importantly, sovereignty had not been vested in the League and its rights of supervision had been reduced to a bare minimum. On the complex question of Sovereignty, the attitude of the British Government was clarified in a minute by Sir Cecil Hurst of 11 May 1927 which stated: '...in our view a mandatory is not clothed with the sovereignty over a mandated area...the word we always use is "authority" which is not a technical term and which gives the mandatory whatever he is entitled to under his mandate. Consequently, without in any way encroaching on the rights which the mandate confers, controversy as to the extent of those rights can be avoided by the use of the word "authority" and by avoiding "sovereignty".'

Addressing the League in May 1922 Balfour was able to state
without much fear of contradiction:

Mandates are not the creation of the League and they cannot in substance be altered by the League. The League's duties are confined to seeing that the specific and detailed terms of the Mandates are in accordance with the decision taken by the Allied and Associated Powers. In carrying out these Mandates the Mandatory Powers shall be under the supervision — not the control — of the League. A Mandate is a self-imposed limitation by the conquerors on sovereignty which they exercise over the conquered territory. In the general interests of mankind the Allied and Associated Powers have imposed this limitation on themselves and have asked the League to assist them in seeing that this policy is carried out.23

How much difference the adherence of the United States to the League would have made to the Mandates System will never be known, but what is certain is that it was far removed from the concepts originally entertained by President Wilson.

American opinion thought so, most notably Robert Lansing who was to write later:

In actual operation the apparent altruism of the mandates system worked in favour of the selfish and material interests of the Powers which accepted the mandates... It seemed obvious from the very first that the Powers which under the old practice would have obtained sovereignty over certain conquered territories would not be denied mandates over these territories. The League might reserve in the mandates a right of supervision of administration and even of revocation of authority, but that right would be of nominal and of little, if any, real value, provided that the mandatory was one of the Great Powers, as undoubtedly it would be.24

The fund of hostility in the United States towards the Mandates System was readily exploited by those Germans who particularly resented the loss of their colonies. In 1922 10,000 copies of The German Colonies under Mandates (Berlin 1922), by Heinrich Schnee, the last Governor of German East Africa, were distributed in America and the response was encouraging. One American academic, Professor David Starr Jordan, was moved to write: 'The Mandate has been degraded and depraved into annexation and vulgar exploitation and that fact is one of the main reasons why the United States never joined the League of Nations.'25

The German Government naturally opposed the interpretation that the League Council had placed upon Article 22 of the League Covenant. In a very well argued memorandum addressed to the
Secretary-General of the League and the governments of member states it was stated that under Article 22 the League itself had 'assumed the care and responsibility for the former German Colonies.' Therefore, while the actual responsibility of administering the various territories quite properly should fall to particular States, the League alone had the proper competence to designate the States to be charged with such responsibilities. Furthermore, it was claimed that paragraph 8 of Article 22 explicitly provided for the actual terms of the Mandates to be determined by a 'Convention between the Members of the League': as the Members of the League only met in the League Assembly such a Convention could 'only take the form of a resolution passed by the Assembly.' The memorandum concluded:

Seen as a whole, the system proposed by the Council of the League amounts to the almost complete elimination of the Assembly, and it reduces the role of the Council to a mere formality, and it thus invalidates the control vested in the League. The Mandatory system would therefore become a mere fiction, and we should find ourselves confronted, in fact, with the annexation of the former German colonial possessions, through a distribution carried out by the Principal Powers.26

Some sympathy for these views was shown in the Foreign Office in London. One official thought that the German contentions were 'well-founded' and could not 'in fairness be denied.' It was, however, only on the conditions endorsed by the League Council that it had been possible to 'introduce the mandate system at all' and there was the view that something could be 'gained by even so attenuated a form of League of Nations control that cynics' might 'regard as a sham.' But that, he admitted, was not necessarily a 'good answer.' Sir Eyre Crowe, the head of the Foreign Office, himself minuted, somewhat wryly, that it was fortunate that a reply to the German memorandum was not required.27

Of all the Mandatory Powers the most satisfied was probably the British Government. The system that had emerged was one that had largely been devised by British politicians and officials and it did not in any way conflict with the established principles of British colonial administration. It was also considered that the mandatory regime was one that was likely to last for a very long time, it being the opinion of those in authority that it would take 'generations' and 'centuries' before the inhabitants of most mandated territory would attain political maturity. In only one respect was there ever a
hint that the British might seek to alter the Mandates System during the period of its establishment. By a military concession made to the French at the Paris Peace Conference the French 'B' Mandates (relating to former German colonies) for Togoland and the Cameroons permitted the raising of indigenous troops for defence purposes outside the territory in which they were resident. The relevant part of the French Mandates stated:

*Le mandataire s’engage à n’établir sur le terroire aucune base militaire ou navale, à n’édifier aucune fortification, à n’organiser aucune force militaire indigène, sauf pour assurer la police locale et la défense du terroire. Toutefois, il est entendu que les troupes ainsi levées, peuvent en cas de guerre générale, être utilisées pour repousser une agression ou pour la défense du terroire en dehors de la région soumise au mandat.*

The British 'B' Mandates did not incorporate similar provisions. This caused the General Staff some anxiety. In a memorandum of December 1920 they argued that the acquisition of Mandates had increased British military liabilities to an 'indefinite and far-reaching' degree. It was 'unsound' to view the military obligations involved in individual Mandates locally for they affected the 'Imperial military organisation as a whole' and there had to be a distribution of the military burden which would prevent the 'strain of exceptional military measures required in any one locality' falling on that locality alone or ultimately on Britain or India. India was the main disquieting factor and the memorandum continued:

The importance of the question has been accentuated by the possibility that in the near future the Government of India may be unwilling or unable to provide troops for service outside India, on the same scale as hitherto. This possibility has compelled consideration of the question as to whether efficient substitutes can be found which will enable us to replace, or partially replace, Indian troops by native troops from other parts of the Empire; and in choosing such substitutes it is well to bear in mind that in the use of native troops generally there is safety in variety of race, creed and location which permits of interchangeability if required.

There was a 'considerable proportion of first-class fighting material' in Africa and it was to Africa that Britain had to look to relieve 'that portion of the military burden imposed by acceptance of the various Eastern mandates, which India may not be able to
bear.' The Government was, therefore, urged to resist any attempt to circumscribe the use of troops raised in mandated territory.29

Within the Colonial Office it had not been considered necessary to demand the military privileges accorded the French for Britain because it was felt that if it was necessary to raise troops in areas under mandate ‘no-one is likely to challenge our action’.30 On the other hand, Sir Maurice Hankey, the Secretary to the British Cabinet, believed that a great mistake had been made ‘in fettering the use of black troops in British territory’ and, although he thought that it was too late to do anything about it, he made a vague attempt to do so by having the matter raised in the Cabinet.31 It was eventually decided by the Cabinet that it would not be prudent to do anything for the moment, but that if, as seemed likely in view of the reluctance of America and other important countries to participate at Geneva, the League Covenant was to be revised ‘reconsideration of the question should not be ruled out.’32

If the British were not unduly displeased with the Mandates System, the French only accepted it with the greatest reluctance. Far from sharing the resentment of the Dominions over the delay in the formal ratification of Mandates, the French Government saw an opportunity to escape their obligations under the Covenant in the uncertain attitude of the United States towards the League and after the American rejection of the Treaty of Versailles stepped up its efforts to avoid the application of the Mandates System in Togoland and the Cameroons. That the French did not succeed was largely due to the insistence of the British that they should abide by their previous undertakings.33 From the beginning the French had not treated the idea of Mandates seriously: at the Peace Conference they had only agreed to it because they felt that there was ‘no real difference between a colony and...[a] mandated area’ and even then G. L. Beer, the American colonial expert, had been cheerfully informed by de Peretti, the chief of the African section of the Quai d'Orsay, that he would see ‘what these mandates will develop into in ten years.’34 It is also of some significance that when the Council of Four allocated the Mandates on 7 May 1919 the word Mandate did not appear in the section relating to Togoland and the Cameroons, which merely stated: ‘France and Great Britain shall make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations as to their future.’35

Milner was inclined to be indulgent towards the French wishes. In lieu of the mandate the French were ‘willing to pledge themselves
by a formal declaration...to carry out such of the conditions of
the draft ‘‘B’’ Mandate as they did ‘not object to’ and as Milner
could see ‘no British interest...involved in forcing them to submit
to a mandate’ he thought that there was ‘more chance of arriving at
an early settlement by falling in with their proposal than by falling
out with them over it.’\textsuperscript{36} The Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, was,
however, unwilling to be so complaisant. At the Spa Conference of
July 1920 he received a document from the French Government
which dealt with the subject of Togoland and the Cameroons and
introduced the French view in no uncertain manner. It claimed:

\begin{quote}
Une décision du Conseil suprême au 7 mai 1919 a placé sous mandat toutes les
anciennes colonies de l’Allemagne, sauf le Togo et le Cameroun pour lesquels les
Gouvernements français et anglais devaient adresser une ‘joint recommendation’
à la Société des Nations.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Cela établit nettement que, dans l’esprit et dans la lettre, le Togo et le Cameroun
doivent être considérés non pas comme des pays à mandat, mais comme des
colonies françaises et anglaises, sous réserve de la ‘joint recommendation’ qui a
été prévue.
\end{quote}

Curzon did not reply to this memorandum, which appears to have
been drawn up solely for use at the Spa Conference, but he was
firmly against the French attitude: whenever the matter came up
for discussion the mandatory regime was to be ‘insisted upon’\textsuperscript{37} He
made his determination clear the following month, following a
French approach to the Foreign Office on the subject of a speedy
entry into force of the Anglo-French declarations of 10 July 1919
which partitioned Togoland and the Cameroons between Britain
and France. Replying to M. de Fleuriau, the French Chargé d’Aff-
faires in London, Curzon made it clear that Britain was not in a
position to act in this matter as hastily as the French would have
liked, but he agreed that ‘subject to the terms of the mandates
which have not yet been issued’ fiscal and administrative reforms
relating to the collection of taxes and customs could be introduced
once the Powers concerned were legally installed in their respective
zones.\textsuperscript{38}

By the end of October 1920 the French appeared to be retreating
from their original position and were now intimating their
readiness to place their portions of Togoland and the Cameroons
under mandate, but of the ‘C’ type (where the ‘open door’ principle
did not in practice apply), on the grounds that it would then be
possible for the ‘natives of these territories’ to participate in the election of members of the Chamber of Deputies. Sir Cecil Hurst, the legal adviser to the Foreign Office, felt that the real reason was to escape the provisions for commercial and trading equality integral to the ‘B’ Mandate, which the British Government considered applicable to Togoland and the Cameroons. On 2 November a conference took place in the Foreign Office between Hurst and Strachey of the Colonial Office, at the end of which it appeared that the problem really troubling the French was that of the ‘black troops question.’ As a consequence of this conference a note from Curzon was handed personally to Fleuriau by Sir Eyre Crowe which stated that it had already been agreed to insert a clause into the French Mandates which would guarantee the right to employ troops raised in Mandates externally and that ‘the form of words proposed is fully calculated to meet the needs of the French Government.’ On receipt of this note Fleuriau informed Crowe that the position of the French Government was that it was prepared ‘to give effect to all the conditions in guarantees contemplated under the Covenant’, but would rather, if possible, avoid the use of the term ‘mandate’. Crowe observed that he hoped that ‘the actual terms of the clause proposed’ would remove the remaining difficulties in the way of the French accepting the mandatory system. Curzon, strongly critical of the French attitude, minuted: ‘I object entirely to allowing the French to escape from a mandate and cannot for the life of me see why we should agree.’

The French response was conciliatory, but truculent. As far as they were concerned the incorporation of the territories in question into the French colonial empire was more a ‘réincorporation’ than ‘une acquisition proprement dite’: when France had originally recognised the German title to them, it had been out of ‘considérations de politique générale’, for prior to such recognition French explorers had concluded treaties with the majority of chiefs in Togoland and the Cameroons. The note continued: ‘Si, en dépit de ces raisons, le Gouvernement français se rallie, par esprit de conciliation, à l'idée du mandat, il estime que c'est un mandat se rapprochant davantage du type C que du type B qu'il convient d'adopter.’ In addition the French Government would be prepared to incorporate into their mandates the provisions for commercial and trading equality contained in the ‘B’ Mandates. Milner was disposed to accept the French point of view, although he fully realized the problems that this would present with regard to
negotiations with the Australians and Japanese over 'C' Mandates, because the insertion of a clause guaranteeing equality of treatment in trade and commerce for members of the League in a 'C' Mandate would provide the Japanese with precisely the kind of leverage they required in their efforts to get the principle accepted for 'C' Mandates generally. Thus Milner thought 'it important that no allusion should be made to the fact that' the British Government 'was practically adopting the C Mandate' for France and that the French Mandates should be spoken of publicly as special adaptations of the 'B' Mandates to the conditions of Togoland and the Cameroons. This condition the French readily accepted.43

In practice this complicated charade was impossible to sustain. The League Council and Assembly were pressing hard by this time for the settlement of the whole Mandates issue and the Dominion Governments were equally impatient for the final confirmation of their 'C' Mandates.44 Negotiations were started at Geneva with the French delegation on the subject of the French desire for 'C' Mandates, but Balfour thought that the resistance of Australia to the Japanese demand for the insertion of a clause in the New Guinea Mandate providing for 'equal trade conditions' would be weakened if the French were granted 'C' Mandates incorporating similar provisions for trading and commercial equality. Accordingly he had it suggested to the French Delegation that all their desiderata might be met in the context of a 'B' Mandate. Evidently the French proved amenable to this proposal and negotiations proceeded.45 Had the French resisted the British suggestion, it could have provoked a very embarrassing situation and would undoubtedly have delayed the League Council's approval of the 'C' Mandates on 17 December 1920,46 for by that time the Japanese had been induced to forgo their objections to 'C' Mandates provided that 'Japanese interests and navigation in New Guinea would not receive worse treatment than they do in Australia' and on the understanding that Japanese agreement was not misconstrued 'as an acquiescence... in the submission of Japanese subjects to a discriminatory and disadvantageous treatment in the Mandated Territories...'.47 The negotiations with the French over Togoland and the Cameroons were also crowned with success and on the evening of 17 December the six draft 'B' Mandates (Tanganyika, British Togoland and Cameroons, French Togoland and Cameroons and Ruanda-Urundi) were submitted to the League Secretariat.48
The League Council had been able to sanction the 'C' Mandates in December 1920, but there was to be a delay of almost two years before the Council was able similarly to endorse the 'B' Mandates. Having declined to join the League the United States Government nevertheless attempted to ensure that it would not be discriminated against by League Members in mandated territory. The ostensible reasons for this were the idealistic ones that had inspired Article 22 of the Covenant, but the underlying considerations were the materialistic desire not to be excluded from the exploitation of Mesopotamian oil and the strategic importance of the Pacific island of Yap. A Foreign Office Memorandum of July 1921 commented:

How far the Americans would have articulated their objections to the passing of the mandates, had it not been for these two concrete cases in which they considered their interests to be particularly affected, can only be conjectured. At all events these cases furnished them with the appropriate opportunity; both have been argued to a deadlock.49

The Council of Four had only allocated the 'B' and 'C' Mandates and it was not until 5 May 1920 at the San Remo Conference that it was decided to assign the 'A' Mandates of Palestine and Mesopotamia to Britain. Seven days later the British Government received a memorandum from the American Ambassador which pointed out that during the peace negotiations the United States had consistently insisted that 'any alien territory which should be acquired... must be held and governed in such a way as to assure equal treatment in law and in fact to the commerce of all nations.' The United States, it was further claimed, had only agreed to the acquisition of this territory by certain Powers 'subject to this understanding...'. Discussions were invited as to the principles that the United States would like to see incorporated in the Mandates, namely: that 'there be guaranteed to the nationals or subjects of all nations treatment equal in law and in fact, to that accorded nationals or subjects of the Mandatory Power' in all spheres of economic and commercial life; that no exclusive economic concessions or monopolies be granted in mandated territories; that concessions should be adequately publicized; and that American citizens or companies should not be placed at any disadvantage. Curzon curtly replied 'the terms of the mandates can only properly
be discussed at the Council of the League of Nations by signatories of the Covenant.'

The Americans, however, were not to be so easily put off. In a note to Curzon of 20 November 1920, Bainbridge Colby, the American Secretary of State, stated that the Mandate for Mesopotamia had been assigned to and accepted by Britain 'subject to no friendly arrangement whatever with any third Governments regarding economic rights' which was 'wholly at variance with the purpose and contemplation of any mandate.' The note welcomed British assurances to the effect that there was no intention to obtain a monopoly of the oil resources of the region for Britain and that these resources would be 'secured to the people of Mesopotamia' in that they should have 'absolute freedom of action in the control thereof...' On the other hand, it disagreed with the British view that the League Council was the proper place for the discussion of the terms of Mandates: the powers which the Allied and Associated Powers possessed concerning Mandates accrued to them as a result of the common struggle against the Central Powers, to which the United States had been a party. Therefore: 'The United States... cannot consider any of the Associated Powers... debarred from the discussion of any of its consequences, or from the rights and privileges secured under the mandates provided for in the treaties of peace.' Accordingly it was requested that, prior to any submission of a Mandate to the League Council, the terms of the Mandate in question should be submitted to the Government of the United States. Much of the note concerned American apprehensions as to the future policy of Britain in Mesopotamia on the question of oil but Colby, somewhat disingenuously, disclaimed that this was the underlying motive in the attitude of his Government. The American view was further developed the following February when Norman Davis asserted to R. L. Craigie that it had been 'quite incorrect' for the British Government to submit the terms of Mandates to the League without consulting the American Government first: 'It was a question of disposing of the spoils of war, and the mere fact that the American Government had, for reasons beyond their control, failed to ratify the Treaty of Peace, furnished no reason whatsoever for a departure from the earlier policy.' Crowe considered the position of the State Department to be 'quite preposterous' and Hurst thought it 'unsound in law.' None the less, the British Government went some way towards satisfying the
American demands, as a result of a direct approach to the League Council by the American Government.

During February 1921 Colby reiterated in a note to the League Council the views he had already communicated to the British. He also intimated that the Government of the United States could not recognize the Japanese Mandates, conferred the previous December, because the terms had not been agreed with the United States; furthermore, his Government was under the distinct impression that the island of Yap, now mandated to Japan, had been specifically excluded from such treatment at the Paris Peace Conference. The response of the Council was both firm and polite. The Council’s reply, drafted by Balfour, stated that it had already been decided to postpone discussion of the ‘A’ Mandates and that in deference to American wishes it was now proposed to defer discussion and approval of ‘B’ Mandates to the next Council meeting, when, it was hoped, American representatives would attend and take part in discussions. It was pointed out that the Council did not wish to dispute the rights which the United States had acquired as ‘one of the leading actors, both in the war and in the negotiations for peace’, but that the situation was inevitably complicated by the fact that America had so far failed to ratify the Peace Treaty and take her place on the Council of the League. On the specific issue of Yap the note explained the responsibilities of the League in clear terms:

...the allocation of all mandated territories is a function of the Supreme Council and not of the Council of the League. The League is concerned not with the allocation but with the administration of these territories. Having been notified in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers that all the islands north of the Equator had been allocated to Japan, the Council of the League merely fulfilled its responsibility by defining the terms of the Mandate.

Curzon signalled no objection to this answer.

No reply from the United States was forthcoming before the Council met in June and the French became apprehensive. On 25 May Curzon was informed by the French Ambassador, the Comte de St. Aulaire, that the proper administration of Togoland and the Cameroons was being hindered by the continuation of ‘un régime provisoire’ in these territories. The French Government wanted the ‘B’ Mandates finally settled by the end of June if possible and it was, therefore, suggested that Britain and France should make
joint representations in Washington with a view to obtaining the consent of the United States to a settlement of the ‘B’ Mandates at the June meeting of the League Council. Five days later the French were proposing that it would be impossible for the League Council to proceed with an examination of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ Mandates ‘avant qu’au préalable, un accord définitif et formel ne soit intervenu entre les Gouvernements alliés et le Gouvernement des États-Unis’. 55

This new posture on the part of the French was not well received in the Foreign Office: in effect it meant further and perhaps indefinite postponement of the confirmation of Mandates by the League. It was felt that: ‘From the practical point of view the consequences of such postponement would be disastrous.’ A prolonged period of uncertainty might mean the demise of the Mandates System altogether, for some Powers might take the view that, unless their position in the mandated territories were regularized swiftly, they would have no alternative other than to annex them. This was clearly an argument that might be used by the French. But

Even if this did not happen, the failure to set up the system, for the working of which the League is responsible, must seriously damage its prestige. From the point of view of the Mandatories themselves, the continuance of the present situation would be highly inconvenient.

It was considered that any attempt to adjourn further discussion of the Mandates at Geneva should be opposed. 56 These views were supported at a Foreign Office conference at the beginning of June. The conference, attended by Curzon, Balfour, Churchill, Fisher, Sir Cecil Hurst and Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations 1920-33, was agreed upon the desirability of getting the League Council to proceed with discussion of Mandates, although it was recognized that opposition could be expected from a number of countries, France and Spain being particularly ‘averse to...any action opposed to the wishes of the United States...’ It was, however, decided to defer a final policy decision to the Cabinet. 57

At the same time a counsel of caution was received from Drummond. He did not think that the idea of a prior agreement with the United States was totally unsound. He informed Balfour that at the present time ‘the question of Mandates exceeds in popular interest all other matters of American foreign policy’ and that:
We are told on the best authority that the administration intend to treat the Mandates question as a test of European friendliness. If the Allied Powers give heed to American protests on the subject, America will agree to close co-operation — obviously greatly to British advantage — in Europe; but if no notice is taken of the American claims, she is likely to retire again into isolation, and this time with full popular approval.

Undoubtedly Britain could, by the exercise of sufficient pressure, prevent postponement of discussion of Mandates by the Council, but in all probability the French would then 'joyfully inform' the Americans of what had taken place and Britain would have to shoulder the entire blame in the eyes of the United States Government. Balfour was won over by Drummond's case.

At this point the French themselves offered a compromise solution to the problem created by their action in advocating delay in the settlement of the Mandates. An Aide Mémoire from the French Embassy suggested that as no particular American interest was involved in the 'B' Mandates the British and French Governments through 'démarches concertées' in Washington could perhaps persuade the Americans not to oppose the settlement of the 'B' Mandates at the next Council meeting. The Cabinet decided, however, on 14 June, after an examination of the whole problem, not to take advantage of the French proposals and to agree to deferment of the consideration of both 'A' and 'B' Mandates. The British Government was of the opinion that it would merely lead to difficulties if it took upon itself the task of deciding which Mandates were of interest to the United States and which were not. The proper course would now be for 'the Council itself to call the attention of the Governments concerned to the desirability of ascertaining the opinions and desires of the United States before any of the Mandates are approved.' A note to this effect was sent to the relevant Governments on 15 June.

Discussions with the Americans were protracted. In Geneva it was suggested by Drummond, after discussions with an American official, that Curzon might set them in train by approaching the American Ambassador in London, Colonel Harvey. Curzon eventually saw Harvey on 12 July and was informed that the latter was 'awaiting instructions.' After further representations notes containing the American attitude on Mandates were communicated to both the British and French Governments on 24 and 9 August respectively. The note delivered to the British Government dif-
fered from the French one in that a section was appended dealing with the American views on the 'C' Mandates and on the exploitation of oil resources in Mesopotamia. Apart from this the two notes were identical: they opened by rehearsing the American Government's opinion that no Mandate could be legally conferred without the prior consent of the United States and suggested alterations in the draft 'A' and 'B' Mandates which essentially concerned equality of treatment for nationals of the United States engaging in commercial and religious activities in the Mandates. The note transmitted to the British Government also demanded most-favoured-nation treatment for the United States in the 'C' Mandates, but immediate discussion of this matter was not considered 'necessary at this time.'

The American note came too late to permit further advance on the subject of Mandates at the September meeting of the League, but as a result of collaboration between British and French officials in Geneva identical replies, mutatis mutandis, to the American note were delivered by the British and French Governments on 22 December. It was agreed that a number of amendments should be made to the draft mandates and it was suggested that the best method of effecting America's approval of and rights in Mandates would be by exchange of notes. Again the United States Government proved dilatory in its response to the Anglo-French proposals. Prompted by the French, a joint Anglo-French approach was made in Washington in March 1922, in which it was made clear to the Americans that it was they who were delaying the final confirmation of Mandates and that an urgent reply would be appreciated. At last on 5 April the British and French Governments were informed that the United States welcomed their desire to meet American wishes and that there would be 'no difficulty or delay in the negotiation of a treaty embodying the assent, upon appropriate conditions, of the United States to the terms of the draft mandates...'. There seems to have been some attempt to obtain the formal assent of the United States to the Mandates in the suggested treaties before the Council passed the 'B' Mandates at its July meeting, but in the end it was decided, on the understanding that the 'American government were content with the terms of the mandates and the terms of the treaties', which would be signed when the 'mandates were issued', to proceed with the measures necessary for gaining the sanction of the League Council. Eventually treaties between the United States and Belgium, France and Great
Britain respecting the rights of the United States in the ‘B’ Mandates were concluded. Anglo-American treaties concerning Togoland, the Cameroons and Tanganyika were concluded on 10 February 1926; the Franco-American Treaties dealing with Togoland and the Cameroons were signed on 13 February 1923; and a Treaty between the United States and Belgium relating to the Ruanda-Urundi Mandate was signed on 18 April 1923.

The United States was not as successful in its efforts to gain recognition from the Dominions of its rights in ‘C’ Mandates. Shortly after the League Council had approved the ‘B’ Mandates a further memorandum emitted from the American Embassy in London in which American grievances over ‘C’ Mandates were elaborated. It was requested that the ‘C’ Mandates should be altered so as to give equality of treatment to American missionaries; that the United States should be accorded most-favoured-nation treatment in all the ‘C’ Mandates, except Samoa, where it was claimed that the United States had special rights under Article III of the Treaty of 2 December 1899 between the United States, Germany and Britain; that provision should be made in the Mandates to prevent Mandatories exercising monopoly rights; and that it should be recognized that the ‘C’ Mandates could not be altered without the consent of the United States. The Memorandum also protested against the introduction of a discriminatory tariff in Samoa by the New Zealand Government, which, it was asserted, violated the treaty of 2 December 1899 between Germany, the United States and Great Britain; an act which had been passed in the Union of South Africa which, for customs purposes, included South-West Africa in the Union and, therefore, permitted discrimination against the United States in the Mandate; discriminatory legislation passed in Australia under which enemy property in New Guinea could only be sold to British subjects or British companies; and statements made in the Australian Parliament according to which any oil deposits in New Guinea would be reserved exclusively for the use of the authorities administering the Mandate.

These views were subsequently transmitted to the Dominions. The South African Government never replied; but it was suggested by the Governments of New Zealand and Australia that it would be best to leave discussion of the matter to the Imperial Conference of 1923. At the Imperial Conference the American attitude was considered by the Prime Ministers of the Dominions in consultation
with the Colonial Office. It was agreed that there could be 'no objection' to granting American missionaries "the treatment desired", but that it would be "impossible to grant the request of the United States Government for national treatment in "C" Mandated territories generally." Some concessions over monopolies were thought possible and no objections were voiced concerning the transmission of duplicate annual reports to the League of Nations to the United States Government until such time as a definite agreement on the 'C' Mandates had been reached. On the matter of Samoa

It was agreed that the special representations of the United States Government...might be considered separately from the representations on the general question of commercial treatment. It was explained that...under the Treaty of 1899 the United States Government are apparently bound to give British shipping in the parts of Samoa under United States administration treatment as favourable as that accorded to United States shipping; this treatment is not in fact accorded...

In these circumstances the New Zealand Government undertook to propose to the American Government that 'national treatment for their commerce in Western Samoa' would be considered if British shipping in the part of Samoa under American control was given 'national treatment'.

This meeting was attended by Mr R. H. Campbell for the Foreign Office. He reported to Crowe that the Prime Ministers of the Dominions had initially been very 'conciliatory,' but that they 'became more unyielding as...they realised more clearly the full import of the American demands.' Once Smuts became aware that to give effect to the American demand for most-favoured-nation treatment in South-West Africa it would be necessary to erect a customs barrier between the Union and the Mandate, he reacted strongly and dismissed the idea as absurd, saying that 'he would not entertain it for a moment.' Campbell's report differed from the official minutes of the meeting in that he considered the attitude of the Dominions on monopolies was much stronger than appeared in the latter: the formula that had been devised for the draft Anglo-American treaties relating to 'B' Mandates was thought to go 'much too far in restricting the liberty of the Dominions, and that it would be very difficult to find any other that would contain the necessary safeguards and at the same time satisfy the Americans.' At the end of the meeting '...the Dominion Prime Ministers recall-
ed with some warmth that it was clearly understood, at the time when the "C" mandates were drawn, that they would be tantamount to annexation." Smuts eloquently summed up the mood of the Dominions when he declared: "I don't want any damned interference in my territory." Campbell thought that as the Americans had not raised the issue of 'C' Mandates for over a year it would be best to remain silent. It was 'just conceivable, though...not very likely, that they' would 'let the whole thing drop'.

In the event they did not. In July 1924 Campbell was asked by the Counsellor of the American Embassy what the situation was concerning the negotiation of treaties for the 'C' Mandates. Campbell replied that 'the final views of the Dominion governments concerned' had so far not been received whereupon it was suggested that the British Government might hasten the communication of these views. When it attempted to do so it was met with a douche of cold water for its pains. On 1 December the Secretary of State for Colonies, L. Amery, was informed by the Governor General of South Africa:

Ministers have given their serious consideration to the Secretary of State's despatch and desire to draw the attention of His Excellency to the fact that the claims raised by the United States of America in respect of C Mandates...affect matters with which the Government of the Union alone are concerned...and that...Foreign Powers should recognise that the proper authority to approach and with whom to discuss and settle such questions is the Government of the Union.

The British Government were asked to inform the United States of this. The Governor General was swift to explain the South African attitude as not intended to impair the 'diplomatic unity of the Empire': it was felt, however, by Prime Minister Hertzog 'that while the status of the Dominions as equal nations has been recognised in every possible way Foreign Powers have been reluctant to do so and that it is now time to insist on their independent position.' Despite the fact that this attitude was not supported by the other Dominions, the South African reaction caused consternation in Whitehall. Sir Cecil Hurst did not 'like the idea of HMG going hat in hand to the Union Government' with a request that the Foreign Office in London be allowed to continue the negotiations and he thought that there ought to be an understanding with the Dominions that where matters concerning the entire Empire were
involved the proper place for negotiation was London. On 22 December a conference took place, attended by both Amery and the new Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, as a result of which Amery undertook to take the matter up with the Union Government.73

Amery pointed out to Hertzog that any arrangement concerning the rights of the United States in a 'C' Mandate could not but affect the situation in the other 'C' Mandates and that after three years of correspondence and negotiation the United States would not be happy if an 'entirely new channel' was opened for discussion of the relationship of the United States with South-West Africa. Although Hertzog ultimately agreed to defer to the wishes of the British, he did so reluctantly, observing that: '...the Dominions' status must be recognised by Foreign Powers and the Union would accept no derogation from it.'74 At any rate the British Government was at last able to inform the Americans that it would not be possible to deal with the 'C' Mandates in the same way as the 'A' and 'B' Mandates. Article 22 of the Covenant made it clear that Mandatories were able to administer class 'C' Mandates as integral parts of their own territory. Furthermore, the United States Government had endorsed the arrangement in 1919 in return for which the Dominion Governments had accepted the Mandates System and it was now 'impossible...to admit any departure from this express understanding.' There were besides 'reasons of a practical and physical nature' which made it impossible for the Dominions to meet all the claims advanced by the United States. The Dominions were, however, prepared, by way of 'testifying to their friendly sentiments towards the United States', to give an assurance that provided the terms of the Mandates remained unchanged the nationals and goods of the United States would be accorded the same status as that of League members.75 Thereafter negotiations on the subject of the United States and 'C' Mandates appear to have lapsed altogether.

In a minor fashion the general problems created by the Treaty of Versailles once the United States refused to ratify it and join the League of Nations are reflected in the establishment of the Mandates System. Having played a formidable role in designing the post-war system of international relations, the United States then abjured responsibility for its maintenance, leaving the idealism
which had animated American policy towards the peace to conflict with the selfish interests of the European Powers. Without an extra-European arbiter there was never any doubt that idealism would be in danger of total submersion. The French attitude towards the Mandates serves as a good illustration of this as well as being symptomatic of the French attitude towards the Peace Settlement as a whole. By way of contrast the British emerged as a force for moderation both during the Peace Conference and after and they could take the credit for having resisted the French ambitions and prevented the lawful annexation of the former German colonies. If the Mandates System as it evolved in the immediate post-war era was one which did not conflict too sharply with British aims and was also a somewhat attenuated version of what the idealists would have liked, it was, none the less, in existence for all that. Despite her imperial status, however, Britain was still a Power with an interest, and an increasing one, in the condition of Europe, and taken in conjunction with her slowly decreasing strength was in a poor position to adopt an arbitral role in the affairs of Europe.

The only Power which could have assumed such a role at the time was the United States and here we are confronted with the curious picture of a state ruthlessly pursuing its own ends under the mantle of the highest idealism. This can be seen most clearly in the policy of the American Government towards naval disarmament and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but its protests concerning the Mandates reveal the same trend. The predominant American anxiety over the Mandates System was that Britain would obtain a monopoly over Mesopotamian oil and hence the insistence of the United States Government regarding the application of the principle of the 'open door' in the Mesopotamian Mandate. While maintaining that the concession granted to the Turkish Petroleum Company in the pre-war period remained valid, the British eventually managed to conciliate the Americans by granting them limited investment rights in the company, in effect participation in the monopoly that it was the declared object of American policy to prevent. Thus it was that the materialistic interests of the United States Government were very much responsible for the delay in the ratification of the 'A' and 'B' Mandates, although in the case of the former French and Italian aims were an added complicating factor. Likewise American policy over the island of Yap, mandated to Japan, was motivated by 'growing distrust of Japanese ambitions in China and the Pacific' and an increasing awareness of 'the
strategic implications of Japanese control' of the Pacific islands north of the equator, particularly Yap, 'through which passed telegraph cables between America and Far East countries.'79 In February 1921 the Japanese, however, granted the United States cable rights on Yap and this may explain why the American Government proved to be less assiduous in pressing its rights in other 'C' Mandates.

By 1925 the Mandates System was finally established. It was at the time, and has been since, fashionable among liberal, radical and socialist sectors of opinion, which tended to advocate international supervision over all colonial territories,80 to view it as disguised annexation. There was some justification for this given the efforts on the part of the British Government during the later 1920s to bring about a closer union of the East African territories under its control, of which the ‘B’ Mandate, Tanganyika, was one, to the advantage of the white settler interest. But it was, in fact, to be the mandated status of Tanganyika which proved to be very instrumental in disrupting and frustrating these designs.81 Although the blurring of the issue of ‘sovereignty’, which agitated Lansing so much, might have seemed to serve the interests of the Colonial Powers, it was fundamentally irrelevant. As Sir Arnold McNair of the International Court of Justice commented in 1951 in reference to both the Mandates System and the Trusteeship System: ‘The doctrine of sovereignty has no application to this new system...what matters in considering the new institution is not where sovereignty lies, but what are the rights and duties of the Mandatory in regard to the territory being administered by it.’82 Once the United States began to assume its proper role in international affairs during the second world war, it was forcibly brought home to the Mandatory Powers that in any system replacing the Mandates under the new international organization of the United Nations the duties would be greater and the rights more circumscribed in Mandates than they had been hitherto. That the Trusteeship System of the United Nations was to approximate more closely to the ideals and wishes of the radical and socialist tradition of the western world was due almost entirely to the fact that the United States was once again possessed of the necessary will to use its power and influence to impose its desires and authority on reluctant Mandatories. In this process both crude self-interest and idealism played a part, but it would be hard to deny that the Trusteeship System was a more ef-
fective tool for the process of decolonization than the Mandates System would ever have been.83

Notes


2. See Public Record Office (PRO) — FO 371/11303/C1733/539/18, Memorandum on the German Colonies by J. R. Troutbeck, 11 February 1926, for a discussion of the colonial terms of the Treaty of Versailles.


5. Louis, Colonies, 93.


11. Louis, Colonies, 117-60.


15. PRO-FO 371/4766/C1300/154/18, Sir Eric Drummond to Lord Curzon, 12 July 1920. See also ibid. 4767/10428/154/18, Memorandum by Sir C. Hurst entitled 'B' and 'C' Mandates, 20 July 1920, and Article 22 of the League Covenant.
16. Ibid., CAB 24/94, W. Hughes to Lloyd George, 6 November 1919, in CP 243. Hughes complained that disloyal and pro-German elements in the Mandates were taking advantage of the uncertainty.

17. PRO CAB 24/94, Buxton to Milner, 15 August 1919, Hughes to Lloyd George, 26 September 1919 and 13 October 1919, Milner to Buxton, 19 August 1919 and Lloyd George to Hughes, 15 October 1919, all in CP 243; Milner to Ferguson, 19 November 1919, in CP 208; and CAB 24/101, Milner to Lord Liverpool, 17 March 1920, in CP 932.


19. The text used here is to be found in ibid., 5477/W3260/55/98, League of Nations to the Foreign Office, 7 December 1920, Report by the Council to the Assembly on the Responsibilities of the League arising out of Article 22 (Mandates), Annex 14, Constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission.


21. Some idea of the complexity of the sovereignty question can be obtained from Q. Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago 1930), 314-39. See also Chowdhuri, op. cit., 230.


27. Ibid., Minutes by S. P. Waterlow and Sir Eyre Crowe, 2 December 1920.


31. PRO-FO 371/5850/C2483/11/18, T. Jones to Sir E. Crowe, 3 February 1921; ibid., C11/11/18, Hankey to Hurst, 29 December 1920; Malkin to Hankey, 29 December 1920; and Hurst to Hankey, 30 December 1920. Interestingly, Balfour took a contrary view. See ibid., 5852/C5897/11/18, Memorandum by Sir L. Worthington-Evans, External Use of Native Troops Raised in Mandated Territories, 18 March 1921.

32. Ibid., CAB 23/25, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 20 April 1921.


34. Louis, art. cit., JAH 1963.


37. PRO-FO 371/4766/C2368/154/18, Berthelot to Curzon, 28 July 1920, and Minute by Sir Cecil Hurst and Phipps, 11 August 1920. See also ibid., 4767/C10428/154/18, Memorandum by Sir Cecil Hurst entitled "B" and "C" Mandates, 20 July 1920.
38. Ibid., 4766/C3159/154/18, Fleuriau to Curzon, 5 August 1920, and C4278/154/18, Fleuriau to Curzon, 18 August 1920; C4876/154/18, Curzon to Fleuriau, 26 August 1920.

39. Ibid., 4767/C10142/154/18, Memorandum by Sir Cecil Hurst, 28 October 1920; Minute by S. P. Waterlow, 2 November 1920.

40. PRO-FO 371/4767/C10142/154/18, Curzon to Fleuriau, 4 November 1920.

41. Ibid., C10750/154/18, Crowe to Curzon, 4 November 1920, and Minute by Curzon, 6 November 1920.

42. Ibid., 4768/C12031/154/18, Cambon to Curzon, 20 November 1920.

43. Ibid., C12353/154/18, Sir G. Fiddes (Colonial Office) to L. Oliphant, 26 November 1920; Ibid., C13187/154/18, Fleuriau to Waterlow, 4 December 1920. For the background to the attitude of the Japanese towards ‘C’ Mandates see FO 371/1467/C10428/154/18, Memorandum by Sir Cecil Hurst, 20 July 1920; C8505/154/18, Memorandum by S. P. Waterlow, Japanese Objections to the ‘C’ Mandates, 8 October 1920; and C11633/154/18, Governor-General of Australia to Milner, 15 November 1920.

44. Ibid. 4767/C11644/154/18, G. S. Spicer (Geneva) to Hankey and Curzon, 18 November 1920; 4768/C12161/154/18, Balfour (Geneva) to Hankey, 25 November 1920; and 4767/C10428/154/18, memorandum by Sir Cecil Hurst, “B” and “C” Mandates, 20 July 1920.

45. Ibid., 4768/C13430/154/18, G. S. Spicer (Geneva) to Crowe, 7 December 1920.


47. PRO-FO 371/4768/C13425/154/18, Balfour (Geneva) to Hankey, 9 December 1920; C14305/154/18, G. S. Spicer (Geneva) to Crowe, 16 December 1920, and Ishii to Balfour, 10 December 1920.

48. Ibid., C14156/154/18, Balfour (Geneva) to Hankey, 17 December 1920.


52. Ibid., 5851/C3546/11/18, Craigie to Sperling, 28 January 1921; Minute by Crowe, 17 February 1921; 7049/W2152/1149/98, Hurst to Crowe, 23 February 1921.

53. Ibid., Colby to Gastão da Cunha, 21 February 1921; W2234/1149/98, Hurst to Crowe, 26 February 1921.

54. Ibid., W3401/1149/98, Gastão da Cunha to Colby, 1 March 1921; W2234/1149/98, Minute by Curzon, 28 February 1921.

55. PRO-FO 371/5852/C10945/11/18, Aulaire to Curzon, 25 May 1921; 7050/W6561/1149/98, Aulaire to Balfour, 30 May 1921.

56. Ibid., 7044/W6475/255/98, Unsigned Foreign Office Memorandum, 1 June 1921.

57. Ibid., 7050/W6562/1149/98, Minutes, 1 June 1921.

58. Ibid., W6563/1149/98, Drummond to Balfour, 2 June 1921; Balfour to Curzon, 3 June 1921.

60. Ibid., W7086/1149/98, Drummond to Fisher, 26 June 1921; W7393/1149/98, Minute by Curzon, 12 July 1921; W8255/1149/98, Curzon to Harvey, 1 August 1921.

61. Ibid., 7051/W9180/1149/98, Harvey to Curzon, 24 August 1921, and 7052/W10457/1149/98, Hurst to Villiers, 22 September 1921. See also 7051/W9180/1149/98, Minute by Villiers, 29 August 1921, and Minute by Crowe, 30 August 1921.

62. Ibid., W9558/1149/98, Kammerer to Vansittart, 24 August 1921; W9749/1149/98, Aulaire to Curzon, 9 September 1921; 7052/W9896/1149/98, Aulaire to Curzon, 15 September 1921; W10457/1149/98, Hurst to Villiers, 22 September 1921; W10565/1149/98, Hurst to Villiers, 24 September 1921; 7053/11974/1149/98, Hardinge to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 1921; W13028/1149/98, Balfour to Curzon, 14 December 1921, and Curzon to Balfour, 17 December 1921.

63. Ibid., 7053/W13029/1149/98, Curzon to Harvey, 22 December 1921.

64. Ibid., 8323/W2550/1110/98, Aulaire to Curzon, 22 March 1922; Curzon to Geddes, 28 March 1922; and Curzon to Aulaire, 30 March 1922; W3012/1110/98, Harvey to Curzon, 5 April 1922.

65. Ibid., 8324/W4377/1110/98, Minute by C. W. Orde n.d.; W4813/1110/98, Hurst to Balfour, 9 June 1922, Balfour to Geddes, 15 June 1921; and Wright, op. cit., 114; W5407/1110/98, Chilton to Curzon, 28 June 1922, and Curzon to Chilton, 29 June 1922.

66. PRO-FO 371/8325/W6327/1110/98, Harvey to Balfour, 26 July 1922.

67. Ibid., 9425/W7833/70/98, Note by the Colonial Office, The Position of the United States in Relation to “C” Mandates, 1 October 1923.

68. Ibid., 9425/W8744/70/98, Minutes of Meeting of Committee on Position of United States in Relation to “C” Mandates, 23 October 1923.

69. Ibid., W8425/70/98, Campbell to Crowe, 24 October 1923.

70. Ibid., 10566/W5829/23/98, Minute by R. H. Campbell, 10 July 1924.

71. Ibid., W10554/23/98, Governor General of the Union of South Africa to Amery, 1 December 1924.

72. Ibid., 1062/W989/5/98, Governor General of Australia to Amery, 2 December 1924, and Governor General of New Zealand to J. H. Thomas, 5 November 1924.

73. Ibid., 10566/W5829/23/98, Minute by Hurst, 12 December 1924; Minute by Tyrrell, 12 December 1924; and Minutes by Chamberlain, 16 December 1924 and 22 December 1924.

74. Ibid., 11062/W989/5/98, Amery to the Governor General of South Africa, 14 January 1925; Governor General of South Africa to Amery, 22 January 1925 and 26 January 1925.

75. Ibid., R. H. Campbell to the US Embassy, 26 February 1925.

76. Nish, op. cit., 396.

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