Requisites of Democracy

Conceptualization, measurement, and explanation

**Jørgen Møller and
Svend-Erik Skaaning**

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This book brings together the conceptual and theoretical writings of Joseph Schumpeter, Robert A. Dahl, Guillermo O'Donnell, and T. H. Marshall. It demonstrates that most of the different conceptions of democracy in the democratization literature can be ordered in one systematic regime typology that distinguishes between 'thinner' and 'thicker' definitions of democracy.

The authors argue that the empirical pattern revealed by this typology is explained by the combination of internal structural constraints and international factors facilitating democracy. The result of such contending forces is that most of the democratizations in recent decades have only produced competitive elections, rather than 'more demanding' attributes of democracy such as political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights.

Examining theoretical and empirical approaches to measuring, defining, and understanding democracy, the book will be of interest to scholars of political theory and comparative politics in general and democratization studies in particular.

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To Erik and Oskar

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Preface

In this short preface, we set the stage for the book. We do so, first, by documenting the historical absence of a clear consensus about the meaning of the term democracy, and second, by pointing out that we nevertheless set out to identify some ordered patterns in the literature. The more general objective is to show that this often quite technical book writes into an age-old and extremely interesting debate about the definition of democracy.

Witness the following quote from George Orwell (1962 [1946]: 2237):

> The words *democracy, socialism, freedom, patriotic, realistic, justice*, have each of them several different meanings which cannot be reconciled with one another. In the case of a word like *democracy*, not only is there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic we are praising it: consequently the defenders of every kind of régime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one meaning. Words of this kind are often used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the person who uses them has his own private definition, but allows his hearer to think he means something quite different.

These words were first published in April 1946. That is to say that they were penned down in the context of the great public and academic debate on democracy during and in the immediate aftermath of World War II (e.g., Schumpeter, (1974 [1942]; Hayek, 1944; Popper, 1945; Tingsten, 1945; Ross, 1952 [1946]). At this point in time, democracy was defined in very different ways by different people. Some, such as Schumpeter, maintained a purely procedural definition, solely stressing the 'competitive struggle for people's vote' (1974 [1942]: 269).[1] Others, most prominently socialists, construed it as social equality or, even, in the case of the Leninists, as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Yet others maintained what Schumpeter called the 'classical doctrine of democracy', thereby equaling it with an institutional arrangement for realizing the common good.

This academic disagreement was mirrored in the empirical world as a wide variety of regimes proclaimed themselves 'democratic' in the decades following

World War II. Some of these were clearly not so according to the Schumpeterian procedural formula. One need only mention the 'people's democracies' of Central and Eastern Europe, Nasser's 'presidential democracy' in Egypt, Sukarno's 'guided democracy' in Indonesia, Franco's 'organic democracy' in Spain, Stroessner's 'selective democracy' in Paraguay, and Trujillo's 'neo-democracy' in the Dominican Republic (Finer, 1962: 242). It is not too difficult to show that we are here dealing with what Giovanni Sartori (1970) termed 'conceptual stretching', that is, a vague and implausible broadening of the meaning of democracy, the semantic correlates of which are to be found in the non-democratic connotations of the employed adjectives (except, perhaps, in the case of 'people's democracies'). But the very proliferation of such regimes goes to show that Orwell was spot on in the observation quoted above.

More than 60 years have passed since this great debate. Has the disagreement abated over this period? Does a broad consensus exist on how to define democracy? To some extent, the answer is a timid 'yes'. After all, few would hold forth the Leninist definition of democracy these days. But, on a more technical level, the answer is clearly 'no'. The scholar who has arguably done most to produce such a consensus, Robert A. Dahl, thus recently noted that it is 'appalling that at this late date we are still struggling with how to conceptualize and measure democracy' (Munck and Snyder, 2007: 145). This diagnosis is of the same ilk as the one he made in *Democracy and Its Critics* two decades ago, observing that 'a term that means anything means nothing. And so it has become with "democracy", which nowadays is not so much a term of restricted and specific meaning as a vague endorsement of a popular idea' (Dahl, 1989: 2). It is striking that this quotation virtually echoes that of Orwell in 1946. And it is equally striking that rampant disagreement about the meaning of democracy resonates throughout the history of the term in general.

Naess *et al.* (1956) and, more recently, Dunn (2005) have documented how the meaning of democracy has undergone significant changes over the millennia. During the heyday of Athenian democracy, statesmen such as Aeschines, Demosthenes, Themistocles, and, particularly, Pericles sang the praises of democracy, which they equaled with the direct rule of the citizens. Nevertheless, virtually all surviving tracts were written by critics of democracy. Most tellingly, the famous 'Funeral Oration' of Pericles is reported by Thucydides, who was antagonistic to the radical form of democracy favored by the former. More importantly, two of the most prominent thinkers of all times ascribed to a highly skeptical view of democracy. Plato considered it to be the penultimate form of misrule, only just better than outright tyranny. And Aristotle equated *demokratia* with the rule of the poor, reserving the word *politeia* for law-abiding, middle-class rule, which he preferred.

Partly due to these writings, 'democracy' received a derogatory meaning within political theory after the fall of the democracies of antiquity (Dunn, 2005). As Naess *et al.* show, democracy was ubiquitously treated as a derogatory term throughout the Middle Ages. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, described it as an *iniquum regimen*, an 'unjust government' (Naess *et al.*, 1956: 92). Nor do we,

with a few New Englanders as exceptions that prove the rule, find self-professed democrats in the period from the Renaissance to the American War of Independence (ibid.: 95). The reason was exactly that democracy – listening to Plato – was construed as majority tyranny. Clearly Hobbes entertained this view of democracy, which we also meet much later with Edmund Burke (ibid.: 99–113). At the same time, democracy was, by definition, equaled with direct rule of the citizens rather than with the election of representatives, the actual western European regime form which came to be conceived in the context of the medieval *Ständestaat* (Myers, 1975: 34–35).

Not until the French Revolution did salient political actors start to use the term to signify something positive (Naess *et al.*, 1956; Dunn, 2005). Yet the immediate effect of this usurpation of the term was to reinforce its derogatory meaning outside of revolutionary France. Such was the case because democracy became equaled with the terror rule of Robespierre and the Jacobins.

Nevertheless, the genie was now out of the bottle. Though we meet few 'honorific applications of the term' (Naess *et al.*, 1956) in the first half of the nineteenth century, some significant exceptions signal that things were about to change. Naess *et al.* (1956: 123–128) point to the fact that particularly Bentham seemed to apply a positive connotation to the words in this period. Also, they neatly demonstrate the way in which Tocqueville's use of the term changed from connoting social equality (in *Democracy in America*) to connoting a political method (in his speeches in 1848) (120).

Tocqueville was not alone in undergoing this transition at this particular point in time. With the advent of the great liberal revolutions of the nineteenth century, 'democracy' once again became an honorific term. This happened because liberals came to recognize that even a relatively broad (male) franchise did not necessarily imperil property. From the critical juncture in 1848 onwards, we thus increasingly encounter a 'liberal connotation' of democracy (Naess *et al.*, 1956: 124).

Dunn (2005) basically retells the story of Naess *et al.* using different terms. His version is that a pitched battle over the meaning of the term was fought out between those who construed it as an 'order of egoism' and those construing it as an 'order of equality'. The former camp, drawing on the classical and medieval doctrine of the 'mixed constitution', were initially among those who rallied against democracy for the simple reason that they, like Aristotle, understood it as the rule of the poor. James Madison is particularly instructive here. In *The Federalist*, he used the term 'republic' for the constitutional system which he advocated, meanwhile issuing a dire warning against democracy. To render the famous quotation:

> Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.
>
> (Hamilton *et al.*, 1974: 133)

In contrast, the latter camp, first associated with the French Revolution, was drawn to the word exactly because of this meaning, that is, due to the ideal about absolute equal access to the exercise of power.

According to Dunn, the two principles subsequently fused as the liberals (and, in time, the conservatives) came to accept democracy as a mixture of the sovereignty of the people[2] and constitutionalism in the nineteenth century.

There seems to be something to this notion of a mid-nineteenth century grand fusion. However, this point should not disguise the fact that democracy again quickly came to mean different things to different people (cf. Christophersen, 1966). One reason was that Dunn's pure order of equality still won praise after the dust of the great liberal revolutions had settled. Witness Karl Marx's use of the concept of democracy before and after these events. In the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, the word was used as synonymous with the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Democracy was thus equaled with the ascendancy to power of the masses and the concomitant economic transformation. Yet, during and in the immediate aftermath of the great revolutions, Marx began employing the word in a very different meaning, namely as denoting the broad, anti-feudal movement represented by the liberal revolutionaries (Sørensen, 1979).

Soon, however, Marx backed away from this ideal, claiming that genuine political equality could only rest on economic equality. He thus regarded the liberal construction of democracy as a constitutional system as a mirage – or, even more insidiously, as a means of the possessive classes to retain the exploitive, capitalist system.

Finally, according to Schumpeter the classical conception also loomed large in the nineteenth century, adding a third facet to the dispute. Even after the great fusion described by Naess *et al.* and Dunn, the disagreement about the meaning of democracy was thus reproduced.

That democracy was placed on a pedestal did hence not entail that people agreed exactly what was worshipped. Some scholars have in fact gone so far as to argue that producing the agreement on how to define democracy, which Dahl advertises for, and which Orwell regretted the lack of, is intrinsically impossible to obtain. Arend Lijphart (1977: 4), one of the most influential contemporary democratic theorists, accordingly holds that democracy 'is a concept which virtually defies definition'.

Even more famously, the British philosopher Walter Bryce Gallie highlighted democracy as the example *par excellence* of what he termed 'essentially contested concepts' (1956: 184). Gallie's basic point is that, because concepts such as democracy are multi-dimensional, internally complex, abstract, qualitative, and, critically, value-laden (aka evaluative), people will never be able (or, for that matter, willing) to subscribe to one and the same meaning of the term. More technically, people will value different dimensions of the concept to different degrees, making it impossible to aggregate the subcomponents in a uniformly accepted way (Schedler, 2011).

That leaves us to ponder why Orwell and Dahl have objected to this lack of consensus. Disregarding the political abuse of the word by wolves in sheep's

clothing – such as the self-proclaimed democrats listed further up in this preface – the very precondition for assessing causes and correlates of democracy is that an agreement exists about the definition of the concept in the first place. As Giovanni Sartori (1970: 1038) pointed out four decades ago, '*concept formation stands prior to quantification*'. Insofar as the broad patterns of the definition are not settled, research on democracy cannot become cumulative as different scholars using different definitions will keep arriving at different results. To quote O'Donnell, who will be our main guide through the morass of democratic theory in this book:

> The literature on new democracies shares two basic assumptions: the existence of a sufficiently clear and consistent corpus of democratic theory, and the possibility of using this corpus, with only marginal modifications, as an adequate conceptual tool for the study of emerging democracies. Unfortunately, the first assumption – that there is a clear and consistent corpus of democratic theory – is wrong. By implication, the second, that existing democratic theory 'travels' well, is impracticable.
>
> (2001: 7)

All of this may seem to make for a very disheartening conclusion about democratic theory and, *a fortiori*, about research on democratization. What this book sets out to demonstrate, however, is that, though no final consensus has emerged on how to define democracy, some systematic patterns exist, both conceptually and with regard to the situation on the ground. Indeed, to some extent, this is even the case with respect to the causes of democracy.

Addressing these issues, the book brings together the conceptual and theoretical writings of, *inter alia*, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Robert A. Dahl, Guillermo O'Donnell, and T. H. Marshall, based on the methodological guidelines of authors such as Paul Lazersfeld, Kenneth D. Bailey, Giovanni Sartori, Gary Goertz, David Collier, and Charles Ragin.

The very title of the book reflects this integrative enterprise. The pivotal word here is *Requisites*, which conveys two distinct meanings. First, the word connotes those defining attributes – discussed and analyzed in Parts I and II – which are individually necessary (and jointly sufficient) for democracy. Second, the word also covers those conditions – necessary and causes – of democracy, which we discuss and analyze in Part III.

More particularly, the book reports two general findings. First, we show that it is possible to scale thinner and thicker definitions of democracy conceptually and empirically. These analytical operations produce an ordinal scale of democracy which should prove valuable to research on the causes and correlates of democratization. Second, we demonstrate that the empirical existence of this scale is no coincidence. Suffice here to say that it reflects the fact that, in the context of a liberal hegemony which forces the elites of most countries to at least pay lip-service to democratization, structural conditions still constrain the ability to move into thicker types of democracy. To some extent, this is thus a classic

plus ça change (*plus c'est la même chose*) conclusion as it implies that – due to the structural inhibitions encountered in most developing countries – the democratization processes of the latest decades have not really had salient consequences outside of the electoral realm.

We elaborate on all of this in the Introduction. At this point, it is pertinent to thank a number of people who have assisted us in traversing the territories covered by the book. Several of the chapters have already been published in various journals, and we are much indebted to the many insightful reports from anonymous reviewers that we have received (and had to tackle), as well as the comments received when presenting these papers at international conferences. We are likewise indebted to our editors at Routledge for accepting the book for publication and for encouraging us along the way. Furthermore, we gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of chapters we have received from Mogens Herman Hansen, participants at presentations at Aarhus University in general and from Professors George Sørensen, Jørgen Elklit, and Palle Svensson in particular. Also, we wish to thank graduate student Lasse Lykke Rørbæk, who in the latest stages of the work took on the responsibility to prepare the manuscript according to Routledge's guidelines and to comment on each of the chapters.

Finally, we wish to thank various publishers and journals for allowing us to reproduce published articles. Parts of the Introduction can be found in © Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning: 'Mapping Contemporary Forms of Autocracy', in: Totalitarismus und Demokratie, Jg.06 Heft 02, Göttingen 2009. Parts of Chapters 1 and 2 have previously been published in Møller, Jørgen and Svend-Erik Skaaning (2010), 'Beyond the Radial Delusion: Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy and Non-democracy', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 261–283, reproduced with permission of Sage Publications. A prior version of Chapter 4 has been previously published as Møller, Jørgen and Svend-Erik Skaaning (2010), 'Post-Communist Regime Types: Hierarchies across Attributes and Space', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 51–71, reproduced with permission of the editors. A prior version of Chapter 5 can be found in Møller, Jørgen and Svend-Erik Skaaning (2010), 'Marshall Revisited: The Sequence of Citizenship Rights in the Twenty-First Century', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 457–483, reproduced with permission of John Wiley and Sons. A prior version of Chapter 6 has been previously published as Møller, Jørgen and Svend-Erik Skaaning (2011), 'Stateness First?', *Democratization*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 1–24, reproduced with the permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd. Finally, a prior version of the Appendix has been published as Møller, Jørgen and Svend-Erik Skaaning (2011), 'Concept-Measure Inconsistency in Contemporary Studies of Democracy', *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, reproduced with the permission of the editors.

Introduction

Today, the most important political distinction among countries concerns not whether they are democratic or not but what kind of democracies they are. This pun on Huntington's (1968: 1) famous dictum about political order – 'The most important political distinction among countries does not concern their form of government but their degree of government' – nicely sums up the message of this book. A majority of the countries that, since 1974, have democratized under the so-called third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) can thus be characterized as instances of what we term 'minimalist democracy'. To be sure, some have made it into more demanding types, namely what we term 'electoral democracy' and 'polyarchy', respectively. But very few are genuine specimens of 'liberal democracy', defined by the combination of free and fair elections, political liberties of speech and assembly, and the rule of law.

This four-fold typology, which can be expanded by including the polar opposite of autocracy, embeds and systematizes much of what has been written about the definition of democracy since Schumpeter (1974 [1942]) inaugurated the 'realistic' tradition of construing democracy as a *Modus Procedendi*, that is, as a political method based on procedures rather than substance.

In Part I of this book, we show that the consequent distinction between 'thinner' and 'thicker' definitions of democracy (Coppedge, 1999) can be transformed into a systematic conceptual hierarchy. Indeed, we show that this can be done even when augmenting the typology with the attribute of social rights and, *ipso facto*, with the concept of 'social democracy'. This procedure transgresses the Schumpeterian boundary but it is nevertheless empirically interesting.

Critically, the existence of such a scale can also be established empirically, meaning that a clear majority of the world's countries clump in the said types of democracy or the autocratic opposite. This equals saying that, in the contemporary era, electoral rights are more widespread than political liberties, which are more widespread than the rule of law, which is more widespread than social rights, thus establishing a virtually perfect empirical hierarchy that mirrors the conceptual hierarchy derived from the literature.

This, in turn, paves the way for lining up an ordinal scale – what is more technically termed a simple order scale (Bailey, 1973) – of democracy (either

including or excluding social rights). Not only is the establishment of such a scale interesting in its own right, it also makes for assessing causes and consequences of democracy, depending on whether the typology is used as *explanandum* or *explanans*.

In Part II, we pursue the established empirical pattern across space and time. First, we demonstrate how the simple order has come into its own in the former Eastern Bloc following the breakdown of communism. This also allows us to push at the pattern using a more elaborate typology and to reflect on the causes of the established hierarchy. The fact that the post-communist experience – what in social science comes close to being a country-level natural experiment – has paved the way for the hierarchy obviously strengthens its robustness. However, we also take stock of its analytical solidity by venturing back in time, to the frail beginnings of the third wave of democratization. On this journey, we revisit T. H. Marshall's sequencing of citizenship rights (civil, political, and social) and show that it has been altered in the latest decades so that it now fits the established hierarchy.

In Part III of the book, we go looking for the causes of the asymmetrical patterns of regime change on which the ordinal scale is based. We first assess the importance of 'stateness', and subsequently carry out a more general test of structural factors. Our conclusion is that, in order to understand the hierarchical pattern, we have to take a combination of domestic and international structural constraints into account.

Setting the stage

This introductory chapter sets the stage for the entire enterprise. We discuss why the attempt to conceptualize democracy has become so popular recently, present the hybrid regime agenda that features prominently in the literature, pose the research problems of the book, argue that these questions can only be answered through a conscious alignment of theories, concepts, measures, and methods, and present the theoretical model upon which our answers are based.

Our point of departure is a simple one: that the literature teems with conceptualizations of democracy and non-democracy. In the mid-1990s, Collier and Levitsky (1996) set out to provide an overview and an appraisal of existing definitions of democracy. They stopped counting at 550! Nothing indicates that the urge to define and redefine democracy has decreased since. Indeed, the endeavors have become ever-more refined in that not only democracy but the entire spectrum between democracy and autocracy is being mapped (e.g., Zakaria, 1997; Diamond, 1999; Howard and Roessler, 2006; Merkel, 2004; Wigell, 2008).

Interestingly, glancing back at the literature of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, this development stands out in strong relief (Mair, 2008). In those decades, the non-democratic part of the spectrum was where the important political variation was sought, conceptually as well as empirically. Recall, just to mention a few, the classical works of Arendt (1958 [1951]), and Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965)

on totalitarian regimes, O'Donnell (1973) on bureaucratic-authoritarianism, Huntington (1968) on political disorder in developing countries, Finer (1962) on military dictatorships, and Linz's (2000 [1975]) effort to provide a conceptual separation between totalitarianism and authoritarianism and their respective sub-types. This non-democratic pivot of scholarship operated even as the new focus on democracy was inaugurated in the 1980s. Witness only the title of O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead's (1986) path-breaking four-volume work: *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*.

Lately, it is the democratic part of the spectrum that has drawn attention. Why this sudden obsession with different kinds of democracy? Why the mushrooming of elaborate typologies? Peter Mair (2008) has pointed to two impulses, one empirical and the other theoretical. First, the most recent wave of democrat-ization has meant that what used to be a relatively homogenous class, subsuming empirical referents situated in Western Europe and North America, has become more heterogeneous. It now contains a large number of quite dissimilar countries encountered in virtually every corner of the globe,[1] thus crying out for concep-tual differentiation.

Second, developments within political science have also contributed to the focus on different kinds of democracy. Since the early 1980s, much of the work within the discipline, and particularly within the subfield of democratization studies, has shifted to a lower level of abstraction. The plea for a return of the state and the advent of the new institutionalisms are examples of this (e.g., Evans *et al.*, 1985; March and Olsen, 1989) – in particular vis-à-vis the encompassing systems theory of Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (1966), among others. As Mair (1996) has explained in an earlier paper, the consequence of this shift in the level of abstraction – and, *ipso facto*, in the scope of comparisons – is that institutional variation is increasingly conceived as *explanans* rather than *explanandum*.

More particularly, the aim of the contemporary typological mappings of democracy and non-democracy is two-fold. First, to fill out the black spots on the conceptual map of the area between liberal democracy and autocracy. Second, to understand the political, economic, and social effects of these differ-ent types of democracy – a debate that frequently takes place under the headline of the 'quality of democracy' (Diamond and Morlino, 2005; O'Donnell *et al.*, 2004). Whereas the former exercise is purely descriptive, the latter exercise is explanatory and/or evaluative.

These two interwoven strands have occasioned not only the general attempt to construct typologies of democracy but also the more particular focus on what are normally termed 'hybrid regimes' (Diamond, 2002; Morlino, 2009). In the literature, the defining aspect of these regimes is exactly that they are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. They thus inhabit a 'grey zone' (Car-others, 2002), which – as a consequence of the 'unprecedented growth in the number of regimes that are neither clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian' (Diamond, 2002: 25) – covers such a large part of the non-Western world today.

Enter the Schumpeterian anchor

The hybrid regime agenda obviously works as a frame of reference for this book. However, we expressly disavow it conceptually. Instead of treating the regimes in the zone between liberal democracy and autocracy as hybrid regimes, we treat them as thinner types of democracy.[2] Our basic argument is that this operation makes for laying bare the most interesting dividing lines within Diamond's and Carothers's so-called grey zone. Most of the countries inhabiting this terrain are, it should be recalled, characterized by some kind of political competition while lacking a number of other aspects of what is conventionally termed liberal democracy. This is not brought out well by treating these countries as different forms of hybrid regimes. Rather, the conceptual distinctiveness of such systems must be understood via the established corpus of democratic theory.

More particularly, our conceptual edifice is anchored in what we hold to be the thinnest procedural type of democracy in the literature, namely Schumpeter's (1974 [1942]: 269) seminal definition of democracy as 'that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote'.

Schumpeter's definition is even more minimalist than is often acknowledged. It is thus not free and fair elections but the mere presence of effective electoral competition for the main political offices that makes for inclusion in this overarching class of democracy. Such is the case because Schumpeter explicitly presents leeway for grouping a country as a case of democracy if it has what we term elections with moderate defects, for example, by restricting the right to vote to a certain part of the adult population. To quote:

> If persons below the age limit are not allowed to vote, we cannot call a nation undemocratic that for the same or analogous reasons excludes other people as well … The salient point is that, given appropriate views on those and similar subjects, disqualifications on grounds of economic status, religion and sex will enter into the same class with disqualifications which we all of us consider compatible with democracy.
>
> (1974 [1942]: 244–245)

Moreover, it is very likely that Schumpeter would also accept partial restrictions on the sovereignty of the people in the form of 'tutelary powers' or 'reserved domains' (cf. Valenzuela, 1992) – especially because such restrictions were prevalent in the 'constitutional-democratic monarchies' of his time, not to speak of those earlier ones which he admired most, in particular eighteenth- and nineteenth-century United Kingdom (see Swedberg, 1991: 52). Hence, if Schumpeter's definition is taken as read, hybrid regimes are instances of such minimalist democracy if they exhibit institutionalized political competition (via elections) for the access to political power. If they do not exhibit such competition, we count them as autocracies.

This pivotal point can be elaborated by drawing on another, more recent, minimalist definition of democracy, namely that of Przeworski (1986, 1991). Przeworski argues that the essence of democracy is political uncertainty regarding the outcome of elections. If such uncertainty is present, that is, if we do not in advance know whether the incumbents (or their anointed successors) will emerge as victors, then we have an instance of democracy. To quote, '[o]utcomes are not known *ex ante*: each party does the best it can, then rolls the dice to see who will win. Democratization is an act of subjecting all interests to competition, of institutionalizing uncertainty' (1991: 14). Or, as Przeworski explains elsewhere, democracy thus understood consists of the two attributes of '*ex ante* uncertainty' and '*ex post* irreversibility' (Alvarez *et al.*, 1996: 50–51).

Tellingly, in the literature, cases of skewed but genuine competition are oftentimes construed as either hybrid regimes or even instances of authoritarianism. The most influential example of the latter is probably Levitsky and Way's (2002) concept of 'competitive authoritarianism', in which authoritarian practices are embedded within democratic procedures. If we accept the reasoning of Schumpeter and Przeworski, this concept is basically a contradiction in terms. Insofar as incumbents with authoritarian instincts allow a contest in which they may lose power, they have already caved in to democracy, at least in a minimalistic sense. That they use the government apparatus to create an uneven contest does not alter this point insofar as the election remains competitive. However, if the contest is structured so that the incumbents cannot in any case loose power, then it is not competitive in the first place, meaning that Levitsky and Way – in such case – commit conceptual stretching by adding this adjective to the noun. Genuinely procedurally based competition, however messy, simply rules out authoritarianism and vice versa, at least according to the Schumpeterian position.

This Schumpeterian anchor, substantiated by Przeworski, is what makes the distinction between thinner and thicker types of democracy so promising. Furthermore, this stepwise augmentation of the definition is exactly what allows us to capture the interesting variation within the poorly charted territory between liberal democracy and autocracy proper.

All the four types of democracy listed on the first pages of the introduction are based on the Schumpeterian notion of democracy as a political method focusing on procedures rather than substance. Nonetheless, the conceptions of electoral democracy, polyarchy, and liberal democracy all go beyond Schumpeter's bare-bones definition. The scholars advocating these definitions thus argue that, with such a modest (merely electoral) intension, the extension covers a very large cluster of countries with very little in common. Thicker definitions are therefore required.

What is important for our purposes is that it is possible to maintain Schumpeter's realistic vein of thinking while expanding the intension of the concept. Like pearls on a string, we thus keep the one necklace yet add adornments. Using the terminology of Collier and Levitsky (1997), such an exercise entails précising the definition. However, this is obviously only possible for so long, since at some point we will, in fact, have gone beyond the Schumpeterian

premise. This boundary problem needs to be recognized, and in Chapter 3 we treat it carefully when we discuss whether the attribute of social rights can be added to the necklace, thereby augmenting the typology with the type social democracy.

Posing the questions

Above, we highlighted the mushrooming of ever-more elaborate typologies of democracy and non-democracy. The way we conceptualize and measure democracy and non-democracy is of critical importance for the descriptive and explanatory inferences we arrive at (cf. Collier and Adcock, 1999: 537–538), and this research agenda should be welcomed. However, even though many of the new conceptual constructs are well-grounded in theory and have proved valuable empirically, the literature suffers from a blind spot. As O'Donnell (2004a) has pointed out, scant efforts have been devoted to systematically scrutinize the relationship between the various components – or constitutive parts – of the root concept of liberal democracy:

> These items may be seen as vectors that tap dimensions that, depending on the data feasible for each, may be arranged in some scale or ordering. … The overall result would be a series of vectors … of relative democraticness. In turn, the relationships among these vectors should not be presupposed; rather, it is an empirical matter for the study of which the disaggregation of vectors (and their component variables) is a necessary step.
>
> (2004a: 64)

The very same point is made by Collier and Levitsky (1996: 32), when they observe that many scholars:

> appear to be working with an implicit ordinal scale of degrees of democracy rather than with a large number of nominal distinctions. To the extent that this ordinal scale is made more explicit and is employed more systematically, the goal of conceptual differentiation will be better served.

In this book, we pick up O'Donnell's – and Collier and Levitsky's – glove and consequently pose three general research questions concerning four democratic attributes, namely electoral rights, political liberties (freedom of expression, association, and assembly), the rule of law, and social rights. First, harking back to the Babylonian Confusion regarding the definition of democracy described in the preface, can order be created out of the apparent chaos of competing conceptions and alternative typologies? Second, if so, can corresponding empirical regularities be identified in today's world? Third, if so, how are such regularities to be explained?

   As mentioned above, this allows us to create exactly such an ordinal scale as that advertised for by Collier and Levitsky. This conceptual scheme rests on a

two-fold premise. First, that it is appropriate to establish the entire spectrum between the democratic and undemocratic poles before introducing new concepts in the intermediate terrain.[3] Second, that any such encompassing typology must be embedded in democratic theory.

The four attributes are – as we will demonstrate in Chapters 2 and 3 – deduced from current writings of democracy in general and from those of O'Donnell in particular. Notice, furthermore, that at least the first three attributes (electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law) can be tied to one and the same theoretical dimension via the concept of accountability, vertical and horizontal.[4] Vertical accountability entails interactions between the rulers and the ruled, in particular the bottom-up control of the former by the latter via elections as well as restrictions on the top-down exercise of power via fundamental rights and the absence of judicial arbitrariness. Horizontal accountability has to do with interactions between branches of the state, in particular via a functioning system of checks and balances (Schmitter, 2004; O'Donnell, 1994, 1998a). These considerations provide theoretical underpinnings for constructing a one-dimensional scale of democratic accountability insofar as this is justified empirically.

The theoretical model

Anticipating the findings of Part I, how are we to make sense of the almost perfect empirical hierarchy between thinner and thicker types of democracy? Below we introduce our basic theoretical model, which we refer back to in the subsequent chapters.

To recapitulate, what is needed are arguments explaining why electoral rights are more widespread than political liberties, which are more widespread than the rule of law, which is more widespread than social rights, hence the hierarchy. More particularly, we need to know why the countries basically only clump in the six types of minimalist democracy, electoral democracy, polyarchy, liberal democracy, social democracy, or the polar opposite of autocracy.

Seen from the higher ground, this pattern can either be a consequence of an intrinsic causal relationship between the components themselves or of exogenous variables. If the answer is indeed to be found in the former category, two possibilities exist. Either the less demanding attributes are necessary but not sufficient for the more demanding attributes or the more demanding attributes are sufficient but not necessary for the less demanding attributes. In both cases, the corollary would be that diminished subtypes combining the presence of, say, the rule of law or social rights with the absence of electoral rights would be without empirical referents.

A number of scholars have, in fact, claimed that electoral competition facilitates the development of the rule of law (e.g., Carothers, 2007; Bäck and Hadenius, 2008; Lindberg, 2006). Likewise, some evidence supports the postulate that more demanding attributes connected to the rule of law spur electoral democratization, which would make for an inherent hierarchy. For instance, Staton *et al.* (2010) argue that judicial independence, one of the subcomponents of our

rule of law attribute, has a positive causal effect on elections. Occupying a position somewhere in-between these claims, Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) find that the rule of law and electoral democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.

Generally speaking, however, we have not encountered convincing explanations about such causal relationships among the attributes in question which allow us to make sense of the hierarchical pattern, nor do we have any on offer ourselves. The basic problem is that it is one thing to argue that a particular status on some attributes favors or even facilitates a movement toward a particular status on other attributes; but it is much more difficult to claim that a particular attribute is either necessary or sufficient for others – as a stringent hierarchy would require.

This seems to indicate that the proper explanation of the hierarchy is exogenous to the attributes. Is there any help in the literature when the systematic patterns are viewed from this angle? First things first, it is worth noting that the general outlines (though not the exact character) of the established hierarchy have been identified by a number of scholars. As already mentioned, students of democratization have directed attention to the fact that many of the countries that have democratized in recent decades are only hybrid regimes that are characterized by a mixture of democratic and autocratic features – at least vis-à-vis the Western liberal democracies (Reich, 2002). Concepts such as electoral democracy (Diamond, 1999) and illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997) are expressly based on the claim that the democratic deficiencies of the hybrid regimes owe more to shortcomings on liberal aspects, such as political liberties and the rule of law, than to flawed elections.[5]

But what are the actual theoretical arguments underpinning these assertions? And do they provide justification for expecting a more particular discrepancy in the respect of the four attributes of democracy identified above? According to our reading, two reasons can be deduced from the literature. First, the present 'liberal hegemony' (Levitsky and Way, 2002) means that most developing countries are affected by an external pressure to democratize, either simply due to the *Zeitgeist* (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 74–76) or via active leverage (Levitsky and Way, 2005, 2006).

Second, internal structural constraints, such as low levels of modernization, problems of stateness and state capacity, and a modest linkage with the developed democracies, mean that the pressure from the outside has lopsided effects on the four attributes (e.g., Diamond, 1999: 57). In gist, whereas elections are spreading like wildfire, the same is not the case for the more demanding attributes of democracy. Most notably, obtaining the rule of law and social rights is likely to be beyond the reach of countries with inauspicious structures. An elaborated version of this two-fold model is the theoretical contribution of this otherwise principally conceptually[6] and empirically oriented book. To arrive at this model, we first take a look at the internal structural constraints.

Diamond (1999: 57) has underlined that most of the countries involved in the recent trend of democratization exhibit an unpropitious structural basis for democracy. For instance, they are often relatively poor, have low linkages with

the 'West' (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2005, 2006), and are often burdened by the so-called 'resource curse', which makes it unlikely that they will be able to safeguard the non-electoral criteria of liberal democracy (see also Sørensen, 2008). In particular, the rule of law is likely to be a very difficult criterion to fulfill in this situation. This is so because such structural constraints link up with what O'Donnell (1999: 314) calls a severe incompleteness of the state, particularly concerning legal issues. Developing this point, O'Donnell (2007: 131) emphasizes that a highly unequal socioeconomic structure tends to undermine the judicial aspects of citizenship for two main reasons: 'One is the dramatic curtailment of capabilities entailed by deep inequality and its usual concomitant of widespread and severe poverty.' The other is 'that the huge social distances entailed by deep inequality foster manifold patterns of authoritarian relations in various encounters between the privileged and others'.

Associated with the low levels of development is the pervasive neo-patrimonial character of politics in many developing countries (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Diamond, 2008: 138; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). In such settings, the informal practices of unaccountable, personalized power and strong patron–client ties tend to trump the formal laws and institutions. State offices at every level are used to privilege oneself and/or family members, ethnic kin, political clients, and business cronies (Diamond, 2008: 145), thereby undermining the rule of law. More generally, entrenched elites surrender their traditional immunity and jeopardize their vested interests only under great pressure (cf. Holmes, 2003; Carothers, 1998: 96).

These insidious elite-interests do not just pose general problems for the establishment of more demanding democratic attributes; they also reinforce the particular sequence between electoral rights on the one hand and the rule of law and social rights on the other hand, with political liberties situated somewhere in-between. What this brief review of the literature indicates, then, is that – in the context of the third wave of democratization – electoral rights are likely to be more widespread than political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights. Furthermore, the rule of law is likely to be more deficient than political liberties in developing and transitional countries.

However, the structural constraints only explain why citizenship rights, and in particular civil and social rights, are often curtailed, not why the countries nevertheless democratize. More technically, the inauspicious structures are constants across most of the developing countries. Not so with the *Zeitgeist* and external pressure (aka leverage), the nature of which shows significant variation, even across shorter spans of time.

This is where the more operative variable, liberal hegemony, enters the storyline. This hegemony owes its existence to the fact that the Western democracies emerged victoriously from the Cold War, and it has been used to make a two-sided claim. On the one hand, the liberal hegemony means that today virtually no country outside the First World can completely ignore the pressure for democratization. Indeed, surveys show an almost ubiquitous preference for democracy as the preferred regime form – even in populaces in which little or no trust in the

actual workings of democratic institutions is present (Klingemann, 1999; Chu *et al.*, 2008). On the other hand, it is underlined that, due to the unpropitious structural constraints described above, the responses often take the form of lip-service to democratization, especially concerning features that go beyond the introduction of competitive elections (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 13; Grzymala-Busse and Luong, 2002: 536).

Elaborating on this point, the actual conditionality carried out as a consequence of liberal hegemony tends to have had an inbuilt asymmetry. O'Donnell (1998a: 117–118) has thus argued that the tendency to identify democracy solely with the presence of elections belittles the historically important role played by republicanism (subjection to the law and service to the public) and liberalism (inalienable rights). If we conflate democracy with such a bare-bones focus on elections, we simply run the risk of ignoring other democratic attributes, such as freedom rights and the rule of law.

The failure to appreciate these pillars of democracy helps to explain why most Western governments have been willing to grant political *bona fides* to countries that hold elections, even when political liberties and – in particular – matters of horizontal accountability are clearly violated (see also Diamond, 1999: 55–56). Moreover, the very fact that the internal structures make the adoption of the rule of law and social rights far more difficult than the holding of competitive elections means that the actual influence of the liberal hegemony tends to be asymmetrical.

When exactly did this operative variable kick in? Based on Levitsky and Way, the fall of communism in 1989–1991 stands out as central. Other scholars agree. McFaul (2002), for instance, draws a line between the third wave of democratization prior to 1989–1991 and the subsequent 'Fourth Wave of Democracy *and* Dictatorship' (as his title reads). His main points are that this fourth wave flows from different causes than the third, exactly due to the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, and that the fourth wave in his conception includes an important autocratic undertow. Most importantly, however, is McFaul's general premise: that the dynamics of regime change have been altered due to democracy's enemy *par excellence* disappearing from the scene.[7]

Is there any solid evidence that international actors have changed their ways following the breakdown of communism and the concomitant East–West rivalry between superpowers? On the macro-level, few would probably dispute this claim. Nonetheless, more particular evidence can also be adduced. A prominent finding in the literature on developmental aid is thus that donor strategies have changed after 1989. To quote from Wright and Winters' (2010: 73) review article of the field:

> bilateral aid during the Cold War was ineffective in promoting reform because donors could not credibly commit to withdrawing aid from strategically important recipients even when reform was not forthcoming, but in the post-Cold war era, donors can make more credible threats to withdraw aid.[8]

In most of this book, we confine our analyses to the 2000s, meaning that we are not really able to test the ascendancy of liberal hegemony. However, in Chapters 5 and 7 we pursue the issue back to the spring of the third wave of democratization in the early 1970s. In these chapters, then, the timing of the advent of liberal hegemony – and, *ipso facto*, the existence of the liberal hegemony as such – is thus not presupposed but instead tested empirically. In the rest of the book, it works as a theoretical assumption only.

To recapitulate, the theoretical model is an attempt to answer the ever-relevant question: Why would rulers accept constraints (cf. Holmes, 2003)? Our model holds that they may do so for two distinct reasons. First, as a consequence of internal constraints, in particular a relatively equal power distribution within society, often with the institutional corollary of a division of power within the state. These constraints are themselves a product of a series of propitious structural factors, most noteworthy stateness, a high level of modernization, a viable civil society, a viable market economy, absence of natural resource dependency, and linkages to the West (see Chapters 6 and 7). Second, the elites may give in to democratization as a consequence of international pressure.

Now, whereas the internal constraints – when effective – facilitate electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights, the external constraints only facilitate the former attributes and, by extension, the thinner types of democracy.[9] Welzel's (2009: 87–88) distinction between 'responsive democratization', 'imposed democratization', and 'opportunistic democratization' is a nice way of elucidating this. Only in the former instance do elites fully respect and sanction democratic freedoms, including the rule of law. In the two latter paths to democracy, most of these rights are precarious. Critically, responsive democratization is intimately linked to auspicious structural conditions, in particular a societal modernization, that ensure a socially embedded and sustainable democracy via mass pressure and a vibrant civil society. On the other hand, countries lacking such features normally fare along the two less fortunate trajectories.

More particularly, and to spell out the expectations based on the theoretical model, in the face of adverse structural constraints, minimalistic democracy is the outcome to be expected if a country democratizes. The core of the lopsided picture is exactly that such minimalist democracy has made significant headway in the context of the third wave but that the same cannot be said about its thicker equivalents. In the subsequent chapters, we hew back to this model in order to formulate hypotheses amenable to empirical testing. The objective is to test the validity of, first, the described hierarchical pattern and, second, its suggested causes.

The importance of alignment

We argue that any such conceptual and/or empirical order must be established via rigorous procedures of conceptualization, measurement, and analysis that are tailored to handle the proposed relationships. In Parts I and II of the book, we

employ descriptive tools of conceptualization and measurement in general and classification, typologization, and aggregation in particular. These tools must make for treating the relationship between intension (aka connotation) and extension (aka. denotation) in a way that reflects both the hierarchical logic of a classical categorization (Sartori, 1970) and the alternative logics of radial types and family resemblance (Collier and Mahon, 1993). Our premise here is that the ultimate measuring rod must be empirical, that is, the extent to which contemporary countries conform to the logics that are plausible conceptually.

In Part III, our selection of methods is based on aligning assumptions about causality with the way in which the theoretical relationships are tested. More precisely, we endeavor to align ontology and methodology (Hall, 2003). To illustrate the importance of this, a large number of the extant theories of democratization highlight certain explanatory factors as either necessary or sufficient for democracy. However, the actual tests carried out normally rely on standard statistical methods which are only amenable to testing linear, additive relationships – not asymmetrical (set-theoretical) relationships of necessity and sufficiency (Ragin, 2000). As opposed to most of the literature, we take these formulations as read and therefore use comparative configurational methods, including typological theory and fuzzy-set QCA.

A few additional words on the conceptual and empirical enterprise of Parts I and II seem pertinent. As Sartori (1970) has forcefully pointed out, any systematic measurement of political phenomena presupposes explicit conceptualization. Sartori's article had a big impact on the discipline and, in the latest two decades, important work on the conceptualization and measurement of political concepts in general and democracy in particular has accumulated (e.g., Collier and Mahon, 1993; Collier and Adcock, 1999; Gerring, 2001; Adcock and Collier, 2001; Goertz, 2006; Munck, 2009).

Yet the standards of the literature on concept formation are something altogether different from the quality of the actual empirical research carried out. In Chapter 1, we make the case for this somewhat sweeping claim by revisiting – and criticizing – some important attempts to classify and measure types of democracy. Also, in the appendix of this book, we carry out a more technical appraisal of the literature, which tests the 'concept-measure consistency' (Goertz, 2006) of the aggregation rules used to create descriptive indices or typologies of democracy and non-democracy. In doing so, we demonstrate that students of democratization have not paid sufficient attention to the problems exposed by Sartori and his heirs – nor, *a fortiori*, to the guidelines proposed to remedy these.

These exercises serve two purposes. First, and generally speaking, to make the case for using a classical categorization rather than a radial alternative to create a conceptual typology of democracy and non-democracy (Chapters 1 and 2). Second, to establish why the aggregation procedure must be one which is actually able to appreciate the Aristotelian logic of such an ordering, that is, that the defining attributes of each type of democracy are individually necessary and jointly sufficient (see the Appendix). The added value of these exercises is that they demonstrate exactly why the inferences arrived at in Parts I and II are no

better than the methodological and conceptual tools they are based on; and why rigorous procedures are of the essence in the first place.

But why do the problems analyzed in Chapter 1 and the Appendix occur at all? We make three tentative suggestions. First, it may simply be due to the lack of methodological awareness. If such is the case, it indicates that the plethora of new writings on conceptualization and measurement, some of which were mentioned above, still needs to travel into the actual practice of the discipline. There may be a time lag here. Insofar as this is the case, there is room for optimism as the practice is likely to become more methodologically self-conscious as the new guidelines and more consistent thinking disseminate.

Second, it may, to a certain extent, be a consequence of the somewhat poor quality and/or availability of the data used to measure democracies and non-democracies. If disaggregated scores are not available, then scholars are unable to distinguish between different properties in their actual measurement. To say this slightly different, they will not be able to use classification rules that are consistent with their conceptual reasoning. There is probably something to this as indices such as those provided by Freedom House (FH) have, until recently, only provided aggregated scores. However, here there is also room for optimism as other datasets with disaggregated data are now on offer, such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which we rely on heavily in this book, while the disaggregated data of some established datasets (such as the *Freedom in the World Survey*) are now publicly available.

Third, the case may be that social scientists use terms such as necessary and sufficient – or implicitly incorporate the logic of these in their formulations – without really meaning *necessary* and *sufficient* (in set-theoretical terms). That is, they stipulate their definitions in a more 'commonsensical' way. Such carelessness may be said to infuse many of the current attempts to conceptualize and classify democracy and non-democracy. This would be more disturbing than points one and two. The very essence of science is, after all, the establishment of a technical language based on sound logical premises (Sartori, 1984). Research can only become truly cumulative if the ambiguity and vagueness present in ordinary language is reduced. The commonsensical use of terms that carry a specific technical meaning should therefore be avoided.

In this book, we attempt to avoid these pitfalls by taking conceptual and methodological matters seriously. The contention is, to reiterate, that it is the thinner types of democracy that have proliferated in recent decades. We have already touched upon the theoretical impulses which have made the mapping of such regimes critical to political science. Later in the book, we endeavor to lay bare the empirical dynamics on which this proliferation is based. Yet, as this introduction should have made painstakingly clear, only an approach reminiscent of what Sartori (1970) terms the self-conscious thinker can pave the way for showing that, in today's world, the difference between different kinds of procedural democracy is of the essence. We hope to demonstrate that this point infuses all that follows.

Part I

Conceptualizing and measuring democracy

1 Defective democracy revisited

Can order be created out of the apparent chaos of competing conceptions of democracy and the alternative typologies? If so, can corresponding empirical regularities be identified in today's world? If so, how are such regularities to be explained?

In the Introduction, these three problems were formulated as a response to O'Donnell's call for scrutinizing the relationship between the constitutive components of liberal democracy. The attempt that currently comes closest to heeding O'Donnell's call is in our opinion the constructions of 'democracy with adjectives' in general (cf. Collier and Levitsky, 1997) and the 'defective democracies' research agenda of Wolfgang Merkel and associates in particular (Merkel *et al.*, 2003; Merkel, 2004). The latter group of scholars explicitly distinguishes between different democratic attributes and there is much to recommend in their attempt to incorporate and systematize some of the most frequently used subtypes of democracy found in the literature, especially the concepts of illiberal democracy and delegative democracy (Zakaria, 1997; O'Donnell, 1994). For this reason, we begin this book by reviewing the defective democracy framework. Reassessing the consequent regime types, we show that the framework suffers from what may be termed 'a radial delusion', the consequence of which is that the conceptualization of different types of democracy is not empirically fruitful and, *ipso facto*, does not offer satisfactory answers to our three research questions.

The defective democracy research agenda

The concept of defective democracy was originally introduced by Hans-Joachim Lauth (1997, see also 2004: 107–120). Lauth never provided any operationalization of his concepts but some of his German colleagues – Merkel, Puhle, Croissant, Eicher, and Thiery (2003) – have ventured further. The result has been a large body of work on defective democracies that has evolved through several stages and, in the process, seen important changes (Merkel, 1999, 2004; Merkel and Croissant, 2000; Puhle, 2006). One guideline has been constant, however: the defective democracies have consistently and deliberately been construed as diminished subtypes, based on the logic of radial concepts (more on

this below). In what follows, we focus on the most comprehensive version of the arguments, originally introduced in a co-authored book in German (Merkel *et al.*, 2003) and subsequently disseminated in English via an influential article (Merkel, 2004; see also Bogaards, 2009).[1]

Merkel's frame of reference, or root concept, is embedded[2] liberal democracy, which ties together five constitutive partial regimes (see Merkel, 2004: 38–42):

- elections (regular, free, general, equal, and fair elections)
- political liberties (freedom of speech, opinion, association, demonstration, and petition)
- civil rights (equal access to and treatment by the law and protection against illegitimate arrest, exile, terror, torture, and unjustifiable intervention into personal life)
- horizontal accountability (lawful government action checked by the division of power between mutually interdependent and autonomous legislative, executive, and judiciary bodies)
- effective power to govern (effective right to rule placed by elected officials).

On this basis, Merkel makes a distinction between four diminished subtypes of defective democracies (2004: 49–50):

- 'Exclusive democracy' is defined by the exclusion of one or more segments of the population from the civil right of universal suffrage.
- 'Domain democracy' is defined by the existence of veto powers, that is, certain political domains are restricted from the democratically elected representatives.
- 'Illiberal democracy' denotes a regime where executive and legislative control is only weakly limited by the judiciary, constitutional norms have little binding impact on government actions, and individual civil rights are partially suspended or not yet established.
- 'Delegative democracy' denotes a regime in which the legislative and the judiciary have only limited control over the executive branch, while the actions of the government – often headed by a charismatic president – are rarely committed to constitutional norms.

As diminished subtypes, the four kinds of defective democracy divide the different properties between them so that each pure type of defective democracy is defined by the attribute (partial regime) it lacks. It is thus with these concepts as with Tolstoy's families: happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. In Merkel's case, the primary category of embedded democracy represents the happy families, which are all alike, the many diminished subtypes the unhappy families, which are – every one of them – unhappy in their own ways.[3]

Yet, even though Merkel emphasizes the strong interdependence of all the aspects of liberal democracy, the electoral attribute functions as a *primus inter*

pares among the partial regimes. The reason is two-fold. First, it is the clearest expression of the very core of democracy, namely the sovereignty of the people. Second, and consequently, it provides the basic criterion for distinguishing democracies from autocracies (Merkel, 2004: 36–38). Countries without meaningful elections, that is, where the electoral regime is more than moderately defective, are deemed autocratic and are thus not ordered in the typology of defective democracies. As an additional criterion, countries violating one or more of the other attributes to an extreme degree are also disqualified from the set (Merkel, 2004: 55; Merkel *et al.*, 2003: 74–75).

Despite the impressive effort to conceptualize the notion of defective democracy, some critical remarks are warranted. First, although Merkel *et al.* (2003: 76–95) provide guidance on how to distinguish between defective democracies and autocracies, it is not very precise. In their empirical work, they frequently base their distinctions on ad hoc considerations. Second, the match between partial regimes and subtypes is not perfect as only four subtypes are constructed from a distinction between five partial regimes. Third, the construction of one of the subtypes, exclusive democracy, does not correspond to the general definition of defective democracies: political regimes with well-functioning elections but limited defects in one or more of the *other* partial regimes (cf. Merkel *et al.*, 2003: 15). Fourth, some subcomponents are linked to more than one partial regime – for example, political participation rights (linked to both elections and civil rights) and independent judiciary (linked to both civil rights and horizontal accountability). That said, the typology has much to offer conceptually. The analytical utility of the typology must, however, also be tested empirically.

From conceptualization to measurement

The creators of the defective democracy typology originally stated that it is not possible to identify the subtypes through a quantitative approach focusing on a large number of cases. The argument was that the standard democracy indices, such as those provided by Freedom House, Polity IV, and Vanhanen, were not suitable for measuring the analytical root concept of liberal democracy or, for that matter, the relevant partial regimes (Merkel *et al.*, 2003: 293).

The disaggregated data compiled in the so-called *Bertelsmann Transformation Index* (BTI) changed that, however. The BTI has been published biannually since 2005 (so far covering the years 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009) and it includes what the BTI terms 'developing and transformation countries', that is, what are, according to the OECD, non-donor, sovereign countries with more than two million inhabitants.

Below, we use the BTI to order the developing countries in the defective democracy typology. As it is a relatively new dataset, a description of the data-generation process is warranted. Each of the countries included in the various versions of the BTI are initially treated in a country report, which analyzes the country's performance on a total of 17 criteria (broken down into 49 questions). The actual index is based on a questionnaire on these 49 questions, each of

which are scored on a scale ranging from 10 (best) to 1 (worst) by a country expert. The questions are grouped into various clusters, such as Stateness, Political Participation, and the Rule of Law.

The numerical ratings of the country expert are reviewed three times. First, an additional country expert scores the country independently on the 49 questions. Two regional experts then discuss these ratings and agree on ratings that reflect the differences among countries of the same region. The regional coordinators and the BTI Team subsequently convene and review ratings across regions to calibrate the scores. Insofar as a calibrated score differs significantly from that suggested by the first expert, the expert is consulted. Final rating decisions, however, are made by the BTI Board.

As laid out in the subsequent discussion, the BTI is the only dataset well-suited for our endeavors as it is amenable to achieving agreement between the definition and the measurement of both stateness and the four attributes of democracy. However, based on the standards presented by Munck and Verkuilen (2002), we also argue that the measures in themselves have a competitive edge over those presented by available datasets, such as the *Worldwide Governance Indicators* (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2009) and the *Freedom in the World Survey* (Freedom House, 2010).

The BTI thus observes a high standard with respect to its attention to detail (many components, a fine-grained scale, and a relatively precise coding manual) and the thoroughness with which these are treated. Also, its coherent framework and reliance on experts makes for measurement reliability and validity. That said, the BTI is not without problems as, *inter alia*, no formal inter-coder reliability test is carried out, some of the indicators, such as the one named civil rights, collapse a number of distinct aspects, the cross-temporal coverage is limited, and the same goes for the country coverage (the BTI 2008, covering the year 2007, includes only 125 non-OECD countries[4]) (Skaaning, 2009, 2010).

As already mentioned, the disaggregated nature of the dataset allows us to capture each of the partial regimes proposed by Merkel and his collaborators. Tellingly, several of them have been involved in the construction and development of the BTI, building upon the embedded and defective democracies framework. Also, several of them have used the data to order a large number of countries in some of their work (e.g., Brusis and Thiery, 2006; Croissant, 2008; Merkel, 2008).

One of the most important advantages of the BTI is that scores are linked directly to narrative qualifiers, which we utilize throughout the book. In what follows, we use the 2010 version (covering the year 2009) of the BTI, which includes 128 countries, to order the empirical referents in the property space created by Merkel and his associates. Subsequently, we report robustness tests for the years 2005 and 2007, that is, the two other years for which BTI contains disaggregated data.

Among the five criteria of political transformation assessed in the BTI, only eight questions linked to two of them, political participation and rule of law, are directly relevant for our purposes. The respective subcategories of these two attributes are illustrated in Table 1.1, in which we also include the indicator number used to denote each of them in the dataset.

Table 1.1 Subcategories of political participation and rule of law

Political participation	Rule of law
2.1 Free elections	3.1 Separation of powers
2.2 Democrats rule	3.2 Independent judiciary
2.3 Association/assembly rights	3.3 Prosecution of office abuse
2.4 Freedom of expression	3.4 Civil rights

If scores from more than one subcategory are used to capture one attribute, the arguments of Merkel *et al.* make it natural to consider the elements to be non-substitutable. Consequently, rather than using the average, we employ a minimum score procedure to aggregate them, as recommended by Goertz (2006) and Bowman *et al.* (2005). In the Appendix to the book, we explain why this aggregation rule is the proper one and show that using less rigorous procedures of aggregation often has consequences for the empirical results.

On each of the categories, the BTI scores a given country on an index ranging from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the highest level of accomplishment. Concerning thresholds, we employ the distinctions suggested by the four-fold hierarchy of linguistic qualifiers guiding the expert assessments in the BTI codebook. This means that we let a score of 9 or 10 denote 'no defect'; the scores 6, 7, and 8 a 'moderate defect'; the scores 3, 4, and 5 a 'severe defect', while the scores 1 and 2 signify an 'extreme defect'.[5]

However, even though the development of the BTI has been heavily inspired by the work of Merkel *et al.* (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2006), it is not completely straightforward to connect the subcategory scores to the different defects emphasized by the German scholars. Table 1.2 shows the marked differences between Merkel's, Puhle's, and Croissant's respective operationalizations, based on personal communication and inferred from some of their later works (Croissant, 2008; Puhle, 2005). To be sure, Merkel, Puhle, and Croissant fully agree in assigning four BTI subcategories, namely elections (2.1), effective power to govern[6] (2.2), separation of powers (3.1), and civil rights (3.4). But with regard to association/assembly rights (2.3), freedom of expression (2.4), independent judiciary (3.2), and prosecution of office abuse (3.3), the three founding fathers seem to disagree, as illustrated in Table 1.2.

The empirical consequences of these differences are noteworthy. Merkel's and Puhle's apportionments of the various indicators lead to the identification of 77 and 76 democracies (liberal or defective), respectively; Croissant's more demanding electoral recipe only to 63. These countries are, to reiterate, characterized by no or only moderate defects on the electoral attribute and no extreme defects on any of the other attributes. In our operationalization, this means that they score at least 6 on the electoral dimension and at least 3 on the other dimensions (see Table 1.2).

Table 1.3 shows the distribution of cases between the 16 pure and mixed types that emerge when the matching compound of attributes is unfolded.

Table 1.2 Linking defective subtypes to BTI subcategories

	Exclusive democracy	*Domain democracy*	*Delegative democracy*	*Illiberal democracy*
Merkel	2.1 Elections	2.2 Effective power to govern	3.1 Separation of powers 3.2 Independent judiciary	2.3 Association/assembly rights 2.4 Freedom of expression 3.4 Civil rights
Puhle	2.1 Elections	2.2 Effective power to govern	3.1 Separation of powers	2.3 Association/assembly rights 2.4 Freedom of expression 3.2 Independent judiciary 3.3 Prosecution of office abuse 3.4 Civil rights
Croissant	2.1 Elections 2.3 Association/assembly rights 2.4 Freedom of expression	2.2 Effective power to govern	3.1 Separation of powers 3.3 Prosecution of office abuse	3.2 Independent judiciary 3.4 Civil rights

Note
The categories listed under each type are – by definition – defective.

Table 1.3 The stringent empirical ordering of defective democracies, 2009

		Inclusive elections		Exclusive elections	
		Liberal	Illiberal	Liberal	Illiberal
Effective power to govern	Control of executive	**11**	**2**	**0**	**0**
		5	*13*	*0*	*1*
		5	0	0	0
		Liberal democracy	Illiberal democracy	Exclusive democracy	
	Delegative	**1**	**9**	**0**	**7**
		0	*5*	*0*	*6*
		6	2	1	16
		Delegative democracy			
Veto powers	Control of executive	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
		0	*3*	*0*	*1*
		0	0	0	0
		Domain democracy			
	Delegative	**0**	**10**	**0**	**37**
		0	*7*	*0*	*35*
		0	1	0	32

Examples of pure diminished subtypes are to be found in the shaded categories, whereas the root concept of liberal democracy is captured by the polar type in the upper-left corner. **Bold** is used to highlight the count based on our operationalization of Merkel, *italics* the count based on Puhle, and normal the count based on Croissant.

Besides the striking discord, notice that none of the three operationalizations lead to the identification of any instances of exclusive democracy or domain democracy. Concerning delegative democracy, only one, nil, and six referents, respectively, are identified. Finally, the corresponding figures for illiberal democracy are two, 13, and nil. Thus, none of the procedures lend significant support to the empirical existence of pure subtypes except in one case, Puhle's illiberal democracies. All the other defective democracies are mixed types, and almost half of them are situated in the lower-right polar type, indicating that they are defective in every way possible – given the general rules for inclusion in the typology.

However, echoing Weber, Merkel *et al.* (2003: 69) explicitly state that mixed forms are expected to dominate the social world, implying that pure types are necessarily exceptional. As a way to overcome this problem, they suggest that it is possible to let the subtypes subsume existing defective democracies by deciding which partial regime is violated the most. This proposal represents a qualification of the dichotomous understanding of defects applied above. Nonetheless, we adjust our measurement to capture this pragmatic logic by using the four linguistic qualifiers attached to the BTI scores, thus distinguishing between the different levels of infringements, in this case between moderate and severe defects.[7] The results are illustrated in Table 1.4.

The table shows that even this – intrinsically questionable – move assigns few referents to the types of exclusive democracy and domain democracy, which remain almost completely empty.[8] In the cases of Merkel and Croissant, the type of delegative democracy becomes somewhat more relevant, empirically speaking, and in the case of Puhle, the number of illiberal democracies gets even higher in both relative and absolute terms. However, the differences between the three scholars persist. In fact, they are accentuated even further – and no clear pattern in support of the framework emerges.

Table 1.4 The pragmatic empirical ordering of defective democracies, 2009

	Exclusive democracy	*Domain democracy*	*Illiberal democracy*	*Delegative democracy*	*Defective democracy*
Merkel	0 (0)	2 (0)	2 (2)	18 (1)	66
Puhle	0 (0)	0 (0)	22 (13)	2 (0)	71
Croissant	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	14 (6)	58

Note
Figures in parentheses refer to the number of cases linked to the pure types through the previous operationalization procedure.

Does this conclusion hold for the two other years for which it can be tested (using the BTI), namely 2005 and 2007? To keep this chapter from swelling, we do not reproduce the full tables for these years.[9] It turns out that the picture for these two years is virtually identical to that in 2009, especially considering the fact that the BTI only included 125 countries in 2007 and 119 in 2005. In the stringent orderings for 2005 and 2007, we once again encounter very few specimens of the four defective subtypes. Not surprisingly, the numbers are higher with the pragmatic orderings – but as in 2009 almost no instances of exclusive democracy and domain democracy come into existence even when focusing on mixed rather than pure types. Bearing these observations in mind, it is time to take stock of the general merits of Merkel and his associates' typological constructs.

The radial delusion

Even though the discussed typology of defective democracies has considerable conceptual purchase, empirically it is somewhat disappointing. In a nutshell, most of the theoretically important types contained few or no empirical referents when pinning one's faith in the BTI. This empirical inadequacy flows from an underlying conceptual difficulty, which we term 'the radial delusion'. It was inaugurated in 1993 when Collier and Mahon published their otherwise seminal elaboration of Giovanni Sartori's ladder of abstraction. In the article, Collier and Mahon contrasted Sartori's (1970) classical categorization – based on the Aristotelian notions of necessity and sufficiency – with two other logical treatments of concepts, namely Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblance', which can be ignored for our purposes, and Lakoff's (1987) notion of 'radial categories'. To elaborate, a classical categorization is one:

> in which the relation among categories is understood in terms of a taxonomic hierarchy of successively more general categories. ... Each category possesses clear boundaries and defining properties that are shared by all members and that serve to locate it in the hierarchy.
>
> (Collier and Mahon 1993: 845)

With radial concepts, this logic is turned on its head. Such concepts do not exhibit the described hierarchy. The core of a radial concept is not found at the most abstract level but in a central subcategory containing all the defining attributes of the concepts – recall the analogy to Tolstoy's happy families. The more abstract versions of the concept should be seen as subsets of this primary category. As Collier and Mahon (1993: 848) explain, 'they do not share the full complement of attributes by which we would recognize the overall category, as they do with classical categories. Rather, they *divide* them'. These subsets are thus the many unhappy families which are each unhappy in their own way.

This equals saying that – as opposed to a classical categorization – no *one* necessary and sufficient condition, placed at the highest level of generality, can be identified. Important for our purposes, Collier and Mahon (1993: 848–50) use the concept of democracy to exemplify this radial logic. Their illustrative point is that democracy has no thin core, only a number of juxtaposed attributes; all of which must be present to make for democracy proper. The task, therefore, becomes one of creating diminished subtypes from this central category, subtypes placed at a higher level of generality.

As already hinted, there is absolutely nothing wrong with this logic. On the contrary, it clearly sharpens the general tools available for our conceptual endeavors. The problem is much more particular, namely that Collier and Mahon – we argue below in this and the subsequent chapter – misconstrued democracy when highlighting it as a specimen of radial concepts. Much of the literature has been led astray by this notion, turning the typological game into one of creating diminished subtypes from a primary, radial category.

This is exactly what Merkel and his associates do as their type of embedded liberal democracy, tying together all the partial regimes, constitutes such a radial category. But as we have also seen, their conception of democracy does in fact conform to the notion of hierarchy in one very important respect: the status of the electoral criterion differs from the other criteria. In fact, in the defective democracy typology, the noun, democracy, denotes only the presence of meaningful elections. This means that the electoral attribute is construed as a necessary and sufficient condition for democracy,[10] whereas the other attributes (when absent) are only necessary conditions for the respective adjectives. There is one qualification to this criterion, namely the very few cases where the observance of the electoral attribute goes hand in hand with an extreme defect on any of the other attributes. But this is a small exception which does not change the fact that the electoral attribute is construed as the most important.

Our contention is that it makes more sense to spell out the hierarchic structure of the construction. As Merkel also recognizes, it is very difficult to imagine using the word democracy to denote a concept if it does not contain the electoral attribute (see also Collier and Adcock, 1999: 559). Literally, this would entail naming a diminished subtype, which has one or more of the other attributes, yet lacks the electoral, 'non-electoral democracy', when using the missing attribute to name the construct. Intuitively, this does not make sense because elections are the *condiciones sine quibus non* of democracy (Lindberg, 2006: 37; Bogaards, 2007: 85). Tellingly, Collier and Levitsky (1996) situate subtypes defined by the absence of free elections, such as 'facade democracy' and 'sham democracy', not within the spectrum of democracies but within the category of 'nondemocratic regimes'.

In fact, in their exemplification of the radial logic, Collier and Mahon (1993) place the electoral attribute (effective political participation) on a different footing than the other attributes. We take this as a tacit acknowledgment that democracy cannot be conceptualized without some appreciation of hierarchy between the attributes.

Conclusions

To sum up, the conceptually impressive radial edifice of Merkel and collaborators does not allow us to assess the empirical dimension of O'Donnell's inquiry. The empirical referents simply do not clump in the diminished subtypes of embedded liberal democracy – and this for the deceptively simple reason that some kind of empirical hierarchy seems to infuse the distribution across the defining attributes of embedded democracy highlighted by Merkel *et al.*

We therefore argue that it is pertinent to embrace Sartori's classical, Aristotelian logic when moving along the ladder of abstraction with a view to creating a typology of democracy and non-democracy that allows us to respond adequately to O'Donnell's plea, stated in the Introduction. Our point of departure is that the electoral criterion is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for democracy and that, *ipso facto*, any country exhibiting the presence of this attribute should be counted as an instance of democracy.

In the subsequent chapter, we use this combination of deductive reasoning about the electoral focal point of democracy and the inductive observations about the lack of empirical instances of the diminished subtypes as a stepping stone to create a hierarchical alternative. Rather than construing the various subtypes as semi-democracies and only the root concept as democracy proper, we thus distinguish between thinner types of democracy, placed on a relatively high level of abstraction, and thicker types of democracy, placed on a relatively low level of abstraction. This also allows us to observe another critical point which emerged from our reassessment of the Merkel edifice: that it is pertinent to work with a clear dividing line between democracy and autocracy at the highest level of generality.[11]

2 Conceptualizing and measuring democracy I

Toward a classical typology

The attempt to capture the reality on the ground using diminished subtypes of liberal – or embedded – democracy proves unsatisfactory. This is the conclusion of Chapter 1. A different take on O'Donnell's request about examining the relationship between attributes of democracy is thus warranted. In this chapter, we demonstrate that a typology based on Sartori's (1970) classical categorization allows us to embed extant constructs such as electoral and illiberal democracy into a comprehensive property space, while rectifying the imbalances of Merkel (2004; Merkel *et al.*, 2003).

More particularly, the typology[1] presented in this chapter is based on the three attributes of electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law. This tripartite division mirrors the development within the field in the latest decades as it embraces the distinctions between the electoral core (free elections) described by Schumpeter (1974 [1942]), Dahl's (1989) political rights elaboration (freedom of speech, assembly, and association), and O'Donnell's (2001, 2004a, 2004b) rule of law addition. The Dahlian liberties are included in most contemporary conceptualizations of democracy (Diamond *et al.*, 1989: xvi; Huntington, 1991; Collier and Levitsky, 1997) but the rule of law attribute, too, has made significant inroads into democratic theory in the latest decades (e.g., Diamond, 1999: 11–12; Holmes, 1995; Merkel, 2004; Schedler *et al.*, 1999).

In the next chapter, we discuss just how far it is possible to expand the Schumpeterian definition. But in this chapter we take the tripartition described above as a given. To say this slightly differently, we accept the conceptual distinctions developed by O'Donnell in order to deliver the empirical research about the relationship among the constituent components of liberal democracy that he has called for (see the Introduction). Reflecting on the Schumpeterian tradition, O'Donnell (2001: 13–14) thus points out that '[r]ealistic definitions of democracy, then, contain two components. The first spells out the attributes of elections that are considered fair. … The second lists conditions, designated as freedoms, guarantees, or "primary political rights", that surround fair elections.' He then goes on to argue that 'the combined effect of the freedoms listed by Dahl and other authors (expression, association, and access to information) cannot fully guarantee that elections will be fair'. It is on this basis that he

introduces a third attribute, namely 'a legal system that enacts and backs the universalistic and inclusive assignment of these rights and obligations' (O'Donnell, 2001: 18).

A conceptual typology

As in the case of Merkel (2004), our ordering can be said to rest on a general electoral premise. However, we avoid inconsistencies in the treatment of this attribute by relaxing the definitional requirements of (minimalist) democracy. It is thus not free, fair, and fully inclusive elections but the mere presence of effective electoral competition that makes for inclusion in the overarching class of democracy (see Figure 2.1 below).

As we explained in the Introduction, this criterion conforms to Schumpeter's (1974 [1942]: 269) famous definition of democracy as 'that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote'. Such is – as also explained previously – the case because Schumpeter explicitly presents leeway for grouping a country as a case of democracy if the election is characterized by what we term 'moderate defects' in the quality of elections[2] (see Elklit and Reynolds, 2005) or in the effective power to govern[3] (see Valenzuela, 1992).

However, we also wish to include the autocracies in our ordering and we therefore unfold Merkel's implicit serial operation with regard to the Schumpeterian electoral attribute, dividing it into three classes: 1) elections without defects, corresponding to free and fair elections which, in the words of O'Donnell (2004a: 14), are decisive;[4] 2) elections with moderate defects, corresponding to meaningful electoral competition with uncertain outcomes/winners but with some shortcoming or modest restrains in the effective power to govern; and 3) no meaningful elections. This separate treatment of the electoral attribute is justified by its status as the very core of democracy, which places it in a league of its own.[5]

To establish correspondence between the consequent types and the said thinner and thicker conceptualizations of democracy prevalent in the literature, the other two attributes are dichotomized based on their presence or absence. The first comprises the Dahlian political liberties of freedom of expression, association, and assembly. The second comprises the O'Donnellian qualifications of horizontal accountability and civil rights, such as judicial independence and due process.

Concerning nomenclature, we name the former attribute 'political liberties' and indicate its presence with '+' and its absence with '−'. The same distinction is made with respect to the latter attribute, which we term the 'rule of law'.[6] Drawing on O'Donnell (1999, 2004b), we consider the rule of law to be defined by the following properties: the legal system upholds political and civil rights for the whole population, and all public and private agents are subject to appropriate, legally established controls of the lawfulness of their acts, that is, no one is *de legibus solutus*.

Table 2.1 further below illustrates the consequent conceptual property space, comprising 12 types (cells). The polar type in the upper-left corner (cell 1) works as a frame of reference as it makes up the polar type of liberal democracy, defined by the presence of all three attributes (no defects) and corresponding to the thickest definition of democracy in our setup. The polar type in the lower-right corner (cell 12) can be construed as illiberal autocracy or autocracy proper. It is defined by the absence of all three properties, meaning that it works as an explicit contrary in the spirit of Sartori (1970: 1042; see also Goertz, 2006: 30–32).

Other than that, three successively thinner types of democracy can be situated within the property space. First, the type that captures Dahl's (1971, 1989) construct of polyarchy[7] (cell 4). If named with reference to its absent attribute, this type can also be construed as O'Donnell's (1994, 2001) delegative democracy as it combines the presence of elections with no defects and political liberties (no defects) with the absence of the rule of law. Second, a type that captures – among others – Vanhanen's (1984: 11)[8] construct of pure electoral democracy (cell 10). If named with reference to its absent attribute, it can also be construed as Zakaria's construct of illiberal democracy. This type combines the presence of free elections of the political power holders with the absence of both political liberties and the rule of law. Third, we have the type reflecting an absolute minimalist, Schumpeterian notion of democracy (cell 11). It combines the presence of elections with moderate defects with the absence of both political liberties and the rule of law. If named with reference to its absent attributes, one might consider using Levitsky and Way's (2002) concept of competitive authoritarianism.[9]

To relate these conceptualizations explicitly to the ladder of abstraction – on which they are based – each step down to a lower rung is performed by the addition of criteria. All liberal democracies, placed at the bottom of the ladder, also fulfill the respective criteria of polyarchy, electoral democracy, and minimalist democracy; all polyarchies also fulfill the respective criteria of electoral democracy and minimalist democracy; and all electoral democracies fulfill the criteria of minimalist democracy.

That is, the typology zealously observes the Aristotelian notion that the defining attributes on each rung are necessary and – either alone or in conjunction with other attributes – sufficient for the respective types. In Table 2.1, the types are named after the 'most demanding', or thickest, category they qualify as. This means that, for instance, type 4 is named polyarchy even though it – logically – also meets the criteria for electoral democracy and minimalist democracy (but not for liberal democracy).

In Figure 2.1, this classical categorization is illustrated in the context of the ladder of abstraction.[10]

The empirical picture

Once again, this is only the conceptual side of the coin. The pivotal question is whether the notion of hierarchy also makes sense empirically. The former analysis

Figure 2.1 Descending the ladder of abstraction to construct types of democracy.

of defective democracies does indeed point to the existence of some such hier-archy on the ground. For even though the diminished subtypes of Merkel (2004; Merkel *et al.*, 2003) divide the defining properties between them, they do not divide the empirical referents. This indicates that the thresholds delimiting the presence of the other defining attributes are fulfilled in a particular sequence, one which groups the countries in only some of the diminished subtypes. In what follows, we provide a more systematic test of the hierarchic nature of the ordering.

Regarding the operationalization of the types, we stay as close as possible to the reassessment of Merkel's typology. First, we once again employ the BTI data that refer to 2009, which allow us to score 128 transformation and developing countries on our three attributes. Second, we basically keep the thresholds from Chapter 1, albeit on the three attributes of electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law, which are not fully identical to the attributes emphasized by Merkel *et al.* Third, countries scoring 6 or better on the electoral attribute (see below) are included in the class of democracy as this threshold demarcates elec-tions with moderate defects. Fourth, we once again use the minimum rule to

aggregate subcomponent scores as we hold that the different attributes are constitutive but should not be seen as mutually substitutable.

More particularly, we anchor our ordering in the descriptions in the BTI codebook. On all indicators, the codebook distinguishes between four levels of fulfillment that we refer to using the terms of no defects, moderate defects, severe defects, and extreme defects, respectively. Hence, election without defects is obtained by the scores 9–10 and elections with moderate defects by the scores 6–8.

Harking back to the BTI indicators listed in Table 1.1, the electoral attribute comprises the subcomponents free elections (2.1) and democrats rule (2.2). The other two attributes – political liberties and the rule of law – are operationalized as either present (scores of 9 or 10) or absent (score of 8 or lower). In terms of the BTI indicators, political liberties subsume the subcomponents association/ assembly rights (2.3) and freedom of expression (2.4), whereas the rule of law subsumes the subcomponents separation of powers (3.1), independent judiciary (3.2), prosecution of office abuse (3.3), and civil rights (3.4).

The consequent empirical distribution for 2009 is illustrated in Table 2.1.

Out of the 128 countries included in the BTI, 70 achieve a score of 6 or higher on the electoral attribute and thus qualify as democracies. Five countries have no defects at all, namely Chile, Estonia, Slovenia, Taiwan, and Uruguay. These countries are situated in the polar type of liberal democracy. The reason that it contains so relatively few referents is that the BTI does not cover the 'old' OECD countries. As shown in the robustness tests below, most of these would also inhabit this type if included in the ordering.

The opposite polar type of illiberal autocracy – or autocracy proper – houses no less than 57 cases. The type that captures the Dahlian construct of polyarchy contains eight countries, while the category electoral democracy subsumes ten countries. Finally, the type reflecting an absolute minimalist Schumpeterian notion of democracy houses no less than 45 countries.

In the final section of the chapter, we identify all the 68 countries classified in the four different types of democracy. But notice two stark contrasts to the ordering proposed by Merkel and his collaborators. First, all of these types of democracy are empirically meaningful, as are the two polar types of liberal democracy and illiberal autocracy. Second, only three countries fall in any of the other types.[11]

Consequently, the empirical distribution almost completely conforms to the logic of what Bailey (1973) terms a perfect simple order scale since there are (virtually) no tie scores on the properties.[12] Any country obtaining the attribute of the rule of law (no defects) necessarily obtains the attributes of political liberties (no defects) and elections without defects. Likewise, with the three exceptions noted above, any country obtaining the attribute of political liberties necessarily obtains the attribute of elections without defects. Conversely, with only three exceptions, any country failing to obtain the attribute of elections with no defects is characterized by the absence of the other two attributes.

Table 2.1 Ordering the cases in the typology of democracy and non-democracy, 2009

		Elections without defects	*Elections with moderate defects*	*No meaningful elections*
+ Political liberties	+ Rule of law	5 Liberal democracy	0 Minimalist democracy	0 Autocracy
	– Rule of law	8 Polyarchy	2 Minimalist democracy	1 Autocracy
– Political liberties	+ Rule of law	0 Electoral democracy	0 Minimalist democracy	0 Autocracy
	– Rule of law	10 Electoral democracy	45 Minimalist democracy	57 Illiberal autocracy

Source: BTI 2010.

With only three exceptions (out of 128!), the scale thus stretches from one corner of the typology to the other, that is, from the polar type of liberal democracy to that of illiberal autocracy. More technically, the coefficient of reproducibility (henceforth CR) conventionally used to assess the strength of such a hierarchical pattern is no less than 0.98 (125/128). This is equivalent to saying that a very clear hierarchy, stretching far beyond the electoral premise, is in fact discernable on the ground. The order is this: the thin electoral attribute (moderate defects) is most easily obtained; subsequently we encounter the thick electoral attribute (no defects); thereafter the political liberties attribute (no defects); and finally the rule of law attribute (no defects). The five types that conform to this hierarchical logic are shaded in Table 2.1.

Are the findings robust?

The empirical regularities of the typological ordering are extremely evident. But, one might object, this could be a result of tailoring the threshold or of the choice of dataset. To avoid such speculations, and to support the reliability of the analysis, we test the robustness of the findings in two steps. First, we use the BTI data for 2005 and 2007. Second, we reorder the referents using the *Freedom in the World* (FH) survey provided by Freedom House. The reason we have chosen the FH is that it is the only other widely employed dataset that makes it possible to distinguish the three attributes of electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law. The other predominant democracy measure, Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009), does not include the two latter criteria.

The BTI robustness test is straightforward as the dataset and our procedures have already been described – in Table 2.2, the results cover the years 2005 (*italic*) and 2007 (**bold**). The findings do not differ much. As illustrated in Table 2.2, the number of exceptions was also three in 2007, whereas an additional five exceptions were present in the ordering referring to 2005. Consequently, the respective coefficients of reproducibility are still impressive, namely 0.98 (122/125) for 2007 and 0.93 (111/119) for 2005, thus strongly supporting the existence of a hierarchical logic to the ordering.

The FH robustness tests require some elaboration. First and foremost, they are not possible to carry out using FH's general distinction between political rights and civil liberties, the latter of which combines both political liberties and the rule of law.[13] However, since FH chose to release their subcomponent scores, beginning in 2006 (covering 2005), it has indeed become possible to distinguish among the three attributes using these disaggregated measures. We once again use the scores for 2005, 2007, and 2009. To mirror the BTI operationalization as closely as possible, the electoral attribute is covered by the component *Electoral Process*, used by FH itself to designate electoral democracies.[14] The political liberties attribute is covered by the components *Freedom of Expression and Belief* and *Associational and Organizational Rights*. Finally, the rule of law attribute is covered by the component *Rule of Law*.

Table 2.2 Ordering the cases in the typology of democracy and non-democracy, 2005 and 2007

		Elections without defects	*Elections with moderate defects*	*No meaningful elections*
+ Political liberties	+ Rule of law	*5* **6** Liberal democracy	*1* **0** Minimalist democracy	*0* **0** Autocracy
	– Rule of law	*11* **10** Polyarchy	*6* **2** Minimalist democracy	*1* **1** Autocracy
– Political liberties	+ Rule of law	*0* **0** Electoral democracy	*0* **0** Minimalist democracy	*0* **0** Autocracy
	– Rule of law	*9* **13** Electoral democracy	*33* **36** Minimalist democracy	*53* **57** Illiberal autocracy

Sources: BTI 2006 (*italic*) and BTI 2008 (**bold**).

Regarding thresholds, matters are a bit more complicated than in the case of the BTI as we do not have any linguistic qualifiers to rely on; an absence for which the FH has – with good reason – been criticized (e.g., Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). This is, in fact, the main reason that we use BTI rather than FH in the analysis proper, despite the fact that FH offers a wider empirical scope. Once again, we have employed a minimum score procedure to aggregate them when needed. Because the different components are not measured on the same range, we have first recalibrated the scores from 0–100. We rerun the empirical analysis with a threshold of 85 to mark the presence of elections without defects, political liberties, and the rule of law and the additional threshold of 55 for elections with moderate defects.[15]

As illustrated in Table 2.3, we encounter more misfits to the hierarchical pattern than was the case in the BTI orderings. Using the FH data for 2009 (normal), eight countries defy this pattern, five of them inhabiting the by now familiar type which combines elections with moderate defects with a status of no defects on political liberties. In the case of the FH ordering for 2005 (*italics*) and 2007 (**bold**), the equivalent numbers are 11 and eight. Out of these, eight and five, respectively, reside in the type that combines elections with moderate defects and no defects on political liberties.

However, the FH 2009 contains more than 190 referents – around a third more than the BTI – because it includes small countries and the developed Western countries. This adds a dimension to the robustness test. Hence, it is all the more striking that the coefficients of reproducibility using the FH data are approximately similar to those based on the BTI, namely 0.96 (186/194) for 2009, 0.96 (185/193) for 2007, and 0.94 (181/192) for 2005.

As the rule of thumb says that a CR higher than 0.85 indicates a strong simple order scale, we conclude that the hierarchical pattern is indeed robust, both across different years and across different datasets. What these additional analyses do indicate, however, is that the one commonly encountered aberration, combining elections with moderate defects and no defects on political liberties, may be theoretically interesting.

Reintroducing scales

The fact that we have demonstrated the empirical existence of a simple order scale is worth elaborating as it allows for various more specific uses of the constructed typology. Such a scale is strongly one-dimensional and characterized by a unique way to reach any combination of attributes if these are awarded a particular score (see Bailey, 1973).

This has several interesting consequences. First, the property space of the typology is easy to reduce. When such a simple order scale exists empirically, one does not need to resort to more sophisticated techniques, such as weighting different attributes to combine them into a composite index that treats the same aggregate scores as equivalent.[16] Rather, one may resort to simple, functional reduction (i.e., deleting the empty cells), which allows one to preserve the notion

Table 2.3 Ordering based on FH data, 2005, 2007, and 2009

		Elections without defects	Elections with moderate defects	No meaningful elections
+ Political liberties	+ Rule of law	*41* **39** 40 Liberal democracy	*2* **2** 1 Minimalist democracy	*0* **0** 0 Autocracy
	− Rule of law	*20* **26** 24 Polyarchy	*8* **5** 5 Minimalist democracy	*0* **0** 0 Autocracy
− Political liberties	+ Rule of law	*1* **1** 2 Electoral democracy	*0* **0** 0 Minimalist democracy	*0* **0** 0 Autocracy
	− Rule of law	*14* **16** 14 Electoral democracy	*38* **34** 33 Minimalist democracy	*68* **70** 75 Illiberal autocracy

Sources: FH 2006 (*italic*), FH 2008 (**bold**), and FH 2010 (normal).

of a hierarchy among the attributes. Second, the systematic sequencing in attribute fulfillment allows us to take advantage of two recommendations of Collier and Adcock (1999). They emphasize that it sometimes makes sense to conceptualize 'democratization as a sequence of steps, rather than as a single event', an approach that 'in effect introduces gradations' (ibid.: 552). Subsequently, they point out that a sharper differentiation can be provided by combining gradations with named categories, thus creating an ordinal scale based on a limited number of categories (ibid.: 560).[17]

These two options can be combined when a perfect simple order scale has been established. Because there are virtually no exceptions, the scale can be construed as an ordinal scale stretching from the thinner to the thicker types of democracy.

Hence, we have come full circle (considering the endeavor to disaggregate the concept of democracy into its constitutive attributes). For what we argue here is that the presence of a nearly perfect simple order scale – based on a careful dissecting of the constituent attributes of liberal democracy as laid out by O'Donnell in particular – allows us to create a one-dimensional index of democracy. This is related to what Collier elsewhere (Collier and Levitsky, 1996) terms a 'perfect cumulative scale'. Collier points out that the extant definitions of democracy do not completely lend themselves to such scaling but also points out that any such ordering has the great merit of 'giving structure to the conceptual innovations' (ibid.: 10) that can be deduced from democratic theory.

As announced in the Introduction, we have thus provided a tentative answer to O'Donnell's request for dealing with the issue of whether and how it would be possible or convenient to reduce the different dimensions of democracy to some kind of index. Our answer is that such a scale can indeed be constructed. Notice, however, that this conclusion can only be reached on the basis of the typological exercises. Moreover, the scale has to be an ordinal scale. An interval scale is not fully supported – or at least requires additional assumptions – because that would entail assigning weights to the attributes. The great advantage of a perfect simple order scale is in fact that the weights are irrelevant 'as long as the countries' ratings match the perfect scale types' (Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990: 56).

Table 2.4 illustrates the consequent ordinal scale of democracy[18] as well as the empirical referents assigned to each class. We here use the BTI ordering for 2009.

Notice that the aggregate scores of 4, 3, 2, and 1 tell us much more than that, say, the Czech Republic (with a score of 3) ranks higher than, say, Bulgaria (with a score of 2). If one knows the score of a country on the scale, one can reproduce the country's ratings on each of the attributes (cf. Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990: 61). To elaborate, an aggregate score of 3 means that the country in question has elections without defects and political liberties but lacks the rule of law (2,1,0) – no other empirical combinations produces this score. Similarly, an aggregate score of 2 necessarily means that the country in question has elections without defects but lacks both political liberties and the rule of law (2,0,0).[19]

Table 2.4 Linking the cases to the democracy types, 2009 (BTI)

Liberal democracy (2,1,1)	Polyarchy (2,1,0)	Electoral democracy (2,0,0)	Minimalist democracy (1,0,0)
Chile	Costa Rica	Argentina	Albania
Estonia	Czech Republic	Benin	Bolivia
Slovenia	Hungary	Botswana	Bosnia
Taiwan	Jamaica	Brazil	Burkina Faso
Uruguay	Latvia	Bulgaria	Burundi
	Lithuania	Croatia	Central African Republic
	Poland	Montenegro	Colombia
	Slovakia	Romania	Dominican Republic
		Serbia	Ecuador
		South Korea	El Salvador
			Georgia
			Ghana
			Guatemala
			Haiti
			Honduras
			Indonesia
			Kenya
			Kosovo
			Lesotho
			Liberia
			Macedonia
			Madagascar
			Malawi
			Mali
			Mexico
			Moldova
			Mongolia
			Mozambique Namibia
			Nepal
			Nicaragua
			Niger
			Panama
			Paraguay
			Peru
			Russia
			Senegal
			Sierra Leone
			South Africa
			Sri Lanka
			Tanzania
			Turkey
			Uganda
			Ukraine
			Zambia

Notice, also, that the conceptual point about all liberal democracies also being polyarchies, electoral democracies, and minimalist democracies cannot be carried over into this scaling. The point here is exactly that the scale is anchored in the unique combinations across the attributes, meaning that one and only one combination here makes for, say, electoral democracy (2,0,0). This does not obfuscate the prior conceptual point about thicker categories subsuming their thinner equivalents. However, the point is that the scale only reflects the pure version of this general hierarchy.

Obviously, similar scales could be constructed for the robustness tests based on other years and/or the FH data. For the sake of illustration – and for the benefit of those who have more faith in the competing index – we present the proper names of the referents in the ordinal scale of thinner and thicker types of democracy using the FH data for 2009 in Table 2.5 below.

Finally, a caveat deserves mentioning. The particular classifications of referents are of course no better than the quality of the employed datasets. If the designation of individual countries seems baffling to some area experts, this might be the reason. Moreover, if one compares the distribution of countries covered by both datasets, there is clearly not full agreement about the ordering into types of democracy.[20] However, we are primarily interested in the hierarchy of the countries on the identified properties of democracy, rather than in comparing the regime types of particular countries. Differently said, though some readers may feel that the view of the trees gets lost in the picture of the forest, we, on the contrary, seek to avoid the situation in which one cannot see the forest for the trees in the first place.

Conclusions

We have attempted to provide the research on the empirical relationship between the constitutive components of liberal democracy that O'Donnell has recently called for. In Chapter 1, we revisited the best current offer on the market, that is, the typology of defective democracy. In doing so, we identified a salient problem which we termed 'the radial delusion'. On that basis, we made the case for an explicitly hierarchical corrective in this chapter. Rather than ascending the ladder of abstraction from a primary radial category, we descended it from a primary classical category.

This equals saying that, instead of construing the types in the grey zone (Carothers, 2002) between liberal democracy and autocracy proper as semi-democracies (or semi-autocracies for that matter), we construe them as thinner types of democracy. This is possible because the famous electoral definition of Schumpeter (1974 [1942]), the stepping stone for most of the contemporary conceptualizations of democracy, is more minimalist than is normally acknowledged. In gist, Schumpeter explicitly allows restrictions with regard to the quality of elections (including universal suffrage) and implicitly with regard to tutelary powers. His definition is therefore based on meaningful electoral competition only (what we term moderately defective elections).

Table 2.5 Linking the cases to the democracy types, 2009 (FH)

Liberal democracy (2,1,1)	Polyarchy (2,1,0)	Electoral democracy (2,0,0)	Minimalist democracy (1,0,0)
Andorra	Argentina	Antigua and Barbuda	Albania
Australia	Belize	Bolivia	Bangladesh
Austria	Bulgaria	Brazil	Bhutan
Bahamas	Costa Rica	East Timor	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Barbados	Croatia	El Salvador	Botswana
Belgium	Dominican Republic	Grenada	Burundi
Canada	Ghana	Guyana	Central African
Cape Verde	Greece	India	Republic
Chile	Hungary	Indonesia	Colombia
Cyprus	Italy	Israel	Comoros
Czech Republic	Latvia	Jamaica	Ecuador
Denmark	Lithuania	Paraguay	Guatemala
Dominica	Mauritius	Peru	Guinea-Bissau
Estonia	Panama	Sao Tome and	Haiti
Finland	Poland	Principe	Iraq
France	Romania		Lesotho
Germany	Slovakia		Liberia
Iceland	South Africa		Macedonia
Ireland	South Korea		Malawi
Kiribati	St. Kitts and Nevis		Maldives
Liechtenstein	St. Lucia		Mali
Luxembourg	St. Vincent and the		Mexico
Malta	Grenadines		Moldova
Marshall Islands	Suriname		Montenegro
Micronesia	Trinidad and Tobago		Nicaragua
Nauru			Papua New Guinea
Netherlands			Samoa
New Zealand			Senegal
Norway			Seychelles
Palau			Sierra Leone
Portugal			Sri Lanka
San Marino			Turkey
Slovenia			Ukraine
Spain			Zambia
Sweden			
Switzerland			
Tuvalu			
United Kingdom			
United States			
Uruguay			

Note
Deviant cases: Japan, Taiwan, Monaco, Benin, Mongolia, Namibia, Serbia, Vanuatu.

Using the Schumpeterian construct to capture the overarching class of democracy allowed us to embed and systematize other valuable extant constructs, such as electoral democracy, illiberal democracy, and delegative democracy. When ordering the referents in the consequent typology using the BTI – and when retesting the relationship using the FH – it turns out that this conceptual hierarchy is mirrored on the ground. In fact, empirically speaking, we identify a robust ordering for 2009 (further corroborated for 2007 and 2005) that almost completely conforms to the logic of a perfect simple order scale, extending from one corner of the property space to the other. This finding supports the merits of our construction. In sum, our contention is that, when creating typologies of democracy and non-democracy, the classical categorization should be brought back in.

Other than that, the most important contribution of this chapter is the empirical establishment of a scale based on a systematic hierarchical pattern. Coppedge and Reinicke (1990) previously used such a scale to measure the concept of polyarchy. But even though their endeavors were quite impressive, almost 20 percent of their referents (33 countries out of 170) did not fit the scale types perfectly. In our principal ordering, the equivalent proportion is less than two percent. The consequent one-dimensional scale is thus virtually perfect. As Bailey (1973: 20) stresses, this situation fulfills Stinchcombe's classical requirement for the fundamental typology, namely that 'a large number of variables have only a small number of combinations of values which actually occur, with all other combinations being rare or nonexistent'.

Hence, our answer to O'Donnell's query – described in the Introduction – is the following: with few exceptions, political liberties are not effective when elections exhibit defects, while the rule of law is not effective when political liberties exhibit defects. This answer can probably be translated into a statement about systematic sequencing between the attributes of liberal democracy. However, our analysis is based on sets of synchronic observations, and lack of proper diachronic data prevents us from assessing the pattern over time. But it is surely so robust that it seems fair to conclude that it is not incidental.

3 Conceptualizing and measuring democracy II
Including social rights?

Procedural definitions and their boundaries

The conceptual and empirical analyses of this book are – as explained in the Introduction – based on the Schumpeterian realistic tradition of construing democracy as a *Modus Procedendi*. We have also indicated, however, that this does not mean adopting Schumpeter's particular definition, which solely stresses electoral competition. Other attributes can be added to this as we descend the ladder of abstraction, the only condition being that we do not leave what is best conceived as the procedural track.

Now, this clearly makes for a boundary problem. For exactly which attributes can be added without introducing a conceptual slide beyond the procedural perspective? One might first attempt to answer this question with reference to the adjective 'realistic', which Schumpeter himself used to denote his approach. Here, things are pretty simple. As O'Donnell (2001: 11) argues, this adjective basically means that we are dealing with 'attributes whose absence or existence we can assess empirically'. If this is our only demarcation line, then the boundary is not very restrictive as a number of substantive policies, which are not normally placed within the realistic tradition, are amenable to measurement. This in itself is unsatisfactory since we thereby loose the Schumpeterian anchor. The demarcation criterion instead has to be found in the more particular concept of *Modus Procedendi*.

Even so, the boundary problem persists. To illustrate the predicament with a telling and very relevant example, Collier and Levitsky (1997: 445–446) argue that O'Donnell slides from the regime to the state when including the rule of law as a defining attribute of what we have termed liberal democracy. What is more, O'Donnell (2001) is perfectly happy to acknowledge this slide. According to Collier and Levitsky (1996, 1997), this implies that O'Donnell's definition is not a procedural one. More generally, Collier and Levitsky make a distinction between, first, précising a procedural definition by adding defining attributes (e.g., political liberties) while retaining the overarching concept of regime as pivot and, second, shifting the overarching concept away from regime (say, to the state).

Modus Procedendi, *regime, and state*

Obviously, then, whether a conceptual slide occurs depends on what we understand by *Modus Procedendi*. Literally, *Modus Procedendi* can be translated as a method of procedure or, more idiomatic, a way of proceeding. Relating this to the concept of a political regime, regime is normally rendered as an institutionalized mode or method of rule. One way to get at this vis-à-vis the state is to distinguish between the access to power and the exercise of power (Bratton and Chang, 2006; Mazzuca, 2010). To quote Bratton and Chang (2006: 1060):

> By *the state*, we mean the bone structure of the body politic or the set of administrative institutions that claim a legitimate command over a bounded territory. At root, the state is characterized by institutions of coercion – army, police, and courts – and, in its modern variant, by specialized bureaucracies governed by legal norms. By *regime*, we mean the set of political procedures – sometimes called the rules of the political game – that determine who may make decisions and how. Differences among regimes are captured in the first instance by a contrast between democracy and authoritarianism and, more finely, by further procedural distinctions.

This distinction between the access to power (the regime) and the exercise of power (the state) is certainly crisp. But it is worth noting that a number of influential definitions of regime are much broader in scope. To give a telling example, Poggi (1978: 27), in his masterful description of the development of the modern state, conceives the state in terms of a system of rule, meaning that the state in his conception signifies what has just been termed the regime. More to the point, the list of regime definitions collected by Munck (1996) clearly shows that most connotations go beyond a limited focus on access of power. Thus, it is simply not cut in stone that regime should exclude properties pertaining to the state – as Collier and Levitsky (1996, 1997) hold.

We argue that it is more appropriate to anchor the understanding of *Modus Procedendi* in Schumpeter's point about democracy being a political method, that is, a way of proceeding. This, however, opens the door for ambiguity. Procedural can then be rendered either as the procedures – or rights – meant to safeguard the political method or, more restricted, as the procedures that constitute the political method as such. Whereas the former understanding paves the way for introducing a variety of rights, the latter understanding basically restricts democracy to the electoral core, that is, to the sovereignty of the people or vertical accountability – the essence of the access to power.

One of Schumpeter's contemporaries, Alf Ross (1952 [1946]), struggled mightily with this problem. He took what is clearly a Schumpeterian track in construing democracy as a legal and formal concept anchored in majority will. Democracy indicates a 'how', not a 'what', as Ross elegantly explains its identity as a political method. Consequently, Ross stresses – as did Schumpeter – that both a planned economy and a market economy are, in principle, perfectly

compatible with democracy (in this sense) and that, though an empirical parallel-ism exists in their development, there is no necessary nexus between democracy and political liberalism.

This is thus a no-nonsense position of equating democracy with majority will in the guise of a political method. Or so it seems. For Ross is soon forced to yield some ground on this otherwise crisp position by introducing two excep-tions to his iron rule. First, he anticipates Dahl by adding the political liberties of freedom of speech and association. He argues that these freedoms are inextric-ably bound up with the principle of majority will as free elections entail such freedoms. Second, to a large extent, he also anticipates O'Donnell by introduc-ing the rule of law as an absolute necessity for both the electoral rights and the political liberties (Ross, 1952 [1946]).

In effect, then, Ross augments vertical accountability with horizontal account-ability, reasoning that the electoral core is meaningless without the surrounding safeguards in the form of political liberties and the rule of law. Two important consequences follow. First, Ross thereby restricts the principle of majority will as the electorate is not allowed to choose a government which abolishes the rule of law in general and freedom of speech and assembly in particular (or, more precisely, the status of democracy does not obtain in such a scenario).[1] Second, if these attributes are only in existence on paper, for example, due to weak state capacity or rapacious elites, then the elections can never have the quality which is required for a proper democracy.

This, of course, is exactly the position taken by O'Donnell (2001) half a century later and thus the very position we have previously used to augment Schumpeter's definition without leaving the procedural sphere. To quote O'Donnell's (2001: 7) formulation, this makes for a 'realistic and restricted, but not necessarily minimalist' definition.

Ross concentrates on defending the fact that these additional attributes are inextricably bound up with elections, without discussing the extent to which the additions alter democracy from a how to a what, which they obviously do to some extent. Notice here that the very same argument can be made with respect to Collier and Levitsky's précising of procedural definitions by including attributes such as civil liberties and the effective power to govern. This too implies a slide beyond the pure how, which Schumpeter alone expressly maintains.

O'Donnell is much more aware of this issue than Ross (and Collier and Lev-itsky) and therefore defends the operation more self-consciously. His point of departure is that even Schumpeter, in his electoral *locus classicus*, implicitly acknowledged that more is needed when, in a famous footnote, he remarks that 'some restrictions are implicit in the legal and moral principles of the commun-ity' (quoted in O'Donnell, 2001: 9). According to O'Donnell, with this note, Schumpeter tries to avoid opening a 'can of worms', that is, tackling the bound-ary problem systematically.[2]

Not so O'Donnell. He attempts to cut the Gordian Knot by anchoring his real-istic definition of democracy in 'agency', the point being that only surrounding freedoms and the rule of law allows the citizen as an agent to enjoy the political

rights. That is, the set of defining attributes must include both those defining the method and those necessary to the functioning of this method (O'Donnell, 2001: 11). This is rather convincing and it is reasons such as this which were invoked to justify the inclusion of the rule of law as a defining attribute in Chapter 2.

Differently said, the understanding of 'procedural' that infuses this book is that of rendering it as the procedures which make for *and* safeguard the electoral core, thereby allowing democracy to function as a political method (accepting the logical consequence that the method is simultaneously restricted to a certain extent). We thus retain the understanding of democracy as a question of how but with a twist; the affiliated freedoms necessary for the how are also stipulated by definition. Crucially, this is still in contradistinction to conceiving democracy in terms of a question of what, that is, as a substantive definition including either policies or outcomes (cf. Collier and Levitsky, 1996).

Including social rights?

This long-winding answer to the question about the meaning of *Modus Procedendi* immediately begs another question, however. To see why this is the case, we once again turn to O'Donnell. More debatable than his inclusion of the rule of law is a distinct step that he seems to take. O'Donnell repeatedly points to the intimate connection between political, civil, and social rights (e.g., 2001: 28) and goes on to discuss the relationship between political rights and the 'overall social context'.

Though the emphasis on a legal system that enacts and backs the political rights is what occupies O'Donnell most, he thus ventures further by ostensibly including social rights as yet another guarantee of free and fair elections (cf. O'Donnell *et al.*, 2004).[3] This augmentation of the definition is much more controversial than that of the rule of law as it constitutes a much grosser slide from democracy constituting a how toward democracy constituting a what.

To illustrate, it is worthwhile to return to Collier and Levitsky (1996), who make the important point that the addition of attributes to procedural definitions does not necessarily create more demanding definitions as the included attributes may simply have been taken for granted when analyzing developed countries in the West. This, of course, is exactly what O'Donnell argues when directing attention to Schumpeter's 'can of worms'. However, while this argument could plausibly be extended to the rule of law attribute, it would be very difficult to carry it over to the issue of social rights. This goes to show that the issue is a thorny one.

On social democracy

In fact, the notion of social democracy has, for at least a century and a half, been the challenger *par excellence* to the notion of liberal democracy. The gist of the notion is that real democracy cannot solely be a product of political and possibly civil rights but also entails a certain (not too unequal) distribution of wealth in society.

This criticism of liberal democracy has been forcefully promoted by both communists and socialists and can be traced to the work of Karl Marx. According to Marx, democracy remains a mirage insofar as it is situated in the context of a capitalist system, the economic inequalities (and inequities) of which are reproduced politically. To quote a famous formulation from *The Communist Manifesto*: 'The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' (Marx and Engells, 1979 [1848]: 82). More particularly, Marx holds that the working class will never be able to break the power of the possessive classes through the ballot box. Only the genuine communist society, in which distinctions between the classes were abolished, makes for democracy proper.

Marx's radical solution to the problem of economically infused political inequality and inequity was attempted and realized in the communist countries, the so-called Second World. At about the same time, a different version, emphasizing the nationalization of the means of production, was highly influential in the Western (First World) countries (Hayek, 1944). Ever since, an echo of some of these ideas has resonated in democratic theory as a number of eminent theorists have stressed that (too) high levels of economic inequality undermine the political equality of democracy.

In this more moderate version, it is thus not a complete leveling – the classless society – but rather a partial leveling of economic differences which is called for. One of the most important theorists here is Lindblom (1977: 167–168), who, for instance, emphasizes that the business world has a disproportionate influence on political decisions, even where one man has one vote.

Influenced by Lindblom, Dahl (1985: 54–55) eventually reached a similar conclusion, in turn stressing that democracy entails that the distribution of resources is not too skewed. Precipitous economic inequalities are – the argument goes – reproduced within the education system, with respect to the access to information, and as regards the ability to participate politically, all of which is to the detriment of democracy proper (see also Beetham, 1999).

Dahl thus argues in favor of extending the democratic process from the political to the economic sphere of society by, for example, democratizing private enterprises. As a minimum, this is to be done through organized channels of employee influence. But in certain works (e.g., Dahl, 1982), he also debates the ownership, albeit without pleading for an outright nationalization of the means of production.

The end of Modus Procedendi*?*

What is important for our purposes is that the realistic tradition thus contains a current which emphasizes an additional defining attribute of democracy, which we will simply render as social rights; indeed, that O'Donnell – our main guide through the wilderness of democratic theory – can be counted among its ranks.

The fact that this attribute can be situated within the realistic tradition places it in contradistinction to most of the other attributes that are normally subsumed

by the 'substantive' tradition (see Sørensen, 2008: Ch. 1), such as those connected with the notion of deliberative democracy (Held, 2006: Ch. 9). These are by and large non-amenable to measurement cross-nationally, which means that it would probably be impossible to include them in our typology of democracy.

Yet the very fact that social rights are normally situated in the substantive rather than the procedural tradition (as policies rather than procedures) goes to show that the boundary problem has come to the fore. Treating social rights as a defining attribute of democracy clearly implies restricting not only the sovereignty of the people but also the notion of democracy as a political method.

As mentioned, a similar argument can be made with respect to both the political liberties and the rule of law. But a significant difference is that these attributes are by nature much less politicized. To be sure, some conservative (e.g., De Maistre, 1847 [1809]) and communist (e.g., Lenin, 1975 [1901]) thinkers have opposed these safeguards of liberty, as have tyrants and monarchs throughout most of history (Holmes, 2003). The reason is straightforward. As Holmes (2003: 21) points out, '[i]njecting uncertainty into social situations is a well-known mechanism of control: if a subject population never knows what is going to happen to it, it is unlikely to present a serious challenge to the government'. However, nowadays, leading political theorists (and most citizens around the world) tend to favor the political liberties of freedom of speech, assembly, and association as well as the rule of law. The attitude toward social rights, on the other hand, is much more ideologically charged as a significant part of the political spectrum opposes such rights, of course depending on their form and extension.

This argument about the specific nature of social rights – vis-à-vis political liberties and the rule of law – is surely pragmatic.[4] However, even though both Dahl and O'Donnell at times underline that social rights are needed as a safeguard of political rights, that is, as surrounding liberties necessary to the electoral core, our position is thus that 'procedural' is stretched to the limit, arguably transgressing the limit, when including social rights.

The augmented typology

The very fact that the realistic tradition contains this emphasis means, however, that it is at least worth an empirical analysis. In this chapter, we therefore include social rights as a fourth defining attribute of a yet thicker definition of democracy. Conceptually, this new operation is straightforward. The attribute social rights can be dichotomized and added to the property space.

Compared with Table 2.1, this addition instantly doubles the number of types from 12 to 24. Yet only one of the additional types is interesting from a theoretical point of view, namely the new polar type 1, which we have named 'social democracy'[5] (see Table 3.1), and which now makes up the thickest conception of democracy in our conceptual edifice.

Does the empirical ordering of cases correspond to this way of extending the typology? Based on our theoretical framework (see also Chapter 5), there are

Table 3.1 Ordering the cases in the augmented typology, 2009

		Elections without defects		Elections with moderate defects		No meaningful elections	
		+ Social rights	– Social rights	+ Social rights	– Social rights	+ Social rights	– Social rights
+ Political liberties	+ Rule of law	4 Social democracy	1 Liberal democracy	0	0	0	0
	– Rule of law	3	5 Polyarchy	0	2	0	1
– Political liberties	+ Rule of law	0	0	0	0	0	0
	– Rule of law	0	10 Electoral democracy	0	45 Minimalist democracy	0	57 Pure autocracy

good reasons to expect that such is actually the case. More specifically, our theo-retical model – presented in the Introduction – makes for arguing that social rights should fit rather neatly into the hierarchical pattern laid bare in the previ-ous chapter, making up the most demanding (and thus the last) attribute in the expanded typology. If so, the simple order scale constructed in the preceding chapter can be extended with social democracy as the democratic terminus. This operation is depicted in Table 3.1 as six shaded types, which now make up the augmented simple order scale.

Empirical analysis

To investigate whether these expectations are corroborated empirically, we stick to our previous measurement of electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law. In addition, however, we employ two indicators from the BTI to opera-tionalize social rights:

- 10.1 Social safety nets (To what extent do social safety nets exist to com-pensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment, or disability?)
- 10.2 Equal opportunity (To what extent does equality of opportunity exist?)

Once again, we treat the subcomponents as non-substitutable and thus use their minimum scores to aggregate them. Also, we retain the thresholds from the pre-vious chapter on electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law and impose the dichotomous threshold of the latter two on social rights, meaning that scores of 9–10 signify the presence (no defects) of the attribute, whereas scores of 1–8 make for its absence (defects).

The empirical distribution for 2009 is illustrated in Table 3.1. The numbers indicate that the augmented conceptual hierarchy resonates strongly empirically. Out of 128 countries, only six do not clump in one of the six shaded types. The CR is thus an impressive 0.95 (122/128), only marginally lower than that of the equivalent analysis in Chapter 2. This equals saying that we once again encoun-ter a close to perfect simple order scale.

More particularly, we identify four instances of social democracy, one of liberal democracy, five of polyarchy, ten of electoral democracy, 45 of minimalist demo-cracy, and 57 of full-blown autocracy.[6] Also, we identify three aberrations situated in one and the same type (type 7), which have the attribute of social rights while lacking that of the rule of law. Replacing the numbers with proper names, the four social democracies are Estonia, Slovenia, Taiwan, and Uruguay, whereas the three new misfits are the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia.

Robustness tests

Once again, we pursue the pattern back in time to the other years for which ade-quate measures are available. This time around, however, the FH data do not

lend themselves to an alternative account as they do not cover social rights. We are thus left with two robustness tests, namely those produced by the BTI scores for 2005 and 2007, respectively.

In 2005, we encounter nine misfits to the simple order scale, meaning that the CR is 0.92 (110/119). As for 2007, only six cases do not fit with the hierarchical pattern, producing a CR of 0.95 (119/125). These fits are obviously impressive. In fact, compared to the analysis without social rights described in Chapter 2, only one and three cases, respectively, are added to the set of deviant cases.[7]

Other than that, the pictures for 2005, 2007, and 2009 are virtually identical. The only analytically interesting difference is that the distribution between social democracy and liberal democracy changes. In both 2005 and 2007, we find one social democracy and four and five liberal democracies. In 2009, the situation is the exact opposite, as four instances of social democracy tower over one lonely instance of liberal democracy.[8]

Needless to say, had it been possible to score the First World countries, many more instances of social democracy would be in existence. Most of the Western countries are thus characterized by this combination of free elections, political liberties, the rule of law, and some kind of a welfare state, meaning that their inclusion would probably reinforce the empirical hierarchy (relatively speaking).

Conclusions

Can social rights be included as a defining attribute of a thick procedural definition of democracy? We have not been able to provide a conclusive answer to this question. However, we have argued that it very much depends on exactly what *Modus Procedendi* means. More precisely, it depends on whether this term signifies only the rights that constitute democracy as a political method or also the surrounding freedoms necessary to safeguard the rule of the people (i.e., the very core meaning of democracy).

Crucially, the conundrum is basically the same with the rule of law and the political liberties as they also place restrictions on the political method (and the majority will) in a way Schumpeter would not accept. Nevertheless, as O'Donnell has explicitly and Ross implicitly argued, Schumpeter's position is questionable and some augmentation of the definition therefore can be justified. Nonetheless, including social rights restricts the political method way more than including the political liberties and the rule of law for the simple reason that the issue of the form and extension of social rights is much more politicized. Hence, as regards the concept of democracy, social rights are probably best understood as subject to democratic decision-making, rather than a constitutive part of the political method (cf. Diamond, 1999: 8; Linz, 2000 [1975]: 57–58).

Our position is thus that the analytical disadvantages of including social rights exceed the advantages. When we have nevertheless done so in this chapter, it is for two reasons. First and foremost, a number of prominent scholars, including both Dahl and O'Donnell, have in fact made the case for this. Second, our inclination to exclude this feature is not definitive.

The consequent analysis showed that the hierarchy we established in the preceding chapter was carried over into the expanded typology as social rights now make up the most demanding attribute. An augmented perfect ordinal scale, with what we term social democracy as the thickest type, can thus be constructed and it boasts a goodness of fit of virtually the same magnitude as that of the preceding scale.

Concluding on Part I, the empirical analyses have provided compelling evidence that current political regimes and the way in which they change exhibit a hierarchical nature as regards the different attributes of democracy. In the Introduction, we provided some tentative theoretical reasons as to why this should be so. These propositions of course need to be tested systematically, which is our objective in Part III. Before getting there, however, we pursue the identified pattern along space and time in Part II. The reader is first taken on a guided tour through the former Eastern Bloc (Chapter 4), then back to the frail beginnings of the third wave of democratization (Chapter 5).

Part II

Trends across space and time

4   Post-communist regime types

Hierarchy across space

In this chapter, we let our typology of democracy and non-democracy – the original one not including social rights – travel to the post-communist setting. Why is it particularly interesting to test the merits of the typology in these quarters? We have chosen to do so for three, distinct reasons.

First, a conceptual – indeed, a purely logical – problem must be faced head on. Recall that our typology of democracy and non-democracy was used to assess the existence of an empirical hierarchy according to which the majority of the world's countries cross thresholds on the attributes of electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law in a particular sequence. However, one part of the hierarchy – that operating on the electoral attribute only – was established through definitional fiat. The distinction between minimalistic democracy and electoral democracy is thus solely based on two classes on the electoral attribute, namely those of moderate and no defects, respectively. By definition, more countries will be situated in the former, less demanding class as this subsumes the stricter class.

This asymmetry vis-à-vis the two other attributes is necessary to appreciate the important conceptual distinctions within democratic theory which we anchored our typology in. However, it seems pertinent to scrutinize what would happen if each of the three attributes were trichotomized in a parallel manner, thereby removing the asymmetry. This is exactly what we do in this chapter, in which we once again expand the original typology. Yet, this time we do not add more dimensions (such as social rights). Instead we increase the number of classes on two of the three dimensions so that the number of types increases from 12 to 27, opening up for more a more detailed analysis.[1]

Second, the post-communist setting is an obvious place to test the empirical robustness of the hierarchical pattern in this way. As a number of scholars (Easter, 1997; Fish, 1998; Bunce, 1999) have emphasized, 'this region furnishes an exceptionally promising laboratory for assessing which factors facilitate – or at least accompany – democratization and which do not' (Fish, 1998: 214). Such is the case because a number of potentially relevant variables of political change – for example, prior regime type – can be held constant due to the relatively similar starting point in 1989–1991; all the while we find significant variation in regime developments in the aftermath of communist breakdown.

To be sure, this line of argumentation has tended to overstate the structural similarities of post-communism as 'deeper' variables such as the level of modernization, pattern of pre-communist nation- and state-building, and linkages to the West also differ significantly across the post-communist space (Kitschelt, 2003; Møller and Skaaning, 2009) – an issue we will return to at the end of this chapter. What is important for our purposes, however, is that all of the current 30 post-communist countries were autocracies on the eve of the collapse of communism and that they have afterwards gone their separate ways politically (see Møller, 2009). If they have done so according to the hierarchical pattern suggested by our simple order scale, this equals saying that the pattern is very robust. For these developments have then taken place in what is – at least in comparative perspective – a context approximating a macro-level (quasi)experiment.

Third, and more pragmatically, we have both published books and articles on this region and are intimately acquainted with both empirical developments and the theoretical literature. As we shall see, this background allows us to use the established empirical pattern – which solely has to do with the political regime form in these countries – to present some tentative arguments about the causes of this phenomenon.

A typology of post-communist regime forms

In the Introduction, we described how the democratization literature teems with typologies of democracy and non-democracy. It is all the more paradoxical that a systematic and encompassing ordering of post-communist political regime forms has not been carried out yet. Scholars have either confined their attention to the singular construction of autocratic subtypes, such as competitive or electoral authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002), or they have simply used Freedom House's *Freedom in the World* survey to make one-dimensional distinctions between post-communist regime forms (e.g., Kitschelt, 1999; Fish, 2001; Kuzio, 2005; Bunce and Wolchik, 2006).[2]

The overviews provided by using the aggregated Freedom House scores and/or classifications are, by and large, unsatisfactory. What we will show in this chapter is that the same is not the case when using the conceptual scaffolding of Part I to systematically order the post-communist countries in the augmented version of our typology.

Since the global hierarchy has already been established in Part I, our approach here is much more deductive. This is also justified by the fact that the theoretical model presented in the Introduction is, arguably, particularly valid for the post-communist countries as they make up a cluster that has recently engaged in a political-cum-economic transition. Also, compared with the Western democracies, many of these countries are characterized by relatively low levels of socio-economic development and a strong tradition for informal practices and, *ipso facto*, of weak formal institutions. On this basis, we expect that the relationship between the three identified attributes of liberal democracy in the post-communist setting can be formalized as expressed by Hypothesis 1a:

H1a: *In the post-communist countries, the average level of election rights is higher than the average level of political liberties, which is higher than the average level of rule of law.*

Differences in average fulfillment: a first look at the reality on the ground

To test this proposition, we once again make use of the BTI 2010, covering the year 2009 and including all 30 post-communist countries. We retain the operationalizations of Chapter 2, including the aggregation procedure and the apportionment of indicators to each of the three attributes, and first turn to descriptive statistics, calculating the average scores on electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law, respectively.

It turns out that the average score for 2009 is indeed highest with regard to the electoral attribute and lowest with regard to the attribute of rule of law, thus supporting H1a. The mean of the BTI scores, which range from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the highest level of accomplishment, are the following: 6.73 for electoral rights, 6.50 for political liberties, and 5.43 for the rule of law.

This result is not ground-breaking in itself but we use it as a stepping stone for making, what Popper (2002) terms, a bold conjecture, reformulating H1a into a more demanding proposition. *Mutatis mutandis*, we expect the existence of a systematic hierarchy in the sequencing across the three attributes:

H1b: *In the post-communist countries, the level of electoral rights is in no instance lower than the level of political liberties, which is in no instance lower than the level of rule of law.*

More sophisticated statistical inferences do not allow us to test this hypothesis. To illustrate, the bivariate correlations (Pearson's r) between the three attributes are 0.93 between electoral rights and political liberties, 0.91 between electoral rights and the rule of law, and 0.93 between political liberties and the rule of law. Based on these correlations, one would not expect a perfect sequencing. Indeed, the correlations tell us next to nothing about a hierarchy between the attributes. To test Hypothesis 1b, other methodological tools, based on categorical distinctions, are needed.

An empirical hierarchy across the attributes

As already explained, we wish to provide a more fine-grained overview than we did in Chapter 2 and therefore each of the three attributes is trichotomized using the subdivisions in the BTI. We here copy the tripartite division employed on the

attribute of electoral rights in our previous analyses. To trichotomize the attributes, we hence distinguish between no defects (9–10), moderate defects (6–8), and severe defects (1–5).

On the basis of these serial operations, a property space of 3^3 (27) types can be unfolded (see Table 4.1). This typology provides a pivot for testing H1b. However, some initial conceptual elaborations are pertinent. As in Chapter 2, our ordering of democracies can be said to rest on a Schumpeterian premise, meaning that only countries exhibiting either no defect or a moderate defect (scores 6–10) on the electoral rights attribute are included in what may be termed the overarching class of democracy. This is thus the one necessary and sufficient condition for democracy. The one necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the overarching class of autocracy is – *ipso facto* – the presence of a severe defect (scores 1–5) on the same attribute. This separate conceptual treatment of the electoral rights attribute is once again justified by the simple theoretical point that free elections are the *condiciones sine quibus non* of democracy (cf. Collier and Adcock, 1999: 559; Merkel, 2004: 36–38).

What is more, we once again distinguish between the five concepts of liberal democracy, polyarchy, electoral democracy, minimalist democracy, and autocracy/illiberal autocracy. The principal difference compared with Chapter 2 is that more cells are instances of each of the five concepts. To be sure, liberal democracy still only comprises polar type 1, just as its opposite of illiberal autocracy is solely represented by polar type 27. But polyarchy now subsumes two types, electoral democracy six types, and minimalist democracy and autocracy no less than nine types (see Table 4.1).

The fact that we do not differentiate between the various types of autocracy[3] calls for a few additional comments. Scholars such as Levitsky and Way (2002) argue that, if a regime exhibits non-democratic features, it cannot be called a democracy. Harking back to the Introduction, our point is that, if these features only have to do with flawed political liberties or the rule of law, it merely means that the country cannot be called a liberal democracy or a polyarchy. To reiterate, insofar as such regimes exhibit meaningful political competition – that is, pass Schumpeter's bare-bones criterion – we consider it a specimen of democracy, albeit possibly only a thin (minimalist) one.

Two questions are now worth posing. First, whether an empirical hierarchy equivalent to the conceptual one can be established. Second, whether it extends beyond the electoral arena. The empirical distribution of the post-communist countries, illustrated in Table 4.1, allows us to answer both of these questions, thereby testing H1b.

The ordering in this multi-dimensional property space supports and substantiates the findings of the preliminary statistical exercise. When we employ the typological procedures, the result for 2009 once again reveals that the post-communist countries do no worse (and often better) with respect to the electoral rights criteria than the political liberties criteria – and that the rule of law criteria are the hardest to fulfill. No less than 13 post-communist countries are characterized by the absence of defects on the electoral attribute. Eight countries earn the

same designation with respect to the political liberties attribute, whereas only two countries clear this threshold on the rule of law attribute.

Furthermore, the typological overview allows us to test H1b. Strikingly, we do in fact find a perfect hierarchy in the sequencing across the attributes. The grey cells – no matter their nuance – indicate the types that conform to this hierarchical logic. All 30 post-communist countries fall in these cells in the distribution for 2009, meaning that the CR is a whopping 1.00 (30/30). More particularly, two post-communist countries are liberal democracies, while eight are illiberal autocracies. The latter type is in fact the only kind of autocracy to be in existence empirically. The two cells that capture the concept of polyarchy contain six countries; the six types that spell out the concept of electoral democracy subsume five countries; and the nine cells labeled minimalist democracy house the remaining nine countries.

This mirrors a very simple pattern with regard to the ordering on the attributes. Any country obtaining the status of no defects on the attribute of rule of law obtains the equivalent status on the attributes of political liberties and electoral rights. Likewise, any country obtaining the status of no defects on the political liberties attribute obtains the equivalent status on the electoral attribute. In fact, the hierarchy extends to all three levels of the attributes. Any country obtaining a status of moderate defects on the rule of law attribute thus obtains at least an equivalent status on the political liberties and electoral attributes. Finally, any country obtaining the status of moderate defects on the political liberties attribute obtains at least an equivalent status on the electoral attribute.

Toward a Guttman scale of post-communist regime forms

The established relationship is so clear-cut that it justifies reformulating the expectations according to an even stricter notion about the sequencing across the attributes, as expressed by our third hypothesis:

H1c: *The post-communist countries are characterized by a perfect simple order scale (i.e., a Guttman scale) with regard to their fulfillment of the three attributes of liberal democracy.*

Notice that the three versions of H1 basically express the same expectation concerning the fulfillment of the criteria connected with the identified attributes. The first points to the presence of a hierarchy with respect to the average post-communist scores on the three attributes, the second to a hierarchy in the particular sequencing with which the post-communist countries clear the thresholds on the three attributes, and the third posits that this hierarchy in sequencing should take the form of a perfect simple order scale (aka a Guttman scale) (cf. Bailey, 1973).

Table 4.1 Distribution of post-communist cases in the regime typology, 2009

		Electoral rights (no defects)	Electoral rights (moderate defects)	Electoral rights (severe defects)
Political liberties (no defects)	Rule of law (no defects)	Estonia Slovenia Liberal democracy	Minimalist democracy	Autocracy
	Rule of law (moderate defects)	Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Polyarchy	Minimalist democracy	Autocracy
	Rule of law (severe defects)	Polyarchy	Minimalist democracy	Autocracy
Political liberties (moderate defects)	Rule of law (no defects)	Electoral democracy	Minimalist democracy	Autocracy
	Rule of law (moderate defects)	Bulgaria Croatia Romania Serbia Electoral democracy	Bosnia-Herzegovina Macedonia Minimalist democracy	Autocracy

	Rule of law (severe defects)	Montenegro Electoral democracy	Albania Georgia Kosovo Moldova Mongolia Ukraine Minimalist democracy	Autocracy
Political liberties (severe defects)	Rule of law (no defects)	Electoral democracy	Minimalist democracy	Autocracy
	Rule of law (moderate defects)	Electoral democracy	Minimalist democracy	Autocracy
	Rule of law (severe defects)	Electoral democracy	Russia Minimalist democracy	Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Illiberal autocracy

If the post-communist countries do indeed conform to such a simple order scale, it would mean that there is a unique way to reach any aggregate combinations of attributes if each of these is awarded a particular value. This, in turn, would pave the way for scaling the post-communist political variation based on ordinal differences between the different regime forms which we have conceptualized. Finally, such regularities would indicate underlying causal regularities, which we will briefly pursue at the end of this chapter and treat much more systematically in Part III.

To assess H1c, it is suitable to convert BTI's linguistic qualifiers into numbers. This move is straightforward as it is simply a question of making it easier to express – and possible to aggregate – combinations of values on the three attributes. On each of the attributes, we therefore let 3 denote no defect, 2 denote a moderate defect, and 1 denote a severe defect. The combinations that conform to the notion of a perfect simple order scale are the following: (3,3,3), (3,3,2), (3,2,2), (2,2,2), (2,2,1), (2,1,1), and (1,1,1). These cells are indicated by a darker shade of grey in Table 4.1.[4]

It turns out that – using the 2009 numbers – 29 out of 30 post-communist countries are situated in these seven types, all of which contain referents. The one exception to the scale is Montenegro, which is part of the general hierarchy but does not match the simple order scale as it combines a status of no defect on electoral rights with moderate defects on political liberties and severe defects on rule of law (3,2,1).

This means that the CR is 0.97 (29/30) – towering far above the 0.85 criterion – and we are so close to a perfect simple order scale that it is justifiable to say that the results corroborate H1c. As such, we have established a virtually perfect Guttman scale. A Guttman scale is, in essence, a theoretical construct based on one-dimensionality since each move along it implies an additional portion of the quality[5] that it disaggregates. In our case, this quality is basically democratic accountability as laid out in the Introduction.

Robustness tests

To support the reliability of the analysis, we once again carry out two sets of robustness tests on the findings. First, by rerunning the analysis for the years 2005 and 2007 using the BTI. Second, by reordering the referents for all three years using the FH.

The operationalization of the FH tests is identical to that of Chapter 2 except for the use of a trichotomous rather than a dichotomous classification on each attribute. More particularly, we run the FH analysis with a threshold of 90 to mark the presence of 'no defects' and the additional threshold of 60 for 'moderate defects'. Any score below 60 denotes 'severe defects'.

Due to space limitations, we refrain from reproducing the tables and solely report the general results.[6] It should be noted that the number of post-communist countries in the two years of 2007 and 2005 are only 29 and 28, respectively, as neither Montenegro nor Kosovo figure in the numbers for 2005 and as the latter country is also missing in the numbers for 2007.

In the BTI analysis for 2005, we encounter two misfits to H1b and H1c, Latvia and Albania, both of which are situated in types not part of the hierarchy at all. In the equivalent distribution for 2007, Kyrgyzstan does not fit the hierarchy, and therefore breaks with both H1b and H1c, whereas Georgia and Montenegro are part of the hierarchy but not of the simple order scale, and therefore only break with H1c.

Regarding FH, we find two misfits in 2005 and 2007, namely Kyrgyzstan and Serbia, both of which are situated outside of the hierarchy. In 2009, three such aberrations to the hierarchy can be observed (Georgia, Mongolia, and Serbia), once again meaning that they break with the expectations of both H1b and H1c.

The robustness tests thus lay bare empirical patterns that are less pure than those of the analysis proper (reported in Table 4.1). That said, they only miss this mark of perfection marginally as the CR is in no case lower than 0.89 (25/28), irrespective of whether H1b or H1c is assessed. Also, in several instances, the CR is somewhat higher than this. Thus, from a bird's eye view the results turn out to be robust.[7]

Enter the cross-spatial hierarchy

As the study has strongly supported our hypotheses, we are equipped to make some more general observations concerning the post-communist setting and to present some derivative theoretical conclusions. Generally speaking, what is happening politically in the post-communist setting is that the countries are doing better with regard to electoral rights than political liberties – and they fare worst with respect to the rule of law.

Only Estonia and Slovenia constitute liberal democracies when including the rule of law as a defining attribute. An additional six countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia, are polyarchies using the Dahlian standards, whereas five countries belong to the group of electoral democracies – namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. The last type of democracy, comprising the minimalist formula of Schumpeter, houses nine countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, and Ukraine. Finally, we encounter eight illiberal autocracies: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

This is the present political reality of post-communism. Can we use the empirical results to say something more about the post-communist setting?

One particular pattern is conspicuous: there is a geographical logic to the ordering (cf. also Rupnik, 1999; White, 2003). First, the liberal democracies and polyarchies are all situated in East-Central Europe, when this region is construed as including the Baltic countries. Second, all five electoral democracies are to be found in the Balkan Peninsula.[8] Third, all the minimalist democracies but one are found in the remaining countries from South-Eastern Europe or countries situated in the Western part of the former Soviet Union. Fourth, and finally, seven out of eight autocracies are situated in the Caucasus or Central Asia.

The cross-spatial pattern is very clear-cut, then. Only two countries present glaring exceptions from a geographical point of view: Mongolia, which is a minimalist democracy in spite of teetering on the edge of the category of Central Asia, and Belarus, which is an autocracy in spite of being situated in the Western part of the former Soviet Union.

A simple observation can be made on this basis. In spite of what seemed a uniform point of departure (Jowitt, 1992: 304–305), the post-communist world is today characterized by diversity. More than that, it is characterized by systematic diversity across space. This descriptive pattern has theoretical consequences. Since the early 1990s, the study of post-communism has witnessed a heated debate between proponents of actor-centered and structural explanations of political change, respectively. The causal factors emphasized by the actor-centered approaches have been aspects such as the outcome of the first elections, the institutional set-up,[9] and the extent of economic reform (e.g., Fish, 1998, 2006; Fish and Choudhry, 2007; Ishiyama and Velten, 1998; McFaul, 2002). Generally speaking, these explanations share two propositions concerning political and economic change. First, the important factors shaping the political outcomes date from the transitional upheavals, not from deeper structural factors. Second, these constraints were put in place by actors in a rather voluntaristic way (see in particular Fish, 1998: 77–78; Fish 2006: 11–12).

The adherents of structural explanations, on the contrary, postulate that historical legacies and other structural factors have shaped the scope of choice in the first place (Kitschelt, 2003; Janos, 1994; Darden and Grzymala-Busse, 2006; Pop-Eleches, 2007; Møller and Skaaning, 2009). The choices of the actors are therefore construed as either spurious or – more often – as an intermediate variable connecting the structural factors to the political outcome.

Obviously, the descriptive inference provided by our mapping of post-communist regime forms does not in itself make for a systematic test of any of these competing claims. That said, using some simple logical reasoning, our results fit better with the logic of one set of explanations than with that of the other set. In a nutshell, it is very hard to reconcile the systematic geographical distribution with the notion that the 'proximate', actor-centered factors described above have been critical with respect to the political pathways after the breakdown of communism. Rather, it supports the notion that 'deeper', structural differences, such as political legacies, the level of modernization, and vicinity to Western Europe, lie behind the present political variation in the post-communist setting.

More particularly, the logic of the actor-centered accounts does not fit with the fact that virtually all East-Central European countries have reached the same political terminus and that virtually all Central Asian countries embarked on a pathway leading to the opposite destination. The structural approach, on the other hand, has fewer problems elucidating these pathways as each subregion would tend to have a relatively similar structural point of departure. Using the above-mentioned country-clusters as examples, the East-Central European

countries, to a large extent, share historical antecedents, whereas, from this perspective, they have virtually nothing but a communist past in common with, for example, the Central Asian countries.

To hammer this point home, the historical legacies stressed by the structural explanations simply make for an intrinsic – and non-random – geographical variation.[10] In an otherwise actor-centered analysis of post-communist political diversity, Michael McFaul (2002: 238) tellingly concedes that:

> The strong correlation between geography and regime type suggests that deeper structural variables might explain the regime variances without the need for a careful accounting of balances of power and ideologies at the time of transition. Geography, as well as economic development, history, culture, prior regime type, and the ideological orientation of enemies most certainly influenced the particular balances of power and ideologies that produced democracy and dictatorship in the postcommunist world. Future research must seek to explain these transitional balances of power.

Our ordering of post-communist regime types supports this tentative conclusion. To be sure, the systematic geographical distribution could also be a consequence of a third factor, namely cross-spatial diffusion (see Kopstein and Reilly, 2000). However, any such diffusion would be likely to reproduce the deeper, structural differences since such a dynamic basically makes up a set of 'regional effects'. Basically, diffusion works much more rapidly and effectively between neighboring countries, rather than across wide spaces. Hence, in our view diffusion should be construed as a mechanism which reinforces the structural differences – at least vis-à-vis the notion of voluntaristic actor-choices (cf. Møller, 2009: 122–129).

Conclusions

The point of departure of this chapter was that the post-communist setting allowed for a more fine-grained test of the nature of the hierarchical pattern revealed in Chapter 2. Also, the fact that a systematic overview of post-communist regime types, based on the dominant distinctions within the democratization literature, has not been carried out yet made for added value.

We have demonstrated that it is indeed possible to order the 30 post-communist countries in a typology that makes more elaborate distinctions between thinner and thicker types of democracy and autocracy, respectively. Also, we have shown that the consequent overview for the year 2009 supports our theoretical expectations, deduced from the literature on regime change. First, there is a clear hierarchy across the identified attributes of democracy, meaning that the post-communist countries do better electorally – or at least not worse – than with respect to political liberties, and that most of them fall short with regard to the rule of law. Second, this hierarchy takes the form of what is virtually a perfect Guttman (simple order) scale of democracy and non-democracy.

What is more, the ordering paves the way for identifying a theoretically interesting empirical pattern, namely the presence of a clear-cut cross-spatial hierarchy. In the Western subregions, we find the thicker types of democracy, in the intermediate area the thinner types of democracy prevail, and in the Eastern subregions the type of illiberal autocracy is predominant. Some exceptions do exist, but seen from the higher ground this geographical logic indicates that deeper, structural factors have shaped the political pathways in the two decades following the breakdown of communism.

As the westernmost countries are structurally favored and the easternmost countries structurally disfavored, this logic implies (over-)determination at the extremes but more randomness in the intermediate area. We do in fact find seemingly uniform lock-ins – taking the shape of bounded wholes, conceptually – in the extreme regions of East-Central Europe and Central Asia.

More generally, the analysis supports the notion that the present political differences between these two areas, and to a lesser extent between these and the intermediate areas, are likely to subsist. Characterized by a specific hierarchy across regime attributes, the post-communist subregions seem to be following distinct political pathways rather than moving along some one-dimensional transitional route to democracy. As such, the chapter goes to show that the established typology can be used as a stepping stone for making interesting observations about the causes of political regime change.

The analysis seemingly begs a question, however. If it is indeed possible to use a more fine-grained typology, why not do so in the analysis proper of Chapter 2? To avoid any misunderstanding, we wish to emphasize that the original typology has more conceptual purchase, in spite of the asymmetry between the serial operations on the three attributes. Such is the case – and here we need to reiterate a pivotal point – because these very asymmetries are needed to appreciate the conceptual distinctions which infuse the literature. Electoral rights form the core of democracy and therefore function as a *primus inter pares* among the defining attributes of its thicker *Gestalts*. Also, only by distinguishing between three rather than two levels of infringements on this attribute is it possible to capture the difference between the Schumpeterian minimalist formula and the electoral component of most other definitions of democracy, whether or not these go beyond the electoral arena.

When it comes to the asymmetry, we are therefore unapologetic. But it is nevertheless heartening that a more fine-grained, yet less conceptually valid, version of the typology makes for identifying a similarly hierarchical pattern as that presented in Chapter 1 – and this in the context of the post-communist (quasi-)experiment. In the subsequent chapter, we test the hierarchy further by broadening our investigation in two ways: first, by going global again; second, by pursuing the hierarchical pattern back in time.

5   Marshall revisited

The sequence of citizenship rights in the twenty-first century

In Western Europe and North America, the process of extending citizenship rights varied much with regard to both the time of initiation and the length and scope. Nonetheless, the developed or First World countries basically reached the same general terminus: liberal democracy concomitant with some kind of a welfare state. Or, to use the tripartite division of citizenships rights suggested by T. H. Marshall (1996 [1949]) in his seminal essay *Citizenship and Social Class*, they came to be characterized by the combination of civil, political, and social rights.

According to Marshall, there was a systematic sequencing to this development. In gist, civil liberties preceded political rights, which then preceded social rights. This sequencing was so clear-cut that Marshall fixed it on the temporal dimension: 'it is possible, without doing too much violence to historical accuracy, to assign the formative period in the life of each to a different century – civil rights to the eighteenth, political to the nineteenth and social to the twentieth' (Marshall, 1996 [1949]: 10).

Even though Marshall focused exclusively on the history of Great Britain in his essay, much indicates that he did regard this evolution as typical of the capitalist West as a whole (cf. Mann, 1996: Ch. 7). Moreover, others have argued that the sequence is in fact an apt description of the evolution of rights in this part of the world (Bendix, 1964; Habermas, 1996).[1]

Why is this itinerary to the modern world relevant for the research agenda of this book? Why revisit T. H. Marshall? In the preceding chapter, we pursued the hierarchical pattern between thinner and thicker types of democracy across space – or, more particularly, across the post-communist space. In this chapter, we change dimension and instead pursue the pattern back in time. Marshall will be our guide as his classical Western itinerary, or sequence, works as a natural frame of reference for anyone wishing to assess the cross-temporal sequence of attributes such as electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights.

Crucially, these four attributes – on which we have based our augmented typological compound – show a high degree of overlap with Marshall's three kinds of citizenship rights in that our notions of electoral rights and social rights are similar to his respective categories of political rights and social rights, while political liberties and the rule of law together virtually make up what Marshall

terms civil rights.[2] To be faithful to Marshall's perspective, we substitute our definitions of rights for the three citizenship rights in this chapter. Below we describe the similarities and differences regarding the definitions and operationalizations in more detail.

Adapting Marshall's sequence to the twenty-first century

Our theoretical framework presented in the Introduction – backed up by the empirical patterns revealed in the previous analyses – suggest some simple expectations about the contemporary sequencing of the Marshallian citizenship rights.

The developed countries are likely to be characterized by the combination of all three kinds of Marshallian rights, very much corresponding to our type of social democracy (Chapter 3). However, the situation is likely to be starkly different for the rest of the world, that is, what used to be known as the Second and Third World but what we will once again, following BTI's nomenclature, term transformation and developing countries.

In this part of the world, the extension of rights simply does not seem to follow Marshall's sequence. As we have already touched upon, a number of scholars have pointed out that democratic elections often take place in the absence of civil and social rights (e.g., Diamond, 1999; O'Donnell, 2001; Sørensen, 2008; Zakaria, 2003). Guillermo O'Donnell (1998a) has specifically argued that Marshall's route is the road not taken these days. Invoking Habermas, Weber, and Marshall, O'Donnell's (1998a: 11–12) point of departure is that – with some important differences in scope and timing – 'the expansion and densification of civil rights in highly developed countries basically took place well before the acquisition of political and welfare rights'. In most contemporary Latin American countries, however, the situation is different. Though 'the political rights entailed by this regime have become generally effective, the extension of civil rights to all adults is very incomplete'. Or – to use a more general formulation of O'Donnell's (2001: 23) – today 'political citizenship may be implanted in the midst of very little, or highly skewed, civil citizenship, to say nothing of social welfare rights'.

In a nutshell, internal structural constraints mean that political rights are likely to be more widespread than civil rights in present-day developing countries. Furthermore, social rights are likely to be even more precarious than the civil rights because both a certain level of affluence and a capable state is needed to sanction such rights. Finally, another consequence of these inauspicious structures is that civil society is likely to stay weak – a driver that has been emphasized as indispensable for the development of both civil and social rights (Oxhorn, 2003).

To be sure, all of these rights may exist on paper in developing and transitional countries, not least because of the near universal ratification of human rights conventions. However, the fundamental point is that, beginning with political rights and ending with social rights, they are likely to be ever more deficient in reality.

The present liberal hegemony, described in our theoretical model, reinforces this structurally induced asymmetry because of the prevailing tendency to identify democracy with elections (cf. O'Donnell, 1998b: 117–118; Beetham, 1999; Saward, 2003). Oxhorn (2003: 36) even makes this point with explicit reference to Marshall: 'The unprecedented ascendance of political democracy, with its concomitant guarantees of political rights, has shifted attention away from Marshall's original focus on the evolution of citizenship rights.' More particularly, the liberal hegemony is likely to facilitate Marshall's political rights much more than his civil and social rights. *Ipso facto*, we expect that it is only with the advent of the post-Cold War liberal hegemony that the adverse combination of political rights in the absence of civil liberties and social rights has spread significantly. On the basis of these theoretical points, it is possible to formulate a very simple hypothesis:

> H1: *In transformation and developing countries of the contemporary era, political rights are at least as effective as (and often more effective than) civil liberties, which are at least as effective as (and often more effective than) social rights.*

This hypothesis is assessed vis-à-vis the conventional sequence based on Marshall's thesis:

> H0: *In transformation and developing countries of the contemporary era, civil liberties are at least as effective as (and often more effective than) political rights, which are at least as effective as (and often more effective than) social rights.*

Notice that the two hypotheses only differ with respect to the respective commencing of political and civil citizenship rights. In both cases, social rights make up the third and final part of the sequence. Consequently, some of the combinations of scores across the various kinds of citizenship rights are covered by both hypotheses. We come back to this below when we describe the conceptual typology used to test H0 and H1.

More generally, the reason that we set out to test these two hypotheses is this: what is still conspicuously absent in the discussions described above is a systematic empirical investigation of the contemporary validity of Marshall's sequence. The only partial exception is Latin America, where Oxhorn (2003) and Foweraker and Krznaric (2002) have demonstrated that the sequence described by H1 seems to be operating. However, a systematic large-N appraisal is still pending.

In this chapter, we set out to deliver such an appraisal. This is in itself a tangible contribution. But the added value of the analysis is that it allows us to

push at the cross-temporal validity of the theoretical factors on which our hierarchical typology is based. Thus, after the analysis proper, which is confined to the 2000s due to data limitations, we venture further back in time to deliver a cross-temporal check on our main finding. This allows us to present some conclusions about the onset of liberal hegemony as well as some derivative conclusions about the distinctiveness of the 'Northwestern passage'.

The scope of the inquiry

As indicated above, our proposition (H1) is bound in both space and time. Regarding the former demarcation line, it does not claim validity for the 'old' OECD countries, most or all of which are today characterized by high levels of respect for political, civil, and social rights. Regarding the latter demarcation line, the temporal scope condition of liberal hegemony is of the essence. As argued in the Introduction, only after the end of the Cold War has the external pressure to democratize become so salient that political rights are likely to be encountered in the most distant of countries.

More precisely, the analyses we carry out include transformation and developing countries in the period 2005–2009. Whereas the set of countries fits the first scope condition neatly, the choice of time period requires some further justification, which also allows us to defend the use of BTI to test the two hypotheses. Arguably, one of the reasons Marshall's sequence has not been systematically revisited so far has to do with data limitations. As already mentioned, conventional indices of democratic rights, such as Polity IV and those provided by Freedom House, do not provide data on social rights.[3] More generally, indicators of social rights are hard to come by and the few extant measures – such as the Human Development Index or the Physical Quality of Life Index – are of an entirely different ilk than the standard procedural measures of political rights and civil liberties. This is so because they measure the (expected) outcomes of rights[4] rather than the actual presence and respect for general welfare rights. Hence, it has been very difficult to include all three attributes in one and the same empirical analysis.

Fortunately, the BTI allows us to capture each of the three attributes described by Marshall. In what follows, we first create a conceptual typology that makes for distinguishing systematically between the respective attributes of political rights, civil rights, and social rights; the thresholds once again being anchored in BTI's linguistic qualifiers. Second, once again, we order the cases at the three points in time covered by the dataset, that is, 2005, 2007, and 2009.

Some might object that any appraisal of sequencing requires a systematic analysis over longer time spans. After all, a well-established methodological point says that a synchronic relationship cannot corroborate or disconfirm the existence of a diachronic development (Bartolini, 1993).

Here we make two counter-claims. First, and logically, the synchronic existence of Marshall's hierarchy is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for the cross-temporal sequence that he describes. Second, and empirically, we

examine whether any countries move within the typology in the period 2005–2009, thus allowing some appreciation of cross-temporal developments.

However, one problem, which does not hold consequences for the test of the two hypotheses, but only for the underpinning theoretical arguments, must be squarely confronted. The temporal scope condition basically means that insofar as H1 is supported, the phenomenon captured by it is – by default – explained by the onset of liberal hegemony after the end of the Cold War. This will not do as it is obviously something that remains to be tested; particularly because this assertion is not uniformly accepted. Oxhorn (2003: 37), for instance, points out that political rights preceded both civil liberties and social rights in the Latin American (re-)democratizations in the 1970s and 1980s. But as already alluded to above, we subsequently attempt to pursue this point by venturing further back in time, covering the whole period of the third wave of democratization.

Conceptualization and operationalization

Before operationalizing the different kinds of rights using BTI, however, we need to clarify their meaning. As we focus on Marshall's sequence, we stay zeal-ously close to his description of the three kinds of rights:

> The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. … By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of polit-ical power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. … By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.
>
> (Marshall, 1996 [1949]: 10)

Bearing these distinctions in mind, we make use of nine subcomponents from the BTI, divided between the different types of citizenship rights in the follow-ing way:[5]

- *political rights* (2.1 Free elections, 2.2 Democrats rule)
- *civil rights* (2.3 Association/assembly rights, 2.4 Freedom of expression, 3.2 Independence of judiciary, 3.4 Civil rights ensured, 9.1 Property rights)
- *social rights* (10.1 Social safety nets, 10.2 Equal opportunity).

The differences vis-à-vis the typology created in Chapter 3 is that, first, political liberties and the rule of law are collapsed, thereby creating Marshall's more general civil rights attribute; second, two of our earlier subcomponents – separation of powers (3.1) and prosecution of office abuse (3.3) – are left out of consideration as they are not directly addressed by Marshall's; third, to appreciate

Marshall's definitions as much as possible, we have included property rights in the very same dimension. Other than that, Marshall's three dimensions neatly cover the four attributes used hitherto.

This systematic distinction between political, civil, and social rights paves the way for the construction of a conceptual typology. For the very reason that the conceptualization is not anchored in the overarching concept of democracy but in the broader concept of citizenship rights, there is no reason to treat the three attributes in an asymmetric manner, neither are we forced to merely dichotomize any of them. Hence, we have chosen to trichotomize each of the three attributes using the previously applied distinctions between 'no defects' (9–10), 'moderate defects' (6–8), and 'severe defects' (1–5).

Empirical analysis

The consequent typology for 2009 with empirical referent is illustrated in Table 5.1. The property space consists of 3^3 (27) types, in which the 128 countries included in the BTI for that year are situated.

The empirical ordering provides a pivot for testing the relative merits of H1 and H0. In Table 5.1, we have denoted the combinations (types) which fit Marshall's logic with an 'M'. The types that instead conform to our expectation, stated in H1, have been shaded in two different nuances of grey. We return to the distinction between these two nuances below. Suffice to say here that H1 is supported by referents inhabiting any of the shaded cells. Notice, furthermore, that the graphical presentation of the typology mirrors the hierarchical logic of H1, meaning that a clustering along the diagonal indicates that political rights are at least as effective as civil liberties, which are at least as effective as social rights.[6] Notice, finally, that six types are covered by both H0 and H1. It is therefore entirely plausible that the fit of both hypotheses may be high. However, the relative fit should still differ due to the fact that each hypothesis also covers four additional types which are not shared. It is these relative differences that are of the essence (insofar as the absolute fit of both hypotheses are high, of course).

To evaluate the extent to which the typological ordering fits each of the hypotheses we once again employ the CR as measuring rod, that is, calculate the proportion of cases classified in accordance with the theoretical expectations. To reiterate a point that might now seem somewhat tedious, we use this measure to assess and compare the relative fit of H1 and H0. To further establish the absolute strength of the two propositions, we calculate the value produced by a random distribution as a frame of reference.

Regarding the 2009 numbers, 59 percent of the cases (75/128) conform to the logic of H0. A random distribution would make for a value of only 37 percent (10/27). At first sight, the evidence thus seems to render unequivocal support to the contemporary relevance of Marshall's sequence. But looks may be deceiving, for the equivalent proportion for H1 is 87 percent (111/128), which equals saying that it finds much stronger empirical support.

Table 5.1 Ordering the countries, 2009

		Political rights (no) defects)	Political rights (moderate defects)	Political rights (severe defects)
Civil rights (no defects)	Social rights (no defects)	Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia Taiwan Uruguay (M)		
	Social rights (moderate defects)	Chile Costa Rica Lithuania Poland (M)	(M)	
	Social rights (severe defects)	(M)	(M)	(M)

Table 5.1 continued

		Political rights (no) defects	*Political rights (moderate defects)*		*Political rights (severe defects)*
Civil rights (moderate defects)	Social rights (no defects)				
	Social rights (moderate defects)	Argentina Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Croatia Latvia Montenegro Romania Serbia South Korea	Macedonia Mauritius Namibia South Africa Turkey Ukraine (M)		
	Social rights (severe defects)	Jamaica	Bosnia-Herzegovina Dominican Republic El Salvador Ghana India Indonesia Malawi	Mongolia Peru Senegal Tanzania Zambia (M)	Lebanon Papua New Guinea (M)

Civil rights (severe defects)	Social rights (no defects)					
	Social rights (moderate defects)	Albania Panama Sri Lanka		Bahrain Cuba Kazakhstan Libya Malaysia Oman Qatar Singapore Thailand Tunisia United Arab Emirates Venezuela		
	Social rights (severe defects)	Benin	Bolivia Burkina Faso Burundi Central African Republic Colombia Ecuador Georgia Guatemala Haiti Honduras Kenya Kosovo Lesotho	Liberia Madagascar Mali Mexico Moldova Mozambique Nepal Nicaragua Niger Paraguay Russia Sierra Leone Uganda	Afghanistan Algeria Angola Armenia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Belarus Bhutan Cambodia Cameroon Chad China Congo, Democratic Republic Congo, Republic Côte d'Ivoire	Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Guinea Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Mauritania Morocco Myanmar Nigeria North Korea	Pakistan Philippines Rwanda Saudi Arabia Somalia Sudan Syria Tajikistan Togo Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Vietnam Yemen Zimbabwe (M)

How about the corresponding empirical orderings for the twin years of 2005 and 2007? To keep things simple, we refrain from reproducing the typological presentations for these years and only take stock of the respective CRs. In 2005 and 2007, the proportion of cases supporting H0 was fairly similar to that in 2009, namely 0.64 (76/119) and 0.58 (73/125), respectively. However, the proportion supporting H1 was once again much higher, namely 0.92 (110/119) in 2005 and 0.89 (111/125) in 2007.

To conclude, H1 has a remarkably better fit with the empirical reality than H0. Furthermore, H1 is strongly supported in an absolute sense since the proportion associated with a random distribution would be 37 percent. Finally, it is worth recalling that H0, too, has a better fit than such a random distribution. There are two reasons for this. First, because the part of the sequence that is similar across H1 and H0, that is, the proposition that social rights are placed at the end of the chain, holds up strongly. Second, because a large number of countries exhibit the same status on political and civil citizenship rights; a combination covered by both hypotheses.

Notice, however, that the combinations that are unique for H0 hold very few referents over the period. In fact, they contain only two in 2009. In 2005 and 2007, the numbers are one and two, respectively. The same is not the case for H1, which houses a substantial amount of referents in the types which are unique to this sequence. In 2009, no less than 38 countries are situated in such types. In 2007 and 2005, there were 40 and 36. On this basis, there are significant differences between the respective fits of the two hypotheses. What the analysis shows is thus basically that the alternative sequence of H1 is the more prevalent one in the contemporary era.

As regards the cross-temporal movements in the, admittedly, short period under consideration, we find 30 changes in the period 2005–2007 and 27 in the period 2007–2009. Out of these, only six and three cases, respectively, disconfirm our expectations by moving beyond the shaded types, whereas the comparable numbers for H0 are no less than 18 and 21. Thus, also in this respect H1 is supported in both an absolute and a relative sense.

Discussing outliers

Even though the fit of H1 is rather convincing, some outliers do exist. The same of course goes for H0. In fact, the most salient outliers to H0 are exactly those countries that conform to the first part of the hierarchy stated in H1, that is, countries in which political rights are more effective than civil rights.

Returning to H1, one unexpected combination (type) in particular stands out as it contains a significant number of referents over the period. This is type 24, where (in 2009) we encounter the countries Bahrain, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. These countries combine a status of severe defects on both political and civil rights with a status of moderate defects on social rights, meaning that they turn the expected sequence upside-down. As regards the distributions of 2005 and 2007, the same pattern is evident as this type contains a majority of the outliers to H1.

Generally speaking, then, this combination of attributes seems to be a viable one. More particularly, three different clusters of countries can be identified in this type. First, formerly or presently communist countries in which a historical legacy of ideological commitment to welfare programs has gone hand in hand with harsh repression of political and civil rights. Second, Asian developmental countries that have used their newly gained wealth to introduce some degree of social rights but still have not – as South Korea and Taiwan – moved away from authoritarianism. Finally, we find a number of oil-rich countries that can afford social benefits, which are used to pacify ('bribe') the population so as not to demand political and civil freedoms.

A perfect hierarchy?

Outliers notwithstanding, the goodness of fit of H1 is so remarkable that it makes sense to further push at the hierarchical logic underpinning it. Our hypothesis can – based on the stipulated trichotomous understanding of defects – be translated into a more demanding hierarchical proposition:

> H2: *Transformation and developing countries of the contemporary era are characterized by a perfect hierarchical relationship with regard to their fulfillment of the criteria underpinning the three attributes of political rights, civil rights, and social rights.*

H2 points back to the basic formula for a perfect simple order scale (aka a Guttman scale) presented in the preceding chapters. Relating this to Table 5.1, these combinations are indicated by a darker shade of grey (types 1, 4, 13, 14, 17, 26, 27), whereas the lighter shade of grey indicates those conforming to H1 but not to H2.

Using the BTI data covering 2009, 85 percent of the cases (109/128) corroborate H2. This time around, a random distribution would imply a value of only 26 percent (7/27). The empirical fit is therefore still very high. In fact, it exactly passes the criterion of 0.85 normally used as a rule of thumb for establishing the presence of a Guttman scale. What is more, in the distributions for 2005 and 2007, respectively, the proportion of cases that fits the scale is 0.88 (105/119) and 0.85 (106/125). In gist, the perfect hierarchical logic underpinning H2 resonates strongly in the data.

Extending the analysis back in time

The prior analysis has clearly demonstrated that the pattern described by H1 is more prevalent than that described by H0 these days. Yet this conclusion only applies to the period of 2005–2009, for which we had adequate data to measure Marshall's tripartite division of citizenship rights. *A fortiori*, we have so far been

unable to test the underlying theoretical assertion about the onset of liberal hegemony after the end of the Cold War. By the same token, we have not been able to assess whether the developing countries have only recently departed from the Western route described by Marshall or whether they have not followed it at all.

As already mentioned, we do not have solid data on cross-national social rights for the period prior to 2005. Recall, however, that H0 and H1 differ only with respect to the sequencing between political and civil rights. Insofar as we can trace the sequencing on these two attributes back in time, it is possible to deliver a tentative test of the validity of the scope conditions on which H1 is based. Equally importantly, such an analysis would make up a robustness test of the analysis proper as it would give us a glimpse of the cross-temporal robustness of H1.

To extend (part of) the analysis back in time, we make use of two datasets. One is, once again, the *Freedom in the World* data provided by Freedom House. Because our purpose is to carry out a cross-temporal analysis, we cannot use the scores on the subcomponents as they are not available back in time. Instead we are forced to rely on the general distinction between 'political rights' and 'civil liberties'. There are some validity problems here as the Freedom House ratings cover more than the political and civil citizenship rights that Marshall had in mind.[7] Also, the dataset is notorious for the extent to which the scores on the two dimensions correlate (Møller, 2007).

Nonetheless, as regards the measurement of civil rights, the FH data definitely appear to be the best cross-temporal measures available. Other options are, however, available regarding the measurement of political rights, and we have chosen to rely on the Democracy-Dictatorship dataset constructed by Cheibub *et al.* (2010; see also Alvarez *et al.*, 1996). The matching definition of democracy as a regime in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections is very close to our understanding of minimalist democracy. This is also clear from Cheibub *et al.*'s (2010: 69) specific requirements, which emphasize that the outcome of the election is not known beforehand, that the winner of the electoral contest actually takes office, and that elections occur at regular and known intervals. Furthermore, the use of Cheibub *et al.* means that we circumvent the noted problem with FH: that the scores on the two dimensions correlate almost by default.

Cheibub *et al.*'s measure is dichotomous so we also dichotomize the FH civil liberties scores so that that the scores 1 and 2 correspond to presence (no defects) and the scores 3–7 to absence (defects). The Democracy-Dictatorship data go back to 1946 but the Freedom House ratings only reach back to 1972, just before the onset of the third wave of democratization. As we have more adequate data from 2005 onwards, we have tested the two hypotheses in the period 1972–2004. This time around, the developed[8] and small countries are also included in this ordering, meaning that the analysis is truly global.

Figure 5.1 shows the relative fit of the hypotheses in the period 1972–2004. The most interesting lines are the lower two, which measure the number of

countries situated in the combination unique to H0 (– political rights, + civil rights) and in the combination unique to H1 (+ political rights, – civil rights), respectively. The two upper lines indicate combinations that fit with both H0 and H1, namely the two polar types (+ political rights, + civil rights; – political rights, – civil rights).

An interesting pattern is laid bare. In the early 1970s, Marshall's hierarchy retains a fit similar to our alternative as less than ten countries are out of line with the respective expectations. But from the beginning of the 1980s, a signific- ant difference emerges; still more countries deviate from the pattern suggested by the hypothesis based on Marshall (*ipso facto* being situated in the combina- tion unique to H1). Meanwhile, the number of cases disagreeing with the altern- ative hierarchy remain on a very low level – indeed, it even tends to drop a bit.

What, then, can we say about the onset of liberal hegemony? On the one hand, with respect to political and civil rights, the competing hypotheses find fairly similar support in the data as regards the beginning of the 1970s, meaning

Figure 5.1 Number of countries by each of the four possible combinations (types) of political rights and civil rights, 1972–2004.

that the alternative development described by H1 seems to have kicked in only recently. This shift set off a full decade before the breakdown of communism and the concomitant onset of liberal hegemony. However, we see a radical change in the years from 1989 to 1991, that is, around the breakdown of communist regimes, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War.

It is thus clear that the 1990s and 2000s did in fact exhibit the largest gap between the fits of H0 and H1 found over the period. Moreover, if attention is directed toward the third link in the chain, social rights, the full sequence described by H1 was probably strengthened much more after 1989–1991 than what is visible in Figure 5.1. Such is the case because the countries of the Eastern Bloc – notorious for their combining of social rights with the absence of political and civil rights – changed their ways: some went democratic while retaining a welfare state (primarily some of the new EU members); others remained autocratic but with deteriorating levels of social security (e.g., the countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus).

Where does this leave us? Most obviously, the cross-temporal analysis lends further support to the conclusion that Marshall's classic sequence has largely been replaced by one in which political rights are respected more than, or at least to the same degree as, their civil counterparts. Here it is once again worth noting that the combinations unique to H0 contain very few referents through most of the period, whereas such is not the case for H1. In 1973, five countries were situated in each of the types unique to H0 (presence of civil rights and absence of political rights) and H1 (absence of civil rights and presence of political rights). Twenty years later (1993), the equivalent numbers were three and fifty.

But the cross-temporal analysis also presents ammunition for questioning the theoretical underpinnings of this new sequencing. The change favoring H1 clearly took place before the onset of liberal hegemony. Thus, this factor becomes less critical, although it probably reinforced the new sequencing. Of course, it is plausible that the liberal hegemony was in ascendancy even by the early 1980s. After all, the communist model was not delivering in this decade as evidenced by the fact that the countries of the Eastern Bloc were lagging more and more behind the Western world with respect to economic performance.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we set out to appraise the contemporary sequencing of Marshall's three citizenship rights, namely civil, political, and social rights. The scope of the initial empirical inquiry was restricted to Second and Third World countries ('developing and transformation' countries using BTI's nomenclature) and to the period 2005–2009. We proposed that, under the auspices of the third wave of democratization, Marshall's sequencing has been altered so that political rights are at least as effective as civil rights, which are at least as effective as social rights. The empirical analyses carried out – including the first two robustness tests – strongly supported this hypothesis. To be sure, Marshall's sequence also

exhibits a relatively impressive fit (compared to that of a random distribution). But this is, first and foremost, a consequence of the fact that many countries exhibit the same status on some or all of the properties.

The fit of H1 was so remarkable that it made sense to reformulate it into an even stronger hierarchical proposition, mirroring the logic of a perfect simple order scale. The establishment of such a hierarchy is interesting in itself as it calls for more sophisticated analyses of the causes and consequences of the regularities. But we, first and foremost, included it to refine and further underpin the empirical conclusion that, in today's world, civil rights rarely precede political rights, thereby turning upside-down the historical sequence of Western Europe. Constant across time, however, social rights generally make up the last part of the sequence.

Finally, we attempted to trace the part of the sequence that differs back in time. The cross-temporal analysis indicated that the departure from Marshall's itinerary appears to be a rather recent development, which kicked in in the early 1980s. That would still place it before the onset of liberal hegemony, at least if this is taken to begin only with the fall of communism. On the other hand, the cross-temporal analyses also indicated an abrupt strengthening of the new pattern after the Cold War had come to an end. Subsequent to this critical juncture, the development seems to inexorably favor the alternative sequence at the expense of the Marshallian one.

In the Introduction, we mentioned that the proliferation of thinner types of democracy has led some scholars to make the descriptive argument that the third wave of democratization is intrinsically shallow. But that is not all. Some have gone further and offered the prescriptive argument that the developed world should use its muscles to revert the sequence to the historical pattern known from the First World. In particular, Zakaria (2003) has argued that the democracy promotion should place emphasis on what he terms constitutional liberalism, relegating elections to a later stage where the rudiments of this constitutional infrastructure are in place.

Our analysis shows that Zakaria's preferred route to liberal democracy – the purely constitutionalist route – does not really exist in the developing world today. Needless to say, this does not in itself prove that this way is shut. That conclusion would rest on a *non sequitur* as the case may simply be that Zakaria's route has not been tried out yet. But it is relatively plausible that Zakaria's path is strewn with obstacles as a number of theoretical arguments can be wielded against it. Carothers (2007) has thus convincingly argued that the development of civil rights is practically impossible in the absence of some kind of electoral competition. Zakaria therefore commits what Carothers terms a 'sequencing fallacy'.

More generally, the historical advent of liberal constitutionalism has required either some form of external pressure, convincing illiberal elites that it is necessary to strengthen the centripetal power and constitutional infrastructure of the state, or some kind of elections to check the power holders. The 'law-abiding autocrat' is virtually an oxymoron and it is very difficult to imagine a country moving toward constitutional liberalism in the absence of such pressures.

In the world of today, where the international society has largely eliminated the geopolitical anarchy known from the Western past (see Krasner, 2005), electoral competition thus seems to be a prerequisite for moving toward both civil rights and, arguably, social rights. That theoretical lesson is supported by our findings. However, we do not feel sanguine about the extent to which this itinerary is in fact open to countries with inauspicious structural constraints. We simply note that the opposite itinerary seems solidly closed.

Important issues are thus at stake in this analysis. However, within the confines of this book, it also seems a bit awkward. For why not pursue our typologies from Chapters 2 and 3 back in time rather than adopting Marshall's framework? Beyond the intrinsic merits of reappraising a classic, the reason is relatively straightforward. As laid out in Chapters 1–3, it is simply not possible to analyze the empirical distribution in our typology prior to either the publication of the BTI (in 2005) or the date when FH began releasing their subcomponent scores (in 2006, covering 2005). Even disregarding social rights, which FH does not include, the distinctions between electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law cannot be traced back in time. Not so with the important part of Marshall's sequence, that based on the distinction between what he terms political and civil rights. For this reason, it was at least possible to deliver a somewhat satisfying cross-temporal test. Crucially, this allowed us to push at some of our explanatory factors, in particularly liberal hegemony. A more genuine test of explanatory factors is the objective of the next two chapters.

Part III

Explaining the hierarchy

6   Stateness first?

Thus far we have established an almost perfect empirical hierarchy between thinner and thicker types of democracy in the 2000s. Moreover, we have demonstrated how it has come into its own since the 1980s: in transformation and developing countries in general and in the context of the post-communist 'natural experiment' in particular. Contemporary patterns of regime change simply observe this logic, which can be elucidated via – and therefore embedded in – some of the most prominent distinctions within democratic theory.

   We have also pushed a bit at the causes of this phenomenon. However, the analyses have so far been confined to what may best be understood as the dependent variable (types of democracy and non-democracy). What is still conspicuously absent from the present account is an empirical analysis of explanatory variables, that is, of the factors that may have produced the striking empirical regularities demonstrated in Parts I and II.

   The objective of Part III is to carry out just such an empirical assessment of the structural antecedents of the hierarchical patterns. Why focus on structural conditions? What about more proximate factors, such as actor-choices? The reason we confine our attention to what Kitschelt (2003) terms 'deep' factors is to be found in the character of the empirical regularities that we have revealed so far. As demonstrated, this hierarchy – taking the form of a simple order scale of democratic accountability – is so perfect that it makes little sense to argue that this could be a consequence of voluntaristic actor-choices. Were such the case, one should expect many more referents to clump in the empirically empty (or near-empty) subtypes as different combinations across the attributes would be likely to occur as a consequence of the contingent choices of the political elites (cf. O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; di Palma, 1990). What is more, within the confines of the post-communist space, the deeper factors emphasized in the extant literature, such as modernization, pre-communist patterns of state formation and civil society, and linkages to the West, resiliently overlap with the empirical hierarchy on the dependent variable.

   None of this is to deny that the actors are important with respect to the dynamics of regime change in the contemporary world. As Huntington (1991: 107) once put it, '[d]emocracies are created not by causes but by causers'. However, the 'political leaders and publics', which Huntington refer to, have to

navigate in irrigated waters, willy-nilly, and this is where the structural constraints are of the essence. Differently put, when seeking to explain cross-national empirical regularities, the actor-choices are best construed as links in a causal chain which explain how the structures shape political patterns (Kitschelt, 2003; Møller and Skaaning, 2009).

We wish to dig deep, then. Where to start? In the subsequent, final chapter, we endeavor to carry out a more general assessment of structural requisites of democracy. In this chapter, on the contrary, we will concentrate on one factor alone, namely what is arguably the deepest possible constraint on democratization.

Stateness first?

'Democracy is a form of governance of a modern state. Thus, without a state, no modern democracy is possible.' With these words, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996: 17) activated a prominent debate within the study of regime change concerning the relationship between what they termed 'stateness' and democracy. Linz and Stepan emphasize two defining properties of stateness. First, that a sovereign state holding a monopoly on the use of force within the territory exists. Second, that the various groups in society have reached an agreement about who has the right to citizenship in this state. In that guise, stateness is explicitly construed as a prerequisite for democracy by Linz and Stepan.

However, until recently, modern democratic theory has not devoted much attention to this issue. Such is the case because the preeminent democratic theorists of the twentieth century were preoccupied with properties pertaining to the political regime. This brings us back to the conceptual point of departure for this book.

As already discussed in detail, Schumpeter (1974 [1942]) and Dahl (1971) explicitly treated democracy as a relatively narrow *Modus Procedendi*. Arguably, until the onset of the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), this parsimonious emphasis on the electoral characteristics of the political regime was adequate to distinguish democracies from non-democracies. But, as O'Donnell (2007) has forcefully argued, such is no longer the case (see also Kraxberger, 2007: 1056–1057). Reiterating his major point, the Schumpeterian and Dahlian focus is based on certain implicit premises anchored in the historical Western route to democracy. In gist, the constitutional infrastructure captured by the German phrase of the *Rechtsstaat* was in place before the franchise was extended in the nineteenth and twentieth century (Marshall, 1996 [1949]; Rose and Shin, 2001).

The *Rechtsstaat* was not the only stopover on the Western route to democracy, however. So was a basic agreement about the borders of the state's political community – and this brings us to the issue of stateness. As described by Eugen Weber (1976), Charles Tilly (1992), and Martin van Creveld (1999), there was absolutely nothing democratic – or liberal – in the manner in which this challenge was tackled in Western Europe. Yet once solved, the basis for a well-functioning democracy was in place.

Not so in the developing world today. Under the current liberal hegemony (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 61), democratic elections are sometimes grafted onto states that are close to legal fictions and the rudimentary state apparatuses of which are thoroughly illiberal, illegitimate, and ineffective. According to Linz and Stepan (1996), the path to democracy proper is strewn with obstacles in this situation, indeed possibly even shut. Over the latest decade, this insight has gained a strong footing in the study of regime change (e.g., Fukuyama, 2004, 2005, 2007; Tilly, 2007; Kraxberger, 2007; Bratton and Chang, 2006; Rose and Shin, 2001). Stateness is increasingly construed as *the* precondition of democracy, what Linz and Stepan (1996: xiv) term a 'macro variable'.

However, a systematic, large-N appraisal of the issue is still pending. In this chapter, we set out to deliver such an appraisal with our distinction between electoral rights, political liberties, rule of law, and social rights as the pivot. Thus, to slightly retouch Fukuyama (2005), the research question of this chapter is: stateness first?

Stateness, the Rechtsstaat, and Democracy

One year after having described the concept of stateness with Stepan, Linz (1997: 118) formulated the dictum to 'no state, no *Rechtsstaat*, no democracy'. The difference between this formulation and the one quoted in the second section of this chapter goes to show that some preliminary conceptual spadework is pertinent. Generally speaking, the two concepts of stateness and the *Rechtsstaat* (i.e., the rule of law) are often conflated in the literature. Such is the case because much of the present literature basically treats stateness in terms of the closely related but broader concept of state capacity. We hold that this is problematical because state capacity also covers the ability to implement policies (see, e.g., Fukuyama, 2005; Evans, 1997), something that obviously goes beyond the monopoly on the use of force within a sovereign territory and the basic agreement about citizenship emphasized by Linz and Stepan (see also Bäck and Hadenius, 2008: 3).

Furthermore, and this brings us to the core conceptual problem, when construed as state capacity, the intension of the concept of stateness is likely to overlap with that of the concept of the rule of law as the latter – by definition – implies a high level of administrative capacity. Such an overlap is unfortunate because we risk conflating stateness with one of the defining attributes of our type of liberal democracy (and, consequently, also of what we have termed social democracy), thereby to some extent rendering the relationship between the two true by definition.

This can be elucidated by revisiting one of O'Donnell's main points: that democratic theory needs to go beyond the bare-bones focus on the political aspects of the regime, that is, electoral rights and political liberties, to embed an appreciation of the state as 'a legal system that enacts and backs the universalistic and inclusive assignment of these rights and obligations' (2001: 18). Critically, this focus on the state's legal system (see also Diamond, 1999: 12) is not

to be confused with stateness in Linz and Stepan's sense; the connotations of the two concepts simply differ. Consequently, whereas the rule of law can be added as a defining attribute of democracy by descending the ladder of abstraction, stateness is conceptually distinct from democracy; it is a prerequisite at most, not a defining attribute.

The research question of this chapter can now be spelled out more clearly. As implied by the wording, stateness first, it can be understood in terms of necessary causation. Relating this to the five types of democracy, the question becomes: to what extent is stateness a necessary condition for minimalist democracy, electoral democracy, polyarchy, liberal democracy, and social democracy, respectively?

It might come as a surprise to some readers that we include the concept of social democracy in this appraisal. The message of Chapter 3 was, after all, that doing so probably transgresses the conceptual boundaries of the *Modus Procedendi*. However, recall also that this did not hinder us from including social rights in our augmented typology in that very chapter. We basically did so for two reasons. First, social rights can at the very least be understood as an accompanying attribute of democracy (Sartori, 1984) and a number of scholars have gone further and virtually included it as a defining attribute (e.g., Dahl, 1985). As we wished to carry out an adequate appraisal of the literature, we included it too. Second, our theoretical model simply made it very interesting to carry out just such an analysis. For analogous reasons, we include social rights, and, *ipso facto*, the notion of social democracy, in the empirical analyses of both Chapters 6 and 7.

True by definition?

But is stateness – in the guise of a monopoly on the use of force within the territory and a basic agreement about the *demos* – a logical or merely (if indeed) an empirical prerequisite for the presence of the different types of democracy? And, insofar as it is only an empirical precondition, why might it function as such to a different extent with regard to the respective types?

To answer these questions, it is helpful to revisit Robert A. Dahl's (1989: 207) famous observation that 'the criteria of the democratic process presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself'. Echoing – and referring to – this observation, Linz and Stepan (1996: 26) underline that stateness is 'logically prior to the creation of democratic institutions'. Elkins and Sides (2008: 1) explain this point as follows:

> The issue is one of consent. While democracy requires that citizens accept the legitimacy of the elected leaders and rules that put them there, it also requires, more fundamentally, that citizens respect the prerogatives and boundaries of the state that these leaders govern.

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, we take our cue from Linz and Stepan. But we part way with them on this particular point. We argue that

stateness cannot simply be construed as a logical prior to the democratic process. Recall in this connection that the definitions of the attributes spelled out above deliberately ensure that the intension of stateness does not overlap with that of the four democratic attributes.

Notwithstanding this crisp conceptual distinction, Linz and Stepan's formulation might be said to make sense if each country operates in a closed system with no external input. However, harking back to the theoretical considerations about liberal hegemony outlined in the Introduction, we propose that, in today's world, international pressure has an independent effect on the status of some of the democratic attributes, even when stateness is accounted for (see below). The extent to which stateness, measured on different levels of infringement, obtains as a necessary condition for electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights is thus not a matter that can be solved logically. Rather, it is an empirical problem.

Stateness and democracy types: two propositions

Is there a systematic difference in the extent to which we should expect stateness to work as a necessary condition for each of the ever thicker forms of democracy? Based on our theoretical model, our answer to this question is in the affirmative. Recall from the Introduction that a number of scholars have claimed that the present liberal hegemony favors the spread of democratic elections and political liberties in developing countries (Nodia, 1996: 22; Hadenius, 1997: 3; Burnell and Calvert, 1999: 1; Levitsky and Way, 2002) but that there are good reasons to believe that the development of other aspects of modern democracy – the rule of law and social rights – is much more intimately wedded to structural constraints (see also Gryzmala-Busse and Luong 2002: 536; O'Donnell, 2001; Sørensen, 2008; Diamond, 1999).

To further recapitulate, today's external pressure is likely to have lopsided effects on the four attributes for the simple reason that the rule of law and social rights depend much more on internal factors than do electoral rights and political liberties. In particular, our model posits that minimalist democracy – the thinnest possible type – should not be intimately tied to structural factors.

Stateness is of course an ultimate example of such structural constraints. It therefore makes sense to probe whether stateness bears upon distinctions – derived from the literature – between thinner and thicker types of democracy.[1] If so, this would go some distance toward explaining the empirical hierarchy revealed in the previous chapters. Based on Linz and Stepan's arguments about the critical importance of stateness for democracy and the writings emphasizing the consequences of the present liberal hegemony, we suggest two propositions:

H1: *In the contemporary era, stateness is to a large extent a necessary condition for thicker types of democracy but to a more limited extent (if at all) for thinner types of democracy.*

> H2: *In the contemporary era, we encounter a stringent hierarchy as the extent to which stateness is a necessary condition increases for every move from minimalist democracy toward social democracy.*

The fact that the problem has been formulated in terms of necessary causation might lead some to dispute the H1 qualifier 'to a large extent' and, *ipso facto*, the notion of a hierarchical pattern stated in H2. Both of these patterns are of course rendered meaningless if we consider necessity in rigid deterministic terms, that is, when not allowing for any exceptions. But perfectly consistent relationships are extremely rare in the social sciences. As Ragin (2003: 180) points out, this is so because there is 'a great deal of randomness and chance in human affairs, and many flaws and errors in the efforts of social scientists to record and decipher social life'.

Furthermore, and as already hinted, strong theoretical reasons can be offered to explain why stateness in the present era of liberal hegemony is more critical for the thicker types of democracy than for the thinner types. With due reference to Ragin (2003, 2006) and Goertz and Starr (2003), we therefore argue that the assessment of stateness as a necessary condition makes sense in non-deterministic terms (these points are elaborated in Chapter 7).

Empirical analysis

The scope of the inquiry

In the analyses below, we once again take stock of the transformation and developing countries included in the BTI 2010 (covering the year 2009). To an even greater extent than the analyses of Parts I and II, the interesting variation on both the *explanandum* and *explanans* is to be found in this setting – the developing countries – because virtually all the OECD countries score high on stateness and all the attributes of democracy, that is, electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights. This in no way goes against the findings of this chapter. But we need variation on stateness (and the types of democracy) to carry out an empirical examination of our propositions – and this variation is to be found outside the 'Northwestern' world.

Furthermore, the temporal scope condition of liberal hegemony is warranted both theoretically and pragmatically. As we argued in the Introduction and elaborated in the previous chapter, only since the 1980s, and particularly after the end of the Cold War, has the external pressure to democratize become so salient that electoral rights and the associated political liberties are likely to be encountered in even some countries with low levels of stateness. But, critically, the rule of law and social rights are still extremely difficult to achieve in this situation. These are of course the twin dynamics theoretically making for the predicted hierarchy (H2).

Still, why not cover a longer time span in the analysis to test the merit of this temporal scope condition? Obviously, it would be interesting to trace the pattern back in time to the onset of liberal hegemony – and to the antecedent period for that matter. Yet this is simply not possible given the lack of data. Actually, this is even more the case in the analysis of this chapter than what was the case for the previous analyses. Not only do we – once again – lack valid, cross-temporal measures of social rights and, albeit to a lesser extent, the rule of law; this time around, we also lack adequate measures of stateness. Only with the advent of the BTI has it become possible to carry out a systematic operationalization of the levels of infringements across all of these attributes in the context of a large number of countries.

Hewing to our definition of stateness, the BTI contains two subcomponents that are highly relevant for our analysis: (1.1) Monopoly on the use of force (to what extent does the state's monopoly on the use of force cover the entire territory?) and (1.2) State identity (to what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate?). Since these aspects refer to constitutive parts of stateness, we once more employ a minimum score procedure to aggregate them.

On methodology

Harking back to the research question and the two hypotheses, the empirical analyses of this chapter presuppose methods capable of handling causal conditions in terms of necessity. This might seem an obvious point but, as already mentioned, it is one that is often ignored in actual empirical analyses. In fact, it is not uncommon to encounter studies that formulate hypotheses in terms of necessity and sufficiency only to test these using standard correlational methods (Goertz and Starr, 2003: 2). This procedure is inappropriate for the very simple reason that to suggest that stateness is necessary for democracy is different from suggesting that the higher the level of stateness, the higher the level of democracy.

More generally, researchers should be conscious about the logical forms of the relationships they are interested in and use the appropriate methods rather than the 'industry standard' (cf. Goertz and Starr, 2003: 17; Ragin, 2003: 179). One of the red threads of this book is that proper methodological procedures, consistent with the theoretical and conceptual considerations, must be chosen (as mentioned in the Introduction). In what follows, we therefore use two methods that are both capable of testing relationships stated in terms of necessity.

We first create a simple conceptual typology that makes for distinguishing systematically between stateness on the one hand and the respective types of democracy on the other hand. As Mahoney (2004) has pointed out, such typologies present a device for assessing explanatory variables in terms of necessary and sufficient causation.[2] Ordering the countries in this typology therefore allows us to carry out a first test of whether the empirical distributions support the hypotheses. To evaluate the strength of the empirical fit of the hypotheses, we use the proportion of referents classified in accordance with the theoretical expectations (the CR).

Subsequently, we use fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) to examine whether the typological findings are robust when employing a more refined measure of consistency that is capable of appreciating the difference between large and small inconsistencies and the differences between the fine-grained scores on the attributes. As a necessary relationship is basically a set theoretical subset relationship, the degree of necessity can be assessed by examining the extent to which membership in the outcome is – consistently – less than or equal to membership in the cause (Ragin, 2006; cf. Goertz and Starr, 2003).

We here adopt Ragin's (2008) yardstick, saying that a strong hierarchical (subset) relationship should show consistency levels about 0.85 or more. This test is valuable as some might object that when stateness is operationalized in dichotomous terms ('either–or'), it biases the results toward necessity due to the fact that nuances are not captured. However, while it is arguably valid to assert that a particular threshold of stateness must be crossed to bring about electoral rights, it would be a very different matter to argue that electoral rights can – logically – never exhibit higher levels of defects than stateness.

A typological analysis

The typological analysis simply contrasts stateness and each of the five types of democracy. Once more, we base our dichotomization on the distinctions found in the BTI codebook, meaning that we cut the BTI scales in two so that the scores 9–10 indicate the presence of a particular attribute (no defects) and scores 1–8 indicate its absence (defects). This procedure applies to stateness and democracy types alike, the only exception being minimalist democracy, which is scored as present in the range of 6–10 (cf. Chapter 2).

Consequently, each test of the relationship between stateness and each of the different types of democracy can be construed as a property space consisting of four (2^2) types. Such simple four-fold tables are the most basic way to assess necessity, empirically. H1 requires that the 128 countries included in the BTI numbers for 2009 to a large extent cluster in the shaded types of the property spaces (Table 6.1) connected with the thicker types of democracy. If such is the case, it equals saying that stateness is basically a necessary condition. However, H1 also indicates that this should probably not be the case with the thinner types, in particular minimalist democracy.

The hierarchical logic of H2 implies that, even if absolutely high across the board, the relative differences should find expression in a stepwise increase of the consistency levels as we move from the thinnest to the thickest type of democracy. How do the empirical facts fit with these expectations?

As illustrated in Table 6.1, the empirical ordering provides strong general support for the hypotheses. Only cases situated outside the shaded cells disconfirm the claim of a necessary relationship. Minimalist democracy clearly does not fulfill the necessity criterion, and it can be debated whether the eight misfits[3] mean that stateness should not be considered a necessary condition for electoral democracy either. However, as this latter fit is so much better than a random fit,

Table 6.1 Typological ordering of countries, 2009

		Stateness	
		No defects	*Defects*
Minimalist democracy	No defects	20	50
	Defects	8	50
Electoral democracy	No defects	15	8
	Defects	13	92
Polyarchy	No defects	10	3
	Defects	18	97
Liberal democracy	No defects	4	1
	Defects	24	99
Social democracy	No defects	3	1
	Defects	25	99

namely 120/128 (0.94) versus 3/4 (0.75), most would probably hold that the said relationship does indeed pass the threshold to necessity. No such doubts can be entertained with regards to polyarchy, liberal democracy, and social democracy. Out of 128 countries, only three countries are polyarchies despite defects in their stateness, whereas the equivalent number is only one for two thickest types.

Replacing the numbers with proper names, the polyarchy aberrations are Estonia, Jamaica, and Latvia; the former being a deviant case in all four instances. All of these exceptions, however, are minor in that their stateness scores are not much lower than their democracy scores.

H1 is thus corroborated. The same is the case with H2 as the precipitous differences across the property spaces pertaining to each democracy type are completely in line with the expectations. Consequently, the empirical data sustain H2 both quantitatively (regarding the general fit) and qualitatively (regarding the face validity of the exceptions). Notice, finally, that though largely necessary for all the types of democracy apart from the most minimalist form, stateness is by no means a sufficient condition for any of these. In fact, quite a few countries fall in the cell exhibiting no defects on stateness but defects on the five types of democracy, thus disconfirming any claim of a sufficiency relationship.

A fuzzy-set analysis

To investigate whether a similar hierarchical pattern exists when using the detailed BTI scores ranging from 1 to 10, we employ fsQCA. This means that – vis-à-vis the typological analysis using the simple property spaces – information is not lost through collapsing values (e.g., 1–8 into the status of absence/defects).

By applying the formula provided by Ragin (2006: 297) to calculate the consistency of necessary conditions, it is thus possible to carry out what may best be understood as a refined robustness test of the typological findings.[4]

The results (see Table 6.2) show that the prior findings are not overturned. Indeed, they are further supported as the levels of consistency pass the benchmark criterion of 0.85 for all types of democracy, save the minimalist version.

Further evidence for this conclusion is provided in Table 6.2, in which we also report the results of a number of sensitivity tests. First, we have augmented the definition and operationalization of stateness with an additional attribute, derived from the BTI, namely (1.4) Basic administration. It measures to what extent basic administrative structures exist. This can be understood as an attempt to make the concept and measurement more tangential to the concept of state capacity. Second, we have run equivalent analyses for the years 2005 and 2007.

These additional tests further substantiate the general picture, namely that modern democracy to a large extent presupposes stateness, yet that this condition is remarkably more critical for the thick types than for the thin types, as postulated in H1.

To illustrate the nature of this systematic pattern – and the logic of the analysis – visually, we have included a plot of the stateness scores against the liberal democracy scores in Figure 6.1. This plot can be understood as an attempt to

Figure 6.1 Scatter (XY) plot of stateness scores and liberal democracy scores, 2009.

Table 6.2 Assessing the degree of necessity for democracy types by means of fuzzy-set QCA

	Minimalist democracy	Electoral democracy	Polyarchy	Liberal democracy	Social democracy
Level of consistency (number for 2009)	0.76	0.91	0.94	0.98	0.99
Level of consistency (alteration: measurement of stateness)	0.70	0.86	0.91	0.98	0.99
Level of consistency (alteration: numbers for 2007)	0.78	0.92	0.94	0.99	0.99
Level of consistency (alteration: numbers for 2005)	0.77	0.91	0.94	0.98	0.99

assess Linz's dictum quoted above: 'no state, no *Rechtsstaat*, no [liberal] democracy'. Notice that virtually all cases fall below the antidiagonal and that they are distributed throughout this area. The most flagrant deviation is Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is characterized by a relatively high level of democracy despite a low level of stateness, probably due to the international deployment of peacekeeping (and administrative) personnel.

This deviation does not change the general conclusions, which are, first, that stateness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the rule of law, second, that the relationship cannot be modeled using standard statistical techniques, and, third, that stateness is not a 'trivial' prerequisite (Mahoney, 2004). The latter would be the case if all referents were placed at the right-hand side of Figure 6.1, meaning that they all scored high on stateness.

Finally, the notion of an empirical hierarchy across the democracy types, as implied by H2, is also sustained by the fsQCA. Such is the case because the hierarchical pattern between stateness on the one hand and the five types of democracy on the other hand is characterized by different consistency levels. All of this goes to show, first, that stateness is necessary for all democracy types, save the very thinnest one, and, second, that it is more critical (more necessary) the thicker the type of democracy.

An additional robustness test

To further underpin these conclusions, we have carried out additional empirical analyses, testing the relationship between stateness and the four attributes of our augmented typology (cf. Chapter 3) directly rather than against the five types of democracy. The reason for doing so is that, due to the use of a classical categorization, the conceptual exercise in itself implies the existence of some kind of empirical hierarchy, thus biasing the results in favor of our second hypothesis formulated above. In a nutshell, the inverse relationship between the intension and the extension of an Aristotelian conceptualization means that, as we descend the ladder of abstraction and therefore add attributes, ever fewer empirical referents will be subsumed by a given concept (Sartori, 1970).

Consequently, there will be more electoral democracies than polyarchies, more polyarchies than liberal democracies, and more liberal democracies than social democracies for the simple reason that each additional category is created by augmenting the definition (recall the stepwise logic of Figure 2.1). Obviously, this makes for a hierarchical relationship between stateness and the ever-thicker types of democracy as still fewer cases make it across the bar, irrespective of their status on stateness. That, however, is not the case when employing the four attributes on their own as neither subsumes any part of the others with regard to the connotation of the concept.

The results presented in Table 6.3 practically interpret themselves. Clearly, the findings of the analysis proper emerge as robust. The only minor hiccup is that the consistency of stateness as a necessary condition is marginally higher for electoral rights than for political liberties in two of the instances, which may be

Table 6.3 Assessing the degree of necessity for attributes by means of fuzzy-set QCA

	Electoral rights	Political liberties	Rule of law	Social rights
Level of consistency (number for 2009)	0.91	0.91	0.98	0.99
Level of consistency (alteration: measurement of stateness)	0.86	0.87	0.97	0.99
Level of consistency (alteration: numbers for 2007)	0.92	0.90	0.99	0.99
Level of consistency (alteration: numbers for 2005)	0.91	0.89	0.97	0.98

said to go against the most pure version of the expected hierarchy. However, the important part of the hierarchy, that the rule of law and social rights are in a league of their own with respect to the consistency, comes out strongly.

Is the relationship spurious?

At first sight, the findings of this chapter are based on a simple bivariate analysis. Some readers may find this problematical as any empirical establishment of causality rests on the *ceteris paribus* clause (Lijphart, 1971), meaning that relevant third variables must be controlled for. In gist, it is necessary to examine whether including other explanatory variables (conditions) give us reasons to think that the relationship is spurious.

To confront this challenge, it is pertinent to distinguish between antecedent and intervening factors. To reveal whether a relationship is spurious, only an examination of potential antecedent causes is warranted. As Mahoney (2007) has emphasized in his discussion of set theoretical relationships, the effect of X (as a necessary condition for Y) – in our case, stateness as a necessary condition for the five democracy types or each of the four democratic attributes – is to be considered spurious if an antecedent condition, Z, is at the same time sufficient for X and necessary for Y.[5]

Herbert Kitschelt's (2003) already-mentioned distinction between deep and proximate factors also bears upon the issue of spuriousness. To be an antecedent cause of stateness, a factor must be deeper in Kitschelt's sense, that is, situated more temporally distant from the *explanandum*. More proximate causes can be intervening at most. What is important for our regards is that stateness – though measured in the 2000s – is a very deep factor. It is strongly path-dependent and therefore almost impervious to change in the short run. Indeed, it is deeper than most other factors that can be identified within the democratization literature, thereby limiting the number of relevant third variables considerably.

Only one important explanatory variable from the literature therefore goes some way to fulfilling the criterion that we have just formulated: that is the level of modernization that has often been hailed as a prerequisite of democracy and that has clearly interacted with, and possibly shaped, state- and nation-building over the latest centuries. To test this, we use the calibrated GNI/capita figures included in the BTI to operationalize the level of modernization.[6]

The results show that modernization easily passes the criterion for being sufficient for stateness, with a consistency level of 0.94. However, for two reasons, this finding does not undermine the main conclusion. First, modernization is neither necessary for any of the democracy types nor necessary for any of the underlying attributes, although – not surprisingly – it is close to being so for social democracy and social rights, a pattern which we pursue in the subsequent chapter.[7] Second, the direction of the causal relationship with stateness is, in all events, not cut in stone. One could more convincingly argue

that stateness is a necessary condition for modernization[8] – or, alternatively, that the two conditions are mutually reinforcing. The relationship between stateness and the attributes of democracy does thus not appear as spurious.

Conclusions

We set out to deliver an appraisal of the influential debate – sparked off by Linz and Stepan over a decade ago – about the relationship between stateness and democracy. The conceptual premise of this empirical exercise was a simple one: that it is vital not to conflate stateness with the attributes of our typology of democracy and non-democracy, particularly the rule of law.

There is an intrinsic danger in doing so because stateness is often simply construed as state capacity in the literature. Zealously sticking with Linz and Stepan (1996), we have argued that stateness should instead be understood in terms of the existence of a monopoly of violence in a sovereign territory and an agreement about citizenship within this polity. In this guise, stateness is not only distinct from democracy; it also works as a deep constraint on democratization.

This conceptual clearing operation provided the stepping-stone for testing the extent to which stateness is a necessary condition for different democracy types and different attributes of democracy. Based on the BTI dataset, we analyzed contemporary developing and transformation countries and encountered some manifest empirical regularities.

First, except the minimalist version, stateness is to a large extent a requisite for all types of democracies, as well as the four underpinning attributes of electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights. The striking results for minimalist democracy, which fit the expectations formulated in H1, clearly corroborate our general theoretical model, presented in the Introduction. For the fact that stateness is not a necessary condition for minimalist democracy goes to show that, in this guise, democracy has indeed been possible in the face of adverse structural constraints. This, of course, is our most important prediction based on the conflicting dynamics of external liberal hegemony and unpropitious internal constraints, and it is an issue that we elaborate on in the next chapter.

How exactly does this bear upon our empirical hierarchy between thinner and thicker types of democracy? The answer is that it goes a long way toward explaining it. What we have demonstrated is that this root cause has an asymmetrical impact. At least within the scope of the present liberal hegemony, it is instrumental in bringing about the situation described by our simple order scale: that electoral rights and political liberties to some extent make headway in spite of structural constraints, whereas the same cannot be said for the rule of law and social rights. Our general answer to the basic question (stateness first?) is therefore 'yes' – but with a twist. It is more of a prerequisite for liberal and social democracy than it is for electoral democracy, and it is actually not a prerequisite for minimalist democracy.

More generally, the empirical results supported our hypotheses, which were deduced from the dominant current writings on democratization discussed in the Introduction and which embedded the theoretical logic of stateness described by Linz and Stepan. The level of stateness is imprinted in the body politics of contemporary developing and transformation countries. This critical stopover on the Western route to democracy is – it seems – equally critical in developing countries of the contemporary era. For a long time, this has been ignored because the problem of stateness had been solved in the developed countries before the widening of the franchise. But if we wish to expound the travails of thicker types of democracy under the auspices of the third wave, then an understanding of this issue is essential.

That does not imply that stateness is logically prior to the democratic attributes. Our empirical analysis clearly showed that exceptions exist in the real world. Only a few countries break with the logic of necessity regarding liberal and social democracy (and the attributes of the rule of law and social rights), but more countries do so as regards electoral democracy (and the attributes of electoral rights and political liberties) and, particularly, minimalist democracy.

Neither should this be taken to mean that stateness in itself makes for thick versions of democracy. What our study has shown is basically that stateness is, to a large extent, a necessary condition for democracy to gain (and retain) a foothold and for democracy to become thicker. It is, however, not a sufficient condition. On the contrary, our analyses shows that a sizeable number of countries do better on stateness than on the various attributes of democracy; it is only the opposite combinations that are rare.

Different ways of handling the problem of stateness have been offered in the literature (cf. Kraxberger, 2007), including provisional shared sovereignty (e.g., Krasner, 2005), international recognition of de facto sovereign units, and reconstructing boundaries when needed (e.g., Herbst, 2004). These analyses all point to the paradox that 'a potentially effective treatment of stateness problems – coercion and repression – is not available to democrats. As it happens, however, they are those who need it the most' (Elkins and Sides, 2008: 1). Even though we have not directly addressed this research agenda, our results certainly support its relevance.

7   Necessary conditions of democracy?

In the preceding chapter, we reported some very strong results concerning the extent to which the deep factor of stateness is a prerequisite for each of the four attributes of our augmented typology of democracy and non-democracy. Not only did stateness – assessed probabilistically using set theory – turn out to be necessary for electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights, it did so to a different extent, meaning that it is instrumental in bringing about the empirical hierarchy laid bare in Part I of this book.

Stateness may as such be in a league of its own. But it is still only one player. In this final chapter, we deliver a more encompassing analysis of conditions of democracy. The objective is once again to elucidate the empirical hierarchy between thinner and thicker types of democracy. More particularly, we revisit the extant theories and findings on democratization and include factors that have been highlighted as necessary for democracy. As opposed to most of the literature, we take these formulations literally and therefore once again use fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) to examine whether a selection of suggested structural conditions are, in fact, necessary for thinner and thicker types of democracy, respectively.

As all of these factors are internal to the cases analyzed, this serves to take further stock of the domestic constraints on democratization. Recall from the Introduction that these constraints make up the first part of our theoretical model of contemporary patterns of regime change, which we thus assess empirically in this way.

After this initial analysis, we once again venture back in time, to the beginnings of the third wave of democratization. In this subsequent analysis, we include virtually all countries in the world. The objective is to push further at the ascendancy of liberal hegemony, that is, the external factor that makes up the second part of our theoretical model.

On the decline of structural constraints

A cross-spatial proposition

A simple prediction about the effect of structural constraints on thinner and thicker types of democracy can be deduced from our theoretical model. In the contemporary world, the structural factors described below should constrain

thicker types of democracy more than their thinner equivalents. Just as was the case for stateness in Chapter 6, the identified conditions should, to a higher extent, be necessary for social and liberal democracy than for polyarchy, electoral democracy, and minimalist democracy – in that descending order.

This way of thinking infuses much of the current literature, which goes to show that our model is embedded in theorizing about the present dynamics of democratization. A telling example is to be found in a recent article in which one of the most prominent participants in debates about political regime change since the mid-1980s, Philippe C. Schmitter (2010), has attempted to look back and take stock.

Schmitter's (2010) main conclusion is two-fold. First, democratization has been easier to bring about than any optimist would have dared believe in the 1970s and 1980s. Second, the social, political, and economic consequences of democracy have been more modest than any pessimist would have feared back then. Schmitter then ties these two observations together, noting that democratization has been unimpeded by elites for the simple reason that it is much less consequential than under prior waves of democratization. This also means that O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) path-breaking conclusion that transitions to democracy were not bound up with any structural prerequisites has turned out to be accurate. In fact, it can be extended as democratic survival has not required such structural requisites either. The only partial exception that Schmitter is willing to admit is the factor we analyzed in the previous chapter, namely stateness.

In an otherwise critical rejoinder, O'Donnell (2010) corroborates Schmitter's two main conclusions. However, he is keen to emphasize that most of the newly democratized countries are of a low-quality species of the genus. It is thus not liberal democracies (or, *a fortiori*, social democracies) that have made headway irrespective of structural constraints. Rather, it is what we have termed minimalist democracies and electoral democracies, defined by political competition but not necessarily by fundamental political liberties or the rule of law, that epitomize this recent democratic breakthrough.

If Schmitter's propositions are correct, it implies that, in the contemporary developing and transformation countries, the structural conditions previously necessary for democracy should no longer obtain this status – at least when stateness is disregarded. However, we may add, with reference to O'Donnell, that such is only the case if democracy is defined in relatively minimalist ways.

Though framed in somewhat different terms, this recent Schmitter–O'Donnell debate thus lends credence to our theoretical model. On this basis, the cross-spatial hypothesis to be tested in the first analysis of this chapter can be formulated:

H1: *In the contemporary world, the extent to which structural factors are necessary is higher for thicker types of democracy (social democracy and liberal democracy) than thinner types of democracy (polyarchy, electoral democracy, and minimalist democracy).*

In fact, bearing the hierarchical pattern on the dependent variable in mind, our conjecture is that we encounter a stringent hierarchy in the extent to which the identified factors are necessary as we ascend the ladder of abstraction from thinner to thicker types.

A cross-temporal proposition

To reiterate, the combination of liberal hegemony, which facilitates democratization, and unpropitious structural constraints, which make the adoption of the more demanding democratic attributes so very difficult, is what underpins H1.

However, the former factor – the notion of liberal hegemony – is expressly not a constant but a variable. *Ipso facto*, a cross-temporal dimension also needs to be taken stock of. As we have already discussed in Chapter 5, it is only in the latest generation, and especially after the breakdown of communism, that democracy has obtained an ideological hegemony in that no genuine competitor for the hearts and minds of people has been in existence.

If the notion of liberal hegemony holds part of the key to explaining the hierarchical pattern on the *explanandum*, it means that the cross-spatial relationship should be nuanced cross-temporally. Here we discard the five-fold distinction between our different types of democracy as we, as mentioned on a number of prior occasions, are unable to track this back in time. Instead, we use Freedom House's Political Rights index to obtain a measure of the thin conception of electoral democracy.

It is important to note that this way of going about things is somewhat unsatisfactory. In the absence of access to FH's subcomponent scores before 2005, even the validity of the electoral democracy proxy is likely to be low due to the muddled character of this measure.

That said, based on our model, the impact of structural conditions on electoral democracy should be less pronounced in the latter half of the period analyzed in this chapter than in the former half of the period due to the ascendancy of liberal hegemony. This, too, obviously fits with Schmitter's (2010) retrospect as he emphasizes that structural constraints no longer hold the same sway as they used to do, at least with respect to thinner types of democracy. But precisely where should the temporal cut-off point be drawn? Here we refer back to previous considerations and introduce 1989–1991 as the pivotal years, after which – invoking our theoretical model – we expect the structural constraints to give way. Translated into a proposition amenable to empirical testing:

> H2: *The structural factors are to a higher extent necessary for electoral democracy in the period 1972–1989 than in the period 1992–2008.*

Here, a caveat. The starkest prediction of our model concerns not electoral democracy but the thinner notion of minimalist democracy. It is with respect to

this regime form, in particular, that the structural conditions should have become less important as a consequence of the advent of liberal hegemony.

We are unable to test this critical implication of our model. Nevertheless, to a lesser extent, the same tendency should be observable with respect to electoral democracy, which is what we actually examine. This issue should, however, be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Notice, furthermore, that had it been possible to analyze the situation prior to the third wave, we would expect that the structural factors constrained democracy (in whatever guise) even more. Such is the case because the third wave can, in and of itself, be construed as the ascendancy of some kind of liberal *Zeitgeist*. To test this even deeper cross-temporal claim is, however, not possible due to the absence of suitable data.

Structural constraints: some predominant propositions

But exactly which factors lie hidden under the general notion of structural constraints? And would one hypothesize that they are indeed necessary for democracy? We here pick factors that have been identified as structural determinants of democracy in the literature.

The most famous such formulation is arguably to be found in Seymor Martin Lipset's (1959) seminal analysis of *Some Social Requisites of Democracy*. The very wording 'requisites' indicates that the factor that Lipset treats, namely modernization, is a necessary condition for democracy. More generally, modernization has been so persistently highlighted as a cause of democracy (e.g., Bollen, 1983; Diamond, 1992; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Geddes, 1999; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Epstein *et al.*, 2006; Teorell and Hadenius, 2007) that Welzel feels confident to declare that 'the fact that modernization operates in favour of democracy is beyond serious doubts' (2009: 81).[1]

Likewise, the presence of a market economy (capitalism) has been highlighted as a necessary condition of democracy (e.g., Hayek, 1944; Bernholz, 1997; Friedman, 1962; Rueschemeyer *et al.*, 1992; Sartori, 1987). The gist of the argument is really a negative: that a planned economy means that only a political disagreement about means, not about ends, is possible. As competing ends are an engrained characteristic of modern democracy, a market economy is, *ipso facto*, a prerequisite for this regime form (Hayek, 1944).

Next, the existence of a vibrant civil society has been identified as a condition of democracy (de Tocqueville, 2000 [1831]; Oxhorn, 2003). The basic point here is that a vigilant civil society is necessary to guard the guardians. This perspective on the need for a balance of power in society can be traced back to, first, Machiavelli and, second, the classical liberals (see Holmes, 2003).

The absence of Islam as the dominant religion in a given society has also been identified as a necessary condition for democracy. The purest statement of this argument is that of Huntington (1996). Yet Huntington has certainly not been alone in casting Islam as democracy-impeding. Kedourie (1994) argues that the very notion of democracy is alien to the mindset of Islam. Also, the absence of a theological maxim similar to the Christian 'Render unto Caesar the things

which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's' has been highlighted as a hindrance to elected secular leadership. Finally, other cultural traits of Islam are said to obstruct the recognition of individual freedom rights (Lewis, 1993; Huntington, 1991: 298–301; Fish, 2002).

Yet another factor singled out as necessary for democracy is ethnic fragmentation. The most famous – indeed, to some, infamous – such formulation is to be found in John Stuart Mill's (1996 [1861]: 392–393) observation that:

> Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the workings of representative government cannot be.

Though this factor has not persistently shown up as important in empirical analyses (see La Porta *et al.*, 1999; Alesina *et al.*, 2003; Fish and Brooks, 2004; Teorell and Hadenius, 2007), Mill has not been alone in pointing to it (see, e.g., Rustow, 1970; Dahl, 1971: 105–123; Diamond and Plattner, 1994). Ethnic fractionalization is said to undermine the willingness to make political compromises across different ethnic groups. Also, mass mobilization in such societies is likely to follow the ethnic cleavages.

Finally, the absence of large-scale dependence on natural resources, in particular oil, has been proclaimed as necessary for democracy (Friedman, 2006). Ross (2001) argues that this 'resource curse' operates through three distinct mechanisms. First, oil rents make for keeping a lid on taxation and for using patronage to dampen pro-democratic pressure. Second, oil revenue facilitates the repression of social movements by the government. Third, economic growth based on oil money does not advance the social and cultural changes which are said to spur democratization (cf. Welzel and Inglehart, 2008; Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). The perspective can be summed up in the dictum 'no representation without taxation', which obviously expresses necessity.

Let us stop a moment to take stock of H1 bearing these considerations in mind. Insofar as H1 is to be corroborated, the six identified factors should be more necessary for the thicker types of democracy than for their thinner equivalents in 2009. Indeed, invoking the notion of a stringent hierarchy, they should be more necessary for social democracy than for liberal democracy than for polyarchy than for electoral democracy than for minimalist democracy.

To corroborate H2, the factors should be more necessary for electoral democracy (based on the FH scores) in the period 1972–1989 than after 1991. To test whether such is the case is the objective of the remainder of this chapter.

Methodological considerations

The empirical analysis, it should be clear, presupposes tools that are able to handle relationships in terms of necessity and sufficiency. As we have already discussed, the use of such tools is somewhat controversial within the study of

regime change (indeed, within social science *tout court*). We here refer to the justification for this line of attack explicated in the preceding chapter but also add some new considerations.

As we have just seen, a large number of influential studies of democratization have in fact formulated propositions in this way, implicitly or explicitly. This is most obvious with the formulations of Hayek, Mill, and Huntington, but the logic infuses analyses placed under each of our explanatory categories.

However, most large-N appraisals have employed standard statistical tools, designed to uncover symmetric relationships, yet incapable of assessing the asymmetric logic formulated in these hypotheses (cf. Goertz and Starr, 2003: 2). This is problematical as it basically makes for testing something else than what is hypothesized. To suggest that a condition is necessary for a certain type of democracy is thus different from suggesting that the higher (or lower) the level of this variable, the higher (or lower) the level of democracy. One might therefore argue that such methods fall in the pitfall of what may best be labeled 'theory-test inconsistency'.

Many scholars immediately seek to turn the tables on this point, however. They (again, implicitly or explicitly) stress that the very notions of necessity and sufficiency make little sense in social science in general and studies of democratization in particular. Edwards (1994: 91–92), for example, points out that such deterministic relationships are never to be expected since deviant cases can always be identified (see also Lane and Ersson, 1990: 69–75). The logical consequence would be that scholars stop formulating hypotheses in terms of necessity and sufficiency, that is, secure consistency between propositions and the analysis by carrying over the logic of the correlational methods to the formulation of propositions.

To be sure, this would make for analytical consistency; and in scientific endeavors (as opposed to life and, sometimes, politics[2]) consistency always beats inconsistency (see also the Appendix). Yet, in our opinion, this recommendation is premature for two reasons. First, preciously few systematical efforts at testing the listed hypotheses using methods that are capable of appreciating relationships stated in terms of necessity (or sufficiency) in fact exist. Until such tests have been carried out, it seems somewhat hasty to argue that it makes no sense. Second, such methods in fact allow for a probabilistic treatment of necessity (and sufficiency), meaning that a single exception (or a few exceptions) do not preclude establishing a relationship of this kind.

Our methodological premise is thus that the assessment of the listed structural factors as necessary can be carried out, and makes sense, in probabilistic terms (cf. Goertz and Starr, 2003 and Ragin, 2003, 2006, 2008). Using the logic of fuzzy sets, the extent to which a condition is necessary can – as explained in Chapter 6 – be assessed by scrutinizing the degree to which the cases' membership in the outcome is consistently less than or equal to their membership in the causal condition (Ragin, 2006; cf. Goertz and Starr, 2003).

We use fsQCA to carry out such assessments. In doing so, we once again adopt a yardstick of Ragin's (2008), namely that a strong (subset) relationship should show consistency levels of at least 0.85.

No more needs to be said about the initial analysis based on the 2009 numbers. Regarding the subsequent cross-temporal analysis, one further point is pertinent. Not only does this diachronic enterprise allow us to push at the logic underlying the notion of liberal hegemony, it also functions as yet another robustness test. Consider here that the very connotations of the term 'necessary' indicate that such a relationship should be rather persistent. Hence, it makes little sense to proclaim a condition as, say, necessary one year if it does not obtain this status in other years – unless reasonable scope conditions are invoked. One such scope condition is of course the advent of liberal hegemony, which we expect to change the extent to which the structural factors appear as necessary for thinner types of democracy.

With that exception, any necessary condition should obtain this status not only across space but also across time. Partly adopting the logic of panel regressions, the examined cases in the cross-temporal analysis therefore consist of country years, meaning that the relationship should hold across the entire period. If the results of the 1972–2008 analyses differ much from those of the initial analysis – based on 2009 only – this thus weakens the validity of these results.

Empirical analysis

Operationalizing conditions

The use of fsQCA requires a calibration of the original scores into fuzzy-set memberships. As in Chapter 6, we have used what Ragin (2008) terms the 'direct method of calibration'. This method identifies three scores on the raw data to designate full membership, the crossover point (maximum ambiguity), and full non-membership, respectively, for all conditions and for the outcome. The choices made in this respect should be defended theoretically, that is, in accordance with the concepts and propositions of the literature.

As explained above, we run two sets of analyses. In both of these, the conditions (structural factors) remain the same, albeit they are measured for different years. Not so with the outcome, democracy. In the first analysis, which covers only 2009, we use the BTI to provide graded measures of all the five conceptions of democracy, namely social democracy, liberal democracy, polyarchy, electoral democracy, and minimalist democracy. In doing this, we stick to the operationalization procedures presented in the previous chapters.

Subsequently, we use Freedom House's Political Rights index to provide a cross-temporal measure of electoral democracy. Here, the values of 1 and 7 demarcate full inclusion and exclusion, respectively, in the set of electoral democracies (and the cross-over point is set to 4.5).

Regarding the conditions, in the first analysis, we use data from the BTI to measure affluence (13.4: GNI per capita rescaled), the strength of civil society (13.2: To what extent are there traditions of civil society?), and the security of private property which is the basis of a market economy (9.1: To what extent do government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property and regulate

the acquisition of property?). As regards the three other factors, we use data on oil rents per capita from Ross (2008) to measure reliance on natural resources, we employ data from Alesina *et al.* (2003) to measure ethnic fractionalization, and we use data on the ratio of Muslims out of a country's population, provided by La Porta *et al.* (1999), as a measure of whether Islam is the dominant religion.

When it comes to the data used in the second (cross-temporal) analysis, we have to substitute the BTI indicators with alternatives. Unfortunately, there are no readily available replacements for the civil society variable, meaning that this condition is not assessed in the diachronic analysis. Regarding market economy, the most widely used measures in comparative studies are the economic freedom indices provided by the Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute. However, they are burdened by two serious problems. First, their scope is rather limited and, second, their composite measures lack measurement validity since they are very (indeed, too) maximalist. Thus, we have chosen to use only one of the subindicators from the Fraser Institute's *Economic Freedom of the World* dataset. This indicator has an extensive coverage and reasonable face validity. More particularly, we employ the scores for credit market regulations as a proxy for market economy. Finally, we employ the data on GDP per capita compiled by Gleditsch (2002) to measure whether a country is affluent. The thresholds used to calibrate the raw data linked to the different conditions into set-memberships, that is, the levels demarcating full inclusion, full exclusion, and the cross-over point, respectively, are reported in the tables.

An empirical assessment of H1

The test of H1 will reveal whether the identified structural factors elucidate the empirical hierarchy between thinner and thicker types of democracy around which this book rotates.

The results shown in Table 7.1 obviously corroborate the expectations expressed in H1. Each of the six included structural conditions turns out to be more necessary for the thicker types of democracy than for their thinner equivalents. Indeed, with all six conditions, we find a stepwise hierarchy as the extent to which the condition is necessary increases as we move from minimalist democracy toward social democracy.

These relative differences strongly elucidate our descriptive hierarchy, reported in the first part of this book. What can be said about the absolute levels of necessity? Adopting the 0.85 yardstick, only the absence of oil dependency emerges as necessary for minimalist democracy. The picture changes somewhat when we augment the democracy definition to electoral democracy. In this case, not only the absence of oil but also the absence of a Muslim majority and the presence of a market economy pass the 0.85 criterion. None of the three remaining conditions turn necessary when electoral democracy is substituted for polyarchy. Moving on to liberal democracy, the presence of a strong civil society joins ranks with this threesome as a necessary condition. None of the two remaining conditions turn necessary but the extent to which their necessity is

Table 7.1 Consistency of subset relationships between conditions and democracy types, 2009 (BTI)

Conditions (thresholds)	Minimalist democracy	Electoral democracy	Polyarchy	Liberal democracy	Social democracy
Affluent (1,5.5,10)	0.50 (0.78)	0.62 (0.71)	0.65 (0.68)	0.78 (0.63)	0.84 (0.61)
Strong civil society (1,5.5,10)	0.60 (0.91)	0.75 (0.84)	0.81 (0.83)	0.92 (0.72)	0.95 (0.66)
Market economy (10,5.5,1)	0.72 (0.82)	0.88 (0.74)	0.92 (0.71)	0.99 (0.58)	1.00 (0.53)
No oil (0,1000,20000)	0.96 (0.73)	0.99 (0.56)	1.00 (0.51)	1.00 (0.39)	1.00 (0.35)
No ethnic fractionalization (0,0.5,1)	0.58 (0.77)	0.68 (0.66)	0.71 (0.63)	0.82 (0.56)	0.87 (0.53)
No Muslim majority (0,0.5,1)	0.84 (0.81)	0.91 (0.65)	0.92 (0.60)	0.93 (0.46)	0.93 (0.42)

Notes
Consistency levels for necessity. Coverage levels reported in parentheses.

increased as a consequence of this conceptual augmentation is striking. Finally, regarding the thickest possible notion – social democracy – all conditions save wealth turn necessary and wealth is as close to crossing the threshold to necessity as is possible.

The simple inference is that the thin type of minimalist democracy can be brought about in the absence of the structural factors identified as necessary for democracy in the literature, with the exception of oil dependency. This is a conclusion that strongly echoes what could be deduced from our theoretical model. So does the other end of the spectrum. Social democracy is so fraught with preconditions that only the presence of all identified structural conditions – save wealth – makes for this demanding type of democracy, at least when necessity is appraised probabilistically as a subset relationship. Almost the same can be said for liberal democracy but the difference between the two categories is still noteworthy, especially concerning ethnic fractionalization.

As in the preceding chapter, we also examine the relationships by substituting the democracy types for the four attributes of electoral rights, political rights, rule of law, and social rights. Recall here that a classical categorization means that the conceptual exercise inherently tilts the results in favor of an empirical hierarchy. Such, however, is not the case when analyzing the attributes individually. What does this additional test show? As illustrated in Table 7.2, although the results are less clear-cut, the substitution of types for attributes does not obscure the main patterns. Generally speaking, the causal conditions are more necessary for the rule of law and social rights than for electoral rights and political liberties. In fact, with four out of the six conditions, we encounter pure versions of this dual hierarchy. What is much less frequently encountered are pure versions of the entire four-fold hierarchy across the attributes.

Table 7.2 Consistency of subset relationships between conditions and attributes of democracy, 2009 (BTI)

	Electoral rights	*Political liberties*	*Rule of law*	*Social rights*
Affluent (10,5.5,1)	0.62 (0.71)	0.61 (0.76)	0.77 (0.68)	0.82 (0.82)
Strong civil society (10,5.5,1)	0.75 (0.84)	0.75 (0.92)	0.90 (0.78)	0.81 (0.79)
Market economy (10,5.5,1)	0.88 (0.74)	0.89 (0.82)	0.99 (0.64)	0.96 (0.70)
No oil (0, 1,000, 20,000)	0.99 (0.56)	0.99 (0.60)	0.99 (0.43)	0.96 (0.47)
No ethnic fractionalization (0,0.5,1)	0.68 (0.66)	0.69 (0.73)	0.82 (0.62)	0.81 (0.68)
No Muslim majority (0,50,100)	0.91 (0.65)	0.87 (0.67)	0.89 (0.49)	0.82 (0.51)

Notes
Consistency levels for necessity. Coverage levels reported in parentheses.

Regarding the two conditions that misfit the dual hierarchy, the absence of oil only does so marginally, whereas the absence of a Muslim majority clearly does so. In the case of oil, it is the attribute of social rights that breaks the pattern. This can probably be explained by the tendency of oil-rich countries to 'bribe' their populations with certain social provisions (Ross, 2001), which might also – at least partially – explain why a strong civil society does not appear to be necessary for social rights (see Table 7.2). As regards the potential influence of Islam (and oil wealth as well for that matter), it is striking that the Middle East and North Africa is the only region where the basic electoral democratization has not made inroads during the third wave (Stepan and Robertson, 2003; Bellin, 2004). The relatively weak relationship between the absence of Islam and social rights vis-à-vis the other attributes is thus not really surprising given the more particular arguments found in the literature. Admittedly, however, the marked robustness of autocratic rule in the Middle East and North Africa region simply does not fit our general theoretical model.

These nuances surely need to be recognized. They do not, however, alter the main conclusion with respect to H1. What the analyses indicate is that requisites of democracy still exist. Yet these days they are first and foremost requisites of thick conceptions of democracy, not of their thinner equivalents. In fact, the difference between the thinner conceptions of minimalist and electoral democracy on the one hand and liberal and social democracy on the other hand are precipitous. The combined insights of Schmitter and O'Donnell – and of our theoretical model – are thus clearly supported by the data.

An empirical assessment of H2

What about the cross-temporal analysis of the period 1972–2008, subdivided into the pre-1990 part and the post-1992 part? The first thing to notice is that the numbers, reported in Table 7.3, lend support to the broad contours of the more valid 2009 analysis. The same three conditions – the absence of a Muslim

Table 7.3 Consistency of subset relationships between conditions and outcome (pre-1990 and post-1992)

	Year	*Electoral democracy*
Wealth (20000,5000,0)	Pre-1990	0.68 (0.75)
	Post-1992	0.67 (0.83)
Market economy (7,4,0)	Pre-1990	0.90 (0.67)
	Post-1992	0.99 (0.74)
No oil (0,1000,20000)	Pre-1990	0.95 (0.50)
	Post-1992	0.98 (0.63)
No ethnic fractionalization (0,50,100)	Pre-1990	0.77 (0.66)
	Post-1992	0.71 (0.79)
No Muslim majority (0,50,100)	Pre-1990	0.91 (0.57)
	Post-1992	0.93 (0.75)

Notes
Consistency levels for necessity. Coverage levels reported in parentheses.

majority, the absence of oil dependency, and the presence of a market economy – thus emerge as necessary conditions for electoral democracy in both periods. Also, neither wealth nor ethnic fractionalization operates as a necessary condition in any of the periods.

But to what extent do the results corroborate H2? That is, when analyzing the two periods, do the identified conditions exhibit the expected relationship with the measure of electoral democracy based on the Freedom House data?

The short answer is that the empirical reality does not really corroborate the expectations as the differences between the two periods are marginal.[3] No one condition changes from being necessary in the pre-1990 period to not being necessary in the post-1992 period. What is more, to the extent that the numbers change, they oftentimes do so in the contrary direction. Only ethnic fractionalization and wealth exhibit lower levels of necessity in the later part of the period analyzed, and as these conditions are in no instance necessary, this matters little. More problematically – at least as first sight – the levels of necessity of oil dependency, the absence of a Muslim majority, and the presence of a market economy are actually on the rise over the period. Again, as no condition changes status based on our 0.85 threshold, this is a difference of degree, not of kind. Nonetheless, these results clearly do not support H2.

Looks may, however, be deceiving. Let us discuss the results of each condition in turn. Ethnic fractionalization is really not problematical. It has not consistently emerged as a crucial constraint on democracy in prior analyses. Furthermore, to the extent that we can say anything here, it has actually become less necessary over time. The two strongly necessary conditions of no Muslim majority and no oil dependency do not genuinely challenge our model either. Vis-à-vis ethnic fractionalization, we are here dealing with the other extreme: *the* two factors that prior analyses have most consistently highlighted as constraining democracy. What is more, and as noted above, the one place where the liberal hegemony has so far made little headway is the Middle East, 'home' of both the resource curse and Islam. Likewise, the high levels of necessity associated with the market economy condition probably testifies to the global liberalization that has taken place concomitantly with the third wave, further reinforced by the breakdown of the planned economy in the prior Eastern Bloc. As such, the rising levels of necessity for this factor might arguably be spurious.

We pursue these issues further in the conclusions of this chapter. The final thing that must be discussed here is the surprising fact that modernization only becomes marginally less necessary over time. This stability does not fit well with our notion of the ascendancy of liberal hegemony, whether this kicked in as early as the 1980s (recall the discussion in Chapter 5) or only after the breakdown of communism.

Let us push a bit more at this issue. With respect to affluence or more generally modernization, the core argument of our model is that poor countries should have an easier time democratizing (electorally) after the advent of liberal hegemony. The group of poor countries is thus exactly where the structural constraints are likely to have lessened over the period. In Table 7.4, we report the results for wealth within this scope condition at three points in time: 1975, 1985, and 1995.

Table 7.4 Consistency of subset relationships between affluence and electoral democracy in poor countries, 1975, 1985, and 1995

Year	Electoral democracy
1975	0.45 (0.75)
1985	0.39 (0.85)
1995	0.33 (0.86)

Notes
Countries (country years) with a GDP/capita lower than 5000 $. Consistency levels for necessity. Coverage level reported in parentheses.

The three years have been chosen to assess the situation before, under, and after the emergence of liberal hegemony. What the results reveal is that the extent to which wealth is necessary has indeed decreased over time – and consistently so. Though the change is once again one of degree (not kind), this at least fits with our model.

However, when taking stock of the cross-temporal analysis, the general conclusion is inescapable: H2 is not really corroborated. This might have been different had we been able to analyze the extent to which the identified factors have been necessary for minimalist democracy over the period. That said, the empirical analysis of this chapter only lends limited support to the diachronic aspect of our model.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have carried out large-N fsQCAs of the conditions of democracy over the period 1972–2009, that is, in the context of the third wave of democratization. What are we to make of the results? First things first, H1 was clearly corroborated. The structural factors identified in the literature, which have so often been coined in terms of necessity theoretically, actually went a long way toward explaining (or at least substantiating) the lopsided picture identified in Part I. In gist, in our analysis focusing on the current situation (in 2009), the conditions were consistently more necessary for thicker types of democracy than for their thinner equivalent. Cross-spatially, the empirical world thus neatly exhibits the implications that can be inferred from our theoretical model.

Not so with the cross-temporal aspect of the model. The analysis of the period 1972–2008, using the less valid FH measure of electoral democracy, showed that H2 – at most – receives a weak support empirically. The identified conditions do not really become less important over time. Actually, some of them counterintuitively become more necessary in the post-1992 period. We did present some arguments as to why this might be neither that surprising nor that problematical for the validity of our model. But at the end of the day it is clear that the diachronic aspects of the model, though not as such falsified by the analysis, were not corroborated either.

Let us try to take stock bearing these points in mind. First, the analyses of this chapter show that – in the context of the third wave – democrats do not paint on blank canvasses. The structural conditions have mattered over the entire period, they still matter after the ascendancy of liberal hegemony, and they matter more the thicker democracy is conceptualized. Most consistently constraining are factors such as the absence of a Muslim majority and the absence of large-scale oil dependency. But with regard to thicker conceptions such as liberal democracy and social democracy, virtually all the identified factors tend to play a significant role (in terms of necessity).

Second, concerning the cross-temporal development, recall McFaul's message that the dynamics of regime change have changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. On the basis of the empirical analysis, it is possible to argue that these new dynamics have not only – as we expected – entailed that the structural constraints on at least thinner types of democracy have lessened. It has arguably also entailed that some structural constraints have in fact been able to kick (further) in, corresponding to McFaul's separate 'wave of dictatorship'. More particularly, the removal of communism created a social scientific laboratory (Fish, 1998), in which factors such as the market economy might have emerged only in the countries that democratized and not those that, according to McFaul, experienced transitions to new forms of authoritarianism. Likewise, the dependency on oil production has seemingly increased over the period analyzed. Such developments may have occasioned our surprising cross-temporal empirical results. Admittedly, however, these reflections are merely tentative hypotheses that call for more work to be done on this issue.

Conclusions

For two-and-a-half millennia, politicians, philosophers, and political scientists have debated the definition, causes, and correlates of democracy. An influential current has even claimed that, as we are dealing with an evaluative concept, a consensus about the definition of democracy cannot be reached. Meanwhile, a number of scholars have pointed out that such a lack of consensus is a straight-jacket that hinders cumulative research on democracy.

The conceptual and empirical analyses of this book have both corroborated and overturned this latter proposition. On the one hand, we have demonstrated that a number of influential conceptions of democracy – spanning the spectrum from minimalist democracy to liberal democracy – can be identified in the literature. What is more, this is solely a variation within the Schumpeterian realistic tradition. If genuine substantive definitions are added, the disagreement becomes even more rampant.

On the other hand, we have shown that, even conceptually, the Babylonian Confusion is only apparent. Such is the case because the most influential definitions – what we have termed minimalist democracy, electoral democracy, polyarchy, liberal democracy, and social democracy – are amenable to being ordered in an encompassing typology of thinner and thicker conceptions of democracy.

These conceptual clearing operations are anchored in the Aristotelian notions of necessity and sufficiency, that is, a classical categorization (Collier and Mahon, 1993), meaning that the identified types of democracy can be situated on a ladder of abstraction by a stepwise augmentation of the definitions. A conceptual *systématique* thus infuses the literature. In fact, as pointed out by Collier and Levitsky (1996), many scholars seem to operate with an implicit ordinal scale when dealing with the concept of democracy.

One of the major contributions of this book is to lay bare such an ordinal scale. We have demonstrated that a hierarchical pattern mirroring the conceptual typology can be identified empirically. In the 2000s, developing and transformation countries clump in the five types of minimalist democracy, electoral democracy, polyarchy, liberal democracy, and social democracy – or the polar opposite of pure autocracy. To the extent this can be assessed, the OECD countries also inhabit this terrain, or more particularly the thickest types, meaning that the

hierarchy is truly global. *Au contraire*, very few countries are situated in the matching diminished subtypes, which so many scholars pin their faith in these days (e.g., Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Merkel, 2004). These diminished subtypes that remind one of Tolstoy's image of the unhappy families which are each unhappy in their own ways thus arguably make up a series of Procrustean Beds.

Our analyses in the first part of the book thereby allowed us to provide an answer to O'Donnell's call to scrutinize whether the constituent attributes of democracy can be scaled. Our answer is in the affirmative. More particularly, we argue that the empirical pattern is amenable to a virtually perfect simple order scale based on ordinal distinctions between the different types of democracy (and also including the polar opposite of illiberal autocracy). The establishment of such a scale is important because it makes for including democracy as either *explanans* or *explanandum* in comparative analyses.

At this point, it is pertinent to zoom in on a particular brick in the typological edifice. The pivot of the conceptual typology is the Schumpeterian notion of democracy as a *Modus Procedendi*. Whether the attribute of social rights and its corollary of social democracy can be included in the scale without trespassing this Schumpeterian boundary is open to debate. We did not really stick our neck out on this issue. Our conceptual inclination is not to include social rights for the simple reason that it makes for a slide from democracy indicating a Schumpeterian 'how' to democracy indicating a substantive 'what'. To a lesser extent, this is also the case for the two attributes that we termed political liberties and the rule of law. But the difference – and it is a stark difference – is that that the issue of social rights is likely to be much more hotly contested politically.

However, the mere fact that a number of scholars working within the Schumpeterian tradition, most prominently Dahl and O'Donnell, have in fact included social rights means that it is worthwhile to try it out empirically. More particularly, we attempted to cut the knot by first treating the scale merely in terms of the distinctions between electoral rights, political liberties, and the rule of law, only subsequently augmenting it with social rights.

This inclusion stretched the scale (and, again, possibly the overarching concept) but it hardly altered the empirical results. In the second part of the book, we pursued the robustness of the scale across space and time. First, we demonstrated that even a more fine-grained version of the original typology fared well in the context of the post-communist natural experiment following the momentous events of 1989–1991. This allowed us to push at an inherent asymmetry of our typological ordering, namely the fact that the pivotal attribute of electoral rights was treated in a different manner than the other attributes, creating one part of the hierarchy – that between minimalist democracy and electoral democracy – largely[1] by definitional fiat. Not only did a symmetric treatment of the attributes, each of which were trichotomized to mirror the serial operations on the electoral *primus inter pares*, make for establishing the very same scale, the analysis also made it possible to theorize about the causes of these empirical regularities, thereby to some extent anticipating the empirical analyses of the book's third part.

Subsequently, we pursued the hierarchical pattern of the augmented scale back in time, to the head of the third wave in the early 1970s. In this cross-temporal analysis, T. H. Marshall was our chosen guide as his seminal sequence of citizenship rights presents a hierarchical alternative worth notice. It turns out that Marshall's hierarchy indeed did seem to be in existence as recently as the 1970s. Since the 1980s, however, our alternative hierarchy has come into its own as electoral rights now precede, rather than supersede, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights. The itinerary to democratization has, it seems, changed dramatically over the course of the third wave. Whereas civil rights and the rule of law preceded inclusive elections in the Western European past, the route followed in the developing world of today seems to be the opposite.

How can this be explained? Why the sudden empirical regularities? Our theoretical model explains the lopsided picture in terms of the combination of unpropitious internal factors and propitious, yet asymmetrical external influences. Whereas the former constraints mean that the adoption of more demanding attributes such as the rule of law and social rights become very difficult in most developing countries, the latter set of influences facilitates the adoption of less demanding attributes, most notably electoral rights. More particularly, our model indicates that minimalist democracy has made salient inroads in the face of the structural constraints traditionally highlighted as necessary conditions for democracy, whereas this is less so for electoral democracy and polyarchy and not at all so for liberal democracy and social democracy.

It is, we argue, these contending dynamics that have created the hierarchical pattern underpinning our empirical scale. In today's world, the political elites of most developing countries are forced to democratize, willy-nilly. Nonetheless, the important fact is that they are only really forced to pay lip-service to democratization by taking timid electoral steps. Also, even if they were willing to go all in, the rule of law and social rights would be likely to remain precarious due to structural constraints.

To what extent did our analyses actually corroborate this model? The answer is that, with one exception, which we return to below, they did so rather convincingly. We first demonstrated that a root cause of political change, namely stateness, stands in an asymmetrical relationship with our four attributes of electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights. In a nutshell, though stateness – assessed in probabilistic terms and using set theory – passes the benchmark criterion of necessity for all four attributes, the degree to which it does so is much higher for the latter two attributes than for the former two. *A fortiori*, stateness is not really a necessary condition for minimalist democracy and it only just passes the threshold to necessity for electoral democracy and polyarchy, meaning that there are a number of exceptions from the general pattern. However, hardly any country defies the statement that stateness is necessary for the thicker types of liberal democracy and social democracy. Unless the state apparatus holds a monopoly on the use of force and a consensus about the *demos* exists, liberal democracy and social democracy is next to impossible.

The same conclusions hold with a wider range of structural constraints, such as wealth, ethnic fractionalization, the absence of a Muslim majority, the presence of a market economy, the absence of oil dependency, and civil society. Here, too, the lopsided picture resonates strongly in the data for 2009 as the listed structural conditions become more and more necessary when descending the ladder of abstraction from thinner to thicker types of democracy. This goes to further corroborate the cross-spatial implications of our theoretical model. Not so with the cross-temporal implications. The analyses also demonstrated that – contrary to our expectations – the said structural factors did not constrain the thinner type of electoral democracy more before the onset of liberal hegemony. There might be a number of possible explanations for this, and we did push a bit at some of these. However, we cannot but admit that this ultimate analysis did pose certain questions about the validity of the dynamic aspects of our model.

This should not disguise the main conclusion, though. It is by and large possible to make sense of the identified hierarchy of types of democracy by invoking our theoretical model, which emphasizes the mutually conflicting dynamics of internal structural constraints and external influences. These contending dynamics go a long way toward explaining why the present wave of democratization is lopsided toward electoral aspects – and thus why the distinction between different kinds of democracy is today of the essence.

Implications

So, what are the more general implications of these conceptual and empirical findings? We have already emphasized that our main conceptual contribution is to show that the most prominent distinctions within the realistic vein of democratic theory can be embedded in a classical categorization, that is, a typology distinguishing between thinner and thicker types of democracy. The conceptual implication is that the flourishing use of diminished subtypes to get at different democratic (or authoritarian) regimes may not be that fruitful analytically. Instead, we call for bringing Aristotelian logic back in (sometimes adding a dash of the resembling fuzzy logic).

This call is strengthened by the fact that our typology can be scaled empirically due to the existence of an equivalent hierarchy on the ground. This scale should prove of general value for anyone seeking to test the causes or correlates of democracy.

Turning to the more particular conceptual-cum-empirical findings, the established scale does not support the claims about a gap between electoral and liberal democracy, which Fareed Zakaria (1997) and Larry Diamond (1999), among others, made in the late 1990s (see also Møller, 2008). The type combining free elections with the lack of political liberties and rule of law is in fact not so crowded. Instead, it is the minimalist democracies, that is, those referents only exhibiting the less demanding criterion of electoral competition, that are the most numerous specimens in the grey zone between liberal democracy and

autocracy proper. Hence, at the very least, the thesis about a gap should be qualified into a proposition about political competition, not free and fair elections.

What is more, Zakaria's prescriptive conclusion that Western donors should begin privileging constitutional liberalism at the expense of elections to overcome any such gap also seems far-fetched based on our analysis. Except for the autocratic polar type, virtually all referents cluster in types that are characterized by elections with either moderate or no defects. Hence, the types representing Zakaria's 'authoritarian' or 'constitutionalist' route are simply not in existence empirically. This does not in itself prove that the way is not passable. Still, it is clearly not one that is passed at the moment. Furthermore, as Thomas Carothers (2007) has recently argued, the very notion that autocrats may favor the development of constitutionalism, including the rule of law, is difficult to sustain theoretically. It is therefore unlikely that countries move toward constitutional liberalism in the absence of some kind of elections to check the power holders (see also Lindberg, 2006).

More generally, the analyses of this book make for a somewhat disheartening reading of the current dynamics of democratization. Such is the case for two interlinked reasons. First, the very fact that the thinner types of democracy proliferate in the developing world means that the third wave of democratization has not brought the rule of law (not to speak of social rights) to the majority of the newly democratized countries. Second, and invoking the arguments presented above, the empirical distribution indicates that the possibility of using political and economic conditionality to spread democracy is to a large extent limited to electoral aspects only.

It is for this reason that the distinction between different forms of democracy today looms larger than the distinction between democracy and non-democracy. So long as the liberal hegemony is retained, very many of the developing countries, which virtually by definition do not exhibit auspicious structural conditions for democratization, are likely to remain in the thinner types of democracy. Or more straightforwardly: the very structural constraints that impeded democratization *in toto* in the past now seem to hinder democratic progression from thinner to thicker types of democracy. Were it not so ill foreboding to reference Robert Michels (1962 [1915]: 355) in a book on democracy, one would thus be tempted to quote the Italian proverb 'si cambia il maestro di cappella, ma la musica è sempre quella' ('you can change the conductor but the music always stays the same').

The Italians, probably due to their relatively convulsed political history, have a knack for such pessimistic dictums about political change. The most famous is probably that of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa in *Il Gattopardo*: 'Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto combi' ('If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change'). To avoid any misunderstandings, the end quotation should not be read as an endorsement of the empirical validity of the Italian elite theory of Mosca, Pareto, and Michels. As Huntington (1991: 263) elegantly notes, though free elections might not solve other problems, they at the

very least present a solution to the problem of tyranny, which is no small feat (see also Sartori, 1987: 151). More generally, even the crudest political competition might have longer-term auspicious political effects, which we have not tested in this book. We merely use the quote to hammer home the main conclusion of this book: that thicker types of democracy are still heavily constrained by structural factors and that – for this very reason – one should not expect the present processes of democratization to have as propitious effects as did the prior democratizations in the developed countries.

Appendix

Concept-measure inconsistency in contemporary studies of democracy

One of the most important methodological discussions emanating from the Sartorian tradition has centered on the strengths and weaknesses of the dominant cross-national datasets used to measure democracy (e.g., Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Bollen and Paxton, 2000; Lauth, 2004). Critically, however, the present deficiencies of conceptualization and measurement should not only be understood in terms of the quality of the raw data used to arrive at relationships between variables. As we have shown in this book, an intermediary operation is very often equally important: that of transforming the raw data into either typologies of democracy and non-democracy or indices, that is, aggregate measures that combine multiple subcomponents, of democracy *tout court*.

This distinction can be understood by harking back to Munck and Verkuilen's (2002) seminal article *Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy*. The article introduced a coherent framework for dataset assessment, which distinguishes between the three requisite steps of conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation. The present appendix is intended as a follow-up to the work of Munck and Verkuilen. The difference is that, rather than evaluating extant indices of democracy such as the FH or Polity IV on their own, we solely assess attempts to aggregate the concept of democracy using these datasets.

The general objective is to make the case for rigor in research relating to conceptualization and measurement – a self-conscious approach that we believe underlies the analyses in the book proper. The more particular objective is to make the case for the use of an aggregation rule that is capable of appreciating the Aristotelian notion of necessity and sufficiency – the logical structure of the classical categorizations employed throughout the book.

Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 24) note that two steps are of the essence in selecting the aggregation rule:

> First, the analyst must make explicit the theory concerning the relationship between attributes. Second, the analyst must ensure that there is a correspondence between this theory and the selected aggregation rule, that is, that the aggregation rule is actually the equivalent formal expression of the posited relationship.

This is what Goertz (2006) terms 'concept-measure consistency', and it is advice worth heeding. That said, the discussion of aggregation is clearly the weakest part of Munck and Verkuilen's otherwise path-breaking article (but see Munck and Verkuilen, 2003; Munck, 2009). A few years later, Goertz (2006) elaborated on the issue in a much more detailed way. Promoting an ontological and realist view of concepts, Goertz's objective is to provide guidelines that make for consistency between the structure of the concept and its measurement.

Goertz accordingly reviews the literature on democracy and shows that virtually any extant definition – including those of Bollen, Dahl, Downs, Lipset, Przeworski, and Vanhanen – treat the subcomponents (what Goertz terms the secondary level) in terms of the Aristotelian notions of necessity and sufficiency (see also Munck, 2009: 51, fn. 19). Based on this overview, Goertz convincingly argues, it makes little sense to construe the subcomponents of democracy – say, electoral competition and political freedom rights – as substitutable.

The most appropriate aggregation procedure is therefore the minimum rule, or 'weakest-link measure', which reflects the logic of individual necessity and joint sufficiency. However, when the listed authors (Przeworski is the most important exception) go on to aggregate the matching subcomponents, they virtually always use an additive (or averaging) procedure (Goertz, 2006: 98).

Since Goertz published his book in 2006, some new developments on aggregation – briefly mentioned by him but treated in an offhand manner – have been introduced into political science. We describe these below. Suffice to say here that they merely enhance the problem Goertz identifies: that the critical operation of aggregation is often treated in an unsystematic or outright erroneous manner in the literature and that this has some adverse consequences with respect to concept-measure consistency.

Indeed, as we demonstrate in this Appendix, it is not uncommon to encounter aggregate indices of democracy or descriptive typologies of democracy and non-democracy that rest on feet of clay. The descriptive and explanatory conclusions that scholars obtain when using such classifications are, *ipso facto*, disputable. More technically, the measurement validity (Adcock and Collier, 2001) is likely to be low in these instances.

As the proverb says, one – or even a few – swallows do not make a summer. However, we subsequently carry out a selective review documenting that the identified examples of inconsistency are not isolated occurrences. Before turning to either of these tasks, however, a few words need to be devoted to the technical aspects of aggregation.

On aggregation

As mentioned above, Goertz's recipe for measuring a concept structured in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient subcomponents is the minimum rule. In gist, one scores the whole based on the lowest score of any of its parts, that is, the weakest link in the chain. This reflects a very commonsensical understanding of necessity, one solely based on the absence of substitutability between

the subcomponents. Yet Goertz does – *en passant* – mention that one might alternatively consider using multiplication to aggregate the subcomponent scores (as recommended by Munck and Verkuilen, 2003; see also Przeworski *et al.*, 2000; Mainwaring *et al.*, 2007). Goertz prefers the minimum rule, however, as multiplication in his view reintroduces some substitutability effects because higher values on one dimension can compensate for lower values on other dimensions (2006: 111–114).

Goertz here betrays a somewhat limited understanding of multiplication as an aggregation procedure.[1] To see why this is the case, we need to move one step back and discuss aggregation procedures of concepts based on constitutive attributes more generally. Munck (2009: 48) has recently provided a helpful overview. His premise is the same as that of Goertz: that the 'choice of aggregation rule hinges on the understanding of what the parts into which a concept has been disaggregated contribute to the whole'.

However, to select appropriate aggregation rules we need to distinguish not only between substitutability and non-substitutability (as does Goertz) but also between interaction and noninteraction (Munck, 2009: 48–50, 68–73). Both distinctions deal with the structure of the concept or, more technically, with the relationship between the concept and its subcomponents (aka attributes) *and* the relationship among its subcomponents. Any concept based on individual necessity obviously conforms to non-substitutability: using Munck's nomenclature, the subcomponents are 'noncompensatory'. But the relationship among the subcomponents may still be 'interactive', meaning that the score on one indicator has to be understood as conditioned by (rather than insulated from) the score on another indicator. On this basis, Munck teases out no less than five different aggregation procedures, reported in Table A.1.

Which of these aggregation procedures is the most convincing with respect to democracy? As the issue at target in this Appendix is one of concept-measure consistency, no general answer can be offered. The gist of the matter is that the choice of the proper aggregation procedure depends on the conceptual definition in the first place. That said, and as already indicated with the assistance of Goertz, virtually all extant definitions of democracy are construed in terms of

Table A.1 Munck's five aggregation procedures

Aggregation rule	Substitution	Interaction
Multiplication (product)	Noncompensatory	Interactive
Minimum	Noncompensatory	Noninteractive
Geometric mean	Partially compensatory	Interactive
Arithmetic mean (simple average, also applies to addition)	Partially compensatory	Noninteractive
Maximum	Compensatory	Noninteractive

Source: Adapted from Munck (2009: 71).

necessity and sufficiency, meaning that they do not allow for any substitutability between the subcomponents. Insofar as this is accepted, the choice is between the two aggregation procedures that are defined by such non-substitutability, namely multiplication and the minimum rule.

These are – to reiterate – distinguished only by whether the subcomponents stand in an interactive relationship or not (not, as Goertz argues, by multiplication allowing for some substitutability effects). Which logic has more purchase? This issue is more nebulous. Plausible arguments have been put forward in support of interaction between subcomponents of democracy such as electoral competition and political freedom rights (e.g., Beetham, 1999; O'Donnell, 2001). This would seem to give multiplication a competitive edge. In this book we have, however, solely used the minimum rule. This is a corollary of our pivotal conceptual point: that we need to be able to distinguish between thinner and thicker types of democracy. If the defining attributes solely connected with the latter definitions – say, the rule of law – do indeed condition the defining attributes of the thinner types – say, electoral rights – then it makes little sense to distinguish these types in the first place. To say this slightly differently, the minimum rule is really the logical consequence of using a typological mapping. This is something we return to below.

However, this particular recipe is not carved in stone and, in this Appendix, our objective is more general. In what follows, we therefore take stock of the results that arise from using the aggregation rule which best fits the conceptual reasoning, be it the minimum rule or multiplication – vis-à-vis the default option employed in the literature, namely that of addition (including calculating the average).

But we proceed in a somewhat roundabout way. The differences between appreciating substitutability (versus non-substitutability) only and also appreciating interaction (versus noninteraction) may be illustrated via a detour that has the added value of illustrating the general issue of this Appendix: the present literature's problems relating to aggregation.

A typological detour

As Munck (2009: 48) briefly mentions, one way of treating a composite measure without an index is to use conceptual typologies. This has often been the preferred strategy within the literature. But as should be clear from Chapter 1, here, too, we encounter a number of examples of concept-measure – or, better, concept-ordering – inconsistency.

As Lazarsfeld (1937; Lazarsfeld and Barton, 1951) – who introduced the formalized logic of typologies into social science – emphasized, a typology is a property space created by combining serial operations on two or more theoretically relevant dimensions (see also Bailey, 1994). In the literature on typologies of democracy and non-democracy, however, multi-dimensional conceptual typologies are often measured using one-dimensional orderings. This is clearly inconsistent, also, in terms of the aggregation rule.

Zakaria and Diamond

Two highly influential typological analyses characterized by such inconsistencies – by Zakaria (1997) and Diamond (1999) – date back to the late 1990s. Both scholars make a valuable conceptual distinction between liberal democracy on the one hand and illiberal democracy (Zakaria) or electoral democracy (Diamond) on the other. As the adjectives indicate, they advance a two-dimensional conceptual definition of liberal democracy, in turn emphasizing an electoral component and a liberal component. Diamond and Zakaria both construe the electoral attribute as free and fair elections, whereas the liberal equivalent includes the rule of law and the protection of basic political liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly, and association.

The upshot of this logic is that the status on each of these two attributes may vary independently of the other. First, a given country can have both free elections and uphold liberal rights and thus be a liberal democracy. Second, a given country can have free elections but not uphold liberal rights and thus be an electoral democracy/illiberal democracy.

However, rather than allowing each of the dimensions to vary independently when ordering their referents in the empirical analyses – that is, when moving from conceptualization to operationalization and measurement – Zakaria and Diamond discard the multidimensional logic and embrace a one-dimensional measure based on the FH (see Møller, 2007, 2008).

They do so in different ways. Diamond first indicates that the Freedom House distinction between 'political rights' and 'civil liberties' can be used to order the empirical referents into the types (1999: 12). This is not exactly what he does, though. He simply compares the countries grouped as 'free' by the Freedom House, which he takes to be liberal democracies, with countries grouped as 'electoral democracies' (what he terms formal democracies) by Freedom House.

However, in neither of these two cases does the ordering treat the electoral and liberal attribute as independent components. Most obviously, the designation of free is based on scores on both dimensions. A country is thus able to move from the class of electoral democracy to that of liberal democracy by either 1) doing better with regard to both the electoral and the liberal criteria, or 2) doing much better with regard to either of the two (Møller, 2007). This fact is also quite obvious when inspecting the respective political rights and civil liberties scores of such movers.

Diamond has subsequently changed his conceptual scheme, most notably by augmenting his typology (see Diamond 2002, 2003). But when ordering the empirical referents in these more fine-grained typological constructs, he simply resorts to the average Freedom House ratings rather than allowing the two dimensions to vary separately, thereby once again measuring conceptual two-dimensionality using a one-dimensional ordering.

Though falling prey to the same problem, Zakaria's case, which we spell out later in this Appendix, is slightly different. Critically for our purposes, such inconsistency – what may be termed erroneous one-dimensionality – is actually

a consequence of using an improper aggregation rule. Such is the case because a multidimensional typology is expressly based on using a minimum rule on each of the dimensions, thereby separating mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive classes (a typology being a combination of several one-dimensional classifications). That is, each type is scored with reference to the minimum score across the attributes of the concept of democracy.

The main virtue of using a multidimensional typology to tease out types of democracy and non-democracy is exactly that this makes for appreciating the Aristotelian structure of conceptual definitions, that is, that the concept is normally based on individually necessary and jointly sufficient attributes. To say this slightly differently, if we are to operate with more than one dimension of democracy – and use a typology to get at this – then we must translate this conceptual point of departure into a genuine multidimensional property space, in which each of the dimensions is allowed to vary separately. By aggregating the scores on the two dimensions using an additive procedure, and thus collapsing the attributes, we learn very little about – *in casu* – the respect for electoral rights vis-à-vis liberal rights in a given country. This is the main problem with the respective analyses of Diamond (1999) and Zakaria (1997) and goes to show that their empirical orderings have low measurement validity vis-à-vis their implicit conceptual typologies.

Engberg and Ersson

Another example of these problems is to be found in Engberg and Ersson (2001), who use the FH to operationalize four different regime types: democracy, illiberal democracy, semi-democracy, and non-democracy. To do so, they proceed in two steps. First, they use FH's own distinction between 'free', 'partly free', and 'not free': the first category is equated with democracy and the third category with non-democracy. Second, the partly free category is then split into the two classes of illiberal democracy and semi-democracy based on the respective scores of 'political rights' and 'civil liberties'. If a partly free country scores better on political rights than on civil liberties, it is classified as an instance of illiberal democracy. Otherwise, it is grouped as a semi-democracy. Using this operationalization, Engberg and Ersson order Third World countries in the period 1972–1999.

Engberg and Ersson's main conceptual aim is to capture illiberal democracies. Accordingly, their very point of departure is that one needs to distinguish between the 'degree of democracy and the degree of (il)liberalism' (Engberg and Ersson, 2001: 38). For this reason alone, the first step in their operationalization, which takes the average across the two dimensions of political rights (the democratic dimension) and civil liberties (the liberal dimension), is flawed. Engberg and Ersson here fall into the same trap as did Diamond and Zakaria in the analyses mentioned above, that is, erroneous one-dimensionality.

Engberg and Ersson's second analytical step, which consists of separating partly free countries into two categories, based on their individual scores on the

two dimensions, is problematical as well. To see why this is the case, one need only revisit Zakaria (1997), who uses the exact same strategy. Zakaria thus combines an initial one-dimensional classification with a multidimensional sub-classification. In the former step, he identifies a class of 'democratizing countries' on the aggregate FH ratings, almost corresponding to the 'partly free' category. In the latter step, he checks whether the referents that fall within this class score lower (i.e., better) on the liberal attribute of civil liberties than on the electoral attribute of political rights. If such is the case, he considers the referents to be instances of illiberal democracy.

But in the case of both Zakaria and Engberg and Ersson, this is obviously fallacious given the conceptual point of departure. Both analyses thereby commit what Sartori (1970) terms conceptual stretching as the illiberal democracies are not countries with impeccable political rights scores that fall below a certain minimum (threshold) on the civil liberties index. Rather, they are countries doing moderately well on the average of these two dimensions, while being characterized by somewhat lower civil liberties than political rights scores.

To be consistent, these two dimensions need to be kept at arm's length of each other. Recall here that the basic point was that such multidimensional typological distinctions require the use of the minimum rule. The question is what happens when Engberg and Ersson's additive-cum-minimum procedure is substituted with a pure minimum procedure? The answer to this question is reported in Table A.2.

In the replication, we have kept Engberg and Ersson's own threshold of 2.5 but we deviate from their practice by employing it on the respective indices of political rights and civil liberties. To make the presentation manageable, we have solely touched upon the first and last of the years analyzed by Engberg and Ersson, namely 1972 and 1999.

What we see is that the picture painted by Engberg and Ersson changes quite a lot when using the proper aggregation rule. In both years, the number of democracies decrease dramatically, whereas the number of illiberal democracies actually increase, although less so. The choice of aggregation rules thus makes an important empirical difference, even when the same data are used.

Table A.2 Distribution of Engberg and Ersson's countries as a function of different aggregation rules, 1972 and 1999

		(Liberal) democracy	*Illiberal democracy*	*Semi- democracy*	*Non- democracy*
1972	Engberg/Ersson	14	8	9	61
	Minimum rule	6	11	5	70
1999	Engberg/Ersson	21	12	19	40
	Minimum rule	11	15	18	48

Note
The 'minimum rule' here equals a score of at least 2 on each dimension (in combination, making for liberal democracy); a score of 5 or more on one of the dimensions equals non-democracy; the distinction between the middle-range types is similar to Engberg/Ersson's.

To make matters worse, Engberg and Ersson (2001: 39) subsequently order their Third World countries in each of the four regime types based on averages across time (the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and the 1972–1999 period, respectively). This, too, constitutes a flagrant case of concept-measure inconsistency as the averages across these periods could easily (and probably do) hide movements on the different dimensions and, consequently, between different regime categories. Just think of the significant regime changes going on in cases like Ghana, Peru, and Thailand over the period from 1972 to 1999. Taken together, the resulting classification provides neither clear-cut information about the regime types nor information about the stability of the particular countries.

Mapping the third wave of democratization using Polity IV

To further illustrate our point, we have carried out a more general analysis of the empirical differences that arise when employing a minimum rule and addition, respectively, to measure the number of democracies using the Polity IV dataset in the context of the so-called third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). More precisely, we compare the number of democracies based on Doorenspleet's (2000) operationalization, which employs the minimum rule across a number of subcomponents, and the measure of Jaggers and Gurr (1995), which simply operates with a particular (arbitrary) threshold on an additive index combining these subcomponents (see the note below Table A.3 for details).

As reported in Table A.3, the numbers differ in interesting ways. In the period 1974–1989, the differences are negligible as they only oscillate between a low of one (1976, 1977) and a high of seven (1989). However, following the end of the Cold War, the numbers surge – and henceforth oscillate between a low of 13 (1990) and a high of 28 (2001). Indeed, since the early 1990s, the number denoting the different count based on the two operationalizations never dips below 20.

Once again, when broken down on subcomponents, the data are exactly the same. But the aggregation rule turns out to have very salient empirical consequences, at least in the post-Cold War period. This is in itself a quite interesting result as it goes to corroborate one of the main findings of this book: that the category of democracy has become more heterogeneous in the latest decades.

But that is by the way in this Appendix. What is important for our purposes is that the aggregation rule matters, empirically. Moreover, as Jaggers and Gurr (1995) define democracy in Aristotelian terms, this is also an example of concept-measure inconsistency (due to the use of addition) – with salient empirical consequences.

Bounded wholes

We have shown that the typological analyses appraised above are part and parcel of the aggregation *problématique*. However, the limits of using typologies to solve the problem of aggregation are – even when Lazarsfeld's guidelines are actually followed – quickly reached; and this in two ways. First, the very fact that typologies rest on categorical distinctions, and that the complexity of the

Tabl*e A.3* Number of democracies according to the Polity IV dataset as a function of different aggregation rules, 1974–2007

Year	Doorenspleet (minimum)	Jaggers and Gurr (additive)	Year	Doorenspleet (minimum)	Jaggers and Gurr (additive)
1974	36	33	1991	74	55
1975	38	35	1992	84	61
1976	37	36	1993	86	64
1977	36	35	1994	91	66
1978	40	36	1995	88	65
1979	43	38	1996	87	67
1980	44	38	1997	88	66
1981	43	38	1998	87	65
1982	45	39	1999	87	65
1983	46	41	2000	91	67
1984	46	40	2001	95	67
1985	47	42	2002	97	71
1986	48	43	2003	95	70
1987	48	43	2004	95	74
1988	50	44	2005	99	75
1989	52	45	2006	104	81
1990	63	50	2007	103	79

Note

Minimum = Doorenspleet's criteria as regards the subcomponents, namely 2 or 3 on 'competitiveness of executive recruitment', 3 or 4 on 'openness of executive recruitment', 0, 3, 4 or 5 on competitiveness on participation, and 4, 5, 6, or 7 on 'constraints on the power of the executive'. Jaggers and Gurr (1995) use a threshold of 7 or higher on the democracy-autocracy scale, that is, the democracy scale minus the autocracy scale, each based on addition of (partly differently weighted) subcomponents, with a range from 10 to –10.

orderings are a product of the number of classes on each dimension *and* the number of dimensions, means that the minimum rule must be employed in a relatively crude manner. Second, typologies only make for appreciating substitutability, not interaction. For these reasons, we now turn to a discussion of some examples of how interaction between attributes has been treated in the literature, and whether it would make a difference if a more appropriate – quantitative – aggregation procedure had been used.

Bounded wholes and aggregation

One of Goertz's reasons for accepting that democracy must be conceptualized using an Aristotelian logic is that he harbors a 'functionalist view of the phenomenon' (2006: 15). Goertz is definitely not alone in this. Many scholars seem to conceive of democracy in terms of the functionalist or systemic logic of 'bounded wholes'. Most telling, perhaps, is the description offered by Linz and Stepan (1996: 13–15). To quote: 'Properly understood, democracy is more than a regime; it is an interacting system. No single arena in such a system can function properly without some support from one, or often all, of the other arenas' (ibid.: 13–15).

Below we assess the analyses of two scholars subscribing to a similar view: Merkel (1998, 2008), who has proposed that we construe democratic consolidation as a stable equilibrium between the institutional, representative, behavioral, and civic features of the democratic system, and Schedler (2002), who has promoted an electoral definition of democracy resting on the logic of a bounded whole.

This use of the bounded whole perspective points back to a venerable tradition within democratic theory, one associated in particular with Sartori (1987: 184). In Sartori's view, bounded wholes create differences of kind (not degree) between the categories of democracy and non-democracy (or any other set of categories for that matter). Accordingly, he zealously emphasizes that the presence of democracy implies that all systemic properties are present. The absence of just one theoretically necessary property is enough to disqualify a case from the class of democracy (see Collier and Adcock, 1999: 543).

It has been convincingly argued that Sartori's distinction between differences of kind and differences of degree based on the notion of a bounded whole is a false one, in that this simply has to do with the aggregation rule (Munck, 2009: 40–41). Sartori's conceptual logic can thus be retained both in terms of categorical distinctions and in terms of graded differences.[2] What is important regarding the notion of a bounded whole is thus not the distinction between dichotomous and continuous measures. It is simply that it is the product of the parts rather than the sum or average of the parts that makes up the whole.

'Product' should be taken as read here. The bounded whole connection between attributes is obviously one of individual necessity and joint sufficiency. However, it also clearly entails that the attributes stand in an interactive relationship. This is what Collier and Adcock (1999: 558) seem to mean when they render their more particular, mathematical elaboration of the logic as follows:

> If $X1$, $X2$, $X3$, and $X4$ are dichotomous components of democracy that assume a value of 0 or 1, the idea of a bounded whole might be represented by $X1*X2*X3*X4$. This bounded-whole formulation assumes the value 1 if all the component scores are 1, and zero if any of them are zero.

As already explained, the use of bounded wholes need not rest on the dichotomous logic of Collier and Adcock's quote. But it does imply multiplication rather than the minimum rule due to the very functionalist (or systemic) relationship described by Goertz and Sartori.

This is where many scholars err. For when descending from what Adcock and Collier (2001) elsewhere term the 'systematized concept' to 'indicators', the idea of a bounded whole is normally not translated into this requisite aggregation rule. Instead, the scholars reviewed below add up (or take the simple mean of) the indicators covering the various attributes.

Merkel

In a recent paper, Merkel (2008: 12, 28) uses the BTI 2006 (covering 2005) to demonstrate that the Western part of the former communist setting – what is

normally termed East-Central Europe – has consolidated democracy much faster than one would have expected, theoretically.[3] In fact, only with respect to the rule of law do the new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe lag markedly behind Southern Europe.

What we are interested in here is the correspondence (or lack thereof) between Merkel's conceptual points and the aggregation rule that he uses. In brief, Merkel employs a four-level model of democratic consolidation (cf. Merkel, 1998) to aggregate a concept that he terms 'overall consolidation'. The model comprises 'institutional consolidation', 'representative consolidation', 'behavioral consolidation', and 'attitudinal consolidation'. These should be understood in terms of a conceptual hierarchy, meaning that the move from the left (institutional consolidation) to the right (attitudinal consolidation) consists in augmenting the definition of consolidation from a thinner to a thicker one.

Overall consolidation therefore subsumes these four dimensions (or attributes). Conceptually, the edifice is cloaked in a bounded whole logic, meaning that all the four attributes are necessary (and jointly sufficient) for overall consolidation and that they interact. This is all very solid. The problem is that Merkel uses a simple logic of addition to aggregate the four dimensions, that is, he uses the mean of the scores of the four kinds of consolidation.[4] However, Merkel's conceptual arguments clearly entail that – insofar as scores from more than one subcategory are used to capture one overarching attribute – the elements must be construed as non-substitutable and interactive. Consequently, rather than using the average, it is pertinent to employ multiplication.

In Table A.4, we have replicated Merkel's analysis using this more appropriate aggregation procedure. To elaborate, we have retained Merkel's BTI indicators – recalibrated to have a range from 0 to 1 to facilitate comparison – while simply altering the aggregation rule. The new results are illustrated vis-à-vis Merkel's original scores, which are based on the mean.

Table A.4 shows that the ranks of the countries do not change much when using different aggregation rules. This finding indicates that the indicators used to measure the four dimensions are highly correlated and, what is more, that they interact and/or are caused by the same factors. However, this surely could have been different and will not necessarily be the case in other instances (e.g., other regions or other time periods).

Next, as regards the absolute consolidation scores, the results are dramatically altered. Merkel's conclusion that the East-Central European countries are by and large fully consolidated is not supported if multiplication is employed. The noteworthy differences between the countries persist but they are all relegated to a lower level of democratic achievements. To elaborate, vis-à-vis West European countries that, if included in the BTI, probably would score high across the board, the differences are much starker using an aggregation rule reflecting the logic of bounded wholes. And such an aggregation rule is, to reiterate, the logical corollary of Merkel's very demanding conceptual criteria.

Table A.4 Merkel's measure of democratic consolidation using different aggregation
          methods, 2005

	Mean	*Multiplication*
Albania	0.69 (12)	0.21 (12)
Belarus	0.14 (19)	0.00 (19)
Bosnia	0.57 (16)	0.10 (16)
Bulgaria	0.75 (9)	0.31 (9)
Croatia	0.87 (5)	0.55 (5)
Czech Republic	0.91 (2)	0.67 (2)
Estonia	0.91 (2)	0.67 (2)
Hungary	0.89 (4)	0.63 (4)
Latvia	0.75 (9)	0.27 (11)
Lithuania	0.84 (7)	0.48 (7)
Macedonia	0.66 (13)	0.17 (13)
Moldova	0.46 (18)	0.04 (18)
Poland	0.86 (6)	0.52 (6)
Romania	0.74 (11)	0.29 (10)
Russia	0.51 (17)	0.06 (17)
Serbia	0.63 (14)	0.16 (14)
Slovakia	0.84 (7)	0.47 (8)
Slovenia	0.93 (1)	0.74 (1)
Ukraine	0.62 (15)	0.14 (15)
Mean	0.71	0.34

Note
The rank number of the countries is shown in parentheses.

Schedler

We encounter the very same problem in an oft-cited article by Andreas Schedler.
Schedler (2002: 37) proposes 'to fill the conceptual space between the opposite
poles of liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism with two symmetrical
categories: electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism'. That is, he intro-
duces a two-dimensional distinction between a liberal and an electoral attribute.
Doing so, his work is in fact also characterized by erroneous one-dimensionality
because he relies on Diamond's (2002) scoring to order the cases in this four-
fold typology.

  However, here we are interested in the fact that Schedler adds another degree
of complexity by construing elections as bounded wholes. Emphasizing seven
requirements for free and fair elections, Schedler (2002: 41) stresses that:

> Elections may be considered democratic *if and only if* they fulfil each item
> on this list. The mathematical analogy is multiplication by zero, rather than
> addition. Partial compliance with democratic norms does not add up to
> partial democracy. Gross violation of any one condition invalidates the
> fulfilment of all the others. If the chain of democratic choice is broken
> anywhere, elections become not less democratic but undemocratic.

How does Schedler provide operational definitions for the said types and classes? This is the weakest link in this otherwise interesting conceptual exercise. As already mentioned, introducing a few ad hoc alterations, Schedler (2002: 47–48) uses Larry Diamond's (2002) scoring of regime forms to this effect. But this is obviously faulty as Diamond uses the average FH ratings (as well as some additional qualitative considerations) to classify the empirical referents.

Disregarding the problems pertaining to erroneous one-dimensionality, this average does not allow us to treat the attribute of free and fair elections as a bounded whole because – as Schedler (2002: 41) himself keenly points out – this would entail using the logic of multiplication across the relevant electoral subcomponents. Schedler's actual scoring is thus not viable considering the aggregation rule he has himself proposed.

Below we simply replicate the part of the analysis that rests on the bounded whole logic. As already mentioned, Schedler uses the FH index to measure the membership of his four constructs. To reiterate, the FH index calculates values between 1 and 7 on the twin attributes of 'political rights' (a proxy for Schedler's electoral dimension) and 'civil liberties' (a proxy for Schedler's liberal dimension), with 1 denoting the highest degree of freedom. Schedler deliberately retains the notion of bounded wholes for the former attribute. In the FH, this attribute is made up of three subcomponents of 'Electoral Process', 'Political Pluralism and Participation', and 'Functioning of Government'. It is thus these three properties – and not the seven emphasized by Schedler – that are available for constructing a bounded whole.[5] Following Schedler's own reasoning, the scores on all of these must be multiplied to calculate the bounded whole score.

When reconstructing the bounded whole of free and fair elections, we have recalibrated these scores to range from 0 to 1 since the subcomponents do not have the same range. We use 0.50 as the thresholds to distinguish between electoral democracies on the one hand and electoral authoritarianism and closed authoritarianism on the other.[6] Finally, we introduce another demarcation point, 0.83, to separate countries with moderate defective elections from countries with virtually free elections.

Freedom House only began to release the subcomponent scores in the 2007 survey (covering 2006). This means that we cannot directly compare the result of the empirical ordering with Schedler's original one, which was based on the numbers regarding 2001. This matters little, however, as the point we seek to make is a more general one, namely that the change of aggregation rule makes a huge difference, empirically. Using the 2006 numbers, the pattern shown in Table A.5 emerges.

Table A.5 shows that the alternative aggregation methods lead to very different distributions among the three categories. The results strongly indicate that, if Schedler had access to the disaggregated data and had translated his conceptual arguments into a stringent operationalization, he would have arrived at a dramatically different picture of the world.

Table A.5 Replicating Schedler's analysis of electoral democracies, 2006

	Mean	*Multiplication*
Electoral democracies with no or minor defects (ABC≥0.83)	65 (34%)	40 (21%)
Electoral democracies with moderate defects (0.83>ABC≥0.50)	58 (30%)	33 (17%)
Electoral authoritarianism and closed authoritarianism (ABC<0.50)	70 (36%)	120 (62%)

Notes
A 'Electoral Process'; B 'Political Pluralism and Participation'; C 'Functioning of Government'.

A review of selected journals

Are the identified problems isolated occurrences or do they indicate a more general – and therefore more troublesome – tendency? We have already provided a tentative answer as we have quoted Goertz to the effect that most scholars do fall into the trap of concept-measure inconsistency when democracy is the subject matter.

To push a little further at the issue, we have carried out a review of four journals: two general flagships in comparative politics (*World Politics* and *Comparative Political Studies*) and two journals expressly concerned with democracy (*Journal of Democracy* and *Democratization*). The objective is to scrutinize which aggregation rules are most prominent in the literature when democracy is measured. To make the exercise as relevant as possible, we have delimited it in three ways.

First, cross-temporally, we review the journals only in the period after the publication of Munck and Verkuilen's (2002) article, that is, 2003–2010. This temporal line of demarcation reflects the fact that only after the Munck and Verkuilen intervention would it be fair to expect a self-conscious handling of the matter of aggregation. Second, we delimit our sample to articles that use democracy as the dependent variable. This is the focus of the already assessed works and most scholars spend much time and effort in conceptualizing and operationalizing their *explanandum*; one should therefore expect a more self-conscious approach to aggregation as far as the dependent variable is concerned. Third, regarding indices/measures, we only include articles that use either FH or Polity IV. These are the two most widely employed extant indices of democracy so the issue of how they are used is definitely not a trifling one.

Taken together, the three scope conditions make for a conservative test of the present extent of concept-measure inconsistency as all should tilt the reviewed analyses toward ones with more careful handling of aggregation. In Tables A.6 and A.7, we have divided the articles that fulfill our three criteria into categories based on the employed aggregation procedure. What does the overview show?

Regarding the use of FH, we find a massive dominance of addition (including averaging). This category also subsumes the use of the general freedom ratings. Most telling is probably the fact that we only find one example of the use of a minimum or multiplication procedure, and this is one that takes the geometric

mean. What is more, the individual scores (on all levels of aggregation) are discredited by the fact that one simply does not know what a particular score indicates (see Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). Even the oft-praised classification of electoral democracies is vulnerable to this criticism. That much is clear when one takes a look at FH's coding criteria, that is, a subtotal score of 7 or better for the subcomponent 'electoral process' and an overall political rights score of 20 or better.[7]

Regarding Polity IV, the picture is more nuanced. Addition/averaging still holds a massive sway. But at least we do find that five out of twenty-four analyses use either the minimum rule or multiplication, meaning that the extreme division of Table A.6 is not repeated.

Needless to say, the fact that addition/averaging is used does not in itself add up to concept-measure inconsistency. This would also require that the concept is treated in terms of necessity and sufficiency. But here it is pertinent to recall one of the premises of this Appendix (indeed, of this book): that most scholars explicitly or implicitly conceptualize democracy in Aristotelian terms. Bearing this in mind, it is surely striking that so few use the aggregation rules of the minimum procedure or multiplication – even in the period after Munck and Verkuilen's and Goertz's interventions.

Summing up

In this Appendix, we have ventured to show that many of the present attempts to combine the subcomponent scores of indices such as FH and Polity IV into aggregate indices or typologies of democracy and non-democracy suffer from concept-measure inconsistencies. We highlighted a number of such lapses, which have to do with using an aggregation rule that does not reflect the

Table A.6 Aggregation rules used in analyses based on Freedom House's *Freedom in the World Survey*, 2003–2010

Average/additive	31
Freedom ratings	24
Minimum/multiplication	(1)*
Individual scores	12
Electoral democracy	6

Notes
Freedom ratings denote Freedom House's own tripartite distinction between free, partly free, and not free. Electoral democracy denotes Freedom House's separate measure of electoral democracies. Individual scores denote the use of either Freedom House's political rights index or their civil liberties index, combined in their aggregate index.
* Geometric mean.

Table A.7 Aggregation rules of analyses using the Polity IV data, 2003–2010

Average/additive	18
Minimum/multiplication	5
Individual scores	1

theorized structure of the concept. This problem besets recent analyses that understand the concept of democracy in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient subcomponents – or even of a bounded whole – but use simple addition/averaging procedures to aggregate these.

More particularly, we showed that it makes quite a difference when more appropriate procedures, such as the minimum rule or multiplication, are employed. As did Goertz (2006: 98), we have thus found 'significant differences between the two measures using *exactly the same data*'.

All of the analyses highlighted, including those based on typological orderings reviewed in the first part of the Appendix, basically suffer from one and the same general deficiency. While the conceptual reasoning is relatively sound, they err with regard to operationalization and measurement. This makes for low measurement validity (cf. Adcock and Collier, 2001), and this shortcoming has salient consequences for the empirical results and, by extension, for the inferences about the present dynamics of democratization. The problems simply 'travel' into both the descriptive and explanatory analyses that these orderings are used to support.

Such lack of conceptual awareness is clearly not small potatoes. While the quality of the standard datasets have been – and should be – placed under critical scrutiny, their unsystematic use in aggregation procedures is likely to have even wider ramifications for the validity of the analyses sustained by these datasets.

All this goes to justify our use of the minimum rule in this book. Whereas multiplication may have a competitive edge when constructing aggregate indices, in particular indices based on the 'bounded whole' logic, the minimum rule is the obvious way to appreciate the Aristotelian notions of necessity and sufficiency (what we termed a classical categorization) when seeking to order referents in conceptual typologies. In fact, it is the only way to do this insofar as the premise is that thinner and thicker types of democracy must be treated independently of each other.

The merits of the BTI

So much for the choice of aggregation procedure. The thoughts conveyed in this Appendix also have consequences for the choice of dataset. In Chapters 1 and 2, we have briefly argued in favor of selecting the BTI rather than FH and Polity IV to order countries in the conceptual typologies presented. Our arguments here focused mostly on the fact that the BTI actually scores countries independently on all of the defining attributes of our typologies, including those of Part II (see Chapters 4 and 5). This is of course critical for our purposes. However, the BTI has additional merits that may be elucidated on the basis of the replications carried out in this Appendix.

First things first, the data of the BTI are available on the indicator level. This disaggregated quality is a precondition for using the proper aggregation procedure and this is in itself a valuable property of the BTI. Second, the linguistic qualifiers that we have used to establish thresholds mean that one knows what a particular score denotes, as illustrated in Tables A.8 and A.9.

Table A.8 BTI's subcomponents: questions and clarifications

Indicator	Question	Clarification
1.1 Monopoly on use of force	To what extent does the state's monopoly on the use of force cover the entire territory?	
1.2 Citizenship agreement	To what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate?	The question seeks to assess the extent to which (1) major groups in society accept and support the official/dominant concept of the nation-state, and (2) ruling groups de jure or de facto exclude ethnic, religious, or cultural minorities from political citizenship (membership in the political nation).
2.1 Free elections	To what extent are rulers determined by general, free and fair elections?	
2.2 Democrats rule	To what extent do democratically elected rulers have the effective power to govern, or to what extent are there veto powers and political enclaves?	The elected rulers to be assessed here are primarily the president and/or parliament or the head of government who is empowered by the parliament. Veto powers can be the military, the clergy, landowners, business elites, etc., with the power to defect partially from democratic procedures without questioning the system as such.
2.3 Association/ assembly rights	To what extent can independent political and/or civic groups associate and assemble freely?	This question refers to the degree of freedom to organize politically that is needed to influence political decision-making processes 'from the bottom up'. It also includes groups that mobilize along ethnic and similar cleavages.
2.4 Freedom of expression	To what extent can citizens, organizations, and the mass media express opinions freely?	Apart from evaluating to what extent freedom of opinion and the press are generally guaranteed, consideration should also be given as to whether the structure of the mass media system provides for a plurality of opinions.
3.1 Separation of powers	To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?	This question refers to the basic configuration and operation of the separation of powers (institutional differentiation, division of labor according to functions and, most significantly, checks and balances). It does include the subjection of state power to the law.

Indicator	Question	Clarification
3.2 Independent judiciary	To what extent does an independent judiciary exist?	An independent judiciary refers first and foremost to how far the courts can interpret and review norms and pursue their own reasoning free from the influence of rulers or powerful groups and individuals. This requires a differentiated organization of the legal system, including legal education, jurisprudence, regulated appointment of the judiciary, rational proceedings, professionalism, channels of appeal, and court administration.
3.3 Prosecution of office abuse	To what extent are there legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions?	This question addresses how the state and society hold public servants and politicians accountable and whether conflicts of interest are sanctioned.
3.4 Civil rights ensured	To what extent are civil rights guaranteed and protected, and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these liberties?	The civil rights in question refer to the protection of personal liberty against state and non-state actors, including the right to life and security of person; freedom from slavery; equality before the law and due process under the rule of law; freedom of movement; access to justice; bans on discrimination; and freedom of religion.
10.1 Social safety nets	To what extent do social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment, or disability?	Social safety nets may be organized by the state or by society (private welfare institutions), and comprise a variable welfare mix. They are ultimately intended to ensure inclusion of almost everyone in economic life.
10.2 Equal opportunity	To what extent does equality of opportunity exist?	The question of equal opportunity is directed at finding out to what extent individuals have equal access to participation in society regardless of their social background. State initiatives – such as access to public services, especially education, and assistance mechanisms – play a central role.

Table A.9 BTI's political participation subcomponents: links between scores and subcategory conditions

	Free elections (A)	Democrats rule (B)	Association/Assembly rights (C)	Freedom of expression (D)
No defect (9–10)	No constraints on free and fair elections.	Elected rulers have the effective power to govern.	The freedom of association and assembly is unrestricted.	There are unrestricted freedoms of opinion and the press.
Moderate defect (6–8)	General elections are held and accepted in principle as the means of filling leadership positions. However, there are some constraints on the principle of equality.	Elected rulers have the power to govern in principle, but individual power groups can set their own domains apart or enforce special-interest policies against the state.	There are partial constraints – not consistent with democratic principles – on the freedom of association, but as a rule there are no prohibitions on parties or social organizations.	Freedoms of opinion and the press are subject to some intervention that undermines democratic principles, but outright prohibitions on the press are limited to a few isolated cases.
Severe defect (3–5)	Elections or partial elections are held but have de facto only limited influence over who rules.	Elected rulers have the power to govern in important matters, but the fundamental orientation of the constitution can be curtailed or rendered ineffective by strong veto groups.	Opposition parties with any relevance for governance are prohibited or systematically disabled. Freedom of assembly is not ensured everywhere by the state. Civic organizations can act if they support the regime or are not outspokenly critical of it.	The core elements of a public sphere and of public debate exist but are vulnerable to distortion and manipulation through massive intervention.
Extreme defect (1–2)	No democratic elections at the national level.	Elected rulers have de facto no power to govern, or rulers are not democratically elected.	No freedom of association for political and social groups. No freedom of assembly.	No freedom of opinion or of the press.

Notes

Preface

1 Naess *et al.* (1956: 130–31) show that this conception of democracy as 'merely a form of government, not a consideration of the purposes to which government may be turned' (quote of James A. Bryce) was already influential in Anglo-Saxon academia in the inter-war period.
2 At first, it was a limited sovereignty of the people as only propertied males and, subsequently, all males obtained the right to vote. With the exception of New Zealand (1893), the women were only franchised in the twentieth century (see Przeworski, 2009).

Introduction

1 Such is the case, at least, when using a thin definition of democracy that only emphasizes free elections. The referents thereby classified as democracies obviously all share the presence of this attribute; otherwise they would simply be cases of non-democracy. However, they have very diverse values on accompanying attributes such as civil liberties (freedom of speech, association, and assembly) and the rule of law (horizontal accountability and equality before the law) – hence the heterogeneity. When embracing thicker definitions, in which all the said properties are construed as defining attributes, the membership of the consequent class of liberal democracy once again becomes quite homogenous, and largely confined to the Western world. We pursue this point – and demonstrate these patterns – in Parts I and II of the book.
2 Needless to say, such is only the case if they exhibit the defining properties of the most minimalistic conception of democracy. Otherwise, we treat them as instances of autocracy.
3 Sartori (1970: 1042) emphasizes that, even at the most abstract level, there must be a contrary to a concept. See also Goertz (2006).
4 It was Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Karl who 'hit upon the concept of accountability as the key to the broadest and most widely applicable definition of "modern representative political democracy"' (Schmitter, 2004: 47).
5 The few attempts that have been made to define and operationalize these regime types in order to test the propositions about a gap between electoral and liberal democracy (Diamond, 1999, 2002; Zakaria, 1997, 2003) have suffered from severe logical problems (cf. Møller, 2007, 2008; see also the Appendix). However, here we are only interested in the theoretical arguments underpinning these claims.
6 Concepts are themselves infused with theory so this distinction is somewhat misleading. Suffice to say that 'theoretical' here denotes explanatory theory (or merely explanation), an analytical operation which concepts of course enter but do not in themselves make for (cf. Munck, 2010).

7 McFaul (2002) explicitly promotes an actor-centered explanation of post-communist regime change. Yet at the very end of the article, he does acknowledge the potential impact of deeper structural constraints. To quote:

> The strong correlation between geography and regime type suggests that deeper structural variables might explain the regime variances without the need for a careful accounting of balances of power and ideologies at the time of transition. Geography, as well as economic development, history, culture, prior regime type, and the ideological orientation of enemies most certainly influenced the particular balances of power and ideologies that produced democracy and dictatorship in the post-communist world. Future research must seek to explain these transitional balances of power. However … the argument advanced in this article is that these big structural variables have path-dependent consequences only in historically specific strategic settings.
>
> (McFaul, 2002: 238)

8 See also the references that this claim is based on.
9 This is only the contemporary pattern, which is obviously based on a number of scope conditions. Historically, geopolitical competition, which is also external to the states, has facilitated all of our four attributes (Hintze, 1975; Tilly, 1992). However, these geopolitical dynamics arguably no longer seem to operate (Tilly, 1992: Ch. 7; Krasner, 2005) and the liberal hegemony has consequences distinct from these external forces characterizing early modern Europe.

1 Defective democracy revisited

1 The article was published in a special issue of *Democratization* on defective democracies. We focus on this article as it is easily accessible, in English, much quoted, and represents one of the latest, authoritative descriptions of the typology.
2 The (internal) embeddedness of a liberal democracy refers to the 'specific interdependence/independence of the different partial regimes of a democracy [that] secures its normative and functional existence' (Merkel, 2004: 36).
3 The allegory is apt in that Merkel's diminished subtypes have negative connotations vis-à-vis embedded democracy; as, needless to say, do Tolstoy's unhappy families. This also means that we hear a distant echo of radical enlightenment thought here, which – to use Sir Isaiah Berlin's formulation – stressed that 'truth is one, error many'.
4 A few exceptions to this numerical criterion exist: Bahrain, Botswana, Estonia, Mauritius, and Montenegro, all of which are included in spite of their smaller populations.
5 See the *BTI 2008 Manual for Country Assessments*, URL (consulted December 27, 2008): www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/Anlagen_BTI_2008/BTI2008_Manual.pdf.
6 This attribute measures whether the elected rulers have the effective power to govern, including whether veto powers are in existence.
7 Referring to the scores 6–8 and 3–5, respectively.
8 Notice that the way exclusive democracy is defined and operationalized means that the modification does not leave any room for empirical referents of this type.
9 Interested readers may get them by contacting us.
10 Merkel (2004: 38) explicitly writes that 'a democratic electoral regime is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for democratic governing'. It is, however, because he equates democratic governing with the root concept of embedded democracy here – a country can, as he recognizes, be termed a democracy with a (derogatory) adjective based on the electoral attribute only (ibid.: 52).
11 Following Sartori (1970: 1042), even at the most abstract level, there must be a contrary to a concept.

2 Conceptualizing and measuring democracy I: toward a classical typology

1 We use the kind of typology that Bailey (1973: 27) terms 'Classification, then Identification', meaning that first we create our conceptual typology and then order the empirical referents within it. Moreover, we work with what Bailey (1973: 21) terms a 'monothetic' typology, that is, the 'possession of a unique set of features is both necessary and sufficient for identifying a specimen as belonging to a particular cell of the typology'.

2 Such as restrictions on the right to vote for a certain part of the adult population (see Schumpeter, 1974 [1942]: 244–245), major discriminations in the electoral laws, or shortcomings in registration, etc. due to lack of administrative capacity.

3 Such as 'reserved domains' or 'tutelary powers' (in the electoral laws).

4 To quote:

> Elections must be decisive in several senses: (a) those who turn out to be the winners gain incumbency of the respective governmental roles; (b) elected officials, based on the authority assigned to these roles, can actually make the binding decisions that a democratic legal/constitutional framework normally authorizes; and (c) elected officials end their mandates in the terms and/or under the conditions stipulated by this same framework.
>
> (O'Donnell, 2004a: 14)

5 This trichotomy mirrors what Coppedge and Reinicke (1990: 53–54) created with respect to the electoral attribute. We have simply borrowed the designation 'no meaningful elections' from their ordering.

6 These properties are also part of many definitions of the related concepts of horizontal accountability, constitutionalism, and *Rechsstaat/estado de derocho/état de droit*.

7 Observe Dahl's (1989: 221) polyarchy criteria: free and fair elections, elected officials, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, and associational autonomy.

8 Vanhanen's (1984: 11) pure electoral definition is this: 'In modern societies democracy means that people and groups of people are free to compete for power and that power holders are elected by the people and responsible to the people.'

9 Notice that Levitsky and Way (cf. the nomenclature) do not construe this as a type of democracy. However, their definition constitutes an equivalent frequently referred to in the literature on regime change. See also the discussion of competitive authoritarianism in the Introduction.

10 Our distinctions are rather similar to those suggested by Howard and Roessler (2006: 367). However, the conceptual framework proposed here has several advantages vis-à-vis their conceptual framework. First, we distinguish more systematically between democracies and non-democracies on the one hand and political liberties and the rule of law on the other. Second, the hierarchical pattern necessary to make both conceptual frameworks useful is merely assumed by Howard and Roessler, whereas we demonstrate it empirically.

11 These three exceptions are, first, India and Mauritius, which have the attribute of political liberties but only elections with moderate defects and, second, Papua New Guinea, which has the attribute of political liberties but no meaningful elections.

12 This also means that it mirrors the distribution of a Guttman scale. The Guttman scale was first introduced in the context of statistical surveys. A perfect Guttman scale consists of a set of items that are ranked in order of difficulty from the least extreme to most extreme position. For example, a person scoring 6 on a 10-item Guttman scale, will agree with items 1–6 and disagree with items 7, 8, 9, and 10. However, a Guttman scale conventionally requires a preliminary theoretical statement of intrinsic one-dimensionality. Our finding is more modest as it solely rests

on an empirical demonstration, although we did hint at a theoretical one-dimensionality in the Introduction (based on the notion of 'accountability').

13 Furthermore, on both political rights and civil liberties, FH includes components that measure something other than our three attributes (e.g., *Functioning of Government* and *Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights*). Hence, using Munck and Verkuilen's (2002) terms, there is a problem of conflation, meaning that the components do not tap into the overarching concept.

14 At least before 2009. Now, the formula is a little more complex, combining a minimum score on this component with an overall minimum score of all the components making up the political rights dimension.

15 The threshold of 85 means that the two highest scores on the subcomponents evaluated by 13-point scales (0–12) and the three highest scores on the subcomponents evaluated by 17-point scales (0–16) refer to situations with no defects. The threshold of 55 corresponds to a score of 7 or higher on the 13-point scales, including the electoral process subcomponent (and 9 on the 17-point scales).

16 What Lazarsfeld and Barton (1951) term 'arbitrary numerical reduction'.

17 This is an echo of Collier and Levitsky's (1996) point about explicating the existing implicit ordinal scales of scholars, described in the Introduction.

18 It comprises the non-autocratic part of the complete scale. On the trichotomized electoral attribute, 2 denotes elections without defects and 1 denotes elections with moderate defects. On the two other attributes, 1 denotes the presence of political liberties and the rule of law, respectively, whereas 0 denotes their absence.

19 Disregarding the two exceptions of India and Mauritius.

20 Witness only the case of Russia, which, according to the operationalization based on BTI, is a minimalistic democracy, whereas it does not clear this threshold using the FH operationalization.

3 Conceptualizing and measuring democracy II: including social rights?

1 *Ipso facto*, Dahl also imposes restrictions on the majority will in his definition of polyarchy.

2 O'Donnell (2001) goes on to argue that Schumpeter's position is less minimalist than normally described because he thereby presupposes other attributes. This reading seemingly runs contrary to our view as we have argued that Schumpeter's position is in fact more minimalist than what is normally implied. However, O'Donnell ignores Schumpeter's point about the *demos* constituting itself, which goes a long way toward explaining the difference.

3 See also Collier and Levitsky (1996: 12) on O'Donnell's prior attempts to include issues of social relations.

4 This is of course no coincidence as the way in which we have approached the boundary problem is necessarily pragmatic. Any augmentation of Schumpeter's position means that the pure and simple stringency of the 'how' must be abandoned.

5 We have borrowed this term from Huber *et al.* (1997), who operate with a set of defining attributes which are rather tangential to ours, the main difference being that they also include participation as an attribute.

6 In Chapter 2, we termed this polar type 'illiberal autocracy'. That makes less sense this time around as it negates not only the rule of law (illiberal) but also social rights (non-social). For this reason, we use expressions such as 'pure' and 'full-blown' autocracy to designate this autocratic extreme in this chapter.

7 As in 2009, the deviant cases in 2007 are the Czech Republic (also in 2005), Hungary, and Slovakia.

8 Recall, however, that all social democracies are, by definition, also liberal democracies.

4 Post-communist regime types: hierarchy across space

 1 As Lazarsfeld (1937) and Bailey (1994) have described, a typology can be expanded – or substructed, as Lazarsfeld terms it – either via augmenting the serial operations on each attribute or by adding attributes, thereby expanding the compound of attributes.
 2 One partial exception is Merkel *et al.* (2003), who include the post-communist countries in a more general classification, emphasizing different types of defective democracies, which we – in Chapter 1 – demonstrated that, though quite impressive, is burdened by some important problems.
 3 The only exception is that we once again (as in Chapter 2) name polar type 27 illiberal autocracy to underline that it is the mirror image of liberal democracy (polar type 1).
 4 Insofar as the countries do indeed clump in these types, it corroborates H1a, H1b, and H1c. In particular, it fits the most demanding version of the hierarchical logic expressed by H1c as it testifies to the existence of a perfect hierarchy (recall that H1a and H1b express less demanding versions of the hierarchical logic). To say this slightly differently, the empirical absence of other combinations – for example, (3,3,1), (3,2,1), (3,1,1) – lends support to our theoretical expectations.
 5 To use the more technical term, just like a classification, the scale must divide the referents with respect to one particular *fundamentum divisionis* (cf. Marradi, 1990).
 6 Interested readers may contact the authors to receive the tables.
 7 We hasten to add that the actual country distribution differs quite a lot between the FH analyses and the BTI analyses. Nonetheless, except for the said misfits, the countries are still situated in the types indicated by the darker shade of grey. And this is the main thrust of the argument about robustness.
 8 We here include Croatia into this geographical category, as is conventionally done. Sometimes Croatia is, however, incorporated into the category of East-Central Europe.
 9 For instance, parliamentarism versus presidentialism, federalism versus unitary state, proportional versus FPTP electoral system.
10 Quoting Kitschelt *et al.* (1999: 394): 'The tabula rasa view may permit the random variation of democratic experiences across the entire cohort of post-communist countries, but not the presence of systematically diverging patterns of democratic competition'.

5 Marshall revisited: the sequence of citizenship rights in the twenty-first century

1 Not everyone agrees, however. Mann (1996: 128) criticizes Marshall's model for being too Anglophile and evolutionary. Likewise, Hirschman (1991: 128) notes that:

> the Marshallian story – the progression from civil rights to mass participation in politics through universal suffrage to socioeconomic entitlements – proceeded in a far more leisurely and 'orderly' manner in Great Britain than in the other major European countries, not to speak of the rest of the world.

2 A similar equivalence between their definitions of different types of democracy and Marshall's definitions of citizenship rights is established by Huber *et al.* (1997: 234).
3 Two subcomponents (personal social freedoms and equality of opportunity) of one of Freedom House's civil liberty attributes, namely personal autonomy and individual rights, constitute partial exceptions to this observation. But unfortunately data for this (lowest) level of measurement are not publicly available.
4 Primarily by using indicators such as child mortality, life expectancy, literacy, and GDP per capita.
5 To the extent that scores from more than one subcategory are used to capture an attribute, we once again consider them to be individually constitutive and non-substitutable. Consequently, as in the previous analyses, we employ a minimum score procedure to aggregate them.

6 The respective positioning of the types could take many other shapes but that would not change the identity of the 27 types – only their position in the eye of the beholder.

7 For instance, the political rights dimension includes aspects such as whether the government operates with openness and transparency, and whether the government is free from pervasive corruption.

8 This should not impact the relative fit of H0 and H1 as the clear majority of these countries are likely to be characterized by the combination of no defects on political, civil, and social rights.

6 Stateness first?

1 A particular challenge must be addressed here. Bratton and Chang (2006: 1061) argue 'that there exists a self-reinforcing cycle in which state building and regime consolidation feed each other'. This implies that stateness is not only a condition of democratization but also a product thereof. However, insofar as the present liberal hegemony on the international scene has an asymmetrical impact on the attributes used to distinguish between the types of democracy, in particular by privileging electoral rights and political liberties over the rule of law and social rights, this would make for a hierarchical ordering even if such endogeneity is present to some degree.

2 In fact, as Elman (2005: fn. 15) stresses, typological theory is basically a simpler version of Ragin's QCA, the very premise of which is the notions of necessary and sufficient causation.

3 Argentina, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Estonia, Jamaica, Latvia, and Montenegro.

4 When calibrating the original scores into fuzzy-set memberships, we have used what Ragin (2008) terms the 'direct method of calibration' using the scores of 10, 5.5, and 1 to designate full membership, the crossover point (maximum ambiguity), and full non-membership, respectively, for all conditions and the outcome. This choice makes sense both theoretically and empirically due to the way our definitions and hypotheses are formulated and the way the BTI dataset is constructed. Once again, our operationalization of minimalist democracy constitutes an exception as the applied cut-off points for this set are 6, 2.5, and 1, respectively.

5 To quote:

> If Z is present, X will always also be present. In this sense X is a redundant necessary cause. And if Z is absent, we already know that a necessary cause is missing, and thus the outcome will be absent. The issue of whether X is present or absent seems irrelevant.
>
> (Mahoney, 2007: 285)

6 We have also tried to combine this indicator with BTI's education indicator into a modernization index. The results based on this measure are practically identical to those derived using only the wealth indicator.

7 The respective levels of consistency are 0.50 (minimalist democracy), 0.62 (electoral democracy), 0.65 (polyarchy), 0.78 (liberal democracy), 0.84 (social democracy), 0.62 (electoral rights), 0.61 (political liberties), 0.77 (rule of law), and 0.82 (social rights). Recall the 0.85 criterion, which is used as a threshold for necessity.

8 To the extent that modernization is accepted as necessary for social rights, this would imply the establishment of a causal chain in which (the deep factor of) stateness is a necessary condition for (the more proximate factor of) modernization, which is then necessary for social rights. Modernization could thus be construed as the intervening variable (Mahoney, 2007: 283) through which stateness is linked to the respect for social rights. The same could of course be the case for other intervening factors.

7 Necessary conditions of democracy?

1 This general agreement about the effect of modernization has not exactly been accompanied by an agreement about the mechanisms that underpin the relationship. Lipset (1959) underlines a number of accompanying attributes of modernization, such as increases in tolerance and moderation, lower levels of inequality, and the rise of the middle class. Rueschemeyer *et al.* (1992) instead point to the working class as the motor power of democratization, particularly with regard to obtaining universal suffrage. And one of the most recent currents in the literature (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003) emphasizes that elites try to keep democratization at bay because they fear that economic equality will be enforced through the ballot box. Higher levels of affluence make this threat less likely as the relative contribution of the elites to redistribution falls, thereby paving the way for democratization (Boix, 2003: 41). In contrast, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) propose that an increase in emancipative values constitutes the link between socioeconomic development and democracy.

2 A. N Wilson's (1988: 403) comparison between Tolstoy and Lenin – both of whom by principle rejected using social initiatives to alleviate human misery – is worth quoting here:

> His son Ilya remarks on the inconsistency between his father's [Tolstoy's] view of social welfare in *What Then Must We Do?* and the practical efforts to which he devoted himself during the famine. When one compares Tolstoy's inconsistency with Vladimir Ulyanov's consistency, one sees the virtue of inconsistency.

Robert Michel's pernicious consistency in giving up his democratic credentials and becoming a fascist after having discovered his 'Iron Law of Oligarchy' would also fall into the political (rather than the scientific) category.

3 Indeed, even if the entire period 1972–2008 is divided into five-year intervals, nothing much happens over time.

Conclusions

1 The qualifier 'largely' is used because the hierarchy still entails that the countries do not simultaneously cross particular thresholds on the other attributes, that is, political liberties, rule of law, and social rights. In gist, then, it is only on the electoral attribute that this part of the hierarchy is established by fiat.

Appendix: concept-measure inconsistency in contemporary studies of democracy

1 However, Goertz expressly welcomes future work dealing with the question 'which among the acceptable necessary and sufficient condition possibilities is the best' (2006: 115), which is exactly the question we seek to answer in this section.

2 We are indebted to Gerardo Munck for explicating this point.

3 Based on predictions made in the early 1990s such as the so-called 'dilemma theorem' (cf. Offe, 1991).

4 Merkel (2008) does not report these operationalizations. However, they can be found in Merkel (2007). Besides taking a simple mean across the four different kinds of consolidation, Merkel also uses simple addition (mean) to aggregate the subcomponents of each of these. We have chosen not to alter this. Whereas the theoretical relationship between the four dimensions is spelled out in the article, it is not clear from the text how the relationship between these subcomponents is to be understood. Insofar as multiplication or the minimum rule rather than addition is in fact the consistent rule on this tertiary level (Goertz, 2006) – which, based on the reasoning in this Appendix, is probably the case – it obviously further enhances the aggregation problems.

5 But notice that FH's three subcomponents to a large extent cover the requirement stipulated by Schedler's seven requirements.
6 Notice that Schedler's criterion, that is, 4 on the overall 7-point measure, is also in the midpoint of the scale. Our additional criterion of 0.83 is more or less equivalent to the score of 2 on the same scale, if recalibrated.
7 After recalibration, (probably) equivalent to a score of 4 (or lower) on the political rights scale ranging from 1 to 7. According to Munck (2001: 126), Freedom House's division of its scale into the categories free, partly free, and not free is also based on ad hoc and arbitrary decisions.

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