

U.S. assistance and military democratization in the Czech Republic.

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Problems of Post-Communism. Mar/Apr98, Vol. 45 Issue 2, p22. 10p. 2 Charts.

NEW SOCIETIES, NEW SOLDIERS

Militaries inevitably reflect the society that they serve. Adapting to democratic civilian oversight is teaching transitioning militaries that no institutions in democracies exist in a political vacuum. U.S. aid programs have not sufficiently addressed this fact.

Because military institutions possess expertise and force that can be directed at either preserving or destroying democratic gains, they must march along the path of democratization in step with civilian institutions for democratic consolidation to be achieved in Eastern and Central Europe. This article assesses the progress of one military institution engaged in democratic transition, the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR), and challenges some of the prevailing assumptions about the democratization needs of post-communist militaries.[1] Proposing concrete approaches to further the process of military democratization should educate both internal and external policy-makers committed to this end.

U.S. Military Democratization Policy

The U.S. military has either adapted existing programs or created new initiatives in the post-cold war era to influence post-communist militaries' transition to democracy. These include defense and military contacts conducted under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Joint Contact Team Program, the International Military Education and Training Program, and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

The 1991 passage of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, better known as the Nunn-Lugar Act, initiated the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program under which the U.S. has appropriated \$1.8 billion since 1992 to facilitate the destruction of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.[2] This legislation also set aside \$15 million annually for defense and military contacts focused on enhancing military democratization within the four nuclear

powers of the former Soviet Union: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus.[3] A similar program of military contacts was initiated in 1992 for Central and Eastern Europe.[4]

The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) has a broad mandate. Its mission is "to deploy teams to selected countries of Central [and Eastern] Europe to assist their militaries in the transition to democracies with free market economies."5 Teams of U.S. military personnel are deployed to present the U.S. armed forces as a model of a highly effective military that operates under civilian control. Today, there are Military Liaison Teams working in Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program provides American military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. The hope is that these individuals, once positively exposed to American life and culture, will eventually rise to prominence within their own militaries and will steer public policy and foreign relations toward U.S. interests.[6] This long-standing program, which was extended to include the states of the former Soviet bloc in 1991, also provides training to civilian defense officials.[7]

Located in Garmisch, Germany, the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies plays the greatest long-term role in educating post-communist officers and civilian defense personnel in democratic principles. The Center focuses on training senior military officers and Defense Ministry personnel in democratic modes of national security and defense planning. This dovetails with the mission of the military-to-military contact programs that emphasize short-term assistance through establishing contacts at the middle ranks.[8]

Substantial funds have also been allocated to assist these states in joining NATO. While politicians insist that admitting new full members will be contingent on the progress of democratization-specifically, democratic political control of the armed forces-little activity at the NATO level has focused on these priorities. The need for both ideological and military interoperability must be recognized as a necessary condition for enlarging NATO.[9]

Examining the Czech Republic's specific military democratization needs along the dimensions of political control and military professionalism illustrates how the military contact programs have not sufficiently addressed them. These programs have increasingly focused on NATO strategic interoperability issues and have continued to weakly conceptualize program activity aimed at military democratization. Contributing to this theoretical deficit is the prevailing

theory of civil-military relations, which ignores the specialized needs of states in transition to democracy.

A Theory of Civil-Military Relations for Democratizing States

Post-communism mandates a new theory of civil-military relations unlike that previously seen by states, whether authoritarian or democratic. This section outlines the elements of political control and military professionalism characteristic of developed democracies in order to model the policy "end point" of states undergoing a democratic transition. This should help delineate a coherent set of civil-military relations that is responsive to the needs of newly democratizing states and can guide domestic and external policy advisers in reforming these systems.

Samuel Huntington, the leading theorist of civil-military relations today, has argued that the interaction of the twin imperatives of security and accountability is at the root of civil-military relations. According to him, a state's civil-military relations depend on the interaction of two competing forces: one compelling the military to become a competent institution and another demanding military accountability and responsiveness to society.[10] Civil-military relations must resolve the tensions that inevitably arise from these competing imperatives.

Democratic Political Control. Theorists have traditionally accepted classical literature's focus on civilian control of the military, defined as "governmental control of the military." [11] Democratic states face the additional and more demanding challenge of ensuring that military security is achieved with minimal sacrifice of democratic practices, norms, and values. The military must serve the democratic state while defending its democratic values and remaining under its control.

The circumstances surrounding post-communist states engaged in democratic transition differ from the conditions that characterize military institutions in stable democratic political systems. Democratic regimes insist on military subordination to civilian leadership and, by extension, to a democratic processes of authority and control, resting ultimately on unfettered electorates choosing officeholders. Therefore, many of the widely held assumptions underlying traditional approaches to civil-military relations need to be reexamined in light of the experience of post-communist states.

Deficiencies of Traditional Approaches. Huntington's analysis mistakenly assumes a brand of military professionalism so unquestionably loyal to whatever government has legitimately come to power that he ignores the ideological adjustments that necessarily accompany shifts in political regimes.[12] As citizens of the states they serve, military personnel inevitably undergo some form of socialization that transmits the values of the state. When society embraces a new set of values, as in the process of transition from authoritarian rule, adjustments must also be made to reorient the motivation for military service.

Moreover, it is wrong to assume that the military is totally isolated from the monumental political and economic transformations that sweep a state. Military personnel, like all participants in the life of the state, are affected by significant changes within it. This is particularly true when political changes undermine, threaten, or perhaps even destroy previous levels of status and material well-being enjoyed by specific groups.

Military professionals in modern democratic states are socialized to defend democratic institutions and believe that the individual freedoms of their countrymen depend on their service. In consolidated democracies, society at large expects the military not only to defend the political order advanced by the democratic regime but to allow itself to be shaped by these norms.

Relying on professionalism alone to ensure democratic political control ignores the ideological shift that transitioning militaries must make and takes for granted the pre-existing ideological socialization of militaries. Non-intervention in the professional military sphere also assumes that, left to its own devices, militaries in democracies will develop a set of norms and practices that reflect the values of the democratic state. At the very least, failing to develop a set of norms and practices reflecting the state's values will have no real consequence for the preservation of a democratic regime.

Democratic Military Professionalism. In addition to continuing the processes of democratic political control, specific attention should be given to developing appropriate patterns of democratic military professionalism. The model of democratic military professionalism developed below balances the dual goals of developing professional competence as a means of protecting the democratic state and creating institutional practices reflecting the societal values of the democracy that the military defends. Transitioning states are still learning the interrelatedness of these issues and tend to address competency and value-related issues sequentially rather than simultaneously, with the latter often classified as a luxury to be

concentrated on at some later date. The result may be only a partial institutionalization of democratic norms. Tensions persist when Soviet-style military professionalism meets a Western style that markedly emphasizes democratic norms.

A Comparison with the Soviet Era. Table 1 contrasts the norms of democratic political control with the patterns prevalent across the Soviet bloc. The democratic norms presented here offer a general framework linking professional norms with infused democratic values and socialization. While drawn from American practice, they have potentially greater applicability, subject to qualifications and adaptations sensitive to the historical experience, habits, and current needs of transitioning states.

The task for consolidated democracies is developing an officer corps of expert soldiers who are also democrats. In contrast, the communist states of the Soviet bloc sought to develop soldiers who were both "red" and "expert." The obvious mission for post-communist states, then, is converting "red experts" into "expert democrats."

Table 2 compares characteristics of military professionalism across political systems. Reform efforts must offer a framework for institutional development that ensures the development of norms and practices essential to democratically accountable military institutions.

Military Democratization Needs: The Czech Experience

This assessment of the specific accomplishments of democratic reform as illustrated by the Czech Republic begins with an analysis of military democratization needs related to the achievement of democratic political control of the armed forces. It then turns to the dimensions of democratic military professionalism (Table 2) to highlight specific areas where Western states can focus their military-assistance efforts.

Quality Civilian Political Control. Civilian control in the Soviet era existed in the form of strict oversight by the Communist Party. Post-communist civil-military reform began by ridding the constitution of communist clauses and establishing new patterns of control among the military, the executive, parliament, and the Ministry of Defense. The Czech constitution names the president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces; however, he needs prime ministerial approval to use military force and to commission and promote generals. According to legislation dating from 1949, authority for declaring a state of emergency is given to a state body; however, there is much discussion whether or not such a body is the proper decision-

making vehicle in a democracy.[13] This unclear delineation of emergency powers could lead to confusion in a crisis and still needs to be resolved constitutionally.[14]

These problems are of particular significance for a transitioning state with weak confidence in democratic institutions. The effectiveness of constitutional constraints depends on how constitutional institutions implement their authority. Consequently, it is necessary to analyze the relationships between the military and the executive, the legislature, and the populace.

One of the hallmarks of democratic political control in full-fledged democracies is the delegation of overall executive oversight of the military to a civilian defense minister. In the Czech Republic, the ACR and its predecessor, the Czechoslovak People's Army, have adjusted to a series of four civilian defense ministers.

Subordination of the General Staff to a civilian-run Defense Ministry has been achieved, but as one American adviser to the Defense Ministry commented, "It doesn't mean that everyone likes it." [15] Officers understand that Czech society is better off with democracy than it was before, but there is also a general feeling that democrats charged with civilian oversight lack both experience and interest in performing this task capably.[16]

Although the first civilian Czech defense minister, Antonin Baudys, effectively rid the ACR of politically unreliable officers, resentment persists within the Czech military over how the screening was conducted. Many officers allege that although department heads at the General Staff were fired, many hard-liners still remain within the command structure.[17] These "red" officers often harbor the greatest resistance toward democratic reform and frustrate the attempts of Western-trained junior officers to introduce new democratic patterns of leadership and professionalism into ACR units.[18]

Of course, merely appointing civilian defense ministers does not ensure effective civilian control. The depth of Defense Ministry civilianization depends on the ability of lower-ranking civilians to permeate the defense structure as well. Civilian defense officials have been challenged by their lack of military knowledge, which seriously limits their influence in the policy-making process and their credibility with military officers.[19]

However, the Czech Republic is progressively giving civilians responsibility for oversight functions with the Defense Ministry. Some estimates indicate that in 1996 40 percent of Defense Ministry posts were occupied by civilians.[20]

Continued military underfunding has led many officers to conclude that civilian oversight is incompetent and even negligent. These concerns were made public in late 1996, when 338 of the air force's 540 pilots signed a letter sent to President Vaclav Havel and the parliamentary Defense and Security Committee, highlighting the air force's desperate state in the wake of three jet crashes in November 1996.[21] Referring to the link between chronic underfunding and the fatal crashes, the pilots argued that "recent developments might arouse the impression that this is a deliberate elimination of the Czech air force." [22]

This discomfort with civilians in oversight positions contributes to incomplete transparency among the parliament, Defense Ministry, and military. Specific deficits are evident in the lack of coordination and information sharing between the General Staff and the Defense Ministry and within these bodies. Officers in the field complain of frequent conflicting guidance from the General Staff and the Defense Ministry.[23]

Parliamentary control is still developing and exists primarily with regard to the budget. In comparison to the communist era, there is a significant increase in parliamentary authority because Soviet-era legislatures routinely approved budgets without even reading them.[24] However, oversight quality is poor because of the lack of expertise on defense issues. The ACR has also been slow in adjusting to the new political environment in which it is just one of many interests lobbying for resources.

The Defense Ministry presents the defense budget to the parliamentary Defense and Security Committee, which can either modify or reject it. The first detailed budget, which appeared in 1993-94, gave a significant boost to defense oversight. Even though a modern defense budgeting system used by NATO countries was introduced in 1993, the Defense Ministry has hardly used this planning resource. (Implementation of the Czech version of Planned Programmed and Budgeting System requires specialized financial expertise that presently only civilian bureaucrats in the Defense Ministry possess.) Parliamentarians still complain that they do not know how money is being spent.

Transparency is crucial for achieving democratic accountability through effective oversight. In the Czech parliament, members can ask for information from any ministry and it must be provided even if it is classified.[25] Additionally, defense acquisition procedures are strictly regulated in the Czech Republic. This makes the bidding process more transparent by limiting the inappropriate influence of political parties and government officials. Observers say the Czech Republic still falls short of practices that would ensure that it gets the best product for

the best price, but these changes have left less room for corruption.[26] However, irregularities in the acquisition process persist and transparency is not uniform. Several pending acquisitions have been canceled because the Defense Ministry could not prove that it followed the required procedures.[27]

The parliament, and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in particular, who served as prime minister from January 1993 to December 1997, focused almost exclusively on economic matters.[28] Thus long-term investments in the Czech military have been avoided, and many politicians consider the military some sort of nuisance "that eats money."[29] Indeed, Klaus's almost complete lack of interest in defense matters left Havel's presidential authority in military affairs unchallenged.[30] Klaus's resignation over the revelation of corruption in his own party has left the Czech Republic in the hands of a caretaker government led by the new prime minister, Josef Tosovskdegrees. No major initiatives are expected to occur on his watch until elections are held in the summer. As a result, the military leadership fills the oversight vacuum with its own policies and priorities, and many areas simply go unattended for extended periods of time.

To be fair, the military, specifically the Defense Ministry, should also take a more active role in drawing up legislation to alleviate many of their pressing problems. The military takes a passive approach in this process and is quick to blame the parliament for not focusing on the military's problems, but slow to fully participate to expedite a solution.

To help realize democratic political control over the Czech armed forces, Western democracies should place a greater emphasis on developing civilian experts through Partnership for Peace and other outreach efforts. The current approach focuses on training military personnel to meet NATO standards, while civilian defense officials have few opportunities to participate in programs that could help the transitioning society.[31] Continued civilian incompetence in military affairs will only exacerbate the gap between the civilian and military sectors of Czech society.[32]

In democratic states it is essential that tensions between society and the military remain low. Furthermore, the military must be perceived as the protector of the state's democratic values and ultimately as the territorial defender of the cradle of those values-the sovereign state itself. The attitude of the society at large is shaped by such factors as the congruence of military and societal values, the historical role of the military in the state, and the prevalence

of outside threats. These factors strain the historically poor relationship of the Czech military to Czech society at large.

The Czechoslovak People's Army, and now the Czech military, suffered from a dismal popular image. Czechs generally portray the military in caricature form and most would have a difficult time putting the words "military" and "professionalism" together in the same sentence.[33] The bumbling image of the Czech soldier portrayed in *The Good Soldier Schwejk* of Czech literary fame prevails. Most Czechs have traditionally believed that the army is redundant and that the security of the country depends on the will of the great powers.[34] The common perception is that officers cannot hold "real" jobs and that mandatory service is a waste of time.[35]

Recruitment and Retention. In the post-communist era, the primary recruitment and retention factors of pay, prestige, opportunity for advancement, and overall quality of life all work against Prague's struggles to build a quality officer corps. The quality of life has declined appreciably for Czech officers continuing to serve in the democratic era. Remaining garrisons are overcrowded, often making it impossible for officers to live with their families at their posts.[36] The overall declining situation for the military family is clearly a negative factor in officer retention-particularly younger officers with more potential for civilian opportunities. The declining interest in the military is reflected at the military academies. The Defense Ministry's authorized quotas are only being filled at rates of 25 to 50 percent. Consequently, there is no competition for admission. Great recruitment and retention problems also exist on the conscript side. The government and the military are committed to the goal of a professional military over time, but attracting young people to serve is a formidable task.

Promotion and Advancement. The Soviet model of personnel management promoted officers on the basis of seniority rather than merit and often depended more on political reliability than professional competence. This ideological dilution of a merit-based system led to a distorted view of "merit" that is difficult to reform today. These problems have been recognized and much attention has been focused on how to correct them, but no adequate solution has been implemented. NATO and U.S. officials alike have singled out the inability of the ACR to reform its personnel system as one of the greatest obstacles to NATO accession. A pyramidal force structure with a defined "up or out" philosophy is needed. Other necessary reforms include an evaluation system built on merit and a professional development program for officers and NCOs focused on improving both technical and leadership skills.

Standards of democratic accountability demand that expenditures on military personnel result in the most competent force possible to defend the values of the state. Until such reforms are undertaken, cronyism, lack of a widely recognized career path, and a priority on job security over job performance will continue to combine to create a package of disincentives for motivated service to the state.

Officership and Leadership. The Western concept of leadership did not exist within the Soviet bloc. Leadership, as understood by and taught to U.S. officers, has never been and is not currently part of officer development. Democratic values, including respect for the rule of law and law-bound behavior, respect for the individual and non-toleration of violations of civil liberties and individual human rights, equal opportunity for advancement based on merit, and the positive use of democratic ideology as a motive for service, have not been appropriated within the post-communist concepts of officership and leadership.

The Czechs recognize that their inherited system is defective. Some senior Czech officers admit that in the past the military's disregard for individuals serving within it was extreme.[39] The establishment of an NCO corps and the professionalization of military forces would help alleviate the leadership deficit of post-communist militaries. Conscripts within militaries formed on the Soviet model have no NCO role models, empathizers, or teachers and no means of mediation between themselves and their commanding officers. Western observers agree that the lack of NCOs is a tremendous disadvantage for the post-communist armed forces.

Reforms focused on emphasizing accountability to democratic values, respect for human rights, stewardship of the public trust, and ethical behavior will not only make the transitioning militaries better reflect their transitioning democratic societies, but lead to increased competence as military institutions adopt more effective leadership styles.

Education and Training. Reforming education and training is a key component in the democratic professionalization of post-communist militaries. These systems are the source of professional socialization and expectations. Military professionals in training acquire the technical expertise they will need to perform their craft as well as the cultural norms of their caste in society.

Fundamental change in the approach to developing future officers through the military education system has not yet occurred in the Czech Republic.[40] Particularly disturbing is the lack of training within the military colleges about the principles of military service in a democratic state. Commissioning sources do not actively embrace democratic values or

allegiance to a democratic constitution. Marxism-Leninism has been replaced by comparative political systems and Czech history with a nationalist emphasis.[41] The Czechs must learn that abandoning Marxist-Leninist ideology does not necessarily mean that democratic ideology will fill the vacuum. Of course the danger in this is that military officers in democratic states do not have the choice of defending the political system of their choice. They are the protectors of one type of political system-as imperfect as it may be-democracy. Reformed education and training programs are crucial elements in the democratization and professionalization of post-communist militaries.

Norms of Political Influence. Further assistance is also needed to understand the appropriate scope and degree of armed forces' participation in democratic politics. The lack of experience of being a player in democratic processes is quite evident. The Czech deficit in democratic norms of political influence is characterized by an unwillingness to participate in politics even by legitimate means. The Czech concept of military professionalism in the political arena is completely apolitical behavior. Such an approach does not take into account the degree of lobbying and the political transmission of expert advice needed from time to time to ensure that civilian national security policy-makers make well-informed judgments.

Post-communist states need to become comfortable with the norms of military influence in democratic states. An officer in service to a democratic state should learn the precepts of democratic ideology and his/her proper role as a defender of its democratic institutions. Officers should also be aware of the established norms for influencing the political process of a democratic state while remaining focused on respecting the constraints of democratic accountability.

Prestige and Public Relations. The Czech military does not fully understand that it must earn the respect of society and take responsibility for reversing its own negative image. The military needs help to more effectively manage its relationship with the public. Particular attention should be given to improving transparency within the defense policy-making process. Continued obsession with secrecy impairs the transmission of information within defense ministries, from the military to democratic institutions responsible for oversight, and to the public.

There is an important link between improving the military's prestige and its responsiveness to the people. Reforms that are clearly communicated to the population will lead to improved coverage in the press and greater public support for the professionalization and transformation

of the military. The ACR must convince all who serve in its ranks that democratic populations expect and deserve full accountability from all institutions of government, including the military. It must also assure recruits that they can serve without fear and willingly commit to careers as commissioned or noncommissioned officers. Continued lack of reform, reliance on secrecy, and acceptance of corrupt behavior, however, will result in a continued downward spiral of prestige and lack of public support.

Compatibility of Military and Social Values. Militaries inevitably reflect the society that they serve. Adapting to democratic civilian oversight is teaching transitioning militaries that no institutions in democracies exist in a political vacuum. While military institutions are not and should never be democracies, the values inherent in militaries should reflect the democratic values of the state.

There is no question that the Czech military leadership respects the principle of democratic civilian control, although it is still learning how to implement it. All societal institutions in the Czech Republic, though equally inexperienced, are working toward the common goal of consolidating democracy. Eventually the oversight capabilities of nascent democratic institutions will gain in strength and experience and force reforms that will bring the values of the transitioning state and the military institution that serves it into line. In the Czech case, these values will be democratic and the ACR will be compelled to root out lingering Soviet-era institutional habits that conflict with the expectations of its democratic citizens-both in and out of uniform.

Problems with the American Military Democratization Effort

The Joint Contact Team Program. An analysis of U.S. military democratization activities in the Czech Republic from 1992 to 1998 indicates that only a small percentage of those activities directly supported the democratization needs outlined in this article. Indeed, many activities can be categorized only as supporting post-communist militaries' quests to be better militaries.

Prior to mid-1997 the JCTP was conducted without either a focused framework or an effective plan for assessing success. In the first five years of the program, a generally passive approach had developed that offered a menu of services rather than the development of a particular product-democratic military institutions. Attempts to improve the overall guidance and administration of the program resulted in the simultaneous implementation of the

European Command's "Focused Engagement" policy and the development of specific country work plans for each participating JCTP country in mid-1997. This effort to improve the focus and oversight of program activity coincided with an overall shift in the European theater's focus toward military-to-military activities that supported the development of NATO interoperability issues.

Even with the development of focus areas to guide program activity, the percentage of events dedicated to military democratization issues has remained constant. Of the 340 military-to-military events recorded in the Czech Republic between 1992 and 1998, 81.2 percent can be categorized as not contributing to the stated goals of the program. The other 18.8 percent made some contribution to the focus areas related to military democratization. An analysis of events scheduled under the auspices of Focused Engagement revealed that even in the era of improved policy guidance and oversight, poor conceptualization and operationalization of the components of the military democratization problem still results in less than effective program activity.

The implementation of country work plans organized around specific objectives and metrics will not be effective if the objectives selected are either inappropriate or weakly conceptualized. For instance, the Czech Republic's country work plan identifies four key focus areas: (1) stability through regional security, (2) democratization, (3) military professionalism, and (4) closer relationships with NATO. The shift toward NATO interoperability goals is self-evident. Furthermore, the events selected to support democratization goals barely address the dimensions of the military democratization model outlined in Tables 1 and 2. Similarly, the country work plan's development of a strategy to improve military professionalism is lacking in its effort to effect change in the military education system or in other leadership development activities. Indeed, a comparison of events that occurred before the implementation of Focused Engagement and specific country work plans shows that the same types of events continue to occur. The problem is that these events are assigned to contribute to particular focus areas, when they may do little to address the scope and substance of the particular area.

Reviews from the field are mixed regarding the impact of military contacts. Some specific strides have been made in identifying problems in the military personnel system and in the establishment of a professional NCO corps. In addition, the U.S. military has enjoyed enviable access to the Czech Republic's top military policy-makers. Beyond these general observations, it is difficult to point to other specific accomplishments related to the

democratization goals of the program. For at least the first five years of the program, policy-makers did not reach their goals, because they did not sufficiently operationalize them. The most recent attempt to improve the conceptualization of military democratization problems is still lacking. For most of the post-cold war era, millions of dollars were expended across the region without a clear plan to maximize their effectiveness.

International Military Education and Training Program. The Czech military looks to the U.S. military as a role model and has actively sought out opportunities to receive training in the United States. The Czechs lean on their IMET participation to lend credibility and prestige to their officer corps. Twenty to thirty Czech officers take part in courses in the United States every year. Such small numbers limit the overall impact that IMET can have on the Czech military, but there is evidence that many IMET graduates are being placed in important command positions.[42] Some Czech civilians have also benefited from courses targeted at training civilians in defense oversight.[43] However, the individual nature of IMET participation, and the lack of systemization of the lessons learned by those who have studied in the United States, inhibits IMET's potential impact on the Czech military.

The Marshall Center. Czechs have participated in every class that has gone through the Marshall Center since its inaugural class graduated in December 1994.[44] It is difficult to assess the impact of this particular military democratization tool because only a few officers and civilians have had the opportunity to attend. In general, the Czechs have sent some of their most senior and influential officers, who have reported that their experiences in Garmisch were worthwhile.[45]

Some problems with the Marshall Center include its dependence on participating states to screen candidates, failure to separate students with virtually no understanding of democratic principles, and the lack of a systematic way to track the progress of graduates in their home militaries. Despite these deficiencies, the potential exists for the Marshall Center to be a significant meeting place and democratic training ground for senior defense officials and officers across the post-communist region.

Democratic Deficits and Poorly Targeted Aid

The Czech case illustrates that an insufficient understanding of how best to foster democratic transitions in the post-communist states can lead to disappointing results. The U.S. military programs were flawed from the start because they did not address the scope of the military

democratization problem across two critical dimensions-democratic political control and democratic military professionalism. The military democratization initiatives failed to sufficiently take aim at patterns of professionalism forged in the Soviet era that are incompatible with the norms of democratic military professionalism.

In addition, the task of democratizing the post-communist militaries is complicated by the widely held, though incorrect, assumptions of civil-military relations theory. These traditional views do not take into account the specific problems of states transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule. The ideological underpinnings of the state must play some role in inculcating the value of civilian supremacy in the officer corps. Ideological shifts, in turn, result in different forms of military professionalism, defined by different norms and behavior patterns.

An analysis of civil-military relations in the Czech Republic has highlighted specific democratic deficits that persist within both civilian and military institutions that limit the achievement of democratic political control and military professionalism. The evidence shows that the need for external assistance is great even in this relatively advanced case. However, U.S. military democratization programs have been plagued by their delay in appreciating the need for a concrete framework to focus their assistance efforts. In reality, these programs have been slow to focus resources on specific democratization needs. In addition, increased emphasis on NATO strategic interoperability needs has distracted policy-makers away from the Czech Republic's military democratization needs. Ironically, the efforts undertaken to date could actually be counterproductive because they have fostered military and strategic competence over ideological compatibility. There is a danger in providing such one-sided assistance to militaries serving states that have not yet become consolidated democracies in consequently creating a greater threat to the stability of the international system.

The advanced democracies have a tremendous stake in the outcome of Central and Eastern Europe's democratic transitions. It is hoped that the illumination of the defects of the current approach and the suggestions for refocusing program activity offered in this study will contribute to a change in the direction of military assistance to the post-communist states and bring the whole region one step closer to the community of consolidated democracies.

Notes

1. This article is drawn from Marybeth Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
2. Jeff Erlich, "Study: Fund Russian Disarmament," *Defense News* (September 7, 1997): 24.
3. Mil-to-Mil Contact Programs for FSU/Central Europe, USAF briefing documents (Pentagon, 1995), p. 13; and Talking Points on Defense and Military Contacts with the FSU, 1993, USAF briefing documents (Pentagon, 1995).
4. Capt. Charles Helms, USAF, former executive officer to Brig. Gen. Thomas Lennon, author interview, Stuttgart, June 2, 1994.
5. JCTP mission statement from HQ EUCOM, November 1997.
6. Spiro C. Manolas and Louis J. Samelson, *The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program: A Report to Congress*, reprinted in *DISAM Journal* 12, no. 3 (spring 1990): 4.
7. Warren Christopher, secretary of state, and William J. Perry, secretary of defense, in a letter to Strom Thurmond, chair of the Senate Committee on Armed Forces, April 7, 1995, p. 1; US EUCOM briefing slide prepared in 1994.
8. Lt. Colonel Frederick P.A. Hammersen, staff officer, Marshall Center, author interview, Garmisch, June 7, 1994.
9. Partnership for Peace Framework Document, January 1994; Marybeth Ulrich, "Democracy and Russian Military Professionalism: Why Full NATO Partnership Is Still a Long Way Off," *Airpower Journal* 10 (Special Edition 1996): 79-87.
10. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 3.
11. Samuel P. Huntington, "Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement," in *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research*, ed. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956), p. 380. Among those in agreement with Huntington are S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Claude E. Welch, Jr., *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany:

State University of New York Press, 1976); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); and idem, *The Political Influence of the Military* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

12. W.H. Morris Jones pointed out the unlikelihood of the military officer cohort always acting as perfectly obedient neutral instruments in the hands of policy-makers in his essay, "Armed Forces and the State," *Public Administration* 35 (winter 1957): 411-16. Also found in Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett, *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 51-55.

13. Ibid.

14. Jan Piskaeek, "The Defense Strategy Is Rather Lame," *Prague Denni Telegraf* (April 1, 1997):2.

15. Kenneth L. Kladiva, Defense Systems Management College and Planned, Programmed and Budgeting System (PPBS) adviser to the Czech Defense Ministry, author interview, Prague, March 1995.

16. Milan Rezac, professor of aeronautics and head, Air Force Department, Brno Military Academy, author interview, Brno, March 1997.

17. Capt. Barry Midkiff, U.S. Army, while an exchange student at Command and General Staff College, Brno Military Academy, author interview, Brno, March 1997.

18. Author interviews with Czech junior officers at the Brno Military Academy and Namest and Pardubice air bases, March 1997.

19. Reka Szemerkenyi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk*, Adelphi Paper no. 306 (December 1996): 11.

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Table 1. A Comparison of Democratic and Soviet Models of Political Control of Military Institutions

The following chart reads as follows:

Row 1 - Elements of political control

Row 2 - Democratic features

Row 3 - Soviet features

Constitutional provisions

Mechanisms for civilian control sufficient and clearly codified.

Communist Party vested with supreme authority.

Executive oversight and control

Clear chain of command from military leaders to the executive. Presence of expert civilian national security staff. Effective civilian oversight within the Defense Ministry. Transparent and responsive Defense Ministry and military. Expert advice of military leaders on input to national security decisions. Mutual confidence between civilian and military leaders. Corruption not tolerated. Executive actively educates public on national security policies and priorities.

Clear chain of command from military leaders to party leaders. General Secretary is Communist Party leader and directs party apparatus that carries out party policies. Military exerted influence over military policy and issues of professionalism but accepted the party as the sovereign authority. Military relatively free of corruption in Soviet era, but corruption increases as transition begins.

Legislative oversight and control

Sufficient expertise to oversee budgetary and other oversight issues. Broad control over policy issues and ability to conduct hearings. Transparent Defense

Ministry and military that allow unrestricted access to information for legislatures. Military responsive to legislative inquiries. Legislators motivated to ensure accountability of the military institution.

Legislature is no counterweight to the party leadership. No real oversight role. Loyal ratifiers of party policy.

Relationship between military institution and society

No serious tensions between military institution and society. Respect for the military as the guardians of societal freedoms. Limits on the military's access to influence and public participation.

Party was source of military's prestige and status and bestowed upon the military a privileged place in society in exchange for defending the regime. Party controlled all levels of socialization and instilled militarism and respect for the military as hallmark of Soviet political culture. However, the degree of military prestige varied across the Soviet bloc.

Table 2. A Comparison of Democratic and Soviet Models of Military Professionalism

Legend for Chart:

A - Elements of military professionalism in a democracy

B - Democratic features

C - Soviet features

Recruitment and retention

Cross-societal, variety of sources. Entry based on merit. Prestige of commissioning sources high.

Democratic values reflected in treatment of personnel.

Conscript system led to universal service. Entry into the officer corps related to merit and factors other than merit.

Promotion and advancement

Merit-based promotion system.[*] Affirmative action-based advancement may be used to fulfill democratic norms of inclusion. Performance and seniority balanced. Officers promoted who support democratic principles

Political influence interferes with merit-based system. Patronage networks compromise bureaucratic norms for promotion.

Officership and leadership

Styles of officership and leadership reflect democratic principles and respect for individual human rights. Preference for non-authoritarian style of leadership.

Individual rights sacrificed beyond the constraints necessary for military competence. Preference for authoritarian style of leadership. Abuse of soldiers common.

Education and training

Principles of democracy and the role of military professionals in the state taught throughout the military system. Allegiance to democratic institutions taught. Qualified civilian and military instructors with some civilian participation as students at some levels. Professional ethics emphasized along with

military competence.[*]

Extensive and in-depth education and training network.

Professional knowledge stressed. Marxist-Leninist ideological training emphasized. Limited appreciation of civilian expertise gained in training. Professional military competence also emphasized.

Norms of political influence

Military fully accepts role in the political order.[*]

No involvement of military in political feuds.

Recognition that some limited degree of political interaction with oversight institutions is necessary.

Direct participation in politics is not accepted.

Attempts to influence the political process are non-partisan.

Accepted junior partner role to sovereign Communist Party. Limited political influence in some areas of military affairs. Favored role in society and centralized economy reduced need to lobby for resources. Competed for resources within the "rules of the game"

Prestige and public relations

Public accountability high. Full disclosure of information. Responsive to outside inquiries.

Media has full access. Military actively manages relationship with the public.

Low public accountability. Controlled release of all information to outside inquiries. Limited media access. Militarist socialization methods continually connected military to society.

Compatibility of military and societal values

Accepts legitimacy of democratic institutions.

Conceptualization of democracy is similar to society's. Adapts internal operations to reflect democratic societal values.

Military and social values highly compatible. Military used as primary instrument of political socialization.

Internal operations reflected corrupted Soviet bureaucratic values.

* Although this model stresses the differences between the Soviet patterns of military professionalism and democratic norms, it is important to note that there is some overlap in

these characteristics that could be appropriate for military professionals in either political system.



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