The Catholic Church in Communist Poland, 1945-1955
Author(s): Elizabeth Valkenier
Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Jul., 1956), pp. 305-326
Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on
behalf of Review of Politics
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1404679
Accessed: 05-05-2019 11:43 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge University Press, University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of
Politics are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of
Politics
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Catholic Church in Communist Poland,
1945.1955
by Elizabeth Valkenier
N POLAND, unlike the other satellites, Communist po
toward the Church in the past ten years has been largely c
tious and at times even conciliatory. There were no wh
sale persecutions, no spectacular trials like those of Mindszent
Stepinac. That is not to say that the Communists were wil
to tolerate the rival claims of the Church to shape the mind a
soul of the population. They merely found it wiser to pu
their goal slowly. The progress toward that goal, involving am
other things the signing of a bilateral agreement, provides so
insights into the course and outcome of a seemingly mild
munist policy.
Caution was dictated by the strength and determinatio
the adversary: the Polish Catholic Church was a powerful i
tution; in prewar days it was an integral part of national
enjoyed constitutional guarantees of its privileged position
managed an extensive and well-knit ecclesiastical organization,
gether with numerous charities, schools, and a sizeable press. A
the war, reinforced by a notable revival of religion and ab
claim the adherence of about 95 per cent of the population
result of territorial changes, the Church strove to regain its p
eminence in the face of radically altered political circumstanc
During the prolonged campaign calculated not to elim
religion but to bring it under the control of the state, the Co
munists have used four tactics. The Holy See was chosen a
first target, since direct attacks on the Polish clergy would h
met with scant success. To render the Vatican and its po
suspect to Polish Catholics, the regime resorted to the most e
tive propaganda that could be spread after the war-the ch
of pro-German sympathies. Gradually, then, attacks hitherto
rected at the Pope were shifted to the Polish clergy. First
press campaign, then in political trials, charges of subversion
pressed so as to serve warning on Church leaders and to un
mine the trust of the people in their clergy.
305
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
These two tactics were supplemented by the p
dissident groups which challenged the authority o
hierarchy. The regime-supported Catholic ranged fro
priests ready to establish a national church, to "So
who sought to reconcile Marxism with Catholicism, sh
Eventually, as the propaganda took effect, part of the
was also arrayed against the episcopate.
Finally, the regime either took over or transferre
controlled groups the extensive welfare, education
services which had traditionally linked the Church to
its influence with, the people.
* * * * *
Of necessity, the perio
elections was one of Com
the Church, taking adva
available to non-Comm
ously and attempted to
In March 1945, four mon
Cardinal Hlond, the Cra
Powszechny. At once t
and independent comm
six other Catholic peri
Catholic associations an
Catholic University at L
re-opened.
True, there were restrictions. Some Catholic associations were
not sanctioned; the Catholic press was subject to censorship; and
civil marriage was established by law in January, 1946, as the
only form recognized by the state. Yet at the same time the
considerable land holdings of the Church were exempted from
the land reform promulgated in January, 1946; the prewar ruling
on mandatory religious instruction in all public schools was retained,
and large sums were appropriated for the reconstruction
of bombed churches.
More important, however, with regard to the future position
of the Church, the regime undermined its legal status. Of the
two documents which had defined this status in the interwar period,
the Constitution and the Concordat, the former remained only
temporarily in force while the latter was repudiated. The "basic
306
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 307
principles" of the 1921 Constitution' were retained
lative assembly drafted a new one. But the regime
mitted itself as to whether it included among these "
ples" the recognition of Catholicism's pre-eminence ove
and the right of the Church to be governed by canon
The circumstances under which the 1925 Concordat was unilaterally
repudiated on September 12, 1945, made the regime's
intentions more explicit. The reason given was that the Vatican
had failed to observe the Concordat's clauses when it authorized
German bishops to administer church affairs in Polish territory
which had been annexed to the Reich after the 1939 invasion. The
step was accompanied by vicious anti-Papal propaganda which
charged the Holy See with a long tradition of pro-German and antiEast
European policy. The decision to repudiate the Concordat
was undoubtedly prompted by the regime's conviction that the
Polish hierarchy's unfriendly attitude was supported, if not encouraged,
by the Vatican. Moreover, the Vatican had refused to grant
recognition to the postwar provisional government,2 had not revoked
the authority of Polish bishops in the territories annexed to
Russia, and had refused to appoint permanent bishops for the
Oder-Neisse territories until a German peace treaty rendered final
the decisions reached at Potsdam.
While the regime was making veiled threats through its anti
Vatican policy, it tried to gain the clergy's cooperation. The conciliatory
gestures, such as exempting Church holdings from land
reform, and the like, were supplemented by official pronoun
ments. Glos Ludu, the organ of the Workers' [Communist] Party
wondered why the Polish hierarchy did not join in the refor
movement, as the hierarchies in the other Russian controlled coun
tries had done, and drew alluring pictures of the Church's enhanc
prestige if only the episcopate would find a "common languag
with the "democratic camp."3
To add substance and cogency to these efforts to win ove
Catholic opinion, the regime sponsored a small group of so-called
Social Catholics headed by Boleslaw Piasecki. Organized in th
1 The repudiation of the 1935 Constitution in July, 1944, was of no cons
quence to the status of the Church since that document upheld the Chur
provisions of the 1921 Constitution.
2 The Vatican still recognizes the Polish government in London, successor
of the wartime exile government.
s Glos Ludu, July 20, 1946.
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
fall of 1945, the group included many members of
movement, "Falanga," of which Piasecki had be
They now confessed to having lost their "totalitaria
and wished to join the Marxists in the battle agains
It was the function of this group and its weekly, D
plemented in March, 1947, by a daily, Slowo P
encourage Catholics to accept the revolutionary
reconcile Catholicism and Marxism.
Against these pressures the Church leaders remained intransigent.
They took no cognizance of the provisional government
with which direct official relations were not established, and missed
no opportunity to make known the Church's opposition to the
predominant political trends. Pastoral letters and the Catholi
press were highly critical of the widespread maladministration of
justice, the numerous inroads into private property, and the variou
totalitarian measures which subjugated the individual to the state.
At the time of the June, 1946, referendum the population wa
advised in a pastoral letter to vote according to its "Catholic
conscience." The Catholic press, however, did not hide the episcopate's
preference for a two-house parliament, thereby joining with
Mikolajczyk's opposition in registering protest against the govern-
ment.
Official overtures inviting co-operation were answered une
ocally. For example, at the June, 1946, meeting of the Wo
and Socialist Parties, Cyrankiewicz acknowledged the governm
desire for better relations. Tygodnik Powszechny made a
reply, asserting that the regime would get cooperation-b
the Church's terms, for Catholicism had its own well-define
gram. Moreover, the episcopal organ reminded the Marxis
eager to promote "democracy," that the essence of a demo
system involved the free operation of several parties with
different programs.5
The hierarchy was equally emphatic in responding to the
posals from the Dzis i Jutro group (the Social Catholics)
episcopate reiterated that it alone could speak officially and au
tatively for Catholicism. It stated flatly that there could
question of Catholics ever joining forces with the Marxists. Fa
Catholics had to base their actions on the papal encyclical
4 Dzis i ]utro, April 6-13, 1947.
5 Tygodnik Powszechny, July 21, 1946.
308
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 309
social ideals of which had nothing in common with
collectivist or the liberal-capitalist programs.
While the episcopate rebuffed any compromise o
dation, it kept insisting upon Catholic participation in
the new marriage legislation, in setting up the new
grams, and in organizing the arts and cultural life
ber 10, 1946, as the time for the first postwar election
the Plenary Conference of bishops issued a statement
unhampered Catholic representation in the parliamen
ops made clear that, since its recent revamping, the C
Party could no longer claim to represent Catholic pri
any future Catholic party, the bishops specified that
gram and its composition must be acceptable to the C
But nothing came of this proposal, although Presid
assured one of the Social Catholics in November that "Catholics
have and shall have the same rights as other citizens in Poland t
form a political party."6 Obviously, the regime could not tolera
a party outspokenly opposed to Marxism; likewise, the hierarch
could not support any but an "authentic" Catholic group wh
would not compromise with materialism.
Even though the Communists did not permit the Catholi
to have an independent parliamentary representation they t
pains not to alienate Catholic opinion. Thus, the electoral pr
gram of the Communist-dominated bloc promised to write into t
constitution (to be framed after the January, 1947, elections) n
only freedom of conscience and religious belief but also "a speci
recognition of the rights of the Catholic Church." Seemingly, t
took care of the basic demands of the Catholics.
Nevertheless these promises failed to win over the Church.
Cardinal Hlond told the faithful to vote "only for such people and
electoral programs that do not oppose Catholic teaching and
morality." Episcopal letters urged Catholics to make their views
felt through the ballot: "Catholics have the right to decide with
their votes the most fundamental laws of Polish public life."7
There was no doubt in anybody's mind that the Church had aligned
itself on the side of the opposition.
~___-X- * * -*- *
O Dzis i Jutro, December 8, 1946.
7 Only extracts were published after cens
November 10, 1946.
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
The rigged elections held in January, 1947, resu
"overwhelming victory" of the Communists and brough
the provisional character of the postwar political sit
stantial changes followed in the relations between C
State.
Faced with an entrenched Communist government, t
of the Church ceased to combat the regime. Instead the
took to temper its policies-a move based upon the
that state power should be limited by ecclesiastical priv
only the Church can bring moral values into public lif
This new approach did not mean that the hierarchy
rendered its aim of gaining for the Church a prominen
pendent place in national life. When a Catholic publicis
Stomma, suggested that Catholics could give way in
secondary importance (as for example, in social ques
preserving an unyielding attitude on religious and mor
the advice was rejected by a spokesman for the episcop
Piwowarczyk, editorial writer for Tygodnik Powszechn
that Catholicism is equally concerned with man's relati
and to society. It would be "suicide" for Catholics if, to
stronger adversary, they did not insist upon religious
the sanctity of marriage, human rights, and private p
the foundation of social and political institutions.8
The episcopate gave formal expression to its dema
Catholic Constitutional Postulates, a document delivered
Cyrankiewicz on March 17, 1947, for consideration in t
elected Sejm that was to serve as a Constituent Asse
undisguised purpose of the Postulates was to save Po
totalitarianism. "The state," in the words of the pream
the arbiter of morality, not the sole source of law, nor
itself. .. ." The various clauses required that the Co
safeguard all the traditional liberties of the individual,
upon the bureaucracy, guarantee private property an
initiative. As for ecclesiastical matters, the bishop
acknowledgment of the Church's autonomy under a gov
its own laws and its responsibility to God alone. In add
asked for the recognition of the Church's rights to est
8 bibd., April 20, 1947.
310
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 311
to administer schools, charitable organizations, publish
ments, and newspapers.9
Public and private morality, the Postulates maintai
improve greatly to the benefit of the state if the C
exercise its influence without hindrance. In the follow
the Church gave substance to this contention by c
strenuous campaign against widespread alcoholism,
the practice of abortion, and by urging the war-demor
to settle down to constructive work. Also, the Church
to abate political strife. Even though the faithful w
pastoral letters to resist the "rampant spirit of mater
were also advised to "respect the goodwill of those pe
materialist ranks who sincerely work for a better tom
the working classes," and to desist from underground
But these moves failed to improve relations betw
and State. During the two years following the ele
Communists were too busy eliminating the remnants o
position and revamping cultural and administrative in
devote full attention to Church affairs. Anti-papal
tinued in the government-controlled press. But incre
Polish hierarchy and clergy were charged with non-c
and this was represented as bordering on treason.11 T
ment scored heavily in this campaign when in Mar
Pope sent a letter to West German Catholics commise
the expellees. The propaganda machine did not mis
tunity to present the letter as papal approval of Germ
ism and as definitive proof that for political reasons
refused to provide a permanent church administration
Neisse territories. The impact these charges must hav
popular mind can be gauged from the response in epi
Tygodnik Powszechny conceded that the Holy See
better informed about German than about Polish affairs.12
While undermining the authority of the Church leaders, the
government took care not to alienate Catholic opinion to the point
where the program of sovietization might be impeded. For ex-
9 Ibid.
10 Quoted in The New York Times, May 24, 1948.
11 During a political trial in December, 1947, the names of two high Church
officials were for the first time connected with the underground.
12 Tygodnik Powszechny, June 6, 1948.
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
ample, during the summer of 1948, when a youth
Zwiazek Mlodziezy Polskiej, fashioned after the R
mol, was being set up, President Bierut tried to a
fears with assurance that the government did no
the young under its exclusive influence and contr
surances accompanied the re-organization of the scho
sity system: no one philosophical viewpoint was
enforced.
Meanwhile the Church's legal status remained
1947 the regime made several attempts through the
lics to establish relations with the Vatican. But since
ment sought to extract the maximum in concessionsnition
and a permanent ecclesiastical administration
Neisse territories-without granting anything substan
these efforts met with no success. The Pope refu
envoys on the ground that he could not discuss the
Concordat until the Polish government had settled i
differences with the Polish Church. And in Poland ChurchState
relations were at a deadlock. The regime was unwi
to give serious consideration to the Catholic Constitutional P
lates; the Church was equally unwilling to forego constitu
guarantees for its administrative autonomy and educational m
*- * * *
Toward the close o
The Polish Primate
His opposition to Com
in seeking concessio
cessor, was a younge
on social problems an
to adapt the Church
Simultaneously with
Church, the regime
the Communist and S
ers' Party and this
organized opposition
way to complete sov
munists adopted a fi
the earlier pledge to
312
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 313
special position was scrapped and the separation of
State was promulgated as the party slogan.
The Church's reaction to the new slogan was su
temperate. Separation, the episcopal organ pointed
make an ideal solution; nevertheless, the Church co
provided that the separation worked reciprocally. To
interference on both sides, the Church needed a fir
of its autonomy; that is, full freedom to conduct i
churches, in schools and welfare organizations, and in
This essentially conciliatory response to a propos
the first postwar years had been considered decidedly
was followed by a visit from Msgr. Sigismund Chorom
tary of the episcopate, to the Minister of Public Adm
Wladyslaw Wolski. After the conference, on March 20
ski made public an eight-point declaration enumeratin
tions on which the state sought agreement with the C
tone of the declaration was not very encouraging, for
given over to denouncing the treasonable activity of t
of the Vatican. As a prerequisite to any agreement
ment expected a fundamental change of heart amon
toward the People's Republic: negotiations must be
a spirit of complete loyalty. Specifically, the governm
a settlement of the church administration for the Oder-Neisse territory;
it promised not to do away with religious instruction in
schools and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Church
so long as the civil laws were not violated and freedom of conscience
was not abused for political purposes. The declaration
also contained the disquieting announcement that the final settlement
of Church-State relations in the proposed constitution depended
wholly on the Church's good behavior.14
The episcopate replied with its own list of complaints but
did not indicate that it believed the existing difficulties to be insoluble.
The Bishops were ready to discuss the internal affairs of
the Polish Church. Matters affecting church organization-that
is, bishoprics in the Western territories-were beyond their competence
and had to be settled with the Vatican directly. As to the
13 Ibid., January 28, 1949.
14 Trybuna Ludu, March 20, 1949.
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
spirit in which the negotiations were to be conducted
asked for an atmosphere of "peace and mutual trust."
Anything but peace and mutual trust prevailed
formal negotiations that began in July, 1949. For
months the government used all the means in its pow
the Church leaders into submission. Vilification of th
stepped up in the press. Charges of collaboration wit
of espionage, bribery and immorality alternated with
of a clerical alliance with reactionary elements at hom
imperialist forces abroad. This campaign was a
emergence of a small group of priests who, without
the hierarchy, publicly indicated their opposition to e
and their desire to reach an agreement with the stat
ernment's terms. Furthermore, a series of decrees
Church. On August 4, 1949, a decree on Freedom
and Religion, safeguarding religious as well as anti-reli
was promulgated. On September 21, 1949, Church h
nationalized under the Ministry of Health. The Ch
organization, Caritas, was taken over on January 23,
government and placed under trusteeship control
paign of extraordinary intensity charging the hierar
mismanagement of large sums and the administration
political purposes. On March 20, 1950, Church lan
exception of the small acreage farmed by the parish
confiscated.16
In spite of the government's decrees, mass meeting
ganda, the Church was not intimidated during t
negotiations. On the contrary, it resisted the reg
way it could. The episcopal letters of the period ur
to remain true to the Church and its leaders, to igno
on the clergy printed in the press, to insist on relig
for their children, and to avoid participating in athei
Protests against illegitimate pressure were also made
ernment directly. In a letter to President Bierut
1950) the episcopate cited instances of "violence"
to back its assertions that religious freedom was nona
"war against God" was taking place, and that the
15 Tygodnik Powszechny, April 10, 1949.
16 The Church lost some 375,000 acres.
314
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 315
being terrorized into concluding an agreement. O
taken to the government's efforts to split the lower c
hierarchy. Minister Wolski's attempt to induce the cl
regard the current negotiations and to enter into "a
a lower level" was especially condemned.17
In this atmosphere a nineteen point Agreement
concluded on April 14, 1950. At the time it was believ
Church had managed to salvage its spiritual autonomy
no recognition to the prevailing politico-economic sy
a refusal to have phrases like "people's democracy"
reconstruction" used in the document and by getting
to acknowledge the spiritual authority of the Pope. B
highly doubtful that non-involvement in socialist po
nomics could be maintained when the Church undert
"the exploitation of religious feelings for anti-state a
teach the faithful respect for the state, to adhere to
policy of the government, to request the Vatican for
bishoprics for the Oder-Neisse lands, to promote nat
struction, and to refrain from opposing collectivizat
Likewise, it was believed that the Church had secu
trative autonomy through the government's guarant
guard freedom of worship; to retain religious instruct
to permit a Catholic press, educational institutions (i
Lublin University), welfare organizations, religious o
sociations; and to allow the ministration of religion i
hospitals, and prisons. However, the spirit in whic
antees would be carried out could well be questio
schools were under the control of the state educat
associations were not free, and the Catholic charities had been
greatly curtailed after the forced re-organization of Caritas.
* * * * *
The conclusion of the
co-existence. It soon b
different interpretation t
lasted until September, 19
that harmony would not p
document was accepted.
17 Text in B. Wierzbianski,
Church in Poland (London, n
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
The episcopate believed that by signing a bilateral ag
had successfully avoided becoming a "bought sect."
to the faithful the episcopate interpreted its mission an
under the April Agreement as follows:
The Church on its side strengthens in the faithful the r
law and authority, encourages enduring work in the
tion of the country. Proclaiming the principles of Ca
morality, it contributes greatly to the establishment of
of Christian community and justice for the general
And through its teaching, the Church strengthens
people respect for human life, obedience, order and h
Clearly, the Church felt that it could serve best by
moral character of the people strong.
The episcopate carried out the specific points of the
in good faith and in a manner appropriate to an eccles
ganization. On the matter of the Oder-Neisse lands
hierarchy tried to induce the Holy See to create p
bishoprics. In a memorandum of October, 1950, and
ing the visit to Rome of Cardinal Wyszynski in April,
argued that these once Lutheran lands were being r
Catholicism. But when the Vatican offered to appoint
bishops, the regime turned this down as not sufficiently
a solution. At home the Church actively worked
flourishing church organization so as to bind the new
more firmly to the rest of Poland. To prove that
wholeheartedly supported Poland's claim to the western
priests joined in the numerous congresses and proclam
pronouncements, however, did not have the tone of ext
tive and national antagonism so characteristic of the r
sored resolutions. Church spokesmen stressed Poland
claim as well as the moral right to compensation for lo
during the last war.
As for endorsing the nation's economy and politics,
leaders pursued a more cautious policy. There was n
in using ecclesiastical authority to support anything t
national welfare. But care was taken not to become identified with
the socialist economic or political system. Thus the episcopate
stinted no efforts to back economic undertakings; but its declara-
18 Quoted in Kultura (Special Issue no. 5), July 1953, p. 22.
316
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 317
tions always stressed the need to reconstruct the countr
called on Catholics to build socialism.
In politics the bishops were scrupulously neutral. Conspiracy
against the state was always unequivocally condemned and the
clergy was sternly reminded of canonical penalties for joining subversive
groups. Priests were enjoined to keep strictly to ecclesiastical
work. They were to instill in the faithful a sense of civic
duty and public morality and were to avoid political involvements
of any kind. In a message commemorating the first anniversary
of the Agreement, the episcopate reminded the clergy "to avoid
political disputes" and "to serve all citizens regardless of their
political leanings."19
But the regime was not interested in the Church's measures
to perfect the private or public behavior of the individual. In
its interpretation of the Agreement, the regime fully expected the
Church to join in the popularization and enforcement of official
policies, and this became clear in a matter of weeks. In June,
1950, difficulties arose over the Stockholm Peace Appeal. The
government expected the clergy not only to sign the appeal but
also to become co-activists with the Communists at the mass meetings
of the peace campaign. As these expectations did not materialize,
a breach of the Agreement was charged. When, on June
22, the episcopate issued a pronouncement on the Defence of
Peace, indicating its approval of the Appeal as a peaceful contribution
to international affairs and condemning the destructive use of
atomic energy, the brevity and the general tone of the statement
were severely criticized. Furthermore, the government arrested
several priests who had openly refused to sign the Stockholm resolution
and dismissed some five hundred priests from teaching posts
for the same offense.
The next point of the Agreement which the regime chose to
enforce in its own version was the church administration in the
western territories. Misquoting the terms (which stated that the
episcopate would "request" the Vatican for a change), the regim
claimed that the hierarchy had undertaken to liquidate the temporary
administration and attacked the Church for doing nothin
about it. On October 23, the newly created Office of Denomin
tional Affairs served notice on the Bishops, demanding an end to
19 News from Behind the Iron Curtain, May 1-13, 1951, p. 24.
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
the temporary administration. When this demand, b
organized mass protests, did not produce the desir
regime proceeded unilaterally to "fulfill the will o
On January 26, 1951, the temporary apostolic ad
were removed and the local Church authorities ordered to elect
permanent vicars. But this move failed to disrupt the Church's
unity, for the vicars elected on January 29, declared their loyalty to
the Vatican and to the Polish episcopate and requested recognition,
which was promptly granted.
In educational matters the Agreement did not work any better.
Even though the government had undertaken not to "limit the
present status of religious instruction in schools" and to treat
religious instructors on an equal footing with other teachers, the
contrary became the rule. True, no decree limiting religious
instruction was passed. Instead the regime resorted to all sorts
of subterfuges aimed at eliminating such instruction from schools
and confining it to the churches. In some schools instructors of
religion were dismissed upon the slightest provocation and not replaced;
in others the teaching of religion was discontinued upon
the "demand" of the parents. Teachers of religion were not admitted
to the professional organization, the League of Polish Teachers,
and consequently were deprived of many professional privileges.
Moreover, the regime gave strong support to the Society of Children's
Friends which establishes schools based on outright atheistic
tenets. As the number of private Catholic schools steadily diminished,
those founded by the Society flourished.
The Catholic press labored under increasingly heavy censorship.
Tygodnik Powszechny, which since 1945 had voiced independent
Catholic views on current political, economic, and social problems,
was by 1951 forced to limit its commentary to literary criticism
and travel reports. A year later it was ordered off the newsstands
and could only be obtained by direct subscription. Then, in March,
1953, it was suspended altogether. When it reappeared in July
under a new editorial board composed of pro-regime Catholics,
its contents reflected the change. In all, the five hundred and
sixteen Catholic publications of 1947 had been reduced to fortyfive
by 1953.20
20 Vladimir Gsovski, ed., Church and State Behind the Iron Curtain (New
York, 1955), p. 205.
318
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 319
While taking these steps to force one-sided "co-ope
the Church, the government did not fail to encourag
growing numbers of its Catholic supporters. In the f
Clerical Commission was formed under the Associatio
for Freedom and Democracy, and also a lay Committe
lic Intellectuals and Leaders under the Committee of th
of Peace. The purpose of these two groups was to
clergy against the Church hierarchy and to marshal
men behind the various programs of the regime.
In October, 1950, the Church leaders began to p
letters to President Bierut the numerous breaches
Agreement, saying that the document placed obligati
sides. Again, at a meeting of Catholic newspaper
publishers in October, 1951, a spokesman for Tygodnik
indicated that the Church would be more willing to p
the peace campaign if the April Agreement were hon
other contracting party. Needless to say, this over
nothing but invective.
After the repeated violations of the Agreement th
one hope left to the episcopate. The expectation
bilateral nature of the Agreement might pave the way
recognition of the Catholic Church and its special
new Constitution. In public discussions of the propos
tion during the early months of 1952, the Church aut
it clear that Article 70, guaranteeing freedom of c
religion to all citizens and proclaiming the separat
and state,
did not cover the whole matter [and] could not be considered
a solution for the highly complex and important problem of
Catholicism in Poland. ... Our attitude in this matter is clear
and simple. We stand by the Agreement of April 14, 1950 ....
We prize the Agreement highly and it is our desire that it should
become a permanent basis governing relations between Churc
and state in Poland. It is also our desire that the Constitution
should not weaken, but, on the contrary, should strengthen t
state of affairs.21
The episcopal comment was attacked viciously in the press and
completely ignored by the Constituent Assembly. The new Constitution,
enacted on July 22, 1952, established separation of
21 Tygodnik Powszechny, March 16, 1952.
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
Church and State, with the proviso that "the prin
relationship between Church and state, as well as
patrimonial position of religious bodies, are determin
Thus the Church was made subject to government dec
tion to the State was to be regulated unilaterally by t
not by way of agreement either with the episcopate o
This was borne out by the February 9, 1953, decre
all church appointments, promotions, and transfe
government consent.
Following the February decree-a clear violation
stitutional provision for the separation of Church
episcopate realized that the attempt at co-existence
failure, and acknowledged as much in a letter in May
Bierut.22 Unlike previous letters, this one was no
protests or an enumeration of violations but stated
conviction that the nature of Communism was re
the failure of the Agreement and made real co-existen
This episcopal letter marks the end of the secon
Church-State relations in postwar Poland. Unable
prewar eminence, the Church had attempted co-ex
the letter made it plain that the episcopate saw no ch
Catholic Church to function autonomously in the Peo
* * * * *
But the acknowledgme
On the contrary, the bi
the limit of possible co
plied to create "favorabl
before and after the letter such resolute action was taken that the
regime at last began to have success in its campaign against the
Church. In December, 1952, five highly placed members of the
Cracow Curia were arrested on charges of directing espionage,
possessing foreign currency, and engaging in political subversion.
Their trial was publicized as evidence of sabotage in the highest
ecclesiastical circles. Accompanied by mass protests, the trial had
served as a convenient prelude to the February decree on Church
appointments. Many arrests-especially among the higher clergy
-followed. On September 13, the arrest of Bishop Kaczmarek
22Text of this letter (May 8, 1953) appears in the White Paper on the
Persecution of the Church in Poland, pp. 50-73.
320
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 321
of Kielce was made public. (Actually he had been
years previously.) On the following day the first
of a bishop was staged. The public prosecutor labor
that Bishop Kaczmarek in his activities, which alleged
espionage for the United States, war-time co-operat
Nazis, and sabotage of internal policies, was merely ca
the policies of the Polish episcopate and the Vatican. O
ber 22, Bishop Kaczmarek, having confessed to all
was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Thr
in Warsaw Cardinal Wyszynski preached a sermon
carefully refrained from polemics but nonetheless ref
to the recent events. What mattered in these "trou
the Primate said, was the "inner truth" inaccessible to
without, including experts in "official investigation."2
reacted quickly to this defiant comment. On Septemb
announced that the Cardinal, charged with violatin
ment, had been removed from his post and allowed
a monastery.
Deprived of its head, the episcopate was forced int
promise to follow the regime's interpretation of the
Agreement. After the Primate's suspension, consu
immediately taken place between Bierut and Msgr.
newly appointed chairman of the episcopate. Accordin
reports, the bishops were showing "full understanding
sity of a change of heart toward the government."24
of change which the episcopate found wise to adopt is
by the statement issued at the conclusion of the cons
bishops took it upon themselves "not to permit in th
distortion of the content and the intentions of the
Agreement and to create conditions favorable for the
of relations between Church and State."25
This declaration marked the end of the hierarchy's open resistance
to the inroads of the government, for on December 17, 1953,
all bishops took a loyalty oath in the office of the Council of Ministers.
But since passive resistance could not be overcome, in subsequent
months the job of placing religion in the service of the
regime was entrusted to others. Already in October the two
23 Quoted in The London Times, September 29, 1953.
24Ibid., October 3, 1953.
25 Tygodnik Powszechny, October 4, 1953.
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
uncoordinated Commissions, set up in the fall of 195
merged into a single Commission of Lay and Clerical
under the All-Polish Committee of the National Front. The task
of adapting Catholicism to the demands of socialism was assigned
to this new body. All that remained for the episcopate was to
lend its support through occasional proclamations to the programs
launched by the pro-regime Catholics.
Once the independent voice of the hierarchy was silenced, systematic
work was undertaken on the revision of Catholic ethics and
on the training of new Catholic cadres. The aim was to put an
end to the "inner emigration" of which the majority of Catholics is
guilty in the eyes of the regime. The government-controlled publishing
house, Pax, puts out books tracing the affinity between
Catholic dogma and Marxism. Especially prominent are work
proving that the social encyclicals give blessing to the economic and
social reforms now being introduced in Poland. In the spring o
1954 Pax began the serial publication of sermons to ensure acceptable
preaching. As is to be expected, these sermons stress that
the concept of Christian love involves social duty and economic
effort.
Catholic institutions of higher learning were also placed under
close supervision. In December 1954, a new Academy of Roman
Catholic Theology, headed by a prominent pro-regime priest,
Father Czuj, was opened in Warsaw. Hailed as a sign of the
government's solicitude for religious life, it was actually a move
to extend control over the teaching of theology, since the Academy
replaced the theological faculties of the Cracow and Warsaw Universities.
The work of the Catholic University in Lublin was
curtailed. By 1955-56 only the faculties of philosophy and the
humanities remained out of the original five. In 1952-53, the
faculty of Law and Social Sciences was abolished; then the department
of Christian philosophy became merely that of philosophy
and it was stipulated that materialist philosophy must also be
taught. Finally, in 1955-56, the faculties of theology and canon
law were discontinued.26 Some church seminaries still remain
(twenty out of the original ninety), but a campaign is being conducted
to "introduce fresh air" into their classrooms, that is, to have
instruction in Marxism.27
26 The Tablet (London), October 8, 1955.
27 Tygodnik Powszechny, November 28, 1954.
322
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 323
The regime uses the supporters it gains among the
priests in many ways. These range from having the pa
join in the collectivization drive, to having "progressiv
leaders partake in and celebrate the various Commu
Their voices add authority to the numerous undertaki
home front, thus giving substance to the widely pr
myth that a united nation backs the regime.
On the international front Catholic supporters ar
useful. They add weight to the peace pronouncemen
erings by stressing the Christian aspect of the peace ca
endorse Soviet international proposals (for exampl
European security plan) as the only salvation for ma
at home and abroad they publicize the danger of Germ
ism through numerous public letters to Catholic intell
clergy in Western Europe; and they charge that th
politically allied with the camp of reaction.
But despite the relative success in building up its co
paratus the regime has had no comparable achievement
over the masses to its "progressive" version of Catholi
can be seen both from the observations of Western visitors and
from the admission of failure by the "progressive" activists.
Gunnar D. Kumlien witnessed in the summer of 1955 the mass
pilgrimages to Czestochowa occasioned by the 300th anniversary
of the Swedish siege. As he watched the 200,000 pilgrims participating
with "utter dedication," he realized that the celebrations
at the shrine-"a symbol of Poland's eternal struggle against its
non-Catholic neighbors"-were nothing more or less than "a single
flaming protest against the present."28 Similar large attendance in
church was observed by Kumlien among the industrial workers
in Polish Silesia.
Celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the
"progressive" Catholic movement did not draw the same crowds
as do the traditional observances. Despite careful preparations,
much pressure and publicity only some 7,000 priests and laymen
participated in the commemorative activities during the fall of
1955. In point of numbers the biggest success was the Danzig
celebration which, however, was connected with the opening of
the reconstructed cathedral. The organizers of these events did
28 The Commonweal, September 16, 1955.
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
not conceal their disappointment at the lack of respon
uted it to the widespread influence of "conservative el
The inconclusive nature of the present situation
State wields the outward controls while the Church retains its
spiritual authority can be deduced from the fact that the regim
still seeks a rapprochement with the Vatican.30 But this sign
weakness should not be overestimated. For while Premier Cyran
kiewicz finds it necessary to hint at a possible release of Cardin
Wyszynski, he still has the power to make it plain that the Cardi
will not be permitted to resume his official position. To qu
Cyrankiewicz's words: "People who would like to undermine
foundations of our state will always be forced by us to express th
views privately and not in official posts."31
In spite of the regime's failure to win over the Catholic pop
lace, many Western observers argue that eventually a natio
church will be established in Poland because of the wide publici
and official support received by the "progressive" Catholics
their ventures. However, evidence seems to indicate that the "p
gressive" Catholics are aiming at something of much wider purp
than the establishment of a national church. Without quest
the regime has succeeded in silencing the bishops and in isolatin
the faithful from Catholic leadership abroad. Nevertheless, t
goal, for which the regime had worked eight years, was achiev
without a separation from Rome. And, interestingly enough, th
men who cooperated with the government to reduce the Churc
to its present status are the ones to deny most insistently the p
sibility of a break with the Vatican on spiritual matters.32 The
condemn the rumors about the establishment of a national church
as fabrications of hostile propaganda which seek to discredit the
changes that have taken place in Poland, and warn their followers
not to challenge or tamper with dogma. Why are such pains taken
to maintain orthodoxy and to forestall the possibility of a break?
29 Dzis i Jutro, December 4, 1955.
30 In September 1955, the government tried to re-establish contact with the
Vatican through Hugo Hanke, a former London Exile Government official who
had just switched his allegiance. The London Times, September 14, 1955.
Ibid., September 16, 1955.
32 This, in spite of the fact that in June, 1955, the Holy Office condemned
Piasecki's chief books as well as his weekly journal Dzis i Jutro. The Tablet,
July 9, 1955.
324
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COMMUNIST POLAND 325
For one, it would make the task of the "progressive" C
more unpopular at home. But another aspect seems
important. A break with the Vatican would cut sho
nounced ambitions to align Catholics all over the w
side of "progress."
The pro-regime Catholics take great pains to con
abroad that basically Catholicism and Marxism ar
patible. According to their explanations, the enmit
Catholics feel for Marxism is due not to any basi
between the two philosophies but to the backwar
political views of the Western Catholics. The Polish
argue that in religion Catholics should distinguish
eternal and the temporal. They want to wean the Wes
peans from identifying Catholic dogma with the forms
life. "If the eternal mission of the Church is to be ca
must be conducted with regard for the historical mom
direction of world development."33 Only in the social
of Eastern Europe can Catholicism find the proper co
its universal mission. In the West the meaning of tha
become warped through being intimately bound up w
ism, war, and reaction, the argument runs.
Considerable effort is made to spread these view
discussing their immediate goals pro-regime Catholics
stress on maintaining contact with and influencing We
lics. Dzis i Jutro publishes large editions in French fo
bution among Catholics of Western Europe. A lively
kept up with leftist groups; for example, with the gr
around the French magazine Esprit. Public letters
French and German Catholic leaders urging them to k
purity and congratulating them when this "purity" c
the Soviet line. Running argument is directed against
tions of Western papers-for example, the Frankfurte
the "progressive" Catholics in Poland are kowtowing t
Western Europeans are invited to attend various even
by the pro-regime group. Although these occasion
propagandize the "progressive" version of Catholici
accompanied by assertions of filial obedience to th
on November 2, 1955, the International Meeting of C
ss Tygodnik Powszechny, December 27, 1953.
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
Christian leaders, convened in Warsaw to commemorat
anniversary of the "progressive" movement and attend
twenty Western Catholics, sent the following cable to
We, the Catholics of Europe and Asia, gathered in W
deliberate on the means of putting into action in thi
world the teachings of the Catholic Church concerning t
cult questions of peace and justice, ask Your Holiness
standing and for a blessing of our endeavors. At the
we stress our attachment to our Mother, the Churc
filial obedience to Your Holiness.34
This self-assumed task of convincing Catholics both inside and
outside of Poland that the Church's mission is quite compatible
with socialism, as well as the care taken not to break with the Holy
See, seems to indicate that the pro-regime Catholics have a much
more ambitious aim than the establishment of a national church.
Their hope seems to be to have Catholicism serve not only the
Polish regime but also world revolution.
4 Dzis i Jutro, November 13, 1955.
326
This content downloaded from 213.226.233.49 on Sun, 05 May 2019 11:43:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms