EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS
Fall 2012
Course Web Site
This is
a graduate-level topics course in Experimental Economics, with a focus on
laboratory experiments. The aim is to expose students to multiple potential
research topics and related literature. Hands-on participation in in-class
experiments will be an integral part of the course. Basic background in
Microeconomic Theory and Game Theory is assumed.

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Instructor:
Peter Katušèák:
Peter.Katuscak@cerge-ei.cz,
office hours by appointment
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Lectures:
Thu, 8:30-10:05, Fri, 8:30-11:50, in room S6
Dates: Oct. 25-26, Nov. 1-2, Nov. 22-23, Dec. 6-7
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Laboratory Sessions:
Thu, 12:50-15:20, Fri, 12:50-14:30, in VT5
Dates: Oct. 25-26, Nov. 1-2, Nov. 22-23, Dec. 6-7
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Announcements:
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Principal Texts:
·
Holt, Charles A., Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior,
Pearson-Adison Wesley, 2007.
Further Suggested Readings
(available from the CERGE-EI Library):
·
Camerer, Colin, Behavioral Game Theory, New
York, Russell Sage & Princeton University Press,
2003.
·
Friedman, Daniel and Alessandra Cassar, Economics
Lab: an Intensive Course in Experimental Economics, Routledge,
2004.
·
Kagel, John and Alvin Roth, Handbook of Experimental
Economics, Princeton, 1995.
·
Smith, Vernon L., Rationality in
Economics, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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Term Project and Grades:
There will be no exams in this class. The course grade will
be based on class participation (20%) and a term project to be delivered by
email to Peter Katušèák by January 15, 2013. In this
project, a student should outline a research question to be addressed by
laboratory experimental economic methods, review the literature, propose a
detailed experimental design, outline hypotheses to be tested and discuss how these
hypotheses will be tested.
Topics:
Part I: Lab experiments (peter Katušèák)
Lecture notes for this part of the course can be downloaded
by clicking on the appropriate link.
1.
Introduction and Methodology
2.
Other-regarding
Preferences
·
Dictator
game
·
Ultimatum
game
·
Understanding
other-regarding preferences
3.
Preference and
Belief Elicitation
·
Willingness-to-pay
elicitation
·
Belief
elicitation
·
Risk
aversion elicitation
·
Elicitation
of other-regarding preferences
·
Elicitation
of attitudes toward competition
4.
Trust, Reciprocity and
Principal-Agent Games (skipping)
·
Trust
game
·
Reciprocity
game
·
Principal-agent
game
5.
Cooperation (skipping)
·
Prisoners‘ Dilemma
6.
Coordination
·
Battle
of the Sexes
·
Minimum
effort game
7.
Guessing
·
Guessing
(beauty contest) game
8.
Public Goods
·
Voluntary
contributions game
·
Voluntary
contributions with punishments
·
Provision-point
mechanism
9.
Auctions
·
Overview
of auction formats
·
Independent
private values: English, Dutch, first-price sealed-bid and second-price
sealed-bid auctions
·
Common
values: first-price sealed-bid
10.
Financial Markets
·
Multi-unit
double-auction:
·
Stock-market,
bubbles
·
Prediction
market
Reading List:
Readings denoted by asterisk will be discussed in class.
Other readings are for student reference. Further readings may be assigned for
in-class discussion during the course of the semester.
1.
Introduction and Methodology
*Holt, chapter 1. (pdf
)
Hertwig, Ralph and
Andreas Ortmann. “Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological
Challenge for Psychologists?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001,
24(3), pp. 383-402. (pdf)
Kahneman, Daniel. “Maps of
Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics.” American
Economic Review, 2003, 93(5), pp. 1449-1475. (pdf)
Rabin, Matthew. “Psychology and Economics.” Journal of Economic
Literature, 1998, 36(1), pp. 11-46. (pdf)
Roth, Alvin E.
"The Early History of Experimental Economics." Journal of the
History of Economic Thought, 1993, 15(2), pp. 184-209. (pdf)
Roth, Alvin E.
"Lets Keep the Con out of Experimental Econ.: A
Methodological Note." Empirical Economics, 1994, 19(2), pp.
279-289. (pdf)
Samuelson,
Larry. “Economic
Theory and Experimental Economics.” Journal of Economic
Literature, 2005, 43(1), pp. 65-107. (pdf)
2. Other-Regarding
Preferences
- Dictator,
Ultimatum and Bargaining Games
*Holt, chapter 12 (pdf)
Binmore, Ken. “Economic Man or Straw Man? Commentary on
Heinrich, et al.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005, 28,
pp. 815-818. (pdf)
Bornstein,
Gary and I. Yaniv. “Individual and
Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?” Experimental
Economics, 1998, 1, pp. 101-108. (pdf)
*Cherry, Todd,
Peter Frykblom and Jason Shogren.
“Hardnose the Dictator.” American
Economic Review, 2002, 92(4), pp. 1218-1221. (pdf)
*Forsythe, Robert,
Joel Horowitz, N.S. Savin and Martin Sefton. “Fairness in Simple Bargaining
Experiments.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6(3), pp.
347-369. (pdf)
Goeree, Jacob and C.
Holt. “Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer
bargaining games.” European Economic Review, 2000, 44, pp. 1079-1089. (pdf)
*Guth, Werner, R. Schmittberger
and B. Schwartz. “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal
of Games and Economic Behavior, 1982, 3(4), pp. 367-388. (pdf)
*Hoffman, E., K.
McCabe., K. Shachat, and V. Smith. “Preferences,
Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and
Economic Behavior, 1994, 7, pp. 346-380. (pdf)
*List, John. “On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games.” Journal
of Political Economy, 2007, 115(3), pp. 482-493. (pdf)
*Ochs, Jack and
Alvin E. Roth. “An Experimental Study of Sequential
Bargaining. American Economic Review, 1989, 79(3), pp.
355-384. (pdf)
Roth,
Alvin E., V. Prasnikar, M. Okunofujiwara
and S. Zamir. “Bargaining and Market Behavior
in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An
Experimental Study.” American Economic Review, 1991, 81(5), pp.
1068-1095. (pdf)
Rubinstein, Ariel.
“Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.” Econometrica, 1982, 50(1), pp. 97-109. (pdf)
*Slonim, Robert and Alvin E. Roth. “Learning
in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in
the Slovak Republic.” Econometrica,
1988, 66(3), pp. 569-596. (pdf)
- Understanding
Other-Regarding Preferences
*Andreoni, James and John Miller. “Giving
According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for
Altruism.” Econometrica, 2002, 70(2),
pp. 737-753. (pdf)
*Bolton, Gary E.
and Axel Ockenfels. “ERC: A Theory of Equity,
Reciprocity and Competition.” American Economic Review, 2000,
90(1), pp. 166-193. (pdf)
*Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin. “Understanding
Social Preferences with Simple Tests.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2002, 117(3), pp. 817-869. (pdf)
Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger. “A Theory of
Sequential Reciprocity.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2004,
47(2), pp. 268-98. (pdf)
Falk,
Armin and Urs Fischbacher. “A Theory of Reciprocity.” Games and Economic Behavior,
2006, 54(2), pp. 293-315. (pdf)
*Fehr, Ernst and
Klaus Schmidt. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and
Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114(3),
pp. 817-868. (pdf)
Levine, D. “Modelling Altruism and Spitefulness in Game
Experiments.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 1998, 1(3), pp.
593-622. (pdf)
Li, Jing. “The
Power of Convention: A Theory of Social Preferences.”Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 65(3-4), pp. 489-505. (pdf)
Rabin, Matthew. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.” American
Economic Review, 1993, 83(5), pp. 1281-1302. (pdf)
Sobel, Joel. “Putting
Altruism in Context,” Brain and Behavioral Science, 2002, 25(2),
pp. 275-276. (pdf)
Sobel, Joel. “Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity.” Journal
of Economic Literature, 2005, 43(2), pp. 392-436. (pdf)
3. Preference and
Belief Elicitation
*Holt, chapters 4
and 30. (pdf)
Andreoni, James and John
Miller. “Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the
Consistency of Preferences for Altruism.” Econometrica,
2002, 70(2), pp. 737-753. (pdf)
*Becker, G.M., Degrooth, M.H., Marschak, J.
Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method. Behavioral Science,
1964, 9(2), pp. 226-232.
*Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin. “Understanding
Social Preferences with Simple Tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
2002, 117(3), pp. 817-869. (pdf)
Croson, Rachel and Uri Gneezy. “Gender Differences in
Preferences.” Journal of Economic Literature, 2009, 47(2), pp.
448-474. (pdf)
Fehr,
Ernst, Helen Bernhard and Bettina Rockenbach. “Egalitarianism in young children.” Nature, 2008,
454(28), pp. 1079-1084. (pdf)
*Holt, Charles A.
and Susan K. Laury, “Risk Aversion and Incentive
Effects.” American Economic Review, 2002, 92(5), pp.
1644-1655. (pdf)
4. Trust, Reciprocity
and Principal-Agent Games
*Holt, chapter 13.
(pdf)
Andreoni, James.
"Trust, Reciprocity, and Contract Enforcement: Experiments on Satisfaction
Guaranteed." 2005, Working Paper. (pdf)
Andreoni, James, William
H. Harbaugh and Lise Vesterlund. “The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards,
Punishments and Cooperation.” American Economic Review, 2003,
93(3), pp. 893-902. (pdf)
*Berg, Joyce, John
Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe. “Trust,
Reciprocity, and Social History.” Games and Economic Behavior,
1995, 10(1), pp. 122-142. (pdf)
Bohnet, Iris, Bruno S.
Frey and Steffen Huck. “More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement,
Trust, and Crowding.” American Political Science Review, 2001,
95(1), pp. 131-144. (pdf)
Cox,
James C. “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity.” Games and
Economic Behavior, 2004, 46(2), pp. 260-281. (pdf)
Engelmann,
Dirk and Andreas Ortmann. “The Robustness of Laboratory Gift Exchange: A Reconsideration.” 2002, Working Paper,
CERGE-EI, Prague, Czech Republic. (pdf)
*Fehr, Ernst,
Simon Gachter and Georg Kirchsteiger.
“Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence.” Econometrica, 1997, 65(4), pp. 833-860. (pdf)
*Fehr, Ernst,
Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl.
“Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental
Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, 108(2), pp.
437-459. (pdf)
*Fehr, Ernst,
Alexander Klein, and Klaus Schmidt. “Fairness and Contract
Design.” Econometrica, 2007, 75(1), pp.
121-154. (pdf)
Glaeser, Edward L., et al. “Measuring Trust.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 2000, 115(3), pp. 811-846. (pdf)
Van
Huyck, John B.; Raymond C. Battalio
and Mary F. Walters. “Commitment versus Discretion in
the Peasant-Dictator Game.” Games and Economic Behavior,
1995, 10(1), pp. 143-170. (pdf)
5. Cooperation
*Holt, chapter 3.1-2.
(pdf)
Andreoni, James. “Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and
Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1995b, 110(1), pp. 1-21. (pdf)
Andreoni, James
and Larry Samuelson. “Building Rational Cooperation.” Journal
of Economic Theory, 127, 2006, pp. 117-154. (pdf)
*Andreoni, James and J.H.Miller.
“Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental
Evidence.” Economic Journal, 1993, 103(418), pp. 570-585. (pdf)
Camerer, C., and K. Weigelt. “Experimental Tests of a
Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model.” Econometrica,
1988, 56(1), pp. 1-36. (pdf)
*Cooper, R., D. DeJong and R. Forsythe “Cooperation Without
Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Games.” Games
and Economic Behavior, 1996, 12(2), pp. 187-218. (pdf)
*Dal Bo, P.
“Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from
Infinitely Repeated Games.” American Economics Review,2005, 95(5), pp. 1591-1604. (pdf)
*Dawes, Robyn and
Richard Thaler. “Anomalies: Cooperation.” Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 1988, 2(3), pp. 187-197. (pdf)
Duffy, John and
Jack Ochs. “Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency
of Social Interaction.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 66,
pp. 785-812. (pdf)
Ellison,
G. “Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random
Matching.” Review of Economic Studies, 1994, 61(3), pp.
567-588. (pdf)
Kreps,
David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson. “Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma.” Journal
of Economic Theory,1982,
27(2), pp. 245-252. (pdf)
Selten,
R. and R. Stoecker. “End Behavior in
Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames: A
Learning Theory Approach.” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 1986, 7(1), pp. 47-70. (pdf)
6. Coordination
*Holt, chapters
3.3 and 26. (pdf)
Ochs, Jack. Coordination. In Kagel and Roth.
Blume, Andreas and
Andreas Ortmann. “The effects of costless pre-play communication:
Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria.”Journal of Economic
Theory, 132, 2007, 274- 290. (pdf)
*Goeree, Jacob and Charles Holt. “An
Experimental Study of Costly Coordination.” Games and Economic
Behavior, 2005, 51(2), pp. 349-364. (pdf)
Cooper, Russell W.,Douglas V. DeJong,
Robert Forsythe and Thomas Ross. “Communication in the Battle of the Sexes
Game: Some Experimental Results.” RAND Journal of Economics, 1989,
20(4), pp. 568-587. (pdf)
Cooper, Russell W.,Douglas V. DeJong,
Robert Forsythe and Thomas Ross. “Selection Criteria in Coordination Games:
Some Experimental Results.” American Economic Review, 1990, 80(1),
pp. 218-33. (pdf)
Cooper, Russell W.,Douglas V. DeJong,
Robert Forsythe and Thomas Ross. “Communication in
Coordination Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992,
107(2), pp. 739-771. (pdf)
Riedl, Arno, Ingrid
Rohde and Martin Strobel. “Efficient
Coordination in Weakest Link Games through Freedom of Partner Choice.” Unpublished manuscript, 2011a. (pdf)
Riedl, Arno, Ingrid
Rohde and Martin Strobel. “Neighborhood Choice and Efficient Coordination.” Unpublished manuscript, 2011b. (pdf)
Schotter, Andy and
Barry Sopher. “Social Learning and Convention
Creation in Inter-Generational Games: An Experimental Study.” Journal
of Political Economy, 2003, 111(3), pp. 498-529. (pdf)
*
Van Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio
and Richard O. Beil. “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination
Failure.” American Economic Review, 1990, 80(1), pp.
234-48. (pdf)
Van
Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio
and Richard O. Beil. “Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination
Failure in Average Opinion Games.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 1991, 106(3), pp. 885-910. (pdf)
Van
Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio
and Richard O. Beil. “Asset Markets as
an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions,
and Tacit Communication.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5,
pp. 485-504. (pdf)
Van
Huyck, John B., John M. Wildenthal
and Raymond C. Battalio. “Tacit
Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence From Repeated Dominance Solvable Games.” Games and
Economic Behavior, 2002, 38(1), pp. 156-175. (pdf)
Weber,
Roberto. “Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient
Coordination in Large Groups.” American Economic
Review, 2006, 96 (1), March, 114-126. (pdf)
7. Guessing
*Holt, chapter 3.4. (pdf)
Moulin, Herve. Game Theory for Social Sciences. New York: New York
Press, 1986.
*Nagel, Rosemarie.
“Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.”
American Economic Review, 1995, 85(5), pp. 1313-1326. (pdf)
8. Public Goods
*Holt, chapters 14 and 15. (pdf)
Ledyard, John. “Public Goods: A Survey of
Experimental Research.” Chapter 2 in Kagel
and Roth (1995).
- Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism
Anderson, Simon
P., Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt. “A Theoretical Analysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public
Goods Games.” Journal of Public Economics, 1998, 70(2), pp.
297-323. (pdf)
Andreoni, James. “Why Free
Ride?: Strategies and Learning in Public Goods
Experiments.” Journal of Public Economics, 1988, 37(3), pp.
291-304. (pdf)
Andreoni, James. “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis.” American
Economic Review, 1993, 83(5), pp. 1317-1327. (pdf)
Andreoni, James.
“Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?” American
Economic Review, 1995a, 85(4), pp. 891-904. (pdf)
*Goeree, Jacob K., Charles A. Holt and S. Laury. “Private Costs and Public Benefits: Unraveling the
Effects of Altruism and Noisy Behavior.” Journal of Public Economics, 2002,
83(2), pp. 257-278. (pdf)
*Isaac, R. Mark
and James Walker. “Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary
Contributions Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988a,
103(1), pp. 179-199. (pdf)
Isaac,
R. Mark and James Walker. “Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism.” Economic Inquiry, 1988b,
26, pp. 585-608.
*Isaac, R. Mark,
James Walker and Arlingtion Williams. “Group Size and
the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large
Groups.” Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 54(1), pp.
1-36. (pdf)
*Marwell, Gerald and Ruth Ames. “Economists Free Ride, Does
Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods,
IV.” Journal of Public Economics, 1981, 15(3), pp.
295-310. (pdf)
Palfrey,
Thomas and Howard Rosenthal. “Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk
in a Public Goods Game with Private Information.” Games and
Economic Behavior, 1991, 3(2), pp. 183-220. (pdf)
Palfrey,
Thomas and Jeffrey Prisbrey. “Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods
Experiments.” Journal of Public Economics, 1996,61(3), pp. 409-427. (pdf)
Palfrey,
Thomas and Jeffrey Prisbrey. “Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?” American
Economic Review, 1997, 87(5), pp. 829-846. (pdf)
- Provision
Point
*Bagnoli, Mark and Michael McKee. “Voluntary Contributions
Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods.” Economic
Inquiry, 1991, 29(2), pp.351-366. (pdf)
Bagnoli, Mark, Shaul Ben-David and Michael McKee. “Voluntary
Provision of Public Goods: The Multiple Unit Case.” Journal of Public
Economics, 1992, 47(1), pp. 85-106. (pdf)
Davis,
Douglas and Charles Holt. Experimental Economics. Princetion: Princeton University Press, pp.
338-343. (pdf)
*Dawes, Robin,
John Orbell, R.T. Simmons and A.J.C. van de Kragt. “Organizing Groups for Collective
Action.” American Political Science Review,
1986, 80(4), pp.1171-85. (pdf)
Rondeau, Daniel, William
D. Schulze and Gregory L. Poe. “Voluntary
Revelation of the Demand for Public Goods Using a Provision Point Mechanism.”
Journal of Public Economics, 1999, 72(3), pp. 455-470. (pdf)
Rondeau, Daniel, Gregory
L. Poe and William D. Schulze. “VCM or PPM?
A comparison of the performance of two voluntary public goods
mechanisms.” Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89(8), pp.
1581-1592. (pdf)
- Cooperation-Enforcing
Institutions: Punishments for Non-Cooperation
*Fehr, Ernst and
Simon Gachter. “Coopertion
and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments.” American Economic Review,
2000, 90(4), pp. 980-994. (pdf)
*Gureck, Ozgur, Bernd Irlenbusch and Bettina Rockenbach.
“The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions.”
Science, 2006, 312, pp. 108-111. (pdf)
*Kosfeld, Michael, Akira Okada and Arno Riedl.
“Institution Formation in Public Goods Games.” American
Economic Review, 2009, 99(4), pp. 1335-1355. (pdf)
9. Auctions
*Holt, chapters 19
and 21. (pdf)
*Kagel, John. “Auctions.” Chapter 7 in Kagel and Roth.
- Private-Value
Auctions
Anderson, Simon
P., Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt. “Rent Seeking
with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction.” Journal
of Political Economy, 1998, 106(4), pp. 828-853. (pdf)
Andreoni, James and John
H. Miller. “Auctions with Artificial Adaptive
Agents.” Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10(1), pp. 39-64.
(pdf)
Android,
James, Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim. “Asymmetric Information about Rivals
Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment.” Games and Economic Behavior,
2007, 59, pp. 240-259. (pdf)
*Chen, Yan, Peter Katuscak and Emre Ozdenoren. “Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man?”, 2009, working paper. (pdf)
*Filiz-Ozbay, Emel and Erkut Ozbay. “Auctions with
Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment.” American Economic Review,
2007, 97(4), pp. 1407-1418. (pdf)
List,
John A. and David Lucking-Reiley. “Demand Reduction
in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard
Field Experiment.” American Economic Review, 90(4), 2000, pp.
961-972. (pdf)
*Lucking-Reiley, David. “Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence
Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet.” American
Economic Review, 1999, 89(5), pp. 1063-1080. (pdf)
Milgrom, Paul. “Auctions
and Bidding: A Primer (in Symposia: Auctions).” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 1989, 3(3), pp. 3-22. (pdf)
Riley, John G.
“Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions (in Symposia:
Auctions).” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989, 3(3), pp.
41-50. (pdf)
- Common-Value
Auctions
Kagel, J., R. Harstad and D. Levin. “Information Impact and Allocation
Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study.”Econometrica, 1987, 55(6), pp.
1275-1304. (pdf)
Kagel, John H. and Dan
Levin. “Common Value Auctions with Insider Information.” Econometrica, 1999, 67(5), pp. 1219-1238. (pdf)
Levin,
Dan, John Kagel and Jean-Francois Richard. “Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value
Auctions.” American Economic Review, 1996, 86(3), pp.
442-460. (pdf)
*Thaler, Richard H. “Anomalies: The Winner's Curse.” Journal
of Economic Perspectives,1988, 2(1), pp. 191-202.
(pdf)
10. Financial Markets
a. Double Auction and
Call Market
Chamberlin, E. H.
“An Experimental Imperfect Market.” Journal of Political Economy,1948, 56, pp. 95-108. (pdf)
Friedman, Dan.
“How Trading Institutions Affect Financial Market Performance: Some Laboratory
Evidence.” Economic Inquiry, 1993, 31, pp. 410-435.
McCabe,
Kevin, S.J. Rassenti and Vernon Smith. “Designing a Uniform-Price Double Auction: An Experimental Evaluation.”
1993. In D. Friedman and J. Rust, eds., The Double
Auction Market: Institutions, Theory and Evidence, SFI Studies in the Sciences
of Complexity, Proceedings, 15, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Smith, Vernon. “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior.” Journal
of Political Economy, 1962, 70, pp. 111-137. (pdf)
Smith, Vernon. “The Effect of Market Organization on Competitive Equilibrium.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1964, 78, pp. 181-201. (pdf)
Smith, Vernon.
“Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental Investigation of the Hayek
Hypothesis.” Economic Inquiry, 1982, 20, pp. 165-179.
- Bubbles in
Financial Markets
*Holt, chapter 11.
(pdf)
*Bostian, A. J., Jacob Goeree and
Charles Holt. “Price Bubbles in Asset Market Experiments
with a Flat Fundamental Value.” 2005, working
paper. (pdf)
Caginalp, G., David Porter
and Vernon Smith. “Financial Bubbles: Excess Cash, Momentum and Incomplete
Information.” Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, 2001, 2, pp.
80-89.
Dufwenberg, Martin, Tobias Lindqvist and Evan Moore. “Bubbles and
Experience: An Experiment.” American Economic Review, 2005, 95(5), pp.
1731-1737. (pdf)
Haruvy, Ernan and Charles Noussair. “The Effect of
Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Spot Asset Markets.” Journal
of Finance, 2006, 61(3), pp. 1119-1157.
King,
Ronald, Vernon Smith, Arlington Williams and Mark Van Boening. “The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Stock
Markets.” In Richard H. Day and Ping Chen, eds., Nonlinear
Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993, pp. 183-200.
Noussair, Charles and
Steven Tucker. “Futures Markets and Bubble Formation
in Experimental Asset Markets.” Pacific Economic Review, 2006,
11(2), pp. 167-184. (pdf)
Peterson, Steven.
“Forecasting Dynamics and Convergence to Market Fundamentals: Evidence from
Experimental Asset Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
1993, 22(3), pp. 269-84.
Porter,
David and Vernon Smith. “Futures Contracting and Dividend
Uncertainty in Experimental Asset Markets.” Journal of Business, 1995,
68(4), pp. 509-541. (pdf)
Shleifer, Andrei and
Robert Vishny. “The Limits of
Arbitrage.” Journal of Finance, 1997, 52(1), pp. 35-55. (pdf)
*Smith, Vernon, G.
Suchanek, & Arlington Williams, “Bubbles, Crashes
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