

INTERMEDIATE


8TH EDITION

MICROECONOMICS

HAL R. VARIAN

24

Monopoly



Pure Monopoly


- ◆ **A monopolized market has a single seller.**
- ◆ **The monopolist's demand curve is the (downward sloping) market demand curve.**
- ◆ **So the monopolist can alter the market price by adjusting its output level.**




Pure Monopoly

\$/output unit
 $p(y)$

Higher output y causes a lower market price, $p(y)$.




Output Level, y




Why Monopolies?

- ◆ **What causes monopolies?**
 - a legal fiat; e.g. US Postal Service




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 - sole ownership of a resource; e.g. a toll highway



Why Monopolies?

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- sole ownership of a resource; e.g. a toll highway
- formation of a cartel; e.g. OPEC



Why Monopolies?

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
- a legal fiat; e.g. US Postal Service
- a patent; e.g. a new drug
- sole ownership of a resource; e.g. a toll highway
- formation of a cartel; e.g. OPEC
- large economies of scale; e.g. local utility companies.

Pure Monopoly

- ◆ Suppose that the monopolist seeks to maximize its economic profit,

$$\Pi(y) = p(y)y - c(y).$$

- ◆ What output level y^* maximizes profit?



Profit-Maximization

$$\Pi(y) = p(y)y - c(y).$$

At the profit-maximizing output level y^*



$$\frac{d\Pi(y)}{dy} = \frac{d}{dy}(p(y)y) - \frac{dc(y)}{dy} = 0$$

so, for $y = y^*$,



$$\frac{d}{dy}(p(y)y) = \frac{dc(y)}{dy}.$$




Profit-Maximization




Profit-Maximization



Profit-Maximization




Profit-Maximization




$\Pi(y)$



Profit-Maximization




Profit-Maximization



$\Pi(y)$



Profit-Maximization




At the profit-maximizing output level the slopes of the revenue and total cost curves are equal; $MR(y^*) = MC(y^*)$.

Marginal Revenue

Marginal revenue is the rate-of-change of revenue as the output level y increases;

$$\mathbf{MR(y) = \frac{d}{dy}(p(y)y) = p(y) + y \frac{dp(y)}{dy}.}$$



Marginal Revenue


Marginal revenue is the rate-of-change of revenue as the output level y increases;

$$\mathbf{MR(y) = \frac{d}{dy}(p(y)y) = p(y) + y \frac{dp(y)}{dy} .}$$

$dp(y)/dy$ is the slope of the market inverse demand function so $dp(y)/dy < 0$. Therefore

$$\mathbf{MR(y) = p(y) + y \frac{dp(y)}{dy} < p(y)}$$

for $y > 0$.




Marginal Revenue

E.g. if $p(y) = a - by$ then

$$R(y) = p(y)y = ay - by^2$$

and so

$$MR(y) = a - 2by < a - by = p(y) \text{ for } y > 0.$$




Marginal Revenue

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$$MR(y) = a - 2by$$


Marginal Cost

Marginal cost is the rate-of-change of total cost as the output level y increases;




$$MC(y) = \frac{dc(y)}{dy}.$$

E.g. if $c(y) = F + \alpha y + \beta y^2$ then

$$MC(y) = \alpha + 2\beta y.$$




Marginal Cost



Profit-Maximization; An Example

At the profit-maximizing output level y^* , $MR(y^*) = MC(y^*)$. So if $p(y) = a - by$ and $c(y) = F + \alpha y + \beta y^2$ then

$$\mathbf{MR(y^*) = a - 2by^* = \alpha + 2\beta y^* = MC(y^*)}$$




Profit-Maximization; An Example

At the profit-maximizing output level y^* , $MR(y^*) = MC(y^*)$. So if $p(y) = a - by$ and if $c(y) = F + \alpha y + \beta y^2$ then

$$\mathbf{MR(y^*) = a - 2by^* = \alpha + 2\beta y^* = MC(y^*)}$$

and the profit-maximizing output level is

$$\mathbf{y^* = \frac{a - \alpha}{2(b + \beta)}}$$



Profit-Maximization; An Example

At the profit-maximizing output level y^* , $MR(y^*) = MC(y^*)$. So if $p(y) = a - by$ and if $c(y) = F + \alpha y + \beta y^2$ then

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and the profit-maximizing output level is


$$y^* = \frac{a - \alpha}{2(b + \beta)}$$

causing the market price to be

$$p(y^*) = a - by^* = a - b \frac{a - \alpha}{2(b + \beta)}$$


Profit-Maximization; An Example

\$/output unit



Profit-Maximization; An Example

\$/output unit




$$y^* = \frac{a - \alpha}{2(b + \beta)}$$

$$MR(y) = a - 2by$$

Profit-Maximization; An Example

\$/output unit




$\frac{a - \alpha}{2(b + \beta)}$

$MR(y) = a - 2by$

Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

- ◆ **Suppose that market demand becomes less sensitive to changes in price (*i.e.* the own-price elasticity of demand becomes less negative). Does the monopolist exploit this by causing the market price to rise?**




Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price

Elasticity of Demand

$$\mathbf{MR(y) = \frac{d}{dy}(p(y)y) = p(y) + y \frac{dp(y)}{dy}}$$

$$\mathbf{= p(y) \left[1 + \frac{y}{p(y)} \frac{dp(y)}{dy} \right].}$$



Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price


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Own-price elasticity of demand is

$$\varepsilon = \frac{p(y)}{y} \frac{dy}{dp(y)}$$



Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price

Elasticity of Demand

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Own-price elasticity of demand is

$$\varepsilon = \frac{p(y)}{y} \frac{dy}{dp(y)} \quad \text{so} \quad \text{MR}(y) = p(y) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right].$$




Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

$$MR(y) = p(y) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right].$$

**Suppose the monopolist's marginal cost of production is constant, at \$k/output unit.
For a profit-maximum**

$$MR(y^*) = p(y^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] = k \quad \text{which is} \quad p(y^*) = \frac{k}{1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}}.$$



Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

$$p(y^*) = \frac{k}{1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}}$$

**E.g. if $\varepsilon = -3$ then $p(y^*) = 3k/2$,
and if $\varepsilon = -2$ then $p(y^*) = 2k$.**


**So as ε rises towards -1 the monopolist
alters its output level to make the market
price of its product to rise.**



Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

Notice that, since $MR(y^*) = p(y^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] = k,$


$$p(y^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] > 0$$



Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

Notice that, since $MR(y^*) = p(y^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] = k,$

$$p(y^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] > 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad 1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} > 0$$




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That is, $\frac{1}{\varepsilon} > -1$




Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

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$$p(y^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] > 0 \Rightarrow 1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} > 0$$

That is, $\frac{1}{\varepsilon} > -1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon < -1$.



Monopolistic Pricing & Own-Price Elasticity of Demand

Notice that, since $MR(y^*) = p(y^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] = k$,


$$p(y^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] > 0 \Rightarrow 1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} > 0$$

That is, $\frac{1}{\varepsilon} > -1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon < -1$.

So a profit-maximizing monopolist always selects an output level for which market demand is own-price elastic.

Markup Pricing


- ◆ **Markup pricing: Output price is the marginal cost of production plus a “markup.”**
- ◆ **How big is a monopolist’s markup and how does it change with the own-price elasticity of demand?**



Markup Pricing

$$p(y^*) \left[1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right] = k \quad \Rightarrow \quad p(y^*) = \frac{k}{1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}} = \frac{k\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon}$$

is the monopolist's price.




Markup Pricing

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is the monopolist's price. The markup is

$$p(y^*) - k = \frac{k\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon} - k = -\frac{k}{1 + \varepsilon}.$$



Markup Pricing

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
$$p(y^*) - k = \frac{k\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon} - k = -\frac{k}{1 + \varepsilon}.$$

E.g. if $\varepsilon = -3$ then the markup is $k/2$,
and if $\varepsilon = -2$ then the markup is k .

The markup rises as the own-price
elasticity of demand rises towards -1.


A Profits Tax Levied on a Monopoly

- ◆ A profits tax levied at rate t reduces profit from $\Pi(y^*)$ to $(1-t)\Pi(y^*)$.
- ◆ Q: How is after-tax profit, $(1-t)\Pi(y^*)$, maximized?



A Profits Tax Levied on a Monopoly

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- ◆ A: By maximizing before-tax profit, $\Pi(y^*)$.



A Profits Tax Levied on a Monopoly

- ◆ A profits tax levied at rate t reduces profit from $\Pi(y^*)$ to $(1-t)\Pi(y^*)$.
- ◆ Q: How is after-tax profit, $(1-t)\Pi(y^*)$, maximized?
- ◆ A: By maximizing before-tax profit, $\Pi(y^*)$.
- ◆ So a profits tax has no effect on the monopolist's choices of output level, output price, or demands for inputs.
- ◆ I.e. the profits tax is a neutral tax.


Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

- ◆ A quantity tax of $\$/\text{output unit}$ raises the marginal cost of production by $\$$.
- ◆ So the tax reduces the profit-maximizing output level, causes the market price to rise, and input demands to fall.
- ◆ The quantity tax is distortionary.



Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist


\$/output unit



$MR(y)$

Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist


\$/output unit



$MR(y)$


Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

\$/output unit



Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

The quantity tax causes a drop in the output level, a rise in the output's price and a decline in demand for inputs.



Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

- ◆ Can a monopolist “pass” all of a \$t quantity tax to the consumers?
- ◆ Suppose the marginal cost of production is constant at \$k/output unit.
- ◆ With no tax, the monopolist’s price is


$$p(y^*) = \frac{k\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon}.$$

Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

- ◆ The tax increases marginal cost to $\$(k+t)$ /output unit, changing the profit-maximizing price to

$$p(y^t) = \frac{(k+t)\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon}.$$

- ◆ The amount of the tax paid by buyers is $p(y^t) - p(y^*)$.



Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

$$p(y^t) - p(y^*) = \frac{(k + t)\epsilon}{1 + \epsilon} - \frac{k\epsilon}{1 + \epsilon} = \frac{t\epsilon}{1 + \epsilon}$$


is the amount of the tax passed on to buyers. E.g. if $\epsilon = -2$, the amount of the tax passed on is $2t$.

Because $\epsilon < -1$, $\epsilon / (1 + \epsilon) > 1$ and so the monopolist passes on to consumers more than the tax!




The Inefficiency of Monopoly

- ◆ **A market is Pareto efficient if it achieves the maximum possible total gains-to-trade.**
- ◆ **Otherwise a market is Pareto inefficient.**



The Inefficiency of Monopoly

\$/output unit




The efficient output level y^e satisfies $p(y) = MC(y)$.




The Inefficiency of Monopoly

\$/output unit




The Inefficiency of Monopoly

\$/output unit



The Inefficiency of Monopoly

\$/output unit




The efficient output level y^e satisfies $p(y) = MC(y)$. Total gains-to-trade is maximized.



The Inefficiency of Monopoly

\$/output unit




$MR(y)$



The Inefficiency of Monopoly



\$/output unit



$MR(y)$


The Inefficiency of Monopoly

\$/output unit



The Inefficiency of Monopoly


\$/output unit



$MR(y)$

The Inefficiency of Monopoly


\$/output unit



$MR(y)$

The Inefficiency of Monopoly

\$/output unit




$MC(y^*+1) < p(y^*+1)$ so both seller and buyer could gain if the (y^*+1) th unit of output was produced. Hence the $MC(y)$ market is Pareto inefficient.

$MR(y)$

The Inefficiency of Monopoly

\$/output unit




Deadweight loss measures the gains-to-trade not achieved by the market.



The Inefficiency of Monopoly

The monopolist produces less than the efficient quantity, making the market price exceed the efficient market price.


\$/output unit



$MR(y)$

Natural Monopoly

- ◆ **A natural monopoly arises when the firm's technology has economies-of-scale large enough for it to supply the whole market at a lower average total production cost than is possible with more than one firm in the market.**



Natural Monopoly


\$/output unit

ATC(y)

p(y)


MC(y)

y
70




Natural Monopoly

\$/output unit




Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly

- ◆ **A natural monopoly deters entry by threatening predatory pricing against an entrant.**
- ◆ **A predatory price is a low price set by the incumbent firm when an entrant appears, causing the entrant's economic profits to be negative and inducing its exit.**




Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly

- ◆ **E.g. suppose an entrant initially captures one-quarter of the market, leaving the incumbent firm the other three-quarters.**



Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly

\$/output unit



Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly

Monopoly

An entrant can undercut the incumbent's price $p(y^*)$ but ...

\$/output unit

$ATC(y)$

$p(y)$, total demand = $D_I + D_E$

$p(y^*)$


p_E

D_E

D_I

$MC(y)$

y



Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly

Monopoly

An entrant can undercut the incumbent's price $p(y^*)$ but

$p(y)$, total demand = $D_I + D_E$

the incumbent can then lower its price as far as p_I , forcing the entrant to exit.

\$/output unit

$ATC(y)$

$p(y^*)$

p_E


p_I

$MC(y)$

D_E


D_I

y




Inefficiency of a Natural Monopolist

- ◆ Like any profit-maximizing monopolist, the natural monopolist causes a deadweight loss.



Inefficiency of a Natural Monopoly


\$/output unit



Inefficiency of a Natural Monopoly

\$/output unit


Profit-max: $MR(y) = MC(y)$
Efficiency: $p = MC(y)$



Inefficiency of a Natural Monopoly


\$/output unit

Profit-max: $MR(y) = MC(y)$
Efficiency: $p = MC(y)$



Regulating a Natural Monopoly


- ◆ **Why not command that a natural monopoly produce the efficient amount of output?**
- ◆ **Then the deadweight loss will be zero, won't it?**



Regulating a Natural Monopoly


\$/output unit

At the efficient output level y^e , $ATC(y^e) > p(y^e)$



Regulating a Natural Monopoly

\$/output unit



Regulating a Natural Monopoly

- ◆ **So a natural monopoly cannot be forced to use marginal cost pricing. Doing so makes the firm exit, destroying both the market and any gains-to-trade.**
- ◆ **Regulatory schemes can induce the natural monopolist to produce the efficient output level without exiting.**

