Online Appendix for "Electoral Confidence, Overconfidence, and Risky Behavior: Evidence From a Study With Elected Politicians"

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This appendix contains supplementary information for "Electoral Confidence, Overconfidence, and Risky Behavior: Evidence From a Study With Elected Politicians". We first provide the instrument used to assess risk-taking and include descriptive statistics on our MP sample's partisan and demographic makeup. We then present results of several robustness checks for the main estimation models reported in the paper. We then present raw (rather than predicted probability) versions for two of the three plots used in the paper. We further include by-country panel plots of the same plots used in the paper, and repeat the original plots with color-coding for MP gain/loss treatment assignment. Lastly, we include a short discussion and an empirical analysis of the added predictive power of in-office subjective evaluations of re-election likelihood over 'objective' electoral safety. We also append the full questionnaire used in this study.

### 1 Instrument

We use the original Asian Disease vignette first introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). On top of the original gain/loss framing manipulation, we introduce a low/high accountability manipulation, resulting in four conditions into which participants were randomly assigned. In the current study we are only interested in the overall rates of risk-seeking, across these experimental conditions.

We describe here the texts of each of the four conditions in the Canadian English version. Translations from this version were made to French, Dutch, and Hebrew, and are available upon request.

#### Condition 1: Gain Frame, High Accountability

Canada is planning for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed and are brought up for vote in the Health Committee, and you are a member of the committee. The exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the program is as follows:

If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.

If program B is adopted, there is a 33% probability that 600 people will be saved, and 66% probability that no people will be saved.

Which of the two programs would you support?

Program A

Program B

#### Condition 2: Loss Frame, High Accountability

Canada is planning for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed and are brought up for vote in the Health Committee, and you are a member of the committee. The exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the program is as follows:

If program A is adopted, 400 people will die.

If program B is adopted, there is a 33% probability that nobody will die, and 66% probability that 600 people will die.

Which of the two programs would you support?

Program A

Program B

### Condition 3: Gain Frame, Low Accountability

Imagine that Germany is planning for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. The exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the program is as follows:

If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.

If program B is adopted, there is a 33% probability that 600 people will be saved, and 66% probability that no people will be saved.

Which of the two programs would you support?

Program A

Program B

#### Condition 4: Loss Frame, Low Accountability

Imagine that Germany is planning for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. The exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the program is as follows:

If program A is adopted, 400 people will die.

If program B is adopted, there is a 33% probability that nobody will die, and 66% probability that 600 people will die.

Which of the two programs would you support?

Program A

Program B

### **1.1 Instrument-Related Results**

For the sake of completion, we report the outcomes of the experimental treatments in the risk-taking module for the 139 MPs in our sample. Table 1 reports both raw frequencies and predicted probabilities, obtained using Clarify (Tomz et al., 2003). For the latter procedure, we estimate a simple logit model of risk-taking, with the treatment variables (gain/loss frame and accountability) as predictors. Using Clarify, we derive the predicted probability and confidence intervals for the overall sample by setting treatment likelihoods for 0.5. To derive the predicted probability for each treatment condition, we set the orthogonal treatment likelihood to 0.5 and the relevant treatment to either 0 or 1, depending on the condition evaluated. In either method the treatment effects are substantively similar, although the predicted probability for overall risk-taking when treatment assignment is fully balanced is higher than when observing the raw distribution, likely owing to small imbalances in treatment assignment in our sample.

	Proportion Risk-Taking Raw Predicted Prob. 95% CI					
Gains Frame Loss Frame	$0.37 \\ 0.79$	$0.37 \\ 0.79$	$[0.27 - 0.48] \\ [0.68 - 0.88]$			
Low Acc. High Acc.	$\begin{array}{c} 0.56 \\ 0.53 \end{array}$	$0.62 \\ 0.58$	$[0.48 - 0.74] \\ [0.44 - 0.71]$			
Overall	0.54	0.60	[0.51 - 0.68]			

Table 1: Risk taking, by treatment assignment.

### 1.2 Correlation Between Treatment Variables and Confidence in Re-Election

To validate that our results are not skewed by treatment assignment, we estimate the effect of gains/loss frame condition and high/low accountability condition on each of our variables of interest. In all cases, treatment assignment is not significantly associated with the outcome. Table 2 reports the full estimation results. We also conduct a robustness check of the models reported in the paper that include the treatment variables. These are reported below in Table 6.

	Dependent Variable:				
	Confidence in Re-Election	Overconfidence	Electoral Safety		
Loss Frame	0.003	0.009	-0.006		
	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.051)		
High Accountability	-0.010	0.071	-0.081		
	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.050)		
Constant	0.739***	0.202***	0.537***		
	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.040)		
Observations	139	139	139		
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.001	0.013	0.019		
F Statistic (df = $2$ ; 136)	0.047	0.884	1.300		
Note:		*p<0.1; **]	p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 2: Estimation Results: Relationship between treatment assignment and three variables of interest. Models reported are standard linear regressions.

## 2 Partisanship Proportionality Descriptives

\_\_\_\_

Parliament	Party	Proportion of Sample (N interviewed)	Proportion in Parliament (N Parliament)
Chamber of Representatives, Belgium			
0	CD&V	$22.3\% \\ 19$	22% $22$
	Groen	7.1%	6%
	LDD	${6 \atop {1.2\%}}$	${6 \atop 1\%}$
	N-VA	$\frac{1}{28.2\%}$	$rac{1}{28\%}$
	Open VLD	$\frac{24}{12.9\%}$	$28 \\ 16\%$
	-	11	16
	sp.a	$17.6\% \\ 15$	$rac{16\%}{16}$
	Vlaams Belang	${10.6\%} \over {9}$	$11\% \\ 11$
	Total	$100\% \\ 85$	$100\% \\ 100$
House of		%	%
Commons, Canada		N	N
Callada	Bloc Quebecois	0% 0	1.3%
	Conservative	32.5%	53.9%
	Green	$\frac{14}{0\%}$	$rac{166}{0.3\%}$
	Liberal	$\begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 16.2\% \end{array}$	$\frac{1}{11\%}$
	NDP	$7 \\ 51.1\%$	$34 \\ 33.4\%$
	Total	$\frac{22}{100\%}$	103 $100%$
	10tai	$\frac{100\%}{43}$	$\frac{100\%}{308}$
The Knesset, Israel		% N	% N
151 401	Balad	2.8%	2.5%
	Hadash	$1 \\ 8.3\%$	$3 \\ 3.3\%$
		3	4

The following table provides a comparison of the by-party proportions in the parliaments we sampled at the time of the study, and in the sample itself.

Hatnua	8.3%	5%
	3	6
Israel Beitenu	2.8%	10.8%
	1	13
Jewish Home	8.3%	10%
	3	12
Kadima	5.6%	1.6%
	2	2
Labor	19.4%	12.5%
	7	15
Likud	11.1%	15%
	4	18
Meretz	11.1%	5%
	4	6
Ra'am-Ta'al	2.8%	3.3%
	1	4
Shas	2.8%	9.2%
	1	11
Yehadut Hatorah	0%	5.8%
	0	7
Yesh Atid	16.7%	15.8%
	6	19
Total	100%	100%
	36	120

## 3 MP Sample Gender and Age Descriptives

	Belgium		Canada		Israel	
	Mean	Range	Mean	Range	Mean	Range
Year of birth Gender (% Female)	$1967 \\ 37.3\%$	[1951 - 1987]	$1961 \\ 29.7\%$	[1943 - 1990]	$1959 \\ 18.5\%$	[1945 - 1978]
Overall	75		37		27	

Table 4: Elected politicians participating in the study, by age and gender.

## 4 Robustness Check: Estimation with Country Interactions

We re-estimate Model 1 by adding an interaction term of confidence in re-election with country fixed effects. For Model 2, we alternately interact overconfidence (2A) and electoral safety (2B) with country fixed effects. We do this using both the election-based electoral safety measure and the polling-based electoral safety measure. In all cases the results remains substantively similar.

# 5 Robustness Check: Estimation with Treatment Effects

We re-estimate Models 1 and 2 by adding the treatment variables used in the Asian Disease experiment - the gain/loss treatment, and the low/high accountability treatment - to which respondents were randomly assigned. We do this using both the election-based electoral safety measure and the polling-based electoral safety measure. In all cases the inclusion of these treatments in the models does not impact our results.

# 6 Robustness Check: Model 2 Estimation with Interaction Term Included

We report a version of Model 2 in which an interaction term between overconfidence and electoral safety is included, to evaluate the potential existence of compound relationship between these two constructs and preference for risk-taking. We do

		Electoral Safe	ty: Election-Based	Electoral Safe	ety: Polling-Based
	Model 1	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 2A	Model 2B
Confidence in Re-Election	$2.321^{*}$ (1.260)				
Overconfidence	(1.200)	$2.719^{**}$	$2.247^{**}$	$2.605^{**}$	2.099**
		(1.328)	(1.072)	(1.311)	(1.057)
Electoral Safety		-1.035	-0.480	-0.792	-0.352
		(0.642)	(0.822)	(0.640)	(0.829)
Canada (FE)	1.703	1.384	0.522	1.449	0.644
	(2.008)	(2.040)	(0.882)	(2.034)	(0.891)
Israel (FE)	0.468	0.173	0.198	0.204	-0.200
	(2.086)	(2.127)	(0.880)	(2.123)	(0.862)
Male	0.205	0.197	0.188	0.184	0.170
	(0.409)	(0.414)	(0.405)	(0.413)	(0.405)
Year of Birth	-0.029	-0.029	-0.028	-0.029	-0.028
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Confidence X Canada (FE)	-2.476	· · ·			· · · ·
	(2.743)				
Confidence X Israel (FE)	-1.106				
	(2.586)				
Overconfidence X Canada (FE)	× ,	-2.078		-2.170	
		(2.785)		(2.776)	
Overonfidence X Israel (FE)		-0.993		-0.991	
		(2.630)		(2.619)	
Electoral Safety X Canada (FE)			-1.191		-1.423
			(1.475)		(1.482)
Electoral Safety X Israel (FE)			-1.787		-0.706
v ()			(1.716)		(1.682)
Intercept	54.794	56.446	54.486	55.776	54.619
-	(36.171)	(36.374)	(36.510)	(36.262)	(36.380)
Observations	139	139	139	139	139
Log Likelihood	-92.062	-90.737	-90.330	-91.289	-91.132

Table 5: Estimation results for a robustness check on country interactions. The dependent variable is the choice type made in the Asian Disease experiment, coded 0 for certain and 1 for risky. FE - fixed effects; base rate is Belgium. Models are logit regressions. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  $* = p \le 0.1$ ,  $** = p \le 0.05$ ,  $*** = p \le 0.01$ .

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 2
		(ES: Election-Based)	(ES: Polling-Based)
Confidence in Re-Election	1.837*		
	(1.083)		
Overconfidence	× ,	$2.324^{**}$	$2.246^{**}$
		(1.131)	(1.128)
		$-1.223^{*}$	-1.058
		(0.709)	(0.707)
Loss Frame	$2.005^{***}$	2.024***	2.040***
	(0.434)	(0.442)	(0.442)
Accountability (High)	-0.233	-0.347	-0.314
	(0.395)	(0.406)	(0.403)
Male	0.449	0.485	0.463
	(0.446)	(0.452)	(0.450)
Year of Birth	-0.012	-0.015	-0.014
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Canada (FE)	-0.390	-0.438	-0.448
	(0.489)	(0.494)	(0.494)
Israel (FE)	-0.102	-0.344	-0.336
	(0.539)	(0.569)	(0.568)
Intercept	21.940	27.051	25.339
	(41.022)	(40.951)	(40.864)
Observations	139	139	139
Log Likelihood	-79.653	-78.120	-78.503
Note:		*p<0.1	; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Estimation results for a robustness check when including Asian Disease treatment variables. The dependent variable is the choice type made in the experiment, coded 0 for certain and 1 for risky. Loss Frame is 0 for the gains treatment, 1 for losses. Accountability is 0 for low accountability, 1 for high. FE - fixed effects; base rate is Belgium. Models are logit regressions. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

this using both the election-based electoral safety measure and the polling-based electoral safety measure. As the results in Table 7 demonstrate, we do not find an interaction effect on the likelihood of risk-seeking, and the original results remain substantively similar, although with reduced significance.

	Model 2	Model 2
	(ES: Election-Based)	Model 2 (ES: Polling-Based)
Overconfidence	2.556	2.392
	(1.985)	(2.005)
Electoral Safety	-0.578	-0.410
	(2.489)	(2.473)
Overconfidence X Electoral Safety	-0.682	-0.590
	(3.286)	(3.291)
Male	0.144	0.124
	(0.403)	(0.401)
Year of Birth	-0.027	-0.027
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Canada (FE)	-0.096	-0.098
	(0.433)	(0.432)
Israel (FE)	-0.563	-0.530
	(0.519)	(0.521)
Intercept	52.579	51.931
	(36.469)	(36.317)
Observations	139	139
Log Likelihood	-91.015	-91.598
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Estimation results: impact of overconfidence and re-election in the subsequent election on the likelihood of risk-taking in the Asian Disease module. FE - fixed effects. Reported models are logit regressions. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

# 7 Robustness Check: Estimation with Objective Electoral Safety as Subsequent Election Performance

We conduct a robustness check of the main Model 2 results in which we substitute our original measure of election-based electoral safety by whether or not the MP was re-elected in the subsequent election. That is, electoral performance / safety is evaluated here not based on recent attainment / polling-based performance, but based on eventual success. We code this re-election variable as 1 if the MP was reelected (including election to similar office - for example, in Belgium some MPs chose to run for the Flemish Parliament or the European Parliament in the subsequent election). We code it 0 if the MP ran again but was not re-elected. MPs who did not run again (e.g. retired or passed away) were coded as missing on this measure, resulting in ten MPs being excluded from the analysis. As can be seen in Table 8, overconfidence is a stronger predictor of risk-taking than re-election, but this relationship does not meet standard levels of statistical significance (p = 0.18). Re-election is not meaningfully correlated with risk-taking, and the relationship is insignificant (p = 0.85).

### 8 Raw Plots

These plots use the raw risk-seeking data, rather than the models' predicted probabilities that are used for the in-paper plots. For these plots we use the election-based electoral safety measure. Results are visually (and substantively) very similar when using the polling-based electoral safety measure.

	Model 2
Overconfidence	1.466
	(1.103)
Re-Election	0.088
	(0.454)
Male	0.162
	(0.413)
Year of Birth	-0.026
	(0.020)
Canada (FE)	0.011
	(0.489)
Israel (FE)	-0.338
	(0.510)
Intercept	49.771
-	(38.494)
Observations	129
Log Likelihood	-85.925
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Estimation results: impact of overconfidence and re-election in the subsequent election on the likelihood of risk-taking in the Asian Disease module. FE - fixed effects. Reported model is a logit regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses.



Fig. 1: Observed risk-seeking by politicians' self-reported re-election rates. Lines are linear predictions



Fig. 2: Observed risk-seeking by politicians' imputed electoral safety. Lines are linear predictions.



Fig. 3: Observed risk-seeking by politicians' imputed overconfidence. Lines are linear predictions.

### 9 Country-Specific Plots

We report by-country versions of the plots reported in the paper. We include plots for both types of electoral safety measures we employ.



Fig. 4: Predicted risk-seeking by politicians' self-reported re-election rates.



Fig. 5: Predicted risk-seeking by politicians' imputed overconfidence. Electoral safety measure used is election-based.



Fig. 6: Predicted risk-seeking by politicians' election-based electoral safety.



Fig. 7: Predicted risk-seeking by politicians' imputed overconfidence. Electoral safety measure used is polling-based.



Fig. 8: Predicted risk-seeking by politicians' polling-based electoral safety.

### 10 Plots with Treatment Assignment Coloring

We present the main plots reported in the paper, with color-coding for Asian Disease treatment assignment.



Fig. 9: Predicted risk-seeking by politicians' self-reported re-election rates. Red: respondents assigned to the gain frame. Turquoise: loss frame.



Fig. 10: Predicted risk-seeking by politicians' imputed overconfidence (left panel), and electoral safety (right panel). Lines are linear predictions. Plots reported are for the election-based electoral safety measure and results. Red: respondents assigned to the gain frame. Turquoise: loss frame.



Fig. 11: Predicted risk-seeking by politicians' imputed overconfidence (left panel), and electoral safety (right panel). Lines are linear predictions. Plots reported are for the polling-based electoral safety measure and results. Red: respondents assigned to the gain frame. Turquoise: loss frame.

## 11 Do Subjective Evaluations Predict Subsequent Electoral Performance?

We conduct two separate tests. First, we estimate two logit models of whether the MPs we interviewed were re-elected in the election subsequent to the time of interview. Second, we estimate two OLS models where the dependent variable is our polling-based adjusted measure of electoral safety at the time of the interviews. In both cases, we examine whether overconfidence and our measure of 'objective' electoral safety predict re-election / polling-based electoral attainment. We also estimate the same models but include country fixed effects.

For re-election, we code the dependent variable as 1 if the MP was re-elected (including election to similar office - for example, in Belgium some MPs chose to run for the Flemish Parliament or the European Parliament in the subsequent election). We code it 0 if the MP ran again but was not re-elected. MPs who did not run again (e.g. retired or passed away) were coded as missing on this measure, resulting in ten MPs being excluded from this analysis. The polling-based measure is scaled to [0,1]. Results are reported in Table 9. As the results show, electoral safety, which is based on performance in the previous election, is a significant positive predictor of re-election in the subsequent election, while overconfidence is not. We observe the same with respect to our polling-based measure of electoral safety - past-election-based safety is a significant predictor, while overconfidence is not.

	Dependent variable:					
	(Model	l: logit)	(Model: OLS)			
	Re-Elected $(1)$ Re-Elected $(2)$		Polling-Based $(1)$	Polling-Based $(2)$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Overconfidence	1.153	1.618	-0.020	-0.004		
	(1.122)	(1.350)	(0.034)	(0.035)		
Electoral Safety	2.316**	$2.874^{**}$	$0.951^{***}$	0.957***		
	(1.175)	(1.358)	(0.037)	(0.037)		
Canada (FE)	· · · · ·	$-2.511^{***}$		-0.013		
. ,		(0.520)		(0.015)		
Israel (FE)		$-1.156^{*}$		$-0.031^{*}$		
× ,		(0.590)		(0.017)		
Intercept	-0.635	0.100	0.034	0.036		
-	(0.830)	(0.950)	(0.026)	(0.026)		
Observations	129	129	139	139		
$\mathbb{R}^2$			0.938	0.940		
Log Likelihood	-78.065	-64.200				
Note:			*p<0.1; *	*p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 9: Estimation results: impact of confidence in re-election and overconfidence on the likelihood of MPs being re-elected in the election that follows the interview. FE - fixed effects. Models are logit regressions. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

## 12 Questionnaire

(Begins next page.)

2013-2014 MP Survey Questionnaire

1) Do you read most of your information on paper (e.g. printed reports, notes) or through digital means (e.g. email, online)? [SLIDER]

Everything on paper – Everything through digital media

2) To what extent do you feel overwhelmed by the information you receive on a daily basis? [SLIDER]

Not overwhelmed – Overwhelmed

3) To what extent do you think that other politicians feel overwhelmed? [SLIDER] Not overwhelmed – Overwhelmed

4) What features of information make you take action (e.g. ask a staff member to follow up on it, write a press release, and so on)? Please indicate for the following features how much they matter to you: [SLIDER: DOESN'T MATTER AT ALL – MATTERS VERY MUCH]

- \_\_\_\_\_ Deals with an issue that I am specialized in (1)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Deals with an issue that my party is specialized in (2)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Deals with something that is important for my voters (3)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Deals with something that is important for my constituency (4)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Can be used to generate negative attention for another party (5)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Can be used to generate positive attention for my party (6)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a lot of potential to gather media attention for me and my party (7)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Can help me realize my policy goals (8)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Can help me realize reelection or a higher position (9)

5) Information can take different forms, and it can deal with different topics. Please use the bars to indicate your preference for each feature: [INDIVIDUAL SLIDERS]

Information that is useful in the short term - Information that is useful in the long term

Information that contains only facts - Information that contains only opinions

Information that is very specialized - Information that is very general

Information about an issue that is already on the agenda – Information about an issue that is not yet on the agenda

6) Please rank the following types of information by order of their importance to your work. Drag the answers to change their ranking. [RANK BY DRAGGING]

- \_\_\_\_\_ Information on political developments and events (1)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Information on new policy issues (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ Information on ongoing policy issues you are interested in (3)

\_\_\_\_\_ Information on your constituency (4)

\_\_\_\_\_ Information related to your responsibilities as a minister (5)

.,	onay ao you oi					
	Multiple times per hour (1)	Once an hour (2)	Multiples times per day (3)	Once per day (4)	Less than once per day (5)	Never (6)
Twitter (1)	О	Ο	0	0	0	0
News websites (2)	О	Ο	O	O	O	O
Email (3)	О	0	0	0	0	Ο
Social media (Facebook, Linked In,) (4)	0	0	0	0	0	О
News agency (5)	О	О	O	О	О	О
Print newspapers (6)	О	О	0	0	О	O
TV news broadcasts (7)	О	0	0	0	0	O
Radio news (8)	О	О	О	О	О	О

7) How frequently do you check the following sources of information?

8) Of the initiatives you personally raised in Parliament or in government last year (e.g. motions for the agenda, bills, written and oral questions), roughly what percentage were inspired by the following: [0 – 100 PERCENT SLIDERS]

\_\_\_\_\_ The media (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ Interest and action groups (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ Within the party (e.g. leadership, research center) (3)

\_\_\_\_\_ Meeting with individual citizens (4)

\_\_\_\_\_ Personal experience (5)

\_\_\_\_\_ Other (6)

9) Of the initiatives you personally raised in caucus in the last year, roughly what percentage were inspired by the following: [0 - 100 PERCENT SLIDERS]

\_\_\_\_\_ The media (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ Interest and action groups (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ Within the party (e.g. leadership, research center) (3)

\_\_\_\_\_ Meeting with individual citizens (4)

\_\_\_\_\_ Personal experience (5)

\_\_\_\_\_ Other (6)

10) Please rank the following tasks according to their importance to you as a politician. Drag the tasks to change their order: [RANK BY DRAGGING]

\_\_\_\_\_ Influencing government policy (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ Providing assistance to individual voters in their dealings with public authorities (2)

\_\_\_\_\_ Looking after the collective social and economic needs of my local area (3)

\_\_\_\_\_ Liaising between members of the parliamentary party and the party leadership and managing Parliament's business (4)

11) Some politicians specialize in one or two policy areas, while others prefer to speak and act upon a wide range of issues from different policy areas. Where would you place yourself on the following scale? [SLIDER:]

I focus on one issue - I focus on a wide range of issues

12) How important is it to you, personally, to promote the views and interests of the following groups of people?

	Very unimportant (1)	unimportant (2)	Important (3)	Very important (4)
All the people who voted for me (1)	0	0	O	О
All the people who voted for my party (2)	0	0	O	О
All the people in my constituency (3)	0	0	0	o
My party (4)	Ο	Ο	Ο	Ο
A specific group in society (5)	0	О	0	o
All people in my region (6)	0	О	0	O
All people in the country (7)	0	0	0	О

13) If you were to decide to stand at the next general election, how confident do you feel that you would be renominated by your party?

- O I would surely win the nomination contest (1)
- I would probably win the nomination contest (2)
- O It could go either way (3)
- O I would probably lose the nomination contest (4)
- O I would surely lose the nomination contest (5)

14) If you were to decide to stand at the next general elections, how confident do you feel that you would be re-elected?

- O I would surely be elected (7)
- I would probably be elected (2)
- O It could go either way (3)
- I would probably not be elected (4)
- I would surely not be elected (5)

15) If it was up to you, where would you like to be five years from now? Tick as many as applies.

- □ A Member of Parliament (1)
- □ A member of a provincial legislature (2)
- □ Senator (3)
- □ A cabinet member in the Federal government (4)
- □ A cabinet member in a provincial government (5)
- □ Mayor (7)
- □ Retired from public life (8)
- □ Working in business (9)
- □ Working for a public agency (10)
- □ Working in the non-profit sector (11)
- **Other (12)**
- □ (Not in use) (13)

16) Politicians need to balance between different goals. What do you think is the right balance a politician should have on the following issues: [SLIDER]

Represent the views of citizens and transform them into policy as accurately as possible -Represent their party platform and gain the public's support for it

Resist the demands of other interests and keep to the party line - Take into account other interests

17) How do you get informed about current affairs? Please tell us the three information sources that are most important to you: [TEXT BOXES]

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

18) Please tell us the three most important issues for you as a politician: [TEXT BOXES]

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

19) How do you get informed about the three top issues you have indicated? Please mark the three channels most important to these issues.

- D Politicians from other parties (1)
- D Politicians from my own party (2)
- □ Mass media (3)
- □ Industry associations (4)
- □ My political party (5)
- □ Social media (6)
- □ Interest groups (7)
- □ Individual citizens (8)
- □ Federal bureaucrats (9)
- □ Scientific institutions (10)
- Personal contacts (11)
- Derliamentary officers, e.g. Library of Parliament, PBO (12)

For the following questions, we'd like to know about how you make decisions and the about the kinds of decisions that you make.

### [RANDOMLY PRESENT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FOUR TREATMENT CONDITIONS]

20a) Canada is planning for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed and are brought up for vote in the Health Committee, and you are a member of the committee. The exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the program is as follows: If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If program B is adopted, there is a 33% probability that 600 people will be saved, and 66% probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs would you support?

• Program A (1)

O Program B (2)

20b) Canada is planning for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed and are brought up for vote in the Health Committee, and you are a member of the committee. The exact

scientific estimate of the consequences of the program is as follows: If program A is adopted, 400 people will die. If program B is adopted, there is a 33% probability that nobody will die, and 66% probability that 600 people will die.

Which of the two programs would you support?

- Program A (1)
- O Program B (2)

20c) Imagine that Germany is planning for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. The exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the program is as follows: If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If program B is adopted, there is a 33% probability that 600 people will be saved, and 66% probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs would you support?

- O Program A (1)
- O Program B (2)

20d) Imagine that Germany is planning for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. The exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the program is as follows: If program A is adopted, 400 people will die. If program B is adopted, there is a 33% probability that nobody will die, and 66% probability that 600 people will die.

Which of the two programs would you support?

- O Program A (1)
- O Program B (2)

Thank you for your participation. Please hand the device back to the interviewer.

#### Interviewer transition text

Thank you for completing the survey. If this is ok for you, we will first start with some general questions on the way you deal with information. Then, we can talk about the questions you indicated for follow-up on the iPad.

Semi-structured Interview Section - Question List

1) The survey included a few questions on your goals and motivations. Can you explain to me what the most satisfying aspect of your job as a politician is?

In the survey a lot of information was devoted to how you get informed about society. In the following part of the interview I would like to ask you some follow-up questions on the importance of information for your work.

2) We already listed some things that may cause you to pay more or less attention to information, but can you explain to me what it is about information that makes it of interest to you?

a. How important is the source of the information?

3) Can you describe the role of the party in your work/what you do/what you pay attention to?

- 4) How many personal staff members do you have?
- 5) Can you describe their role and what they do?

## References

- Tomz, M., J. Wittenberg, and G. King (2003). Clarify: Software for interpreting and presenting statistical results. *Journal of Statistical Software* 8(1), 1–30.
- Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211(4481), 453–458.