

# User authentication and identification

PV018

# Identification vs. Authentication

Determination of a person's identity. (1:N)

Verification of a person's identity claim. (1:1)

“Positive authentication”

Easier than identification.

Hard to achieve

User group size – accuracy!

- Small user groups.
- Low accuracy.
- Exception: iris scan.

## Means of authentication

- something you know (password, PIN)
- something you have (key, smartcard)
- something you are - biometrics
- or combination of the above

## Access to a service

- Access by a person (process) that knows a secret.
- Access by a person possessing a “key”.
- Access by a person with this characteristic.

# Something you know

- + Easy transport
- + Not a physical object
- + Easy & Fast control
- + Easy maintenance
- + (Low cost)
- Easy to copy after discovery
- Can be discovered without user's knowledge
- Limited by human memory
- Can be forgotten

# Something you have

- + Hard to copy
- + Loss easy to discover
- + The object itself can process information
- Need of reader
- User is not recognized without the object
- The object must be complicated so that it is hard to copy
- Can break down, this often not detected easily

# Something you are

+ Is part of a person

+ Cannot be lost

– Accuracy

– Protests/resistance of users

– Hard to measure

– Limited number of object to use 😊

# Combine!

- Multifactor authentication
  - Something you know
  - Something you have
  - Something you are
- ATM/Banking card – card + PIN
- Spoken passphrase – passphrase + speaker recogn.
- Really smart smartcard – card + PIN + fingerprint

# Passwords

- Group passwords common to all users (in a group) of a system
- Passwords unique to individual users
- Non-unique passwords confirming identity
- One-time passwords



# Don't store passwords in clear text!

- Salting technique
  - userID, salt, hash(password, salt)
  - Effective password
    - Longer
    - Not a common word/combination
  - Two users with the same password have different entries in the password database.

# Passwords

## Human memory vs. security

(short easy-to-guess string vs. long complicated string)

- Dictionary attack
  - All combinations of up to 5-8 characters.
  - Common words and user-related values.
  - Usual success rate 20-40%


# Choice of passwords – problems

- Easy to remember for the user and hard to guess for anyone else
- Requested change (password “circulation”)
- Password selection without user input ☹️
- Same password over more systems

# Choice of passwords – suggestions

- Password (choice) quality control!!!
- Special characters, Shift, substitutions (phonetic, mnemonic)
- Use phrases: Early One Morning With Time To Kill (☺ Sting) – EY1ghe2KL
- Enforce your password security policy through some mechanism!!!

# Passwords – replay attack




- One-time password
  - Pre-generated (password list).
  - Time/challenge based (usually with a token).
- Hash function to mask the password
  - Possibly also with a random value

# Banks – card & PIN

- Personal Identification Number
  - Every combination with same probability
  - Not discarding “easy” combinations
  - Not only 4, but up to 8 (6) digits
  - Markus Kuhn – Cambridge (UK) – ref. later
- Distribution of card, PIN
  - Both via different routes (or instances)
  - Personal retrieval (of at least one)
  - PIN of own choice

# PIN verification

- Offline – usually ATMs have the same key  $K$ , the card carries  $x=f(K,PIN)$
- Online:



# Suggested (not required) readings

- M. Kuhn: *Probability Theory for Pickpockets – ec-PIN Guessing*  
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ec-pin-prob.pdf>
- J. Yan et al.: *The memorability and security of passwords – some empirical results*, University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory Technical Report No. 500  
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/TechReports/>



# Token

- The dictionary says...
  - Projev, znamení, upomínka, památka
  - Znamka pravosti
  - *By the token...* Na důkaz toho
  - *Token money...* Mince kryté zlatem

# Tokens

- Keys
- Magnetic cards (3-track strip ~ 250 B)
  - Easy to copy
    - Shifting tracks of limited use
    - Individual characteristics of tracks can be of some use
  - PIN manipulation also easy
- Bank cards – with signature, possibly PIN
  - *Customer Not Present* transactions problematic

# Smartcards

- Smartcard vs. Chipcard
- Can store (some even work with) a crypto key
- Cash-loading (anonymous vs. loss-recoverable)
- GSM – authentication key; PIN-PUK
- Implementation in bank cards
  - Compatibility – users, retailers(!) (VISA – 2007)
  - Potentially can be used with biometrics

# Authentication calculators

- Challenge-response based
  - Response =  $f(\textit{secret key}, \textit{challenge})$
- Time-based (SecurID)
  - Server takes care of time-frame shifts
- Transfer – manual vs. automatic
- PIN – standard and emergency

# Biometrics


- PIN/password either matches (at 100%) or not
- **Verification** (of identity) - 1:1 match)
- Biometrics rarely match at 100% (often taken as a fake/attack).
- **Identification** - 1:N search for the best match
- Threshold-based decision introduces the rates of false acceptance and rejection

# Biometrics - how to evaluate

- Do you have it?
  - Finger, iris, palm, face...
- Can you do it?
  - Sign
  - Read a sentence
  - Type on keyboard
  - Move your face

Devices:

- readers/verifiers
- acceptance threshold:
  - False Acceptance Rate
  - False Rejection Rate



# Biometrics – major issues

- Biometrics are very sensitive
- Biometrics are not secrets
- Copying: neither trivial nor hard
- New attack countermeasures are followed by newer attacks

# Related topics – to be discussed later

- Biometrics – to be continued...
- Authentication of data/messages – protocols
  
- Course PV157 “Authentication and Access Control”



Questions?

Reminder:

Term project topic agreed by March 9!