Security in communications and networks

PV018

Vašek Matyáš

Typical Security Requirements

- Authentication: originator's identity assured.
- **Integrity**: information received as originated.
- **Confidentiality**: information available only to authorized parties.
- Availability: data & resources available when needed.
- Non-repudiation: party cannot deny communication (origin, receipt, delivery, etc.).
- Access Control: resources controlled by authorized parties.

Major security enablers – critical (infrastructure) applications

• Kerberos

 Public-key crypto based – certificates, typically X.509 – SSH, SSL/TLS

• Shared-key crypto based – symmetric key ciphers, hash functions

Kerberos

• Greek mythology – guardian to the entrance of Hades (master of the Underground)

• MIT project Athena – MIT's UNIX-based campuswide academic computing facility









Kerberos – threat model

- Users reading messages of other users
- Users replaying messages of other users
- Users altering a workstation network address
- Users impersonating themselves

Kerberos – approach

- Centralised authentication server authenticating both users and machines
- Using symmetric-key techniques, no public-key techniques

Kerberos

- Trusted third-party authentication service
- Key Distribution Center (KDC) grants authentication tokens ("tickets") to users

- Trusted, dedicated machine

- Applications can use Kerberos for:
 - Data authentication
 - Data integrity
 - Data confidentiality

Kerberos – simple authentication

- $C \rightarrow AS$: $ID_C || P_C || ID_V$
- $AS \rightarrow C$: Ticket
- $C \rightarrow V$: $ID_C \parallel Ticket$

 $Ticket = E_{Kv}(ID_C || P_C || ID_V)$

Kerberos Tickets

- Ticket-Granting-Ticket
 - Used to obtain further tickets
 - Requires password or additional authentication from user
 - Lifetime in hours
- Service Tickets
 - Issued to user from KDC
 - User can not decrypt ticket
 - User passes ticket to authenticate to server

Kerberos used for applications

- telnet, rlogin, rcp, FTP, etc.
- Use Kerberos Protocol to exchange authentication information
- Client application uses Ticket-Granting-Ticket to obtain service tickets from KDC
- May use session key to encrypt data checksums (data integrity) or encrypt data (data confidentiality)

Kerberos Tickets (Credentials)

- Partly encrypted data structures
 - client ID
 - server ID
 - timestamp
 - session key
 - encrypted part (session key, client info, timestamp)
- Passed the way KDC \rightarrow client \rightarrow server
- Encrypted with the key of intended recipient

Kerberos – important terms

- C = Client
- AS = authentication server
- V = server
- ID_c = identifier of user on C
- ID_V = identifier of V
- $P_C =$ password of user on C
- $-AD_{C} =$ network address of C
- $K_V =$ secret encryption key shared by AS an V
- TS = timestamp
- $\parallel = concatenation$

Kerberos – time vs. replay issue

- The threat: an opponent steals a ticket and uses it before its expiry time
- Lifetime of the ticket-granting ticket
 Too short ⇒ frequent ticket requests
 - Too long \Rightarrow greater risk of replay attack

Tickets

- Ticket-Granting Ticket get once per logon
- Service-Granting Ticket get then once before first use of a service (usually in a given logon session)

• Authenticated Service Request – once per (service) session

Kerberos(v4) Authentication Process

Authentication Service Exhange – To obtain the Ticket-Granting Ticket

- 1) $C \rightarrow AS$: $ID_{C} \parallel ID_{TGS} \parallel TS_{1}$
- 2) AS \rightarrow C: $E_{Kc}(K_{C,TGS} \parallel ID_{TGS} \parallel TS_2 \parallel Lifetime_2 \parallel Ticket_{TGS})$

Ticket-Granting Service Echange – To obtain the Service-Granting Ticket

- 3) $C \rightarrow TGS$: $ID_V \parallel Ticket_{TGS} \parallel Authenticator_C$
- 4) TGS \rightarrow C: $E_{K_{C}}(K_{C,V} \parallel ID_{V} \parallel TS_{4} \parallel Ticket_{V})$

Client/Server Authentication Exhange: To Obtain Service

- 5) $C \rightarrow V$: 6) $V \rightarrow C$: Ticket_v || Authenticator_C
- $E_{Kc.v}(TS_5 + 1)$

Kerberos today

- Currently two broadly used versions:
- 4 restricted to a single realm (domain)
- 5 allows inter-realm authentication
- Kerberos v5 is an Internet standard (RFC1510)
- MSFT implementation (since Windows 2000)

Key distribution (with indirect authentication)


• Direct distribution $\underline{A} \xrightarrow{E_{KAB}(K_S,...)} B$


• Key distribution center (also generates the key – following slide)

• Key transport center

TTP - C $E_{KAC}(K_S)$ $E_{KBC}(K_S)$ B

Indirect authentication – key distribution topologies.





X.509 based authentication

- X.509 specifies the format for public-key certificates.
- The certificate contains the public key of a user and is signed with the private key of a Certification Authority (CA).
- Distributed environment using a database with certificate (user) information.
- Used in S/MIME, IP Security, SSL/TLS, SET.

What is SSL/TLS?

Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer Security

- Protocols providing security and reliability
- Protecting communication of two applications
- Running over standard protocols like TCP
- SSL developed by Netscape, supported also by Microsoft...
- TLS IETF standard (sometimes called SSL v3.1)
- Transparent for higher-level protocols like HTTP
- Using PKI and X.509 certificates


What security SSL/TLS provide?

Three basic security services:


- Entity authentication the entities are authenticated using server and client certificates.
- Integrity message authentication code (MAC) which ensures the data received is same as the data sent.
- **Confidentiality** after the initial "handshake", a symmetric key is defined and used to encrypt all subsequent communication (even checked passwords, etc.).

Concepts of SSL/TLS

- Record Protocol
 - -The basic layer of the protocol.
 - -Works over TCP/IP (or other transport protocol).
 - -Allows for encapsulation of different higher level protocols (HTTP, FTP, telnet, etc.) which run unmodified.
- Handshake Protocol
 - -Allows the server and client to authenticate each other.
 - -By default, server authentication is mandatory, client authentication optional.
 - -Authentication through presentation of <u>digital certificates</u>.
 - And verification of the ability to use the related private key!



SSL/TLS Change Cipher Protocol



... more detail

- Establish Session
 - Send random challenge value, accept public key.
 - Verify signed challenge.
 - Deliver session key protected by recipient's public key.
- Communicate Protected Data
 - Encrypt data using agreed cipher and the session key.
 - Produce hash regularly to protect integrity.
 - Data packed into sequenced records.
- (Change Cipher optional)
- Finish Session
- http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt

Typical network attacks

- Holes in software (sendmail, RPC, NFS, or the firewall itself ☺)
- Network snooping search for gold
- IP/DNS spoofing masquerade
- Holes in new (higher-level) protocols

Intrusion Detection Systems

- Intrusion activity aimed at disrupting or circumventing a service within an organization's system
- Also penetration, breach (, attack)
- Social engineering ③
- Technical methods

IDS Principles

- Anomaly detection
 - Unusual pattern (as compared to typical user/system behavior).
 - False positives!

- Misuse detection
 - Pattern of intrusion(like) behavior
 - False negatives!

Combine these two approaches!

IDS Topologies

Network-based

- Checking network traffic
- Use raw network packets.
- Typically a network adapter running in promiscuous - monitoring and analyzing all traffic.
- Responses like admin notification, connection termination, session recording (for forensic analysis), other detailed evidence collection.

Host-based

- Checking machines (log files, etc.).
- Started in 80s log file review.
- Typically monitor system, event, and security logs on WinNT and syslog on Unix.
- Also critical file checksum control, response time, port activities.
- Responses analogous...

Combine these two approaches!

Email Security

• Postcard-like service

- PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)
- S/MIME (Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension)
- (X.400)

IPSEC

- Authentication Header (AH), RFC-1826
 Authenticity & integrity
- Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC-1827
 - Confidentiality (non-repudiation of origin)
 - Tunneling mode (encapsulation incl. headers)
 - Transport mode (data encapsulation)
- Security Associations (SA)

IPSEC – Security Associations

- Set of security features for a given session between two or more systems.
- Identifiable by Security Parameter Index (SPI) and the IP address.
- SPI depends on its Domain of Interpretation (DOI), this defines format, type of key-exchange, naming conventions, etc. One system can support more DOIs.

Parameters of Security Associations

- For AH key authentication alg.
- For ESP encryption alg., crypto synchronization, initiation vector.
- Both for AH and ESP level of security, key lifetime, support of certificates, etc.

Firewalls

- Protect against attacks from the outside (across the firewall)
- Attacks against internal data
- Denial-of-service attacks
- Communication options:
 - 1. Allow
 - 2. Deny
 - 3. Translate (Proxy)

Basic options – firewalls

TCP/UDPAllow/DenyPacket filtering(routers)

TCP A/D/Translate Circuit-gateway (*trust inside*)

HTTP, FTP... A/D/T

Applic.-gateway

Secure SHell

- SSH
- http://www.ssh.com/
- Non-commercial downloads

- WinSCP
- http://winscp.sou
 rceforge.net/eng/
- WinSCP

Closely related topics – to be discussed later.

- Firewalls and network security
 - Guest lecture next week Josef Pojsl,
 Technical Director, Trusted Network Solutions

Recommended reading (assignment #1)

• Paper "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication System"

ftp://athena-dist.mit.edu/pub/kerberos/doc/krb_evol.PS

 Limitations of Kerberos 4, and changes made in Kerberos 5.

Questions?

Reminder:

Term project presentations May 3 & 10! 6 slots each date – mail to follow soon...