


Mobile Security Threats

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Wandera – How It Works



- Threats Detection
- Compliance
- Data Cost Management

Sensitive Information

- API keys
- Session IDs
- Encryption keys
- Authentication tokens
- Passwords
- Credit card numbers
- Personal Identifiable Information (PII)
- Location
- ...

Taxonomy of Mobile Threats

- OWASP – Open Web Application Security Project (Mobile Security Project)
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project
- Zimperium
(Modern Mobile Threat Landscape - Network and Host)
<https://www.zimperium.com/download-whitepaper>
- Wandera
<https://www.wandera.com/mobile-threat-vectors-explained/>
- Avast
- Appthority
- McAfee
- ...

M1 – Improper Platform Usage

- Misuse of a security tool that is part of the operating system
- Examples
 - (iOS) Use local storage instead of Keychain to store security significant data
- Advices
 - Invest your time to study API and frameworks
 - Do not assume anything (e.g., certain functionality)

M1 – Improper Platform Usage

- Resources
 - [Introduction to Secure Coding Style \(Apple\)](#)
 - [Security Overview \(Apple\)](#)
 - [Tutorial: Understanding Android's Security Framework \(Android\)](#)
 - [Windows UWP Security](#)

M2 – Insecure Data Storage

- Insecure data storage and unintended data leakage (SQL databases, log files, binary data stores, cookie stores, cloud synced, ...)
- Examples
 - Application storage
 - Copy&paste buffer caching
 - URL caching
- Advices
 - Be aware of caches
 - Track where your data are stored

M2 – Insecure Data Storage

Name	File Type	Size	Date Modified
Spotify			
Documents			7/7/11 1:02 PM
Library			5/6/12 8:19 AM
Application Support			6/11/12 1:36 PM
Caches			6/2/12 1:45 PM
com.plausiblelabs.crashreport...			6/2/12 1:45 PM
com.spotify.client			6/9/12 11:29 AM
com.testflight.testflightsdk			5/6/12 8:19 AM
crashes			6/2/12 1:45 PM
Snapshots			6/11/12 1:36 PM
VolatileCache			6/7/12 5:27 PM
Cookies			1/27/12 7:57 PM
Cookies.binarycookies	BINARYCOOKIES	1 kB	1/27/12 7:57 PM
Mail			7/29/11 6:26 PM
Preferences			6/11/12 1:56 PM
com.apple.dataaccess.launchd	LAUNCHD		7/29/11 6:24 PM
com.apple.PeoplePicker.plist	PLIST	68 B	6/2/12 9:51 AM
com.spotify.client.plist	PLIST	2 kB	6/11/12 1:56 PM
WebKit			
Spotify.app			
tmp			
iTunesArtwork		35 kB	
iTunesMetadata.plist	PLIST	1 kB	

iExplorer

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

```
<key>launchCount</key>  
<integer>92</integer>  
<key>password</key>  
<string>4e6e1e6144431fcde96a0657729d66b5b1f48df9</string>  
<key>proVersion</key>  
<true/>  
<key>ratePopupShown</key>  
<true/>  
<key>username</key>
```


M3 – Insecure Communication

- Moving data from A to B insecurely (TCP/IP, TLS, WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC, GSM, 3G, SMS, ...)
- Examples
 - Use of non-secured channels
 - Lack of certificate inspection (SSL, TLS)
 - Weak handshake negotiation
- Advices
 - Transport sensitive data securely – always!
 - Track where data goes and how

M3 – Insecure Communication

CARDCRYPT

FAILURE TO ENCRYPT TRANSACTION DATA

INSIGHT INTO EXPOSED CREDIT CARD DATA

LOCATION: SINGAPORE
DATE: 29TH OCT 2015
TICKETS PURCHASED: CIRQUE DU SOLEIL
AMOUNT: 2x TICKETS SINGAPORE \$344

SITE/APP: SISTIC APP
SMARTPHONE: COMPANY ANDROID
IMPACT: CANCELING CARDS TO BE SURE OF NO IDENTITY THEFT

“It’s not just my card number and code and expiry that was exposed, but also my name and address so who knows who could be stealing my identity now. It’s extremely troubling that in this day and age, companies taking credit card information are not properly securing the data.”

- SINGAPORE RESIDENT CARD HOLDER

Other companies:
Trobe Jr
Dash Card Services
Get Howired
Tribeca Med Spa

* UPDATE: WE ARE PLEASED TO SAY WE HAVE LEARNED THAT EASYJET, CHILTERN RAILWAYS, SAN DIEGO ZOO, CN TOWER, AIR CANADA, AER LINGUS AND SISTIC HAVE NOW CONFIRMED THERE IS NO ONGOING ISSUE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST OTHERS IN TRYING TO SWIFTLY RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

M3 – Insecure Communication

- CardCrypt regex:

```
^(?:4[0-9]{12}(?:[0-9]{3})?      # Visa
| 5[1-5][0-9]{14}                # MasterCard
| 3[47][0-9]{13}                 # American Express
| 3(?:0[0-5] | [68][0-9])[0-9]{11} # Diners Club
| 6(?:011 | 5[0-9]{2})[0-9]{12}  # Discover
| (?:2131 | 1800 | 35\d{3})\d{11} # JCB)$
```


- URL:

```
http://services.XXXXXXX.com/mci/start;jsessionid=0000MGP0s4IfmahBnFIOEXYnYa_:acsaywg00
017mciprd1f2Cloneld?_flowExecutionKey=_c560FB507-C2B0-26A9-08EB-
7482E4BD0734_kA0E60EBA-A1C8-37BF-F699-E947E4BF171D
```


- POST message:

```
_flowExecutionKey#_c560FB507-C2B0-26A9-08EB-7482E4BD0734_kA0E60EBA-A1C8-37BF-F699-
E947E4BF171D#creditCard.type#AX#creditCard.form_of_payment#3790XXXXXXXXXXXX#credit
Card.expiry.month#07#creditCard.expiry.year#2019#creditCard.nameOnCard#Melissa#XXXXX
XX#_eventId_continue#Continue
```

M3 – Insecure Communication



M3 – Insecure Communication



M4 – Insecure Authentication

- Weaknesses in session management, user identification, device enrollment, ...
- Examples
 - Trivially Guessed Identifiers
 - Private Data Used As Identity
 - Anonymous Service Endpoints
 - Client only logout
- Advices
 - Bother who is on the other side
 - Implement session timeouts

M5 – Insufficient Cryptography

- Cryptography was attempted but it wasn't done correctly :-)
- Examples
 - Small or poor keys (predictable randomness)
 - Easily forged integrity checks
 - Wrong type of crypto (symmetric when asymmetric is more appropriate)
- Advices
 -

An empirical study of cryptographic misuse in android applications

M6 – Insecure Authorization

- Any failures in authorization
- Examples
 - Authentication instead of authorization
 - Client-based authorization decisions
 - Forced browsing
- Advices
 - Always check permissions

M7 – Client Code Quality

- Code-level implementation problems in the mobile client (language dependent)
- Examples
 - Buffer overflow in C
 - Format string vulnerability
 - ...
- Advices
 - Keep high code quality (reviews, testing, static analysis)

M8 – Code Tampering

- Modifications to the application package (code or resources)
- Examples
 - Malware payloads
 - Short-circuited in-application purchase
 - Steal credentials or data
- Advices
 - Package/code region checksum
 - Complicate static analysis (misleading code)
 - Complicate dynamic analysis (detect jailbroken/rooted device)

M9 – Reverse Engineering

- Analysis of the app to determine its source code, libraries, algorithms, and other assets
- Examples
 - (Android) apk is an archive containing assets and classes.dex
Dex to Jar converter + Java decompiler ;-)
- Advices
 - Avoid security through obscurity
 - Obfuscate your code
 - Place important logic on the server side if possible

M10 – Extraneous Functionality

- Extra security security controls that are not intended to be released
- Examples
 - Plaintext password in comments or assets
 - Disabled (two-factor) authentication from testing process
 - Existing (hidden) backdoor functionality
- Advices
 - Avoid security through obscurity
 - Set up process to avoid human errors

Wrap up

- Security is a complex task
- Understand what you are doing
- Employ best practices and available tools
- Set up processes to minimize possibility of human errors
- Design security with respect to possible attack