P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\titulka.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\titulka.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\titulka.jpg
PV204 Security technologies
Programming JavaCard platform
Petr Švenda        svenda@fi.muni.cz        @rngsec
Centre for Research on Cryptography and Security, Masaryk University
Please comment on slides with anything unclear, incorrect or suggestions for improvement
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1plqP8-e4Qq2OVzNdZoZWeeE4LvHXHscw/view?usp=sharing

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Overview
•JavaCard programming platform
•Skeleton of JavaCard applet
•GlobalPlatform – managing applications on smartcard
•How to upload and communicate with
•Best practices – security and performance
•Supplementary materials
–Simple signature applet
–Simple symmetric cryptography applet
•
•
2
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
3
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
http://www.eurosmart.com/facts-figures.html
Telco
Payment

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Old vs. multi-application smart cards
•One program only
•Stored persistently in ROM or EEPROM
•Written in machine code
–Chip specific
•
•Multiple applications at the same time
•Stored in EEPROM
•Written in higher-level language
–Interpreted from bytecode
–Portable
•Application can be later managed (remotely)
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
4

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
laptop
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
Libraries
PKCS#11, OpenSC, JMRTD
Smartcard control language API
C/C# WinSCard.h, Java java.smartcardio.*, Python pyscard
System smartcard interface: Windows’s PC/SC, Linux’s PC/SC-lite
Manage readers and cards, Transmit ISO7816-4’s APDU
Custom app with
direct control
PC application via library:
browser TLS, PDF sign…
PC application
with direct control:
GnuPG, GPShell
API: EMV, GSM, PIV, OpenPGP, ICAO 9303 (BAC/EAC/SAC)
OpenPlatform, ISO7816-4 cmds, custom APDU
SC app programming:
JavaCard, MultOS, .NET
Readers
Contact: ISO7816-2,3 (T=0/1)
Contactless: ISO 14443 (T=CL)
Card application 3
Card application 2
Card application 1
5
Our focus today

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
apdu
APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit)
•APDU is basic logical communication datagram
–header (5 bytes) and up to ~256 bytes of user data
•Format specified in ISO7816-4
•Header/Data format
–CLA – instruction class
–INS – instruction number
–P1, P2 – optional data
–Lc – length of incoming data
–Data – user data
–Le – length of the expected output data
•Some values of CLA/INS/P1/P2 standardized
•Custom values used by application developer
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
6

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
What values of APDU header are used?
•Standardized values for selected application
–Improves interoperability
–https://web.archive.org/web/20180721010834/http://techmeonline.com/most-used-smart-card-commands-a
pdu/
•Custom commands for proprietary application
–Your own API
7
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard basics
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
8
226px-Wave

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard
•Maintained by Java Card Forum (since 1997)
•Cross-platform and cross-vendor applet interoperability
•Freely available specifications and development kits
–http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javacard/index.html
•JavaCard applet is Java-like application
–uploaded to a smart card
–executed by the JCVM
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
JCArchitecture D:\Documents\Obrázky\SmartCard\firts_javacard_1997.jpg
9

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
blank_card server
User Application
PC/SC library
Applet1
Applet2
JCVM
JavaCard applets
•Written in restricted Java syntax
–byte/short (int) only, missing most of Java objects
•Compiled using standard Java compiler
•Converted using JavaCard converter
–check bytecode for restrictions
–can be signed, encrypted…
•Uploaded and installed into smartcard
–executed in JC Virtual Machine (JCVM)
•Communication using APDU commands
–small packets with header
–
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
10

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard versions
•JavaCard 2.1.x/2.2.x (2001-2003)
–widely supported versions
–basic symmetric and asymmetric cryptography algorithms
–PIN, hash functions, random number generation
–transactions, utility functions
•JavaCard 2.2.2 (2006)
–last version from 2.x series
–significantly extended support for algorithms and new concepts
•long “extended” APDUs, BigNumber support, biometrics
•external memory usage, fast array manipulation methods…
•JavaCard 3.x (2009)
–classic and connected editions, later
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
11

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
12
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard 2.x not supporting
•No dynamic class loading
•No Security manager
•No Threads and synchronization
•No Object cloning, finalization
•No Large primitive data types
–float, double, long and char
–usually not even int (4 bytes) data type by default
•specialized package javacardx.framework.util.intx for support
•Most of std. classes missing
–most of java.lang, Object and Throwable in limited form
•Limited garbage collection
–Newer cards supports, but slow and not always unreliable
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
13

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard 2.x supports
•Standard benefits of the Java language
–data encapsulation, safe memory management, packages, etc.
•Applet isolation based on the JavaCard firewall
–applets cannot directly communicate with each other
–special interface (Shareable) for cross applets interaction
•Atomic operations using transaction mode
•Transient data (buffer placed in RAM)
–fast and automatically cleared
•A rich cryptography API
–accelerated by cryptographic co-processor
•Secure (remote) communication with the terminal
–if GlobalPlatform compliant (secure messaging, security domains)
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
14

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard 3.0.x (most recent 3.0.5 from 2015)
•Major release of JavaCard specification
–significant changes in development logic
–two separate branches – Classic and Connected edition
•JavaCard 3.x Classic Edition
–legacy version, extended JC 2.x
–APDU-oriented communication
•JavaCard 3.x Connected Edition
–smart card perceived as web server (Servlet API)
–TCP/IP network capability, HTTP(s), TLS
–supports Java 6 language features (generics, annotations…)
–move towards more powerful target devices
–focused on different segment then classic smart cards
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
15
Connected edition is not used so far (potentially dead?)

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard 3.1 (2018)
•Focus on IoT
•Not much experience yet (no devices)
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
16

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Version support
•Need to know supported version for your card
–convertor adds version identification of packages used to binary cap file
–If converted with unsupported version, upload to card fails
•Supported version can be (somewhat) obtained from card
–JCSystem.getVersion() ® [Major.Minor]
–https://github.com/petrs/jcAIDScan
–See https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/jcsupport.html
•Available cards supports mostly 2.x specification or 3.x (newer cards)
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
17

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard applet firewall – runtime checks
•
18
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
blank_card
Inspired by http://ekladata.com/IHWNXUB-yernblD2sdiK1zxxQco/5_javacard.pdf
SmartCard hardware
JavaCard runtime environment (JCRE)
JCRE = JCVM + API
APDU
•Access to other applet’s methods and attributes prevented
–Even if public
•Applets can access specific JCRE objects
•JCRE can access all applets (no restriction)
•Static attributes of package accessible by all its applets!
Cap file 1
Static data
Cap file 2

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
DEVELOPING JAVACARD APPS
•
19
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Group activity: complex development
•Write down all steps that take place during development
–Write code, compile, CI…
•Separate groups: Development, Testing, Delivery, Support
–Pre-printed structure
•(7 minutes)
•Collect areas into mind-mapping software
•Add and discuss relevant tools/steps from JavaCard world
•(10 minutes)
•
1.
•
•
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
20

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Desktop vs. smart card
•Following slides will be marked with icon based on where it is executed
•
•       Process executed on host (PC/NTB…)
•
•       Process executed inside smart card
21
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
package example;
import javacard.framework.*;
public class HelloWorld extends Applet {
    protected HelloWorld()  {
       register();
    }
    public static void install(byte[] bArray, short bOffset, byte bLength) {
        new HelloWorld();
    }
    public boolean select() {
        return true;
    }
    public void process(APDU apdu) {
        // get the APDU buffer
        byte[] apduBuffer = apdu.getBuffer();
        // ignore the applet select command dispached to the process
        if (selectingApplet()) return;
        // APDU instruction parser
        if (apduBuffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_CLA] == CLA_MYCLASS) &&
            apduBuffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_INS] == INS_MYINS)) {
            MyMethod(apdu);
        }
        else ISOException.throwIt( ISO7816.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
    }
    public void MyMethod(APDU apdu) { /* ... */ }
}
include packages from javacard.*
extends Applet
Called only once, do all allocations&init HERE
Called repeatedly on application select, do all temporaries preparation HERE
Called repeatedly for every incoming APDU, parse and call your code HERE
22

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JC development process
•
23
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
server blank_card
6. Write user Java app
(javax.smartcardio.*)
1.Extends
javacard.framework.Applet
2. Compile Java®*.class
(Java 1.3 binary format)
3. Convert *.class®*.jar/cap
(JavaCard Convertor)
4. Upload *.jar/cap
® smart card (GPPro/GPShell)
5. Install applet
(GPPro/GPShell)
7. Use applet on
smart card (APDU)

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard application running model
1.Uploaded package – application binary
2.Installed applet from package – running application
3.Applet is “running” until deleted from card
4.Applet is suspended when power is lost
–Transient data inside RAM are erased
–Persistent data inside EEPROM remain
–Currently executed method is interrupted
5.When power is resumed
–Unfinished transactions are rolled back
–Applet continues to run with the same persistent state
–Applet waits for new command (does not continue with interrupted method)
6.Applet is deleted by service command
24
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
On-card, off-card code verification
•Off-card verification
–Basic JavaCard constraints
–Possibly additional checks (e.g., type consistency when using Shareable interface)
–Full-blown static analysis possible
–Applet can be digitally signed
•On-card verification
–Limited resources available
–Proprietary checks by JC platform implementation
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
25
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
GLOBALPLATFORM
•Managing applets on card
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
26

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
GlobalPlatform
•Specification of API for card administration
–Upload/install/delete applications
–Card lifecycle management
–Card security management
–Security mechanisms and protocols
•Newest is GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.3
–December 2015
–Previous versions also frequently used
–http://www.globalplatform.org/specificationscard.asp
–
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
27

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
blank_card
GlobalPlatform – main terms
•Smart card life cycle
–OP_READY, INITIALIZED (prepared for personalization)
–SECURED (issued to user, use phase)
–CARD_LOCKED (temporarily locked (attack), unlock to SECURED)
–TERMINATED (logically destroyed)
•Card Manager (CM)
–Special card component responsible for administration and card system service functions (cannot be
removed)
•Security Domain (SD)
–Logically separated area on card with own access control
–Enforced by different authentication keys
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
Security
Domain 1
Security
Domain 2
Card Manager
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Key-icon.png D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Key-icon.png
28

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
blank_card
Security
Domain 1
Applet 2
Security
Domain 2
Applet 1
Applet 3
Card Manager
GlobalPlatform – main terms
•Card Content (apps,data) Management
–Content verification, loading, installation, removal
•Security Management
–Security Domain locking, Application locking
–Card locking, Card termination
–Application privilege usage, Security Domain privileges
–Tracing and event logging
•Command Dispatch
–Application selection
–(Optional) Logical channel management
–
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
29

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Smart card life cycles
•The smart card passes various logical life cycle states between manufacture and final destruction
•Life cycle states define which operations can be performed with the card
•The card Life Cycle States OP_READY and INITIALIZED are intended for use during the Pre-Issuance
phases of the card’s life.
•The states SECURED, CARD_LOCKED and TERMINATED are intended for use during the Post-Issuance phase
of the card although it is possible to terminate the card at any point during its life.
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
30

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Smart card life cycles
•OP_READY – card is ready for uploading of key diversification data, any application and issuer
specific structures.
•INITIALIZED – card is fully prepared but not yet issued to card holder.
•SECURED – card is issued to card holder. Card management is possible only through Security domain
(installation of signed applets etc.).
•CARD_LOCKED – card is locked due to some security policy and no data management can be performed.
Card can be locked by Security domain and later unlocked as well (switch back to SECURED state).
•TERMINATED – card is logically “destroyed“ due to card expiration or detection of the severe
security thread.
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
31

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Global Platform APDU commands
•DELETE – delete uniquely identifiable object (e.g. JavaCard applet)
•STORE_DATA – upload content of single data object
•GET_DATA - used to retrieve a single data object
•SET_STATUS – set Life Cycle status
•GET_STATUS – return Life Cycle status
•INSTALL – initiate installation, typically (JavaCard) applet
•LOAD – upload file from PC to smart card, e.g. JavaCard cap file
•PUT_KEY – update value of specified key
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
32

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Card Production Life Cycle (CPLC)
•Manufacturing metadata
•Dates (OS, chip)
•Circuit serial number
•(not mandatory)
•GlobalPlatform APDU
–80 CA 9F 7F 00
–gppro --info
•ISO7816 APDU
–00 CA 9F 7F 00
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
33

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Example CPLC results from several G&D cards
A picture containing indoor, table, group, white Description automatically generated
34
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
OpenPlatform Package/applet upload
A.Security domain selection
B.Secure channel establishment – security domain
C.Package (cap file) upload
–Local upload in trusted environment
–Remote upload with relayed secure channel
D.Applet installation
–Separate instance from package binary with unique AID
–Applet privileges and other parameters passed
–Applet specific installation data passed
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
35
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
DEVELOPING SIMPLE APPLET
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
36

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JavaCard – My first applet
•Desktop Java vs. JavaCard
–PHP vs. C J
•No modern programming features
–No threads, no generics, no iterators…
•Limited type system
–Usually no ints (short int and byte only), no floats, no Strings
•Fun with signed 16-bits values
–JavaCard is usually 16-bit platform (short)
–(short) typecast must be performed on intermediate results
–Shorts are signed => to obtain unsigned byte
•Convert to short with & 0x00ff
•
–
–
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
37

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Necessary tools
•Several tool chains available
–both commercial (RADIII, JCOPTools, G&D JCS Suite)
–and free (Sun JC SDK, AppletPlayground…)
•We will use:
–Java Standard Edition Development Kit 1.3 or later
–ant-javacard ant task for building JC applets
•Apache Ant 1.7 or later, JavaCard Development Kit 2.2.2
–NetBeans 6.8 or later as IDE
–GlobalPlatformPro for applets management
–
–
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
38
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
package example;
import javacard.framework.*;
public class HelloWorld extends Applet {
    protected HelloWorld()  {
       register();
    }
    public static void install(byte[] bArray, short bOffset, byte bLength) {
        new HelloWorld();
    }
    public boolean select() {
        return true;
    }
    public void process(APDU apdu) {
        // get the APDU buffer
        byte[] apduBuffer = apdu.getBuffer();
        // ignore the applet select command dispached to the process
        if (selectingApplet()) return;
        // APDU instruction parser
        if (apduBuffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_CLA] == CLA_MYCLASS) &&
            apduBuffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_INS] == INS_MYINS)) {
            MyMethod(apdu);
        }
        else ISOException.throwIt( ISO7816.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
    }
    public void MyMethod(APDU apdu) { /* ... */ }
}
include packages from javacard.*
extends Applet
Called only once, do all allocations&init HERE
Called repeatedly on application select, do all temporaries preparation HERE
Called repeatedly for every incoming APDU, parse and call your code HERE
39

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Simple JavaCard applet - code
1.Subclass javacard.framework.Applet
2.Allocate all necessary resources in constructor
3.Select suitable CLA and INS for your method
4.Parse incoming APDU in Applet.process() method
5.Call your method when your CLA and INS are set
6.Get incoming data from APDU object (getBuffer(), setIncomingAndReceive())
7.Use/modify data
8.Send response (setOutgoingAndSend())
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
40

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
select() method
•Method called when applet is set as active
–for subsequent APDU commands
–begin of the session
–use for session data init (clear keys, reset state…)
•
•
•
•deselect()
–similar, but when applet usage finish
–may not be called (sudden power drop) => clear in select
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
 public void select() { // CLEAR ALL SESSION DATA
        chv1.reset(); // Reset OwnerPIN verification status
        remainingDataLength = 0; // Set states etc.
        // If card is not blocked, return true.
        // If false is returned, applet is not selectable
       if (!blocked) return true;
       else return false;
    }
41

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Sending and receiving data
•javacard.framework.APDU
–incoming and outgoing data in APDU object
•Obtaining just apdu header
–APDU.getBuffer()
•Receive data from terminal
–APDU.setIncomingAndReceive()
•Send outgoing data
–APDU.setOutgoingAndSend()
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
42

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Sending and receiving data – source code
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
private void ReceiveSendData(APDU apdu) {
     byte[]    apdubuf = apdu.getBuffer();     // Get just APDU header (5 bytes)
     short     dataLen = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); // Get all incoming data
     // DO SOMETHING WITH INPUT DATA
     // STARTING FROM apdubuf[ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA]
     // ...
     // FILL SOMETHING TO OUTPUT (apdubuf again)
     Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(apdubuf, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, 10, (byte) 1);
     // SEND OUTGOING BUFFER
     apdu.setOutgoingAndSend(ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, 10);
 }
43

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
COMMUNICATION WITH SMART CARD
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
44

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
JavaCard communication lifecycle
1.(Applet is already installed, APPLET_AID)
2.PC: Reset card (plug smart card in, software reset)
3.PC: Send SELECT command (00 a4 04 00 APPLET_AID)
lreceived by Card Manager application
lSC: sets our applet active, select() method is always called
4.PC: Send any APDU command (any of your choice)
lSC: received by process() method
5.SC: Process incoming data on card, prepare outgoing data
lencryption,  signature…
6.PC: Receive any outgoing data
ladditional special readout APDU might be required
7.PC: Repeat again from step 4
8.PC: (Send DESELECT command)
lSC: deselect() method might be called
45
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Java javax.smartcardio.* API
•List readers available in system
–TerminalFactory.terminals()
–identified by index CardTerminal.get(index)
–readable string (Gemplus GemPC Card Reader 0)
•Connect to target card
–Check for card (CardTerminal.isCardPresent())
–connect to Card (CardTerminal.connect("*"))
–get channel (Card.getBasicChannel())
–reset card and get ATR (Card.getATR())
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
46
Already used in labs last week – SimpleAPDU project
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Java javax.smartcardio.* API (2)
•Select applet on card
–send APDU with header 00 a4 04 00 LC APPLET_AID
•Send APDU to invoke method
–prepare APDU buffer (byte array)
–create CommandAPDU from byte array
–send CommandAPDU via CardChannel.transmit()
–check for response data (getSW1() == 0x61)
–read available response data by 00 C0 00 00 SW2
•Process response
–status should be ResponseAPDU.getSW() == 0x9000
–returned data ResponseAPDU.getData()
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
47
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Response APDU (R-APDU)
•Response data + status word (2 bytes)
–0x9000 - SW_NO_ERROR, OK
–0x61** -  SW_BYTES_REMAINING_**
–see javacard.framework.ISO7816 interface
–other status possible (GlobalPlatform, user defined)
•May require special command to read out
–first response is just status word (0x61**)
–00 C0 00 00 ** or C0 C0 00 00 ** APDU
•** is number of bytes to read out
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
48
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
DEBUGGING APPLET
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
49

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
•
50
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
1. Debugging applets: simulator
•The smartcard is designed to protect application
–Debugger cannot be connected to running application
•Option 1: use card simulator (jcardsim.org)
–Simulation of JavaCard 2.2.2 (based on BouncyCastle)
–Very helpful, allows for direct debugging (labs)
–Catch of logical flaws etc.
–Allows to write automated unit and integration tests!
•Problem: Real limitations of cards are missing
–supported algorithms, memory, execution speed…
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
51
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
2. Debugging applets: real cards
•Option 2: use real cards
–Cannot directly connect debugger, no logging strings…
•Debugging based on error messages
–Use multiple custom errors rather than ISO7816 errors
–Distinct errors tell you where problem (might) happened
•Problem: operation may end with unspecific 0x6f00
–Any uncaught exception on card (other than ISOException)
–Solution1: Capture on card, translate to ISOException
–Solution2: Locate problematic command by insertion of ISOException.throwIt(0x666); and recompile
52
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Possible causes for exception on card
•Writing behind allocated array
•Using Key that was Key.clear() before
•Insufficient memory to complete operation
•Cipher.init() with uninitialized Key
•Import of RSA key into real card generated by software outside card (e.g., getP() len == 64 vs.
65B for RSA1024)
•Storing reference of APDU object localAPDU = origAPDU;
•Decryption of value stored in byte[] array with raw RSA with most significant bit == 1 (set first
byte of array to 0xff to verify)
•Set CRT RSA key using invalid values for given part - e.g. setDP1()
•Too many nested calls, no free space on stack for arguments
•… and many more J
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
53

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Getting more than 0x6f00
54
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
    public void process(javacard.framework.APDU apdu) {
        // ignore the applet select command dispatched to the process
        if (selectingApplet()) return;
        try {
            //
           // … Standard APDU command dispatching...
           //
        } catch (ISOException e) {
            throw e; // Our exception from code, just re-emit
        } catch (ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt(SW_ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException);
        } catch (ArithmeticException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt(SW_ArithmeticException);
        } catch (ArrayStoreException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt(SW_ArrayStoreException);
        } catch (NullPointerException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt(SW_NullPointerException);
        } catch (NegativeArraySizeException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt(SW_NegativeArraySizeException);
        } catch (CryptoException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt((short) (SW_CryptoException_prefix | e.getReason()));
        } catch (SystemException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt((short) (SW_SystemException_prefix | e.getReason()));
        } catch (PINException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt((short) (SW_PINException_prefix | e.getReason()));
        } catch (TransactionException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt((short) (SW_TransactionException_prefix | e.getReason()));
        } catch (CardRuntimeException e) {
            ISOException.throwIt((short) (SW_CardRuntimeException_prefix | e.getReason()));
        } catch (Exception e) {
            ISOException.throwIt(Consts.SW_Exception);
        }
    }
final short SW_Exception     = (short) 0xff01;
final short SW_ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException = (short) 0xff02;
final short SW_ArithmeticException     = (short) 0xff03;
final short SW_ArrayStoreException     = (short) 0xff04;
final short SW_NullPointerException     = (short) 0xff05;
final short SW_NegativeArraySizeException     = (short) 0xff06;
final short SW_CryptoException_prefix     = (short) 0xf100;
final short SW_SystemException_prefix     = (short) 0xf200;
final short SW_PINException_prefix     = (short) 0xf300;
final short SW_TransactionException_prefix     = (short) 0xf400;
final short SW_CardRuntimeException_prefix     = (short) 0xf500;
Some exceptions provide additional information (code). Propagate it further
Our exception, just re-emit

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Debugging using custom commands
•Addition of custom commands to “dump” interesting parts of data
–Intermediate values of internal arrays, unwrapped keys…
•Should obey to Secure by default principle
–Debugging possibility should be enabled only on intention
–E.g., specific flag in installation data which cannot be enabled later (by an attacker)
–Don’t let debugging code into release!
•
55
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
BEST PRACTICES (FOR APPLET DEVELOPERS)
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
56

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Quiz
1.Expect that your device is leaking in time/power channel. Which option will you use?
–AES from hw coprocessor or software re-implementation?
–Short-term sensitive data stored in EEPROM or RAM?
–Persistent sensitive data in EEPROM or encrypted object?
–Conditional jumps on sensitive value?
2.Expect that attacker can successfully induct faults (random change of bit(s) in device memory).
–Suggest defensive options for applet’s source code
–Change in RAM, EEPROM, instruction pointer, CPU flags…
–
57
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Security hints (1)
•Use API algorithms/modes rather than your own
–API algorithms fast and protected in cryptographic hardware
–general-purpose processor leaks more information (side-channels)
•Store session data in RAM
–faster and more secure against power analysis
–EEPROM has limited number of rewrites (105 - 106 writes)
•Never store keys, PINs or sensitive data in primitive arrays
–use specialized objects like OwnerPIN and Key
–better protected against power, fault and memory read-out attacks
–If not possible, generate random key in Key object, encrypt large data with this key and store
only encrypted data
•Make checksum on stored sensitive data (=> detect fault)
–
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
58

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Security hints (2)
•Erase unused keys and sensitive arrays
–use specialized method if exists (Key.clearKey())
–or overwrite with random data (Random.generate())
–Perform always before start of new session
•Use transactions to ensure atomic operations
–power supply can be interrupted inside code execution
–be aware of attacks by interrupted transactions - rollback attack
•Do not use conditional jumps with sensitive data
–branching after condition is recognizable with power analysis => timing/power leakage
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
59

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Security hints (3)
•Allocate all necessary resources in constructor
–applet installation usually in trusted environment
–prevent attacks based on limiting available resources
•Don’t use static attributes (except constants)
–Static attribute is shared between multiple instances of applet (bypass applet firewall)
–Static ptr to array/engine filled by dynamic allocation cannot be removed until package is removed
from card (memory “leak”)
•Use automata-based programming model
–well defined states (e.g., user PIN verified)
–well defined transitions and allowed method calls
–
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
60

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Security hints (4)
•Treat exceptions properly
–Do not let uncaught native exceptions to propagate from the card
–Do not let your code to cause basic exceptions like OutOfBoundsException or NullPointerExceptions…
•
–
61
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Security hints: fault induction (1)
•Cryptographic algorithms are sensitive to fault induction
–Single signature with fault from RSA-CRT may leak the private key
–Perform operation twice and compare results
–Perform reverse operation and compare (e.g., verify after sign)
•Use constants with large hamming distance
–Induced fault in variable will likely cause unknown value
–Use 0xA5 and 0x5A instead of 0 and 1 (correspondingly for more)
–Don’t use values 0x00 and 0xff (easier to force all bits to 0 or 1)
•Check that all sub-functions were executed [Fault.Flow]
–Fault may force program stack or stack to skip some code
–Idea: Add defined value to flow counter inside target sub-function, check later for expected sum.
Add also in branches.
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
62
Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel Attacks, Riscure

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Security hints: fault induction (2)
•Replace single condition check by complementary check
–conditionalValue is sensitive value
–Do not use boolean values for sensitive decisions
•
–
–
•
•
•Verify number of actually performed loop iterations
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
63
Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel Attacks, Riscure
if (conditionalValue == 0x3CA5965A) { // enter critical path
  // . . .
  if (~conditionalValue != 0xC35A69A5) {
    faultDetect(); // fail if complement not equal to 0xC35A69A5
  }
  // . . .
}
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) { // important loop that must be completed
//. . .
}
if (i != n) { // loop not completed
  faultDetect();
}

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Security hints: fault induction (3)
•Insert random delays around sensitive operations
–Randomization makes targeted faults more difficult
–for loop with random number of iterations (for every run)
•Monitor and respond to detected induced faults
–If fault is detected (using previous methods), increase fault counter.
–Erase keys / lock card after reaching some threshold (~10)
•Natural causes may occasionally cause fault => > 1
•
64
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel Attacks, Riscure

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
How and when to apply protections
65
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
Riscure
•

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Execution speed hints (1)
•Big difference between RAM and EEPROM memory
–new allocates in EEPROM (persistent, but slow)
•do not use EEPROM for temporary data
•do not use for sensitive data (keys)
–JCSystem.getTransientByteArray() for RAM buffer
–local variables automatically in RAM
•Use algorithms from JavaCard API and utility methods
–much faster, cryptographic co-processor
•Allocate all necessary resources in constructor
–executed during installation (only once)
–either you get everything you want or not install at all
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
66

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Execution speed hints (2)
•Garbage collection limited or not available
–do not use new except in constructor
•Use copy-free style of methods
–foo(byte[] buffer, short start_offset, short length)
•Do not use recursion or frequent function calls
–slow, function context overhead
•Do not use OO design extensively (slow)
•Keep Cipher or Signature objects initialized
–if possible (e.g., fixed master key for subsequent derivation)
–initialization with key takes non-trivial time
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
67

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
JavaCard applet firewall issues
•Main defense for separation of multiple applets
•Platform implementations differ
–Usually due to the unclear and complex specification
•If problem exists then is out of developer’s control
•Firewall Tester project (W. Mostowski)
–Open and free, the goal is to test the platform
–http://www.sos.cs.ru.nl/applications/smartcards/firewalltester/
–
short[] array1, array2; // persistent variables
short[] localArray = null; // local array
JCSystem.beginTransaction();
array1 = new short[1];
array2 = localArray = array1; // dangling reference!
JCSystem.abortTransaction();
68

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Relevant open-source projects
•Easy building of applets
–https://github.com/martinpaljak/ant-javacard
–https://github.com/ph4r05/javacard-gradle-template
•AppletPlayground (ready to “fiddle” with applets)
–https://github.com/martinpaljak/AppletPlayground
•Card simulator https://jcardsim.org
•Profiling performance
–https://github.com/crocs-muni/JCAlgTest
–https://github.com/OpenCryptoProject/JCProfiler
•Curated list of JavaCard applets
–https://github.com/EnigmaBridge/javacard-curated-list
•Low-level ECPoint library
–https://github.com/OpenCryptoProject/JCMathLib
69
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Mandatory reading
•Mandatory
–Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel Attacks, Riscure
•IS, Riscure_Whitepaper_Side_Channel_Patterns.pdf
•Optional
–Gemalto JavaCard developers guide
•IS, Gemalto_JavaCard_DevelGuide.pdf
–Java Card lecture, Erik Poll, Radboud Uni
•http://ekladata.com/IHWNXUB-yernblD2sdiK1zxxQco/5_javacard.pdf
•
70
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Summary
•Smart cards are programmable (JavaCard)
–reasonable cryptographic API
–coprocessor for fast cryptographic operations
–multiple applications coexist securely on single card
–Secure execution environment
•Standard Java 6 API for communication exists
•PKI applet can be developed with free tools
–PIN protection, on-card key generation, signature…
•JavaCard is not full Java – optimizations, security
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
71

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
•
72
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
73

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
QUICK AND DIRTY START
•
74
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Quick and dirty start – OpenPGP applet
1.Get JavaCard smart card and reader
2.Install Java SDK and ant build environment
–Don’t forget to set proper paths (javac, ant)
3.Download AppletPlayground project
–https://github.com/martinpaljak/AppletPlayground
4.Download GlobalPlatformPro uploader
–https://github.com/martinpaljak/GlobalPlatformPro
75
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
1. Compile and convert applets
•> ant toys
–‘toys’ is ant build target inside build.xml
–Compiles source with Java compiler (javac)
–Convert with javacard convertor
•(use > ant simpleapplet to build only our applet)
76
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
2. Manage applets on smart card
•GlobalPlatformPro tool
–Authenticates against CardManager
–Establish secure channel with CM
–Manage applets (list/upload/delete)
•
77
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
Auto-detected ISD AID: A000000003000000
Host challenge: BD525E5585006202
Card challenge: 05211C9591C58232
Card reports SCP02 with version 255 keys
Master keys:
Version 0
ENC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
MAC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
KEK: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
Sequence counter: 0521
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
•
78
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
>gp -list –verbose
Reader: Gemplus USB SmartCard Reader 0
ATR: 3BF81300008131FE454A434F5076323431B7
More information about your card:
    http://smartcard-atr.appspot.com/parse?ATR=3BF81300008131FE454A434F507632343
1B7
Auto-detected ISD AID: A000000003000000
Host challenge: 10FFA96848D9EB62
Card challenge: 0520E372F35B4818
Card reports SCP02 with version 255 keys
Master keys:
Version 0
ENC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
MAC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
KEK: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
Sequnce counter: 0520
Derived session keys:
Version 0
ENC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:654E72AAADA31F0A7B5567160DE4C5A7
MAC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:C6883A00AB6E56384B845A5A6F68CA6C
KEK: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:3875213C9F2123EB01AA420DC83C18F0
Verified card cryptogram: 62CBE443B3F4FB80
Calculated host cryptogram: 9AAC671F9B1E0630
AID: A000000003000000 (|........|)
     ISD OP_READY: Security Domain, Card lock, Card terminate, Default selected, CVM (PIN)
management
AID: A0000000035350 (|.....SP|)
     ExM LOADED: (none)
     A000000003535041 (|.....SPA|)
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
3. Upload applet to smart card
•(already converted applet *.cap is assumed)
•> gp --instal OpenPGPApplet.cap –verbose
•
•
•
•
•
•
•Hint: test with gpg --card-edit
79
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
CAP file (v2.1) generated on Sat Oct 03 15:13:58 CEST 2015
By Sun Microsystems Inc. converter 1.3 with JDK 1.8.0_60 (Oracle Corporation)
Package: openpgpcard v0.0 with AID D27600012401
Applet: OpenPGPApplet with AID D2760001240102000000000000010000
Import: A0000000620101 v1.3
Import: A0000000620201 v1.3
Import: A0000000620102 v1.3
Import: A0000000620001 v1.0
Cap loaded
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
OpenPlatform Package/applet upload
A.Security domain selection
B.Secure channel establishment – security domain
C.Package upload
–Local upload in trusted environment
–Remote upload with relayed secure channel
D.Applet installation
–Separate instance from package binary with unique AID
–Applet privileges and other parameters passed
–Applet specific installation data passed
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
80
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
4. Communicate with smart card
•> gp --apdu  apdu_in_hex --debug
•Example for SimpleApplet.java
–gp –-apdu B0541000 -d (generate random numbers)
–
–
–
–
–
–
81
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
>gp --apdu B0541000 -d
[*] Gemplus USB SmartCard Reader 0
SCardConnect("Gemplus USB SmartCard Reader 0", T=*) -> T=1, 3BF81300008131FE454A
434F5076323431B7
SCardBeginTransaction("Gemplus USB SmartCard Reader 0")
A>> T=1 (4+0000) B0541000
A<< (0016+2) (32ms) 801D52307393AC0AB1CC242F6905B7C5 9000
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
5. Delete applet
•> gp --delete D27600012401 --deletedeps
•
•(Verify that applet was deleted by gp –list)
82
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
server

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
DEVELOPING SIMPLE PKI APPLET
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
83

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
PKI-relevant JavaCard API
•Access controlled by PIN
–javacard.security.OwnerPIN
•Asymmetric cryptography keys
–javacard.security.KeyPair, PublicKey, PrivateKey
•Digital signatures
–javacard.security.Signature
•Asymmetric encryption
–javacard.security.Cipher
•
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
84

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
PIN verification functionality
•javacard.framework.OwnerPIN
•Management functions (available for “admin”)
–Create PIN (new OwnerPIN())
–Set initial PIN value (OwnerPIN.update())
–Unblock PIN (OwnerPIN. resetAndUnblock())
•Common usage functions (available to user)
–Verify supplied PIN (OwnerPIN.check())
–Check if was verified (OwnerPIN.isValidated())
–Get remaining tries (OwnerPIN.getTriesRemaining())
–Set new value (OwnerPIN.update())
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
85

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
PIN code
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
// CREATE PIN OBJECT (try limit == 5, max. PIN length == 4)
OwnerPIN m_pin = new OwnerPIN((byte) 5, (byte) 4);
// SET CORRECT PIN VALUE
m_pin.update(INIT_PIN, (short) 0, (byte) INIT_PIN.length);
// VERIFY CORRECTNESS OF SUPPLIED PIN
boolean correct = m_pin.check(array_with_pin, (short) 0, (byte) array_with_pin.length);
// GET REMAING PIN TRIES
byte j = m_pin.getTriesRemaining();
// RESET PIN RETRY COUNTER AND UNBLOCK IF BLOCKED
m_pin.resetAndUnblock();
86

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Digital signature
•Management functions
–Generate new key pair (KeyPair().genKeyPair())
–Export public key (KeyPair().getPublic())
–(export private key) (KeyPair().getPrivate())
–create Signature object (Signature.getInstance())
–init with public/private key (Signature.init())
•Common usage functions
–sign message (Signature.update(), Signature.sign())
–verify signature (Signature.update(),verify())
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
87

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
On-card asymmetric key generation
•javacard.security.KeyPair
•Key pair is generated directly on smart card
–very good entropy source (TRNG)
–private key never leaves the card (unless you allow in code)
–fast sign/verify operation
•But who is sending data to sign/decrypt?
–protect signature method by PIN.isValidated() check
–use secure channel to prevent injection of attacker’s message
–terminal still must be trustworthy
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
88

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Key generation - source code
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
// CREATE RSA KEYS AND PAIR
m_keyPair = new KeyPair(KeyPair.ALG_RSA_CRT, KeyBuilder.LENGTH_RSA_1024);
// STARTS ON-CARD KEY GENERATION PROCESS
m_keyPair.genKeyPair();
// OBTAIN REFERENCES TO PRIVATE AND PUBLIC KEY OBJECT
m_publicKey = m_keyPair.getPublic();
m_privateKey = m_keyPair.getPrivate();
Example shows RSA 1024b – not recommended
Use KeyBuilder.LENGTH_RSA_2048 instead
(But 2 APDUs are required to transmit signature back)
89

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Public (private) key export/import
•Obtain algorithm-specific key object from KeyPair
–e.g., RSAPublicKey pubKey = keyPair.getPublic();
–get exponent and modulus
•getExponent() & getModulus() methods
–send it back to terminal via APDU
•Similar situation with key import
–setExponent() & setModulus() methods
•Private key export
–It is up to you if your code will allow private key export (usually not)
–Otherwise similar as for RSAPublicKey
–more parameters with RSAPrivateCrtKey (CRT mode)
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
90

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
javacard.security.Signature
•Both symmetric and asymmetric crypto signatures
–RSA_SHA_PKCS1 (always), ECDSA_SHA, DSA (less common)
–DES_MAC8_NOPAD (always), ISO9797 (common), AES (common)
–check in advance what your card supports (JCAlgTester)
•Message hashing done on card (asymmetric sign)
–message received in single or multiple APDUs
–Signature.update(), Signature.sign()
•If you need just sign of message hash
–use Cipher object to perform asymmetric crypto operation
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
91

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Signature – source code
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
// CREATE SIGNATURE OBJECT
Signature m_sign = Signature.getInstance(Signature.ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, false);
// INIT WITH PRIVATE KEY
m_sign.init(m_privateKey, Signature.MODE_SIGN);
// SIGN INCOMING BUFFER
signLen = m_sign.sign(apdubuf, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, (byte) dataLen,
                                     m_ramArray, (byte) 0);
92

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Asymmetric encryption
•javacardx.crypto.Cipher
•Usage similar to Signature object
–generate key pair
–export/import public key
–initialize Key and set mode (MODE_ENCRYPT/DECRYPT)
–process incoming data (Cipher.update(), doFinal())
•Supported algorithms
–RSA_NOPAD (always), RSA_PKCS1 (almost always)
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
93

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
DEMO - SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY APPLET
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
94

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Random numbers
•javacard.security.RandomData
•Two versions of random generator
–ALG_SECURE_RANDOM (truly random)
–ALG_PSEUDO_RANDOM (deterministic from seed)
•Generate random block
–RandomData.generateData()
•Very fast and high quality output
–bottleneck is usually card-to-terminal link
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
95

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
RandomData – source code
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
private RandomData     m_rngRandom = null;
// CREATE RNG OBJECT
m_rngRandom = RandomData.getInstance(RandomData.ALG_SECURE_RANDOM);
// GENERATE RANDOM BLOCK WITH 16 BYTES
m_rngRandom.generateData(array, (short) 0, ARRAY_ONE_BLOCK_16B);
96

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Key generation and initialization
•Allocation and initialization of the key object (KeyBuilder.buildKey())
•Receive (or generate random) key value
•Set key value (AESKey.setKey())
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
// …. INICIALIZATION SOMEWHERE (IN CONSTRUCT)
// CREATE AES KEY OBJECT
AESKey m_desKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder.buildKey(KeyBuilder.TYPE_AES,
    KeyBuilder.LENGTH_AES_256, false);
// Generate random data to be used as key
m_rngRandom.generateData(array, (short) 0,
    (short) KeyBuilder. KeyBuilder.LENGTH_AES_256/8);
// SET KEY VALUE
m_aesKey.setKey(array, (short) 0);
97

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Symmetric cryptography encryption
•javacard.security.Cipher
•Allocate and initialize cipher object
–Cipher.getInstance(), Cipher.init()
•Encrypt or decrypt data
–Cipher.update(), Cipher.doFinal()
•
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
98

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Encryption with 3DES – source code
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
// INIT CIPHER WITH KEY FOR ENCRYPT DIRECTION
m_encryptCipher.init(m_desKey, Cipher.MODE_ENCRYPT);
//….
// ENCRYPT INCOMING BUFFER
void Encrypt(APDU apdu) {
      byte[]    apdubuf = apdu.getBuffer();
      short     dataLen = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive();
      // CHECK EXPECTED LENGTH (MULTIPLY OF 64 bites)
      if ((dataLen % 8) != 0) ISOException.throwIt(SW_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH_BAD);
      // ENCRYPT INCOMING BUFFER
      m_encryptCipher.doFinal(apdubuf, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, dataLen, m_ramArray, (short) 0);
      // COPY ENCRYPTED DATA INTO OUTGOING BUFFER
      Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(m_ramArray, (short) 0, apdubuf, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, dataLen);
      // SEND OUTGOING BUFFER
      apdu.setOutgoingAndSend(ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, dataLen);
}
99

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Message authentication code (MAC)
•javacard.security.Signature
•Usage similar to asymmetric signatures
•Create signature object for target MAC algorithm
•Initialize with symmetric cryptography key
•Supported algorithms
–DES_MAC8 (always), AES_MAC8 (increasingly common)
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
100

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
MAC – source code
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•Example based on 3DES, can be AES as well
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
private   Signature      m_sessionCBCMAC = null;
private   DESKey         m_session3DesKey = null;
// CREATE SIGNATURE OBJECT
m_sessionCBCMAC = Signature.getInstance(Signature.ALG_DES_MAC8_NOPAD, false);
// CREATE KEY USED IN MAC
m_session3DesKey = (DESKey) KeyBuilder.buildKey(KeyBuilder.TYPE_DES, KeyBuilder.LENGTH_DES3_3KEY,
false);
// INITIALIZE SIGNATURE DES KEY
m_session3DesKey.setKey(m_ram, (short) 0);
// SET KEY INTO SIGNATURE OBJECT
m_sessionCBCMAC.init(m_session3DesKey, Signature.MODE_SIGN);
// GENERATE SIGNATURE OF buff ARRAY, STORE INTO m_ram ARRAY
m_sessionCBCMAC.sign(buff, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, length, m_ram, (short) 0);
101

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Data hashing
•javacard.security.MessageDigest
•Create hashing object for target algorithm
–MessageDigest.getInstance()
•Reset internal state of hash object
–MessageDigest.reset()
•Process all parts of data
–MessageDigest.update()
•Compute final hash digest
–MessageDigest.doFinal()
•Supported algorithms
–MD5, SHA-1 (always), SHA-256 (increasingly common)
–related to supported Signature algorithms
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
102

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Data hashing – source code
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
// CREATE SHA-1 OBJECT
MessageDigest m_sha1 = MessageDigest.getInstance(
   MessageDigest.ALG_SHA, false);
// RESET HASH ENGINE
m_sha1.reset();
// PROCESS ALL PARTS OF DATA
while (next_part_to_hash_available) {
 m_sha1.update(array_to_hash, (short) 0, (short) array_to_hash.length);
}
// FINALIZE HASH VALUE (WHEN LAST PART OF DATA IS AVAILABLE)
// AND OBTAIN RESULTING HASH VALUE
m_sha1.doFinal(array_to_hash, (short) 0, (short) array_to_hash.length,
   out_hash_array, (short) 0);
103

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
GPPro – M. Paljak
•gp.exe -install applet.cap -verbose
•Reader: OMNIKEY AG Smart Card Reader USB 0
•ATR: 3BF81800008031FE450073C8401300900092
•More information about your card:
•http://smartcard-atr.appspot.com/parse?ATR=3BF81800008031FE450073C8401300900092
•
•Auto-detected ISD AID: A000000003000000
•Host challenge: 764D6A0982DC5E17
•Card challenge: 0005112D5C02E152
•Card reports SCP02 with version 1 keys
•Master keys:
•Version 0
•ENC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
•MAC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
•KEK: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
•Diversififed master keys:
•Version 0
•ENC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:8D16CDB90D9A1BCB9C3B208FB491DFF6
•MAC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:D3A3DD0DB2C1F84F79E3BC0EF4B0A78E
•KEK: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:F80C3E807D4C57293B651693ED999448
•Sequnce counter: 0005
•Derived session keys:
•Version 0
•ENC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:6BCC8856C64D5A6090A603C5FFBA7F4F
•MAC: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:3BDCE52AE932EFF43E506C498BAC9F21
•KEK: Ver:0 ID:0 Type:DES3 Len:16 Value:FFC30797EFA7EC37A28E4485052EA21D
•Verified card cryptogram: 37C4139407A2F0DD
•Calculated host cryptogram: A9376B4721194AFA
•CAP file (v2.1) generated on Tue Aug 04 14:34:51 CEST 2015
•By Sun Microsystems Inc. converter 1.3 with JDK 1.8.0_31 (Oracle Corporation)
•Package: AlgTest v1.0 with AID 6D797061636B616731
•Applet: JCAlgTestApplet with AID 6D7970616330303031
•Import: A0000000620001 v1.0
•Import: A0000000620102 v1.2
•Import: A0000000620101 v1.2
•CAP loaded
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
104

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
GPShell script – another tool for upload
•
# Install & configure script for Gemalto TOP IM GX4, mother key
mode_201
gemXpressoPro
enable_trace
establish_context
card_connect
select -AID A000000018434D00
open_sc -security 3 -keyind 0 -keyver 0 -key 47454d5850524553534f53414d504c45
delete -AID ${jc.applet.AID_GPShell}
delete -AID ${jc.package.AID_GPShell}
install -file ${jc.package.shortName}.cap -sdAID A000000018434D00
    -nvCodeLimit 4000 -priv 0
# test selection
select -AID ${jc.applet.AID_GPShell}
card_disconnect
release_context
Connect to reader and card
Select Card Manager application
Authenticate and establish secure channel (OpenPlatform)
Delete previous version of our applet (instance first, package second)
Upload and install file *.cap with applet
Try to select newly installed applet
105

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
DEMO: OPENPGP APPLET
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
106

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
OpenPGP
•Standard for PGP/GPG compliant applications
•Includes specification for card with private key(s)
–openpgp-card-1.0.pdf
•Supported (to some extend) in GnuPG
•Pre-personalized OpenPGP cards available
–http://www.g10code.de/p-card.html
•Open source Java Card applet available
–JOpenPGPCard
–http://sourceforge.net/projects/jopenpgpcard/
–our card can be used
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
107

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
JOpenPGPCard applet
•Main parts
–two level of PIN protection
–on-card keys generation, public key export
–on-card encryption/signature
•Compilation and upload
–Project settings (preconfigured)
–AID (given in OpenPGP specification)
–GPShell script
•Compile and upload applet to card
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
108

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Compilation and upload
•gpg --card-edit
•Command> admin
•Command> help
•Command> generate
–follow the instructions (default PINs)
–signature, decryption and authentication key
–private keys generated directly on the card
–public keys exported to GPG keyring
•Change your PIN by Command> passwd
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
109

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
GPG --card-edit
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
No keys generated yet
110

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
GPG – keys generation finished
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
111

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
What we have…
•Card with OpenPGP-compliant applet
•GPG generated private&public keypairs
–sign, enc, auth
•Public keys exported from card and imported to local keyring
•Can be used to sign, encrypt message on command line
•Can be further integrated into applications
–Thunderbird + Enigmail + GPG
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
112

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
(gpg –card-edit) Command> list
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
113

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Using GPG with smart card
•gpg --clearsign --output myfile.sig --sign myfile
–our public key is already imported to keyring
–PIN is required to sign (notice signature count so far)
–--clearsign causes output in BASE64
•gpg --verify myfile.sig
–smart card not required, public key in keyring
•gpg --output gpshell.log.gpg --recipient petr@svenda.com --encrypt gpshell.log
–smart card not required, public key in keyring
•gpg --decrypt gpshell.log.gpg
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
114

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
MORE DETAILS ABOUT JAVACARD
•
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
115

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
JavaCard – more to be discovered
•Recursion is slooow...
•Memory allocation issues
–EEPROM vs. RAM allocations, new operator
–No (real-time) garbage collector!
•Persistent objects
•Transactions, atomic operations
•JavaCard applet firewall
•
function f(…) {
    byte a[] = new byte[10];
    byte b[] = JCSystem.makeTransientByteArray(...);
    byte c;
}
116

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
GPShell upload&install
•Upload and install converted *.cap file
–GPShell tool with script specific for target card
–GP SCP channel version (mode_201, mode_211)
–select CardManager by AID (various AIDs)
–authenticate and open secure channel (open_sc)
–delete previous applet version (1. applet, 2. package)
–load and install (install command, many params)
–install may pass personalization data (master key…)
•Check applet functionality
–from GPShell script,  no need for secure channel
–select your applet by AID (select –AID xxx)
–send test APDU (send_apdu -APDU xxx)
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
117

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
JavaCard – PIN verification
•Image/code for PIN verification
–Vulnerable to transaction rollback
•
public class OwnerPIN implements PIN {
    byte triesLeft; // persistent counter
    boolean check(...) {
        ...
        triesLeft--;
        ...
    }
}
118

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
JavaCard – PIN verification done better
•Non-atomic operations
public class OwnerPIN implements PIN {
  byte[] triesLeft = new byte[1]; // persistent counter
  byte[] temps =
     JCSystem.makeTransientByteArray(1,
                JCSystem.CLEAR_ON_RESET);
  boolean check(...) {
    ...
    temps[0] = triesLeft[0] - 1;
    // update the try counter non-atomically:
    Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(temps, 0, triesLeft, 0, 1);
   ...
  }
}
119

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
JavaCard – Atomic vs. Non-Atomic
•Persistent memory updates
–Two ways of updating
–FillArrayNonAtomic, CopyArrayNonAtomic
•Code refactoring
–Original short/byte values have to be converted to arrays[1]
•
120

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 9.3.2020
JavaCard – Atomic vs. Non-Atomic
•Non-deterministic variable rollback
•
•
•
•
•
•Result dependency on the commands order
–a[0] == 0 vs. a[0] == 2
•
a[0] = 0
beginTransaction()
  a[0] = 1;
  arrayFillNonAtomic(a,0,1,2);
  // a[0] = 2;
abortTransaction()
a[0] = 0;
beginTransaction();
  arrayFillNonAtomic(a,0,1,2);
  // a[0] = 2;
  a[0] = 1;
abortTransaction();
121