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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
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PV204 Security technologies
Cryptographic smartcards, attacks against two-factor
Petr Švenda        svenda@fi.muni.cz        @rngsec
Centre for Research on Cryptography and Security, Masaryk University

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Smart cards
•Lecture:
–PC/SC communication framework, APDU
–Basic platforms – JavaCard & .net card & MULTOS, comparison
–Secure channel protocol (authentication, session keys, APDU protection), SCP
–Attacks against two-factor authentication
•Lab
–Creating secure channel protocol
–Communicating with smart cards
•
–
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Mind path for lecture
•Smart cards are typical example of secure element ® what smart card can be ® what smart card is
capable of
•How to communicate with cards
–Contact (ISO7816-2) / contactless (ISO/IEC 14443)
–Low level transmission (T=0/T=1, ISO 7816-4)
–Logical packets (APDU)
–Standardized API on card (OpenPlatform, PIV, OpenPGP, ePassport)
–Standardized API on host (PC/SC, PKCS#11/15)
–Secure channel with card (OpenPlatform SCP’03, BAC, EAC)
•What are cards capable of – supported algorithms, speed
•What sc can be used for
–Digital signatures – generate and use private key (+ attacks), key encryption on card
–Two-factor authentication, access control (challenge-response protocol) (+attacks)
–Secure environment (code protection, trusted element - tokenization) (+attacks)
–
•
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Check-in activity: how to stay awake
•Any idea what we can do, prepare, try… to help us stay awake?
•(5 minutes)
•
1.
•
•
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Overview
1.What smart cards are?
2.What smart cards are capable of?
3.How to manage smart cards?
4.Lightweight secure channel protocols
5.Two-factor authentication and some attacks
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
WHAT A SMART CARD IS?
•Smart card basics
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Basic types of (smart) cards
1.Contactless “barcode”
–Fixed identification string (RFID, < 5 cents)
2.Simple memory cards (magnetic stripe, RFID)
–Small write memory (< 1KB) for data, (~10 cents)
3.Memory cards with PIN protection
–Memory (< 5KB), simple protection logic (<$1)
–
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
rfid
7

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Basic types of (smart) cards (2)
4.Cryptographic smart cards
–Support for (real) cryptographic algorithms
–Mifare Classic ($1), Mifare DESFire ($3)
5.User-programmable cryptographic smart cards
–JavaCard, .NET card, MULTOS cards ($2-$30)
•Chip manufacturers: NXP, Infineon, Gemalto, G&D, Oberthur, STM, Atmel, Samsung...
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
We will mainly focus on these two categories
D:\Documents\Obrázky\cryptojavacard.png
8

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Cryptographic smart cards
•SC is quite powerful device
–8-32 bit processor @ 5-50MHz
–persistent memory 32-100s kB (EEPROM)
–volatile fast RAM, usually <<20kB
–truly random generator, cryptographic coprocessor (3DES, AES, RSA-2048...)
•~10 billion units shipped in 2018 (EUROSMART)
–mostly smart cards, telco, payment and loyalty...
–~1.5 billion contactless (EUROSMART)
•Intended for physically unprotected environment
–NIST FIPS140-2 standard, security Level 4
–Common Criteria EAL4+/5+
–
–
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| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
ActualGoldChip
EEPROM
CPU
CRYPTO
RNG
chip

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
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| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
http://www.eurosmart.com/facts-figures.html
Telco
Payment

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
hybridcard_2
Smart cards forms
•Many possible forms
–ISO 7816 standard
–SIM size, USB dongles, Java rings…
•Contact(-less), hybrid/dual interface
–contact physical interface
–contact-less interface
–hybrid card – separate logics on single card
–dual interface – same chip accessible contact & c-less
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
JavaRing 8300-ACOS2-8K iKey_image
11

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Contact vs. contactless
•Contact cards (ISO7816-2)
–I/O data line, voltage and GND line
–clock line, reset lines
•Contactless cards
–ISO/IEC 14443 type A/B, radio at 13.56 MHz
–Chip powered by current induced on antenna by reader
–Reader ® chip communication - relatively easy
–Chip ® reader – dedicated circuits are charged, more power consumed, fluctuation detected by
reader
–Multiple cards per single reader possible
–
–
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Smart cards are used for…
•GSM SIM modules
•Digital signatures
•Bank payment card (EMV standard)
•System authentication
•Operations authorizations
•ePassports
•Multimedia distribution (DRM)
•Secure storage and encryption device
•…
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Smart card is highly protected device
•Intended for physically unprotected environment
–NIST FIPS140-2 standard, security Level 4
–Common Criteria EAL4+/5+
•Tamper protection
–Tamper-evidence (visible if physically manipulated)
–Tamper-resistance (can withstand physical attack)
–Tamper-response (erase keys…)
•Protection against side-channel attacks (power,EM,fault)
•Periodic tests of TRNG functionality
•Approved crypto algorithms and key management
•Limited interface, smaller trusted computing base (than usual)
•http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Main advantages of crypto smart cards
•High-level of security (CC EAL5+, FIPS 140-2)
•Fast cryptographic coprocessor
•Programmable secure execution environment
•Secure memory and storage
•On-card asymmetric key generation
•High-quality and very fast RNG
•Secure remote card control
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
SMARTCARDS USED IN WIDER SYSTEM
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Big picture – terminal/reader and card
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
laptop
What principles and standards are used?
D:\Documents\Obrazky\question.png
Merchant payment
Digital signature
17

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Group activity: smartcard stack
•(Imagine e.g., digital signature application with private key on smartcard)
•Organize and glue floating items into smartcard stack
•Use internet… (but don’t google for my slides from previous years J)
•Annotate with own comment (what is the item about)
•(15 minutes)
•
•Stack presented on the next slide, what you placed differently?
•(5 minutes)
•
1.
•
•
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
laptop
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
C/C# WinSCard.h
ISO7816-4
Browser (TLS client authentication)
GPPro
API: EMV CAP
20
ISO 14443 (T=CL)
ISO7816-2,3 (T=0/1)
GnuPG
PKCS#11
OpenSC
Python pyscard
Java java.smartcardio.*
SCardListReaders
SCardTransmit
API: PC/SC
PC/SC-lite
APDU
OpenPGP
API: GSM 11.11
Personal Identity Verification (PIV)
ICAO 9303
GlobalPlatform
.NET for smartcards
MultOS
JavaCard
ISO7816-1
ISO7816-8
NIST FIPS140-2
13.56 MHz

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
laptop
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
Libraries
PKCS#11, OpenSC, JMRTD
Smartcard control language API
C/C# WinSCard.h, Java java.smartcardio.*, Python pyscard
System smartcard interface: Windows’s PC/SC, Linux’s PC/SC-lite
Manage readers and cards, Transmit ISO7816-4’s APDU
Custom app with
direct control
PC application via library:
browser TLS, PDF sign…
PC application
with direct control:
GnuPG, GPShell
API: EMV, GSM, PIV, OpenPGP, ICAO 9303 (BAC/EAC/SAC)
OpenPlatform, ISO7816-4 cmds, custom APDU
SC app programming:
JavaCard, MultOS, .NET
Readers
Contact: ISO7816-2,3 (T=0/1)
Contactless: ISO 14443 (T=CL)
Card application 3
Card application 2
Card application 1
21

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Big picture - components
•User application
–Merchant terminal GUI
–Banking transfer GUI
–Browser TLS
–…
•Card application
–EMV applet for payments
–SIM applet for GSM
–OpenPGP applet for PGP
–…
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
server blank_card
User application
Card OS
Card application
Card I/O manager
contact(less)
transmission
OS smart card API
smart card reader
22

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Main standards
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
server blank_card
User application
Card OS
Card application
Card I/O manager
contact(less)
transmission
OS smart card API
smart card reader
•ISO7816 1-4
–Card physical properties ISO7816-1
–Physical layer communication protocol ISO7816-2-3
–Data packet format (APDU)
•PC/SC, PC/SCLite (host side)
–Readers/cards management
–Transmission of logical APDU packets
–C/C# WinSCard.h, Java java.smartcardio.*, Python pyscard
•PKCS#11
–standardized interface on host side
–card can be proprietary
•GlobalPlatform
–remote card management interface
–secure installation of applications
23

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
server blank_card
User application
Card OS
Card application
Card I/O manager
contact(less)
transmission
OS smart card API
smart card reader
Card’s programming platforms
•MultOS
–Multiple supported languages, native compilation
–Often bank cards
•JavaCard (details in 3rd lecture)
–open programming platform from Sun
–applets portable between cards
•Microsoft .NET for smartcards
–Similar to JavaCard, but C#
–Applications portable between cards
–Limited market penetration
24

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
apdu
APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit)
•APDU is basic logical communication datagram
–header (5 bytes) and up to ~256 bytes of user data
•Format specified in ISO7816-4
•Header/Data format
–CLA – instruction class
–INS – instruction number
–P1, P2 – optional data
–Lc – length of incoming data
–Data – user data
–Le – length of the expected output data
•Some values of CLA/INS/P1/P2 standardized
•Custom values used by application developer
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
What values of APDU header are used?
•Standardized values for selected application
–Improves interoperability
–https://web.archive.org/web/20180721010834/http://techmeonline.com/most-used-smart-card-commands-a
pdu/
•Custom commands for proprietary application
–Your own API
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Selected software components
•PC/SC (MS API: SCardxx, Java: java.smartcardio.*)
•PC/SCLite (implementation of PC/SC for Linux/MAC)
•OpenSC – proxy component between proprietary tokens and PKCS#11 interface
•SoftHSM – virtual PKCS#11-compliant card
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
SMARTCARD ALGORITHMS AND PERFORMANCE
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Common algorithms
•Basic - cryptographic co-processor
–Truly random data generator
–3DES, AES128/256
–MD5, SHA1, SHA-2 256/512
–RSA (up to 2048b common, 4096 possible)
–ECC (up to 192b common, 384b possible)
–Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH/ECDSA)
•Custom code running in secure environment
–E.g. HMAC, OTP code, re-encryption
–Might be significantly slower (e.g., SW AES 50x slower)
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Cryptographic operations
•Supported algorithms (JCAlgTester, almost 90 cards)
–https://github.com/crocs-muni/JCAlgTest
–https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/jcsupport.html
–
•
–
D:\Documents\Obrazky\algtest_algs.png
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
What is the typical performance?
•Hardware differ significantly
–Clock multiplier, memory speed, crypto coprocessor…
•Typical speed of operation is:
–Milliseconds (RNG, symmetric crypto, hash)
–Tens of milliseconds (transfer data in/out)
–Hundreds of millisecond (asymmetric crypto)
–Seconds (RSA keypair generation)
•Operation may consists from multiple steps
–Transmit data, prepare key, prepare engine, encrypt
–® additional performance penalty
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Performance tables for common cards
•Visit https://jcalgtest.org
•
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https://jcalgtest.org
Is faster always better?
D:\Documents\Obrazky\question.png
What influences the speed?

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Performance with variable data lengths
•
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Limited memory and resources
may cause non-linear dependency on a processed data length
https://jcalgtest.org

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
D:\Documents\Obrazky\numobjects2.png
How many cryptographic engines?
•
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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
SMART CARD MANAGEMENT
•
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What functionality would require?
D:\Documents\Obrazky\question.png

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Motivation
•How to upload, install and remove applications?
•Who should be allowed to upload/remove apps?
•What if multiple mutually distrusting apps on card?
•How to update application in already issued card?
•
•Need for cross-platform interoperable standard
–Many manufactures and platform providers
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
GLOBALPLATFORM
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
37

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
GlobalPlatform
•Specification of API for card administration
–Upload/install/delete applications
–Card lifecycle management
–Card security management
–Security mechanisms and protocols
•Newest is GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.3
–December 2015
–Previous versions also frequently used
–http://www.globalplatform.org/specificationscard.asp
–
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
blank_card
GlobalPlatform – main terms
•Smart card life cycle
–OP_READY, INITIALIZED (prepared for personalization)
–SECURED (issued to user, use phase)
–CARD_LOCKED (temporarily locked (attack), unlock to SECURED)
–TERMINATED (logically destroyed)
•Card Manager (CM)
–Special card component responsible for administration and card system service functions (cannot be
removed)
•Security Domain (SD)
–Logically separated area on card with own access control
–Enforced by different authentication keys
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
Security
Domain 1
Security
Domain 2
Card Manager
D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Key-icon.png D:\Documents\Obrázky\is2\Key-icon.png
39

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
blank_card
Security
Domain 1
Applet 2
Security
Domain 2
Applet 1
Applet 3
Card Manager
GlobalPlatform – main terms
•Card Content (apps,data) Management
–Content verification, loading, installation, removal
•Security Management
–Security Domain locking, Application locking
–Card locking, Card termination
–Application privilege usage, Security Domain privileges
–Tracing and event logging
•Command Dispatch
–Application selection
–(Optional) Logical channel management
–
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Smart card life cycles
•The smart card passes various logical life cycle states between manufacture and final destruction
•Life cycle states define which operations can be performed with the card
•The card Life Cycle States OP_READY and INITIALIZED are intended for use during the Pre-Issuance
phases of the card’s life.
•The states SECURED, CARD_LOCKED and TERMINATED are intended for use during the Post-Issuance phase
of the card although it is possible to terminate the card at any point during its life.
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Smart card life cycles
•OP_READY – card is ready for uploading of key diversification data, any application and issuer
specific structures.
•INITIALIZED – card is fully prepared but not yet issued to card holder.
•SECURED – card is issued to card holder. Card management is possible only through Security domain
(installation of signed applets etc.).
•CARD_LOCKED – card is locked due to some security policy and no data management can be performed.
Card can be locked by Security domain and later unlocked as well (switch back to SECURED state).
•TERMINATED – card is logically “destroyed“ due to card expiration or detection of the severe
security thread.
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Global Platform APDU commands
•DELETE – delete uniquely identifiable object (e.g. JavaCard applet)
•STORE_DATA – upload content of single data object
•GET_DATA - used to retrieve a single data object
•SET_STATUS – set Life Cycle status
•GET_STATUS – return Life Cycle status
•INSTALL – initiate installation, typically (JavaCard) applet
•LOAD – upload file from PC to smart card, e.g. JavaCard cap file
•PUT_KEY – update value of specified key
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Card Production Life Cycle (CPLC)
•Manufacturing metadata
•Dates (OS, chip)
•Circuit serial number
•(not mandatory)
•GlobalPlatform APDU
–80 CA 9F 7F 00
–gppro --info
•ISO7816 APDU
–00 CA 9F 7F 00
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
TWO FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
•
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Two-factor authentication
•Two factors with tokens/smart cards
–Token (smart card, phone) + Knowledge (PIN, Password)
1.Authorize transaction with card and PIN
2.Authenticate with password and SMS
3.Authenticate user with One-Time Password (OTP) generated on mobile phone (stored secret key)
after screen unlock (pattern)
4.U2F token (password + token + button press)
5.…
• How to attack two-factor?
1.
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
D:\Documents\Obrazky\question.png
46

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Application uses PC/SC interface (SCardxx)
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
User application
winscard.dll
reader driver
USB driver
APDU
47

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Where to log communication?
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
User application
winscard.dll
reader driver
USB driver
APDU
In-application logging
Virtual reader
SW USB sniffer
HW USB sniffer
In-card logger
“Stub” winscard.dll logging
48
HW ISO7816 T=0/1

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
APDUPlay project (https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/apduinspect.html)
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
User application
winscard.dll (stub)
original.dll
[begin]
SCardTransmit (handle 0xEA010001)# apduCounter:0#
totalBytesINCounter:1#
transmitted:00 a4 04 00 0a a0 00 00 00 28 80 10 30 01 ff
responseTime:31#
SCardTransmit result:0x0#
received:6a 81
SCardTransmit (handle 0xEA010001)# apduCounter:1#
totalBytesINCounter:16#
…
based on ApduView utility (by Fernandes)
49

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
What can you do then…
•Log all APDU send via SCardTransmit()
•Log all SCardXXX function calls
•
•
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Visualize logged APDU’s
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
For attacking two-factor, logging is usually not enough
•Manipulate incoming/outgoing APDUs
–modify packet content (change receiver account number)
–replay of previous packets (pay twice)
–simulate presence of smart card
–…
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
[RULE1]
MATCH1=in=1;t=0;cla=00;ins=a4;p1=04;
ACTION=in=0;data0=90 00;le=02;
00 a4 04 00 08 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
winscard.dll (stub)
90 00
53

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
German banking malware (2009)
•Two-factor authorization of transactions (chipTAN/cardTAN)
•Application code injection
–modifies info about transaction and balance shown to user in browser
–intercepts/modifies transaction data for signature by smart card
–http://www.cio.com/article/2429854/infrastructure/german-police--two-factor-authentication-failing
.html
•The Fairy Tale of “What You See Is What You Sign” - Trojan Horse Attacks on Software for Digital
Signatures (2001)
–http://www.hanno-langweg.de/hanno/research/scits01p.pdf
–Importance of physical PIN-pad and display of transaction amount independently
•
–
54
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
German banking malware
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
User application
winscard.dll
reader driver
USB driver
APDU
Code inject application
55

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
ZeuS smartcard support module
•ZeuS Banking Trojan (2010, 2012)
–Analysed by A. Matrosov, Group-IB and others
–http://www.welivesecurity.com/2010/11/05/dr-zeus-the-bot-in-the-hat/
–http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/zeus/
•Smart card controlled via PC/SC interface
56
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D:\Documents\Obrázky\SmartCard\zeus-2.png D:\Documents\Obrázky\SmartCard\zeus-5.png

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
ZeuS smartcard support module
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
User application
winscard.dll
reader driver
USB driver
APDU
Malicious application
Malicious app
57

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
D:\Documents\Obrázky\SmartCard\ranbyus.png
Win32/Spy.Ranbyus
•Analysed by A. Matrosov
–http://www.welivesecurity.com/2012/06/05/smartcard-vulnerabilities-in-modern-banking-malware/
•Scans for available smart cards, info send to C&C
–uses PC/SC SmartCard API for scan
–later redirects communication on USB level (FabulaTech USB for RD installed)
•
58
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Win32/Spy.Ranbyus
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
User application
winscard.dll
reader driver
USB driver
APDU
Malicious application
Malicious app
Remote USB redirection
59

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Skimmers, PoS hacks
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
APDU
D:\Documents\Obrázky\pos_terminal.jpg key_icon D:\Documents\Obrázky\Lock.png
Manipulated PoS firmware:
•Magnetic skimmer (+ send data over GSM)
•MitM: chip®verified by signature
D:\Documents\Obrázky\SmartCard\hybridcard_2.jpg
60

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
RECALL U2F
HOW CAN YOU ATTACK U2F IF PC/SC LAYER IS CONTROLLED?
•
61
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
FIDO U2F protocol
62
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
https://developers.yubico.com/U2F/Protocol_details/Overview.html

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
SECURE CHANNEL PROTOCOL (FOR SMARTCARDS)
•How to authenticate and communicate securely?
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
TLS handshake
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
Credit: Cloudflare
64

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Why not to use TLS all the time?
1.Requires asymmetric cryptography
–Unsuitable for slower devices
2.Requires long keys
–Unsuitable for devices with small memory
3.Requires significant data overhead (~6.5KB)
–http://netsekure.org/2010/03/tls-overhead/
4.More lightweight protocols exist
–RFID / smartcards / IoT…
•Note: TLS can be fully implemented on smartcards (but slow)
–https://github.com/gilb/smart_card_TLS
•
–
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Secure channels – questions to ask
•What attacker model is assumed?
•Integrity protection? Encryption? Authentication?
•One-side or mutual authentication?
•What kind of cryptography is used?
•What keys are required/pre-distributed?
•Additional trust hierarchy required?
•Is necessary to generate random numbers/keys?
•What if keys are compromised? Forward secrecy?
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
•
67
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
•What attacker model is assumed?
•Integrity protection? Encryption? Authentication?
•One-side or mutual authentication?
•What kind of cryptography is used?
•What keys are required/pre-distributed?
•Additional trust hierarchy required?
•Is necessary to generate random numbers/keys?
•What if keys are compromised? Forward secrecy?

P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Common lightweight SCPs
•OpenPlatform SCP’01,’02 (3DES-based)
•OpenPlatform SCP‘10 (RSA-based)
•OpenPlatform SCP’03 (AES-based)
•ISO/IEC 7816-4 Secure Messaging
•ePassports Basic Access Control (3DES-based)
•ePassports Extended Access Control (3DES,RSA,DH,SHA1/2-based)
•
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Example: GlobalPlatform SCP’03
•Mutual authentication (based on symmetric crypto)
•Session key derivation (based on long-term keys)
–NIST SP 800-108
•Message (APDU) confidentiality and integrity MAC
1.INITIALIZE UPDATE
–Random challenge, card’s computations
2.EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
–Terminal response
3.Secure messaging
4.
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What are problems with
usage of symmetric crypto?
D:\Documents\Obrazky\question.png

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                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
Secure Channel Protocol '03‘, Card Specification v2.2 – Amendment D, GPC_SPE_014
70

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
Secure Channel Protocol '03‘, Card Specification v2.2 – Amendment D, GPC_SPE_014
71

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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
ePassport protocols (ICAO 9303)
•Significantly more complex trust model
–Passport, Inspection terminal, Trusting countries, Distrusting countries
–Multiple sensitivity levels (basic info / fingerprint / iris)
–Combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography
•Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol
–SCP-like protocol, static key is content from MRZ
•Extended Access Control (EAC) protocol
–Terminal authentication (RSA/ECDSA, SHA-1/2)
–Chip authentication (DH/ECDSA key)
–PACE protocol to establish session keys
•Active Authentication (AA) protocol
–
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Mandatory reading
•When Organized Crime Applies Academic Results
–A Forensic Analysis of an In-Card Listening Device
–https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/963.pdf
•
•Which academic attacks is of concern?
•What system is targeted?
•How is attack carried out? Is it protocol flaw?
•What can prevent this attack vector?
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P:\CRCS\2012_0178_Redesign_loga_a_JVS\PPT_prezentace\sablona\pracovni\normalni.jpg
                       www.crcs.cz/rsa  @CRoCS_MUNI
Conclusions
•Smartcards are highly secure and capable modules
–Programmable
–Accessible (cost, API…)
•Protocol stack between PC application and smartcard
–PC/SC, APDU transfer, GlobalPlatform, JavaCard
•Two-factor authentication is not silver bullet
–But way better than password alone!
•
•
| PV204 Smartcards 12.3.2019
question
Questions
74