PV204 Security technologies

Trust, trusted element, usage scenarios, side-channel attacks


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Slides for comments (Thank you!) https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CIRY35LQDpyKVGVe9Zn5gz26Sa62JaJV/



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www.fi.muni.cz/crocs





Trusted system

- "...system that is relied upon to a specified extent to enforce a specified security policy. As such, a trusted system is one whose failure may break a specified security policy." (TCSEC, Orange Book)
- Trusted subjects are those excepted from mandatory security policies (Bell LaPadula model)
- User must trust (if wants to use the system)
 - E.g., you and your bank

Trusted computing base (TCB)

- The set of all hardware, firmware, and/or software components that are critical to its security
- The vulnerabilities inside TCB might breach the security properties of the entire system
 - E.g., server hardware + virtualization (VM) software
- The boundary of TCB is relevant to usage scenario
 - TCB for datacentre admin is around HW + VM (to protect against compromise of underlying hardware and services)
 - TCB for web server client also contains Apache web server
- Very important factor is size and attack surface of TCB
 - Bigger size implies more space for bugs and vulnerabilities

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base


TRUSTED ELEMENT

What exactly can be trusted element (TE)?

- Recall: Anything user entity of TE is willing to trust ③
 - Depends on definition of "trust" and definition of "element"
 - We will use narrower definition
- Trusted element is element (hardware, software or both) in the system intended to increase security *level* w.r.t. situation without the presence of such element
 - 1. By storage of sensitive information (keys, measured values)
 - 2. By enforcing integrity of execution of operation (firmware update)
 - 3. By performing computation with confidential data (DRM)
 - 4. By providing unforged reporting from untrusted environment (TPM)
 - 5. ...

Typical examples

- Payment smart card
 - TE for issuing bank
- SIM card
 - TE for phone carriers
- Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
 - TE for user as storage of Bitlocker keys, TE for remote entity during attestation
- Trusted Execution Environment in mobile/set-top box
 - TE for issuer for confidentiality and integrity of code
- Hardware Security Module for TLS keys
 - TE for web admin
- Energy meter
 - TE for utility company
- Server under control of service provider
 - TE for user private data, TE for provider business operation
- Complex Scenarios: trusted element with (even more) trusted (crypto) hardware
 - TE for device manufacturer secure derived keys, TE for chip manufacturer secure root keys






ATTACKS AGAINST TRUSTED ELEMENT

Trusted hardware (TE) is not panacea!

- 1. Can be physically attacked
 - Christopher Tarnovsky, BlackHat 2010



- Infineon SLE 66 CL PE TPM chip, bus read by tiny probes
- 9 months to carry the attack, \$200k
- <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXX00tRKOlw</u> (great video with details)
- 2. Attacked via vulnerable API implementation
 - IBM 4758 HSM (Export long key under short DES one)
- 3. Provides trusted anchor != trustworthy system
 - Weakness can be introduced later
 - E.g., bug in newly updated firmware

Motivation: Bell's Model 131-B2 / Sigaba

- Encryption device intended for US army, 1943
 - Oscilloscope patterns detected during usage
 - 75 % of plaintexts intercepted from 80 feets
 - Protection devised (security perimeter), but forgot after the war
- CIA in 1951 recovery over 1/4 mile of power lines
- Other countries also discovered the issue
 - Russia, Japan...
- More research in use of (eavesdropping) and defense against (shielding) \rightarrow TEMPEST



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Common and realizable attacks on Trusted Element

1. Non-invasive attacks

- API-level attacks
 - Incorrectly designed and implemented application
 - Malfunctioning application (code bug, faulty generator)
- Communication-level attacks
 - Observation and manipulation of communication channel
- (Remote) timing attacks
- 2. Semi-invasive attacks
 - Passive side-channel attacks
 - Timing (local) / power / EM / acoustic / cache-usage / error... analysis attacks
 - Active side-channel attacks: fault injection
 - Power/light/clock glitches...
- 3. Invasive attacks
 - Dismantle chip, microprobes...

Break Once, Run Everywhere (BORE) ?

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Where are the frequent problems with crypto algs nowadays?

- Security mathematical algorithms
 - OK, we have very strong ones (AES, SHA-3, RSA...) (but quantum computers)
- Post-quantum algorithms
 - Too "young", many schemes broken or questioned recently, e.g., Rainbow, SIKE
- Implementation of algorithm
 - Problems \rightarrow implementation attacks
- Randomness for keys
 - Problems \rightarrow achievable brute-force attacks
- Key distribution
 - Problems \rightarrow old keys, untrusted keys, key leakage
- Operation security
 - Problems \rightarrow where we are using crypto, key leakage

NON-INVASIVE LOGICAL ATTACKS


Non-complete list

- Algorithmic flaw in Infineon's RSALib (CVE-2017-15361)
 - RSA public / private key generation on many Infineon cards (huge impact)
 - https://keychest.net/roca, https://github.com/crocs-muni/roca/
- Not enforcing secure memory protections
 - A complete exploit on Set-top Boxes
 - Presented for two ST chips, but with impact on other ST chips too
 - <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WF1wSzTTqdg&ab_channel=HackInTheBoxSecurityConference</u>
- Shortening Key (against hardware key stores or key ladders):
 - Using half of an AES key as a DES key or using 3DES with half of the key (i.e., single DES key)
- TEE (e.g., ARM Trustzone) issues
 - Configuration, Memory Ranges, Boot ROM...
 - <u>https://www.slideshare.net/CristofaroMune/euskalhack-2017-secure-initialization-of-tees-when-secure-boot-falls-short</u>


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Passive Side-Channel

SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS




More advanced setup for power analysis




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Even more advanced setup for EM analysis



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Simple (Cheap) Power Fault Injection setup




https://github.com/noopwafel/iceglitch


More on that in two weeks

Simple vs. differential power analysis

- 1. Simple power analysis
 - Direct observation of single / few power traces
 - Visible operation => reverse engineering
 - Visible patterns => data dependency
- 2. Differential power analysis
 - Statistical processing of many power traces
 - More subtle data dependencies found





https://www.riscure.com/uploads/2018/11/201708_Riscure_Whitepaper_Side_Channel_Patterns.pdf



Reverse engineering of JavaCard bytecode


- Goal: obtain code back from smart card
 - JavaCard defines around 140 bytecode instructions





Simple power analysis – data leakage

- Data revealed directly when processed
 - e.g., Hamming weight of instruction argument
 - hamming weight of separate bytes of key $(2^{56} \rightarrow 2^{38})$, how severe it is?





Hamming Weight or Hamming Distance Leakage

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Differential power analysis (DPA)

- DPA attack recovers secret key (e.g., AES)
- Requires large number of power traces (10²-10⁶)
 - Every trace measured on AES key invocation with different input data
- Key recovered iteratively
 - One recovered byte at the time $Sbox(KEY_i \oplus INPUT_DATA_i)$
 - Guess possible key byte value (0-255), group measurements, compute average, determine match






Define: DPA Bias Signal = $T(n) = A_1(n) - A_0(n)$


PTI

Differential power analysis

- Very Powerful attack on secret values (keys)
 - E.g., Sbox(KEY ⊕ INPUT_DATA)
- 1. Obtain multiple power traces with (fixed) key usage and variable data
 - 10^3 - 10^6 traces with known I/O data => S(n)
 - Sbox(KEY \oplus KNOWN_DATA)
- 2. Guess key byte-per-byte
 - All possible values of single byte tried (256)
 - D = HammWeight(Sbox(KEY \oplus KNOWN_DATA)) > 4
 - Correct guess reveals correlation with traces
 - Incorrect guess not
- 3. Divide and test approach
 - Traces divided into 2 groups
 - Groups are averaged A_0 and A_1 (noise reduced)
 - Subtract group's averaged signals T(n)
 - Significant peaks if guess was correct
- No need for knowledge of exact implementation




Define: DPA Bias Signal = $T(n) = A_1(n) - A_0(n)$



www.crcs.cz/rsa @CRoCS_MUNI

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
Timing attack: principle



Timing attacks



- Execution of crypto algorithm takes different time to process input data with some dependence on secret value (secret/private key, secret operations...)
 - 1. Due to performance optimizations (developer, compiler)
 - 2. Due to conditional statements (branching)
 - 3. Due to cache misses or other microarchitectural effects
 - 4. Due to operations taking different number of CPU cycles
- Measurement techniques
 - 1. Start/stop time (aggregated time, local/remote measurement)
 - 2. Power/EM trace (very precise if operation can be located)



Naïve modular exponentiation (modexp) (RSA/DH...)


• $M = C^d \mod N$

Is there any dependency of time on secret value?

•
$$M = C * C * C * ... * C \mod N$$

Easy, but extremely slow for large d (e.g., >1000s bits for RSA)
 – Faster algorithms exist

Faster modexp: Square and multiply algorithm



• How to measure?

- Gilbert Goodwill, http://www.embedded.com/print/4408435 (dead link)
- Exact detection from simple power trace
- Extraction from overall time of multiple measurements

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Faster and more secure modexp: Montgomery ladder

- Computes x^d mod N
- Create binary expansion of d as $d = (d_{k-1}...d_0)$ with $d_{k-1}=1$

```
x<sub>0</sub>=x; x<sub>1</sub>=x<sup>2</sup>

for j=k-2 to 0 {

if d<sub>j</sub>=0

x_1=x_0*x_1; x_0=x_0^2

else

x_0=x_0*x_1; x_1=x_1^2

x_1=x_1 \mod N

x_0=x_0 \mod N

}

return x_0
```

Both branches with the same number and type of operations (unlike square and multiply on previous slide)

 Be aware: timing leakage still possible via cache side channel, nonconstant time CPU instructions, variable k-1...

Faster and more secure modexp: Montgomery ladder

- Computes x^d mod N
- Create binary expansion of d as $d = (d_{k-1}...d_0)$ with $d_{k-1}=1$

```
x<sub>0</sub>=x; x<sub>1</sub>=x<sup>2</sup>

for j=k-2 to 0 {

    b=d<sub>j</sub>

    x<sub>(1-b)</sub>=x<sub>0</sub>*x<sub>1</sub>; x<sub>b</sub>=x<sub>b</sub><sup>2</sup>

    x<sub>1</sub>=x<sub>1</sub> mod N

    x<sub>0</sub>=x<sub>0</sub> mod N

}

return x<sub>0</sub>
```

Memory access often is not constant time! Especially in the presence of caches.

- Is it constant time?
 - Solution: conditional swap or conditional move, arithmetic-based procedures

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Faster and more secure modexp: Montgomery ladder

- Computes x^d mod N
- Create binary expansion of d as $d = (d_{k-1}...d_0)$ with $d_{k-1}=1$

```
x<sub>0</sub>=x; x<sub>1</sub>=x<sup>2</sup>; sw = 0

for j=k-2 to 0 {

    b=d<sub>j</sub>

    cswap(x<sub>0</sub>,x<sub>1</sub>,b\oplussw)

    sw = b

    x<sub>1</sub>=x<sub>0</sub>*x<sub>1</sub>; x<sub>0</sub>=x<sub>0</sub><sup>2</sup>

    x<sub>1</sub>=x<sub>1</sub> mod N

    x<sub>0</sub>=x<sub>0</sub> mod N

}

cswap(x<sub>0</sub>,x<sub>1</sub>,sw)

return x<sub>0</sub>
```



- Does it work? Do an example with 10110 with pen and paper ③
- But is it constant time?

Cswap based on arithmetic of field operands

```
1
   void fe25519_cswap(fe25519* in1, fe25519* in2, int condition)
2
   {
3
       int32 mask = condition;
4
       uint32 ctr;
\mathbf{5}
       mask = -mask;
6
       for (ctr = 0; ctr < 8; ctr++)
\overline{7}
       ſ
8
            uint32 val1 = in1->as_uint32[ctr];
9
            uint32 val2 = in2->as_uint32[ctr];
10
            uint32 temp = val1;
11
            val1 ^= mask & (val2 ^ val1);
12
            val2 ^= mask & (val2 ^ temp);
13
            in1->as_uint32[ctr] = val1;
14
            in2->as_uint32[ctr] = val2;
15
       }
16 \}
```

More advanced attacks


(template, deep learning, and clustering attacks)

```
1
   void fe25519_cswap(fe25519* in1, fe25519* in2, int condition)
 2
   ł
 3
       int32 mask = condition;
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       uint32 ctr:
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       mask = -mask;
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8
            uint32 val1 = in1->as_uint32[ctr];
9
            uint32 val2 = in2 \rightarrow as_uint32[ctr];
10
            uint32 temp = val1;
            val1 ^= mask & (val2 ^ val1);4
11
            val2 ^= mask & (val2 ^ temp);
12
13
            in1->as_uint32[ctr] = val1;
14
            in2->as_uint32[ctr] = val2;
15
       3
16 \}
```

For more read: <u>https://github.com/sca-secure-library-sca25519/sca25519</u>

Gather data \rightarrow Analyse \rightarrow Bias found \rightarrow Impact

Run ECC operations \rightarrow MSB/time \rightarrow Bias found in ECDSA \rightarrow CVE-2019-15809




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Minerva vulnerability CVE-2019-15809 (10/2019)

- Discovered by ECTester (<u>https://github.com/crocs-muni/ECTester</u>)
- Athena IDProtect smartcard (CC EAL 4+)
 - FIPS140-2 #1711, ANSSI-CC-2012/23
 - Inside Secure AT90SC28872 Microcontroller
 - (possibly also SafeNet eToken 4300...)
- Libgcrypt, wolfSSL, MatrixSSL, Crypto++
- SunEC/OpenJDK/Oracle JDK
- Small time difference leaking few top bits of nonce
- Enough to extract whole ECC private key in 20-30 min
 - ~thousands of signatures + lattice-based attack



Example: Remote extraction OpenSSL RSA

- Brumley, Boneh, Remote timing attacks are practical
 - https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf
- Scenario: OpenSSL-based TLS with RSA on remote server
 - Local network, but multiple routers
 - Attacker submits multiple ciphertexts and observe processing time (client)
- OpenSSL's RSA CRT implementation
 - Square and multiply with sliding windows exponentiation
 - Modular multiplication in every step: x*y mod q (Montgomery alg.)
 - From timing can be said if normal or Karatsuba was used
 - If x and y has unequal size, normal multiplication is used (slower)
 - If x and y has equal size, Karatsuba multiplication is used (faster)
- Attacker learns bits of prime by adaptively chosen ciphertexts
 - About 300k queries needed

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Defense introduced by OpenSSL

- RSA blinding: RSA_blinding_on()
 - <u>https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030317.txt</u>
- Decryption without protection: M = c^d mod N
- Blinding of ciphertext *c* before decryption
 - 1. Generate random value *r* and compute r^e mod N
 - 2. Compute blinded ciphertext $b = c * r^e \mod N$
 - 3. Decrypt *b* and then divide result by *r*
 - r is removed and only decrypted plaintext remains


$$(r^e \cdot c)^d \cdot r^{-1} \mod n = r^{ed} \cdot r^{-1} \cdot c^d \mod n = r \cdot r^{-1} \cdot c^d \mod n = m.$$

Is RSA_blinding_on sufficient?

- No, more advanced attacks are possible
 - Cross-correlation attack on OpenSSL,
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ah98QIPT8Y4&ab_channel=SHA2017
- What about adding RSA blinding: $c = m^{d+r*\varphi(n)} \mod n$?
- That is better but not sufficient either, more advanced attacks:
 - Template Attacks,
 - Deep Learning, and
 - Clustering attacks.
- For every countermeasure there is / will be an attack and vice versa...

Example: Practical TEMPEST for \$3000

- ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs
 - https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/129.pdf
- E-M trace captured (across a wall)






(a) Attacker's setup for capturing EM emanations. Left to right: (power supply, antenna on a stand, amplifiers, software defined radio I (white box), analysis computer.

(b) Target (Lenovo 3000 N200), performing ECDH decryption operations, on the other side of the wall.

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Example: Practical TEMPEST for \$3000

- ECDH implemented in latest GnuPG's Libgcrypt
- Single chosen ciphertext used operands directly visible




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Example: How to evaluate attack severity?

- What was the cost?
 - Not particularly high: \$3000
- What was the targeted implementation?
 - Widely used implementation: latest GnuPG's Libgcrypt
- What were preconditions?
 - Local physical presence, but behind the wall
- Is it possible to mitigate the attack?
 - Yes: fix in library, physical shielding of device, perimeter...
 - What is the cost of mitigation?

Example: Acoustic side channel in GnuPG

- RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis
 - Insecure RSA computation in GnuPG
 - <u>https://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf</u>
- Acoustic emanation used as side-channel
 - 4096-bit key extracted in one hour
 - Acoustic signal picked by mobile phone microphone up to 4 meters away



Example: Cache-timing attack on AES

- Attacks not limited to asymmetric cryptography
 - Daniel J. Bernstein, <u>http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf</u>
- Scenario: Operation with secret AES key on remote server
 - Key retrieved based on response time variations of table lookups cache hits/misses
 - $-2^{25} \times 600B + 2^{27} \times 400B$ random packets + one minute brute-force search
- Very difficult to write high-speed but constant-time AES
 - Problem: table lookups are not constant-time
 - Not recognized / required by NIST during AES competition
- Cache-time attacks now more relevant due to processes co-location (cloud)

Other types of side-channel attacks

- Acoustic emanation
 - Keyboard clicks, capacitor noise
 - Speech eavesdropping based on high-speed camera
- Cache-occupation side-channel
 - Cache miss has impact on duration of operation
 - Other process can measure own cache hits/misses if cache is shared
 - <u>https://github.com/defuse/flush-reload-attacks</u>
 - http://software.imdea.org/projects/cacheaudit/
- Branch prediction side-channel (Meltdown, Spectre)
 - (separate short course running now)

MITIGATIONS

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Generic protection techniques

- 1. Do not leak
 - Constant-time crypto, bitslicing...
- 2. Shielding preventing leakage outside
 - Acoustic shielding, noisy environment
- 3. Creating additional "noise"
 - Parallel software load, noisy power consumption circuits
- 4. Compensating for leakage
 - Perform inverse computation/storage
- 5. Prevent leaking exploitability
 - Ciphertext and key blinding, key regeneration, masking of the operations

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Example: NaCl ("salt") library

libsodium

- Relatively new cryptographic library (2012)
 - Designed for usable security and side-channel resistance (mostly time!)
 - D. Bernstein, T. Lange, P. Schwabe
 - <u>https://cr.yp.to/highspeed/coolnacl-20120725.pdf</u>
 - Actively developed fork is libsodium https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium
 - Also check µNaCl for embedded devices: <u>https://munacl.cryptojedi.org/</u>
- Designed for usable security (hard to misuse)
 - Fixed selection of good algorithms (AE: Poly1305, Sign: EC Curve25519)
 - C = crypto_box(m,n,pk,sk), m = crypto_box_open(c,n,pk,sk)
- Implemented to have constant-time execution
 - No data flow from secrets to load addresses
 - No data flow from secrets to branch conditions
 - No padding oracles (recall CBC padding oracle in PA193)
 - Centralizing randomness and avoiding unnecessary randomness
- Extra side-channel and fault injection protections: <u>https://github.com/sca-secure-library-sca25519/sca25519</u>

How to test real implementation?

- 1. Be aware of various side-channels
- 2. Obtain measurement for given side-channel
 - Many times $(10^3 10^7)$, compute statistics; is it enough?
 - Same input data and key; group A
 - Same key and different data; group B
 - Different keys and same data...
- 3. Compare groups of measured data
 - Is difference visible? => potential leakage
 - Is distribution uniform? Is distribution normal?
 - More advanced methods, for example: Test Vector Leakage Assessment:
 - <u>https://docplayer.net/45501976-Test-vector-leakage-assessment-tvla-methodology-in-practice.html</u>
- 4. Try to measure again with better precision ③


Active Side-Channel

FAULT INJECTION ATTACKS

Semi-invasive attacks


- "Physical" manipulation (but card still working)
- Micro probes placed on the bus
 - After removing epoxy layer
- Fault induction
 - liquid nitrogen, power glitches, light flashes...
 - modify memory (RAM, EEPROM), e.g., PIN counter
 - modify instruction, e.g., conditional jump

PIN verification procedure





- Attacker can induce bit faults in memory locations
 - power glitch, flash light, radiation...
 - harder to induce targeted then random fault
- Protection with shadow variable
 - every variable has shadow counterpart
 - shadow variable contains inverse value
 - consistency is checked every read/write to memory



Robust protection, but cumbersome for developer



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More in "Programming in the presence of side-channels / faults" in **PV286/PA193** or <u>https://riscureprodstorage.blob.core.windows.net/production/</u> 2017/08/Riscure_Whitepaper_Side_Channel_Patterns.pdf

FI Example: the "unlooper" device



CONCLUSIONS

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Morale

- 1. Preventing implementation attacks is extra difficult
 - Naïve code is often vulnerable
 - Not aware of existing problems/attacks
 - Optimized code is often vulnerable
 - Time/power/acoustic... dependency on secret data
 - Dangerous optimizations (Roca: Infineon primes)
- 2. Use well-known libraries instead of own code
 - And follow security advisories and patch quickly
- 3. Security / mitigations are complex issues
 - Underlying hardware can leak information as well
 - Try to prevent large number of queries

Mandatory reading

- Constant-time crypto: <u>https://bearssl.org/constanttime.html</u>
- Focus on:
 - What can cause a cryptographic implementation to be non-constant?
 - Is there any impact by the compiler?
 - How is bitslicing technique improving the situation?
 - What particular techniques are used by BearSSL?

Optional reading

- Why Trust is Bad for Security, D. Gollman, 2006
 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/15710661/157/3
- Focus on:
 - Which definition of Trust Gollman uses?
 - Why Gollman claims that Trust is bad for security?

Conclusions

- Trusted element is secure anchor in a system
 - Understand why it is trusted and for whom
- Trusted element can be attacked
 - Non-invasive, semi-invasive, invasive methods
- Side-channel attacks are very powerful techniques
 - Attacks against particular implementation of algorithm
 - Attack possible even when algorithm is secure (e.g., AES)
- Use well-know libraries instead own implementation



