Public key, in this subliminal channel, is the pair (n, h). We already know that n = 6059 and k = 21. Since $h \equiv k^{-2} \mod n \Leftrightarrow h \equiv (k^{-1})^2 \mod n$, we have to compute k^{-1} . By using Euclide's algorithm, we have:

```
\begin{array}{l} 6059 = 288 \times 21 + 11 \\ 21 = 1 \times 11 + 10 \\ 11 = 1 \times 10 + 1 \end{array}
```

We can deduce that $1 = 2 \times 6059 - 577 \times 21$, which means that $-577 \times 21 \equiv 1 \mod 6059$, and in extenso $-577 \equiv 21^{-1} \mod 6059 \Leftrightarrow 5482 \equiv 21^{-1} \mod 6059$. Therefore, $k^{-1} = 5482$. Now we can compute h:

$$\begin{split} h &\equiv (k^{-1})^2 \mod n \\ h &\equiv 5482^2 \mod 6059 \\ h &\equiv 5743 \mod 6059 \end{split}$$

Now we will sign the message. In this case, two signatures (S_1, S_2) must be computed, according to the following scheme: $S_1 \equiv \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{w'}{w} + w\right) \mod n$ and $S_2 \equiv \frac{k}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{w'}{w} - w\right) \mod n$. This can be rewrited $S_1 \equiv 2^{-1} \cdot (w' \cdot w^{-1} + w) \mod n$ and $S_2 \equiv k \cdot 2^{-1} \cdot (w' \cdot w^{-1} - w) \mod n$. This implies knowing 2^{-1} and w^{-1} . Since $2 \times 3030 = 6060 \equiv 1 \mod 6059$, we can easily see that $2^{-1} \equiv 3030 \mod 6059$, but for w = 54, it is less obvious. We once again use Euclide's algorithm:

$$6059 = 112 \times 54 + 11$$

$$54 = 4 \times 11 + 10$$

$$11 = 1 \times 10 + 1$$

Then, we have $1 = 5 \times 6059 - 561 \times 54$, and thus we can deduce $w^{-1} \equiv -561 \mod 6059 \equiv 5498 \mod 6059$. Given that, we can compute S_1 and S_2 :

$$\begin{split} S_1 &\equiv 2^{-1}.(w'.w^{-1} + w) \mod n \\ S_1 &\equiv 3030 \times (2021 \times 5498 + 54) \mod 6059 \\ S_1 &\equiv 3030 \times 11111512 \mod 6059 \\ S_1 &\equiv 3030 \times 5365 \mod 6059 \\ S_1 &\equiv 5712 \mod 6059 \end{split}$$

 $S_2 \equiv k.2^{-1}.(w'.w^{-1} - w) \mod n$ $S_2 \equiv 21 \times 3030 \times (2021 \times 5498 - 54) \mod 6059$ $S_2 \equiv 63630 \times 11111404 \mod 6059$ $S_2 \equiv 3040 \times 5257 \mod 6059$ $S_2 \equiv 3697 \mod 6059$

Now, we must prove that the signature is correct. To power this verification, $w' \equiv S_1^2 - hS_2^2 \mod n$ must hold:

$$\begin{split} S_1^2 - hS_2^2 \mod n &\equiv 5712^2 - 5743 \times 3697^2 \mod 6059 \\ &\equiv 5712^2 - 5743 \times 3697^2 \mod 6059 \\ &\equiv 5288 - 5743 \times 4764 \mod 6059 \\ &\equiv 5288 - 3267 \mod 6059 \\ &\equiv 2021 \mod 6059 \end{split}$$

As we can see, $w' \equiv S_1^2 - hS_2^2 \mod n$: as a result, the signature is valid. We can now decrypt the message.

To decrypt the message, we have to compute $w \equiv \frac{w'}{S_1+k^{-1}S_2} \mod n$, which is equivalent to $w \equiv w'.(S_1 + k^{-1}S_2)^{-1} \mod n$. We have $S_1 + k^{-1}S_2 = 5712 + 5482 \times 3697 = 20272666 \equiv 5311 \mod 6059$. Therefore, we have to calculate $5311^{-1} \mod 6059$, and we will once again use the Euclide's algorithm:

$$\begin{array}{l} 6059 = 1 \times 5311 + 748 \\ 5311 = 7 \times 748 + 75 \\ 748 = 9 \times 75 + 73 \\ 75 = 1 \times 73 + 2 \\ 73 = 36 \times 2 + 1 \end{array}$$

We obtain $1 = 2620 \times 6059 - 2989 \times 5311$. Consequently, $-2989 \mod 6059 \equiv 3070 \mod 6059 \equiv 5311^{-1} \mod 6059$.

Finally, since we know all needed values, we can compute w:

$$w \equiv w' (S_1 + k^{-1}S_2)^{-1} \mod n$$

$$w \equiv 2021 \times 5311^{-1} \mod 6059$$

$$w \equiv 2021 \times 3070 \mod 6059$$

$$w \equiv 54 \mod 6059$$

We find the value of w given in the statement.

Question 2.

See excel table

From $(m_1, sig(m_1))$ we have $12^d = 46 \mod 1591$. From $(m_2, sig(m_2))$ we have $33^d = 1080 \mod 1591$ From the exercise book, we know that for the RSA signature scheme it holds: if s_1 and s_2 are signatures of messages m_1 and m_2 , we can easily compute the signature of the message $m = m_1 * m_2$ $mod n as s = s_1 * s_2 \mod n.$ $m_3 = m_1 * m_1$ $s_3 = s_1 * s_1 \mod 1591$ $s_3 = 525$ Verify: $525^{13} \mod 1591 = 144$ $m_4 = m_1 * m_2$ $s_4 = s_1 * s_2 \mod 1591$ $s_4 = 359$ Verify: $359^{13} \mod 1591 = 396$ From the exercise book, we know that if s is a signature of a message m then $s^{-1} \mod n$ is the signature of the message $m^{-1} \mod n$. $m_5 = m_4^{-1} \mod 1591$ EEA for 359, 1591 = 195 * 359 + (-44) * 1591 = 1

 $s_5 = 195 \mod 1591$

Verify: $195^{13} \mod 1591 = 454$

Question 4.

For each message, we need a unique combination of the values from the secret key and match them with values in the public key for verification.

For every n, we have 2n possible keys and we want to find bit size of messages, which give us the highest number of created messages.

If we choose the bit length = 2n, there is only one possible message, as $\binom{2n}{2n} = 1$. However we know from the Pascal triangle, that the highest result of combination number is when k = n/2, if n is even, and k = n/2 + 1 or k = n/2 - 1 if n is odd. So the maximum number of distinct messages one can sign with such scheme for n is $\binom{2n}{n}$ as 2n is always even.

For n = 10 we are choosing 10 out of 20 y_{ij} , which give us:

$$C(n,k) = \frac{n!}{k!(n-k)!} = \frac{20!}{10!(20-10)!} = 184756$$

unique combinations (subsets) of the key values, so we can sign 184756 distinct messages with such scheme.

(a) We have the public key (p = 101, q = 27, y = 14), a message w = 61 and the signature is (27, 51). We verify if the Elgamal signature verification equality holds:

$$y^{a}a^{b} \mod n = 14^{27}27^{51} \mod 101$$

 $y^{a}a^{b} \mod n = 40$
 $q^{w} \mod 101 = 27^{61} \mod 101$
 $q^{w} \mod 101 = 40$

The equality holds, $y^a a^b = q^w \mod n$, which means the signature is valid.

(b) We can observe that q = a = 27. As we have :

 $a \equiv q^r \mod p$ $27 \equiv 27^r \mod p$

Then r can only be 1. Knowing that r = 1, we can easily compute x with the formula :

$$x = (w - r.b)a^{-1} \mod (p1)$$

 $x = (61 - 51) \times 27^{-1} \mod 100$
 $x = 630 \mod 100$
 $x = 30$

We have x = 30. As an additional proof to verify this hypothesis, let us see if x = 30 works to compute b = 51 we were given :

$$b = (w - x.a)r^{-1} \mod (p - 1)$$

 $b = (61 - 30 \times 27) \mod 100$
 $b = 51$

We find the *b* that we were given, x = 30 seems to be valid.

Question 6

(a) If the protocol is followed properly then

$$\prod_{i=1}^t y_{p_i}^{a_{p_i}} a_{p_i}^{b_{p_i}} = \prod_{i=1}^t q^w \mod p = q^{wt} \mod p$$

(b) The protocol is not unforgeable. The sectes x_i do not have to be unique. If it happens that $x_i = x_j$, $i \neq j$, then the party *i* can forge *j*'s part of the signature a_j, p_j with his own r'_j (and vice-versa), leading to a possible signature created by less than *t* parties.