

PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION

Rabin cryptosystem

- Chinese remainder theorem
- Quadratic residues
- Euler's criterion
- Legendre and Jacobi symbols

ElGamal cryptosystem

Security definition for PKC

Chinese remainder theorem

$$\begin{aligned} x &\equiv a_1 \pmod{n_1} \\ x &\equiv a_2 \pmod{n_2} \\ &\vdots \\ x &\equiv a_k \pmod{n_k} \end{aligned} \quad \forall i, j \text{ gcd}(n_i, n_j) = 1$$

$$\begin{aligned} N &= n_1 \cdot n_2 \cdot n_3 \cdots n_k & x &= \sum_{i=1}^k a_i N_i M_i \pmod{N} \\ N_i &= N/n_i & x &+ N, x+2N, \dots \\ M_i &= N_i^{-1} \pmod{n_i} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &x \pmod{n_j} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^k a_i N_i M_i \pmod{n_j} \\ &= a_j N_j M_j \pmod{n_j} \quad (\text{because } \forall i \neq j, N_i \text{ is a multiple of } n_j) \\ &\equiv a_j \pmod{n_j} \end{aligned}$$

Example

$$N = 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 5 = 60$$

$$\begin{aligned} x &\equiv 0 \pmod{3} & N_1 &= 4 \cdot 5 = 20 & M_1 &= 20^{-1} \equiv 2^{-1} \equiv 2 \pmod{3} \\ x &\equiv 3 \pmod{4} & N_2 &= 3 \cdot 5 = 15 & M_2 &= 15^{-1} \equiv (-1)^{-1} \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \\ x &\equiv 4 \pmod{5} & N_3 &= 3 \cdot 4 = 12 & M_3 &= 12^{-1} \equiv (2)^{-1} \equiv 3 \pmod{5} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x &\equiv 0 \cdot 20 \cdot 2 + 3 \cdot 15 \cdot 3 + 4 \cdot 12 \cdot 3 \pmod{60} \\ &\equiv 0 + 135 + 144 \pmod{60} \\ &\equiv 15 + 24 \pmod{60} \\ &\equiv 39 \pmod{60} \end{aligned}$$

Quadratic residues in \mathbb{Z}_n^* no multiplicative group mod n

{set of all non-zero numbers coprime to n}
smaller than n

$a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ is a QR if $\exists x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ s.t. $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{n}$
 $x \equiv \sqrt{a} \pmod{n}$

$$\mathbb{Z}_5^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \quad \text{QR}_5 = \{1, 4\} \quad x \equiv a^{\frac{1}{2}} \pmod{5}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 1^2 &\equiv 1 \pmod{5} & \text{There are } \frac{p-1}{2} \text{ QR}_5 \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}_p^* \text{ for prime } p. \\ 2^2 &\equiv 4 \pmod{5} & x^2 \equiv a \pmod{p} \\ 3^2 &\equiv 4 \pmod{5} & (-x)^2 \equiv a \pmod{p} \\ 4^2 &\equiv 1 \pmod{5} \end{aligned}$$

Euler's Criterion

Legendre Symbol

For an odd prime p , $\gcd(a, p) = 1$

$$a^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv \begin{cases} 1 \pmod{p} & \Leftrightarrow a \text{ is a QR mod } p & \left(\frac{a}{p}\right) = 1 \text{ (QR)} \\ -1 \pmod{p} & \Leftrightarrow a \text{ is a QNR mod } p & \left(\frac{a}{p}\right) = -1 \text{ (QNR)} \end{cases}$$

Legendre symbol

Jacobi Symbol

Legendre Symbol

$$\left(\frac{a}{h}\right) = \left(\frac{a}{p_1}\right)^{d_1} \left(\frac{a}{p_2}\right)^{d_2} \dots \left(\frac{a}{p_k}\right)^{d_k}$$

$$h = p_1^{d_1} p_2^{d_2} \dots p_k^{d_k}$$

How to calculate square roots mod p ? (p - prime)

C is a QR mod p . Find X s.t. $X^2 \equiv C \pmod{p}$
 $X \equiv \sqrt{C} \pmod{p}$

- 1) $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \rightarrow$ easy
- $p \equiv 1 \pmod{4} \rightarrow$ a bit more involved (but efficient)
- for $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, $\frac{p+1}{4}$ integer division
- $\sqrt{C} \equiv \pm C^{\frac{p+1}{4}} \pmod{p}$ (1 by Euler's criterion)

$$\left(C^{\frac{p+1}{4}}\right)^2 \equiv C^{\frac{p+1}{2}} \equiv C \cdot C^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv C \pmod{p}$$

$$C \cdot C^{\frac{p-1}{2}} = C^{\frac{p-1}{2} + 1} = \frac{p-1 \cdot C}{2} = \frac{p-1}{2} \cdot C$$

Rabin cryptosystem

Elements: $n = p \cdot q$, p, q are large primes ($p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$)

Public key: n

Private key: p, q

Encrypt: $1 < w \leq p-1$ $C \equiv w^2 \pmod{n}$

Decryption: of C $w \equiv \sqrt{C} \pmod{n}$

Decryption: of C

$$W \equiv \sqrt{C} \pmod{n}$$

↓ is easy with the knowledge of p, q
hard without it

1.) How decrypt with knowledge of p and q ?

You can find x s.t.

$$x^2 \equiv C \pmod{n} \rightarrow 4 \text{ solutions}$$

From m_p and m_q , s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} m_p^2 &\equiv C \pmod{p} && \equiv m_p \equiv \pm C^{\frac{p+1}{4}} \pmod{p} \\ m_q^2 &\equiv C \pmod{q} && \equiv m_q \equiv \pm C^{\frac{q+1}{4}} \pmod{q} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \boxed{X \equiv m_p \pmod{p}} &\Rightarrow X = k \cdot p + m_p && X^2 = k^2 p^2 + 2k \cdot p \cdot m_p + m_p^2 \equiv C \pmod{p} \\ \boxed{X \equiv m_q \pmod{q}} &\Rightarrow X = l \cdot q + m_q && X^2 = l^2 q^2 + 2l \cdot q \cdot m_q + m_q^2 \equiv C \pmod{q} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x^2 &= k \cdot p + C \\ x^2 &= l \cdot q + C \\ x^2 &= m \cdot pq + C \\ x^2 &\equiv C \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

$x_1 \equiv m_p \pmod{p}$	$x_3 \equiv m_p \pmod{p}$
$x_1 \equiv m_q \pmod{q}$	$x_3 \equiv -m_q \pmod{q}$
$x_2 \equiv -m_p \pmod{p}$	$x_4 \equiv -m_p \pmod{p}$
$x_2 \equiv m_q \pmod{q}$	$x_4 \equiv -m_q \pmod{q}$

Four different solutions

$$j_q \equiv q^{-1} \pmod{p} \quad j_p \equiv p^{-1} \pmod{q}$$

$$x_1 \equiv (m_p \cdot q \cdot j_q + m_q \cdot p \cdot j_p) \pmod{n}$$

$$x_2 \equiv (-m_p \cdot q \cdot j_q + m_q \cdot p \cdot j_p) \pmod{n}$$

$$x_3 \equiv (m_p \cdot q \cdot j_q - m_q \cdot p \cdot j_p) \pmod{n}$$

$$x_4 \equiv (-m_p \cdot q \cdot j_q - m_q \cdot p \cdot j_p) \pmod{n}$$

How to attack the cryptosystem

1.) Factor n

2.) Can we calculate \sqrt{c} (all four of them) mod n without factorization?

$\gcd(x_1+x_2, n) = p$ → solution to factorization.

Example: (Exercise 6.1)

decrypt $c = 56$ with $n = 143 = 11 \cdot 13 = pq$

$$\begin{aligned} m_p &\equiv \sqrt{c} \equiv \sqrt{56} \pmod{11} \\ &\equiv 56^{\frac{12}{4}} \pmod{11} \\ &\equiv 56^3 \pmod{11} \\ &\equiv 1^3 \pmod{11} \\ &\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{11} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} m_q &\equiv \sqrt{56} \pmod{13} \\ &\equiv \sqrt{4} \pmod{13} \\ &\equiv \pm 2 \pmod{13} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{array}{l|l|l|l} x_1 \equiv 1 \pmod{11} & x_2 \equiv -1 \pmod{11} & x_3 \equiv 1 \pmod{11} & x_4 \equiv -1 \pmod{11} \\ x_1 \equiv 2 \pmod{13} & x_2 \equiv 2 \pmod{13} & x_3 \equiv -2 \pmod{13} & x_4 \equiv -2 \pmod{13} \end{array}$$

$$\begin{aligned} b_p &\equiv 11^{-1} \pmod{13} & b_q &\equiv 13^{-1} \pmod{11} \\ &\equiv 6 \pmod{13} & &\equiv 6 \pmod{11} \end{aligned}$$

$$x_1 \equiv m_p \cdot a \cdot b_q + m_q \cdot p \cdot b_p = 1 \cdot 13 \cdot 6 + 2 \cdot 11 \cdot 6 = 78 + 132 \pmod{143}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= 78 + 132 \equiv 67 \pmod{143} \\ x_2 &= -78 + 132 \equiv 54 \pmod{143} \\ x_3 &= 78 - 132 \equiv 89 \pmod{143} \\ x_4 &= -78 - 132 \equiv \dots \pmod{143} \end{aligned}$$

$$(54)^2 \pmod{143}$$

$$x_1 = N - x_4$$

⚡

Unique decryption?

→ pattern in correct plaintext e.g. binary representation of plaintext

ends in 5 symbols (1)

$$m \text{ (n-bit)} \rightarrow m \cdot 2^5 + 2^5 - 1$$



→ Extra bits:

	Quotient	Remainder
x_1	-1	0
x_2	1	1
x_3	-1	1
x_4	1	0

$$(\langle 1, 3, p \rangle)$$

→ Williams-Rabin

Let $N = pq$, with $p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$. If $p \not\equiv -q \pmod{8}$
 then $\left(\frac{2}{N}\right) = -1$. \Rightarrow For every $1 \leq x < N$ exactly one
 of $x, N-x, 2x, N-2x$ is a square modulo N .

$p \equiv 3 \pmod{8}$
 $q \equiv 7 \pmod{8}$ then you want to map $m \rightarrow x$ which
 is even and $\left(\frac{x}{N}\right) = 1$ $1 \leq m < \frac{N}{8} - 1$

$$x = P(m) \begin{cases} 4(2m+1) & \text{if } \left(\frac{2m+1}{N}\right) = 1 \\ 2(2m+1) & \text{if } \left(\frac{2m+1}{N}\right) = -1 \end{cases}$$

ElGamal

- 1.) Based on discrete logarithm
- 2.) Has randomized encryption

Elements: p - large prime
 g - primitive element in $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, \dots, p-1\}$
 $= \{g, g^2, g^3, \dots, g^{p-1}\}$

x - secret exponent $\{1, \dots, p-1\}$

$$y = g^x \pmod{p}$$

Public: p, g, y

Private: x

Encryption: $w \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$

1.) Choose r a random $r \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$

Primitives: $w \in \mathbb{Z}_p$

1.) Choose a random $r \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$

$$2.) \begin{aligned} a &\equiv g^r \pmod{p} \\ b &\equiv w \cdot g^r \pmod{p} \end{aligned}$$

$w \rightarrow (a, b)$

Decryption:

$$\begin{aligned} w &\equiv b \cdot (a^r)^{-1} \equiv b \cdot a^{-x} \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv w \cdot g^r \cdot a^{-x} \\ &\equiv w \cdot (g^r)^x \cdot (g^r)^{-x} \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv w \cdot g^{x \cdot r} \cdot g^{-x \cdot r} \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv w \pmod{p} \end{aligned}$$

Always keep r secret!

$$w = b \cdot g^{-r} \pmod{p}$$

Never reuse r !

Security definition PKC

$$\forall m, c \quad \underbrace{P(C=c)}_C = \underbrace{P(C=c | M=m)}_M \quad \Downarrow$$

$$\Pr \left\{ A[e(m), h(m)] = f(m) \right\} \leq \Pr \left\{ B[e(m)] = f(m) \right\} + \eta(n)$$

A, B are efficient algorithms (in site of private keys)

e \rightarrow encryption function

M \rightarrow plaintext distribution

$e(M)$ \rightarrow ciphertext distribution

$\eta(n)$ is a negligible function

h, f functions $\{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$

$A[e(m), h(m)]$ \rightarrow something that can be efficiently calculated from distribution of plaintexts and ciphertexts

$$\left(P(C=c | M=m) \right)$$

$B[e(m)]$ \rightarrow something that can be efficiently

$$\left(P(C=c) \right)$$

calculated from distribution of g_i vertices only