

Opening and closing borders: migration and mobility in East-Central Europe

Claire Wallace

Abstract *This paper considers the effects of migration since 1989 for Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics – countries which have been crucially affected by the opening of borders to the European Union. There has not only been migration from these countries, but also into these countries; the former has declined and the latter has increased in the last ten years. The paper argues, however, that this migration most often takes the form of short-term circulatory movements. It considers a number of factors which account for this and explain why migration is not as high as had been expected (and feared) and why it might be better described as mobility. The paper goes on to consider the effects of migration on the host societies, especially in terms of xenophobia, using the World Values Survey data for 1980, 1990 and 1995 and the New Democracies Barometer for 1998. Finally, the paper considers the role of migration in these countries in relation to an enlarged EU.*

KEYWORDS: MIGRATION; MOBILITY; BORDERS; ACCESSION; EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

Introduction

The opening of borders in Eastern and Central Europe after 1989 placed the Central-East European (CEE) states of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in a new strategic position with regard to migration. No longer were they sealed off from Western Europe; rather they became a meeting ground for all kinds of travellers. People from CEE could travel relatively easily into the European Union and those from the West could easily travel to CEE. On the other hand, until recently, visitors from Eastern and Southern Europe could also travel to CEE, even if they could not travel further west without visas, since many of the old communist-era regulations still applied. From this interaction of migrants a range of different kinds of economic activities evolved which played a part in the economic development of CEE as well as posing challenges for the culture and values of those countries. More recently, the accession negotiations to the EU has meant that migration has once more been restricted: migration policy forms an essential part of the *acquis communautaire*. CEE countries have been required to impose visa restrictions upon neighbouring citizens from the East and South, often reluctantly. The decade of the 1990s, rather than being one of increasing freedom of movement, has therefore been one of increasing restriction of movement, especially since these countries form the new border of

the Schengen region, one of borderless travel. Hence, the last ten years has been a period of both closing and opening borders.

Traditionally, the CEE countries were places of emigration: since the nineteenth century, many millions left for new lives in the New World or in Western Europe, escaping poverty or persecution. In the mid-twentieth century this continued on account of the brutal population displacements carried out by Stalin and Hitler during and after the Second World War (Fassmann and Münz 1995), and this pattern of East–West migration continued even after the borders between Western and Eastern Europe were closed by the Iron Curtain. It was a popular expectation in Western Europe (and still is) that millions would continue to pour out of CEE in search of better economic conditions. However, the reality is that migration has tended to decline from CEE countries since the early 1990s and I would predict that it will continue to do so.

At the same time, CEE countries have themselves become the targets of migratory flows. Since they will bring these patterns of migration with them into the European Union, it is important to understand what kinds of pressure exist. The general trend in these countries has been for in-migration to start to exceed out-migration. An important aspect of this migration, both into and out of the country, has been the fact that rather than permanent one-way migration (the dominant pattern until recently) there has been a predominance of *short-term, circulatory movements* backwards and forwards across borders. This would be better termed *mobility* than migration.

To understand why there has not been a deluge of migrants from the East, despite the continued fears in Western Europe, it is necessary to consider a variety of factors inhibiting migration. The paper begins with a description of the different kinds of mobility in the region and an assessment of the reasons for the absence of large-scale migration; it then goes on to consider the consequences of the migration which has taken place for the societies concerned, especially the implications for xenophobia. Finally, I discuss the role of EU enlargement. I concentrate on Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (abbreviated to CEE), but often refer to data from Germany and Austria for purposes of comparison.

Migration out of CEE

Permanent emigration from CEE countries is low and has been declining since the mid-1990s (IOM/ICMPD 1999). Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics all had a positive net migration balance in recent years – that is, more migrants were coming to those countries than were leaving. Although Poland had a negative migration balance (more were leaving than coming), this could be seen as otherwise if we take into account the large number of clandestine and temporary migrants (Stola 2001). According to Fassmann and Münz (2000: 37), in the 1970s and early 1980s there were roughly 100,000 emigrants from Eastern and Central Europe per year. In the mid-1980s this number rose to nearly 1 million and at the beginning of the 1990s to nearly 3 million per year (including war refugees, asylum-seekers and ethnic migrants or *Aussiedler*). After 1993 the numbers of European East–West migrants fell first to 2.5 million and in the following year dramatically to 500,000 per year.

Germany and Austria – the closest countries to CEE – remain the most important destinations for Central Europeans and it is here that regionally-

Table 1. Duration of time respondents wanted to go abroad (%)

	A few weeks	A few months	A few years	Forever
Poland (n = 1,141)	46	37	18	14
Czech Republic (n = 961)	49	44	24	11
Slovakia (n = 974)	56	47	27	10
Hungary (n = 973)	33	30	20	8

Source: IOM (1998).

Note: This table brings together data asked in four separate questions. Respondents could have said that they want to go abroad for a few weeks, and for a few months, and for a few years, and forever. Thus the rows do not sum to 100%.

specific short-term mobility as well as long-term migration flows are most significant. This is also reflected in the subjective perceptions of people in CEE countries (IOM 1998). Yet the IOM survey¹ showed that Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians see an important difference between working abroad and emigrating for settlement. For working abroad, Germany was seen as the best destination country with 36 per cent of Poles, 38 per cent of Czechs, 25 per cent of Hungarians and 17 per cent of Slovaks expressing an interest in working there. However, as a place to live permanently, Germany was far less popular and the numbers dropped to 5 per cent for Poles, 6 per cent for Czechs, less than 1 per cent for Slovaks and 2 per cent for Hungarians (IOM 1998).² For permanent migration, it is the New World – the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – which is seen as most attractive, reflecting historical patterns of migration. Thus, for example, in 1998, 20 per cent of Poles, 14 per cent of Czechs, 7 per cent of Hungarians and 7 per cent of Slovaks showed an interest in emigrating to the USA.

Although not many people wanted to emigrate permanently, what we do see is large numbers of people who would want to work abroad temporarily. Table 1 shows the proportions of people surveyed who expressed an interest in going abroad for a few weeks, a few months, a few years or the rest of their lives. It is clear that the shorter the period of time, the more people were interested in going abroad, and hence the most popular period was just for a few weeks. Around one-half of people in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary would like to go abroad for a few weeks. The numbers of people wanting to emigrate permanently were very small.

Germany and Austria have tried to regularise this tendency for labour migration by offering temporary labour programmes of various kinds (Hönekopp 1997). Besides regular employment on these programmes, numerous temporary migrants from CEE, mainly Poland, find their niches in the informal labour markets of Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece and other EU countries.

These workers are attracted to Germany and Austria by the possibilities of seasonal work, especially in construction, agriculture and services, at wages which are much higher than they can earn at home (Rudolph 1996; Williams *et al.* 2001). In the case of female workers, who form a large separate category, there is a high demand for domestic services such as childcare and domestic cleaning, as women in Western Europe are drawn in increasing numbers into the labour force. This demand for casual labour reflects the move towards a service

society, the presence of many large construction projects in Eastern Germany as well as the prevalence of tourist services in Austria and Southern Germany. The patterns of migration between CEE and Western Europe are to a great extent short-term and circulatory in character (Wallace and Stola 2001).

In the future, as wage levels in CEE and EU countries approach one another, even this migration will likely decline. The costs of migration will outweigh the benefits before wage levels equalise with the EU. We might expect the pattern of migration after enlargement to more reflect the experience of those sending countries which joined the EU in an earlier round of enlargement. In Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece there was not a sudden surge of out-migration after accession. Rather, they started to become receiving countries themselves.

Migration into CEE

Migration into the CEE countries has generally been higher than out-migration in recent years (Wallace and Stola 2001). As it has become more and more difficult to apply for asylum or to emigrate or work in Western Europe, so East–West migration has been displaced onto CEE countries. Since these are also the borders with the European Union, they have also become transit countries for migrants aiming for places further west. Another reason for the attraction of these countries for external migrants is their relative economic and political stability, despite high unemployment. Figure 1 shows the gross average monthly wages of selected countries in the region in 1998. The figures are in Euro PPP (purchasing power parities) and are sourced from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW 2000: 148–51). The case of Austria is used as the EU comparator, since Austria is geographically closest to the countries of CEE. Furthermore, Austria (with similar wage levels to Germany) is higher than the EU average. As the diagram shows, the Czech Republic has wages which were somewhat less than half of those in Austria, and Poland and Hungary about one-third. However, the wages in CEE were still substantially higher than in countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia, their immediate neighbours to the east and south. Hence, Ukrainians were earning only one-third of the wages of those in the Czech Republic, and Romanians only half – although we should not assume that migration is caused by different wage levels in any direct way, without taking other factors into account (Salt *et al.* 1999).

In understanding the economic well-being of the population, we should also take into account the economic situation of the population as people perceive it. Here we find that, despite rising prosperity in CEE countries, not much more than half the population believe they are able to get by on their incomes in 1998.³ In Belarus only about one-fifth were able to live from their incomes and in Romania only 16 per cent. In Ukraine this dropped to only 8 per cent. Thus in Ukraine, 92 per cent of the population were not able to live on their earned incomes; even if people have a job they are often not paid for long periods of time and wages have fallen far behind inflation. This dire economic situation was also reflected in qualitative interviews (Wallace *et al.* 1999a). This by rights should stimulate a strong migration ‘push’ out of those regions plunged into poverty. However, the numbers migrating are far lower than might be expected and people tend to leave temporarily to pursue economic activities rather than




Figure 1. Average gross monthly wages in Euro PPP (1998)

emigrate. The relatively prosperous situation of CEE countries means that they can offer certain economic opportunities to those from the East and South. Generally speaking, therefore, there has been a *convergence* between the EU and CEE countries on the one hand, and a *divergence* with the CEE countries and the CIS countries on the other (EBRD 2000).

Another reason for the attraction of the CEE for migrants is the role of the informal economy (Czako and Sik 1999; Sik 1993). This is partly a legacy from earlier times, including survival strategies which were necessary under communism, but which have taken on new features because the speed of economic change has not kept up with legislation to control it. Thus, liberalisation of the economy allowed small-scale enterprise to flourish, but fiscal and legal frameworks followed only later, meaning that there were many uncontrolled spaces in the economy which could be exploited by nationals as well as migrants – for example, in the creation of large informal markets for buying and selling consumer goods (Sik and Wallace 1999; Sword 1999). It is also the case that this legacy encouraged an attitude of beating the system, bending the rules and economic self-help, as well as a tradition of corrupting officials (Morawska 1999; Wedel 1992).

Let us now consider the different kinds of migration that have taken place in this region, taking in turn permanent settlers, asylum-seekers, transit migrants, labour migrants and small-scale traders.

Permanent settlers

The permanent settlers include people who join families, get married or otherwise choose to legally settle in the countries of Central Europe. However, these countries do not see themselves as countries of immigration, so legalisation of residence is cumbersome, naturalisation procedures are quite difficult and integration is not facilitated through, for example, language courses.

Each of the countries has a diaspora of its co-ethnics living abroad, partly on account of past migrations and partly on account of the multiple changing of the borders this century. There are often special immigration 'gates' for these

nationals to get into their historic homelands, which to some extent resemble the German *Aussiedler* policy. The largest group are ethnic Hungarians who, through successive shrinkages of the Hungarian territory, found themselves as a minority in other countries, mainly Romania, Slovakia and Yugoslavia. There are 1.6 million according to the estimate of Brubaker (1998) and 6 million according to the estimate of Juhasz (1997). They form the majority of migrants to Hungary seeking permanent settlement (of whom 70 per cent were from Romania). This inflow peaked at 29,917 migrants in 1990 and has been declining ever since (Juhasz 1997). However, this downward trend may change since the Hungarian government wishes to offer those Hungarians outside the borders a special privileged citizenship status in Hungary, even if they are currently citizens of other countries.

In Poland, there has been a movement of ethnic Poles from Siberia and Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, where many Poles had been deported under Stalin (Iglicka 1998). There are between 1.2 and 2 million ethnic Poles in the former Soviet Union, with the largest Polish communities living in Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania, where they settled in a distant past and have remained separated since the border changes after the Second World War. These ethnic Poles take part in the wider stream of circulation across the eastern Polish border, but they also are increasingly visible among foreign students, thanks to Polish government scholarship schemes.

The Czech and Slovak Republics have large numbers of each others' nationals living in their countries, reflecting the fact that they were one country for much of this century. Thus, for example, 30 per cent of the migrants to Slovakia in 1997 were from the Czech Republic (IOM/ICMPD 1999). Settlements of Czechs in Volhynia (Ukraine) and Romania have also shown an interest in 'returning' to the country where economic and political conditions were much more favourable for them, and those from Volhynia were granted a favoured immigration status on the grounds that they were escaping from the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, although this was later withdrawn (Valaskova *et al.* 1997).

However, there have also been people returning from the West. Most of the Polish diaspora – the product of the rich history of Polish emigration – live in North America and Western Europe. Some of the emigrants of more recent outflows, of which the largest one was in the late 1980s, have decided to take advantage of opportunities offered by Poland's economic progress. Yet others return having failed to integrate in their immigration countries. Most numerous are those who probably never intended to settle abroad in the first place. About half of the immigrants registered in Poland as 'permanent' are in fact returning migrants. Also people of Polish origin, such as second- or later-generation emigrants in various countries, have been visible as employees of foreign companies that began to operate in Poland (Salt and Ford 1993). Juhasz (1997) notes that 10 per cent of people naturalising as Hungarians were in fact from OECD countries, which means that many of them might also have been of Hungarian origin. In the Czech Republic, this return was encouraged by the possibility of (conditional) restitution of property. People who had been forced to leave for political reasons could have their citizenship restored and in each country some did indeed return.

The existence of large numbers of co-nationals outside the country borders is one of the reasons why the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been

Table 2. Numbers claiming asylum in CEE countries, 1995–2000

	1995	1996	1997	Jan–Dec 1999	Jan–Nov 2000
Poland	714	3,205	3,531	na	na
Czech Republic	1,406	2,156	2,098	7,222	7,793
Slovak Republic	359	415	645	1,320	1,233
Hungary	590	667	1,065	11,499	6,608

Sources: IOM/ICMPD 1999; IOM/ICMPD questionnaires 2001.

reluctant to agree to the visa restrictions that form part of the accession negotiations.

Asylum-seekers

Although the numbers of people seeking asylum in these countries have still been low in comparison with Western Europe, they are on the rise (see Table 2). In the 1990s there have been several waves of refugees within Europe, reflecting mainly the various conflicts in the region of the former Yugoslavia. In CEE, Hungary received large numbers of asylum-seekers in the late 1980s from Romania and in the early 1990s from the border regions of Yugoslavia. However, the majority of these went no further than the border and returned as soon as the situation at home was more peaceful (Fullerton *et al.* 1995).

The ratio of applications accepted to those rejected is rather low: 4 per cent in Poland, 5 per cent in the Czech Republic, 10 per cent in Slovakia and 15 per cent in Hungary in 1997 (IOM/ICMPD 1999: 30). However, the fact that large numbers disappear before their asylum application is processed means that they find other strategies for migration, or are not *bona fide* asylum-seekers (40 per cent in the Czech Republic, 89 per cent in Poland and 84 per cent in the Slovak Republic in 1997 – IOM/ICMPD 1999: 134)

This list of nationalities claiming asylum does bear resemblance to the nationalities trying to cross the border illegally and indeed one strategy of asylum-seekers in the Central European countries is to try to cross into the West, or – to put it otherwise – one strategy of transit-seekers is to claim asylum in Central Europe, especially when they are apprehended. Thus, the number of official asylum-seekers and refugees is an overestimation of the real numbers of people in this category. On the other hand, the official numbers of asylum-seekers and refugees also underestimates the real numbers of such people. A study on migration in the Czech Republic found that only those people with little social capital and few resources in the Czech Republic became official asylum-seekers (Wallace and Palyanitsa 1995). Those people who had social networks and contacts as well as survival skills for living in the Czech Republic tended not to declare themselves as official asylum-seekers but rather to become part of the community of foreigners, supporting themselves either legally or illegally by trading or finding casual jobs or even starting businesses. Hence, the official statistics rather poorly represent flows of asylum-seekers: they are inflated by illegal transit migrants but they do not include many real refugees. People fleeing their homelands can include not only people displaced directly by war or violence but also people dislodged by the collapse of economies, and those

avoiding military service and other indirect consequences of war. Thus, in the Czech Republic, there were a number of Serbian refugees from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) during the 1990s in this category, although they would not fit the official definitions of refugees.

Transit migrants

The opening of the borders meant that the CEE countries became countries that migrants enter in order to go somewhere else (usually the EU or other Western countries). Taking advantage of less stringent border controls and the lack of migration policies, some migrants enter legally or illegally with a view to going on illegally into other countries. CEE countries thus become drawn into global and transnational migration flows. The numbers of such irregular transit migrants are 'guesstimated' from the numbers of those apprehended while trying to cross the borders illegally. The numbers of illegal border crossings have generally fallen since the early 1990s, which may reflect a real fall in transit migration or it may reflect the changing efficiency of the border patrols.⁴ In Poland there has been a fall in these statistics, as is the case in Hungary. In the Czech Republic, numbers have risen steadily. However, the numbers of people who have been prevented from entering the country have risen considerably in all these countries, reflecting the strengthening control at the eastern and southern borders of CEE, making it more difficult for irregular transit migrants to enter.

According to IOM/ICMPD (1999) there are two main groups of these illegal migrants. The first group were people from the poorer and less stable countries to the east and south – mainly Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and FRY. These accounted for more than half of all those apprehended. The second group consists of non-Europeans, among whom people from Iraq, China and Afghanistan feature prominently. It is estimated that between 20 per cent and 25 per cent of these transit migrants are ferried by traffickers or human smugglers. These can be large organisations spanning several continents and earning large sums of money from their clients. Trafficking has become big and highly profitable business in the most recent wave of migration to Western Europe and the post-communist countries are one of the main routes used by the smugglers (IOM/ICMPD 1999). The most recent figures published by IOM/ICMPD show that trafficking is on the rise in CEE countries, although there was a fall between 1999 and 2000, perhaps reflecting increasing control of this activity (IOM/ICMPD 2001).

In response to this new phenomenon, and under pressure from their West European partners, the countries of the region have made significant efforts to prevent illegal transit, including the modernisation of border guards services, the introduction of more effective regulations and international co-operation on the return of illegal migrants (Laczko 2001). Nevertheless, transit migrants of this kind often disappear into the informal economy and/or try to cross the border again, although measures are being introduced to try to prevent this.

Each country of the region has developed a series of bilateral agreements on readmission, which rule that those caught illegally crossing the border (or caught within the country after crossing the border illegally) can be sent back to the last country through which they came. Since the vast majority of illegal border crossers are caught on the eastern borders of the European Union, they

Table 3. Labour migrants entering CEE countries, 1998

	No.	% of labour force
Poland	16,928	0.1
Czech Republic	44,031	0.9
Slovak Republic	3,722	0.1
Hungary	18,079	0.4

Notes: Labour force figures are author's calculations using data in WIIW (2000); work permits for Slovakia are temporary only. *Sources:* Unpublished data from IOM/ICMPD 2001; WIIW (2000).

are sent back to the Central European region, even if they came from Romania, Pakistan or Iraq originally. The authorities in Central European countries in turn try to deport irregular migrants further east or south. Elsewhere, I have argued that this has turned the CEE countries of Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics into a 'buffer zone' or 'waiting room' for holding migrants unwanted in EU countries (Wallace 2001). However, the CEE countries have now signed bilateral agreements in turn with their neighbours to the east and south. The effect of this further set of bilateral agreements is to turn the countries further east and south – such as Ukraine – into new 'migration buffers' instead. Hence, in order to prevent migration into the EU in future, Western countries will have to start to extend migration policies further and further eastwards beyond the borders of CEE.

Labour migrants

Although Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and Slovaks have been working as guest-workers or temporary labour migrants in Western Europe, there are also increasing numbers of labour migrants coming to their countries. Table 3 below shows that the largest number of work permits issued was in the Czech Republic, followed by Hungary and then Poland. It may seem surprising that there are rising numbers of migrant workers, given the high unemployment in these countries.⁵ However, the labour migrants do not for the most part directly compete in the same sectors of the labour market as the local workers. The market for foreign workers is polarised between the low-paid and low-skilled sectors, earning less than the local population, and the highly paid, highly skilled people earning much more (Salt and Ford 1993; Wallace *et al.* 1998). This often coincides with different origins of the migrants: most migrants from the East are found in the lower sector while migrants from the West locate in the upper one (although some migrants from the East are also in the upper segments). The lower segment of the labour market is much larger, so migrants from the East make up most of the total, even if many are better educated and more skilled than their jobs require (Williams *et al.* 2001). Ukrainians in each country – except Hungary – represent the majority of work permit holders.

In each country a significant number of persons come from the West – mainly from Germany, the USA and the UK – and work in the highly paid, highly

skilled sector of the economy. A certain number come as representatives of multinational companies, international organisations and NGOs, as foreign language teachers, or to set up businesses (Rudolph and Hillmann 1998). Most of them, however, stay only temporarily.

In addition to these registered workers, there is a large number of unregistered workers, people who come as students or 'tourists' and find jobs in the informal economy. For the kinds of work that many of these migrants perform, an irregular status is advantageous. The procedure for applying for work and residence permits is quite cumbersome and time-consuming, and is becoming more difficult as stricter regulations are imposed by the authorities over the 1990s. This discourages people from registering, especially when the bureaucratic procedures are unable to cope with casual types of work. Some migrants do not want to register in order to avoid paying tax and social security fees, and this can also be an advantage for their employers.

Estimates of unregistered labour migrants vary. In the Czech Republic there may be about 200,000 illegal foreign workers according to official estimates – that is, as many as work permit and business authorisation holders combined. Assuming the same proportion of legal to illegal workers for Slovakia, there may be up to 10,000 illegal foreign workers there. In Hungary it is estimated that the illegal workers represent probably half of all foreign workers, and this seemed to be confirmed when a spot check by the Hungarian authorities found that 50 per cent of foreign workers were not legally employed (IOM/ICMPD 1999). Estimates in Poland range between 150,000 and 200,000 migrants annually – that is, ten times the number of work permit holders – but some think that their number is even higher. A study of migration flows from Ukraine to Poland allows for estimates of as many as 800,000 visits involving work annually (Okólski 2001). Taking into account that these are mostly short-term migrants (or very short-term), the actual stock of migrants is much lower.

As elsewhere, irregular foreign workers in Central Europe are concentrated in construction and agriculture, then in housekeeping, restaurants and hotels. They may also be found in small businesses in labour-intensive industries. A comparison of native and migrant workers in the labour market in CEE found that migrant workers tend to be small rather than large enterprises, in service-sector enterprises rather than industry, and in private concerns rather than in public-sector or privatised companies. This was the opposite to the situation of native workers, who are rather inflexible in their employment and tied to the older, larger industries in industrial areas by tradition and by their accommodation (Wallace *et al.* 1998).

Migrant workers tend to congregate in big cities, in particular in Budapest, Prague and Warsaw. In these cities there are diversified labour markets requiring unskilled workers on the one hand and skilled professionals on the other (Sassen 1995). Ukrainians are the most numerous group of migrants in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. They are also active in Hungary, although Romanians are the leading group in that country. In addition to other eastern neighbours, such as Belorussians and Russians, there is a large group of Vietnamese. Recruited during the communist period to work in large industries, these migrants did not return home when their labour contracts were finished but instead sought other kinds of work or started trading. Labour inspectors have noted also irregular migrants from Western Europe and America – language teachers, consultants, employees of foreign companies – who simply

disregard local employment regulations. For example, of 2,500 cases of illegal employment of foreigners registered by labour inspectors in Poland in 1998, 300 migrants were from the European Union and 36 from the USA (Stola 2001). The illegality of the migrants' status results from the lack of an appropriate work permit rather than illegal entry or residence. Irregular labour migrants enter legally and usually respect the three-month limit for visa-free visits. They are therefore irregular as foreign workers, but not as foreign visitors.

Irregular migrants make up a large part of labour migrations to the region and hence reinforce the importance of informal labour markets. Informal institutions, such as informal hiring fairs, middlemen and labour agents who operate in both sending and receiving countries, migrant networks providing information and financing, transportation arrangements and so on have all appeared in the 1990s (Stola 2001). The shorter and more-often-repeated the work-cycle of the petty labour migrants, the more important are the institutions of the informal labour market which facilitate contacts between migrants and local employers and reduce their transaction costs. Recruitment agents contribute to the expansion of the migrant labour market in sending and receiving countries. In sending countries they spread knowledge about migration through advertising.

Small-scale traders

If we are considering forms of new cross-border mobility for economic purposes, then we should not leave out small-scale traders, even if many of them travel to Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics for only a few days. This category of migrants, who do not figure in the traditional migration literature, nevertheless take advantage of open or semi-open borders in order to pursue economic activities. Known also as 'suitcase traders' or 'shuttle traders', these were already visible in the 1980s but their numbers expanded considerably during the 1990s. Many large markets were established on the borders and in large cities for these traders to buy and sell, bringing with them (and taking home) as much as they could carry in a voluminous bag or suitcase. They then sell these goods in their home country. Their activities are now quite well documented (Iglycka 1999; Sik and Wallace 1999; Wallace *et al.* 1999b). Whereas at first they came mainly to sell goods which could be acquired more cheaply in the former Soviet Union, after 1992 they came more often to buy goods. This reflected soaring prices and the fall in production in the Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation and the continuing worsening of the economy so that many families had to find additional means to supplement their incomes. In Poland, which is the main place of international 'petty' trade in the region, it accounted for 46 per cent of all registered trade to Ukraine and the equivalent of 138 per cent of the registered trade to Belarus in the mid-1990s (Wallace and Stola 2001). The Warsaw Stadium, one of the biggest bazaars of this kind, used to generate a turnover which made it equivalent to one of the largest industries in Poland and maintained an estimated 60,000 jobs (Sword 1999); although this may have declined since visa restrictions were introduced for CIS countries, it nevertheless continues to be an important source for economic mobility.

Yet, as with migration out of CEE, the migration into these countries tends to have a temporary, circulatory character. This means that migration is not as high as expected and takes different forms.

Why is migration not higher?

Future economic conditions

A factor here is that, although CEE and Eastern European societies have suffered much in the transition from communism and living standards for most people are still below what they were in 1989, many people still have faith that the future will be better. Table 4 shows respondents' assessments of their economic situation at the time of the interview (1998) compared with their ideas of whether their family situation will be better in five years' time. Only in the Czech Republic are the future expectations more gloomy than the present economic prospects and this could be explained by a slump in the economy in 1997 after several years of steady growth. In every other country, the expectations of the future are more optimistic than assessments of the present. In most countries, people believe that things will get better. This is even the case in places such as Belarus, Ukraine and Romania where poverty rates are extremely high. This perhaps represents the victory of faith over experience, but also helps to explain why many people are not more interested in migrating and escaping from very poor economic conditions.

Those who have established a pattern of circulatory migration may become more and more dependent upon wages from abroad and less and less integrated into the home labour market. Okólski (2001) estimates that these migrants are socially and culturally disadvantaged in the long term because they are neither fully part of one society nor another. Hence, for some migrants, circulatory patterns may become a more permanent arrangement, without ever leading to full emigration. This reflects older patterns of seasonal migration for agriculture or between industries and villages which still persist in some parts of CEE.

This situation of dislocation from the home society is already established with some Ukrainian migrants who have followed a pattern of working in Poland and the Czech Republic (and to a lesser extent Hungary and Slovakia). For them, the imposition of visas and the tightening of borders to the east of CEE,

Table 4. *Assessment of household economic conditions now and in five years' time*

	Now (1998)	In 5 years' time
Czech Republic (n = 961)	52	36
Slovakia (n = 923)	41	46
Poland (n = 1,141)	44	46
Hungary (n = 973)	24	49
Belarus (n = 1,000)	43	45
Romania (n = 1,192)	33	50
Ukraine (n = 1,161)	15	46

Note: Question wording was: 'As for your own household, how do you rate its economic situation today? Very satisfactory, fairly satisfactory, not very satisfactory, very unsatisfactory' (the first two scores were combined to create this table). The second question was 'What do you think the economic situation of your household will be in five years? Much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, a lot worse'. Again, the first two scores were combined to create this figure. N = 7,588 all countries combined.

Source: New Democracies Barometer, 1998.

will probably result in re-directing patterns of commuting migration or encourage the use of more illegal methods.

Migration policies

The opening of the borders has allowed a relatively free flow of people to and fro. However, long-term migration has been discouraged. People from CEE can travel to Western Europe on a variety of short-term schemes to work, to study or as 'tourists' for up to three months. During this time they may take up some kind of clandestine economic activity. Similar rules prevailed on the eastern border until 2000 when Eastern European migrants from many countries could arrive as short-term labour migrants or as 'tourists' and undertake clandestine economic activity. This has now been made more difficult by the fact that migrants must apply for work permits before they enter the country and by the imposition of visas upon CIS nationals as well as many from post-communist South-East Europe. However, this does not make the borders impermeable. Before, migrants from the East had to obtain vouchers; now they need to find an invitation in order to obtain a visa – this might be troublesome, but is not a great barrier to mobility.

The imposition of visas for CIS nationals has been resisted by CEE countries such as Poland which have benefited from the circulation of people across the eastern borders. However, now these patterns of migration have been established from places such as the Ukraine, it might be the case that they continue in spite of the new restrictions, with CIS nationals finding new ways of circumventing these regulations. Indeed, there is evidence that they have now spread further into the EU, especially in those countries such as Portugal or Italy with large informal economies (Peixoto 2002). This may in the future change the character of the migration that we have been describing because of the greater distances involved.

Household economies

An additional factor limiting migration at the moment is the nature of the household economy in CEE (cf. Portes 1997; Stark 1991). The dominant pattern is for migrants from the region to arrive singly, not in family groups. They migrate in order to support households or more extended families who continue to live at home. The migration is worthwhile for them not because of their better living conditions in the destination country (where most live very frugally), but rather because of the status and money that this can bring when they return home. The money they earn may not go very far in the destination countries (as they are often low-paid workers) but can represent a princely sum in the country of origin. Nor will people in the country of origin know about the degrading conditions under which the money was earned.⁶

In most cases migrants are supporting children, wives, husbands, parents, grandparents and so on who continue to live in the family dwelling, often raising livestock and working small garden plots in order to supplement living standards. It is the combination of all these sources of income – pensions, migrants' wages, child allowances etc. – which enables families to survive as part of a portfolio of activities (Rose and Haerpfer 1992; Wallace 2002). These survival strategies of post-communist households build upon earlier forms of

self-help using the state economy, self provisioning and peasant subsistence (mostly in the form of garden plots) along with the market economy in different combinations to survive (Piirainen 1997). Migrant remittances and industrial earnings are additional contributions to the household portfolios in countries where people seldom manage alone. This is encouraged by the fact that many people own their own property in which they have invested time and effort and which represents a source of security in uncertain times.

Rather than being family dependents in the migration process, women form a whole different set of migration flows, which are not necessarily concerned only with family reunification. In CEE and CIS countries, the tradition of women working as income-earners along with their lower wages and greater likelihood of unemployment encourages them to become migrants. Areas of the labour market which are feminised include the hotel and catering trade, sectors of agriculture and the sex trade (cf. Campani 1995). However, men form the majority of migrants.

Households and gender intersect in the migration patterns of Central Europe because they affect what kinds of work women are able to do, given that they also have domestic responsibilities, which is perhaps why they are found more often on very short trading trips rather than longer periods of working abroad. In prevailing gender ideologies, women have responsibility for household budgets, which might also drive them out to seek alternative sources of income. Women's roles also affect at which stages of the life-cycle they are able to engage in supplementary income-earning activity abroad. The work of women in different generations of the family in maintaining the household and family and in rearing children enables men to become circular migrants. Thus the gender ideologies in the household as well as in the society as a whole are important in determining the types of migration and mobility taking place.

The welfare state

This leads us to consider a further factor which will likely limit migration. Welfare states are attached to nation-states, and the countries of CEE, along with the CIS countries, have well-developed welfare states which, although under some considerable strain, do provide pensions, education and a health service for their citizens. It is my contention that, far from encouraging 'welfare shopping' amongst migrants, these welfare states encourage immobility as benefits depend upon contributions. Contributions are often paid through the workplace in CIS countries which is why nominal unemployment is very low: people continue to be registered at their place of work in order to be entitled to benefits, even if they are not paid or are not in fact working (or are working abroad). To be sick, to raise their children and in order to retire, migrants have to return home and take advantage of their own welfare states. The nature of the welfare system, along with the irregular status of many migrants, means that they need to continue to stay in contact with their own welfare system in order to be entitled to health care, education and pensions. This tends to encourage circular migration: migrants return home to use the welfare system when they need it and they leave children at home for their education and health needs. This is an important factor which makes the migration in the Central European region different to migration between poorer, developing nations and developed ones.

Cultural and social embeddedness

Further factors discouraging migration include the limitations of language and culture as well as the attachment to the land of origin. Many languages are spoken in the region, and although those from neighbouring slavic countries are often able to understand one another, only the most educated have been able to learn EU languages. Social networks and family support are tied to the home base and form an essential element of the survival strategies of households in times of transformation (Williams 2001). However, this might change once larger migrant communities are established abroad.

Improved communications

Improvements in communications have contributed to increased mobility world-wide and have led to a shrinking of space-time distancing (Beck *et al.* 1995). Since the fall of communism in 1989, there have been great improvements in transportation in Central and Eastern Europe. New roads and highways have been built, many more border crossing points opened and the traditionally good railway infrastructure has been supplemented by long-distance private buses. There has been an increase in personal car ownership, as well as in the volume of air transport. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have all rebuilt their airports to become busy international centres. The result is that both the cost and ease of travel are relatively low, which is partly why there is so much cross-border traffic. Although this has increased migration flows, it has also improved the chances of going back (or even back and forth).

In addition, the improvement in communications technologies (telecommunications, post, television, electronic mail, internet) means that information can flow more quickly and freely between people and across the world (cf. Castells 1997). The transfer not just of information but also of capital has assisted the kinds of development taking place in Eastern and Central Europe. The ease of information flows has greatly assisted the development of transnational networks and communities which are so important in the determination of migration. Staying in touch with fellow-nationals and family members around the world is not as difficult as it was in the past, and information about how to avoid migration controls is important not just for migrants but also for migrant traffickers and the development of informal migration institutions. Communications make it easier for migrants to be simultaneously members of more than one society without relinquishing their national identities, language or culture.

Summing-up

Putting all these factors together, we could say that the new patterns of migration have to some extent a post-industrial character (Massey *et al.* 1998). Whereas the historical 'Fordist' East-West migrations from the countryside or from other countries were often concerned with migration to work in large industries, most of the work done by the migrants who we are concerned with in this article is created by the rise of the service economy and regimes of flexible accumulation (Lash and Urry 1994). This creates a demand for flexible workers, both in the primary and secondary segments of the labour market (and includes

Table 5. *Per cent agreeing with each statement about migrants by country*

	Hungary	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Poland	Austria	NDB mean
The number of migrants should be reduced a lot	47	44	33	31	5	26
Migrants should not stay too long	33	19	25	15	13	17
Migrants should be sent home	22	26	37	25	20	21
Migrants increase crime rates	78	82	71	71	53	58
Migrants take away jobs	67	53	56	55	37	49
Migrants are good for the economy	6	14	12	8	32	22
Migrants make society more open	25	27	35	26	41	29

Note: The percentages agreeing represent those who 'strongly agree' and those who 'somewhat agree' on a five-point scale.

Source: New Democracies Barometer (NDB), 1998.

the 'privileged layer' of language teachers, consultants and mobile managers), which can be fulfilled by migrants. Indeed this demand can be fulfilled better by temporary circulating migrants than by the 'Fordist'-style migrants of the earlier era following a pattern of one-way migration and assimilation. Patterns of temporary and irregular migration flows fit with the developing trends in the casualisation and flexibilisation of parts of the European labour market, seen most clearly, for example, in Southern Europe (Baldwin-Edwards 1998; Mingione 1995).

The impact of migration: xenophobia

The shift from societies based on emigration to ones based on immigration has not been fully accepted in European public opinion. Even in Germany, the biggest receiving country, this concept is resisted. In the countries of CEE, isolated for many years by the Iron Curtain, this idea is even more alien. These societies view themselves as culturally homogenous and indeed, there is to some extent a xenophobic and nationalistic backlash against the idea of multicultural societies, although this is not as strong in terms of political movements as it has been in Austria and other West European countries. Furthermore these immigrant groups, being new and having the character of circular migrants rather than permanent settlers, have not really challenged the political system too much. Nor have they any incentive to organise themselves as lobbies. Nevertheless, the resistance to the recognition of more than one culture within the state border is a potential source of tension.

In 1998 I was involved in managing a survey in several Central and Eastern European countries as part of the New Democracies Barometer (NDB) which included some questions on xenophobia.⁷ The countries were Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, FRY, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Belarus (N = 11,294); Austria was included for purposes of comparison

with Western Europe. The NDB mean allows comparison between the CEE and other post-communist countries. Table 5 presents some key results from this survey.

If we look at responses to the statement 'The number of migrants should be reduced a lot', we find large numbers agreeing in Hungary and the Czech Republic, fewer in Slovakia and Poland and very few (only 5 per cent) in Austria. In answer to the statement 'Migrants should not stay too long', Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are the most xenophobic countries, with Poles rather less xenophobic; and in this case the Austrians (13 per cent) more resemble the Poles (15 per cent). In other words, there is an expressed preference for short-term migration. In response to the stronger statement 'Migrants should be sent home', we find about one-fifth in Hungary and Austria agreeing, one-quarter in the Czech Republic and Poland, and a much larger number – 37 per cent – in Slovakia. The overwhelming majority of CEE citizens think that migrants increase crime rates – 82 per cent in the Czech Republic, 78 per cent in Hungary, 71 per cent in Slovakia, 71 per cent in Poland, and one-half of respondents in Austria. This is because the opening of the borders coincided with a steep rise in crime, although the two are not necessarily directly connected. About one-half of CEE residents are afraid that migrants will take away jobs, although this rises to two-thirds in Hungary and falls to only one-third in Austria. In all these questions CEE citizens are in all respects more xenophobic than Austrians. Comparison with the NDB mean shows, moreover, that they are also more anti-migrant than people in other post-communist countries.

However, we should be careful to also ask positive questions about migration, not just negative ones. If we word the statements the other way round, for instance 'Migrants are good for the economy', we find the same consistent pattern as in the negative statements, with one-third of Austrians agreeing, but only 6 per cent of Hungarians, 14 per cent of Czechs, 12 per cent of Slovaks and 8 per cent of Poles. Similarly, whilst 41 per cent of Austrians thought that 'Migrants make society more open', this was the case with only about one-quarter of Hungarians, Czechs and Poles and 35 per cent of Slovaks.

Hence, we find a fairly consistent pattern of xenophobia being higher in CEE countries than in Austria, no matter whether we ask positive or negative questions. This is despite the fact that migration is generally low in these countries (even though it has increased) and nowhere represents more than 2 per cent of the population (in Austria, by contrast, it is just over 9 per cent and in Germany 8.5 per cent). Xenophobia tends to be higher in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia than in Poland. This may be because it was well-known that the Polish economy benefited from the small-scale traders coming over the eastern border – indeed there were demonstrations and road blocks against the imposition of visas in those (often depressed) Eastern regions which benefited most from this trade. Furthermore, Polish people have the most contact with the peoples of the former Soviet Union and also the longest border with them and it is from these countries that most of the migrants come.

Summarising, we can say that xenophobia is very high in CEE. In these countries it is not only high compared with Austria, the nearest Western neighbour, which has experienced a lot more immigration, but also high when compared with other post-communist countries such as Slovenia, Croatia,

Table 6. Percentages who would not like Muslims, immigrants or someone of a different race as a neighbour: selected CEE and West European countries, 1980–95

	Different race			Muslims		Immigrants		
	1980	1990	1995	1990	1995	1980	1990	1995
Austria		8		14			20	
West Germany	10	10	2	20	9	20	16	4
East Germany		12	4	20	16		18	10
Hungary		23	19	18			22	25
Poland			20		26			21
Czech Republic		29	10	47	46		33	28
Slovakia		36	14	51	68		37	18

Source: World Values Surveys. Numbers sampled in each country: Austria 1,460; West Germany 1,305, 2,101 and 1,017 in 1980, 1990 and 1995 respectively; East Germany 1,336 (1990) and 1,009 (1995); Hungary 999 and 644; Czech Republic 931 and 1,147; Slovakia 466 and 1,095.

Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania (Wallace 1999a, 1999b). Is this a response to the opening of the borders?

Here, the World Values Survey, conducted in 1980, 1990 and 1995, can give us some information. Although the questions asked were different to those in the NDB survey, they can give us some indication of changes over time. Austria and Germany are included for comparison. Table 6 sets out some results. If we look first of all at people who would not find someone of a different race acceptable as a neighbour, we find that these numbers have shrunk in all countries. In all countries there is increasing tolerance of people of a different race, as least as far as it is measured in this question. In CEE countries, however, the number remains high even though it has declined.

In the case of intolerance towards Muslims, this has also fallen in the 1990s and by 1995 respondents were generally more tolerant towards Muslims everywhere apart from Slovakia, where the proportion rejecting Muslim neighbours has risen considerably. Czechs and Slovaks have an exceptionally high intolerance of Muslims according to these data; and in CEE countries generally there is much less tolerance of Muslims than in the West. In the case of attitudes towards immigrants, finally, we find that there is also increasing tolerance (except in Hungary), but again with very high levels of intolerance in CEE compared with the West.

Yet xenophobia has had very little impact in terms of electoral politics in Central and Eastern Europe, where migration has never really been a political issue. This is in contrast to the way in which such issues are used by European Union politicians, with the rise of anti-immigration parties in countries such as Austria, France, Italy, Belgium and most recently the Netherlands. In general, therefore, there is an increase in tolerance in the CEE countries towards foreigners or those of a different religion or race, although intolerance is higher in Eastern than in Western Europe. This also confirms previous analysis comparing different points in time (Haerpfer and Wallace 1998).

Why are there such high levels of xenophobia in CEE? One answer might be the general isolation of these countries and the tendency to see themselves as culturally homogenous (reinforced by post-1989 independence). Another

might be the absence of debates about migrants within civil society and the absence of organisations to put alternative points of view to support migrants. The temporary and irregular status of most migrants means that they have no organisational or political lobby and this tends to reinforce prejudice against them. Furthermore, we could say that the perceived threat from migration does not correspond with the real threat, since Slovakia has the lowest number of migrants, but some of the most xenophobic attitudes towards migration. Finally, an earlier analysis (Wallace 1999a, 1999b) has indicated that it is the older, rural and less-educated people who are the most xenophobic. They are also the losers in the transition process and most threatened by the changes that have taken place (Wallace 1997). The younger, urbanised and educated population, whom we could say are the winners of transition, are the least xenophobic.

Conclusions: implications for EU enlargement

If what we are arguing in this article is correct – that short-term mobility rather than long-term migration is the general pattern of movement in this region – then there is little to fear from the enlargement process to CEE, especially as living conditions converge. Those inclined to leave will have done so already under the various opportunities (both legal and illegal) which were available to them. For the most part, migration will take the form of short-term, circulatory commuting where people can travel relatively easily. However, closing borders is likely to increase the possibility of permanent or long-term commuting by making migration more difficult. It would also be likely to drive migration underground.

This conclusion has implications for the transition periods being imposed upon the CEE countries in terms of labour market integration during the accession: the longer the transition the more distortions in mobility this may introduce with people being forced to leave for longer periods.

However, since Germany and Austria are disproportionately the target countries of this kind of East–West migration, they feel the most threatened both by short-term circulatory movements (which would undermine the position of native workers faced with cheap competition from across the border) and also by the lack of sound border protection and migration control within the CEE countries which makes them vulnerable to incursions from elsewhere. This has been reflected in recent political trends in Austria and Germany, where xenophobic politics have been ascendant over the last ten years.

We conclude therefore that migration from CEE countries will continue to decline as there is greater convergence with the EU. Indeed perhaps there is a greater danger that there will *not be enough* migrants from CEE to fulfil the demographic needs of European societies, since the countries of CEE are beginning to follow the same pattern of greater longevity and declining birth rates. This might be compensated by taking more migrants from the CIS and post-communist South-East Europe.

However, migration *into* CEE could be expected to rise, especially if there is increasing economic deterioration and political instability in the countries to the east and south of them. They will continue to act as gateways to the European Union for a wider circle of countries and this is a more likely future problem than the influx of migration *from* CEE.

The patterns of mobility reflect the transformations in the EU as well as in

post-communist societies, with a post-industrial shift towards flexible accumulation and a service economy. However, there seems to be a contradiction between the continuing demand for temporary and flexible workers in European labour markets and the political desire to close borders in response to xenophobic and political pressures. Hence, we might expect this continuing demand for labour to be met in future by further irregular migration and informal labour markets. Since the pattern of commuting across the eastern borders of CEE is already quite well established and has created a dependency in the household economies over the last ten years, we might expect this to continue in a more clandestine form. In other words, some of this circulatory migration will be driven underground.

A new border, however, will emerge to the east along the eastern borders of the CEE countries, constructed as a result of European Union policies as to who is allowed into the privileged club of Europe and who is excluded. This will in turn help to reinforce the prejudices, held by many in both EU states and in the CEE countries, that all countries to the east and south of themselves are somehow less civilised and less deserving than themselves, thus further exacerbating xenophobia (Hars *et al.* 2001; Kürti 1997).

At the very moment that the countries of CEE found their independence and national integrity, they were also integrated into a new set of supra-national structures. Since 1989 the nation-states of Central Europe were able to enjoy their autonomy after years of Soviet domination. However, in the field of migration, as in other fields, their reforms are determined to a great extent by supra-national bodies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and so on. Hence they are forced to close borders and patrol the boundaries of Europe on account of external political pressure rather than in response to their own perceived needs.

Xenophobia is likely to be an issue in these CEE countries, perhaps brought more into the open by in-migration. In these countries integration policies or public discussion of the implications of migration are underdeveloped. Xenophobia may take the form of attacks on or harassment of foreigners, but also has the potential to be reflected in politics as part of an anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-international backlash. This is especially the case if the transition turns out to be not as fast and successful as people had hoped: here we have to bear in mind that even in the most successful CEE countries only about half the population are better off than they were before 1989 in terms of their own subjective assessment (Wallace 1997). In the post-communist countries beyond CEE, the overwhelming majority of households are worse off than they were under communism. Until now, many people remain optimistic about the future nevertheless. Although people are still optimistic at present, and xenophobia has not played a large part in popular politics until now, it would seem there is some potential for this to happen, especially for those who are the losers in the transition from communism.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the help of ICMPD Vienna, and especially Irene Stacher, in providing information for this article; and also the role of Dariusz Stola.

Notes

- 1 The International Organization for Migration (IOM 1998) reports the results of a survey carried out by this author (N = 11,294 face-to-face interviews in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Belarus).
- 2 It should be emphasised that these numbers were based upon a representative sample survey of the populations of those countries carried out in 1998 which asked people only if they were interested in going abroad. This can only provide a rough indication of the numbers who might actually leave, although another analysis of this data-set showed a high correlation between actually having been abroad and expressing an interest in going abroad (Wallace 1999a).
- 3 The exact question wording was: 'Do you get enough money from your main job to buy what you really need?' The answer categories were: definitely enough, just enough, not quite enough, definitely not enough.
- 4 The meaning of these figures is ambiguous. A rise in the number of people caught illegally crossing the border could reflect the increased efficiency of the border patrols rather than a change in migration patterns. It might also reflect the fact that the increased efficiency of the border controls has caused illegal border crossers and traffickers to change their strategies. Thus the rise in the numbers caught at the Czech border might simply reflect the increased efficiency of policing at the Polish border with Germany.
- 5 In fact unemployment is lower in the Czech Republic than in the other countries we are considering. And it is lowest of all in Prague, where the majority of labour migrants are working.
- 6 A study by Romaniszyn (2000) of Polish cleaners in Vienna found that Polish women were reluctant to admit that they performed the degrading work of cleaning other people's houses. However, when they returned home they were granted greater prestige for having acquired a variety of consumer or material goods from these earnings and no-one asked them how they earned the money. The same is true for many sex workers.
- 7 The survey was sponsored by the Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Verkehr, Vienna.

References

- Baldwin-Edwards, M. (1998) 'Where free markets reign: aliens in the twilight zone', *South European Society and Politics*, 3(3): 1–15.
- Beck, U., Giddens, A. and Lash, S. (1995) *Reflexive Modernisation*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Brubaker, R. (1998) 'Migrations of ethnic unmixing in the "new Europe"', *International Migration Review*, 32(4): 1047–65.
- Campani, G. (1995) 'Women migrants: from marginal subjects to social actors', in Cohen, R. (ed.) *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 546–50.
- Castells, M. (1997) *The Information Age. Economy, Society and Culture. Volume 2: The Power of Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Czako, A. and Sik, E. (1999) 'The characteristics and origins of the Comecon open air market in Hungary', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 23(4), 715–37.
- EBRD (2000) *Transition Report 2000*. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- Fassmann, H. and Münz, R. (1995) 'European East–West migration, 1945–1992', in Cohen, R. (ed.) *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 470–80.
- Fassmann, H. and Münz, R. (2000) 'Vergangenheit und Zukunft der europäischen Ost-West-Wanderung', in Fassmann, H. and Münz, R. (eds) *Ost-West Wanderung in Europa*. Vienna: Böhlau, 11–48.
- Fullerton, M., Sik, E. and Toth, J.E. (1995) *Refugees and Migrants: Hungary at the Crossroads*. Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Political Science.
- Haerper, C. and Wallace, C. (1998) 'Xenophobic attitudes towards migrants and ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe', in Columbus, F. (ed.) *Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, Volume 1*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 183–214.
- Hars, A., Sik, E. and Toth, J. (2001) 'Hungary', in Wallace, C. and Stola, D. (eds) *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*. London: Palgrave, 227–92.
- Hönekopp, E. (1997) *Labour Migration to Germany from Central and Eastern Europe*. Nuremberg: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung, Report No. 23.
- Iglicka, K. (1998) 'Are they fellow countrymen or not? The migration of ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan to Poland', *International Migration Review*, 32(4), 995–1014.
- Iglicka, K. (1999) 'The economics of petty trade on the Eastern Polish border', in Iglicka, K. and Sword, K. (eds) *The Challenge of East–West Migration for Poland*. London: Macmillan, 120–44.

- IOM (1998) *Migration Potential in Central and Eastern Europe*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- IOM/ICMPD (1999) *Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: 1999 Review*. Vienna: International Organization for Migration and International Centre for Migration Policy Development.
- IOM/ICMPD (2001) *Annual Report on Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe (1999–2000)*. Budapest: ICMPD Liaison Office.
- Juhász, J. (1997) 'The statistical characteristics of migration', in Fullerton, M., Sik, E. and Toth, J. (eds) *From Improvisation toward Awareness? Contemporary Migration Politics in Hungary*. Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Science, Institute of Political Science, 17–31.
- Kürti, L. (1997) 'Globalisation and the discourse of "otherness" in the "new" Eastern and Central Europe', in Modood, T. and Werbner, P. (eds) *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe. Racism, Identity, Community*. London and New York: Zed Books, 29–53.
- Laczkó, F. (2001) 'Irregular migration in Eastern Europe: an overview of return policies and procedures', in Wallace, C. and Stola, D. (eds) *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*. London: Palgrave, 151–74.
- Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) *Economies of Signs and Space*. London: Sage.
- Massey, D.S., Arango, J., Hugo, A., Kouacouci, A., Pellegrino, A. and Taylor, J.E. (1998) *Worlds in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Mingione, E. (1995) 'Labour market segmentation and informal work in Southern Europe', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 2(2): 121–43.
- Morawska, E. (1999) *The New–Old Transmigrants, Their Transnational Lives, and Ethnicization: A Comparison of 19th/20th and 20th/21st C Situations*. Florence: European University Institute.
- Okólski, M. (2001) 'Incomplete migration: a new form of mobility in Central and Eastern Europe. The case of Polish and Ukrainian migrants', in Wallace, C. and Stola, M. (eds) *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*. London: Palgrave, 105–28.
- Peixoto, J. (2002) 'Strong market, weak state: the case of recent foreign immigration in Portugal', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 28(3): 483–97.
- Piirainen, T. (1997) *Towards a New Social Order in Russia. Transforming Structures and Everyday Life*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Portes, A. (1997) 'Immigration theory for a new century: some problems and opportunities', *International Migration Review*, 31(4): 799–825.
- Romaniszyn, K. (2000) 'Wpływ migracji zagranicznych na forme organizacji rodziny' ('The impact of international migration on family models'), *Studia Polonijne*, 21: 7–40.
- Rose, R. and Haerpfer, C.W. (1992) *New Democracies between State and Market*. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, Studies in Public Policy, No. 204.
- Rudolph, H. (1996) 'The new *gastarbeiter* system in Germany', *New Community*, 22(2): 287–300.
- Rudolph, H. and Hillmann, F. (1998) 'The invisible hand needs invisible heads: managers, experts and professionals from Western countries to Poland', in Koser, K. and Lutz, H. (eds) *The New Migration in Europe*. London: Macmillan, 60–84.
- Salt, J. and Ford, R. (1993) 'Skilled migration in Europe: the shape of things to come?', in King, R. (ed.) *Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future*. London: Belhaven, 293–309.
- Salt, J., Clarke, J., Schmidt, S., Hogarth, J., Densham, P. and Compton, P. (1999) *Assessment of Possible Pressure and its Labour Market Impact Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe*. London: University College London, Department of Geography.
- Sassen, S. (1995) 'Immigration and local labour markets', in Portes, A. (ed.) *The Economic Sociology of Immigration*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 87–127.
- Sik, E. (1993) 'From the second economy to the informal economy', *Journal of Public Policy*, 12(2): 153–75.
- Sik, E. and Wallace, C. (1999) 'The development of open-air markets in East-Central Europe', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 23(4): 697–714.
- Stark, O. (1991) *The Migration of Labour*. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell.
- Stola, D. (2001) 'Two kinds of quasi-migration in the Middle Zone: Central Europe as a space for transit migration and mobility for profit', in Wallace, C. and Stola, D. (eds) *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*. London: Palgrave, 84–104.
- Sword, K. (1999) 'Cross border "suitcase trade" and the role of foreigners in Polish informal markets', in Iglicka, K. and Sword, K. (eds) *The Challenge of East–West Migration for Poland*. London: Macmillan, 145–67.
- Valaskova, N., Uherek, Z. and Broucek, S. (1997) *Aliens or One's Own People. Czech Immigrants from the Ukraine to the Czech Republic*. Prague: Institute of Ethnology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.

- Wallace, C. (1997) *Who is for Capitalism, Who is for Communism?* Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, Report No. 44.
- Wallace, C. (1999a) *Xenophobia in Transition: Austria and Eastern Europe Compared. Final Report to the BMWV*. Vienna: Institut für Höhere Studien.
- Wallace, C. (1999b) 'Xenophobie in Zentral- und Osteuropa', in Fassmann, H., Matuschek, H. and Menasse, E. (eds) *Abgrenzen, Ausgrenzen, Aufnehmen*. Klagenfurt: Drava, 33–42.
- Wallace, C. (2001) 'The new migration space as a buffer zone?', in Wallace, C. and Stola, D. (eds) *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*. London: Palgrave, 72–83.
- Wallace, C. (2002) 'Household strategies: their conceptual relevance and analytical scope in social research', *Sociology*, 36(2): 275–92.
- Wallace, C. and Palyanitsa, A. (1995) 'East–West migration and the Czech Republic', *Journal of Public Policy*, 15(1): 89–109.
- Wallace, C. and Stola, D. (eds) (2001) *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*. London: Palgrave.
- Wallace, C., Bedzir, V. and Chmouliar, O. (1998) *Some Characteristics of Labour Migrants in Central Europe*. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Wallace, C., Shmulyar, O. and Bedzir, V. (1999b) 'Investing in social capital: the case of small-scale, cross-border traders in post-communist Central Europe', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 23(4): 751–70.
- Wallace, C., Sik, E., Kovatcheva, S. and Zartler, U. (1999a) *Economic and Social Change in Households: Hungary and Bulgaria, Final Report*. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Wedel, J.R. (1992) *The Unplanned Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- WIIW (2000) *Structural Developments in Central and Eastern Europe*. Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW).
- Williams, A.M. (2001) 'New forms of international migration: in search of which Europe?', in Wallace, M. (ed.) *Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 103–21.
- Williams, A.M., Baláz, V. and Kollar, D. (2001) 'Coming and going in Slovakia: international labour mobility in the Central European "buffer zone"', *Environment and Planning, A*, 33: 1101–123.

Author details

Claire Wallace is Head of the Department of Sociology at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna.

She may be contacted at:

E-mail: wallace@ihs.ac.at

Copyright of Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies is the property of Carfax Publishing Company and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.