Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud
Split-ticket voting in German Federal elections,
1953­90: an example of sophisticated balloting?
Harald Schoen*
Institut fu¨r Politikwissenschaft -- Johannes Gutenberg-Universita¨t Mainz, Saarstraße 21, D-55099
Mainz, Germany
Abstract
Though the German electoral system has provided the opportunity of split-ticket voting
since 1953, until now there has only been mere speculation concerning the rationality of ticket-
splitting. In this paper we examine the rationality thesis empirically, using data provided by
the official representative electoral statistics of the Federal Republic. Modifying the Downsian
notion of rational voting, rational ticket-splitting is defined in terms of coalition building and of
voters' expectations of the electoral success of candidates and parties. Applying this conceptual
framework, it will be shown that the combinations of first and second votes actually chosen
by a majority of the German electorate can rather be conceived of as a product of accident
than of tactical considerations.  1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Ticket-splitting; German elections; Sophisticated voting
1. Introduction
Since 1953, German voters have had two votes in Federal elections; thus the opport-
unity to split tickets has been a feature of German Federal elections for more than
40 years. The distribution of seats between parties, however, is almost exclusively
determined by the so-called second vote (Zweitstimme) which is given to a party, while
the first vote (Erststimme), cast for a candidate, affects -- with two minor exceptions
(the so-called surplus mandates and the Grundmandatsklausel) -- only the personal com-
position of parliament. This is accomplished by a mechanism of seat allocation which
* Tel.: 49-6131-39-3450; fax: 49-6131-39-2996; e-mail: harald.schoen@politik.uni-mainz.de
0261-3794/99/$ - see front matter  1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S0261-3794(99)00023-2

474 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
works in the following way: first, in each of the 328 local constituencies, a so-called
direct mandate is awarded to the candidate who attracts a relative majority of first votes.
In a second step, a total of 656 seats is allocated to the parties according to their share
of the national second votes.1
Then, in a decisive third step, in each state (Land) the
number of direct mandates a party has received in the first round is subtracted from its
total seat share; only the remaining seats are filled by candidates from the party lists.
Although some observers describe the German electoral system in terms of a mixed
system, it is an almost pure system of proportional representation.
There is sufficient evidence to show that voters do indeed make use of the opportunity
to split tickets. In 1953, 10 per cent of voters gave their first vote to the candidate of
one party, but cast their second vote for a different party. This type of voting behavior
decreased throughout the 1950s to reach a minimum of 4.4 per cent in 1961, but then
almost continuously increased. In 1972, 8.8 per cent of the combinations were split, and
in 1980 even one in ten voters cast a split vote. During the subsequent decade the portion
rose at an even higher rate resulting in a split ticket rate of 16.2 per cent at the reunifi-
cation election in 1990 (cf. Schoen, 1996, pp. 37­40). Thus, in Germany, ticket-splitters
still form a minority, but they are a growing one.2
Compared to other countries, however,
this ratio is not very impressive; in New Zealand, for example, under an electoral system
very similar to the German model (cf. Vowles, 1995) in 1996 about 37% of the tickets
were split (cf. Banducci et al., 1998, 1999, p. 2).
Despite the long tradition of ticket-splitting in Germany and its growing quantitative
importance, this topic has been neglected by political scientists for quite a long time.
There are but a few contributions addressing the simple descriptive question of the
extent of ticket-splitting (see Nohlen and Schultze, 1969; Harscheidt, 1973; Jesse,
1975, 1987). With regard to the motives for ticket-splitting, the literature proves to be
sparser still. Only Jesse (1988) raises the point that tickets might be split for quite
irrational reasons, but does not test this suspicion systematically. Most other observers
simply take it for granted that tickets are split in a rational, sophisticated way. In
particular, it is very popular to consider ticket-splitting as an instrument of supporting
prospective governmental coalitions in a sophisticated way (cf. e.g. Beyme, 1996, p.
88; Rudzio, 1996, p. 186). Schultze (1995, p. 346) seems to have the same in mind
when he states: "The majority of ticket-splitters cast their votes based on tactical con-
siderations and rational decision-making" (author's translation). Similarly, Eith (1989,
p. 106) claims that any vote combinations that cannot be justified by that kind of
reasoning should be seen rather as an indication of protest than of ignorance, which
implies that the author is still regarding at least implicitly such decisions as a result
of a politically motivated calculation.3
In sum, the fundamental assumption of ration-
ality has widely been treated so far as a kind of self-evident axiom, not as a hypothesis
which should be tested empirically in a systematic way. It is the aim of this contribution
1
This procedure applies only to those parties which manage to gain at least 5 per cent of the national
second votes or are able to win at least three direct mandates (Grundmandatsklausel).
2
Based on exit polls, in 1998 already 20 per cent of voters have been found to cast split tickets.
3
Such an argument, however, runs the risk of making "rationality" a mere tautology and thereby
becoming unsuitable as a criterion for an assessment of empirical behavior, see Converse (1975, p. 119).

475H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
to concentrate on the latter. The paper is divided into three sections: first, we will
discuss what tactical ticket-splitting means in the context of German Federal elections.
Second, we will attempt to operationalize our conceptual framework and deduct some
empirically testable hypotheses. The remaining part of our paper is then dedicated to
an empirical analysis of tactical ticket-splitting in Germany.
2. Tactical ticket-splitting in Germany: spelling out a thesis in theoretical terms
In Germany, a widespread view regards ticket-splitting as an instrument of sup-
porting prospective governmental coalitions in a sophisticated way (cf. Beyme, 1996,
p. 88; Rudzio, 1996, p. 186). The proponents of this thesis rely simply on common
sense and a few empirical observations; however, there has been no attempt to ana-
lyze ticket-splitting based on theoretical reasoning. Because of this omission, it seems
reasonable to try to couch this contention in a theoretically more satisfying way.
Fundamentally, it is assumed that voters' decision-making is instrumental and
short-term in perspective (Downs, 1957).4
It is distinct from purely expressive voting
behavior because casting a vote for a specific party does not provide a utility in
itself. Based on this fundamental premise, the notion of rational ticket-splitting --
widespread in Germany -- comprises two components. First, it draws on a tradition
in political science represented by Maurice Duverger. He stated that voters anticipate
the mechanical effects of electoral systems and accordingly adjust their behavior; as
a result, a psychological effect of electoral systems is postulated (Duverger, 1954).
In particular, it is assumed that voters do not wish to waste their votes (see, e.g.,
Fisher, 1973; Cox, 1997, p. 80). The second component states that, furthermore,
voters seek to influence the selection of the future government. Where coalition
governments are expected, tickets have to be split in regard to the partisan compati-
bility of the two votes. This thesis which is discussed as "portfolio maximizing"
(Cox, 1997, pp. 194­198), however, is much less popular than the former one.
As noted above, German electoral law can be described as a proportional represen-
tation system supplemented by components of a plurality system. Under these very
special circumstances, a rational voter trying to assess the candidates' and parties'
electoral prospects has to use different sets of criteria. It is possible that a party's
prospects on the two dimensions relevant for decision-making are quite disparate.
If, for example, a given party is promising in one respect while its attempt in the
other seems despairing, a rational voter will cast his votes for two different parties
4
Thus, long-term strategic behavior is not analyzed. An example of the latter approach is a voter's
attempt to make two parties presently not willing to form a coalition inclined to do so in the future. This
omission can be justified by the argument that the longer the range of time, the less likely it is that a
sufficiently large number of voters will actually poll with calculation in mind. Moreover, the theoretically
interesting question whether a Downsian rational voter will go to elections at all, is not addressed. Voter
turnout is simply taken for granted based on the working of the feeling of citizen duty internalized by
the voters. For an underpinning of this argument, see Ordeshook and Zeng (1997, p. 178), for the empirical
importance of citizen duty in Germany, cf. Rattinger and Kra¨mer (1995).

476 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
in order to affect the electoral results with both votes. Since a rational elector, how-
ever, is not only interested in electoral fortunes but also has political inclinations,
he will choose among the viable parties the alternative which ranges highest in his
order of preferences. Since political affiliations, normally, do not differ too dramati-
cally between the first and the second vote, there should, furthermore, be only a
minor ideological distance between the two parties chosen.5
One has to take into consideration that on the national level, Germany has been
governed almost exclusively by coalition governments (Schu¨ttemeyer, 1990, pp.
470­472).6
Therefore, the assumptions concerning empirical splitting behavior have
to be rephrased in terms of a restriction of the voter's calculus. This implies a compli-
cation of voters' decision-making insofar as they have to take into account the par-
ties' coalition preferences and the electoral prospects of potential governments.
Theoretically, this results in a large amount of information by voters due to the large
number of potential coalitions. In reality, this number is lowered by the fact that
German parties generally reveal their preferences concerning coalition building well
before election day (see Eckstein, 1995, p. 122; Vo¨lk, 1989, p. 143). In addition,
German parties tend to keep their promises in regard to coalition building. Thus,
German voters generally do not need to deliberate about possible coalitions, but can
direct their attention at the latter's arithmetical chances. Therefore, the opportunity
to reduce electoral decision-making in German Federal elections to a competition
between different possible coalitions restricts the number of combinations of first
and second votes eligible for a rational voter. Voters who decide to split their votes
because of their assessment of electoral prospects and who want, in addition, to
influence the selection of government, must vote for two parties which are willing
to form a coalition with each other after the election. Otherwise, by casting their
vote for two parties not (mutually) willing to form a coalition, they would be voting
for two mutually exclusive governmental alliances.
Whatever the sequence of decision-making criteria,7
in German Federal elections a
rational ticket-splitter of the Downsian type faces two restrictions, one concerning the
incentives induced by the electoral system, the other in terms of coalition politics. In
respect of the first vote, he can only choose a party whose candidate might win a
majority in his constituency, while for the second vote he can take only those parties
into consideration which seem to be able to enter parliament. Additionally, the two votes
should not be incompatible in terms of party politics, i.e. a split ticket is rational only
5
This consideration suggests regarding the empirical patterns of ticket-splitting as an indicator of the
ideological distance between the parties as perceived by the voters. The meaningfulness of this measure,
however, depends heavily upon the question of whether the ticket-splitters constitute a representative
sample of the electorate, and are not too different from the rest of the electorate in terms of political prefer-
ences.
6
Here, for example, the phase after the German Party left the coalition with CDU/CSU in 1960 is
disregarded. Similarly, mere caretaker governments are not taken into consideration.
7
Alternatively, an elector can start by forming political preferences for a particular coalition government
and deduct his splitting decision from the attempt to maximize this coalition's number of seats. This
reasoning gains further attractiveness due to the possibility that so-called surplus mandates could be
generated by widespread ticket-splitting.

477H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
insofar as it is cast for two parties which are willing to form a coalition after election day.
Applying both rationality criteria simultaneously, four theoretically possible categories of
ticket-splitting emerge (Fig. 1). If a voter takes both restrictions into account, we will
call his behavior "rational ticket-splitting". Observing only the electoral prospects, he
acts in terms of maximizing the impact of his votes on the composition of parliament.
A voter exclusively concerned with coalitions is called an "ideologue". Finally, we assign
the label "ignorant" to those voters who disregard both restrictions.
Clearly, this conceptualization of tactical ticket-splitting is not the only one poss-
ible and it is based upon quite a narrow notion of ticket-splitters' rationality. This
is a result of the thesis to be tested which has additional consequences worth men-
tioning. First, our analysis is focused on the occurrence of certain patterns of ticket-
splitting; therefore, it differs somewhat from the conventional literature on rational
or tactical voting. Furthermore, the decisions regarding the two votes are considered
not to be made in isolation, rather they are supposed to be interrelated. On the one
hand, as far as electoral incentives are concerned, a split ticket is called rational only
if both votes meet the respective criteria. Hence, if a person casts his or her second
vote for a splinter party, he or she is considered irrational in terms of the institutional
arrangement, irrespective of their use of the first vote. On the other hand, the coalition
argument ties both votes together in a way similar to the thesis well-known from
the existing US literature on ticket-splitting; there, ticket-splitting is supposed to be
a means to create moderate policies (cf. Fiorina, 1988, 1996) or to enable the func-
tioning of a system of checks and balances (cf. Ladd, 1990). Additionally, this argu-
ment takes only government formation into account, while combinations plausible
for other reasons, e.g. pure ideological proximity, are not called rational.
3. Measuring tactical ticket-splitting
3.1. Data and operationalization
The data on which our analysis is based are generated by an instrument unique
to the German political system. Between 1953 and 1990, at each Federal election
in roughly 3 per cent of the electoral districts, ballots were marked according to age
Fig. 1. Types of ticket-splitting.

478 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
and sex; at each election, a random sample of almost two million voters was taken.8
Thus, the German Federal Statistical Bureau was able to provide data on the absolute
frequencies of all possible split ticket patterns in federal elections between 1953 and
1990, as well as data on the gender and age of party voters and abstainers. Using
this information, some problems of alternative data bases can be avoided. First, the
sheer size of the sample eliminates, to all practical purposes, any sampling errors.
Second, in contrast to survey data, actual voting behavior is registered, not only
voters' reports; thus problems of validity and reliability do not exist. Third, the data
available gives the real amount of ticket-splitting, whereas traditional aggregate data
only shows the net ratio (see, for example, Dutter, 1986; Bawn, 1993; Burnham,
1965). Since actual ticket-splitting is registered at the individual level, this kind of
data is well suited for an analysis of split-ticket voting (cf. Rattinger, 1992, p. 224;
Falter and Schumann, 1989, pp. 12­13).
Unfortunately, representative electoral statistics present certain new problems.
First, this invaluable data collection was suspended for the 1994 and 1998 elections,
based on doubts concerning the secrecy of the vote. A second limitation for longitudi-
nal analysis is caused by boundary changes to the territory covered by the representa-
tive electoral statistics. In 1953 Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate and the Saar were not
included, and the latter was even omitted in 1957. This affects, of course, the longi-
tudinal comparability of the data, since the label "Federal Republic" thus embraces
different territories. If the missing areas were significantly different in terms of theor-
etically relevant dimensions, this could lead to somewhat biased results. With the
reunification election of 1990, such difficulties do not arise because the data for the
"old" Federal Republic can easily be calculated. Another drawback can be seen in
the fact that the data are only published at the state and national levels, but not
at the constituency level. This precludes the analysis of the classical Duvergerian
psychological effects at the level at which they are supposed to work (Duverger,
1954; for a discussion see Riker, 1982).9
One way of measuring the rationality of ticket-splitting is to define rationality in
terms of the degree of congruence between the voter's analysis of the premises for
his decision-making and the actual vote. Applying this strategy, one would need data
on voters' perceptions of the prospects of the parties and on parties' preferences in
regard to coalition formation. Furthermore, information about voters' intentions pur-
sued by their vote and their actual decision is needed. Unfortunately, representative
electoral statistics inform us only about the objective results, not about the subjective
components of that calculus. Therefore, rationality has to be measured indirectly.
For each election, we will first determine which parties seemed promising to sur-
mount one of the two electoral hurdles, and second which coalitions a voter could
realistically expect at that time. Furthermore, we will introduce a uniformity assump-
8
The lowest number of voters included is about 300 000 in 1953 (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt, 1991,
p. 6). This means that our analysis presented below is in any case based on more than 10 000 ticket-
splitters; taking into account only the time since 1970, the number of cases even exceeds 50 000 in
any election.
9
In this regard, the data collected in New Zealand are superior (see Banducci et al., 1999, pp. 7­10).

479H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
tion by suggesting that all ticket-splitters had arrived at exactly the very same percep-
tions. This allows us to attribute any deviation from the ideal-typical rational pattern
of split-ticket voting to wrong conclusions based on correctly recognized facts. Only
then are we in a position to classify any theoretically possible party combination
according to the scheme presented in Fig. 1.
3.2. A coalition history of the Federal Republic
Before analyzing the amount of tactical ticket-splitting, we have to decide which
combinations could be regarded as rational with respect to the two relevant aspects
delineated above. Let us first turn to the electoral prospects. Between 1953 and 1990,
only the CDU/CSU and the SPD were able to secure a majority of candidate votes
(Erststimmen) in local constituencies (see Jesse, 1985, p. 295). Though in the 1950s
other parties like the FDP, the national-conservative Deutsche Partei (DP), and the
Catholic Zentrum won some constituency seats as well, they are not regarded as
promising because their successes were both temporally confined and territorially
restricted to only very few areas.10
For the same reason, we disregard the FDP and
the PDS, the heir of the GDR state party, in 1990.11
In respect of the 5 per cent hurdle, the established Bundestag parties, i.e. the
CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP, are classified as "promising" in every election.
In contrast, extremist left- and right-wing parties are not categorized as "promis-
ing".12
The exception to the rule was the PDS in 1990. The successor party of the
SED could hope to obtain more than 5 per cent of the total vote in the territory of
the former GDR. This would have been sufficient to enter parliament because of the
unique amendment to the electoral law for the first Federal election in the reunified
Germany (see Jesse, 1994, pp. 30­32). The latter holds true as well for the Alliance
90/The Greens party, a successor of the citizens' rights movement in the GDR, and
its Western cousin, the Green Party, which had turned out to be electorally successful
already in the two preceding elections.13
For 1953, we assume that the 1949 coalition of CDU/CSU, FDP and DP was to be
continued and the refugees' movement GB/BHE tried to join this coalition.14
By 1957,
10
In 1953 the FDP gained a majority of first votes in 14, the DP in 10 and the Zentrum in one
constituency; in 1957 the FDP was awarded one direct mandate, while the DP won six. Hence, in 1953,
about 10 per cent and in 1957 about 3 per cent of the constituencies are not in line with the pattern
indicated in Fig. 2.
11
The FDP obtained a constituency seat in Halle, Saxony-Anhalt, while the PDS succeeded in one
constituency in the Eastern part of Berlin and came second in a couple of constituencies.
12
This assumption is even made for the NPD in 1969, since its temporary success induced by the
economic downturn in 1966 and 1967 started to decline in 1968; cf. Die Wa¨hleranteile der Parteien,
supplement to Noelle-Neumann and Piel (1983). For a different opinion see Vo¨lk (1989, p. 87).
13
For the somewhat controversial assessment of the electoral prospects in 1983, see Noelle-Neumann
and Piel (1983, p. 297).
14
Though the GB/BHE was supposed to be willing to join any coalition promising a chance of carrying
through the refugee party's proposals and provide its members with offices, the BHE's leaders' inclination
towards bourgeois political views is taken as an indication of a tendency to join the so-called "Bu¨rger-
block" coalition; cf. Sto¨ss (1986, pp. 1434­1435).

480 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
the government coalition was reduced to a CDU/CSU and DP alliance.15
In contrast,
the SPD found a potential ally in the Federalist Union, which is indicated by several
constituency agreements between the two parties.16
While in 1961 and 1965 the voters
could expect a coalition of CDU/CSU and the FDP, in 1969 the lines of coalition politics
were far from being clear-cut. In spite of some confusion provoked by parties' tactics,
however, a rational voter should have been able to recognize before election day that
a social­liberal coalition was emerging. The FDP's support of the SPD-candidate for
the Federal presidency could be regarded as a harbinger of the new coalition. The same
partisan pattern holds for the following three elections in 1972, 1976 and 1980. Sub-
sequently, the breakdown of the social­liberal alliance in 1982 led to a change back to
a liberal­conservative coalition seeking a majority of votes from 1983 onwards. In the
other political camp, however, a major change took place. In 1983, a coalition between
the Social Democrats and the Greens seemed far from being realistic, whereas in 1987
and 1990 a red­green partnership became increasingly plausible.17
These considerations form the basis of the following classification of theoretically
possible first/second-vote patterns in the elections from 1953 to 1990 (see Fig. 2).
3.3. Problems with this approach
This approach may be challenged in several respects. In regard to the assumption
that all ticket-splitters are fully informed, an a priori criticism seems to be inappropri-
ate. However since the thesis of split-ticket voters as rational actors is to be tested,
such voters, by definition, should be fully informed. The other assumptions concern-
ing the objective pursued by the vote on the one hand and the parties' perceived
coalition preferences on the other are relevant in as far as only if these assumptions
are met can deviations from the ideal-typical rational split-ticket pattern be attributed
to voter irrationality. There are only very few cases in which it could not be decided
objectively how a voter should judge the electoral situation realistically. Finally, the
ticket-splitter as the personification of a politically sophisticated citizen should be
aware of the ultimate goal of an election. Thus, the assumption that citizens attempt
to influence by their vote the selection of government seems legitimate also.18
The indirect procedure of measurement practised in this analysis implies an infer-
15
Cf. Sto¨ss (1986, p. 1437) and Kitzinger (1960, pp. 121­130), respectively. In the latter respect, it
should be noted that the FDP was not included in any constituency agreement with CDU/CSU and DP;
cf. Schindler (1983, p. 109). The question of whether the FDP's attempts to delimit itself against other
parties were only of a tactical nature cannot be answered here definitively.
16
Cf. Schindler (1983, p. 109). In the same direction points the fact that in Bavaria between 1954 and
1957, a coalition existed which consisted of SPD, Bavarian Party, FDP, and BHE.
17
The thesis referring to the red­green cooperation is supported both by the Greens' willingness to
tolerate a SPD minority government and by the fact that the SPD's official aim, an absolute majority,
was highly controversial within that party. Furthermore, in Hesse a red­green coalition was in power
from 1985 up to 1987. See Vo¨lk (1989, p. 88) and Schultze (1987, p. 10).
18
Additionally, survey data indicate that some voters do actually take into consideration the parties'
chances of passing the 5 per cent hurdle when deciding which party to vote for; cf. Noelle-Neumann and
Piel (1983, p. 358).

481H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
Fig. 2. Classification of theoretically possible patterns of ticket-splitting in Federal elections 1953­90
according to their degree of tactical rationality. (The notation is taken from Fig. 1. The asterisks in 1990
indicate theoretically impossible combinations.)
ence of voter motives and perceptions from observable behavior. This suggests that
between both levels, there exists a clear-cut relationship in as far as any deviation
from the expected pattern could be explained in terms of inadequate conclusions
based on correctly perceived information. Unfortunately, this assumption is not very
realistic. Any behavioral pattern can be caused by many different motives. In the

482 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
(Fig. 2. Continued.)
context of our analysis, this implies that "irrational" split-ticket patterns are not
necessarily an indication of a voter's political "insanity". The vote could be mot-
ivated by other goals than influencing the selection of government, or by perceptions
of the political situation different from the operationalization presented above (see
Behnke, 1994, pp. 400­406). Therefore, the causes of "irregular" split-ticket voting
cannot be discerned exactly. A wide variety of potential explanations of deviations
from the "correct" pattern could be offered. Since, however, our data do not contain

483H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
(Fig. 2. Continued.)
any information on the irrationality of voting intentions, in the following sections
we will rely primarily on an analysis of the factual premises (for this concept cf.
Simon, 1976, pp. 45­46), i.e. the information concerning parties' viability and
coalitional preferences on which voters' decision-making is based.

484 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
(Fig. 2. Continued.)
4. Tactical ticket-splitting from 1953 to 1990: hypotheses and empirical
findings
4.1. Hypotheses
The above discussion suggests that ticket-splitting need not be constantly rational
over time; the level of rationality should vary according to the information available
concerning the factual premises of decision-making. In the course of the cognitive
mobilization of the electorate beginning in the 1960s (Dalton, 1996, p. 21) which
led to an improved level of awareness on the demand side of the political market,
ticket-splitting should have become more rational.
Separating both dimensions of decision-making, more detailed hypotheses can be
derived. Concerning the electoral system, it can be assumed that the longer an elec-
toral law is in effect, the larger the share of the electorate acquainted with it, since

485H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
each election provides the voters with another opportunity to acquire the electoral
rules. Because of the widely stable distribution of vote shares in the constituencies
and only marginal shifts on the federal level, it can be presumed that the ability to
assess the parties' electoral prospects has increased over time, too. Thus, with regard
to the implications of the electoral system, rationality of split-ticket voting should
have increased from election to election.
Furthermore, party strategies to increase the awareness of "correct" ticket-splitting
should be taken into account. Therefore, campaigns aimed at encouraging voters to
split tickets in a certain way should be accompanied by a high rate of vote combi-
nations which are correct in terms of the incentives generated by the electoral laws.
Concerning the coalitional preferences of parties as perceived by the electorate, a
similar training effect can be expected. The longer a party alliance lasts, the larger
the number of voters who are aware of it. Besides their duration, the unambiguity
of the coalitional preferences of the parties appears relevant. Parties which are unde-
cided or which quarrel internally about their coalitional preferences do not provide
voters with reliable information for their decision-making. Furthermore, it seems
plausible that the number of parties wanting to form a coalition is important because
any uncommitted party constitutes a further element of uncertainty for the voter's
calculus. Thus, an increase in the share of parties committed to forming a coalition
should be associated with a growth in the level of rationality of ticket-splitting.
Finally, a durable electoral system and a highly stable distribution of the vote
coincide with sharply changing preferences with regard to coalition politics. This
suggests that voters should have internalized the former much better than the latter.
The share of split tickets rational in coalitional terms should be systematically
exceeded by the proportion of vote combinations which are correct in terms of the
electoral system. Information on the frequencies of the four theoretically possible
types of ticket-splitting can be gathered by applying both criteria simultaneously. As
a result, when the requirements for the application of both kinds of considerations
are met, one can expect an especially large percentage of fully rational split ticket
patterns.
4.2. Empirical test
An initial look at our data shows that on average between 1953 and 1990 about
30% of the tickets are split in an entirely rational way. Almost 15% are rational in
terms of coalition politics only, whereas about 30% are rational in regard to the
electoral system as the only criterion of decision-making. Finally, about a quarter
of the combinations of first and second votes seem to be totally unaffected by any
considerations concerning the electoral system or the composition of a prospective
government (Table 1). Separating both dimensions shows that on average about 65%
of the ticket-splitters apply electoral laws correctly, whereas almost 50% pay atten-
tion to potential coalitions (Table 2).
Behind these average results, quite dramatic fluctuations can be observed over
time (Table 2). Let us first turn to combinations which are correct in terms of the
electoral system. Starting with an absolute minimum of 23% in 1953, the percentage

486 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
Table 1
Empirical frequencies of the types of ticket-splitting, 1953­90 (per cent of split tickets)
Election Type of ticket-splitting
Tactically rational Rational in terms Rational in terms Irrational
of the electoral of coalition
system building
1953 14.3 8.9 30.3 46.5
1957 10.5 37.9 17.0 34.7
1961 24.1 32.3 11.5 32.1
1965 30.0 39.6 10.3 20.2
1969 17.9 42.9 7.9 31.4
1972 51.8 23.5 14.7 10.1
1976 37.6 29.2 17.9 15.3
1980 37.1 28.0 15.1 19.8
1983 35.8 43.6 1.5 19.1
1987 45.4 22.5 14.2 17.9
1990 27.5 25.1 16.4 31.1
West Germany 30.2 26.1 17.0 26.7
East Germany and 19.8 22.3 14.9 43.0
Berlin
1953­90 (West) 30.4 30.4 14.3 24.9
Table 2
Frequencies of rational ticket-splitting in terms of electoral system and coalition building (per cent of
split tickets)
Election Rational in terms of the electoral Rational in terms of coalition
system building
1953 23.2 44.6
1957 48.4 27.4
1961 56.4 35.7
1965 69.5 40.2
1969 60.7 25.7
1972 75.3 66.4
1976 66.8 55.6
1980 65.1 52.2
1983 79.4 37.3
1987 68.0 59.6
1990 52.5 43.9
West Germany 56.3 47.2
East Germany and Berlin 42.1 34.7

487H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
of rational combinations continuously increased to 70% in 1965. This development
can be interpreted as evidence of the hypothesis that in the course of elections, voters
actually learned to handle the electoral system in a more sophisticated way. After a
decline in 1969, the amount of rational combinations reached 75% in 1972 before
decreasing again in 1976 and 1980. In 1983, rational combinations made up almost
80% of split tickets, the elections of 1987 and 1990 fell clearly behind these results,
the latter being at the same level as the elections of the 1960s. If only the mere
knowledge of electoral mechanisms accounted for this development over time, such
a decline would seem implausible. We should therefore look for additional mech-
anisms.
The negative deviations in 1969 and 1990 suggest that misperceptions of electoral
prospects might explain the development. What may sound plausible for the 1969
election where the right-wing NPD was about to enter the Bundestag does not apply
at all to the 1990 election. There was no third party which could have acquired 5 per
cent of the second votes. Hence, misperceptions do not suffice in explaining empiri-
cal findings adequately.
Turning to 1972 and 1983 as exceptions most wanting of an explanation, there
are some common features of both elections in regard to the political constellation.
In both cases, one of the coalition parties faced the danger of being voted out of
Parliament, and, in consequence, a government in office was confronted with possible
dismissal. In order to prevent this, the ruling coalitions campaigned heavily for ticket-
splitting by propagating their versions of "correct" combinations of first and second
votes. In light of this mechanism, the low level of ticket-splitting in 1990 can be
explained by the fact that no party in this election explicitly called for ticket-splitting,
and that for many voters, the outcome of the election seemed not to be a very close
one, which in turn led them to regard careful ticket-splitting as unnecessary.
To sum up, until the 1960s the variation of ticket-splitting labeled as "correct" in
terms of the electoral system can be explained by improved knowledge of the Ger-
man electoral system. After this initial phase, characterized by the introduction of
the two-vote system and gradual consolidation of the German party system, this
mechanism lost ground19
and, in its place, political factors gained in importance.
The impression that the existence of a government could depend upon "correct"
ticket-splitting seems in particular to increase the inclination of voters to take the
mechanisms of the electoral system into account.
Turning to coalition preferences, on a lower level a much more irregular pattern of
development emerges. In 1953, about 45 per cent of ticket-splitters chose reasonable
combinations. Up to the beginning of the 1960s, this proportion fell at times clearly
below this level, whereas since 1972 the 45 per cent level has been passed regularly.
The duration of a coalition option does not affect the likelihood that it is actually
taken into account. From 1972 to 1980 and from 1987 to 1990, the constellation of
19
This finding supports the argument that only in the elections immediately following the introduction
of a new electoral system can learning effects account for differences. Similarly, expectations concerning
the electoral prospects of political parties seem to be an adequate explanation only if the party system
has not yet settled, but not if the electoral prospects are stable over time.

488 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
party alignments remained the same. Despite this fact, which suggests an increase
in rationality, in both periods "correct" ticket-splitting declined. In addition, the share
of parties committed to potential coalitions cannot account for the variations observed
over time. Both in 1969 and in 1972, two out of six parties could be regarded as
potential allies. In the former case, however, an absolute minimum was reached,
while in the latter an absolute maximum was achieved.
The extraordinarily low levels in 1957 and in 1969 throw light on the mechanisms
actually affecting the degree of coalition-based rationality of ticket-splitting. In 1957,
voters were highly uncertain about the coalition preferences of the FDP due to its
attempts to foster its image as an independent third force. Similarly, in 1969 the
FDP left many voters in doubt by revealing its preferences for the Social Democrats
only at a very late stage of the electoral campaign. Additionally, that 1969 election
was held under a grand coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD, a fact which might have
encouraged voters to cast split tickets for these two parties, though both parties
clearly did not want to continue their cooperation. Thus, campaigns in which parlia-
mentary parties refrain from clear-cut statements about post-electoral alliances seem
to produce low levels of politically rational ticket-splitting.
This view is corroborated by the 1972 figures. Before that election, coalition pref-
erences were evident and the governing parties strongly emphasized coalition politics
in their campaigns in order to lead their partisans to split tickets. In 1976 and 1980,
the situation was quite different and this difference can explain the decline in ration-
ality in these elections. Though in these years the electorate had to decide whether
the social­liberal coalition should be continued, the two partners were already too
estranged for the one to have stood aside for the other's benefit; consequently, both
strove not for ticket-splitting but for both votes.
In contrast, the low level of ticket-splitting rational in terms of coalition politics
in 1983 seems implausible at first glance because in that campaign the Liberals called
upon the supporters of their partner, the CDU/CSU, to cast their second votes for
the FDP (see Roberts, 1988, pp. 326­327). This can be explained by taking into
account the entry into the political arena of the Green Party, an ideological offspring
of the extra-parliamentary opposition and the left wing of the Social Democrats
which rejected at that time cooperation with any "established" party. Some voters,
evidently less interested in actually viable coalitions than in ideological purity, cast
one vote for the Greens notwithstanding their unwillingness to form a coalition. Thus
the amount of rationally split tickets in terms of party politics decreased in spite of
the Liberals' call for clever ticket-splitting.20
The 1987 level clearly falls behind the 1972 peak though in 1987 red­green ticket-
splitting can be regarded as rational. This may be attributed to the fact that in 1987,
neither camp openly campaigned for ticket-splitting; additionally, within the SPD
the choice of an appropriate coalition partner for government was quite controversial.
In 1990, the percentage of combinations meaningful in terms of coalition building
20
Regarding a red­green coalition as a realistic option even in 1983, the proportion of ticket-splitting
correct in terms of coalition building rises to 63.9 per cent -- a level quite similar to that of 1972.

489H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
once again declined in spite of the evidence of the parties' coalition preferences. It
must be kept in mind that parties tended to campaign for both votes, not for split
tickets, and that many citizens took the continuation of the Kohl coalition for granted.
These considerations can be generalized as follows: the level of rationality of
ticket-splitting in regard to coalition building is furthered when each parliamentary
party can be assigned to a potential government coalition in an unambiguous way.
As the 1983 election shows, however, information as such is not the crucial precon-
dition. In addition, voters must be willing to use it.
Comparing the shares of both kinds of rational ticket-splitting, the hypothesis
stated above is corroborated. The restriction referring to governmental alliances is
indeed much more demanding than that induced by electoral laws. We may thus
draw the conclusion that information on the electoral system and the parties' electoral
fortunes are better available and, due to its stability, easier to process than that on
potential coalitions.
Only in 1953 can the inverse relationship be observed. This can be accounted for
by the fact that this was the very first election held under the two-vote system, while
the demarcation line between the different potential governments remained largely
unchanged in comparison to 1949. In part, however, this finding can be regarded as
a methodological artifact. We assumed that only two parties, the CDU/CSU and the
SPD, were in a position to win direct seats in the 1950s. In fact, in 1953 some 26
candidates of other parties managed to obtain a majority of first votes (Jesse, 1985,
p. 295). This implies that actually rational split tickets including a first vote for one
of those 26 candidates is declared irrational, which results in a systematic underestim-
ation of the percentage of ticket-splitting regarded as rational in terms of the elec-
toral system.
Applying both criteria simultaneously reveals information relative to the fre-
quencies of the four theoretically possible patterns of ticket-splitting presented in
Table 1. If we disregard the exception of 1953, the share of completely rational
combinations continuously increased in a first phase ranging from 1953 to 1965.21
This indicates that the citizenry learned to judge the electoral perspectives and
coalition preferences over time. This steady rise is followed by the most restless
period. In 1969, the share dramatically decreased before reaching an absolute
maximum of more than 50 per cent in 1972. The low level in 1969 can be attributed
to the joint effects of uncertainty about potential coalitions and the parliamentary
entry of the NPD. In contrast, in 1972 factors favoring tactical ticket-splitting, more
specifically a clear-cut demarcation line between potential government alliances and
a vigorous campaign for ticket-splitting, produced a new peak.
In subsequent elections, this level was never reached again. The proportion of
tactical splitting fluctuates within a 30 and 40 per cent interval. Only in 1987 was
21
Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that in 1953, Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate, and the Saar were
not covered by the representative electoral statistics. This could have induced an arithmetical exaggeration
of the rationality of ticket-splitting, as throughout the period since 1965, Bavarian voters have handled
ticket-splitting quite irrationally, and the electorate in the two other states has differed from the federal
average at least partly in a negative way; cf. Schoen (1996, pp. 104­112).

490 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
the upper limit slightly exceeded with 45 per cent. Since this local maximum is
accompanied by an election in which all parliamentary parties had a chance to
become coalition partners and did not advise their followers to abstain from ticket-
splitting, the situation was in many ways similar to that of 1972. Thus, the hypothesis
that tactical split-ticket voting should be especially widespread in elections when the
preconditions for the application of both criteria are met, can be seen as corroborated.
Conversely, the 1969 election demonstrates that uncertainty in regard to both dimen-
sions of ticket-splitting reduces the share of tactically split tickets.
This analysis of the determinants of rational ticket-splitting is underscored by a
cross-sectional comparison of West and East Germany in 1990. That East German
voters on all three dimensions of rationality fell behind their West German counter-
parts is no surprise. For the first time, East Germans were able to choose their rep-
resentatives by a two-vote system. In addition, they were not accustomed to realistic
coalition options. Under these preconditions, a deficit in knowledge and, as a result,
a wide gap in splitting rationality was to be expected.
The first Federal election in the unified Germany constitutes the temporary end
point of a negative trend of tactical ticket-splitting starting in the 1970s. On the one
hand, the 1987 local maximum clearly falls behind the 1972 peak. On the other
hand, the share of rational ticket-splitting subsequently declined from almost 40 to
30 per cent. This development raises doubts as to the explanatory power of the so-
called cognitive mobilization hypothesis, which implies a likely increase for that
period. This finding can be seen as evidence that both phenomena may not be connec-
ted at all. Alternatively, if such a connection is taken for granted, it would follow
that the educational boom was rather a formal than a substantial one. Moreover, it
is more plausible to argue that it was the public discussion in 1972 of ticket-splitting
which made the citizenry more sensitive to tactical ticket-splitting. This resulted in
a higher level of splitting rationality than before 1970, even in elections in which
there was no incentive to do so. However over the course of time, the influence of
this discussion vanished. As a consequence, rational ticket-splitting declined in 1990
to its 1960s level. This interpretation provides an answer to the question whether
the high level of the 1970s and 1980s should be regarded as a rule or as an exception.
It suggests that in these two decades, factors favoring rational ticket-splitting were
at work, the presence of which cannot always be taken for granted. For this reason,
the level of the 70s and 80s should be regarded rather as an exception than as the rule.
In analyzing the development of the rationality of ticket-splitting over time and
its determinants, we have tested several hypotheses. The more mechanical ones, e.g.
the number of parties committed to coalitions, have been rejected. In contrast, those
implying political factors have performed quite well. Since the empirical develop-
ment is explained quite conveniently in terms of theoretically derived hypotheses,
our measurement of rationality of ticket-splitting may be regarded as valid. Based
on this conclusion, we can in the following section turn to an assessment of the
empirical level of the rationality of ticket-splitting.

491H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
5. Ticket-splitting -- an indicator of political maturity or mere accident?
Expectations concerning the empirical level of rationality of ticket-splitting heavily
depend on normative perspectives. When we look at ticket-splitting as an indication
of political maturity and sophistication, as it is widespread, almost any ticket-splitter
will a priori be classified as "rational". In contrast, one could argue that ticket-
splitting is purely idiosyncratic, i.e. not at all motivated by political reasoning. Apply-
ing this latter assumption, it could be expected that the empirical distribution of
combinations would not differ from a random distribution with electoral prospects
and coalition intentions not being considered at all. On the one hand, such an expec-
tation can be operationalized by a simple random distribution (Table 3). On the
other hand, an empirically supported version can be constructed which results from
a multiplication of the parties' shares of first and second votes under the assumption
that both votes are completely independent from each other (Table 4).
A comparison of the empirical findings with the two purely theoretical reference
models reveals mixed results. Though far from being completely rational voters,
ticket-splitters seem to perform quite well. Taking the third model into consideration,
however, the one which is supported empirically, this conciliatory judgement seems
to require revision. The share of fully rational combinations actually chosen by the
ticket-splitters does indeed exceed the predicted frequency. This statement, however,
holds as well for the absolutely ignorant combinations. The picture is further dark-
ened when both dimensions of decision-making are examined separately. Now, with
Table 3
Frequencies of types of ticket-splitting according to a random distribution model (per cent of split tickets)
Election Splitting pattern
Tactically rational Rational only in Rational only in Irrational
terms of the terms of coalition
electoral system building
1953 6.7 13.3 13.3 66.7
1957 2.4 11.9 7.1 78.6
1961 2.4 7.1 2.4 88.1
1965 3.3 10.0 3.3 83.3
1969 3.3 10.0 3.3 83.3
1972 3.3 10.0 3.3 83.3
1976 3.3 10.0 3.3 83.3
1980 3.3 10.0 3.3 83.8
1983 3.3 16.7 3.3 76.7
1987 6.7 13.3 6.7 73.3
1990 5.5 13.0 5.5 75.9
West Germany 5.5 13.0 5.5 75.9
East Germany and 5.5 13.0 5.5 75.9
Berlin
Cell entries are relative frequencies of the different types of ticket-splitting in Fig. 2, e.g. in 1953, two
out of 30 cells are / -cells which results in a ratio of 6.7 per cent.

492 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
Table 4
Frequencies of types of ticket-splitting according to an empirically supported random model (per cent of
split tickets)
Election year Splitting pattern
Tactically rational Rational only in Rational only in Irrational
terms of the terms of coalition
electoral system building
1953 10.0 43.6 13.5 32.9
1957 2.7 60.7 4.0 32.6
1961 9.2 58.6 8.6 23.6
1965 7.6 70.3 6.1 16.1
1969 4.2 72.0 3.5 20.3
1972 7.5 81.2 4.1 7.2
1976 5.9 80.9 4.7 8.6
1980 8.0 75.0 5.3 11.7
1983 5.8 82.1 1.8 10.3
1987 11.4 68.8 7.1 12.8
1990 9.8 58.1 7.8 24.2
West Germany 10.0 61.7 7.4 20.8
East Germany and 9.5 47.8 8.7 33.9
Berlin
respect to coalition building, the actual combinations are more rational than predicted
by the model. With regard to the electoral system, however, the results would appear
more sophisticated if the voters did not apply the implied calculus but cast their two
votes simply by chance.
Finally, we want to supplement the above analysis, which so far is exclusively
based on the comparison of single percentages, by applying the Loosemore­Hanby
Index. Using this tool, it emerges that with only two exceptions in all elections, the
third model best fits the empirical distribution. In only one case, the 1972 election,
does the optimal model correspond best to reality; but even the pure random model
is able to do so in one case, namely in 1953. This suggests that we look at ticket-
splitting not as a result of tactical considerations but as "a nice touch of sophistication
based on ignorance" (Smith, 1987, p. 134) (Table 5).
6. Conclusion
Our empirical analysis shows that it cannot be taken for granted that a majority
of voters in German Federal elections rationally consider the electoral system and
potential coalitions when deciding which combination of parties to vote for with
their first and second votes. Between 1953 and 1990, not more than half of the
tickets were split in a completely rational manner. This finding leads us to refute
the widespread thesis cited above and to abandon the over-optimistic picture of
ticket-splitters held by some observers and replace it with a more realistic one. In

493H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
Table 5
Deviation of the empirical frequencies of types of ticket-splitting from three theoretical models
(Loosemore­Hanby Indexa
, Loosemore and Hanby, 1971)
Election Deviation from ...
Optimal model Random distribution Random distribution
backed up empirically
1953 0.86 0.25 0.35
1957 0.90 0.45 0.23
1961 0.76 0.56 0.26
1965 0.70 0.63 0.31
1969 0.82 0.52 0.29
1972 0.48 0.73 0.58
1976 0.62 0.68 0.52
1980 0.63 0.64 0.47
1983 0.64 0.59 0.39
1987 0.55 0.55 0.46
1990 0.73 0.45 0.33
West Germany 0.70 0.49 0.36
East Germany and 0.80 0.33 0.25
Berlin
1953­90 (West) 0.70 0.55 0.38
a
This index is defined as 1/2|fi pi|, where fi is the empirical portion, pi is the share predicted by the
respective model, and i 1, 2, 3, 4 is the type of ticket-splitting as given in Table 1. Thus, for example,
the last number in the first row is calculated as follows: ((0.143 0.1) (0.436 0.089) (0.3030
.135) (0.465 0.329))/2 0.35.
this more realistic scenario, both the politically sophisticated ticket-splitters and their
politically confused counterparts should be considered.
The validity of the operationalization presented in this paper is corroborated by
the fact that the variation of the proportion of rational split tickets may be explained
by the change in the factual premises of decision-making perceived by the voters.
Thus, the conceptual framework of this analysis, though not the only possible
interpretation of "rational ticket-splitting", appears to be promising. Additionally, it
seems suitable to apply it to other political systems in order to understand the ration-
ality of ticket-splitting in different settings. Since the problems innate to the indirect
measurement used in this analysis should not be neglected, studies based on survey
data are also highly recommended. Moreover, such data would permit the investi-
gation of the effects of further variables, especially those of attitudinal character;
additionally, they would allow research in line with the traditional literature on soph-
isticated voting.
Our quite simple analyses have shown that in Germany, the rationality of ticket-
splitting is problematic in terms of both coalition politics and electoral incentives.
Regarding the former aspect, where we found rationality to be more severely lacking,
an appropriate remedy is not easy to offer. The ambiguity in the signalling of future
coalitions by political elites is the main cause, and there is no way to force party
leaders to make clear-cut commitments.

494 H. Schoen/Electoral Studies 18 (1999) 473­496
Turning to electoral incentives, deficits are both less dramatic and more easily
curable by institutional engineering. By far not all German voters are able to handle
the electoral system, which implies that a large portion of the electorate is unable
to communicate its political preferences to the political system in a straightforward
way. In order to remedy this shortcoming, which is especially problematic in respect
of normative theoretical considerations on democracy, two measures seem appropri-
ate. At first sight, one is tempted to call for an intensification of civic education in
order to enable more voters to handle the existing electoral system. However, in
Western societies, which emphasize the protection of individual freedom, no eligible
voter can be forced to expose himself to such instructions. Hence, such attempts do
not appear very promising. Therefore, a second solution may be considered, namely
that of adjusting the electoral system in a way in which more voters are able to
understand it. This may be accomplished in two ways. First, one can think of chang-
ing the nomenclature of the two votes. The more important party vote should be
called "first vote", the less important vote for a candidate "second vote". Second, a
substantial electoral reform may be taken into consideration. A straightforward sol-
ution would be to abolish the two-vote-system and to return to the one-vote-system
that was in use at the first German Federal election in 1949. Each citizen voter would
then have only one vote with which to influence the selection of both a candidate
and a party, and this would preclude any confusion concerning the relative impact
of different votes.
Acknowledgements
I would like to give thanks to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
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