http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html
Cato Policy Analysis No.
239 September
18, 1995
Policy Analysis
The Western European Union As NATO's Successor
by Barbara Conry
Barbara Conry is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute.
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Executive Summary
Washington unwisely clings to outdated Cold War policies instead of devising new policies that
better address America's security requirements in the post-Cold War era. Nowhere is that more
evident than in the effort to maintain or even expand NATO, even though the enemy it was
created to face, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, and the United States and Europe now have
relatively few common security interests.
The Western European Union, the security arm of the European Union, should replace NATO as the
primary guarantor of European security. A robust WEU would have a number of advantages over
NATO. WEU member states have many common security interests, in contrast to the increasingly
divergent U.S. and European perspectives that have already produced serious disarray in NATO.
The West European nations have ample economic resources and are capable of providing for their
own defense without a U.S. subsidy. Finally, Moscow is likely to view the WEU as less
provocative than a U.S.-dominated NATO--especially an enlarged version that expands to
Russia's borders.
Maintaining NATO as the primary European security institution both is expensive and risks
drawing the United States into military entanglements even when no vital American interests
are at stake. Replacing NATO with the WEU would emphasize that most disputes in Central and
Eastern Europe are more relevant to the European nations than to America and that dealing with
such problems is properly a European responsibility. Moreover, once the West Europeans develop
a full independent military capability, the WEU would be a strong partner for the United
States in the event of a future threat to mutual U.S.-European security interests.
Introduction
The 1989-90 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union were a dramatic ending to the Cold War. Throughout that four-decade conflict, U. S.
rivalry with the Soviet Union was the beacon that guided American foreign policy. The size and
structure of the U.S. military, American alliances and security commitments, and U.S.
involvement in remote regional conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere all were driven by
the need to contain America's adversaries in the Kremlin and their surrogates around the
world. No part of the foreign policy debate occurred outside the confines of the East-West
conflict.
That Cold War framework, which for so long informed every foreign policy initiative, withered
away with the Soviet Union. Yet Washington policymakers have displayed a disturbing
inclination to maintain Cold War policies. Rather than welcome the opportunity to divert
resources from national defense to more productive sectors of the economy, they cling
stubbornly to a military that costs more than it did during the Nixon era and remains
configured to confront a superpower enemy. Instead of viewing minor regional conflicts as
unfortunate but ubiquitous features of the international state system from which the United
States can afford to stay detached, much of the foreign policy elite advocates rushing in at
the first signs of trouble, needlessly sacrificing American blood and treasure.
Instead of encouraging America's West European allies to develop a new security system that is
relevant to the post-Cold War era, Washington insists on maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization--an alliance that was designed to defend the West against the Soviet Union and
has no other credible mission or rationale. In many ways, the debate over post-Cold War
European security epitomizes the foreign policy community's irrational, almost sentimental,
attachment to Cold War institutional and policy relics, regardless of their relevance in the
new international environment. As one Russian journalist has commented, "Some analysts in the
West believe that under the new conditions, to justify the existence of NATO is a jigsaw
puzzle for its strategists."(1) Indeed, so strong is the determination to maintain NATO that
the alliance no longer seems to be viewed as a tool to protect American vital interests; in
the eyes of many of its proponents, NATO itself has risen to the level of a vital interest.
That approach is wrong and potentially dangerous. NATO functioned effectively during the Cold
War, but it is out of place in the new international environment. The conditions that led to
its creation--the Soviet threat and the extraordinary coincidence of American and European
interests in containing that threat--no longer exist. The Soviet Union is gone, and the
concurrence in American and European interests has diminished dramatically; conflict, not
cooperation, has been the hallmark of U.S.-European relations in the post-Cold War era. Former
British diplomat Jonathan Clarke makes the provocative observation, "If NATO did not already
exist, it is doubtful that Washington would now invent it."(2)
Yet Washington not only refuses to disinvent NATO, it seems determined to reinvent it. Much of
the foreign policy community is obsessed with proposals for new NATO missions and expanded
NATO membership. Many of the proposals conflict with one another, and others are inherently
unworkable, but their authors remain engaged in an earnest discus-sion of how to ensure that
NATO remains relevant in the post-Cold War world. To most of NATO's champions, no suggestion
is too radical for serious consideration--except the suggestion that the alliance has outlived
its usefulness and should be eliminated so that an alternative arrangement for European
security, one that is appropriate to the post-Cold War era, can be made.(3)
Europe after NATO: Bogus Nightmare Scenarios
It is inaccurate to suggest, as NATO partisans often do, that the only alternative to
Atlanticism is a return to the dark ages of the interwar era: nationalized European defenses,
American isolationism, xenophobia, demagoguery, and the other evils associated with the rise
of Hitler and World War II. Former U.S. senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) warns that weakening
NATO will have dire consequences. "As we have thrice before in this dreadful century, [we
will] set in motion an instability that can only lead to war, shed blood, and lost treasure.
Pray that we are wiser."(4) Lawrence di Rita of the Heritage Foundation similarly defends NATO
as an "insurance policy" against a future world war. "If keeping 65,000 young Americans in
Europe will prevent 10 times that many new headstones in Arlington cemetery once the Europeans
turn on themselves again--as they have twice this century--then it's a small price to pay."(5)
Such alarmism underestimates the significance of 50 years of economic and political
cooperation among the West European powers and the role of pan-European institutionssuch as
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It also ignores the fact that a
viable institutional alternative to NATO--the Western European Union--already exists. With the
proper resources and recognition on the part of Washington and the Europeans that an
independent European defense is essential in the post-Cold War era, the WEU is a promising
alternative to Atlanticism. Far from being a lame second choice to NATO or defense on the
cheap, a robust WEU would be superior to NATO in many ways, better suited in the long run to
protecting European and, indirectly, American interests.
The WEU's Mission
The WEU was created in 1954 with six members--Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. It has since grown to include Spain, Portugal, Italy, and
Greece.(6) Largely inactive during the first 30 years of its existence, the WEU was
revitalized at a 1984 meeting of its member states' foreign and defense ministers. European
leaders concluded that the deterioration in superpower relations in the early 1980s warranted
closer cooperation among the West European nations on security issues. The subsequent adoption
of the Single European Act, and renewed interest in "Europeanization" generally, further
bolstered the WEU, as did the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. But it was the demise of the Soviet
Union, which for so long had ensured NATO's primacy in European security affairs, that sparked
the real renaissance of the WEU.
There is no question that the WEU needs to develop better military capabilities and stronger
internal cohesion before it will be prepared to take responsibility for European defense. The
continued emphasis on NATO, however, exacerbates the WEU's deficiencies in both of those
areas. David Garnham, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, has
observed,
The symbolic character of European security structures limits their ability to replace NATO in
its key role in European security. As long as the West Europeans continue to see common
foreign and security policies primarily as means to measure progress toward European unity,
rather than as tangible instruments for defending Europe, neither the WEU nor the larger
European Union will qualify to replace the Atlantic Alliance. Europe is unlikely to cross that
threshold until the American security blanket is further withdrawn--or if America's military
hegemony causes Europeans to see the United States as more threatening than reassuring.(7)
Changing the Incentives
The Europeans are loath to divert existing military resources from NATO to an untested
institution, and they are even less inclined to increase military spending for a European
security organization when NATO offers them a defense subsidy, courtesy of U.S. taxpayers.
Similarly, there is little incentive for them to hammer out intra-European disagreements on
defense issues, as would be necessary if Europe took responsibility for its own security, when
they can gloss over internal disputes and attack Washington for sowing dissension in the
transatlantic community.
Washington's frosty attitude toward any competitor to NATO, especially an independent European
defense identity, has also undermined the WEU. Former president George Bush told the West
Europeans at a 1991 NATO meeting,
Our premise is that the American role in the defense and the affairs of Europe will not be
made superfluous by European union. If our premise is wrong, if, my friends, your ultimate aim
is provide individually for your own defense, the time to tell us is today.(8)
Although U.S. public opinion has long demanded that American officials call for "burden
sharing," and two generations of U.S. policymakers have paid lip service to the need for
Europeans to assume greater responsibility for defense of their region, Washington has
generally resented and resisted signs of genuine independence on the part of its European
partners. Indeed, U.S. officials have repeatedly warned the Europeans that transatlantic
defense cooperation must take precedence over cooperation among the Europeans themselves on
security matters.(9) As Reginald Dale, economic and financial editor of the International
Herald Tribune, has remarked, "The ideal state of affairs for Washington has Europeans always
laboring toward greater unity, but never actually achieving it. The Europe of Sisyphus."(10)
However, if NATO were out of the picture and the necessary steps were taken to prepare the WEU
to assume responsibility for European defense, the WEU would have a number of inherent
advantages over NATO. Unlike NATO, the WEU is not solely a military alliance but the defense
identity of theEuropean Union, designed to "play an integral role in the development of the
European Union and . . . implement EU decisions with military applications."(11) It requires
no external threat or adversary to justify itself. Alliances, on the other hand, derive their
raisons d'`atre from external adversaries. Josef Joffe of SAAddeutsche Zeitung points out,
No alliance has ever persisted longer than the threat that spawned it. The idea of an alliance
is logically inseparable from the idea of a threat and a foe. . . . In the absence of a threat
and a foe, the NATO alliance as we know it will not persist much longer.(12)
Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), one of NATO's most prominent fans in the U.S. government,
concedes that NATO must go "out of area" or risk going "out of business."(13) In other words,
it is imperative that NATO find some external adversary to justify its institutional existence
because, unlike the WEU, it lacks a self-contained rationale.
The Vain Attempt to Transform NATO
Of course, many champions of NATO allege that it has always been much more than an ordinary
military alliance. Winston Churchill's military adviser, Lord Ismay, reportedly quipped that
NATO was designed "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down."(14)
NATO's supporters insist that the organization remains useful today as a means of dampening
intra-European disputes and preventing the renationalization of European defenses. Volker
Ruehe, Germany's defense minister, expresses that view concisely.
On both sides of Atlantic it must be made clear why we still need the U.S. commitment to
Europe. . . . Europe still has a long way to go before it can act on the basis of a really
unified power. The political revolution in Europe is not yet finished. Although Europe is no
longer suffering from a military threat that could lead to a devastating war, it is now
plagued by a number of local crises and regional conflicts that had previously been suppressed
under the concrete layer of the communist dictatorship.(15)
Most of the arguments for extending NATO into Central and Eastern Europe assume that NATO
would serve purposes--for example, promoting democracy and preventing regional
instability--that exceed the scope of traditional military alliances. But, as Ian Davidson of
the Financial Times points out,
This argument is inherently absurd. Nato is a military alliance for collective defense; and
even if today it is embarrassed by the disappearance of the Soviet threat, it remains a
military alliance, and it cannot be transmogrified into some kind of all-purpose political
club.(16)
The WEU and the Renationalization Specter
In any case, there is no apparent reason that the EU and the WEU could not carry out the
nonmilitary functions that NATO advocates insist justify the continued existence of the
alliance. It is not clear, for instance, that NATO would be essential--or even useful--in
subduing political conflicts among EU member states. Intra-European disputes can be expected
to arise, but their resolution is well within the purview of the EU. The EU provides numerous
forums for European governments to address their grievances, and the highly integrated
European economy provides incentive for the peaceful settlement of disputes that is as
compelling as the U.S. military presence, if not stronger. It is extremely unlikely that
intra-European squabbles would lead to war; as Malcolm Rifkind, Britain's foreign minister,
has argued, "The European Union has made war in Western Europe unthinkable."(17)
Yet many NATO partisans insist that the alliance is needed to guard against such an improbable
scenario. Jeffrey Simon, a senior fellow at the National Defense University, emphasizes the
importance of NATO's role in preventing the renationalization of European defenses.
Were NATO to atrophy and wither away, re-nationalization of defense planning might occur and
old suspicions might arise in Europe. The prospect becomes particularly serious in light of
Germany's unification and other countries' lingering suspicions of Germany. . . . NATO's force
planning process, which continues to embed Germany in multilateral security structures and
provide trans-parency, is a significant, though not often discussed, security function of
NATO.(18)
But a strong WEU could be as effective as NATO in preventing the renationalization of European
defenses. Forexample, as a member of the WEU, an expansionist Germany could not easily
initiate a military buildup for the purpose of threatening its European partners. Transparency
and integrated military command among WEU member states would prevent it from pursuing its
expansionist aims just as NATO would. A would-be aggressor could withdraw from the WEU--and
most likely would do so--but it could just as easily withdraw from NATO.
NATO AAber Alles No More:The Divergence of U.S. and European Interests
The WEU is better suited to the new international environment not only institutionally but
also because its composition reflects more accurately than NATO the states that are likely to
have common security interests (and the means to protect those interests) in the post-Cold War
era. Washington's Cold War era dominance of European security is unnatural, unsustainable, and
ultimately unhealthy for both Western Europe and the United States.(19) The conditions that
initially led to a major U.S. role in the defense of Western Europe, namely, a compelling
mutual interest in preventing Soviet dominance of the Continent and the West Europeans'
weakness after World War II, no longer exist. Owen Harries, editor of the National Interest,
contends that the close transatlantic cooperation during the Cold War may prove to have been
an aberration.
The political "West" [the NATO community] is not a natural construct but a highly artificial
one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile "East" to bring it into
existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the
disappearance of that enemy.(20)
American and European interests are increasingly diver-gent and the West Europeans are capable
of providing for their own defense. Given those realities, it is in America's interest (and,
in the long term, in Europe's interest as well) to return responsibility for European security
to the Europeans.
Mounting Transatlantic Tensions
Post-Cold War disputes between the United States and its European allies have erupted over a
number of matters, both trivial and significant. Relatively mundane transatlantic squabbles
have arisen over such matters as whose preferred candidates should head the World Trade
Organization and UNICEF, and there has been somewhat more serious bickering between Washington
and Paris over industrial espionage. It is the deterioration in transatlantic relations on
more important matters, however, that illustrates the NATO allies' parting of ways.
European, especially French and German, business ties with countries the United States has
condemned as "rogue states," such as Libya and Iran, have been one major point of contention.
Yet even as U.S. officials and indignant editorial boards of U.S. newspapers castigate the
Europeans for refusing to cooperate with American directives calling on the international
community to isolate those countries, the critics miss the larger point. The Europeans
presumably are not defying Washington for the sake of being cantankerous; their dissent very
likely represents a sincere perception that Washington's policy prescription does not serve
European interests. At the very least, there is a significant difference in priorities, with
the United States emphasizing potential security threats and the Europeans favoring trade. The
dispute over European commerce with rogue states, like the U.S.-French disagreements over
Algeria, the Anglo-American dispute over Clinton's embrace of Sinn Fein, and the efforts of
some European countries to lift sanctions against Iraq despite Washington's bitter opposition
are merely symptoms of the larger problem: the accelerating divergence of U.S. and European
interests overall.
Disagreements about Bosnia
The most spectacular rift within NATO has been over policy toward the former Yugoslavia. Much
of the dispute has centered on Washington's refusal to commit ground troops in Bosnia even as
it has called for aggressive policies (such as the "lift and strike" option) that the
Europeans felt would jeopardize their troops on the ground, who were serving as part of a UN
"peacekeeping" force. An unnamed French official remarked that Washington's policy was, at the
very least, inconsistent. "It's nice to say you want to help the victims of aggression, but it
bears no relation to what is happening on the ground. The Americans say they know what is
right and what we should do, but they don't even dare to put their troops on the line."(21)
London's Independent was harsher.
No amount of diplomatic niceties can conceal the true implications of America's behaviour in
theBalkans. The first phase of the post-Cold War era, the period when everything seemed
possible, is over, from now on, the Europeans face tough security decisions and more often
than not these will have to be taken without U.S. co-operation.(22)
The U.S.-European discord over Bosnia underscores that American and European interests are no
longer in sync as they were during the Cold War. The dispute did not itself cause the
disharmony between U.S. and European interests. Wall Street Journal correspondent Mark Nelson
recognizes the long-term significance. "With no common enemy, Europe and American are coming
unglued. . . . Though Europe and America have confronted plenty of problems in the course of
their common history . . . this latest rift is deeper and more fundamental."(23) And as
Michael Lind of the New Republic warns, "To invent a threat in order to reunite these
interests is to act against the grain of both history and sanity."(24)
Ending the Transatlantic Military Welfare Program
In light of the relative paucity of common U.S.-European security interests in the post-Cold
War era, it makes little sense for the United States to continue subsidizing European security
(at an annual cost to American taxpayers of nearly $90 billion). It is sometimes argued that
the United States must continue to act as Europe's security guarantor because Europe is
incapable of mustering the military might to provide for its own defense. But given the size
of the European economy and population, that argument strains credulity. The Institute for
National Strategic Studies' 1995 Strategic Assessment estimates that Western, Central, and
Eastern Europe's combined share of the gross world product--35 percent at market exchange
rates and 27 percent at purchasing power parity exchange rates--exceeds that of any other
region.(25) As most of that GWP is concentrated in the EU countries, it is clear that Western
Europe has the financial and human resources to provide for its own defense.
If the EU's current military resources are insufficient to meet the challenges that it
perceives as threatening, there is no doubt that its potential military capabilities are more
than adequate to meet its defense needs in the post-Cold War era. Realizing that military
potential would require the European countries to increase their defense budgets, which are
relatively modest at the moment. Defense spending across the Continent has fallen considerably
sincethe demise of the Soviet Union, and most West European countries have announced their
intention to cut their defense budgets further. They can afford to do so as long as Washington
is picking up the tab for much of their defense. As Clarke explains,
The Europeans have a manifest interest in sharing the burden of their defense with the United
States. . . . The more the United States shows that it is willing to continue with its
European tasks, the fewer resources the Europeans will feel they need to devote to
defense.(26)
Indeed, the prospect of losing Washington's defense subsidy is one reason every European NATO
government insists that the United States must remain engaged in Europe and NATO, even though
some, particularly France, have long resented Washington's dominance of European security
affairs. Ted Galen Carpenter has pointed out,
The departure of American forces from the Continent--much less a U.S. withdrawal from the
North Atlantic Treaty--would confront West Europeans with an unpalatable choice: either
increase their military spending to compensate for the loss of Washington's military support
or continue to underfund their military establishments, despite the volatile political and
security environment in Russia and Eastern Europe, and thereby accept a higher level of
risk.(27)
It should not be surprising that the Europeans would resist such a choice. Washington,
however, in light of its chronic budget woes, cannot continue to allow the prosperous EU
states to depend on the United States to finance Western Europe's defense. Yet as long as NATO
remains the primary vehicle for the Continent's security, American taxpayers will be forced to
subsidize European defense needs.
Avoiding European Quagmires
The financial benefits to the American people of disentangling U.S.-European security are
significant. More important than the economic benefits, however, are the security
implications. It should not be forgotten that NATO is a military alliance--which by definition
entails a risk of sending American troops to war. During the Cold War, that may have been a
risk worth taking, as an attack (presumably from the Soviet Union) on Western Europe would
havebeen likely to threaten America's own security. NATO's probable missions in the post-Cold
War era, however, are far less likely to have an immediate and substantial impact on American
interests. Any scenario involving NATO action in the foreseeable future would almost certainly
inject the United States into a parochial European conflict--which would be neither necessary
nor wise.
Is the United States a "European Power"?
There are, of course, those in the foreign policy community who allege that any threat, direct
or indirect, to America's West European allies is equally threatening to the United States.
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke, for example,
has written in Foreign Affairs,
The United States has become a European power in a sense that goes beyond traditional
assertions of America's "commitment" to Europe. In the 21st century, Europe will still need
the active American involvement that has been a necessary compo-nent of the continental
balance for half a century. Conversely, an unstable Europe would still threaten essential
national security interests of the United States. . . . Local conflicts, internal political
and economic instability, and the return of historical grievances have now replaced Soviet
expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe. Western Europe and America must
jointly ensure that tolerant democracies become rooted throughout all of Europe and that the
seething, angry, unresolved legacies of the past are contained and solved.(28)
Holbrooke makes no distinction between American and European interests. But the notion that
events in Central and Eastern Europe are of equal concern to the EU--some of whose member
states share borders with Central European countries--and the United States--which is
thousands of miles away--is both ahistorical and illogical. Although the United States has
some interests in Europe, American and European interests are not identical and should not be
viewed as such. Maintaining NATO as the primary European security regime fosters the fallacy
of congruent "transatlantic" interests. The belief in congruent interests was exaggerated even
during the Cold War, despite the existence of a mutual security threat. It has no validity in
a postCold War setting. Encouraging the WEU to emerge as NATO'ssuccessor would be recognition
that European interests can be, and often will be, distinct from American interests.
Not All European Disputes Matter to America
The likelihood of large-scale conflict within the EU is negligible, but there are numerous
potential conflicts on its periphery. The local conflicts, internal political and economic
instability, and return of historical grievances that Holbrooke mentions may indeed threaten
European interests, but it is difficult to envisage a scenario in which such conflicts would
have a significant impact on American security. As long as NATO exists, however, there will be
immense pressure on the United States to become involved when the alliance's European members
perceive that their interests are threatened. The United States therefore runs a great risk of
being drawn, at the insistence of its NATO allies, into a Central or Eastern European quagmire
that has no bearing on American security. Such an intervention would not only represent a
waste of American blood and treasure, it could, as the University of Chicago's Charles Glaser
concedes, more broadly jeopardize America's safety.
Because war in the East is likely, Western commitments would likely be put to the test.
Intervention in a Central European war could involve the West in a war that becomes
unexpectedly large, including the possibility of an unintended clash with Russia.(29)
Indeed, the pressure for U.S. involvement in Bosnia--which even the Europeans do not view as
sufficiently threatening to their interests to warrant large-scale intervention--has already
demonstrated the likelihood of such a situation. Many Americans, including former UN
ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Morton Abramowitz of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, have conceded that no vital Western interests are at stake in Bosnia but have urged
NATO to take action in order to affirm the alliance's relevance to European security.
University of Southern California professor Ronald Steel excoriates such reasoning. "The
purpose of NATO is to protect its members from wars, not to get them into one.
Interventionists should argue the merits of their cause, not maintain that they need to find a
job for NATO after the cold war."(30) That such an argument has even been advanced underscores
the risk that the continued existence of NATO poses to the United States.
Protecting European Interests
In light of the economic costs and security risks that NATO entails, replacing the alliance
with a European-directed security regime would benefit America. Also important, however, are
the long-term benefits that such an arrangement would have for the Europeans. After an initial
adjustment period--which would probably cause some short-term pain, as the West Europeans lost
the U.S. defense subsidy and had to hash out difficult issues among themselves rather than
look to Washington for leadership--a powerful WEU would be superior to NATO for the Europeans
as well. As Defense News has opined, "A unified European voice--with the military cohesion,
assets, and will to back it up--is the best guarantor for peace and prosperity on the
continent."(31) The WEU could act as such a guarantor.
A robust WEU would give Western Europe the ability to protect its vital interests without
depending on the United States--something it is conspicuously lacking at this point. One
participant in a meeting of George Washington University's Jean Monnet Council observed, "In
matters of European security, NATO, which now has no purpose, holds Europe hostage to U.S.
decisions on military actions."(32) As noted earlier, European dependence on NATO may draw the
United States into wars that affect European, but not American, interests. But if Washington
(rightly) refuses to become involved in such conflicts, dependence on NATO can prevent the
European countries from protecting their own vital interests. Pierre Lellouche of the French
Institute for International Relations warns that, as long as the United States dominates
European security arrangements, "Europeans are condemned to becoming impotent spectators of
the convulsions which threaten them directly."(33) That is a risk no European country should
run, but the temptation to do so will be strong as long as NATO remains the primary vehicle
for European security.
A strong WEU would also aid the process of European integration. Former French president
Franáois Mitterrand noted, "If we want to build Europe, we must realize that this Europe needs
its own defense. If it simply remains dependent on outside powers, it will not be itself."(34)
Die Zeit diplomatic correspondent Christoph Bertram, writing in the Financial Times, likewise
emphasized that a European defense capability is a crucial part of overall EU cooperation.
The idea that defense--the next step, so to say--should be excluded from European integration
isnot only illogical. . . . A European Community in which most other aspects of national
policies, but not defense, are being merged will never be credible as a political union.(35)
A unified, democratic Europe is in the interest of both Europe and the United States and has
the potential to be Washington's strongest partner. That is true even though U.S. and European
interests are diverging, since some overlap still exists and can be expected to continue.
Washington should encourage the development of a viable, limited U.S.-EU partnership,
including supporting a strong WEU, rather than artificially limit the progress of
Europeanization by pressuring the EU to abdicate one of its primary responsibilities to an
outside organization.
The Russia Factor
Replacing NATO with the WEU would also be likely to have a salutary effect on U.S. and
European relations with Russia. Despite the West's assurances that the Atlantic alliance has
only benign intentions, Russia views the continued existence of NATO--not to mention the
prospect of its expansion--with considerable suspicion. Russian president Boris Yeltsin,
commenting on NATO's plans to extend security guarantees to former Soviet satellites, warned
at the December 1994 meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Europe, not having yet freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War, is in danger of
plunging into a cold peace. Why sow the seeds of mistrust? After all, we are no longer
enemies. We are all partners.(36)
Americans too often dismiss the notion that Russians might have legitimate concerns about NATO
or its expansion. Wall Street Journal columnist George Melloan, for example, complains,
The fact that the U.S. has been bending over backward to avoid [the appearance that NATO
expansion would be a threatening gesture toward Russia] doesn't seem to have assured them [the
Russians]. . . . They choose, conveniently, to forget that NATO's charter specifies that it is
a defensive alliance, not an offensive force.(37)
That attitude is insensitive as well as unrealistic. Alexei Pushkov, deputy editor-in-chief of
Moscow News, expresses the apprehension of many Russian policymakers and opinion leaders about
NATO.
Military-political alliances do not exist for the sake of abstraction or charitable purposes.
They are always directed against someone or something. . . . The conclusion to be made is that
NATO expansion to Eastern Europe can be directed only against one country: Russia.(38)
It is unlikely that Moscow would regard the WEU with as much trepidation. The WEU, as noted
earlier, is not purely a military alliance and is therefore inherently less menacing
institutionally. Even though its potential military strength exceeds the probable strength of
the post-Cold War Russian defense establishment, it is less likely to arouse Russian ire than
would be a U.S.-led military alliance. Perhaps more important to the Russians than the WEU's
institutional basis, though, is that its emergence as NATO's successor would mark the burial
of an organization that owes its very existence to Cold War era Russian-Western European
enmity. Although many in the West have questioned why Russia would object to NATO unless
Moscow harbors aggressive intentions toward its European neighbors, there are reasons why even
a cooperative Russia would view NATO and the continued U.S. military presence in Europe
nervously.
Mutual U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian suspicion is in part a legacy of the Cold War. Russian
foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev emphasizes that problem. "Whatever one thinks of NATO, it's
still a military alliance that was created when Europe was divided."(39) Forty years of
superpower enmity cannot be erased by five years' of summits between the last remaining
superpower and its greatly weakened former adversary. Nor do more inclusive (but relatively
meaningless) NATO offspring, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council or the Partnership
for Peace, necessarily cancel out the sinister associations between NATO and the Cold War in
the Russian mind.
U.S. and NATO actions since the end of the Cold War may also have exacerbated Moscow's innate
distrust of the alliance. Although Western policy should be expected to reflect the reality
that the United States and its allies, rather than Russia, were the victors in the Cold War,
the West has at times failed to recognize that Russia remains a key power and will
understandably expect to be treated as such. In the Balkans and elsewhere, the West has often
treated Russiaas a "junior partner" whose views, although tolerated, are seldom given much
consideration. Most great powers would object to such treatment, and Russia is especially
sensitive to both perceived and actual slights. Even Kozyrev, one of Russia's most pro-Western
officials, has warned Washington to "recognize Russia as a player, recognize our desire to
defend our national interests, and play an important role in the world."(40)
That is not to say that U.S. policy should pander to Moscow. In the event of a threat to
national security, the United States should take all necessary steps to protect U.S. vital
interests, even if Russia objects. Maintaining a high-profile presence in Europe, however, is
not a national security imperative. It makes little sense to alienate the Russians over a
matter that has little impact on vital American interests--especially since aggressive,
ultranationalist Russian elements, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, would be likely to benefit
from antagonistic U.S. policies.(41) The greater the Russian hostility toward the United
States, the more Moscow will be inclined to seek out opportunities to obstruct American
foreign policy; conversely, amicable U.S.-Russian relations will enhance cooperation in the
international arena and minimize the risk that conflicts will have to be resolved through
force. Europe and the United States alike would benefit from less confrontational relations
with Moscow.
Partners in Peace: The United States and the WEU
Finally, both the United States and the Europeans would benefit from the partnership of a
strong U.S. military and an enhanced WEU. Although there is currently no large-scale threat to
common U.S. and European vital interests, the emergence of such a threat in the future is not
outside the realm of possibility. If such a threat were to arise, the combined U.S.-WEU
military assets would be an impressive deterrent to a would-be aggressor. Likewise, a U.S.-WEU
alliance would be a formidable fighting force in the event of an actual war.
NATO, especially in its current state of disarray, might not have the same impact. Though
NATO's military capabilities are unrivaled, those capabilities are relevant only to the extent
that member governments agree on their use; internal disagreements over fundamental issues
render the alliance's otherwise impressive military assets virtually useless. Today, because
NATO is uncertain about both its interests and its mission, it has declining credibility as
adeterrent. Even once NATO becomes engaged, its effectiveness is undermined by its lack of
direction, as has been quite evident in NATO's performance in Bosnia. Internal quarrels among
and competing agendas of NATO members have all but paralyzed the alliance. The discord within
NATO is likely to worsen as U.S. and European interests continue to diverge, and as long as
the disharmony persists, NATO will have diminished value as a deterrent.
From NATO to the WEU
It is important to consider the feasibility of a transition from NATO to the WEU and what
capabilities the WEU could be expected to have once that transition is finished. The United
States can exert considerable--though not unlimited--influence over such arrangements. The WEU
must be both committed politically and prepared militarily to assume responsibility for
European defense. A firm, clearly expressed decision by Washington to move away from its
NATO-centered European policy would help facilitate those developments.
The American foreign policy community--and many Europeans as well--tends to dismiss the notion
that the Europeans are capable politically of providing for their own security without
leadership from Washington. One high-level U.S. official reportedly remarked that the EU
member states "could not organize a three-car motorcade if their lives depended on it."(42)
Europe's failure to resolve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia after Bush explicitly
designated it a European issue is often cited as evidence that, despite their cooperation on
economic matters, the Europeans simply cannot get it together when it comes to security
issues. Dale justifiably argues that such criticism is unfair.
Condemning the EC for not behaving like the United States of Europe is like setting the high
jump bar at twenty feet and criticizing a five-foot athlete for failing to clear it. . . . It
is worth remembering that when the United States was at the age of the Community, it was in
the middle of the War of 1812 with Britain. That was half a century before the Civil War and
nearly a century before the U.S. dollar became the nation's single official currency.(43)
The West Europeans do indeed need to enhance their ability to act in concert in the security
sphere. Euroskeptics should, however, also recognize that Europe'sdependence on NATO is one of
the main reasons the EU has cooperated less on defense matters than it has on economic issues.
Moreover, intra-European cooperation on defense matters has, in fact, increased substantially
in recent years. Clarke cites evidence of at least a modestly encouraging trend.
Institutional cohesion on political and security matters has steadily increased. The
Maastricht Treaty established formal mechanisms for close political collaboration between EU
members. The EU has also taken steps to develop its joint military capabilities outside the
NATO framework. It has reinvigorated the WEU. . . . WEU ships have already undertaken sanction
patrols in the Persian Gulf and Adriatic Sea. In addition, the French and Germans have formed
the 35,000-strong Eurocorps.(44)
Such progress on military cooperation among the West Europeans is in striking contrast to the
turmoil that has more or less incapacitated NATO throughout the same period. It is reasonable
to expect that if NATO ceased trying to be Europe's dominant security institution, the trend
toward cooperation among the Europeans would continue, perhaps even accelerate.
WEU Military Capabilities
There is also reason for confidence regarding Europe's military capabilities. Although Europe
remains excessively dependent on U.S. military resources, the West European countries
currently have substantial, if insufficient, capabilities of their own. The British and French
nuclear arsenals may fall well short of U.S. and Russian arsenals, but they still provide the
WEU with a credible nuclear deterrent independent of the American nuclear guarantees provided
through NATO. WEU countries also boast significant conventional capabilities, which provide a
sound basis for European military self-sufficiency in the reasonably near future.
The WEU member states' armed forces were more than 2 million strong in 1994, and the countries
also possess significant numbers of tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft
and attack helicopters.(45) Britain and France, Western Europe's leading naval powers, have
between them 8 nuclear missile submarines, 19 nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines, and 82
large surface warships.(46) Also important, the West European countries are in the process of
modifying their armed forces so that they are suited to the types of operations--such as
peacekeeping and crisis management--they are likely to undertake in the postCold War era,
rather than maintaining the Cold War force structure that was configured to repel a Warsaw
Pact invasion.(47)
The WEU countries are deficient, however, in terms of operational capabilities, primarily in
the areas of strategic lift, communications, logistics, and intelligence.(48) They have
generally depended on NATO infrastructure and assets, most of which are American assets
assigned to the alliance, for those capabilities. Although the Europeans currently are
sometimes allowed to draw on NATO for those assets, their use is subject to Washington's veto.
A viable WEU defense would have to develop independent capabilities in those areas.
The Role of the Eurocorps
The Europeans currently have in the Eurocorps what could be viewed as an embryonic WEU army.
Created in 1992 by Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, the Eurocorps now
consists of approximately 35,000 troops drawn from France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands. The three missions it is authorized to undertake--action within the joint
defense framework of the allies in accordance with article 5 of the NATO treaty or in
accordance with the WEU treaty; action aimed at preserving peace; and action aimed at
providing humanitarian assistance--reflect the delicate politics surrounding the debate over
European security. It is an attempt to reconcile decisions taken by both NATO ("We welcome the
perspective of a reinforcement of the WEU, both as the defense component of the process of
European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance") and
the European Community ("the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time
lead to a common defense").(49)
Because of its rather awkward and precarious position of being able to operate under the
command of either NATO or the WEU--and deliberate ambiguity on the issue of which organization
takes precedence--the Eurocorps has been the object of considerable scorn.(50) If NATO were no
longer a factor, however, such criticism would have little basis, although questions about
Europe's current military capabilities would continue to be relevant. Nonetheless, the
Eurocorps is an important first step toward an independent European defense.
After NATO: The United States and Europe
It is important to realize that replacing NATO with a European-directed security regime does
not mean the end of American engagement in Europe. The United States should maintain and work
to expand its economic and trade relations with not only the EU but all European countries.
Even former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, a prominent NATO supporter, admits, "Security
can no longer be the principal unifying bond of the Atlantic nations because, fortunately,
there no longer exists a unifying threat."(51) Economic and trade relations should be the
primary transatlantic link in the future. The United States should, of course, remain
politically and diplomatically engaged in European affairs as well. The OSCE will be very
important in that respect because it encompasses not only the United States and the EU but the
other European countries and the former Soviet republics, including Russia.
The United States should also take some interest in security arrangements for Europe east of
the EU area. Considering the challenges that the transition from NATO to the WEU would pose,
it is likely to be some years before arrangements for the entire Continent are in place. Some
sort of association between the WEU and other European countries may be advisable. Smaller
regional security organizations--preferably in conjunction with economic and political
cooperation--may also work. Washington should strongly discourage the fragmentation of Europe
into two or more opposing military alliances, however. The United States should instead
encourage the Europeans to work toward Continentwide security based on vigorous economic and
trade relations, diplomatic consultations when crises arise, and strong defensive--not
offensive--military capabilities. That is the best hope for a peaceful Europe, and a strong
WEU is a crucial component.
Notes
(1) "Commentary on NATO's Policy on Admitting New Members," Foreign Broadcast Information
Service Daily Report on Central Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-93-235, December 9, 1993, p. 6.
(2) Jonathan Clarke, "Replacing NATO," Foreign Policy, 93 (Winter 1993-94): 23.
(3) An example of the dismissiveness that is typical among NATO's advocates concerning
proposals to do away with the alliance can be found in William E. Odom, "NATO's Expansion: Why
the Critics Are Wrong," National Interest, no. 39 (Spring 1995), pp. 38-49.
(4) Malcolm Wallop, "Coping with Victory Proves Quite a Struggle," San Diego Union-Tribune,
December 26, 1993, p. G1.
(5) Lawrence di Rita, "Fine Print in Defense `Contract,'" Washington Times, March 7, 1995, p.
A16.
(6) The WEU's roots are in the 1948 Brussels Treaty, which provided for cooperation on
economic and military matters among its five signatories--Great Britain, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The treaty as amended in 1954 formally established the WEU and
included Germany.
(7) David Garnham, "Ending Europe's Security Dependence," Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no.
4 (December, 1994): 137.
(8) Quoted in Alan Cowell, "Bush Challenges Partners in NATO over Role of U.S.," New York
Times, November 8, 1991, p. A1.
(9) Anand Menon, Anthony Forster, and William Wallace, "A Common European Defense?" Survival
34 (Autumn 1992): 98-118.
(10) Reginald Dale "What Lessons Will Yugoslavia Teach Europe?" Jean Monnet Council, George
Washington University Forum in European Studies, Occasional Paper no. 15, July 1993, p. 2.
(11) "Western European Union: Ready to Take on Role as European Union's Defense Arm," European
Report, no. 1904 (November 24, 1993).
(12) Josef Joffe, in "The Western Alliance: For Love or Convenience," in Does "The West" Still
Exist? A Conference of the Committee for the Free World (New York: Orwell, n.d.), p. 7.
(13) Richard G. Lugar, "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business: A Call for U.S. Leadership to
Revive and Redefine the Alliance," remarks delivered to the Open Forum of the U.S. Department
of State, August 2, 1993.
(14) Quoted in Michael Lind, "Let's Appease Russia!" New Republic, January 9 and 16, 1995, p.
30.
(15) Quoted in "Trans-Atlantic Links Evolve," Defense News, May 16-22, 1994, p. 20.
(16) Ian Davidson, "Nato Looks East," Financial Times, April 12, 1995, p. 14.
(17) Malcolm Rifkind, "Need for an Atlantic Community to Better Reflect U.S.-European
Relations," NATO Review, March 1995, p. 11.
(18) Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?" Orbis 37 (Winter 1993): 24.
(19) Indeed, even at the inception of NATO the United States was never intended to be the
dominant partner but was meant only to back up Europe's efforts to provide for its own
defense. Nor was the deployment of U.S. troops on the European continent part of the original
plan. Once American troops were sent to Europe it was supposed to be a temporary measure. As
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower said in 1951, "If in 10 years, all American troops stationed in
Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this
whole project [NATO] will have failed." Quoted in Center for Defense Information, "What Next
for NATO?" Defense Monitor 24, no. 2 (1995): 2.
(20) Owen Harries, "The Collapse of `The West,'" Foreign Affairs 72 (September-October 1993):
42.
(21) Quoted in William Drozdiak, "Airstrike Fails to Mend Split between U.S. and Europeans,"
Washington Post, November 22, 1994, p. A15.
(22) "Broken Ranks, Stronger Bonds," Independent, November 16, 1994, p. 18.
(23) Mark M. Nelson, "Transatlantic Travails," Foreign Policy 92 (Fall 1993): 75.
(24) Lind, p. 31.
(25) "Strategic Assessment 1995," Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, 1995,
p. 42.
(26) Clarke, p. 25.
(27) Ted Galen Carpenter, "Conflicting Agendas and the Future of NATO," Journal of Strategic
Studies 17, no. 4 (December 1994): 153.
(28) Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74 (March-April 1995):
38.
(29) Charles L. Glaser, "Why Europe Is Still Best," International Security 18 (Summer 1993):
10.
(30) Ronald Steel, "Beware of the Superpower Syndrome," New York Times, April 25, 1994, p.
A11.
(31) "A Major Boost for WEU," Defense News, March 20-26, 1995, p. 30.
(32) Dale, p. 8.
(33) Quoted in Andrew Borowiec, "Clinton and Europe: The Morning After," Washington Times,
January 19, 1994, p. A16.
(34) Quoted in "German Tanks Roll in Paris, This Time as Part of Eurocorps," Washington Times,
July 15, 1994, p. A13.
(35) Christoph Bertram, "Visions of Leadership: Germany," in From Occupation to Cooperation:
The United States and United Germany in a Changing World Order, ed. Steven Muller and Gebhard
Schweigler (New York: American Assembly, 1992), p. 65
(36) Quoted in Daniel Williams, "Yeltsin, Clinton Clash over NATO's Role," Washington Post,
December 6, 1994, p. A1.
(37) George Melloan, "Gloomy Times around the Old NATO Cor-ral," Wall Street Journal,
September 26, 1994, p. A15. Emphasis in original.
(38) Alexei Pushkov, Letter to the Editor, Foreign Affairs (January-February 1994): 173.
(39) Quoted in Rick Atkinson, "Russia Warns NATO on Expan-sion," Washington Post, March 21,
1995, p. A14.
(40) Quoted in Michael Dobbs, "Russia's Kozyrev Portrays Stance as Benign to Ensure U.S.
Support," Washington Post, April 30, 1995, p. A28.
(41) See, for example, "NATO Growth Could Aid Russian Ultranationalists," Washington Times,
February 7, 1995, p. A1.
(42) Quoted in Ted Galen Carpenter, "Who Lost Yugoslavia?" Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 2,
1992.
(43) Dale, p. 2.
(44) "Alternatives to NATO," in The Cato Handbook for Congress (Washington: Cato Institute,
1995), p. 275.
(45) WEU member states' military personnel by country: Belgium, 54,000; France, 506,000;
Germany, 360,000; Greece 214,000; Italy 435,000; Luxembourg, 1,000; Netherlands, 79,000;
Portugal, 76,000; Spain, 213,000; United Kingdom, 258,000, "Documentation," NATO Review, March
1995, p. 35. On military hardware, see "Alternatives to NATO," p. 275.
(46) "Britain, France, Discuss Possibility of Joining Forces," Washington Times, June 14,
1994, p. A15.
(47) See, for example, the German and French white papers on defense: Federal Ministry of
Defence, "White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and
Future of the Bundeswehr," 1994; and French Republic, "Livre Blanc sur la Dfense," 1994.
(48) Robert Grant, "U.S., France, Close the Strategic Gap," Defense News, May 16-22, 1994, p.
19; and Ray Mosely, "NATO Needs a Steady Hand from U.S.," Chicago Tribune, November 7, 1993,
p. IV-1.
(49) For in-depth analysis of the Eurocorps, see Jonathan Clarke, "The Eurocorps: A Fresh
Start in Europe," Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 21, December 28, 1992.
(50) See, for example, David White, "Europe's New Muddle Army," Financial Times, May 21, 1992;
and Ian Mather, "EuroSoldiers Another Unity Scheme Cooked Up by Politicians," Edmonton
Journal, November 13, 1993, p. 12.
(51) Henry Kissinger, "For U.S. Leadership, a Moment Missed," Washington Post, May 12, 1995,
p. A24.