Chapter 18
European Foreign and Security Policy
and Latin America
European security and defence policy is deeply interrelated
with the wider context of Europe's foreign action. Having laid
the foundations of a new defence policy, the EU is confronted
with a new US administration that has restructured, at least tem-
porarily, the global security agenda, such that anti-terrorism is
the core element driving international relations. At the same
time, the new American administration is undertaking this task
with profound mistrust of multilateral action and integration,
thus challenging many of the assumptions upon which the new
post-Cold War world order were based, which were those that
guided relations between the EU and the Mercosul. The decade
of the 1990s constituted a window of opportunity for multilat-
eral action, but it was not fully taken advantage of. Now, in
must tougher circumstances it is necessary to ensure the triumph
of a vision of the world governed by norms and rules accepted
by the majority.
This new situation generates new and heavy responsibilities
for the EU. It is more important than ever to determine the rule
that the EU will carve out for itself and to know whether the
Union will be able to develop its own vision of the international
system and gain the means with which to have a say in the
resolution of the most pressing international issues. Success de-
pends on the ability of the EU to combine coherently its eco-
nomic power and the powerful attraction of its model, with an
effective foreign and security policy and credible military capa-
bilities. There is a fair chance that this could happen, but un-
fortunately still far from certain. The more that Europe becomes
a political actor the more it will seek to consolidate relations
with other partners that have a similar vision of inter-state re-
lations. This being the case, the survival and consolidation of
the Mercosul is essential.
The Heritage of the 1990s: A New Multilateral Project
The 1990s was the decade that signalled the end of bipolarity
and heralded a new opportunity to organise international rela-
tions according to rules and norms that could limit the power
of states. It became possible to speak of a "new multilateralism",
characterised by three main elements: the sense that the inter-
national community and the United Nations (UN) in particular
were responsible for the protection of the rights of individuals,
above and beyond sovereign boundaries; by regionalism, a struc-
tural feature of the international system as a whole; and by the
emergence of a global public opinion, which expresses the desire
of civil society to influence or participate in global decision-
making. Like the globalisation of trade, finances and services,
this'second wave' of globalisation has pushed the need for global
multilateral governance forward. This is a sovereignty-altering
multilateralism, which changes the position of the state in the
international system (The New Multilateralism, Sixth Euro-Latin
American Forum Report, 2001).
It was during the 1990s that post-Maastricht Europe estab-
lished Economic and Monetary Union with the circulation of
the Euro, and laid the foundations for political union. This was
also the decade of the development of the Mercosul. During
the period a series of multilateral initiatives were adopted, the
most important of which was the creation of the ICC. Region-
alism became na essential component and structuring element
of this new multilateralism. The viability of a new kind of mul-
­ 386 ­
tilateral action was to depend in large measure upon the capacity
of the regional groups to become consolidated international ac-
tors. These groups, which are essentially civil actors, were con-
fronted with the need to take on foreign policy and defence
roles. Since the end of the decade, international circumstances
are much less favourable for multilateral and regional projects,
as well as for the defence of human rights. This is particularly
true given that the election of an administration in the US that
is much more unilateral diminishes the incentives for multilat-
eral and regional action, as states tend to attach growing im-
portance to close alliances with the US.
September 11 plays a central role in all this, as the US there-
after defined the fight again terrorism as its topmost foreign and
security policy, relegating free trade initiatives such as the FTAA
or the protection of ethnic minorities from the threat of ethnic
cleansing to a pale secondary position. For the Bush adminis-
tration, combating terrorism means creating alliances with au-
thoritarian regimes that were under pressure to liberalise during
the 1990s. At the same time, the difficulties that the Mercosul
has been undergoing have weighed against the regionalist op-
tion.
The EU only began to affirm itself as an international actor
very slowly, which meant that it was unable to take full advant-
age of the opportunities open to the European model during
the 1990s. This was particularly obvious with the enormous
difficulty of the EU in dealing with and learning from the crisis
in the Balkans. As far as Latin America is concerned, although
priorities were more or less clearly defined, the EU was unable
to move ahead with the reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy essential for a free trade agreement with the Mercosul,
which was considered a priority.
Elements for a Coherent Foreign Policy
The Mercosul was established with the signature of the Treaty
of Asunción in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uru-
guay, with the aim of establishing a common market. From the
outset, the EU identified the Mercosul as an example of the
universal nature of the European model. There has been a clear
­ 387 ­
tendency in a variety of regions to establish different integration
and co-operation schemes, but the majority of such projects
have not gone beyond a basic intergovernmental co-operation
that is fragile in the absence of true political convergence. The
Mercosul appeared to be was an exception to the rule. For the
EU, the credibility of the Mercosul was based on various factors.
The first is that it is an integration project among democratic
countries, which introduced a democratic clause in its treaty
providing for sanctions, including expulsion, if a member re-
turns to authoritarian rule. The firm and effective reaction of
the countries of the Mercosul to the coup d'état in Paraguay in
April 1996 was an important test that increased the credibility
of the regional group. The EU has underlined the international
legitimacy of the Mercosul based on this democratic commit-
ment.
Second, the alteration of traditional relations of enmity and
rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, which implied the mutual
abandonment of national military-oriented nuclear pro-
grammes, is seen as a major achievement at a time when pro-
liferation is a dominant security concern. Third, apart from the
EU, the Mercosul is the only regional group that goes beyond
free trade and has aimed to create a common market. Like the
EU, the Mercosul is a "deep" integration process. The group
participates as a bloc in trade negotiations. Both the EU and the
Mercosul view regionalism as a way to affirm foreign policy
autonomy and emphasise the importance of inter-regional links.
Last but not least, the EU and the Mercosul share a similar
attitude towards globalisation. The triumph of the neo-liberal
vision that has accompanied the unfolding process of globalisa-
tion is viewed as a potential threat to deep integration projects
as it can force their dilution into vast free trade areas. For the
EU the aim has been to make compatible the demands of a new
competitive economic order and the system of social cohesion
that lies at the heart of the integration model. For the Mercosul,
a post-globalisation integration model, the aim has been to cre-
ate conditions favourable for a pragmatic implementation of
liberalisation policies. In sum, the Mercosul seeks a process of
controlled liberalisation to allow it to compete globally. The EU
and the Mercosul also share the ambition of formulating com-
mon multilateral rules to administer the process of globalisation.
Much has been written and many positions adopted about
­ 388 ­
the position of the EU in the international system and on rela-
tions between the Union and the Mercosul, notably within the
Commission (at the level of Director General for Foreign Affairs
as well as Foreign Trade) and the European Parliament, by Eu-
ropean and Latin American research institutions, and within the
speeches of politicians and more, albeit few, member States. (It
should be noted that the Council has not done this, which
would have given greater coherence to the EU position as a
whole).
The key ideas put forward can be summarised as follows: The
foreign policy of the EU must emphasise a new multilateralism
based on regionalism, particularly deep integration that goes
beyond free trade. To put this idea into action partners that
share the same view are necessary. Of all the regional integration
projects, the Mercosul is the closest to the European model.
Consequently, it should be viewed as a strategic partner. As
Commissioner Patten has stated, the aim of the EU in the ne-
gotiation of the association agreement is to establish a strategic
partnership.1
The EU and the Mercosul share a clear interest in
promoting multilateral action, be it in the domain of interna-
tional security, justice, human rights or regarding the environ-
ment. The EU and Latin America, with the Mercosul and Mex-
ico as pivotal actors, are the two regions of the world that are
presently most committed to multilateral action. The EU has a
strategic interest in the reinforcement of the Mercosul and
should contribute to its deepening. In the context of a Euro-
Latin American policy that favours inter-regional relations, the
EU must prioritise relations with sub-regional groups.
The view of the EU regarding the Mercosul differs from that
of the US. For the latter, the Mercosul constitutes a form of
"trade deviation", and is an obstacle to the creation of the FTAA.
The EU must try to prevent the dissolution of the Mercosul
within the FTAA, an event that would contradict the interests of
the EU and of the Mercosul countries. Reinforcing the Mercosul
means creating a biregional agreement. Given that both the EU
and the Mercosul are civil powers, an agreement of substance
must be based on free trade, with due consideration to political
1. Speech by Chris Patten to the European Parliament, 1 March 2001,
Brussels.
­ 389 ­
and security issues. A free trade agreement implies concessions
on the part of some European states where agriculture is con-
cerned.
Political and security co-operation also implies concerted ac-
tion to deal with the security problems faced by the countries
neighbouring the Mercosul, notably Colombia. An approach
that differs from that of the US is necessary, however, in much the
same way that a different policy was adopted towards Central
America in the 1980s during the Reagan administration. The EU
and the Mercosul share common attitudes regarding democracy
and human rights. The Mercosul adopted a democratic clause,
and the EU did the same at European Council in Amsterdam.
Both actors must find ways to co-operate to promote those val-
ues, not only within their own borders but also beyond them.
The US is essential for a successful multilateral project that
enables the international community to prevent crises and en-
sure security, as well as to intervene militarily when other alter-
natives have been exhausted. Indeed, for both regions the US is
an "inescapable" partner. The EU must achieve more balanced
relations, however, reinforcing the EU-Mercosul side of the "At-
lantic Triangle". The aim is not to create a Western Bloc, but
to create the conditions for a world internationally determined
rules. In this context, the "multilateralisation" of the US is in
the interest of both regions. In short, the dominant ideas of the
pre- September 11 context were to consider that the EU should
become the driving force of a new multilateralism to organise
the international system, and that it should cultivate its ties with
the Mercosul as well as other regional groups like ASEAN or SADC,
to reinforce the tendency towards regionalism in the world. This
vision is still valid, even though it is more difficult to put them
into practise today.
European Actors and Initiatives
Relations with the EU clearly illustrate the role that the Com-
mission can play in EU foreign policy. The EU signed an inter-
institution agreement with the Mercosul in 1992, only a year
after the creation of the regional group. It clearly stipulated the
aim of the transference of integration know-how. In 1995, a
­ 390 ­
framework agreement was signed in Madrid between the two
parties, with the aim of establishing a future association based
on free trade. Both initiatives are largely the result of the work
of the Commission, although they also reflect the influence of
some member States. Throughout the 1990s, Portuguese and
Spanish officials primarily dealt with Latin American issues
within the Commission. The first informal ministerial meeting
between the EU Twelve and Mercosul Four took place during
the Portuguese presidency of the EU, and the framework agree-
ment was signed during the Spanish presidency. Undoubtedly,
the accession of Portugal and Spain to the Community gave
renewed impetus to European relations with Latin America.
The Commission views the free trade agreement as a strategic
instrument. It was this that led the EU to present a substantial
negotiating proposal at the Montevideo Round in July 2001,
even in the absence of a Mercosul counterproposal. The EU pro-
posal was viewed as a way to encourage the Mercosul in its
consolidation efforts during a crisis period for the group resulting
from Argentina's financial troubles. It is a proposal that will force
the Mercosul to forge a common response to negotiate as a bloc.
The obstacles turned out to be significant however, revealing
the problems of a policy dictated essentially by the Commission
and a small handful of member States. A free trade agreement
requires the liberalisation of agricultural trade to which France
(along with other less vocal member states) is opposed. The
agricultural issue is paradigmatic of the lack of coherence in the
policy priorities announced by the EU. France is the country
that experiences the greatest difficulty in maintaining a coherent
posture, as it is constantly torn between the need to contain the
farm lobby, its relations with certain Latin American countries,
such as Mexico, and the awareness that the Mercosul is an es-
sential part of its vision of the world. The French president
expressed this problem in Brazil thus: "the future of Latin Amer-
ica is not within a North-South axis. It is in Europe for histor-
ically and culturally grounded reasons, for shared values, the
same kind of humanism, but also because of economic comple-
mentarity".1
1. Extract from "Jacques Chirac sets out to conquer Latin America", Le
Monde, 12 March 1992.
­ 391 ­
There are many European countries, however, notably those
with an eminently commercial vision of European foreign pol-
icy, that view the Mercosul in merely commercial terms. If Eu-
rope limits its ambition to its current status as a regional power
of a mercantile nature, this will reduce the countries of the
Mercosul to a backyard of the US in a reversed Monroe Doc-
trine1
whereby Latin America is left no other alternative but an
umbilical relationship with the US. This perspective could yet
win the day in the negotiating process with the Mercosul.
Within CFSP relations with the Mercosul are insignificant
compared with other non-European regions, notably the Med-
iterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa, or even Asia and other Latin
American regions such as Central America. This illustrates the
difficulty of putting forward a pro-active agenda. Among the
rare declarations by the EU and its member States, it is worth
mentioning the condemnation of the coup attempts in Paraguay
in 1996 and 2000. Notably, however, there is no reference to
the threat that this could pose to the Mercosul nor to any action
that might be taken to prevent coups in Paraguay.
Internal Conditionality
If one is to prevent the negotiations with the Mercosul from
being taken over by the interests of lobbies within the member
States, it will be necessary to define a common European vision
of the international system, to which the negotiators can refer
as a from of "conditionality of interests". This means defining
the essential and vital common interests of the EU, just as Jac-
ques Delors proposed in the negotiations that preceded Maas-
tricht. The state of EU relations with the Mercosul shows how
far this debate is from ending.
The ambiguities of European Members State's vision of the
world order are notorious. The EU does not project a multipolar
model (or a pentagonal model based on continental powers like
the EU, the US, China, Japan or Russia, eventually joined by
1. The "Monroe Doctrine" announced by President Monroe in 1823,
proclaimed the end of European colonialism in the New World, the "pro-
hibition" of European intervention in hemispheric affairs, as well as US non-
intervention in European affairs.
­ 392 ­
India and Brazil, or the Mercosul), a reproduction of the pre-
Second World War European balance of power system on a
planetary scale. Even if some European leaders like Jacques
Chirac have explicitly referred to the need to build a multipolar
world as an alternative to unipolarism, in speeches in China,
Brazil and India, all countries with international power ambi-
tions. France supports the creation of a multipolar order that
could balance the "hyper-power" of the US (an expression coined
by Hubert Védrine). There would be a system of clearly defined
poles, inspired by the European balance of power system before
the Second World War, within which the EU could seek to
affirm its sovereignty and autonomy, although the negative im-
pact on world security would be partly reduced thanks to the
existence of multilateral institutions. A case in point is the Rus-
sian-Chinese declaration on the promotion of a multipolar
world of April 1997.
The European model suggests a third way. As Jean-Marie
Guéhenno put it, it "would be based neither on the indefinite
supremacy of the United States, nor on the pursuit of inde-
pendence and sovereignty as the ultimate goal of a political
entity".1
The European model presupposes that the EU will not
become a "super State" contributing to a world of antagonistic
blocs but rather that it will be able to influence the creation
and adoption of international norms accepted by the largest
number of states possible to weave a network of interdependent
multilateral institutions, such as the WTO or the ICC, based on
the growing weight of international law. In the final analysis
the aim is to build a multilateral system based on multiregion-
alism. In short, for the European Union the idea is to replace
the unstable world of unipolarity not with an even more un-
stable world based on a traditional multipolar balance of power
system shaped by the frequent dissolution and reversal of alli-
ances. Rather, it wants to build a new multilateralism based on
regional integration groups, whose experience with the supra-
national regulation of relations between states can be put to
good use. In other words, it seeks the transformation of the
international system into a community that is based on the
1. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, "The impact of Globalisation in Strategy", 40th
Annual IISS Conference, Oxford, 3-6 September 1998.
­ 393 ­
success of its own experience and on the reinforcement of in-
ternational institutions, particularly of the United Nations. In
other words, it is about the institutionalisation of interdepend-
ence. This system is also the most appropriate for the adminis-
tration of a world that could lead towards multipolarity with
the emergence of great powers that have adopted a power pol-
itics perspective of foreign relations For this to be possible, the
supranational axis must gain greater capacities for political in-
tervention, and new and similar axes must develop elsewhere.
This is why the EU attempts counteract the dissolution of the
Mercosul into a hemispheric free trade area or even by the global
market, and why it supports its consolidation as an open, su-
pranational axis of multi-regionalism and multilateralism.
A Regional or Global Actor?
Over the next decade, it is clear that the EU will be concen-
trating primarily on the consolidation of democracy and stabil-
ity in the European continent, implementing a policy of inclu-
sion (with positive results in the case of Portugal and Spain)
through widening, which will finally embrace the Balkans. Wid-
ening this policy to include North Africa will be a second for-
eign policy priority for the EU. This is the action of an eminently
regional power. Yet a variety of factors suggest that the EU must
ensure that its Latin American policy and all other regional
policies are compatible with a global policy:
­ The EU needs to gain influence within multilateral organ-
isations to ensure the triumph of policies that serve regional
interests and regional integration.
­ The EU needs to sustain an internal balance between mem-
bers that have an essentially continental foreign policy and those
with strong interests and relations outside Europe, including
Latin America.
­ The importance of relations with the US means that the
EU is drawn into areas of US foreign policy interest and priority
and must take in consideration also American concerns.
­ The global nature of EU trade interests and competition
for markets and investments make the Mercosul an essential
sub-region (the EU is the main trade partner of the Mercosul,
­ 394 ­
and the impact of the FTAA as well as all 4+1 agreements between
the Mercosul and the US are a source of concern for the EU.
The Mexican example highlights how appropriate are such con-
cerns. After the creation of NAFTA, US exports rose from US $41
million in 1994 to US $79 million in 1998. European exports
in 1998 represented only 9 million Euros. According to the
Commission, European exports to the Mercosul, grew more
than exports to all other regions between 1992 and 1998.
Adding the defence dimension to foreign
and security policy
The European Union needs a strong voice and a solid posi-
tion in crisis resolution to exert influence on the evolution of
the international system, not only in its periphery but also at a
global level. This aim can only be achieved through a clear-cut
policy, which should be derived from a definition of common
interests, setting forth the main priorities and guiding principles
in what concerns the use of the military instrument, i.e. the
newly-created intervention force. The emphasis on the construc-
tion of a military apparatus ­the "putting capabilities first" po-
sition adopted since St. Malo and then Helsinki, is not enough.
Nor is the emphasis on institutional arrangements and mecha-
nisms that followed, at least not in the absence of a clearly
formulated set of policy goals. In order to make the defence
dimension and the military instrument both useful and usable,
these shall have to be clearly set out. This is all the more so
since the military might of the European Union, if we were to
consider the armies of all EU member states combined, comes
second only, in strength and modern equipment, to that of the
United States. Even though the European Union has proved it
is capable of achieving consensus on internal affairs­ of which
measures in Justice and Home Affairs related to fight against
terrorism within its boundaries are one example ­the truth is in
the wake of the 11 September the Union's difficulty in achiev-
ing consensus on foreign policy has become glaringly apparent.
This is especially true when the latter can lead to the use of the
military instrument or the adoption of any kind of coercive
measures, and becomes acutely apparent whenever the European
­ 395 ­
Union's approach differs from that of the United States. The
bland, hesitant reaction of the Europeans to Ariel Sharon's
scorched earth policy, which seems more concerned to avoid
causing any irritation to the Americans than to act in order to
resolve a rapidly deteriorating crisis at its very doorstep.
Security issues are central to the role of States when a grave
crisis occurs, and effective action has to be taken swiftly. It
makes little sense to structure foreign and defence policy with-
out or against member States. CFSP and ESDP, moreover, are a
domain where inter-governamentalism will prevail. The main
guidelines of European foreign policy have to be commonly
defined by the Fifteen member States. This also applies to spe-
cific policies and measures to put them in practice, in a coherent
and integrated way on all dimensions: political and security as
well as economic, namely trade and cooperation and aid. These
guidelines should preside over the external action of all member
States, including those with a permanent seat in the United
Nations Security Council.
From a military action perspective, it is not acceptable that
those who cannot or will not commit forces have the right to
veto of the remaining countries. In other words, one must ac-
cept, in the area of security and defence, the principle of rein-
forced co-operation and exploit the potential of the "contribu-
tors' committee" as previewed in the Treaty. In order to prevent
the reinforced co-operation from facilitating, in the long term,
the emergence of a new directory of European powers ­abso-
lutely contrary to the spirit of the European construction­ it is
necessary that the cores in reinforced co-operation have precise
goals and are open to every country that wishes to participate.
In response to the 11 September crisis it was blatant, on the
one hand, the singular role of States in security matters, and,
on the other hand, the lack of means to "Europeanise" their
individual action. Tony Blair acted like a Brit and not like a
European. Could he have acted like a European, had enhanced
co-operation in security and defence issues not been specifically
barred at Nice? Nothing could be more unlikely. Conversely,
had enhanced co-operation in security and defence been ap-
proved and the Nice Treaty ratified, it would have made it
considerably more difficult for the United Kingdom to legiti-
mise its go-it-alone policy. Evidently, everything will ultimately
depend on the policy that the governments of the member States
­ 396 ­
decide to subscribe in any given crisis, especially when its res-
olution implies any sort of military intervention. If the Euro-
pean Union displayed its utter impotence for four years in Bos-
nia, this was not due to the lack of military capabilities of
member States, which actually deployed troops in significant
numbers under UN command. The reason was the majority of
EU states, including those who committed troops to the UN
operation were set on a course of appeasement towards Serb
nationalism. This appeared to Milosevic as an encouragement
to the campaign of ethnic cleansing for which he was ultimately
brought before the International Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia.
The post-11 September has evidently brought forth the ques-
tion of whether the European defence policy will have a regional
or a global dimension. One may think that the British consider
that it is the European Union's responsibility to solve conflicts
in the European continent, and that European security and de-
fence policy should not have a global reach. In this case, without
the contribution of the UK, there is at present no capability to
project forces in case of some major crisis with some military
significance, all the more so because Germany still struggles with
existential doubts every time it has to send in troops. It is prob-
able that the British consider, as other former colonial powers
­France, Portugal, Belgium­ do, that there will be crises in
Africa where intervention, even military intervention, will be-
come necessary. It appears that Sub-Saharan Africa may be the
exception in an essentially continental security and defence pol-
icy.
This is no impediment to other co-operation possibilities to
be exploited with other regions in the domain of security and
defence, which certainly is a necessity felt with particular em-
phasis in the Mediterranean and a stimulus to relations with
Latin America. Euro-Mediterranean relations implicate a serious
effort to contradict the negative perceptions that grow on both
margins, and that the 11 September has negatively influenced.
European defence policy, if it is not complemented by trans-
parency and information measures that make its priorities clear,
may be perceived by opinion sectors in third countries as having
for a main goal the projection of power in the south in particular
in North Africa and the Middle East.
Regional integration in Latin America, namely with Merco-
­ 397 ­
sul, represents an opportunity for the European Union to affirm
its conception of the world as based on multilateralism and
regionalism, a vision of the international system that has been
called "new multilateralism". The domains for co-operation be-
tween the European Union and Mercosul in the domain of
defence reach from peacekeeping operations to the weapons in-
dustry, as well as the more specific operations of transnational
security such as the war on drugs. But the essential feature re-
sides in both regions' support for the United Nations and in
the common interest in providing them with the instruments
to assume a central role in security, which has been absent. By
globalising its commitment to security, the European Union
might take advantage of the vast diversity of international in-
terest of its member States. For the countries of the Union with
a global agenda, the European defence policy it is an opportu-
nity to promote a more assertive and active role of the Union
beyond the continent's boundaries and the "near abroad", to-
wards a truly global role.
Latin America and the European Union would both stand to
benefit from closer security and defence co-operation in inter-
national peacekeeping and the promotion of democratic security
in both continents. The fact that the European Union has added
a defence and security dimension to its foreign policy should
favour a "mulilateralisation" and a region-to-region approach
towards the existing bilateral channels and mechanisms for se-
curity and defence co-operation, and adding a security dimen-
sion to the existing bi-regional political dialogues.
The new defence dimension and the increasing "communi-
tarisation" of the second pillar open up two new areas where it
is of particular relevance to ensure overall coherence and comp-
tatibility of European Union external action as a whole. In what
concerns European Union-Mercosul relations, the following
areas should be of particular concern:
­ Joint "declaratory" action for the promotion of multilat-
eralism, issuing joint statements and raising the level of concern
and awareness towards issues pertaining to the protection of
human rights and the promotion of international justice, as well
as the protection of the environment.
­ Building the ICC into a true, credible and strong instru-
ment of universal justice. It cannot become a merely symbolic
instrument, strong enough to prosecute only the leaders or citi-
­ 398 ­
zens of states too weak to resist it, while strong states who op-
pose the ICC altogether are able to impose de facto limits to its
jurisdiction.
­ Although Latin America, unlike Euruope's closer neigh-
bours, has no misgivings in what concerns ESDP, regular ex-
changes of information in security and defence aspects, includ-
ing progress in ESDP, should form part of the political dialogue.
The central aim of these exchanges should be to promote a
common language, in order to facilitate consensus on major
international security issues. No less importantly, the dialogue
should allow frank exchanges, including at experts' level, on the
links between democratisation, fundamental rights and security.
­ Enhancing bi-regional co-operation in the fight against ter-
rorism, drug traficking and other forms of transnational organ-
ised crime, in particular human smuggling, building on the pro-
gress already achieved in Euro-Latin American co-operation. A
serious and focused dialogue on common security concerns im-
plies a realistic assessment of risks and threats to international
security, which must include regional conflict and assymetric
violence, as well as issues such as proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, which have a global dimension and will place
the debate into a wider framework.
­ It is of particular consequence that the European Union
should be able to firmly set defence policy into the wider frame
of its own foreign policy agenda, including in relation to the
Mercosul. Argentina has shown a consistent interest in cooper-
ating with Nato, notably in peacekeeping operations, and the
Brazilian Navy has taken part in Nato manoeuvres in the At-
lantic. As noted above, peace operations offer a potentially in-
teresting field for European Union-Mercosul security co-oper-
ation. Latin American countries have a strong tradition of
participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace-enforce-
ment operations. As ESDP comes into being, it is of interest to
both regions to develop a security and defence dialogue as part
of the bi-regional dialogue, with a focus on training and related
matters for peacekeeping and nation building, as far as both
military and police forces are concerned. It is also important to
bring the bilateral dimension into play, and take advantage of
the existing defence co-operation agreements, and tradition in
military and police academy exchanges to bolster co-operation
in the bi-regional arena. There is also scope for launching new
­ 399 ­
Euro-Latin American initiatives, such as a permanent seminar
on security and defence, as part of the dialogue at experts' level.
This should be tasked, among other things, with identifying
opportunities for co-operation among defence industries. The
participation of Latin-American forces or observers in future
ESDP exercises should be encouraged, and form a natural com-
plement to the security dialogue.
­ Special, joint training for peace operations and support to
nation-building, exploring the commonality of language, for ex-
ample, is a case in point. National initiatives to this end, such
as the military training centre in Argentina, should be encour-
aged, including through the participation of EU military person-
nel as trainers and trainees. The importance of military and
defence-related exchanges in forging a common political and
security culture should not be underestimated. Bi-regional dia-
logue on security, on the other hand, should include civil-mili-
tary relations, as well as the implications of involving the mili-
tary in the fight against terrorism and against crime, drug
trafficking in particular, or in establishing the authority of the
sate over the national territory.
­ Developing a common approach on how to deal with in-
ternal security issues, especially when these have a clear trans-
national dimension, should currently be defined as a priority in
the security dialogue. In spite of its current predominance in
the international agenda, terrorism is not the only problem af-
fecting international security and the fighting terrorism does
not have equal relevance to the security and stability of all re-
gions of the world. Common to all, however, is the need to
establish a clear link between security, in all its aspects including
the fight against terrorism, and human rights and international
justice. Strengthening judiciary co-operation between both re-
gions is also important in this light.
­ The issue of immigration is clearly rising in the hierarchy
of concerns of European Union member states, and concomi-
tantly becoming more relevant in Europe's external relations.
At the same time, migration is acquiring increased relevance in
inter-state relations world-wide, and an unwarranted link with
security issues is quite often established. Migration is certainly
another issue to be developed at group-to-group level, with the
aim of developing a new approach to migration (emigration and
immigration alike). The experience of most Latin American
­ 400 ­
countries can be particularly helpful to Iberian countries and
others who are experiencing a rather abrupt transition from
countries of origin to host countries. In any case, the issue of
migrants should be included in bi-regional agreements.
The European Union identifies the Mercosul as a potential
privileged partner for the establishment of a more balanced,
more multilateral international system based on the essential
pillar of regionalism. For the European Union, the greater the
affirmation of the identity of the Mercosul within the Americas
the better it will be suited as a partner. By the same token, the
main problem with the Mercosul ­beyond the current crisis­ is
its institutional deficit, the absence of a system of checks and
balances that can help to balance power equitably among the
participating states. Equally important is the lack of macro-
economic convergence among its member countries. Crises are
thus inevitable and their devastating effects cannot be averted.
The grave financial and political crisis in Argentina threatens to
seriously affect Brazil. Should the temptation to "re-nationalise"
commercial policies prevail, with the consequent effect of going
back to an individual approach to trade negotiations with and
the European Union, and the whole future of the Mercosul
could be compromised. The current crisis in Argentina in fact
illustrates the need for greater macroeconomic convergence in
the Mercosul and for the creation of a tribunal to settle trade
disputes. Bold steps towards deeper integration are often taken
at times of crisis and adversity. Only time will tell however
whether this will be the case for the Mercosul.
In Europe, xenophobic and populist trends are growing and
with them the trend towards a more closed European space,
more protectionist in terms of trade and more restrictive in
terms labour movement. This creates an environment in which
self-centred security concerns could be detrimental to the wider
sphere of external relations affecting Europe's regional partners.
Be that as it may, the future agenda of Euro-Latin American
relations will be shaped in no small measure by the US factor.
Indeed, for both regional groupings and their individual mem-
ber states, the relationship with the United States is likely to
top the political, economic and security agenda.
Álvaro de VASCONCELOS
­ 401 ­