Nations and Nationalism 1 (3), 1995, 3 5 7 4 8 . 0ASEN 1995
Does race matter?*
357
PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE
Department of Sociology, University of Washington,Mail Stop DK-40,
Seattle, Washington,98195, USA
ABSTRACT This essay contends that behaviour can only be understood within an
evolutionary framework that gives equal weight to genes and environment. Our
cultural environment itself evolved, in part through natural selection of genes and in
part through other mechanisms. Racism, however, involves association of genetically
caused differencesin physical appearancewith characteristicsto which they are wholly
unrelated. Yet this association has a biological cause: fitness maximisation through
nepotism. This association, therefore, has an effect upon the life chances and
reproductivesuccess of genetically different groups and, therefore, upon the process of
humanevolution.
The facile, accepted,politically correct answer to the question in my title for
the last half century of social science has been: `only if you think it does'. A
clear distinction was drawn between the discredited notion of biological race
in the sense of subspecies, and the concept of social race, in the sense of the
time-, place- and culture-specific association of certain behavioural, moral
and intellectual traits with physical phenotypes. Biological race was asserted
to be of dubious objective validity since the human species was not clearly
subspeciated, and of no relevance to social scientists since there was no clear
relationship between biological and social definitions of race. This simple
formulation long seemed to close the book on the subject.
Having ruled out biology as a possible explanation for any behavioural
variation in humans, the etiology of race and racism thus relied almost
exclusively on psychological, social-structural or cultural explanations. This
is not the place for a review of the literature, but racism was variously
attributed to personality traits aggravated by frustrating experiences, or to
rationalisations for exploitation, slavery, colonialism and so on, or to
peculiarities of certain cultural traditions.' Those `explanations'were not so
much wrong as incomplete, ad hoc and situation- or culture-specific. They
were, in short, proximate descriptions of specific sequences of events in
* An earlier version of this article was delivered at the conference on `Race and Nation'
sponsoredby the Associationfor the Study of Ethnicityand Nationalism at the London School
of Economics and Political Science on 14 May 1993. I am thankful to the Graduate School and
the Jackson School of InternationalStudiesof the University of Washingtonfor a travel grant,
and to the LSE for its hospitalityin London.
358 Pierre L. van den Berghe
particular places and times, and they had little standing as general scientific
explanations. The issue was further befuddled by the almost inevitable
intrusion of a dense ideological and political fog into the arguments.
Invective, self-censorship, moralism, indignation, bias and plain intellectual
dishonesty frequently contaminated scholarly discourse, and indeed continue
to do so. The ideological opprobrium which attaches to any serious
consideration of the biological bases of human behaviour becomes especially
virulent when the subject is race. The general revulsion of social scientists
against racism leads them to avoid any consideration of human behavioural
ecology for fear of political misuse of any knowledge gain. In short, when
the subject is race, many social scientists are quite ready to espouse,an
obscurantist stance, and to be, in effect, social creationists about human
behaviour.
In the last twenty years or so, an increasing body of findings makes it
more and more difficult to accept the facile disassociation between the
biological and the social.' Our behaviour, just as much as our anatomy,
evolved by natural selection, and, therefore, can only be explained as the
interaction of genotypes and environments to produce phenotypes. There
must be a biological basis to behaviour as well as an environmental one, and
the crux to understanding behaviour - human or non-human - lies in the
unravelling of the complex interplay of genes and environment. This is no
prescription for rigid `biological determinism', a favourite red herring of
social scientists, but it is an injunction to investigate linkages between
biology and behaviour instead of dismissing the possibility of such linkages.
Let me sequentially raise three questions: (1) Are there biological races in
Homo sapiens? (2) Does the formation of social race have any biological
underpinning? (3) If so, does this biological basis of social race formation
explain the etiology of social race and racism in contemporary societies?To
anticipate, my answer to these three questions will be respectively: no, yes
and yes.
Are there biological races in Homo sapiens?
All taxonomies of subspecies of Homo sapiens have failed to establish
exhaustive and mutually exclusive genetic populations in our species. In that
conventional sense, there are no biological races in Homo sapiens. What we
do have, however, are large differences in the frequencies of certain alleles3
in a great multiplicity of overlapping human groups yielding a wide range of
genotypic as well as phenotypic variation on a number of traits, some
behaviourally trivial, others not SO.^
At least six important conclusions can be drawn from genetic hetero-
zygosity' in humans:
(1) Genes that are polymorphic (i.e., which can have one of several
alternative alleles on a given locus on a chromosome) often are present in
Does race matter? 359
different proportions in different population groups, but they are indepen-
dent of one another, and, therefore, different genes divide human popula-
tions along different lines. A frequency distribution map for the ABO blood
types, for example, will not be consistent with one for genes that control
skin pigmentation. Different gene clines6cut up populations along different
lines.
(2) Polymorphic genes almost always define relative, not absolute
differences between populations. The differences in proportions are often
small, and, furthermore they often follow gradual geographicalclines rather
than abrupt changes. For example, as one goes from the Mediterranean to
the Arctic Circle in Europe, the proportion of blue eyes tends to increase,
but there is no geographical line at which brown eyes stop and blue eyes
begin.
(3) Both phenotypic and genotypic7 differences are almost invariably
greater within subpopulations than between them. Distributions of individual
measures tend to be wider than distributions of means of subgroups within
the same population.
(4) Genetic differences between human populations are sufficiently small
that there is no evidence that interbreeding reduces fitness.8 In fact,
interbreeding is more likely to increase fitness than reduce it, especially in
new environments. The bulk of the genetic evidence for humans favours the
hybrid-vigourhypothesis. Heterozygosity is the best hedge against extinction.
(5) A large amount of migration and interbreeding in recent centuries
between hitherto isolated populations has further reduced genetic differences
between human groups and blurred geographicalclines.
(6) Having said all this, some of the genetic differences between both
individuals and groups affect behaviour, directly or indirectly. For example,
colour vision, handedness, lactose intolerance and other traits known to be
under partial genetic control, differentially affect the ability of groups and
individuals to use certain tools, perform certain tasks or eat certain foods.
In some cases, the behavioural variation is mostly individual (handedness);
in others, it is mostly sex-linked (colour vision); in others, it is partly group-
linked (lactose intolerance, sicklecell anemia).
In short, no, there are no human races in the sense of well-defined
subspecies, but partly genetically based behavioural differences between
individuals, sexes, age groups and breeding populations have been estab-
lished, and many more are likely to be discovered in the future. It is
unscientificto pretend otherwise.
Do social races have any biological underpinning?
At a trivial level, the answer to that question is an obvious `yes'. A social
race is dejned as a group sharing physical (as distinguished from cultural)
attributes.' But must there by such a linkage? Do physical differences
360 Pierre L. van den Berghe
between groups always lead to social differences? More generally, do
physical phenotypes always matter socially?And, if so, why?
My theory, first stated a decade-and-a-half-ago, is very simple.lo All
social organisms are biologicallyprogrammed to be nepotistic, i.e. to behave
favourable (or `altruistically') to others in proportion to their real or
perceived degree of common ancestry." Social organisms evolved to be
nepotistic because altruistic investment in unrelated organisms is biologically
wasted and therefore could not evolve, as Darwin clearly saw well over a
century ago. The evidence, both human and non-human, for rampant
nepotism is overwhelming. The bibliography on humans alone now runs
into several hundred titles. Favouring kin among humans is sometimes
conscious, sometimes unconscious, and biologically, it does not matter
which. But, consciously or unconsciously, we must be able to discriminate
according to degree of biological relationship to ourselves, if our beneficence
to others is to increase our inclusive fitness.
For the most fundamental mammalian social tie, the mother-infant one,
a simple mechanism is typically present: identification and imprinting
shortly after birth by sight, sound, olfaction or a combination of these.
Experimental switching of neonates has demonstrated these simple recogni-
tion mechanisms in many mammalian species. But often, and certainly for
humans, the situation is much more complex. More than most (perhaps all)
other organisms, humans recognise and make fine gradations of kinship,
and dispense their largesse or their nastiness accordingly.l 2
Being intelligent and opportunistic animals, humans use all possible clues
of relatedness, with a preference for the ones that are reliable, quick and
cheap. Since it pays, in fitness maximisation terms, to be a fine-tuned
discriminator of kinship in a wide range of situations involving hundreds or
even thousands of relationships, any readily identifiable, unfalsifiable
marker of probable common ancestry will be used. Specification of a few
simple properties of the marker itself, of the social circumstances of the
individual, and of the ecological conditions of the social encounter can lead
one to good behavioural predictions. For example, it can be predicted that,
among social mammals with heavy biparental investment in offspring,
parenthood will be `tested' by males more than by females, because
paternity is exposed to much more uncertainty than maternity. Mothers
know their babies are theirs; fathers cannot be so sure, and therefore will
look much more for physical resemblance, especially for signature-like rare
characteristics such as a mole on the nose. Women concerned with paternal
investment in their offspring, on the other hand, can be expected to stress
the physical resemblance of their babies to their mates more than to
themselves. `Isn't he his father's spitting image?'
Let us now widen the focus from kinship in the narrow sense, to that
form of extended kinship we call race or ethnicity. Both racial and ethnic
groups are socially defined by real or putative common descent, and the
distinction between the two types of groups is merely in the relative salience
Does race matter? 361
of biological or cultural markers of membership. My contention is that, in
both cases, the social concern is with common biological descent, even when
the markers are primarily cultural.
There are three main objections to my formulation of ethnocentrism and
racism as extended forms of biologically rooted nepotism.
(1) The common descent of ethnic groups is often a myth, not a
biological reality. Therefore, my argument is invalid. To which I reply: A
myth, to be effective,has to be believed, and a myth of ethnicity will only be
believed if members of an ethnic group are sufficiently alike in physical
appearance and culture, and have lived together and intermarried for a
sufficient period (at a minimum three or four generations) for the myth to
have developed a substantial measure of biological truth. The Emperor of
Japan can effectivelyclaim to be the father of the Japanese nation in a way
that Queen Victoria could never validate her claim as mother of India.
Ethnicity or race cannot be invented or imagined out of nothing. It can be
manipulated, used, exploited, stressed, fused or subdivided, but it must
correlate with a pre-existing population bound by preferential endogamy
and a common historical experience. Ethnicity is both primordial and
instrumental.
(2) If ethnicity and race are both rooted in the biology of nepotism, why
is it that most ethnic groups stress cultural markers of membership rather
than heritable physical ones? The answer here is quite simple: because most
ethnic groups seek to differentiate themselves from their immediate
neighbours in situations where some short-distance migration and inter-
marriage take place. Therefore, most ethnic groups look so much like their
neighbours that they must rely on cultural markers of distinction. The proof
of the biological pudding is that, where physical, genetic markers do a
reliable job of differentiating between groups, they are used. In fact, the
conditions under which racial groups do emerge are quite predictable: they
appear after long-distancemigration of sizeable groups across visible genetic
clines: slavery, colonialism, indenture, voluntary migration, military con-
quest are so many examples, especially across large geographical barriers
such as oceans or deserts. And racial groups can only survive as long as
interbreeding remains relatively infrequent. Three or four generations of 25
per cent or more exogamy typically erode both racial and ethnic boundaries,
and lead to the formation of new ethnic groups. Both race and ethnicity are
not immutable, but their mutability is a function of exogamy over several
generations.
(3) If biological nepotism is extended to large groups, which, under
modern conditions, often comprise millions of individuals, has not the
concept been diluted to the point of meaninglessness,and reduced to a mere
analogy?
Of course, the more distant the biological relationship between two
individuals, the more diluted the benefits of nepotism become. Indeed, the
biological model predicts that the preference is proportional to the degree of
362 Pierre L. van den Berghe
relationship. Relatedness is relative. Ego is at the core of a set of concentric
circles defining declining degrees of relationship: nuclear family, extended
family, lineage, clan, dialect group, subethnicity, nation. These levels of
relatedness are imbedded into one another. Circumstances and interests will
determine the level of solidarity which is activated at any given place and
time, in a classical fission-and-fusion scheme such as British anthropologists
have described for African segmentary lineage societies. But the principle of
nepotism, however diluted, suffuses all levels, and there is no a priori reason
why nepotistic discrimination should stop at any particular point, unless it
can be displaced by a superior strategy of fitness maximisation. Brothers do
murder each other, but not gratuitously and not as easily as strangers.
When they do, there is usually a big payoff, such as a throne, an inheritance
or a harem. To affirm the operation of nepotism, even in large groups, is
not to deny the operation of other principles of cooperative behaviour (such
as class solidarity), or fitness maximisation (such as deceit and treachery).
The size of the group dilutes the effectivenessof solidary behaviour whatever
the base of solidarity, but not more so for ethnic groups than for other
social groups such as classes, corporations, clubs or army units, and perhaps
even less. Ethnic and racial groups can be politically mobilised, even on a
huge scale, with greater ease and rapidity, than other social groups,
especially under external threat from an enemy who is himself defined in
ethnic or racial terms.13
Does the biology of social race explain the etiology of racism in Contemporary
societies?
Better put, does my theory of the biological genesis of social race predict
and explain contemporary racism better than competing theories? The
answer, I think, is yes, not because it supplants other theories, but because
it complements them at a higher level of theoretical generality. It provides a
predictive scheme of when, where and why racism can be expected to wax
and wane, on a world-wide basis, without having to invoke any special
cultural, psychological or historical causes.
Racism, defined as discriminatory behaviour based on inherited physical
appearance, can be expected to arise whenever variance in inherited physical
appearance is greater between groups than within groups. This is a relatively
rare event, except when two or more hitherto isolated populations migrate
across large geographical obstacles. It is even rarer for intergroup variance
to remain greater than intragroup variance for long, because contact
generally brings about interbreeding. So, racism will appear after long-
distance migration, but will only persist as long as social barriers to
exogamy prevent intermixture, and thus the recreation of a more typical
situation where intragroup genetic diversity exceeds intergroup differences.
Racism cannot be sustained long if racial membership cuts across the
Does race matter? 363
microkinship of the family. Precisely because social race is an extension of
the principle of nepotism, it cannot long survive interbreeding. Even the
rare exceptions, such as relations between white and brown Afrikaners in
South Africa, confirm the rule: the `races' only survived the interbreeding of
slavery because of the reimposition of an endogamous caste system after
slavery.
Having specified the objective conditions which lead to the rise and the
decline of racism, does it follow that racism will inevitably accompany these
conditions? Unfortunately, I think the answer is, again, affirmative. Why?
Because we are not only selfish maximisers, but intelligently opportunistic
ones. Sociality is synonymous with discrimination. Only a fool behaves
indiscriminately towards all. We must constantly decide when to be nice or
nasty, trusting or suspicious. In the last analysis, we have only two bases for
doing so: reciprocity and nepotism. Reciprocity is tricky, unstable, open to
cheating, and often dependent on costly information or past experience. It
only works between individuals who know one another well and who expect
to continue interacting in a mutually beneficial way without deceit or
coercion. For nepotism to yield its genetic reward, the only requirement is
correct assessment of relatedness. It works best if the cost of that assessment
is minimised, that is, if the assessment is reliable, easy and fast.
These simple principles enable us to predict which markers of group
membership will be used under what conditions. Where neighbouring
groups look alike physically, cultural markers do a better job of assessing
group membership than genetic traits. Not all cultural markers are equally
good. The beret may be a symbol of Basque ethnicity, but it is not reliable.
Indeed, it has been usurped by millions of Frenchmen, Spaniards and
others. Military uniforms are used for ready recognition of friend and foe
from a distance, but they too are open to cheating. That is why costume is
frequently a symbol of ethnicity, but never a tesr of it. Facial scarification is
much more reliable than dress because it cannot easily be undone. Cultural
markers of ethnicity which permanently change physical appearance are
common: circumcision, tooth filing, tattoos and so on. Language is also a
common marker. Even though it is strictly cultural, it is learned early in life
and difficult to `fake' in adulthood, because few people retain the ability to
mimic the phonetics of a language learned after puberty. Until recent
migrations, someone who spoke your dialect without a foreign accent was
most likely to be a native fellow ethnic. But the drawback of language as a
marker is that, though reliable, it is fairly slow. You have to ask questions
before you shoot, and sometimes you cannot afford the delay.
Let us turn to biological markers. They only work between groups that
look quite different. Between Zulus and Boers in South Africa, they worked
with complete efficacy: you could shoot at 500 metres and never make a
mistake. Norwegians and Swedes, on the other hand, could never be racists
towards one another, even if they wanted to. They have to listen to one
another before they can tell who is who. The Nazis tried to be racists with
364 Pierre L. van den Berghe
Jews but their biological markers worked with perhaps 10 to 15 per cent
reliability. In practice, they used mostly cultural markers: circumcision.
synagogue attendance, the Star of David, denunciations, surnames, etc.
Nazi racial theory ludicrously outstripped the reality of genetic differences.
They actually had a very difficult time picking out Jews from their Gentile
neighbours, especially in the assimilated Jewry of Western Europe.
Physical markers, in short, only `work' under the limiting and rare
condition of genetic heterozygosity being greater between groups than
within. If such a condition is present, however, does it follow that racism is
inevitable? Not by a long shot, because most genotypic differences are
phenotypically hidden by recessivity or are so cryptic as to be useless for
purposes of quick and easy group membership ascription. Blood types, for
instance, must be tested by antigens from a blood sample, and the test is
slow and costly enough that soldiers in combat are culturally tagged (or, in
the case of the SS in Nazi Germany, even tattooed) for their genotype.
In practice, then, only a few inherited phenotypes are culturally utilised
to form social races, and they are chosen, not for their behavioural
significance, but simply for their visibility. Skin pigmentation is the most
widespread because it is the most visible from the greatest distance and
subject to only a limited range of environmental variation. (The genetics of
skin colour are still poorly understood and are probably under the control
of four to six different loci.) Facial features (notably eye, lip and nose
shape), hair texture and physical stature are also used where they are
diacritic. For example, in Rwanda and Burundi where the Hutu-Tutsi-Twa
distinction is marked by large group differences in height, stature is widely
used as a criterion. It works better in Rwanda where a rigid caste system
hindered interbreeding, than in the more fluid social structure of Burundi,
but, in both cases, the physical distinction was used as a quick and dirty
basis for sweeping genocidal action (against the Tutsi in Rwanda, against
the Hutu in Burundi). A particularly gruesome atrocity against the Tutsi in
Rwanda was to amputate them at the knee to cut them down to size.
This double condition of greater inter- than intragroup heterozygosity
and high phenotypic visibility predicts when, where and why physical
phenotypes get transmuted into social races. The reason why racism became
the great pandemic of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was simply the
sudden acceleration of large-scale, long-distance migration across wide
genetic clines. The social consequences were enormous and noxious because
racial distinctions are peculiarly invidious and immutable, well beyond
cultural distinctions. All group distinctions between in-group and out-group
are designed to exclude potential competitors from competition for scarce
resources, but racial distinctions are especially nasty because they are almost
totally beyond individual control. You can learn a language, convert to a
religion, get circumcised or scarified, adopt a dress style, but you cannot
become tall or white.
In practice, social race is always a social stigma for the subordinate
Does race matter? 365
group, and all attempts to pretend otherwise have been singularly
unsuccessful. Pragmatically, in terms of policy, it means that institutionali-
sation of racial categories, however innocuous or even benevolent it may
appear, is frequently noxious in its consequences. I am thinking of such
measures as racial questions on censuses, race-based affirmative action and
similar measures, which have generally had the effect of reinforcing
stigmatised racial distinctions.l4
Conclusion
Let us now close the circle on the relationship between genes and behaviour.
I have repeatedly stressed that behaviour, human and non-human alike, can
only be understood within an evolutionary framework that gives equal
weight to genes and environment acting in concert. For humans, culture is,
of course, a large part of the social environment of our species. A genetic
effect on behaviour can be direct and result from natural selection, even
when it leads to a reduction in fitness (e.g. overeating when food is
available, leading to obesity in affluent societies, but providing valuable
caloric storage in unstable hunting and gathering economies characterised
by cycles of feast and famine; or the craving for drugs which mimic the
pleasurable sensations of natural enzymes).
The case of racism, however, is different. The linkage between genes and
behaviour is clear, but it did not evolve by natural selection. Racism is
conceivably a case of culture `highjacking' genes which were selected for
different ends (e.g. skin pigmentation regulating exposure to sun radiation
in different latitudes), and making them serve a totally different social
agenda. Yet, that social agenda itself had an underlying biological
programme: fitness maximisation through nepotism. Finally, but not less
importantly, that social agenda itself had an enormous feedback effect on
the life chances of different groups, on their reproductive success, and
therefore, in the final analysis, on the course of human evolution itself.
We are only in the infancy of understanding the co-evolution of genes
and culture, but understand it we must if we are to make sense of our
behaviour, especially behaviour, such as racism, which does not seem to
make sense.
Notes
1 The literature is immense, and the following represent but a fraction of representative books
from a wide range of perspectives: Allport 1954; Banton 1967, 1977, 1987, 1994; Barth 1969;
Blalock 1967; Francis 1976; Fredrickson 1981; Gurr and Harf 1994; Horowitz 1985; Keyes
1981; Kuper and Smith 1965; Lieberson, 1980; Mason 1971; Miles 1989; Myrdal 1944; Park
1950; Patterson 1982; Rex 1970, 1986; Rex and Mason 1986; Schermerhorn 1970; Smith 1981,
366 Pierre L. van den Berghe
1986, 1993; Shibutani and Kwan 1965; Sowell 1981, 1983, 1994; Wagley and Harris 1958;
Wilson 1973, 1978, 1987. My own Race and Racism (1967) is also squarely in the social science
mainstream of the 1960s and 1970s.
2 Any attempt to present this evidence would take us well beyond the subject of this article, but
a sketchy beginner's bibliography would minimally include the following books: Alexander
1979, 1987; Barash 1979, 1986; Betzig 1986; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Chagnon and Irons
1979; Daly and Wilson 1983, 1988; Dawkins 1976, 1982; Lopreato 1984; Lumsden and Wilson
1981; Shepher 1983; Symons 1979; Trivers 1985; van den Berghe 1979, 1981. The bibliography
in Daly and Wilson (1983) while already a decade old, contains over 700 titles.
3 An allele is a specific form of a gene on a given locus (position) on a chromosome. A gene
found on a given locus may have more than one variant (e.g. the gene that determines eye
colour in humans), and each variant is called an allele.
4 The field of human genetics is currently exploding, partly as a consequence of the
monumental Human Genome Project, by far the largest, most concerted, best organised
attempt at self-understanding in human history. A standard short introduction to human
genetics is Cavalli-Sforza (1977).
5 Heterozygosity refers to the presence of multi-allelic genes on any number of loci in the
genome of individuals or populations.
6 A cline is a gradual change in gene frequencies across the geographical range occupied by an
organism.
7 A phenotype is an observable property of an organism and can be either behavioural or
anatomical. A genotype is the genetic constitution linked to an inheritable trait. Phenotype and
genotype may be congruent with one another, but often are not.
8 Fitness, in the genetic sense, refers to the contribution of a given genotype to the next
generation of a population is relation to the contribution of other genotypes. The fitness of an
organism is measured by its reproductive success relative to other organisms in the population.
9 Nearly thirty years ago, I distinguished race as `a group that is socially defined but on the
basis of physical criteria', from ethnicity which is `socially defined but on the basis of cultural
criteria' (van den Berghe 1967: 9-10). That definition is widely shared in the social science
literature, e.g. Cashmore (1988), Farley (1995), Rex (1970). Sowell (1994), Wilson (1973).
10 My main statement is contained in The Ethnic Phenomenon (1981), but the book was
preceded by my 1978 article in Ethnic and Racial Studies. See also my 1986 piece in the Rex and
Mason collection, Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations.
11 The biological basis of nepotism has now been firmly established in hundreds of social
species of both vertebrates and invertebrates. Indeed, nepotism is one of the main mechanisms
of sociality in all known social organisms. See Daly and Wilson 1983; Dawkins 1976; Trivers
1985; and Wilson 1975, for a few book-length overviews of both the theoretical basis of, and
the empirical evidence for, nepotism.
12 My 1979 book, Human Family Systems, was an attempt to reinterpret the conventional
anthropology of mamage and kinship in terms of the evolutionary biology of mating and
reproduction. More extensive biological accounts of human mating and reproductive systems
can be found in Daly and Wilson 1983, and Symons 1979.
13 I engage my critics at greater length in van den Berghe (1987).
14 Among the many critics of race-based measures to redress past racial inequities, see DSouza
1992; Glaser 1975; Herrnstein and Murray 1994; and Sowell 1983. Most of these critics have
come from the political right, but I have argued for more radical `affirmativeaction' based on
socio-economic criteria, not race or ethnicity.
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