Noncontemporaneity,
Asynchronicity and Divided
Memories
Bernhard Giesen
ABSTRACT. Three different paradigms of temporal inconsistency
are distinguished. `Noncontemporaneity' refers to the local and tem-
poral coexistence of phenomena that are related to different historical
periods or different stages of social evolution. This paradigm presup-
poses an encompassing unity of society and disregards the normality
of hybridization and syncretism in real societies. The paradigm of
`asynchronicity' centres the differences of pace and rhythms between
different social systems or institutional domains. Here the indispens-
ability of temporal differences for the perception of time and change
is frequently ignored. The third model is called `divided memories'.
Divided memories are generated by different experiential back-
grounds with respect to the perception of core events. Generations
are presented as communities of experience that differ with respect to
this experiential background. Most important in this respect are
triumphant or traumatic experiences that devalue the experience of
the parental generation and provide a frame for the collective identity
of a generation. The authenticity of these experiences is rooted in
corporal presence and bodily rituals. Recently public debates tend to
construct generational differences in an inflationary manner. This
public construction of generations contrasts to the blurring of genera-
tional differences on a microsocial level. KEY WORDS · asyn-
chronicity · collective memory · generations · noncontemporaneity
Introduction
Sometimes central concepts resist translation. The Hegelian notion of
Aufhebung is a famous case in point. In a similar way the German concept of
Time & Society copyright  2004 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
VOL. 13 No. 1 (2004), pp. 27­40 0961-463X DOI: 10.1177/0961463X04040741
www.sagepublications.com
Ungleichzeitigkeit des Gleichzeitigen coined by Ernst Bloch in the 1930s can
only be transferred into English by splitting its meaning into several English
terms. Consequently we will distinguish between noncontemporaneity, asyn-
chronicity and divided memories in order to cope with this semantic manifold.
On the most general level the concept refers to temporal inconsistency that is
contrasted to an orderly and balanced relationship between events or states of
reality. It should be noted that ­ contrary to common assumptions ­ we will not
assume this temporal inconsistency to be an extraordinary and puzzling state
that requires complex explanations. Instead we will argue that it is the normal
relationship between processes in loosely coupled systems. It is simultaneity or
synchronicity that can be viewed as the puzzling case that should draw the
attention of sociologists and indeed ­ in a certain respect ­ it has been one of the
core issues of classical sociology. Therefore the sociological perspective on our
phenomenon should be tilted: instead of viewing temporal inconsistency as a
substantial relationship between events or part of a social system we should
explore the selective attention to certain forms of it.
The following remarks will outline the background assumptions or models
that foster and increase our sensitivity for Ungleichzeitigkeit. The first part will
present three of these models or conceptions. They represent fundamentally
different perspectives on key notions of temporality and change. Noncontempo-
raneity for example conceives of time in terms of historical periodization,
asynchronicity centres pace and speed lags and assumes a relativistic model of
time, whereas divided memories focus on temporal horizons, i.e. founding
events. The second part will deal with the issue of simultaneity and explore the
conditions that produce the unity of the collective memory of a generation.
1. Noncontemporaneity
When we talk about noncontemporaneity in everyday contexts we refer fre-
quently to the simultaneity or the coexistence of phenomena that we relate to
different historical periods or attribute to different evolutionary stages (Bloch,
1964; Ogburn, 1964; Koselleck, 2000). Modes of action and objects that we trace
back to past societies, that we can interpret only by refering to cultural frames of
the past occur in the present time and are juxtaposed to other modes of action that
we consider to be part of contemporary culture. We plant vegetables in our home
garden and, shortly afterwards, go to a fast food restaurant. We, as tourists,
observe a Beduin riding a camel in close vicinity to an oil derrik. We surf in the
internet and get our wine at a local winery the owner of which we have known for
years etc. The event that catches our attention as being extraordinary is consti-
tuted by the presence of seemingly heterogeneous or dissynchronous phenomena
in one local site. We take notice of this event because we assume inadvertently an
28 TIME & SOCIETY 13(1)
encompassing unity of society in which the meaning of every phenomenon can be
translated into or be related to every other phenomenon in a consistent way. There
should be no breaches and ruptures in the web of meaning in society, there should
be a clear architecture of symbols in a society and meaningless phenomena should
be removed ­ no dirt in a clean room, no garbage on the table of culture. Social
and cultural change occurs ­ according to this perspective ­ only as an encom-
passing shift that devalues and dissolves the institutions, techniques and
cultural patterns of the past entirely. They should survive ­ like garbage ­ only in
enclosed places and in nonserious modes of existence. Special frames like theatre,
history, museum, tourism, play, decoration and sport produce this bracketed,
nonserious mode of existence and thus allow for the persistence of the past. Only
if this mediation between phenomena from different historical epochs by special
symbolic and institutional frames fails, only if nothing separates clearly the
phenomena of the past from the phenomena of the present, only then do we
perceive their coexistence as noncontemporaneity.
Such a conception of noncontemporaneity is thoroughly modernist and
historicist ­ hybridization of different historical cultures, a mixture of different
periods on an equal footing is regarded to be improper. But it is not only the
modernist insistence on the purity of style, that does not allow for mixing past
and present, but also the modern idea of a radical opposition between past and
future, the present being a turning point between a past that will and should
never return and a future that is seen as the field of creativity, surprise, invention
and innovation (Koselleck, 2000). The future should not be contaminated by the
past. Even if we inverse the relationship between past and future and idealize a
golden past in contrast to a catastrophic future, the radical opposition, tension
and incommensurabilty between both temporal horizons remains.
Although quite common, this perspective is too simple to account for the
postmodern bricolage of cultures. In particular it is unable to respond to the
acceptance of multiculturalism and hybridization as the normal situation. If we
reverse the perspective and consider the coexistence of historically hetero-
geneous phenomena to be the normal situation we can account for translations,
bricolage, syncretism, but we lose our phenomenon ­ Bloch's Ungleichzeitig-
keit des Gleichzeitigen as a special phenomenon becomes invisible.
2. Asynchronicity
The concept of asynchronicity differs from the model of noncontemporaneity as
outlined above. It is related to the attempt to consider time not as a transhistori-
cal and transsocial presupposition of varying social processes but it reverses this
relationship and conceives of time as a varying product of social construction
(Luhmann, 1990; Giesen, 1992). Variations of temporal structure, of pace and
GIESEN: NONCONTEMPORANEITY, ASYNCHRONICITY, DIVIDED MEMORIES 29
rhythm here are determined by differences between institutional orders or social
systems. In this perspective social reality appears as a relatively enduring and
continuous order and this order is reproduced by a sequence of events. The
pace, rhythm or speed of this sequence are patterned by the institutional order,
by the logic of the system or by the structure of the field and varies in accord-
ance with it. Market exchange has a faster pace than barter exchange, exchange
systems enable and even require a faster sequence of events than political con-
stitutions, we change our weekend acquaintances more frequently than our
marriage partners, the periphery of an economic system is lagged with respect to
the centre, the temporal perspective of financial markets is shorter than the
temporal perspective of banking houses, and most importantly perhaps, social
systems that measure time by clocks are in contrast with systems that structure
their time according to natural events (we will meet at sunset) etc.
The most common perspective on asynchronicity centres problems of co-
ordination that result from mutual interdependence and tight coupling between
systems. This coordination can result from a central control agency like a
government that causes the same developments and structural changes in differ-
ent parts of a society. Increasing the power of the central control agency is pre-
sented as the remedy against asynchronicity. But coordination can also result
from fast responses to environmental changes and mutual adaptation between
several subsystems or fields without any control by a central authority. Here the
asynchronicity results from the relatively slow, delayed and retarded response
of systems like traditional bureaucracies as compared to fast systems like
markets. Speeding up, accelerating, catching up the lead of the fast systems are,
consequently, the solutions suggested by the paradigm of progress. But also the
opposite can be recommended. Since Burkhardt and Seume a movement of
resistence against acceleration is part of the general criticism against modernity.
These differences of pace and speed appear to be a problem of coordination
between systems, but they are constitutive for the perception of social time.
Speed, rapidity or slowness of temporal sequences can only be perceived in
relation to the speed of the position of the observer ­ as the famous image of the
Einstein train suggests. Without differences of speed time we would risk to
losing our phenomenon ­ time. The perception of, for example, accelerated
change hints at a reference that nobody wants to accelerate ­ human maturation
and ageing. Instead of accelerating the process of ageing we try to inhibit it and
to extend the human life span, we increase the time in our lives spent on educa-
tion and learning etc. Hence it is not only the increasing speed of social systems,
but also the slowing down of maturation and ageing that amounts to the percep-
tion of acceleration.
The model of asynchronicity conceives of time as sequential reproduction,
while the question of origin or of beginning is disregarded. This also affects the
meaning of events. In the modernist or historicist paradigm the event was con-
30 TIME & SOCIETY 13(1)
stituted by the juxtaposition of historically inconsistent elements at a particular
moment in a particular locality. In the paradigm of asynchronous speed, events
are generated by the logic of reproduction. The meaning of these events can
only be understood by reference to the order or system, and order and system
can, in their turn, only be reproduced and turned into tangible reality by events.
Both are not inconsistent, but interrelated. Inconsistency only comes in when
two sequences of events are not coordinated, which points to the core assump-
tion of the model of asynchronicity: Society is seen as a system of interrelated
subsystems that, ideally, should be tightly coupled to each other, and that
should exchange information accurately and in time. Asynchronicity becomes
perceptible only as a deviation from this ideal, as a lack of centralized control
and coordination or as a slowing down of mutual adaptation. Social life does
not, however, operate according to the functionalist schedule ­ it operates by
delays and omissions, fuzzy relationships and vague orientations, accelerations
and flexibilities and it can avoid breakdowns only because it is not tightly but
loosely coupled. As fuzzy and vague as social reality may be, it is, nevertheless,
imagined as proceeding orderly and neatly, as coordinated and accurate. Thus
the observation of asynchronicity results from the attempt to admit to the
imperfection of social reality in relation to the imagined ideal order.
A slightly different model of speed differences is at the core of the distinction
between different levels, layers or strata of historical change as presented by
Fernand Braudel (1984) or Reinhart Koselleck (2000). As Braudel distinguishes
l'histoire événementielle from the longue durée of cultural change, Koselleck
separates the level of individual persons and their perception of events from
generational experiences and from long-term structural or institutional changes.
Traditionally the speed of change decreases if we turn from individual biogra-
phies to generations and from generations to institutional or cultural systems.
But in modern societies this relationship can be seen as reversed. Here the pace
of innovation in cultural systems, e.g. in scientific research or in markets for
goods and commodities can exceed the relatively slow speed of individual
learning: The scientific education learned at university is thought to be valid for
a lifetime but is outdated soon, the succession of new car models outpaces the
customers readiness to exchange their old car against a new one etc. If the rate
of innovation is faster than the ability of individual persons to respond to it or to
cope with it then change is experienced as vertigo, as noise, as bewildering. If,
in contrast, the turnover of generations does not correspond to a change of insti-
tutional or cultural patterns, then the new generation tends to regard society as
too conservative or even repressive. This asynchronicity, too, refers, however,
less to actual differences of speed between individual biographies and institu-
tional or cultural structures than to the visibility of these differences for indi-
vidual persons. Differences of speed are omnipresent, but most of them escape
our attention and perception ­ processes of innovation, growth and change pass
GIESEN: NONCONTEMPORANEITY, ASYNCHRONICITY, DIVIDED MEMORIES 31
unnoticed until they are rendered visible by special media, by figures and
records or until the process of change occurs immediately in front of our eyes
and ears, in our everyday life. The analysis of asynchronicity amounts therefore
to exploring the visibility of a particular difference of speed or ­ in other words
­ it amounts to the social construction of speed differences.
3. Divided Memories
The third paradigm will shift this perspective on temporality in two respects:
Unlike many approaches to the social construction of simultaneity or dis-
synchronicity this paradigm will not focus on different fields, systems or institu-
tions as pacemakers of temporal rhythms, but, instead, will assume social
collectivities to be the carriers of different temporal horizons and collective
memories. In a common attempt to remember the past, social groups can and
frequently will encounter differences of temporal horizon or differences in
focusing special events as turning points of history. Events that have a key
importance for the collective memory of one group may be ignored or omitted in
the collective memory of others and even if both agree to attribute crucial impor-
tance to a particular event they still can greatly diverge in their interpretation of
it. What is remembered as a victory by one party, is a bitter defeat for another.
Civil wars result, therefore, in divided memories. Viewed from this perspective
our theme appears as a barrier of understanding or of translation between differ-
ent collective memories within one society (Halbwachs, 1992; Assmann, 1999;
Giesen, 1999, 2001). Here again we have to emphasize that differences between
collective memories are as normal as differences between individual memories
are. In this respect splits and divisions on the horizon of memory should not
surprise us. This normality of divided memories becomes even more salient if
we consider the collective memory of generations. For example, the concept
of nation or social class `generation' is a thoroughly temporalized concept
(Mannheim, 1928/1968; Matthes, 1985; Bude, 2000). Assuming the normality
of divided memories the question is rather: Under which conditions does this
division become a problem and ­ above all ­ why do different individuals merge
their memories to form a collective memory of a generation?
The second respect in which the memory paradigm differs from the para-
digms of noncontemporaneity or asynchronicity concerns the relationship
between order or structure on the one hand and event on the other.
Asynchronicity conceives of events as the mere intersections in a temporal
sequence, as temporal instantiations of an order, a structure or a rule. Such
events would be having lunch at a regular time or watching the TV news at the
same time. The memory paradigm sees events in a radically different way: It
does not conceive of events as following a rule or as something that is produced
32 TIME & SOCIETY 13(1)
by a system, an institutional order, a mechanism and that, hence, can be pre-
dicted on the basis of accurate knowledge about this system, order or mecha-
nism. Instead, it considers events as unexpected, extraordinary and even
unexplainable. Events occur suddenly, they breach the rule, stop the sequence
and disrupt the common order of things ­ the world is no longer the same after
an event occurs, our plans have to be revised, our stories have to be rearranged,
our identities have to be reshaped (Koselleck, 2000). On the most demanding
level events occur as the epiphany of the sacred or the demonic in our everyday
life ­ they result in a crisis of our commonsensical notions, they disrupt the web
of meaning, they devaluate the traditional experience and set the stage for a new
history. The attack on the Twin Towers or the breakdown of the Berlin Wall are
such events that have left a traumatic imprint on collective memory or have
opened up the historical horizon in a triumphant turn.
4. Triumph and Trauma
Such traumatic or triumphant events are at the core of the collective memory of
generations. The unity of a generation and of its collective memory is con-
structed by a fundamental common experience that devalues the experience
of the previous generation (Koselleck, 2000). These experiences provide a
common horizon of meaning to which, however, outsiders have only limited
access. The others cannot understand that they even should not be able to under-
stand. Experiences that create the collective identity of a generation result from
victorious or lost wars, from persecution and imprisonment, from expulsion and
displacement, from bombing raids and living in devastated areas, from partici-
pation in social, political or cultural movements. These events provide the back-
bone of collective memory because and insofar as they are related to corporal
experiences and can be remembered as such (Merleau-Ponty, 1966; Rittner and
Kamper, 1976; Meyer-Drawe, 1984).
In order to become the core of collective memory an experience of trauma or
triumph does not have to be absolutely unique or unprecedented, but the
individuals concerned have to see it that way. This tendency is fostered by the
special situation of adolescents. In between the normality of their parental
families and the normality of their future life as adults, adolescents encounter
the extraordinary, unfamiliar and even strange in a situation of uprootedness, of
transition and of social disembeddedness (Mannheim, 1928/1968). They cope
with this uncertainty by participating in a movement in the literal or indirect
sense (Reulecke, 1995). They change residences and know that they will not
stay forever, they travel with peers, they join a movement that thrusts to change
society or culture, they live in a mood of no more and not yet. This social situa-
tion of `being on the move' is reflected by increased readiness to get rid of the
GIESEN: NONCONTEMPORANEITY, ASYNCHRONICITY, DIVIDED MEMORIES 33
past and to discover something new and unheard of ­ even if from the perspec-
tive of the outside observer the newly discovered may appear as a repetition of
some well known patterns. The transitoriness of adolescence favours oblivion
and supports the fascination by the future as the field of possible events
(Koselleck, 2000). The devaluation of tradition and the invention of the new
construct the collective identity of a generation.
5. Authenticity and Corporeality
The collective self-consciousness of a generation depends less on the actual
uniqueness of an event than on its believability and authenticity (Trilling, 1974).
The collective experience should not fit into well known patterns, it has to be
taken as incomparable, immediate and authentic. This authentication is usually
achieved by relating it to personal, in particular to corporal, experience. The
experience that is inscribed into the body is immediate and cannot be denied or
alienated ­ the scars testify the fight better than words (Scarry 1987; Hahn,
1993). This emphasis on corporeality responds to the modern risk of imitation
and fluidification. While traditional societies related collective identity mostly
to primordial attributes that resist any attempt to planned alteration and change,
modern societies face the programmatic challenge of dissolving social bound-
aries and fluidifying social communication. If however, everything can be
traded, communicated, questioned and acquired, this dissolution can also touch
those fundaments that should remain unalienable and immutable property. The
antidotes against this risk of modernity are corporeality and experience. In refer-
ring to corporal experience generations construct boundaries and barriers
against the risk of being understood by outsiders in a society in which neither
class and descent nor locality can provide these boundaries any more ­ at least
not in a legitimate way.
A first and basic mode of corporeal experience is provided by presence at the
site of the event ­ one's own eyes have seen the extraordinary event, the ears
have heard it, the skin has felt it. A strong collective identity of a generation ­ in
particular of its male part (Reulecke, 2001) ­ is based on the actual or imagined
presence at the local site of the extraordinary event ­ one was there on the
barricade or under gunfire, in camps or in treks of refugees, at the opening of the
Berlin Wall or at the collapse of the Twin Towers, at Verdun or Berlin, New
York, Seattle or Gorleben ­ at least one could have been present if sheer coinci-
dence would not have prevented this (Mannheim, 1928/1968).
Even the indirect presence mediated by the press, radio or TV can generate
this corporeal presence although in a weakened form. Most of us remember the
moment when we heard the news about the defeat of Germany in 1945, the fall
of Saigon in 1974, the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989 or the attack on the
34 TIME & SOCIETY 13(1)
Twin Towers and this moment relates our corporeal presence to the historical
event.
Corporeal experiences are frequently reinforced by rituals and remembered
by collective rituals (Turner, 1969; Van Gennep, 1977; Bell, 1997; Giesen,
1999). These rituals like common marching, singing, dancing, praying, shouting
or being silent coordinate the movements of the participants. Those who are
present and participate are mirrored in the body of others, they experience
immediately a corporeal similarity, they are merged into a collective identity.
This corporeal experience is enhanced by the presence of a common enemy
who threatens the integrity of one's own body and those of one's fellow genera-
tion. The presence of the enemy, the awareness of danger, the perception of risk
generates the collective identity of a generation ­ at least of its male part. It may
be enforced from outside or longed for by ourselves ­ the experience of danger
for our bodies produces an authentic sense of extraordinariness that is hard to
surpass.
This holds true in particular for a generation experiencing its collective self.
The extraordinary experience of danger and force melts away the trust in the
parental protection and in the superiority of the older generation ­ a new state of
nature opens up, the old rules are no longer valid, the experiences of the older
generation are worthless, the new generations can no longer consider them-
selves to be just a continuation of the old ones. They step forward out of the
shadow of the old generations and take a stand on their own (Buford, 1991). At
the same time the new generation in being endangered by an enemy encounters
for the first time its own mortality ­ they are no longer children. Children can
imagine death only as the death of others, but not as the inescapable limitation
of their own lives.
This moment of being touched by death results in the strongest experience of
corporeality ­ it can however, in the moment of experience, not yet be mentally
integrated and symbolically represented ­ only later on, in retrospection, in
remembering we become aware of the moment of ultimate danger. The mind
cannot cope with the shocking moment of possible death, it has to ignore it in
the moment when it happens, instead of renarrating it, the individual as well as
the collective mind has to silence it for some time (Caruth, 1996a, 1996b;
Alexander et al., 2003). The collectively shared experience of endangered life
can thus engender a collective trauma, that is at first enclosed into the body of
its carriers and that can be spoken out only later on from a distance, at first only
among those who had similar experiences, later, when the eyewitnesses are
fading away, it is also told to outsiders. This traumatic memory, the experience
of utmost danger, the moment when the parents protection failed, represents the
ultimate horizon of reference for the collective identity of generations.
The collective trauma results ­ like no other experience ­ in a barrier of
understanding between generations. This barrier exists as long as the eye-
GIESEN: NONCONTEMPORANEITY, ASYNCHRONICITY, DIVIDED MEMORIES 35
witnesses are still alive ­ the succeeding generation cannot understand because
they could not participate in the expulsion and trekking, in the war at the eastern
front, in the trenches of Verdun etc. Thus the collective trauma of a generation
constitutes a distinctive historical horizon (Koselleck, 2000), a founding event
of history that for the lifespan of this generation is shared neither by the preced-
ing nor the succeeding generation. Only later on when the generation is fading
away and when the trauma is spoken out, when, what has been the unalienable
trauma before, is turned into an object of historical reconstruction then the
boundary of understanding fades away and the founding event is integrated into
a sequence of historical narration ­ but this shift from generational memory to
history, is, in most cases, also the time when the generation as a living commu-
nity disappears (J. Assmann, 1999; A. Assmann, 2002).
But the experience of one's own mortality is only one horizon or reference for
the construction of a strong collective identity of a generation. Its counterpart is
the experience of an unexpected victory against the adversity of the world, the
bold attempt that was taken against the advice of the parents and that remained
victorious and successful, the experience of luck and triumph. Here the
collective identity of a generation is not based on the experience of mortality and
danger, but on the collective certainty of being born (Fanon, 1968; Jennings,
1999; Sorel, 1999; Giesen, 2004). This reference to birth does not extend to
the bodily birth of its individual members but to their birth as an autonomous
collectivity that disregarded the plea of their parents to be cautious, that took
the risk of doing the unreasonable, the extraordinary, the unprecedented.
Participation in new social movements, revolutions and struggles for autonomy
results, if successful, in such a feeling of being reborn again, of finding your true
self and of standing on your own. The war of liberation against the Napoleonic
Occupation 1815, the German Revolution 1848 or the student's movement of
1968 provided these experiences of collective heroism and triumph.
6. From Centre to Periphery
However, neither the collective memory of triumph nor that of trauma will last
forever. New generations enter the stage and they, in their turn, devalue the
experiences of the previous ones. The new generations try to get at a distance
from the world of adults, who, according to them, have lost their sensitivities for
the new and extraordinary experience. What the adult generation considered to
be an extraordinary experience is now turned into the pathetic news of yester-
day. Not only the generation of Germans who rushed enthusiastically into the
First World War or the generation who voted Hitler into power, but also the
Generation of 1968, who had mocked the experiences of the Post-war
Generation, had to face such a reinterpretation of their own constitutive experi-
36 TIME & SOCIETY 13(1)
ences. Those who considered themselves to be heroes ­ although defeated
ones ­ were despised by the follow up generations as perpetrators, cowards or
victims, those who took themselves for revolutionaries devoted to the common
good and the progress of history, were, afterwards, discovered as terrorists or as
irresponsible extremists, as opportunists at best, those who, by indulging in sex,
drugs and Rock`n'Roll, believed to redeem the world from `repression', were,
later on, seen as bland sexists or reckless hedonists.
It is these axial shifts in the interpretation of the collective identity that cause
an acerbated feeling of divided memories on the part of the older generations.
They are not only unable to tell their stories to the younger ones, but are
frowned upon as outdated, as people from yesterday, are denied a chance to
present their own memories in public, are removed from the core group that
embodies the nation at its best. Their own generational memories do not fit into
the public construction of national identity anymore. Finally they perceive
themselves as a generation that made fatal mistakes and became guilty. Retreat
from the fore of public attention and silence with respect to their past hint at the
move from the centre to the periphery of society (Bude, 1997).
The younger generations, in contrast, experience divided memories, if the
members of the older generations still hold the centre of political and social
power, and defend this position against the younger ones who strive to replace
them. They consequently attack the power holders by scandalizing their past, by
revealing misdeeds and crimes that had been carefully concealed or ignored, in
short, by questioning the legitimacy of the older generation's authority. Thus,
what could have coexisted as the inevitable difference of generational memories
is turned into a public debate about the collective memory of the encompassing
community: The nation. As far as key events of the collective memory of a
generation are also key events in a national narrative, the public debate about
the past risks to centre and aggravate a difference that is neither surprising nor
avoidable: The divided memories of generations.
7. Blurring the Difference
The boundaries between generations can be contested and conflicted, but they
can also be publicly declared in a generally accepted way and they can be
imagined by literature and media. The conflict between classes has been
increasingly replaced by the turnover of generations as the prime mover of
history. This temporalization of social structure is reflected by a new public
sensitivity for generational differences. Sociologists, public intellectuals and
lifestyle specialists are discovering and proclaiming ever new generations: The
sceptical generation is followed by the critical generation, the generation of
dropouts gives way to the generation of computer kids, to the generation of 98,
GIESEN: NONCONTEMPORANEITY, ASYNCHRONICITY, DIVIDED MEMORIES 37
to the generation Golf, to the generation Berlin etc. Slight shifts of lifestyle are
blown up to fundamental differences, a responsibility for the fate of future
generations is proclaimed as a new ethical reference of politics, the contract
between the generations advances to a key issue of retirement plans and social
politics, `generation' becomes the mythical core term of commercials and
lifestyle. This inflationary use of the concept hints at a general acceptance of the
boundaries between generations. But this general acceptance of boundaries
risks to devaluate them as barriers of understanding. Generational differences
tend to relate less to unalienable corporal experiences than to lifestyles that can
be appropriated by almost everybody regardless of age. This shift from corporal
experiences to lifestyle subculture and fashion as the markers of a generation
is not entirely new. Historical generations that were based on a traumatic or
triumphant devaluation of the parental experience were frequently followed by
subcultural generations that could not refer to a special historical project or to an
extraordinary experience. Instead the subcultural generations tried to draw a
boundary from the previous generation by adopting a style that deviated
strongly from the parental taste and that hence could resist imitation at least for
some time. These markers of boundary were frequently bodily attributes that in
the course of time had to be pushed to the extreme in order to remain immune
against being understood and appropriated by the adult generation: Haircuts had
to be very long or very short, piercings and tattoos provide immutable marks,
drugs and dirt keep the regular order at a distance. But even these desperate
attempts to raise barriers against understanding and imitation were frequently
overcome by the parental thrust to level the differences between the generations.
Today parents strive to be accepted by their children as their best friends, shun
authoritarian behaviour and refuse to recognize the boundary set by their
children. And there are hints that they are succeeding. An increasing number of
young adults in western societies see their parents as their best friends and still
reside at the parental home ­ not for necessity but for convenience and comfort.
They do not care for the staging of subcultural differences and generational
boundaries, but use the advantages of `Hotel Mama'. Thus, in a countermove to
the public staging and invention of new generations, the actual barriers
surrounding subcultural generations tend to be levelled. The insurmountable
cleavage separating the collective memory of generations is replaced again by
boundaries surrounding the family as the safe haven in a heartless world. The
oedipal struggle between the generations seems to be fading out. At the end it
seems sufficient to wear jeans that show the belly in a way the mother would not
dare to do.
Again, it is the bodily attribute that marks the difference. This blurring of the
generational difference on the social level may respond to the above mentioned
inflationary use of the generational metaphor on the public level or it may also
hint at the unexpected rise of strong new macrostructural cleavages and con-
38 TIME & SOCIETY 13(1)
flicts that take centre stage and that, in a compensatory turn, lend new salience
to the family as a haven in a heartless world.
Yet, as harmonious and cosy this new coexistence of different generations
may be, it does not cease the turnover between generations as such. Like other
generations also the generation `Hotel Mama' demarcates its identity in contrast
to the previous one. It does so, in a paradoxical turn, by devaluating the very
generational project of their parents who, as adolescents, insisted on divided
memories and barriers of understanding. Their future children, however, could
well return to resistance and rebellion.
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BERNHARD GIESEN is Professor of Sociology at the University of
Konstanz and recurrent visiting professor at Yale University. Among his
visiting positions during the last years are UCLA, Stanford, University of
Chicago, European University Institute Florence, New York University.
His latest books are Intellectuals and the German Nation (1998), European
Citizenship (2001, with Klaus Eder), Cultural Trauma (2003), Triumph and
Trauma (2004) and The Performative Turn in the Social Sciences (2004).
ADDRESS: Universität Konstanz, Fachbereich Geschichte und Soziologie,
Universitätsstr. 10, Postfach 5560, D-78464 Konstanz.
[email: Bernhard.Giesen@uni-konstanz.de]
40 TIME & SOCIETY 13(1)