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The Emotive & Organizational
Contexts of Terrorism
Fear & Changes in Group
Structures of Terror Organizations
MU MVZ 203 / 448
Spring 2010
Sonoma State University
Dave McCuan
* Key multidisciplinary questions for which we do not have
sufficient answers:
* What are the vulnerabilities of a networked terrorist organization?
* What are some ideological differences among key terrorist groups,
and how can these differences be exploited by counterterrorists?
* What new approaches for combating terrorism can be developed in
an open, democratic society?
* What is the media's role as a "force multiplier" for both terror orgs. &
CT purposes?
The Study of Terrorism ­ Where We Are In
The Field
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Additional multidisciplinary issues requiring further research:
* Evolutions in terrorist strategies, weapons, & tactics
* The dimensions of terrorism and WMD
* Future acts of terrorist "judo" / adaptation of learning & technique
* Information warfare / cyber terror to also include...
* Electronic warfare
* Potential terrorist group alliances
* Common ideology?
* Complimentary goals/objectives?
* Common enemy / common hatred of a particular policy?
* Strategic sense (better potential for success by combining forces)?
* Complimentary strengths? Mutual Gain?
* 5th Generation Warfare ­ strategic surprise & adaptation among orgs.?
The Study of Terrorism ­ Where We Are
In The Field
How Do Terror Groups Maintain
Themselves and/or Re-Constitute
Themselves As Viable, Legitimate
Political Threats?
How Do Terror Organizations
"Walk the Walk & Act in Credible
Ways?"
Credibility as a key variable of note!
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Motivations for Terrorism - Macro
* Rational
­ Rational Choice Theory
* When an individual makes a choice after weighing the
consequences and rewards of an action or behavior.
* For example, a terrorist thinks like a business person. The
terrorist looks at all options and takes action on the choice that
is most cost effective and beneficial to his/her cause.
* Psychological
­ Arises from the individual terrorist's personal
dissatisfaction with a government or political system
­ Antisocial behaviors create "US" vs. "THEM"
­ Believe that everyone outside their own group is EVIL
* Cultural
­ Cultures shape values and motivate people to take
action
Micro - Org. & Ind'l Motivational Dimensions
financial gain TERROR ACTIVITIES inflict
suffering
"positive"societalchange
Criminal
Terror
Pathological
Terror
Terrorism
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Trying to "Walk the Walk"
* Between 1970 & 1974, the Weather Underground
(and its activists, the "Weathermen") took
responsibility for 12 bombings.
* The New World Liberation Front (NWLF)
­ Formed in San Francisco (1970)
­ Responsible for 30 bombings over next eight years
­ START GTD reports 1 fatality (1978) and 1 injury (1977)
over this campaign
­ Claimed to be a "moral" revolutionary group, attacking
only "legitimate" targets such as utility companies
­ Considered themselves at war with the establishment
­ Sought to recruit and ally with membership of the SLA
and the BP in the SF Bay Area in the mid-1970s.
­ Published a magazine called, The Urban Guerilla
(TUG)
Alliances & Staving Off Loss
According to McLellan and Avery (1977) in their book The Voices of Guns, the NWLF had
engaged in a campaign of more than 10 Bay Area bombings in late 1974 and 1975 alone:
* Aug. 6, 1974: Bomb failed to explode at Burlingame office of General Motors Acceptable
Corporation;
* Sept. 3, 1974: Bomb exploded in the San Francisco office of Dean Witter and Company;
* Sept. 13, 1974: Bomb exploded at the Palo Alto office of Dean Witter and Company;
* Sept. 28, 1974: Bomb exploded in a warehouse of an ITT subsidiary in San Leandro;
* Oct. 2, 1974: Bomb exploded in a women's restroom of the ITT-owned Sheraton-Palace Hotel
in San Francisco;
* Oct. 30, 1974: Bomb exploded at the Los Altos Hills home of retired ITT president Robert
Halleck;
* Nov. 6, 1974: Seven meter maid three-wheeled motorcycles blown up in a Berkeley parking lot;
* Dec. 19, 1974: Bomb exploded in the San Francisco office of General Motors Corporation;
* Feb. 3, 1975: Bomb exploded at the San Jose office of General Motors Corporation;
* Feb. 4, 1975: Double bombing at Pillar Point Air Force Radar Station near Half Moon Bay and
the Vulcan Foundry in Oakland;
* Feb. 6, 1975: Pipe bomb exploded at KRON-TV station in San Francisco;
* Aug. 4, 1975: Three NWLF fire bombs exploded in the carport of the Woodside home of
Charles de Brettville, chairman of the Bank of California, a director of Pacific Gas and Electric,
Shell Oil, Western Union and Safeway Stores, Inc;
* Aug. 14, 1975: The NWLF claimed credit for bombing of an Emeryville police cruiser.
* By February 1975, the Bay Area was averaging one bombing every 16 days. The NWLF was
linked to more than 70 bombings by authorities, mostly in Northern California.
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1970s Activist Groups, SF Bay Area
Trying to Walk the Walk
* NWLF's attempts to expand
­ Few new recruits willing to join so they
`expanded' by forming a number of brigades
­ In a final ploy to gain support, NWLF joined
up with prison reform movement and allied
with Tribal Thumb group
­ This alliance cemented their failure due to
association with violent felons; lost all public
support
* Tribal Thumb was a group of militant ex-convicts
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Trying to "Walk the Walk"
* Why many modern terrorist groups fail:
­ In order to have effect, terrorist groups have
to be large
­ To become large, group needs
popular/political appeal
­ Need a cause that is acceptable to a large
segment of the public
­ Most terrorist groups do not have this appeal
and thus fail
Two Critical Variables For
Credibility Among Terror Groups:
Group Size & Campaign Length
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Group Size & Campaign Length
* Ted Robert Gurr's analysis of terrorist
groups
­ Most terrorist actions involve only a few
people who generate more noise than injury
­ The majority of successful groups embrace
doctrines such as nationalism or religion
­ Large terrorist groups are more successful
than small groups
Group Size & Campaign Length
* Length of Terrorist Campaigns:
­ Most terrorist campaigns end within 18
months of the initial outburst of violence
­ Terrorism is short-lived because it seldom
generates support
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Group Size & Campaign Length
* Implications of Gurr's Analysis
­ Conclusions imply that most terrorist
organizations are small, short-lived operations
­ IF terrorism is the result of a popular social
issue, the power of the group is enhanced
­ Strong support for a group is more important
than the actual number of operatives
The `Sunsetting' of Terror Groups - RAND
How do terrorist groups end?
The evidence since 1968 indicates
that terrorist groups rarely cease
to exist as a result of winning or
losing a military campaign.
Rather, most groups end because
of operations carried out by local
police or intelligence agencies or
because they join the political
process.
This suggests that the United
States should pursue a
counterterrorism strategy against
al Qa'ida that emphasizes policing
and intelligence gathering rather
than a "war on terrorism"
approach that relies heavily on
military force.
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Breakdown of 648 Terrorist Groups
41%
38%
21%
Group Ended
Still Active
Went Elsewhere
Source: How Terrorist Groups End, Seth Jones & Martin Libicki, RAND 2008
How Terrorist Groups End
* Policing (40%)
* Military force
(7%)
* Splintering*
* Politics (43%)
* Victory (10%)
*136 of 648 in the study splintered. The group ended,
but terrorist activities continued
* Economic
sanctions against
supporters
* Target hardening
* Intelligence
* Diplomacy
Contributing Factors
(usually a
combination)
Source: How Terrorist Groups End, Seth Jones & Martin Libicki, RAND 2008
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Group Size is Important
Group Size is Important
* Italian Terrorist Groups
­ Between 1975 and 1985, there was a large
number of terrorist actions in Italy
­ Only large groups involved in sustained
actions/terrorist campaigns
­ Everything else was `single incident' terrorism
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Group Size is Important
* Hezbollah
­ Serves as example of large successful group
­ Began as political group
­ In 1982, moved to Bekaa Valley in Lebanon
­ Hezbollah is large enough to maintain a
campaign, and religion provides common
base among its members
Group Size is Important
* Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elaam (LTTE)
­ LTTE is bound by nationalism and ethnic
identity
­ LTTE began fighting Sri Lankan government
in 1976
­ Claimed to represent Tamil minority
­ May have had up to 10,000 members
­ While defeated, still rumblings of support &
activism / activists
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Group Size is Important
* Terrorist Campaigns After WW II
­ Campaigns of large terrorist organizations
accounted for majority of world terrorism
­ Large terrorist organizations have prompted
governments to employ macropolicies
­ Large groups represent political threats
Group Size is Important
* Values Vs. Large Base of Support
­ Most terrorists try to hide their most radical
positions and sensationalistic violence to
appeal to a broader base
­ This can and does ebb / flow with campaigns
and with internal and external credibility
pressures.
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Creating Terrorist Organizations
Creating Terrorist Organizations
* Pyramid Organization:
­ Support is most common job in terrorist
groups
­ Fraser and Fulton's hierarchy of terrorist
group:
* Smallest group at the top is responsible for
command
* Second level is active cadre--people who carry
out organization's mission
* Third level is most important: active supporters
* Fourth level is passive supporters; largest group
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Creating Terrorist Organizations
* Anthony Burton's Structure of Subunits:
­ Terrorist organizations have two primary types of
subunits:
* Cell
* Column
­ The most basic unit is the cell. Composed of 4-6
people and specialized as tactical or intelligence
section
­ Groups of cells create columns, which are
semiautonomous groups with a variety of specialties
and a single command structure
New Models for a New Day:
Post Cold War & Post 9/11
Terror Organizations
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New Models for a New Day
* Umbrella Organization
­ Several smaller pyramids gather under
sheltering group that
* Manages supplies
* Obtains resources
* Creates support structures
* Gathers intelligence
­ Sheltering umbrella disassociated from
violence, casting a blind eye when
semiautonomous pyramid groups take action
New Models for a New Day
* Organizations that emerged in the 1990s:
­ Virtual organizations were created through
computer and information networks
­ Chain organizations linked separate groups
with similar philosophies or religions without
creating hierarchy
­ Centralized hubs developed to manage or
support individual cells
­ "Leaderless resistance"--groups or
individuals operating on their own
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New Models for a New Day
* New Organizational Styles:
­ As organizations change, network provides
strength
­ Network is supported by larger nonviolent
following
* Motivated by nationalistic, ethnic, or religions
concerns
­ Role of force multipliers dominates terrorism
The Problems of Managing
Organizations
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The Problems of Managing
Organizations
* Special organizational problems:
­ Secrecy
­ Decentralization
­ Training
­ Internal Discipline
­ Gaining immediate tactical support for
operations
The Problems of Managing
Organizations
* Bodansky's types of activities
accompanying terrorist campaigns:
­ Intelligence--includes everything from
selection/observation of targets to forging of
documentation/travel papers
­ Direct logistical network--established to
supply terrorists with weapons
­ Support network--for safe houses,
transportation, food sources, and medical
supplies
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The Problems of Managing
Organizations
* Terrorist attacks require political support,
planning, organization, and resources
The Individual:
The Ultimate Small Group
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The Individual:
The Ultimate Small Group
* Technology and the individual:
­ A technological structure can be changed into
a weapon if attacked
* Examples: power grid, fuel distribution system,
computer network
­ For the first time in history, a single individual
can become a lone force of significant
destruction
The Individual:
The Ultimate Small Group
* Jessica Stern and the disturbing trend in
terrorism:
­ Terrorists motivated by religion are gathering
into loose groups with no leader
­ Many groups are virtual organizations held
together by ideology and information
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The Individual:
The Ultimate Small Group
* Louis Beam
­ A right-wing extremist leader involved with Ku
Klux Klan and Aryan Nations
­ Believed that a group could not evade law
enforcement, so he called for elimination of
organizations
The Individual:
The Ultimate Small Group
* "Leaderless Resistance"
­ Extremist groups do not need extensive
organizations
* Only necessary to take action
­ Examples:
* Green Party extremists in Germany
* Animal Liberation Front
* Timothy McVeigh
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The Individual:
The Ultimate Small Group
* Lone Wolf
­ In the right-wing fantasy novel Hunter,
protagonist (individual) serves as example of
how an individual extremist can murder
people of color and Jews in the name of
White supremacy
­ Eric Rudolph--charged in connection with 4
bombings ranging from 1996 Atlanta
Olympics to 1998 abortion clinic bombing
The Individual:
The Ultimate Small Group
* Berserker
­ White defines berserkers as crazed,
frightened true believers
­ Can leave a trail of clues