1
Weeks Five, Six:
Explaining Terrorism & Political
Violence From 4GW to 5GW &
Fifth Wave Tribalism
MU MVZ 203 / 448
Spring 2010
Sonoma State University
Dave McCuan
This is Section Builds on our
Previous Discussions of
Radicalization & Waves of
Terrorism Activities Among States &
Sub-State, Non-State Actors
Continuing our Explanations of
Terrorism & Political Violence
2
General Explanations for Terrorism
* Rational / Rationalist Approach
* Cultural Approach
* Structural(ist) Approach
* Other Competing Approaches as laid out
by Sageman and Hoffman
The Rationality of War (Political
Violence)
* So, is war (or political violence)
good for "absolutely nothing"?
* How would a rationalist answer?
HINT: While war may not be
good for everyone - especially
those who fight it - it may be very
"good" for others
To rationalists, war is not
fundamentally different from
other forms of political violence,
including terrorism. Thus ...
US oil profits
What Makes a Terrorist?
Explaining Political Violence
Key
Point
Key
Point
3
The Logic of Terrorism
* ... to understand the rational choice explanation of terrorism, we
must be begin with a basic assumption, namely, ...
Terrorism is a ________
act
rational
What does it mean to say that terrorism
is "rational"? What are the implications
of this premise?
What does it mean to say that terrorism
is "rational"? What are the implications
of this premise?
What Makes a Terrorist?
Explaining Political Violence
The Logic of Terrorism
* Key Implications
To say that terrorism is rational is to say that terrorists are not crazy,
that they are not "abnormal" or otherwise suffering from a psychological
disorder that compels them to behave in a pathologically violent
manner
To say that terrorism is rational is to say that terrorists, like everyone
else, have specific, "reasonable" goals they wish to achieve through
their actions; terroristic violence is, in this regard, an instrument or
means to an end
To say that terrorism is rational is to say that terrorists engage in a
rational process of strategic calculation; that they weigh the costs and
benefits of many options and choose the "best" alternative among
many
What Makes a Terrorist?
Explaining Political Violence
4
The Logic of Terrorism: A Simple Idea
Political
Actors/Terrorist
Organization
"Tools"
Political actors typically
have a range of
available tools: they will
choose the one that is
most effective
"Goal"
The "hammer of terror"
(as opposed, say, to the
"pillars of protest") may
be used when it is the
most effective tool
available to achieve the
goals of the organization
The following figure
helps to illustrate the
basic idea behind
the statement,
"Terrorism is
rational"
Terrorists are the basically the same--and as sane--as other political actors
What Makes a Terrorist?, cont'd
The Logic of Terrorism: Key Implications
* Real World Implications: Consider one argument made by Patrick
Rael, which presupposes that terrorists, such as Osama bin Laden,
are rational actors ...
"Of all the misinformation, half-truths, and outright lies about terrorism put forth by the Bush
Administration, none is as pernicious as the one repeated by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer ...
[and others in the Bush administration]. Echoing a claim Bush has frequently made since the
attacks on September 11, 2001, Bremer asserted, with all the authority his 14 months as
special envoy to Iraq confers, that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda attacked the U.S.
because they `hate freedom.'
However reprehensible the attacks on September 11 were, responding effectively to
the threat they represent requires the courage to confront the situation truthfully.
Seeking to comprehend Islamist Jihadists by facilely asserting that they simply hate freedom
is about as sensible as, well, invading a non-Islamist state such as Iraq in the hopes of
destroying Islamist terrorism. It does not serve the truth, nor the security of the American
people, but only the short-sighted and misguided political aims of those in power."
What Makes a Terrorist?, cont'd
Citation: "Do They Really Hate Freedom? The Myth of the Insane Terrorist"
By Patrick Rael, Professor of History, Bowdoin College
5
The Logic of (Suicide)Terrorism
* A Logical Quandary?
Can suicide terrorism be considered a
rational act?
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
The answer is not at all clear; what is clear, though, is that
suicide attacks can be effective, very effective. Indeed, they
can be one of the most effective "tools" in the arsenal of terrorist
organizations
For terrorist organizations, suicide attacks represent a relatively
low cost way of achieving a political goal: consider the suicide
attacks launched by Hizballah against the US and French
military contingents stationed in Beirut in 1983.
The Logic of Terrorism
* If terrorism is a rational act, we must still explain why
the choice of terrorism is made, why individuals
become terrorists
The answer should already be clear ...
Individuals turn to terrorism when they
believe that no other viable option exists
to achieve a political goal; terrorism arises
when the "benefits" of using political
violence outweigh the "costs
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
6
The Logic of Terrorism
* The lack of viable options is a key to understanding
terrorism. It tells us, among other things, that ...
Terrorism is a response to objective conditions - political, social or
economic inequality, injustice, oppression, exclusion, and so on
(conversely, that terrorism is less likely in the absence of inequality,
oppression, injustice, and exclusion)
Terrorism is rarely a first response; instead, it is typically a last resort,
an option used when all other methods have failed or are doomed to
fail
Terrorism is (relatively speaking) a "weapon of the weak"
Terrorism is most intense in places where inequality, injustice, or
oppression are very high; however, if the costs are too high, if any
resistance is absolutely doomed to failure, then terrorism would not be
anticipatedExamples: in Soviet Russia, in North Korea, in Iraq under Hussein, there was relatively
little, even no significant terrorist activity. State power was so extensive and effective that
the likelihood of successful terrorist activity was practically zero
Examples: in Soviet Russia, in North Korea, in Iraq under Hussein, there was relatively
little, even no significant terrorist activity. State power was so extensive and effective that
the likelihood of successful terrorist activity was practically zero
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
The Logic of Terrorism
* Rationality, Mistakes, and Constraints: Additional
Points
Terrorists, while rational, often make serious, even deadly
miscalculations; some decisions, in short, are very bad ones
One reason is the lack of __________________________ ; in
addition, strategic ________________ makes any outcome
problematic
Another reason is the fact that they typically face overwhelming
odds against success in the first place: consider Hizballah's
confrontation against Israel and the United States ...
perfect information
interaction
Hizballah's leaders recognized that they were no match militarily to the US
and Israel, so even under the best-case scenario, failure was always a strong
possibility
End of rational choice argumentEnd of rational choice argument
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
7
Culture, Religion and Terrorism
* Most culturalists would agree that there is a strong
relationship between culture and political violence;
the relationship, however, should not be described as
strictly causal...
Particular cultures
make terrorists
Culture can
make largescale
terrorism
possible*
* Under certain conditions and in certain political, social or economic
contexts; moreover, pretty much any culture--from Islamic, to Hindi, to
Christian, to Jewish-- has this same potential
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
Culture, Religion and Terrorism
* Important Caveat
Culture or cultural factors do not
act alone. The importance of culture
as a variable must always be
understood within particular
contexts What does this mean? What "particular
type of contexts" might matter?
What does this mean? What "particular
type of contexts" might matter?
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
8
Culture, Religion and Terrorism
* While culture and cultural factors do not act alone, culture can still be
said to have an autonomous effect insofar as culture may provide a
necessary basis for collective (as opposed to individual) action
* That is, one might say that without an appeal to cultural or religious
symbols, certain collective undertaking would be difficult if not
impossible too achieve
­ This is probably more accurate with terrorism than with other types of
collective endeavors since the becoming a terrorists requires an
extraordinarily high level of commitment and risk--and sometimes
certain death
Consider the points made by both Hoffman and Sageman: Even relatively
privileged individuals become terrorists. Their behavior cannot be explained by
rational factors alone: it would make much more sense for privileged individuals to
free ride on the efforts of others. To fully explain their choices requires an
understanding of how culture can have a fundamental impact on an individual's
identity, thinking and perceptions.
Consider the points made by both Hoffman and Sageman: Even relatively
privileged individuals become terrorists. Their behavior cannot be explained by
rational factors alone: it would make much more sense for privileged individuals to
free ride on the efforts of others. To fully explain their choices requires an
understanding of how culture can have a fundamental impact on an individual's
identity, thinking and perceptions.
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
Culture, Religion and Terrorism
* The Case of Terrorism in Lebanon
The larger context: Prior to the emergence of terrorism in
Lebanon, Lebanese society was characterized by the unequal
division of political and economic privileges between Muslims
and Christians
Domestic inequality was exacerbated the country's weak
security situation, both domestically and internationally:
Lebanon was subject to two military incursions by Israel, the first
in 1978 and the second in 1982
The dominant group in Lebanon was supported by Israel; the
subordinate group was supported by Iran; Syria had a growing
role until about 2007
Important Note: Inequality and seriously
imbalanced power relations are an
underlying factor in many, if not most cases
of terrorism: Northern Ireland, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Pakistan, and
Palestine, to name a few. At the same time,
inequality and political discrimination don't
always lead to terrorism; conversely in
relatively equitable societies, incidences of
domestic terrorism occur. Context matters,
but does not explain everything.
Important Note: Inequality and seriously
imbalanced power relations are an
underlying factor in many, if not most cases
of terrorism: Northern Ireland, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Pakistan, and
Palestine, to name a few. At the same time,
inequality and political discrimination don't
always lead to terrorism; conversely in
relatively equitable societies, incidences of
domestic terrorism occur. Context matters,
but does not explain everything.
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
9
Culture, Religion and Terrorism
* The Case of Terrorism in Lebanon
What role did culture play in the rise of terrorism in
Lebanon?
Was there a natural fit between "pure" Islamic values,
practices, and beliefs, on the one hand, and terrorism
on the other hand?
The short answer is ...
NONO
Instead, Islamic culture was co-opted by leaders of organizations,
such as Hizbollah; Islamic culture was reshaped to suit the needs of
the organization, to help the organization achieve its political goal
Instead, Islamic culture was co-opted by leaders of organizations,
such as Hizbollah; Islamic culture was reshaped to suit the needs of
the organization, to help the organization achieve its political goal
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
Culture, Religion and Terrorism
* The Case of Terrorism in Lebanon
How were Islamic values co-opted
to justify or legitimize terrorist violence,
especially with regard to the use of
suicide bombers?
The use of suicide attacks was justified by the spiritual
leader of Hizballah in the following manner: When an
enemy cannot be attacked through conventional means,
then the combatant must fight with "special means," which
includes purposefully sacrificing one's own life. But "such
an undertaking differs little from that of a soldier who fights
and knows that in the end he will be killed. These two
situations lead to death; except that one fits in with
conventional procedures of war, and the other does not."
Thus, "there is no difference between dying with a gun in
your hand or exploding yourself."
The use of suicide attacks was justified by the spiritual
leader of Hizballah in the following manner: When an
enemy cannot be attacked through conventional means,
then the combatant must fight with "special means," which
includes purposefully sacrificing one's own life. But "such
an undertaking differs little from that of a soldier who fights
and knows that in the end he will be killed. These two
situations lead to death; except that one fits in with
conventional procedures of war, and the other does not."
Thus, "there is no difference between dying with a gun in
your hand or exploding yourself."
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
10
Culture, Religion and Terrorism
* The Case of Terrorism in Lebanon, 2005-2007
In sum, the rise of political violence in Lebanon was a complex
process that involved social, political, economic and cultural
factors; external political relations were also significant
Culture, however, did play a prominent, if not indispensable role
in spurring and sustaining collective action that increasingly
relied on "violent sub-state activism"; in this regard, it is
important to understand that culture is a extremely powerful
symbol or system of meaning that can be referenced during
terror attacks and by movements.
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
Culture, Religion and Terrorism
* The Power of Culture: A Reprise
Culture, it is important to remember, is not the only powerful
system of meaning ... consider the power of another, more
pervasive system: nationalism
In the name of nationalism (or patriotism), we are willing - even
eager - to wage brutal wars where the mass killing of innocents
is justified as "collateral damage"; in the name of nationalism,
we are willing to subordinate other values and beliefs; in the
name of nationalism we are willing to give up our own lives
This is not to say that nationalism is bad; rather, it is to say that nationalism--
an idea, a belief--is a powerful, very powerful force in the world. As with any
system of meaning, it can have a very positive effect or a very negative one.
In this sense, there is nothing inherently "evil" about nationalism, just as there
is nothing inherently good about it.
This is not to say that nationalism is bad; rather, it is to say that nationalism--
an idea, a belief--is a powerful, very powerful force in the world. As with any
system of meaning, it can have a very positive effect or a very negative one.
In this sense, there is nothing inherently "evil" about nationalism, just as there
is nothing inherently good about it.
Key
Point
Key
Point
Explaining Political Violence, cont'd
11
A retrospective
article on the Beirut
bombing in 1983:
the first suicide
terrorist attack
against the United
States. To read the
full article go to:
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/m
east/10/21/lebanon.anniv.ap/
Question of the
media here: Was
this accurate with
the "first
encounter?"
Not true, but
implications of the
headline? Effect(s)?
An interactive
understanding of
culture: recall this
figure from earlier
in the quarter
It illustrates a basic
assumption in
contemporary cultural
analysis, which posits
that cultural factors
never "act alone": they
interact with
economic, political,
social, historical and
other forces to
produce specific
outcomes in specific
places and times
Cultural
forces
Cultural
forces
Economic
forces
Economic
forces
Political
forces
Political
forces
Institutional factorsInstitutional factors
Transnational
factors
Transnational
factors
"Outcome"
"Outcome"
Historical
forces
Historical
forces
Understanding the Role of Culture & Terrorism:
An Interactive Explanatory Model
12
National Security Challenges Result: The "Geography" of Terrorism
Regional Stability: Afghanistan's Humanitarian Crisis in The Long War
13
Difficulties of Historical & Cultural
Barriers ­ Tribal, Clan, & Familial
The 1893 Durand Line Is
the Source of a
Continuing Border
Dispute Between
Afghanistan and
Pakistan
Political Violence, Human Rights, & Genocide
14
Horn of Africa Difficulties?