1 Why Revolutions & Political Violence Occur ­ Is There a Link & Logic to Terrorism? MU MVZ 203 / 448 Spring 2010 Sonoma State University Dave McCuan Theories..... * Why a Revolution happens in one place and not another is the critical issue. * For MVZ 203 / 448, our task is: Why do some individuals turn to terrorism, but most individuals do not? How do we understand this phenomenom? Is it new? Different? The same as it ever was? * There are three general theories that explain why revolutions happen. * The theories tend to overlap and include the other, and in essence it depends more on where the emphasis is put. 2 Three General Theories... * 1. Ideological/Nationalist * 2. Behaviorialism/Rational Choice * 3. Structuralist Ideological * Ideological can be divided into two sub sections and one sub-sub section: ­ a) nationalism ­ b) justice, and ­ C) religious/political * a) Nationalism is the reason that underlies many of the revolutions in Africa post W.W.II. Most were in response to colonialism. 3 Ideology * The attraction of nationalism as an ideology was widespread and an obvious route to self- empowerment. * Poverty alongside the knowledge or sense that there was no access to social mobility -- unless you were European. ­ According to the colonized, all Europeans were wealthy . Ideology * The belief was that if the Europeans left, they would leave their wealth behind and the poor would then have enough. * European educational institutes taught European history including how Europeans threw off their own dictatorships (monarchies) to be free and equal, and to live with the dignity that accompanies a democracy. 4 Nationalist Revolutions * Hence, European history and culture became the "toolbox" from which the colonized extracted what they needed: civil rights, democracy, sovereignty, and nationalism. * Nationalist revolutions were the easiest ­ and most successful type of revolution to wage: it made so much sense that it is easy to persuade the masses to support the goals of independence. Nationalist Revolutions * There is no counterrevolution: once the European colonial administration is dismantled, colonial administrators leave. * Other countries did not tend to invade because of the strength of a nationalist revolution. * By definition, it is not a threat to other states. 5 Nationalist Goals are Undisputed: The Logic is Clear * The national revolutionary group does not have to invent a different economic system -- nor set out to destroy a middle and upper class ­ the class element tends to be less divisive. * A nationalist revolution has as its goal a Western nation/state; that is, one that is developed, egalitarian, sovereign. * Generally however, the achievement of this for most post colonial states has been almost totally out of reach. Justice as a Centerpiece... * What underlies nationalism is an idea of the status quo not being just or fair. * Philosophers have suggested that humanity is fundamentally a meaning-shaping species. ­ Implicit is the issue of morality..we are "moralizing creatures:" what's right, what's wrong, what's good and what's evil. * Diaries and autobiographies of guerilla fighters show that the majority were motivated by justice. 6 Injustice Sustaining Revolutions.. * Latin America had the highest division of wealth in the world, where less than 10% of the population own 70% of the country's wealth. * The sense of injustice in this pattern of distribution was recognized by the majority: ­ many supported "movements" which emerged in their countries. ­ It is the idea of justice that sustained the "guerilla fighter" when conditions worsened. Behavioralism * Behavioralism is a sub-field of psychology that tried to give a rational explanation for human behavior. * Theorist Ted Gurr, in Why Men Rebel, suggested that people respond aggressively when they feel that they are denied something that they are promised or that they feel entitled to. 7 Relative Deprivation * This is called `relative deprivation' not absolute deprivation... because it's relative to what one thinks one should have. * Deprivation is contextual: ­ While the aggression may be initially focused, in a situation of systemic inequality, it can spiral into broad based revolution which (attempts to) overthrow the status quo. Relative Deprivation & Economics * Relative deprivation theory was enhanced by a study which plotted revolutions in relation to the economy. * Studies have shown that revolutions occurred when after prolonged periods of strong economic growth and social development, a period of sharp reversal or downturns followed. * Often, hard- won ground gained during the periods of growth are drastically diminished. 8 Rational Choice Theory, Behavior (RCB): The Logic of Terrorism * According to rational choice theorist, Martha Crenshaw, `terrorism can be understood as an expression of political strategy." * Terrorism follows logical processes that can be explained.. ­ That is terrorist behavior ­ the resort to violence ­ is a willful choice made by an organization for political and strategic reasons, rather than the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors. The Logic of Terrorism Through RCB * Terrorism displays a "collective rationality." * The radical group/political organization is the central actor in the "terrorist drama," and possesses collective preferences or values. * Terrorism is the course of action selected from a range of other (perceived) alternatives. * According to Crenshaw, regular decision-making procedures are employed to make an intentional choice in conscious anticipation of the consequences. 9 Strategic Choices * Organizations reach collective judgments about the relative effectiveness of different strategies of opposition, on the basis of abstract strategic conceptions derived from ideological assumptions. ­ Social learning theories come into play here. * Issue of "free-riding" have made the benefits of terrorism more psychological when looking at traditional rational choice analysis. ­ Strategic analysis shows that people can be collectively rational ­ realizing that size and cohesion are important as are the implications of free-riding. Collective Rational Strategic Choice * Advantages of "collective rational strategic choice" theory: ­ A standard can be created from which deviations can be measured, I.e. for research/intelligence purposes. ­ Although miscalculations and imperfect knowledge are inevitable, it is useful to perceive terror groups as having a clear strategy ­ Issue of "limited rationality." ­ Wide range of terrorist activity cannot be dismissed as "irrational" pathological, unreasonable, inexplicable: not necessarily an aberration, but a response to circumstances ­moral inhibitions are overcome. 10 Terrorism as a Choice * Terrorist claim that there is no other choice but violence/terror. * In several cases, terror followed the failure of other methods: ­ E.g. In the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, terror followed the failure of Arab efforts at conventional warfare against Israel. ­ Non-state or sub-state users of terror are constrained in their options by a) the lack of mass support and b) superior power aligned against them. Terror as a Sign of Weakness * Small organizations resort to violence to compensate for their lack in numbers; the imbalance between the resources mobilized and the power of the regime is a decisive consideration in decision making. * Terrorism is often perceived as the weapon of the weak, but is actually the explanation for weakness: why does an organization lack the potential to attract a large support base (to change government policy or overthrow it)? ­ Incompatibility of preferences; extreme political/religious/ideological position: e.g. Italians did not support aims of neo-fascist groups in the late 1960s: groups such as the ETA in Spain or the Provisional Irish Republican Party (PIRA) appeals exclusively to ethnic, religious or other minorities ­ hence fixed and limited boundaries. 11 Terror as a Strategy of the Weak * Failure to mobilize support is another reason that terror is utilized: ­ Resources are limited, organizational work is difficult and slow, and rewards are not immediate. * In an authoritarian state, the problem is worsened. * Oftentimes when the use of violence is combined with nonviolent organizing strategies, the latter suffers the consequences. For example many groups have split as a result of the tensions incurred between wanting to use violence ­ Red Brigades, and wanting to maintain a peaceful organizational efforts ­ left-wing Italian organizations. The IRA and Sinn Fein is another example. Terror as a Tool of the Weak * The weakness of terror groups is also central to repressive regimes. * People may not support a groups because of fear of countermeasures/revolution: hence groups will misperceive support. * Time constraints lend themselves to the decision to use terror. 12 Advantages of Terror * Terrorism can put the issue of political change on the public agenda: `resistance' is put on the public's mind by attracting attention. * Terrorism can (be intended to) create revolutionary conditions; it can prepare the ground for mass revolt by undermining the government's authority and demoralizing major institutions ­ courts, police, military. * By spreading insecurity, the regime may be pressured into making concessions Hostage Taking as a Bargaining Tool * Terrorists take hostages because a government's strength and resources are not an immediate advantage. * Kidnappings, hijackings and barricade-type seizures of embassies or public buildings are attempts to manipulate a government's political decision. * Strategic analysis of bargaining terrorism assumes that the terrorists seek the concessions they demand: it does not allow for the possibility of deception or hostage taking as an end it itself (because of the publicity benefits). * HT is a form of blackmail or extortion; hostages are seized to affect a government's choices. 13 Paradoxes of Hostage Taking * The threat to kill hostages must be credible, but control over the situation can only be maintained as long as the hostages are alive. * One strategy is to make the threat sequential ­ that is by killing one hostage at a time: this shows the terrorists' commitment to carrying out the threat. * Barricading is another terrorist strategy: when they are trapped with their hostages, it's more difficult to back down: the government expects desperate behavior because the losses are greater for the terrorist. Cost-Benefits of Bargaining * Terrorists try to make their demands legitimate by asking for food to be distributed to the poor: rewarding compliance is not easy to reconcile with making threats credible. * If terrorists use publicity to emphasize their threat to kill hostages, they also increase the costs of compliance for the government. * Prolonging the hostage crisis increases the costs to both sides: Bargaining depends on the existence of a common in a common interest between two parties ­ bargaining theories assume that preferences of each side remain stable during negotiations. 14 Changing Preferences, Breaking the Stalemate * Often the nature and intensity of preferences may change throughout the incidence: embarrassment over the Iran-Contra scandal may have decreased the US's interest in ensuring the release of hostages in Lebanon. * Bargaining is not useful if a government is willing to accept the maximum cost rather than concede: I.e. Tupacamaru in Uruguay in late 1970s.: Hostage Taking at Entebbe, Uganda of Israelis by the PLO, etc. * The government's options are not restricted to resistance or compliance; armed rescue attempts break the stalemate. * Terrorists may also provoke military intervention. Structuralist Arguments * Structural explanations include how colonialism and the violence that emerges in response to it, is part of the structure of society -- as is the status quo of repression, vast inequalities, and the culture of poverty. * Structuralist explanations tend to focus on historical explanations for why revolutionary/terrorist tendencies exist. 15 Structural Arguments * Society is structured in such a way to benefit only a small sector of the population -- society thus inherently creates the seeds of its own destruction. * Society (as it stands) creates no avenues for political expression. * Expression is ultimately gotten through alternative and more violent means. In this way, poor countries tend to be perceived as more prone to revolutionary activity. Structuralist Economic Arguments * Structuralists will tend to focus on economic characteristics of a country ­ and international system: ­ world systems theory, imperialism, neo-colonialism, proxy powers, I.e. how Israel is perceived by domestic and international terror organizations. * The structuralist argument alongside behavioralist explanations are used most of the time (when ideology and nationality are not central) -- particularly presently.