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Complex Social Networks:
The Case of Jihadi Global Networks &
The Willingness To Use Terrorism
After 9/11
MU MVZ 203 / 448
Spring 2010
Sonoma State University
Dave McCuan
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Elements of the New Terrorism
BG Howard's model - "8 Ways Terrorism Has Changed After 9/11"
1. America is at risk on the homeland front
2. Terrorists are more violent ­ different political aims
3. Terrorists have global reach and are transnational non-state actors
­ rise of Internet & enhanced communication networks
4. Terrorists are better financed ­ zakat, charity orgs., wealthy donors
5. Terrorists are better trained in tradecraft, AW, IW (info. warfare)
6. Terrorist cells are more difficult to penetrate (esp. AQ)
7. Terrorists have access to more lethal weapons (Soviets, bio/nukes)
8. Success and/or failure are difficult to measure ­ no clear outcome &
no clear end or cessation of hostilities
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Elements of the New Terrorism
* Global in scope and strategic objectives
* Generational in scope; epic struggle, David vs. Goliath
- Bin Laden as Robin Hood
* "The number of the brothers is large . . . I do not know everyone who
is with us in this base or this organization."
­ Bin Laden as Pied Piper., with a constant call to jihad as the duty
of every good Muslim
* Educated members as martyrs in AQ; longer planning cycles (9/11
hijackers arriving in U.S. as early as 1994)
* Evolution into a political social movement, a global insurgency
against Western-oriented globalization
* Afghanistan and Iraq offering new locations for Jihad, indoctrination,
tactical training, network formation
Elements of the New Terrorism
* Increasing number and lethality of attacks
* Attacks are carried out not by AQ or some other centralized group,
but by affiliates and wanna-bes
* Use of children and female suicide bombers by terrorist
organizations
* Info Ops ­ role of technology
­ From DVDs and web videos to Al Jazeera
­ Availability of info on government security, CT efforts
* EW / IW ­ another role of technology & potential for attacks
* Taking instruments from our daily life--the backpack, the car, the
shoe, the cell phone--and turning them into weapons. Goal damage
the trust necessary for a successful open society
* Shifting from small groups to motivated and resourceful individuals
(Madrid, London)
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Al Qaeda is an increasingly decentralized organization,
constantly evolving, and employs a "virtual network"
concept learned from American right-wing extremists,
which makes it harder to detect and destroy.
Willingness to adapt its mission enables it to forge broad
alliances with other terrorist organizations and attract new
recruits (including women).
Ability to secure coordination with other like-minded groups
(like Hezbollah) and its links with organized crime (a
crime boss in India gave $100,000 to Mohammad Atta,
the 9/11 hijack leader) underscore the advanced stages
of organization (professionals sharing ideas, crosstraining,
resources, joint planning, etc.) that al Qaeda has
achieved.
A "Protean Enemy"
Stern, 2003
* Netwar: Information-related conflict at a grand level
between nations or societies.
* It means trying to disrupt or damage what a target
population knows or thinks it knows about itself and the
world around it.
* A netwar may focus on public or elite opinion, or both.
* It may involve diplomacy, propaganda and psychological
campaigns, political and cultural subversion, deception of
or interference with local media, infiltration of computer
networks and databases, and efforts to promote dissident
or opposition movements across computer networks.
- John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 1993; 2001.
Netwar: A Modern Form of Asymmetric
Warfare
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Networked Terrorism
* Social interactions
* Affiliation networks
Ties developed at events or activities, like sporting events, clubs, or
religious meetings
* Communities of Identity
­ Communities of locality
* District or geographic region in which people live, interact, or under which they
are governed
* Examples: neighborhood, village, city, town or province
­ Communities of interest
* Communities formed around a common interest or shared experience
* Examples: prisoners or inmates, members of the military, scientists, sports
enthusiasts, and hobbyists comprise communities of interest.
Networked Terrorism
Three important concepts in social network analysis (SNA): diversity,
redundancy, and adaptability
* Diversity of identity = individuals often have multiple identities: a
familial identity, an employment identity, a religious identity, an
academic identity, etc.
* Redundancy = individuals sharing multiple identities across
networks (e.g., two individuals attending the same church,
graduating from the same university, and working in the same office
building).
­ Multiple shared identities (location, religion, education, and
employment) means that some links between sets of individuals may be
disproportionately strong.
* Adaptability = relationships change over time - a social network
may evolve as a person's interests change, he moves to another
community, or his position within that community shifts.
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Terrorist Network Structures
Source: Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.),
November 2001
Source: On Distributed Communications: Introduction to Distributed Communications Networks, Paul Baran, August
1964
Terrorist Network Structures
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Global Terrorism
Networks
Interconnected terrorist
groups, criminal
organizations,
individuals, etc. around
the world.
Global Terrorism Networks
Interconnected terrorist
groups, criminal
organizations, individuals,
etc. around the world.
Shared strategies
Sharing tactics, training
Cross-fertilization, interorganizational
learning
Shared profits from
trafficking in drugs, arms,
other contraband
Increasingly connected
via technologies/Internet
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Shared Similarities of Strategy,
Training, & Tactics
* Afghanistan
* Algeria
* Bosnia
* Chechnya
* Colombia
* Egypt
* Indonesia
* Japan
* Kashmir
* Lebanon
* Libya
Establish training camps ­ Developing the will to kill and the skill to kill
* Operational space: Geographic isolation
* Teachers: Experts in relevant knowledge, e.g., military combat experience
* Committed learners: Careful recruitment, cultivation
* Time, money, & basic necessities: Handled for individuals
* Northern Ireland
* Peru
* The Philippines
* Somalia
* Spain
* Sri Lanka
* Sudan
* Syria
* Turkey
* United States
* Uzbekistan
Global Salafi
Network
Interconnected by
common ideology (Militant
Islam revivalist
movement), with strong
bonds formed through
fighting together, family,
etc.
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Terrorist Networks
Even though it's a decentralized network, there are still critical
functions that enable the network to operate
* Critical functionary roles ­ can become a hub of multiple networks
­ Weapons procurement; logisticians
­ Financier (funder or banker) (particularly in Halawa system)
­ Document forgerer
­ Human traffickers
* Support individuals (trusted contacts) can and sometimes do
support multiple networks; can provide supplies/facilitate trafficking
of weapons & funds to multiple networks
* Example: 60% of day spent moving legitimate charity money
around; 20% of day on Hamas transactions, other activity on side
* Some may get profit for doing these support/function roles
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Different members
of the network
play support and
action roles
* Qin. et al, 2005:
­ Information collected on social relations between members of
Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ) network from multiple sources (e.g.
reports of court proceedings, mainstream media publications)
­ Applied social network analysis as well as Web Structural Data
Mining to this network
­ Authority Derivation Graph (ADG) captures (directed) lines of
authority in the network
Network Analysis & Jihadists
Terrorists with top centrality
ranks in each clump
1-hop network of 9/11 attack ADG of GSJ network
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Networked Terrorism
Implications:
* We tend to target operational (attack/combat) cells and
overlook support cells that disseminate propaganda,
recruit members, procure supplies, maintain transport,
forge false and adapted identities, facilitate travel, and
organize safe houses.
* For example, operating through front, cover, and
sympathetic organizations, Al Qaeda and its associate
groups established charities, human rights groups,
humanitarian organizations, community centers, and
religious associations to raise funds and recruit youth.
(Gunaratna)
Table 3: Networks to Map
Web sites. Videos and encrypted disks delivered by courier. Travel
records. Human intelligence: observation of meetings and
attendance at common events.
4. Strategy &
Goals
Bank account and money transfer records. Pattern and location of
credit card use. Prior court records. Human intelligence:
observation of visits to alternate banking resources such as
Hawala.
3. Money &
Resources
Logs and records of phone calls, electronic mail, chat rooms,
instant messages, Web site visits. Travel records. Human
intelligence: observation of meetings and attendance at common
events.
2. Task
Prior contacts in family, neighborhood, school, military, club or
organization. Public and court records. Data may only be available
in suspect's native country.
1. Trust
Data Sources
Relationship/
Network
Krebs, 2002 - http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_4/krebs
Networks to Map
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* Learning Organizations = committed to capturing
knowledge, analyzing it, forming new doctrine and tactics
which are informed by lessons from the past
­ Learn from each other
­ Learn from trial and error (IRA example)
­ Media showcasing `best practices' to others
­ Managing public image (PR)
(becoming more sophisticated)
* Emerging professional networks in the terrorist world
Knowledge Transfer & Terrorist Networks
Knowledge Transfer & Terrorist Networks, cont'd
The network challenge
* "As far back as 1968 the PLO . . . had welcomed terrorists
from around the world to their guerilla camps in Jordan for
training, indoctrination, and the general building of
transnational revolutionary bridges. In this respect, the
Palestinians pioneered the `networking' dimension of
international terrorism still in evidence among many groups
today."
Bruce Hoffman, 1997, p. 82
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The network challenge
* "Strategic partnerships" between Al Qaeda and groups
like Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiya, HT, IMU, and MILF, as
well as drug cartels in Latin America and other criminal
organizations
* For example, "Hezbollah . . . trained Al Qaeda fighters in
Sudan, Lebanon, Iran . . ." (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 196)
(why would Shiite Muslims work so closely with Sunni Muslims?)
Knowledge Transfer & Terrorist Networks, cont'd
Overall CT challenge: How to fight a network of networks
Specific challenges include:
* Identifying network members, especially when membership is
hidden until demonstrated by overt behavior
* Determining network structure, leadership/decision-making
cells
* Intelligence gathering/Infiltrating the network
* Defending against an attack from unknown network members
Challenges of Terror Networks
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Recall the Twelve Mechanisms of
Radicalization Among Terrorists
* Ind'l Level:
­ Personal Grievance;
­ Group Grievance;
­ Personal Ties;
­ Slippery Slope;
* Group Level:
­ Extreme shift in like-minded
group;
­ Dynamic shifts of isolation
and/or threat;
* Group Level, cont;d:
­ Intra-group competition;
­ Inter-group competition;
­ Condensation / consolidation
from a larger movement;
* Mass Level:
­ Hate movement(s);
­ Martyrdom movment(s);
­ Jujitsu politics shift
(management of perception
& strategies of violence /
non-violence, & includes
suicide bombing rise)