






Part I: Concepts of Global Civil Society







Chapter 1

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN AN ERA OF REGRESSIVE GLOBALISATION

Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier and Marlies Glasius

The first few months of 2003 witnessed a global popular mobilisation on a scale unprecedented in history. On 15 February 2003, some 11 million people demonstrated in approximately 800 cities all over the world (see Map 1.2). A new generation was politicised with young people walking out of school to demonstrate against the war in Iraq. The *New York Times* was moved to describe global civil society as the 'second superpower' (Tyler 2003), and the *New Yorker* magazine (2003) wondered if the mass mobilisation of people on that day amounted to the largest one-day protest in history.

Yet despite this energy, the anti-war movement was defeated. Within a few weeks, the United States and Britain had gone to war with Iraq. The United Nations was sidelined and all major international institutions were deeply divided. In particular, the European Union has been immobilised by divisions of opinion.

A crisis represents a danger and an opportunity. On the one hand, we face the real possibility of the unravelling of the global institutional framework, painfully built up over the last 50 years, but especially in the last decade. This applies both to the framework of economic institutions that establish rules about trade and investment and to the framework of international law, justice, and human rights. Most troubling is that the prohibition against starting wars, first codified in the Kellogg-Briand pact in 1928 and later fortified by the decisions of the Nuremberg court and by the United Nations Charter, has been seriously undermined. This global institutional framework made possible the growth of global civil society—and global civil society helped constitute global institutions. This synergetic relation is now being challenged by what Martin Shaw in Chapter 2 of this Yearbook calls 'regressive globalism', and which we understand as a form of displaced, latter-day particularist (quasi-imperial, nationalist or fundamentalist) thinking in the context of global capitalism.


On the other hand, the mobilisation of global civil society in the first few months of 2003 was by no means an isolated event that could be easily reversed


or neutralised. As we show in this chapter, the 1990s were a period of consolidation of global civil society, a period in which a solid infrastructure was established, based on a broad shift in cultural and social values, especially in developed market economies. Indeed, there are signs that the dramatic development of social forums in the early 2000s, the anti-war movement, and other developments may not only indicate continued expansion of global civil society but may also suggest an evolution in institutional terms.

Of course, we do not know how the present crisis of global governance will be resolved. However, we argue in this chapter that it is possible to outline different directions of change, possible scenarios, which depend both on the positions and strategies of global civil society and on the responses of states and global institutions such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organisation. In order to elaborate this argument, we start with some conceptual themes that run through many of the chapters in this Yearbook. They concern how we think about the complex and conflictual nature of global civil society and its relation to globalisation. We then summarise, in more detail than in previous Yearbooks, what we have learned from our data collection effort that accompanies the production of the Yearbooks and is summarised in our records section. The next section deals with the recent popular mobilisation, the rise of social forums and the anti-war movement. And in the final section, we draw some conclusions and set out what this analysis might imply for possible future directions of change.

Conceptual Themes

In the first edition of this Yearbook, published just days before the tragic events of 11 September 2001, we introduced the concept of global civil society to our readers as a useful and ultimately normative concept for depicting what we saw as an emerging reality of global civic action and connectedness. In our initial understanding, the growing transnational character of civil society seemed to offer a positive





response, even counterweight, to narrow notions that linked globalisation to economic processes alone; and the concept also seemed to suggest greater participation and involvement of the world's citizens in shaping a common future. At the same time, we argued, the very notion of a global civil society runs up against the conventional political discourse of a world seemingly dominated by nation-states, and is at odds with the conceptual frameworks and methodological toolboxes of the social sciences (see Chapters 2 and 3).

Aware of the terminological tangle that had developed around the concept of global civil society, we offered a working definition of it as the sphere of ideas, values, organisations, networks, and individuals located primarily outside the institutional complexes of family, market, and state, and beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies. At first sight, this working definition might appear rather abstract—or, rather, 'usefully abstract', as we would like to think—but what it suggests is ultimately straightforward: global civil society is about people, organisations, and the values and ideas they represent, but with the major difference that these are, at least in part, located in some transnational arena and not bound or limited by nation-states or local societies.

We also emphasised the normative implications of the concept. Global civil society is also about the meaning and practice of human equality in an increasingly unjust world, and about the complex debate on how individual human beings can develop their own capabilities to meet their needs. It is also about searching for, and developing, new forms of civic participation and involvement in a globalising world; it is about finding and giving 'voice' to those affected by old, new, and emerging inequities in the broadest sense, and providing a political and social platform for such voices to be heard. Global civil society is about civic engagement and civic-mindedness in a transnational, potentially global sphere; it is about private action for public benefit however defined. It is an arena for people to express different views, values, and interests, and to agree or disagree about them.

Methodological nationalism


An important theme of this Yearbook is 'methodological nationalism', a term introduced independently by Shaw (2000), Scholte (1999), and Beck (2000). We often read, for example, that Germany and France were against waging war on Iraq, while the British and the Americans were in favour. It is in this reified way that the media explain world politics to us, and it is in this way that we often talk amongst ourselves, wondering whether 'the Italians'


might change sides, and what 'Turkey' will do. It seems so natural to equate government positions with the entire country so that, irrespective of the millions of people marching against the war in Britain or Italy, we continued to speak of 'the British' and 'the Italians' on the basis of their government's position. It is hard to even notice that there is something absurd in the complaints of American academics and activists against American (rather than US government) imperialism (see, for instance, Schiller 1998; Mokhiber and Weissman, 2001).

We are conditioned to believe that nations take stands in international politics en bloc, that governments represent the views of the nation, and that what other people in that country might think is domestic politics and irrelevant at the international level. It is conceivable to us that the anti-war mood in Britain might bring down Tony Blair, but we still find it much more difficult to imagine that it might change the dynamics of international decision-making. In our first yearbook, and in reference to Shaw (2000) and Beck (2000), we termed as *methodological nationalism*¹ this deeply entrenched world view that affects everyday language, journalism, and the media as much as it does the social sciences and policy analysis. In this Yearbook, we further refine the concept in essays by Shaw and Beck. Shaw, who compares the old way of doing social science to 'stamp-collecting', pleads for a deep inter-

We are conditioned to believe that nations take stands in international politics en bloc, that governments represent the views of the nation, and that what other people in that country might think is domestic politics

¹ This nationalism is not a fanatical insistence on the superiority of one nation over another; it means to consider nation-states as the natural and only way to divide up the world. As the 'prime divisor', it takes precedence over all other possible categorisations.





disciplinarity, a global social science in which disciplines are just building blocks. Beck gives us the example of social inequality to show that the myopia of methodological nationalism is not just unhelpful, but ends up being immoral because we can see only small inequalities within nation-states and are blind to global inequalities. Beck insists on a 'methodological cosmopolitanism' to underpin new social science research and teaching.

This is not just an academic discussion but also a matter of great political and practical importance. How scientists do research, what kind of research gets funded, how university professors and secondary-school teachers teach, and what textbooks they use ends up determining how decision-makers, journalists, activists, ordinary people see the world and how they think. It is for this reason that we find it so very difficult to shake the habit of thinking about states as if they were single actors: this is how we have been brought up and taught. The direction of social science therefore determines whether present and future generations will have an analytical toolkit that is appropriate for their decision-making in the twenty-first century context. This is important for policy-makers at all levels, but above all for transnational activists, whose goals and methods simply disappear from view in the methodological nationalist framework.

In producing the Yearbook, our goal is to engage in the 'global social science' or 'methodological cosmopolitanism' Shaw and Beck call for. Fortunately, we are not alone in this and, as Shaw acknowledges, a transformation of the social sciences is under way. In contrast to standard globalisation research, we emphasise the importance of individual agency in globalisation, and focus on what could be described as 'globalisation from below'. Specifically, the Global Civil Society Yearbooks try to break through conventional social science boundaries by:

- *challenging methodological nationalism.* Both in our choice of subject matter and in our methodology, we try to delineate and illuminate what is both non-governmental and transnational;

- *overcoming disciplinary fragmentation.* Because there is no specific discipline devoted to civil society, nor is any discipline the 'most natural' or dominant one, we experiment with a mix of lenses and methodologies; and
- *building bridges between research, policy, and practice.* Our aim is to create a space for self-reflection and debate about the role of global civil society for practitioners, activists, policy-makers, and researchers alike.

Positions revisited: regressive globalism


While the idea of a global civil society still seems to us as relevant as ever, it is also clear that the global political environment has changed. An important new concept in this respect, proposed by Shaw in Chapter 2, is that of *regressive globalism*. In our first

'Regressive globalisers' are individuals, groups, firms, or governments that favour globalisation only when it is in their particular interest and irrespective of any negative consequences for others

Yearbook, we categorised positions on globalisation in terms of Supporters, Reformers, Alternatives, and Rejectionists—a categorisation close to that of Held et al. (1999: 10). These positions reflect the preferences of actors and organisations in global civil society as well as those of political parties, governments, and individuals. In the course of our research, it has become clear that there are very few 'out and out' Supporters, that is to say, groups or individuals who favour all forms of global connectedness (trade, finance, migration, law, and politics); there are also very few 'out and out'

Rejectionists, i.e. people who oppose all forms of connectedness and seek to return to some form of nation-state nirvana however defined.

Rather, the dominant responses to globalisation are mixed. We have therefore revisited the two other positions, and added a new one: *regressive globalisers*. These are individuals, groups, firms, or even governments that favour globalisation when it is in their particular interest and irrespective of any negative consequences for others. Regressive globalisers see the world as a zero-sum game, in which they seek to maximise the benefit of the few, which they represent, at the expense of the welfare of the many, about which they are indifferent at best. What we call Reformers or redistributive








Table 1.1: Positions on globalisation revisited

Globalisation of:	Supporters	Regressives	Reformers	Rejectionists
Economy	<i>For:</i> As part of economic liberalism. E.g. <i>The Economist</i> ; Thomas Friedman	<i>Mixed:</i> If beneficial to own country or group and leading stakeholders. E.g. French farmers; British fuel protest; US Administration	<i>Mixed:</i> If leading to greater social equity. E.g. ATTAC; Fair trade cooperatives; Novib; Jubilee 2000	<i>Against:</i> Greater protection of national economies needed. E.g. 50 Years is Enough; Walden Bello; Ralph Nader
Technology	<i>For:</i> As part of open competition for technological innovation. E.g. gene and plant technologists	<i>Mixed:</i> For in economic terms and for military and security purposes, against for social or environmental purposes. E.g. private sector scientists and business associations	<i>Mixed:</i> If beneficial to broader groups and the marginalised. E.g. Treatment Action Campaign; Copyleft	<i>Against:</i> Technology threatens local communities and traditional ways of life. E.g. Friends of the Earth; Aids sceptics; Vandana Shiva
Law	<i>For:</i> With emphasis on international commercial law and human rights legislation; role for International Criminal Court	<i>Against:</i> For if facilitating private investment and trade but generally against. Emphasis on strengthening national laws on property rights and domestic democracy; no role for International Criminal Court. E.g. anti-Kyoto lobby	<i>For:</i> Building global rule of law not solely dependent on sovereign states. Pronounced role for International Criminal Court. E.g. Amnesty; Women's Caucus for Gender Justice	<i>Against:</i> Undermines national sovereignty and democracy. E.g. Euro-sceptics (left & right); anti-humanitarian intervention(left & right) such as Noam Chomsky, Samuel Huntington
People	<i>For:</i> Open border policy, e.g., <i>The Economist</i>	<i>Mixed:</i> For immigration for economic and domestic needs but against for asylum seekers or people of other cultures and ethnicities	<i>For:</i> Open policy. E.g., Genoa Social Forum; European Council on Refugees and Exiles	<i>Against:</i> Closed border policy. E.g. European anti-immigrant parties; Australian government





globalisers are groups or individuals who favour 'civilising' or 'humanising' globalisation; in other words, Reformers favour those dimensions of globalisation that benefit the many.

As can be seen from Table 1.1, the Regressive globalisers occupy a somewhat contradictory policy position between Supporters and Rejectionists. In cases where Supporters are generally for the globalisation of the economy, technology, law, and people movements, and Rejectionists against, the Regressive globalisers come out with mixed messages or conditional policy statements. They are for globalisation if it strengthens their national positions and/or if it is likely to benefit key political stakeholders, electoral groups, or particular communities. If, however, globalisation processes could potentially weaken stakeholder institutions and in particular national sovereignty, or otherwise threaten the interests of powerful lobby groups or ethnic or religious groups, Regressive globalisers become very similar to Rejectionists.

Regressive globalisation has become much more visible since 11 September and this is why the environment for global civil society has become so much more inhospitable. It has in fact become the new doctrine of a unilateralist Bush White House, a policy position which both Reformers and Supporters regard as a nineteenth-century reaction to twenty-first century problems. The re-emergence of nation-state thinking with pro-market economic policies and minimalist government leads to greater emphasis on international security concerns and assertiveness about domestic values. One important area in which this new policy manifests itself is that of biological and chemical weapons, discussed in Chapter 5. On the one hand, the Bush Administration raises the spectre of biological and chemical terrorism as a justification for increased defence spending and 'pre-emptive strikes', on the other hand it has rejected a new protocol to improve multilateral monitoring of biological weapons capacities.

Regressive globalism also characterises the religious and nationalist groups that are described in Chapter 7. These groups favour nation-state thinking; yet they organise transnationally and indeed are

growing both as a reaction to the insecurities generated by globalisation and because they are able to mobilise by making use of the new global media and funding from Diaspora groups. Regressive globalists tend also to promote masculine, aggressive cultures where women have a traditional and passive role to play. In this respect, they also present new challenges for the movement that combats violence against women, described in chapter 6.

At the same time, however, the growth of social forums and the anti-war movement represents what social movements theorists call a 'political opportunity structure' (see McAdam 1996; Diani and McAdam, 2003)—a framework where individuals can participate and engage in global debates. In particular, as we argue, the social forums have become the institutionalisation of the 'newest social movements', from the so-called anti-capitalist


Regressive globalisers favour globalisation only if it strengthens their national positions, and if it is likely to benefit key political stakeholders, electoral groups, or particular communities

movement to environmental concerns and Internet-based forms of activism. The activists who are engaged in these new movements are, in fact, divided between Rejectionists and Reformers. In the anti-war movement, for example, there are those who oppose all forms of state-based humanitarian engagement, believing that this a legitimisation for imperialism. And in the economic field, there are those who oppose free trade and free capital movements. There are also of course those who want to strengthen the capabilities of multilateral institutions to deal

with humanitarian emergencies and to contribute to global justice. A big concern in this Yearbook, spelled out in Chapter 4 on trade by Desai and Said, is that the former group, the Rejectionists, might combine with the Regressives to squeeze out the possibilities for a more humane form of globalisation.

Manifestations of global civil society

One of the main characteristics of global civil society, celebrated by some, deplored by others, is its multi-faceted nature. We believe it is helpful to think about global civil society not just in terms of the positions it takes but also through the various forms in which it manifests itself. The different manifestations,






Table 1.2: Manifestations of global civil society

Forms	Main actor	Of primary interest to	Example
<i>New Public Management:</i> Civil society organisations as sub-contractors to robust national and IGO policy-making	NGOs and devolved government	Supporters and Reformers	Oxfam, World Vision, Save the Children
<i>Corporatisation:</i> Civil society organisations partnering with companies	NGOs and TNCs	Supporters and Reformers	Nike and GreenPeace; Starbucks and World Wildlife Fund
<i>Social capital or self-organisation:</i> civil society building trust through networking	NGOs and associations; alternatives	Reformers; Rejectionists; Regressives	Community building organisations, faith-based communities
<i>Activism:</i> civil society monitoring and challenging power-holders	Movements, transnational civic networks	Reformers and Rejectionists	Global Witness; Corporate Watch; Social Forums

summarised in Table 1.2, play different roles in the triad of market, governance, and civil society.


The first is the *new public management* manifestation, which is part of the modernisation of welfare states currently under way in most developed market economies, and is, via World Bank, EU, and IMF policy prescriptions, also affecting the rudimentary social welfare systems in developing countries and transition economies. At the international level, new public management is replacing conventional development assistance policies (Deacon, Hulse, and Stubbs 1997; Clark 2003) and seeks to capitalise on what is viewed as the comparative efficiency advantages of non-profit organisations through public-private partnerships, competitive bidding, and contracting under the general heading of privatisation (McLaughlin, Osborne, and Ferlie, 2002).


The main actors, according to this approach, are the professionalised organisational components of global civil society, in other words NGOs and INGOs. Prompted in part by growing doubts about the capacity of the state to cope with its own welfare, developmental, and environmental problems, analysts across the political spectrum have come to see NGOs as strategic components of a middle way between policies that put primacy on 'the market' and those that advocate greater reliance on the state (Giddens 1999). Institutions like the World Bank (Fowler 2000),

the United Nations (UNDP 2002) or the European Union (Commission of the European Community 1997) together with bilateral donors and many developing countries are searching for a balance between state-led and market-led approaches to development, and are allocating more responsibility to INGOs. In fact, as shown below, service provision has been the fastest growing area of INGO activities in the 1990s.

With the rise of new public management, the emphasis on NGOs as service providers and instruments of privatisation casts them at the international level essentially in a subcontracting role. NGOs have become instruments of national and international welfare state reform guided by the simple equation of 'less government = less bureaucracy = more flexibility = greater efficiency' (see Kettle 2000). Hence, this approach is typically associated with the Supporters and Reformers of globalisation.

To some, the public management manifestation is associated with co-optation (Chandhoke 2002). This takes different forms. In some cases, NGOs are artificially created as a fig-leaf for states unable or unwilling to act, especially in failed states. In other cases, NGOs are supported if not created by international institutions, and then hand-picked for consultation rounds to provide a semblance of democratic legitimacy for the institution (K. Anderson 2000).





Increasing and more frequent *corporate* facets are the second manifestation of global civil society. This has to do with the 'corporatisation' of NGOs as well as the expansion of business into local and global civil society. As Perrow (2001; 2002) argues, corporations use extended social responsibility programmes to provide, jointly with non-profits, services previously in the realm of government (e.g. health care, child care, and pensions, but also community services more widely). On the other hand, NGOs 'professionalise'; under pressure from management gurus they increasingly adopt corporate strategies, as well as being increasingly open to partnerships with business. We suggest that the corporatisation of NGOs will gather momentum, encouraged by a resource-poor international community eager to seek new forms of cooperation, particularly in development assistance and capacity building.

Given that over one third of the world's 100 largest 'economies' are transnational corporations (TNCs), there are growing 'points of contact' between global businesses and global civil society organisations, in particular INGOs like Greenpeace, in the World Wildlife Fund, Oxfam, and World Vision—the global brand names of civil society. TNCs and INGOs work together in addressing global problems (e.g., environmental degradation, malnutrition, low skills and education levels) but also many local issues in failed states and areas of civic strife and conflict.


Yet it is not only in the developing world that global business and INGOs are forging partnerships. In some ways as a backlash to, in other ways as an implication of, neo-liberal policies and 'lean states', public opinion in developed market economies is expecting greater corporate responsibility and 'caring' about the societies in which they operate. Increasingly, as Oliviero and Simmons (2002) point out, this goes beyond adherence to principles of corporate governance and some core of conduct; it implies greater emphasis on service delivery to employees and their communities (e.g., educational programs, child care), addressing negative externalities or 'bads' of business operations (e.g., pollution, resource depletion), and public goods (health, sustainability). Willingly or


reluctantly, companies and NGOs team up to divide responsibilities the state is failing to meet. This approach is typically associated with Supporters and Reformers of globalisation.

A third manifestation is *social capital* or self-organisation. Here the emphasis is not so much on management as on building relations of trust and cohesion. The idea is that norms of reciprocity are embodied in transnational networks of civic associations. What is important, according to this approach, is that self-organisation across borders creates social cohesion within transnational communities. In contrast to the basically neo-liberal role NGOs assume in the public management manifestation, they are now linked to the perspective of a 'strong and vibrant civil society characterised by a social infrastructure of dense networks of face-to-face relationships that cross-cut existing social cleavages such as race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and gender that will underpin strong and responsive democratic government' (Edwards, Foley, and Diani 2001:17). Norms of reciprocity, citizenship, and trust are embodied in national and transnational networks of civic associations. Put simply, the essence of this manifestation is: civil society creates social capital, which is good for society and good for economic development.

According to this thinking, NGOs are to create as well as facilitate a sense of trust and social inclusion that is seen as essential for the functioning of modern societies both nationally (e.g. Putnam, 2000; 2002; Anheier and Kendall 2002; Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000; Halpern 1999; Offe and Fuchs 2002) as well as transnationally (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001; see Edwards and Gaventa 2001). The main argument is that participation in voluntary associations, including social movements, creates greater opportunities for repeated 'trust-building' encounters among like-minded individuals, an experience that is subsequently generalised to other situations such as business or politics. Thus, what could be called the neo-Tocquevillian case for NGOs is largely an argument based on the positive and often indirect outcomes of associationalism.

NGOs
'professionalise':
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management gurus
they increasingly
adopt corporate
strategies, as well as
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open to partnerships
with business





The term 'social capital' is associated with the Supporters of globalisation, who see the creation of transnational social capital as good for political stability and international business. But it is also relevant to the Regressives, who create trust and bonding among transnational religious or ethnic groups, what Putzel (1997) has called the 'dark side of social capital'. And it is relevant for Reformers as well. In our first Yearbook, we included a category of 'Alternatives' in addition to the positions of Reformers, Rejectionists, and Supporters of globalisation. What we meant by this were groups of people who choose to organise their own communities and represent alternative ways of living—local barter schemes, for example, or ecologically responsible communities. The category of 'Alternatives' is more appropriately treated as a form of global civil society organisation than a position. Someone who adopts an alternative lifestyle could be a Reformer (ecological experiment), Rejectionist (protecting the local), or Regressive (orthodox religious communities).

The final form is the *activist manifestation*. Here the main actors are social movements, transnational civic networks, and social forums. They are a source of dissent, challenge, and innovation, a countervailing force to government and the corporate sector (see, for instance, Howell and Pearce 2001; Keane 2001). They serve as a social, cultural, and political watchdog, keeping both market and state in check, and they contribute to and reflect the diversity, pluralism, and dynamism of the modern world. This approach includes Rejectionists and Reformers and, in so far as religious and nationalist militant groups are active, Regressives as well.

The first two approaches—new public management and corporatisation—are more top-down and professional. As we shall show, they dominated global civil society during the last decade, and are important in providing the infrastructure for global civil society. The second two approaches—social capital and activism—are more bottom-up and have again become important in recent years. They tend to provide the mobilising impetus and agenda-setting component of global civil society.

The Contours of Global Civil Society: Portrait and Interpretation

In the context of the dramatically changed geopolitical situation and the rise of regressive globalism since the first edition of the Yearbook,


In the activist manifestation of global civil society, social movements, transnational civic networks, and social forums are a source of dissent, challenge, and innovation, a countervailing force to government and the corporate sector


it is important to gain a better understanding of the major contours of global civil society. To this end, we will revisit and expand our initial analysis (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001: 4–12) and look closer into the scale, scope, and changing composition of global civil society over time. We will also examine its relationship to other aspects of the globalisation process, in particular economic globalisation and international law. We will summarise our findings under five headings, following our working definition and the notion that global civil society includes an institutional and organisational infrastructure, values and ideas, and

individuals willing to participate and contribute to it.

The infrastructure of global civil society

The infrastructure of global civil society includes a vast array of NGOs, voluntary associations, non-profit groups, charities, and interest associations, in addition to more informal or less permanent ways of organising such as Diaspora networks, dot.causes, or social forums. INGOs account for a large part of the formal part of that infrastructure. Quantitative information on the scale of INGO operations is still patchy and limited to very basic indicators such as numbers of organisations and fields of activity. The limitations of organisational counts become clear when we put the number of the some 48,000 NGOs that were included in the Union of International Associations database in 2001 (UIA 2002/3: 3) in relation to the UNCTAD (2001) estimates of over 60,000 TNCs for the same year. Although the respective numbers of organisations seem not far apart, measures of economic scale would obviously





dwarf the NGO totals. At the same time, as many have argued, NGO presence, operations, and impact are not primarily about economic measures. Non-economic aspects such as membership base, volunteers, clients served, people mobilised, or indicators of achievements in terms of social and political change would be more in line with the organisational characteristics and *raison d'être* of civil society organisations like NGOs.

Scale. Unfortunately, these data are not available to us at the transnational level in any comprehensive way, and we are limited to examining different facets of the phenomenon. One set of information is provided by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Project (Anheier and Salamon 2003; Salamon and Anheier 1996) that attempted to measure basic economic indicators on the size of international non-profits in a broad cross-section of countries. These data allow us to fathom at least some aspects of the scale of INGO activities, albeit from a country-based perspective. For the 28 countries for which such data are available INGOs amount to 1–2 per cent of total non-profit sector employment, or 134,000 full-time equivalent jobs. They also attracted a larger number of volunteers, who represent another 154,000 jobs on a full-time basis (see Record 21).

For some countries, it is possible to examine the growth for the 1990s. Employment in French INGOs grew by 8 per cent between 1990 and 1995 (Archambault et al. 1999: 89), over 10 per cent in Germany (Priller et al. 1999: 115), by over 30 per cent in the UK (Kendall and Almond 1999: 188) during the same period. Even though the data are limited, the resulting pattern is in line with some of the other evidence we present below: international non-profit activities have expanded significantly and, while they continue to represent only a small portion of national non-profit economies, their share has nonetheless increased.

In terms of revenue structure, the international non-profits, as measured by the Johns Hopkins team, receive 29 per cent of their income through fees and charges, including membership dues, 35 per cent from both national and internal governmental

organisations in the form of grants and reimbursements, and 36 per cent through individual, foundation, or corporate donations. With volunteer input factored in as monetary equivalent, the donation component increases to 58 per cent of total 'revenue', which makes the international non-profit field the most 'voluntaristic and donative' part of the non-profit sector after religious non-profit (73 per cent) and far more than is the case for domestic service-providing non-profits.


This suggests that INGOs benefit more from volunteer commitment and general mobilisation of the population behind particular causes (e.g., human rights, humanitarian assistance, peace and international understanding) than more conventional non-profits in social services, culture and the arts, or housing, which are increasingly financed by the public sector and commercial revenue sources.

The pronounced donation and volunteer element applies also to INGOs of significant size and with complex organisational structures that increasingly span many countries and continents (Anheier and Themudo 2002; Anheier and Katz in this volume). Examples include Amnesty International with more than 1 million members, subscribers, and regular donors in over 140 countries and territories. The Friends of the Earth federation combines about 5,000 local groups and 1 million members (see Map M2

in methodological chapter). The International Union for the Conservation of Nature brings together 735 NGOs, 35 affiliates, 78 states, 112 government agencies, and some 10,000 scientists and experts from 181 countries in a unique worldwide partnership. Much of the international coordinating work involved is done on a volunteer basis.

As Figure 1.1 shows, the share of NGOs in official aid flows has increased significantly since the 1970s. At that time NGO aid as share of all aid flows from OECD countries to developing countries was 11 per cent. Since then the INGO share has doubled, with most of the gain in the 1990s, a period which coincides with the significant expansion of INGO operations more generally. What is more, INGO contributions increased in both relative and absolute

International INGOs benefit more from volunteer commitment and general mobilisation of the population behind particular causes (e.g., human rights, humanitarian assistance, peace and international understanding) than more conventional non-profits







Figure 1.1: Aid from OECD to developing countries and share of NGOs as % of total



terms as official aid flows decreased, as Figure 1.1 illustrates.


The change in the economic weight and political importance of INGOs is highlighted even further when we look at the composition of INGO aid flows, using estimates compiled by Clark (2003: 130). Whereas in the 1980s INGOs increasingly become an additional circuit of official development and humanitarian assistance flows, jumping from 44 per cent to 55 per cent of total aid between 1980 and 1988, the 1990s saw a remarkable reversal: official aid flows declined overall, both directly (bilateral and multilateral) and indirectly via INGOs. In 1990 dollars, official grants to INGOs fell from \$2.4 billion in 1988 to \$1.7 billion in 1999. By contrast, private donations, including individual, foundation, and corporate contributions, more than doubled from \$4.5 billion to \$10.7 billion. These figures underscore the significant expansion of INGOs in the changing development field of the 1990s, and the major private mobilisation effort they represent.

The infrastructure of global civil society is, of course, broader than that of INGOs in development and humanitarian assistance. The most comprehensive data coverage of INGOs is provided by the UIA in Brussels. Indeed, as we stated in the first edition of this Yearbook (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001: 4),

the data indicate a sustained rise in the number of NGOs since the 1970s (see also Anheier and Themudo 2002: 194; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Dispersal. The growth of INGOs and their organisational presence is, of course, not equally spread across the world. Not surprisingly, Europe and North America show the greatest number of INGOs and higher membership densities than other regions of the world (see Map M4 in the methodological chapter). And even though, as we will show, cities in Europe and the United States still serve as the NGO capitals of the world, a long-term diffusion process has decreased the concentration of NGOs so that they are now more evenly distributed around the world than ever before.

There are several ways to illustrate the greater reach of global civil society's infrastructure. Figure 1.2 shows the growth in membership for different world regions. As is to be expected, INGO memberships increased in all regions, but more in some than in others. The highest expansion rates are in central and eastern Europe, including central Asia, followed by East Asia and the Pacific. The growth in central and eastern Europe is clearly linked to the fall of state socialism and the introduction of freedom of association, whereas the growth in Asia is explained by economic expansion and democratic reform in many countries of the region. Figure 1.3 adds a








Figure 1.2: Percentage growth in INGO membership by region, 1990-2000





Source: UIA (1990; 2000)

Figure 1.3: Percentage growth in INGO membership by country income group, 1990-2000



Source: UIA (1990;2000)





different dimension and shows INGO membership growth in relation to economic development. Growth rates throughout the 1990s were higher in middle-income countries (East Asia, central and eastern Europe, parts of Latin America) than in the high-income countries (western Europe, Pacific, and North America). What is more, the expansion rate of INGOs in low-income countries is higher than in richer parts of the world.

Together, these data indicate that the growth of the organisational infrastructure of global civil society does not involve concentration but dispersion, and points to inclusion rather than exclusion. In organisational terms, global civil society today is less a Western-based phenomenon than in the past, and the significant growth rates of recent years enhanced its reach and expansion outside North America and the European Union. In the terms of David Held et al. (1999), the organisational infrastructure of NGOs has attained wider reach (extensity) and higher density (intensity), a finding also supported by Anheier and Katz (Map M4) in the methodological chapter in this volume.

To illustrate the process of dispersion, it is useful to review some basic patterns of NGO locations over time, and to go back briefly to the beginnings of modern NGO development. In 1906, only two of the 169 INGOs had their headquarters outside Europe; by 1938, 36 of the total of 705 INGOs existing at that time were located outside Europe. By 1950, with a significant increase of US-based INGOs and with the establishment of the United Nations, 124 of the 804 existing INGOs were not based in Europe. With the independence movement and the generally favourable economic climate of the 1950s and early 1960s, the number of INGOs increased to 1,768, of which 83 per cent were located in Europe, 10 per cent in the United States, and between 1 per cent and 2 per cent each in Asia, South America, Central America, Africa, Middle East, and Australia (Tew 1963).

By 2001, much of this concentration had given way to a more decentralised pattern around an emerging bipolar structure of INGOs, with two centres: Western Europe and North America (Map M4 in Anheier and Katz). Europe still accounts for the majority of INGO headquarters, followed by the United States, but other regions like Asia and Africa have gained ground, as have seen in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. Nonetheless, among the ten countries hosting the greatest number of intercontinental organisation headquarters in 2001, we find eight


European countries (United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Austria), next to the USA and Canada (UIA 2002/3: Vol. 5: 81).

In terms of cities, we find that by 2001 the traditional role of Paris (729), London (807), Brussels (1,392), Geneva (272), and New York (390) has not been diminished in absolute terms. They are, however, less dominant in relative terms: over ten other cities in four continents have more than 100 INGO headquarters and another 35 on five continents over 50 each.

Organisational links. As we have already pointed out in *Global Civil Society 2001*, the infrastructure of global civil society in terms of INGOs has not only become broader in geographical coverage, it also became much more interconnected throughout the 1990s. In 2001, the UIA reported over 90,000 such links among NGOs and 38,000 between INGOs and international governmental organisations. The average number of links jumped from an average of 6.7 in 1990 to 14.1 in 2000: an increase of 110 per cent. The infrastructure of global civil society has not only become bigger and broader, it has also achieved greater density and connectedness.

While these links measure a range of inter-organisational activities from consultations, joint projects, and financing to publication and outreach campaigns, Figure 1.6 focuses on three critical areas of inter-organisational relations from the perspective of institutional development. In each of three cases—participation in founding or creating an INGO, membership interlock, and joint activities—we see substantial increases in recent years, as indicated by the increased thickness of the arrows linking INGOs to INGOs and IGOs. In all of these areas, INGOs have become more interconnected as well as more connected to international institutions like the United Nations or the World Bank.

Composition. Next to scale and connectedness, field of activity or purpose is another important dimension in describing the infrastructure of global civil society. When looking at the purpose or field in which INGOs operate (Figure 1.5), we find that, among the INGOs listed in 2001, two fields dominate in terms of numbers: economic development and economic interest associations (26.1 per cent) and knowledge-based NGOs in the area of research and science (20.5 per cent). At first, the pronounced presence of these activities and purposes among INGOs seems surprising, yet it is in these fields that







Figure 1.4: Links between international organisations




the need for some form of international cooperation, exchange of information, recognition and standard-setting has long been felt. There are thousands of scholarly associations and learned societies that span the entire range of academic disciplines and field of human learning. Likewise, there is a rich tradition of business and professional organisations reaching across national borders, such as international chambers of commerce, consumer associations, and professional groups in the fields of law, accounting, trade, engineering, transport, civil service, or health care.

Indeed, the earliest available tabulation of INGOS by purpose lists 639 organisations in 1924, with nearly half in either economic interest associations (172) or learned societies and research organisations (238) (Otlet 1924). Only 55 organisations fell into the category 'political', 28 in sports, 25 in religion, and 14 in arts and culture. In other words, the political, humanitarian, moral, or religious value component to INGOS is a more recent phenomenon. Although some of the oldest humanitarian organisations date back

to the nineteenth century, such as the Red Cross or the Anti-Slavery Society, their widespread and prominent presence at a transnational level is a product of the latter part of the twentieth century.

Indeed, as Figure 1.5 shows, today value-based NGOs in the areas of law, policy, and advocacy (12.6 per cent), politics (5.2 per cent), and religion (5.2 per cent) make up the second largest activity component, with a total of 23 per cent of all INGOS. This is followed by a service provisions cluster, in which social services, health, and education together account for 21 per cent of INGO purposes. Smaller fields like culture and the arts (6.6 per cent), the environment (2.9 per cent), and defence and security make up the balance.

Yet next to a greater emphasis on values, the changes in the composition of purposes that took place in the 1990s brought a long-standing yet often overlooked function of INGOS to the forefront: service delivery has become a visible and important part of INGOS. Indeed, the provision of social services as a purpose grew by 79 per cent between 1990 and 2000,







Figure 1.5: Growth in number of INGOs by purpose, 1990-2000



GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN AN ERA OF REGRESSIVE GLOBALISATION Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier and Marlies Glasius

health services by 50 per cent, and education by 24 per cent. This function of INGOs is primarily connected to the public management manifestation of global civil society, which we outlined above.

Although INGOs provide only a partial picture of global civil society, INGO data show that the infrastructure of global civil society has expanded significantly since 1990, in terms of both scale and connectedness. We also saw that the relative focus on these organisations, taken together, shifted more towards value-based activities and service provision. Overall, the expansion of INGOs and the value-activity shift imply both quantitative and qualitative changes in the contour and role of global civil society organisations. Throwing some light on these changes will be the task in the next section, where we examine the relationship between value changes in Western societies from the 1970s onwards, the link to transnationalism, and the rise of civil society in the 1990s.


Values and global civil society

Social, cultural, and political values show significant variation within and across countries and cultures, but the resulting value patterns are relatively stable over

time, and typically change more between than within generations (Inglehart 1990). Shifts in basic value pattern are relatively rare, and if they happen they are full of consequences and carry many implications—from social and economic behaviour to politics and the institutions of society at large. However, one such value shift took place in many OECD countries between 1970 and the late 1980s, as social scientists such as Inglehart and Baker (2000), Abramson and Inglehart (1995), Klingemann and Fuchs (1995), Van Deth, and Scarbrough (1995), and others have shown.

Researchers have used several different labels to describe this value shift, and the precise extent and sustainability of the changes involved continues to be debated among experts in the field. While there are many sociological correlates to this value shift and its causation, it is associated with the rise of cosmopolitan values, a preference for democratic forms of governance, and an appreciation of cultural diversity (Inglehart 1990; Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995). In other words, cosmopolitan values such as tolerance, respect for others, emphasis on human rights, and so on have become increasingly important.

Table 1.3 demonstrates the consistent and significant increase of the cosmopolitan value 'Tolerance and respect for others as a quality in children', based






Table 1.3: Tolerance seen as core quality in children, in percent of respondents

Country	1981	1990	2000
Argentina	44	78	70
Belgium	45	67	84
Canada	53	80	82
Denmark	58	81	87
France	59	78	84
Germany	42	76	73
Hungary	31	62	65
Iceland	58	93	84
Ireland	56	76	75
Italy	43	67	75
Japan	41	60	71
Mexico	39	64	72
Netherlands	57	87	90
Norway	32	64	66
South Africa	53	59	74
South Korea	25	55	65
Spain	44	73	82
Sweden	71	91	93
United Kingdom	62	80	83
United States	52	72	80
Average	48	73	78

Source: European Values Surveys (2003); and World Values Survey Study Group (1999–2000; 2003)

on data from the European and World Value Surveys. In all of the 20 countries included for which such data are available across the three waves (1981, 1990, and 2000), 'tolerance and respect for others' becomes a more frequently cited core value; and with very few exceptions this increase took place in the 1980s, with a levelling off in the 1990s at fairly high levels. Across the countries listed in Table 1.3, responses stating that tolerance and respect for others are qualities to be encouraged in children increased from 48 per cent to 75 per cent in the 1980s, and to 78 per cent in the following decade.

This shift in values goes beyond the traditional left-right cleavage in politics. Instead, beginning in the 1960s and more forcefully and widely in the 1970s, many people began to engage in new forms of political activities and to participate in social

movements, in particular the women's, environmental, and peace movements. The new social movements provide the institutional connection between the shift in values and the growth of global civil society. These new movements emerged in developed countries from the 1960s onwards: the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movement of the 1960s, the environmental movement, the women's movement of the 1970s, the peace movement and human rights movement of the 1980, and the anti-globalisation movements of the 1990s, are all closely related to the value shift identified by Inglehart, van Deth, and others. Chapter 6 discusses a crucial global achievement resulting from this value shift: the insertion of language defining violence against women into various international legal instruments.

Importantly, the value set connected with the new social movements had from the beginning a transnational element, and particularly so in Europe (environment, peace, women), Latin America (human rights), and Australia (indigenous rights), but less so in the United States, where the value shift and the changes in social structures could more easily be linked to a renewal of some form of domestic Tocquevillian democracy or the American Way of Life (Anheier 2004; see Edwards, Foley, and Diani 2001; Siriani and Friedland 2000). In Europe, by contrast, the value shift coincided with the development of the European project (from the Common Market to the European Community to the European Union) as the next step in a modernisation process that points to a more peaceful and prosperous future and that necessitates the evolution of nation-states and national societies into a framework of European cooperation and integration.

We have not yet been able to observe how far the rise of regressive globalism, as for example in the case of religious and nationalist militant groups described in Chapter 7, may reverse this value shift. Nor can we assess whether the renewed mobilisation of global civil society will be able to sustain the trend towards cosmopolitan values. The rise of anti-immigrant parties and the entry of 'tough' language on asylum-seekers and integration in Europe and Australia, the pursuit of an 'America first' policy by the US Administration, and the rise of communal politics in many other parts of the world suggest that 'anti-cosmopolitan' values may now be in the ascendant. In these circumstances, it is of particular importance to safeguard and strengthen the legal

