societies ... the crisis if any stems precisely from the centralized intervention itself' (ibid.: 97). He concludes that 'the main task of the theorist ... is to help strengthen resistance against oppressive institutions'. See the critique of Cowen and Shenton (1996: 453-61) on the ironies of this position.

11 A relevant journal is *Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor*. In 1993 a Foundation for the Promotion of Indigenous Knowledge Based Development was set up in Mysore, India, along with a Centre for Advanced Research of Indigenous Knowledge Systems. See also Goonatilake 1999.

12 Tony Chiejina (1993) compares Kothari's earlier articles, as founding editor of *Alternatives* in 1975 and subsequently, with his 1993 position. Elsewhere Kothari (e.g. 1993a) is more positive about citizen movements and organizations, recognizing their socially innovative contributions.

7

AFTER POST-DEVELOPMENT

The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crime have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work. Moreover, the historical conditions which catapulted the idea into prominence have vanished: development has become outdated. (Wolfgang Sachs 1992b: 1)

Along with 'anti-development' and 'beyond development', post-development is a radical reaction to the dilemmas of development. Perplexity and extreme dissatisfaction with business-as-usual and standard development rhetoric and practice, and disillusion with alternative development are keynotes of this perspective. Development is rejected because it is the 'new religion of the West' (Rist 1990a), it is the imposition of science as power (Nandy 1988), it does not work (Kothari 1988), it means cultural Westernization and homogenization (Constantino 1985) and brings environmental destruction. It is rejected not merely on account of its results but because of its intentions, its worldview and mindset. The mindset of economism implies a reductionist take on existence. Thus, according to Sachs, 'it is not the failure of development which has to be feared, but its success' (1992b: 3).

Post-development starts out from a basic realization: that attaining a middle-class life style for the majority of the world population is impossible (Dasgupta 1985). In time this has led to a position of total rejection of development. In the words of Gustavo Esteva,

> If you live in Mexico City today, you are either rich or numb if you fail to notice that development stinks... The time has come to recognize development itself as the malignant myth whose pursuit threatens these among whom I live in Mexico.... the 'three development decades' were a huge, irresponsible experiment that, in the experience of a world-majority, failed miserably. (1985: 78)

Post-development overlaps with Western critiques of modernity and techno-scientific progress, such as critical theory, poststructuralism and ecological movements. It parallels alternative development and cultural critiques of development. It stands to development as 'deep ecology' does to environmental management. There are different strands to this way of looking at development. *Anti-development* is rejectionism inspired by anger with development business-as-usual. *Beyond development* ('au delà de développement') combines this aversion with looking over the fence. In *post-development*, these are combined with a Foucauldian methodology and theoretical framework of discourse analysis and a politics inspired by poststructuralism. These positions are not all consistent and besides, as a recent approach, post-development thinking is not theoretically developed. The overlap among these sensibilities is sufficient to group them together here under the heading of post-development.

Development is the management of a promise — and what if the promise does not deliver? Living in Chiapas or other oppressed and poor areas, chances are that development is a bad joke. The question is what is done with this assessment. Post-development is not alone in looking at the shadow of development; all critical approaches to development deal with its dark sides. Dependency theory raises the question of global inequality. Alternative development focuses on the lack of popular participation. Human development addresses the need to invest in people. Post-development focuses on the underlying premises and motives of development, and what sets it apart from other critical approaches is its rejection of development. The question is whether this is a tenable and fruitful position.

In the 1980s these views crystallized around the journal *Development: Seeds for Change*. They have been taken up by intellectuals in Latin America (Esteva, Escobar), India (see Dallmayr 1996 on the 'Delhi school'), Pakistan (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997), Malaysia (Just World Trust 1995), France (Latouche 1993), Switzerland (Rist 1997), Germany (Sachs 1992a), Belgium (Verhelst 1990), England (Seabrook 1994), Ireland (Tucker 1999), Japan (Lummis 1991). They have become prominent since they coalesce with ecological critiques and ecofeminism (Mies 1986, Shiva 1988b) and through bestsellers such as Sachs' *Development Dictionary*.

First we will consider some of the overt positions of post-development – the problematization of poverty, the portrayal of development as Westernization, and the critique of modernism and science. The argument then turns to the methodological dimension of discourse analysis of development. We will then look at the difference between alternative development and 'alternatives to development'. The reasons why this difference is made out to be so large are, in my interpretation, anti-managerialism and dichotomous thinking. This exposition closes with a discussion of the politics of post-development and a critical assessment.

Problematizing Poverty

An insight that runs through post-development is that poverty is not to be taken for granted. In the words of Vandana Shiva:

> Culturally perceived poverty need not be real material poverty: subsistence economies which serve basic needs through self-provisioning are not poor in the sense of being deprived. Yet the ideology of development declares them so because they don't participate overwhelmingly in the market economy, and do not consume commodities provided for and distributed through the market…(1988b: 10)

Poverty is in the eye of the beholder. Sachs (1999) distinguishes between *frugality*, as in subsistence economies; *destitution*, which can arise when subsistence economies are weakened through the interference of growth strategies; and *scarcity*, which arises when the logic of growth and accumulation has taken over and commodity-based need becomes the overriding logic. In this early work, Sachs' policy recommendation is to implement growth strategies with caution, building on frugal lifestyles. This matches the recommendations made by 'ecological developers' all along, such as the agronomist René Dumont (1965, 1974), to follow growth

strategies in tandem with appropriate technology and maximum use of local resources. But the rejection of either growth or development does not follow.

'Poverty' is not simply a deficit, for that is simply to adopt the commodity-based perspective of the North; 'poverty' can also be a resource. Attributing agency to the poor is a common principle in alternative approaches such as conscientization *à la* Paulo Freire, human-scale development (Max-Neef 1982, 1991, Chambers 1983), participatory action research and the actor-oriented approach. According to Rahnema, poverty is real enough, but is also a culturally and historically variable notion. 'The way planners, development actomaniacs and politicians living off global poverty alleviation campaigns are presenting their case, gives the uninformed public a distorted impression of how the world's impoverished are living their deprivations. Not only are these people presented as incapable of doing anything intelligent by themselves, but also as preventing the modern do-gooders from helping them' (1992: 169). This is a different issue: it concerns the representation of poverty. By way of counterpoint, Rahnema draws attention to 'vernacular universes' that provide hope and strength; to the spiritual dimension ('Most contemporary grassroots movements have a strong spiritual dimension'; 171); and to 'convivial poverty', 'that is, voluntary or moral poverty' (171). This suggests affinity with the lineage of the Franciscans, liberation theology and Gandhian politics.

In this view, it is the economism of development that is truly pauperizing. While these considerations may be valid up to a point, a consequence is that poverty alleviation and elimination – for what these efforts are worth – slip off the map. Another problem is that less market participation does not necessarily imply more social participation – lest we homogenize and romanticize poverty, and equate poverty with purity (and the indigenous and local with the original and authentic). The step from a statistical universe to a moral universe is worth taking, but a moral universe also involves action, and which action follows?

Development = Westernization

> The debate over the word 'development' is not merely a question of words. Whether one likes it or not, one can't make development different from what it has been. Development has been and still is the *Westernisation of the world*. (Serge Latouche 1993: 160; emphasis in original)

According to Escobar, the problem with 'Development' is that it is external, based on the model of the industrialized world and what is needed instead are 'more endogenous discourses'. The assertion of 'endogenous development' calls to mind dependency theory and the 'foreign bad, local good' position (Kiely 1999). According to Rajni Kothari, 'where colonialism left off, development took over' (1988: 143).[1] This view is as old as the critique of modernization theory. It calls to mind the momentum and pathos of decolonization, the arguments against cultural imperialism, CocaColonization, McDonaldization, Disneyfication and the familiar cultural homogenization thesis according to which Western media, advertising and consumerism induce cultural uniformity.

All this may be satisfying, like the sound of a familiar tune, but it is also one-sided and old-fashioned. In effect, it denies the agency of the Third World. It denies the extent to which the South also owns development. Several recent development perspectives originate to a considerable extent in the South, such as dependency theory, alternative development and human development. Furthermore, what about 'Easternization', as in the East Asian model, touted by the World Bank as a development miracle? What about Japanization, as in the 'Japanese challenge', the influence of Japanese management techniques and Toyotism (Kaplinsky 1994)? At any rate, 'Westernization' is a lumping concept that ignores diverse historical currents. Latouche and others use the bulky category 'the West', which in view of steep historical differences between Europe and North America is not really meaningful. This argument also overlooks more complex assessments of globalization. A more appropriate analytic is polycentrism. Then, the rejoinder to Eurocentrism is not Third Worldism but a recognition that multiple centres, also in the South, now shape development discourse (e.g. Amin 1989; Chapter 2 above).

Critique of Modernism

Part of the anti-Western sentiment is anti-modernism. No doubt development suffers from a condition of 'psychological modernism', has erected monuments to modernism, vast infrastructure and big dams – placing technological progress over human development. States in the South have used science as instruments of power, creating 'laboratory states' (Visvanathan 1988), as in Rajiv Gandhi's high-tech modernization drive in India and Indonesia's experiment in aircraft technology. In Latin America, the work of the *cientificos* is not yet complete. Brazil's commitment to high modernism is on display in Brasilia (Berman 1988). Islamabad in Pakistan is another grid-planned capital city without heart or character. The 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia are another rendezvous of science and *raison d'état* (Subrahmanyam 1998). For Gilbert Rist development thinking represents the 'new religion of the West' (1990a), but indeed the worship of progress is not reserved to the West.

Aversion to modernism also exists in the West; rationalism is one face of the Enlightenment and romanticism is another. There are many affinities and overlaps between critical theory and the counterculture in the West (Roszak 1973, Berman 1988, Toulmin 1990) and anti-modernism in the South. Schumacher ('small is beautiful') found inspiration in Buddhist economics (Wood 1984) and Fritjof Capra in Eastern mysticism, while Ashis Nandy's outlook has been shaped by Freud, the Frankfurt School and Californian psychology.

Part of the critique of modernism is the critique of science. A leitmotif, also in ecological thinking, is to view science as power. 'Science' here means Cartesianism, Enlightenment thinking and positivism, an instrument in achieving mastery over nature. Critique of Enlightenment science runs through the work of Vandana Shiva (1991). But this is not a simple argument. For one thing, science has been renewing itself, for example in quantum physics and chaos theory, and undergoing paradigm shifts leading to 'new science'. In addition there are countertrends within

science, such as the methodological anarchism of Feyerabend and the work of Latour (1993). In social science, positivism is no longer the dominant temperament; increasingly the common sense in social science is constructivism. In economics positivism prevails, but is also under attack. Thus, for Hazel Henderson economics is not science but politics in disguise (1996b). A clear distinction should be made between *critique of science* and *anti-science*. Acknowledging the limitations of science, the role of power/knowledge and the uses made of scientific knowledge does not necessarily mean being anti-science. Critique of science is now a defining feature of new social movements North and South (Beck 1992). Ecological movements use scientific methods of monitoring energy use, pollution and climate changes. 'Green accounting' and 'greening the GDP' use scientific standards, but for different ends than previously.[2] Anti-development at times sounds like twentieth-century Luddism, with more rhetoric than analysis and not altogether consistent (e.g. Alvares 1992).[3] From a Third World point of view as well there are other options besides anti-science (e.g. Goonatilake 1999).

It is more appropriate to view modernism as a complex historical trend, which is in part at odds with simple modernization. Thus, the dialectics of modernity are part of modernity, which has given rise to critical modernism and reflexive modernity (Beck 1992). Ironically, the aversion of modernism is also an expression of high modernism, advanced modernity and postmodernism (Lee 1994; cf. Chapters 9 and 10 below).

Development as Discourse

According to Escobar, the 'discourse of Development', like the Orientalism analysed by Edward Said, has been a 'mechanism for the production and management of the Third World... organizing the production of truth about the Third World' (1992b: 413-14). A standard Escobar text is: 'development can best be described as an apparatus that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies' (1996: 213).

Discourse analysis forms part of the 'linguistic turn' in social science. It involves the careful scrutiny of language and text as a framework of presuppositions and structures of thought, penetrating further than ideology critique. Prominent in literature criticism, discourse analysis has been applied extensively in cultural studies, feminism, black studies, and now in social science generally. Discourse analysis contributes to understanding colonialism as an epistemological regime (Mitchell 1988), it can serve to analyse the 'development machine' (Ferguson 1990) and development project talk (Apthorpe and Gasper 1996, Rew 1997) and has become a critical genre in development studies (Crush 1996a, Grillo and Stirrat 1997). Discourse analysis applied to development is the methodological basis of post-development, which in itself it is not specific to post-development; what is distinctive for post-development is that from a methodology, discourse analysis has been turned into an ideological platform.

Escobar (1992b: 419) concurs with Gustavo Esteva that development is a 'Frankenstein-type dream', an 'alien model of exploitation' and besides reflects

Development but a different regime of truth and perception' (ibid.: 412-14). Escobar refers to a 'group of scholars engaging in the most radical critique of Development' viewed as the 'ideological expression of postwar capital expansion'. In this view, World Bank studies and documents 'all repeat the same story'. 'Development colonized reality, it became reality'. It 'may be now a past era'. 'The dream of Development is over' (419). To 'establish a discontinuity, a new discursive practice' it is appropriate to 'undertake an archaeology of Development' (414-15). To effect change means to effect a 'change in the order of discourse', to open up the 'possibility to think reality differently'. The grassroots orientation disrupts the link between development, capital and science and thus destabilizes the 'grid of the Development apparatus' (424).

Escobar's perspective provides a broad and uneven *mélange*, with exaggerated claims sustained by weak examples. Broad in combining vocabularies: poststructuralism, social movement theory and development. Uneven in that the argument centres on anti-development but makes no clear distinction between anti-development and alternative development. Exaggerated in that his position hinges on a discursive trick, a rhetorical ploy of equating development with 'Development'. This in itself militates against discourse analysis, caricatures and homogenizes development, and conceals divergencies within development. His perspective on actual development is flimsy and based on confused examples, with more rhetoric than logic. For instance, the claim that the World Bank stories are 'all the same' ignores the tremendous discontinuities in the Bank's discourse over time (e.g. redistribution with growth in the 1970s, structural adjustment in the 1980s, and poverty alleviation and social liberalism in the 1990s). And while Escobar and Esteva associate 'Development' with urban bias, World Bank and structural adjustment policies in the 1980s have been precisely aimed at correcting 'urban parasitism', which for some time had been a standard criticism of nationalist development policies (a classic source is Lipton 1977).

Alternatives *to* Development

Many concerns of post-development are not new and are shared by other critical approaches to development. Post-development parallels dependency theory in seeking autonomy from external dependency, but now taken further to development as a power/knowledge regime. Post-development faith in the endogenous resembles dependency theory and alternative development, as in the emphasis on self-reliance. While dependency thinking privileges the nation state, post-development, like alternative development, privileges local and grassroots autonomy. Alternative development occupies an in-between position: with post-development it shares the radical critiques of mainstream development but it retains belief in and accordingly redefines development. The record of development is mixed and includes achievements (as noted in human development), so what's the point of rejecting it *in toto*? In many ways the line between alternative and post-development is quite thin, again except for the rejection of development.

Scanning 'the present landscape of Development alternatives' looking for 'a new reality', Escobar is 'not interested in Development alternatives, but rather in alternatives to Development'. Alternative development is rejected because 'most of the efforts are also products of the same worldview which has produced the mainstream concept of science, liberation and development' (Nandy 1989: 270). Latouche (1993: 161) goes further: 'The most dangerous solicitations, the sirens with the most insidious song, are not those of the "true blue" and "hard" development, but rather those of what is called "alternative" development. This term can in effect encompass any hope or ideal that one might wish to project into the harsh realities of existence. The fact that it presents a friendly exterior makes "alternative" development all the more dangerous.' This echoes Esteva's fulmination against those who 'want to cover the stench of "Development" with "Alternative Development" as a deodorant' (1985: 78).

Latouche examines 'three principal planks of alternative development: food self-sufficiency; basic needs; and appropriate technologies' and finds each of them wanting (1993: 161). In fact these are part of 'another development' in the 1970s and are no longer specific to alternative development in the 1990s, if only because they have entered mainstream development discourse. Latouche maintains that 'The opposition between "alternative development" and *alternative to* development is radical, irreconcilable and one of essence, both in the abstract and in theoretical analysis.... Under the heading of "alternative development", a wide range of "anti-productivist" and anti-capitalist platforms are put forward, all of which aim at eliminating the sore spots of underdevelopment and the excesses of maldevelopment' (159).

At this point other arguments come into the picture: anti-managerialism and dichotomous thinking. These are not necessarily part of the explicitly stated post-development view, but they might explain the size of the gap between alternative development and post-development.

Anti-managerialism

Development thinking is steeped in social engineering and the ambition to shape economies and societies, which makes it an interventionist and managerialist discipline. It involves telling other people what to do – in the name of modernization, nation building, progress, mobilization, sustainable development, human rights, poverty alleviation, and even empowerment and participation (participatory management). Through post-development runs an anti-authoritarian sensibility, an aversion to control and perhaps an anarchist streak. Poststructuralism too involves an 'anti-political' sensibility, as a late-modern scepticism. If the public sphere is constructed through discourse and if any discourse is another claim to truth and therefore a claim to power, what would follow is political agnosticism. This also arises from the preoccupation with autonomy, the problem of representation and the indignity of representing 'others'.[4]

Douglas Lummis declares an end to development because it is inherently anti-democratic (1991, 1994). Viewing development through the lens of democratization

is pertinent enough, not least in relation to the Asian authoritarian developmental states. Nowadays development managerialism not only involves states but also international financial institutions and the 'new managerialism' of NGOs. All of these share a lack of humility, a keynote of the development power/knowledge complex. In post-development there is suspicion of alternative development as an 'alternative managerialism' – which may make sense in view of the record of many NGOs (e.g. Sogge 1996). So what to do? Emery Roe's response, in a discussion of sustainable development as a form of alternative managerialism, is 'Nothing' (1995: 160).

However, as Corbridge argues, 'an unwillingness to speak for others is every bit as foundational a claim as the suggestion that we can speak for others in an unproblematic manner' (1994: 103, quoted in Kiely 1999: 23). Doing 'nothing' comes down to an endorsement of the status quo (a question that returns under the politics of post-development below). Gilbert Rist in Geneva would argue: I have no business telling people in Senegal what do, but people in Switzerland, yes.[5] This kind of thinking implies a compartmentalized world, presumably split along the lines of the Westphalian state system. This is deeply conventional, ignores transnational collective action, the relationship between social movements and international relations, the trend of post-nationalism and the ramifications of globalization. It completely goes against the idea of global citizenship and 'global civil society'. Had this been a general view, the apartheid regime in South Africa would have lasted longer. Under the heading of 'post' thinking, this is actually profoundly conservative.

Dichotomous Thinking

Post-development thinking is fundamentally uneven. For all the concern with discourse analysis, the actual use of language is sloppy and indulgent. Escobar plays games of rhetoric: in referring to development as 'Development' and thus suggesting its homogeneity and consistency, he essentializes 'development'. The same applies to Sachs and his call to do away with development: 'in the very call for banishment, Sachs implicitly suggests that it is possible to arrive at an unequivocal definition' (Crush 1996b: 3). Apparently this kind of essentializing of 'development' is necessary in order to arrive at the radical repudiation of development, and without this anti-development pathos, the post-development perspective loses its foundation.

At times one has the impression that post-development turns on a language game rather than an analytic. Attending a conference titled 'Towards a post-development age', Anisur Rahman reacted as follows: 'I was struck by the intensity with which the very notion of "development" was attacked. ... I submitted that I found the word "development" to be a very powerful means of expressing the conception of societal progress as the flowering of people's creativity. Must we abandon valuable words because they are abused? What to do then with words like democracy, cooperation, socialism, all of which are abused?' (1993: 213-14)

There are several problems with this line of thinking. First, some of the claims of post-development are simply misleading and misrepresent the history of development. Thus, Esteva and several others in the *Development Dictionary* (Sachs 1992a) refer to Truman in the 1940s as the beginning of the development era. But this is only one of the beginnings of the application of development to the South, which started with colonial economics; besides, development has an older history – with the latecomers to industrialization in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Soviet economic planning.

Second, dichotomous thinking, pro- and anti-development, underrates the dialectics and the complexity of motives and motions in modernity and development. Even though at given points particular constellations of thinking and policy seem to present a solid whole and façade, there are inconsistencies underneath and the actual course of development theory and policy shows constant changes of direction and numerous improvisations. Thus, some speak of 'the chaotic history of development theory' (Trainer 1989: 177) and 'the fashion-conscious institutional language of development' (Porter 1996; Chapter 3 above).

Third, post-development's take on real existing development is quite narrow. The instances cited in post-development literature concern mainly Africa, Latin America and India; or reflections are general and no cases are discussed (as with Nandy). The experience of NICs in East Asia is typically not discussed: 'the assertion that "development does not work" ignores the rise of East Asia and the near doubling of life expectancy in much of the Third World' (Kiely 1999: 17).

Politics of Post-development

Strip away the exaggerated claims, the anti-positioning, and what remains is an uneven landscape. Eventually the question to ask is, what about the politics of post-development: fine points of theory aside, what is to be done? Post-development does make positive claims and is associated with affirmative counterpoints such as indigenous knowledge and cultural diversity. It opts for Gandhian frugality, not consumerism; for conviviality, à la Ivan Illich, for grassroots movements and local struggles. But none of these are specific to post-development nor do they necessarily add up to the conclusion of rejecting development.

Forming a position in relation to post-development might proceed as follows. Let's not quibble about details and let's take your points on board and work with them. What do you have to offer? This varies considerably: Sachs (1992a) is a reasonable refresher course in critiques of development. Latouche's arguments are often perceptive and useful, though they can also be found in alternative development sources (such as Rahman 1993, Pradervand 1989) and are mostly limited to sub-Saharan Africa. A commonsense reaction may be: your points are well taken, now what do we do? The response of Gilbert Rist is that alternatives are not his affair.[6] The general trend in several sources is to stop at critique. What this means is an endorsement of the status quo and, in effect, more of the same, and this is the core weakness of post-development (cf. Cowen and Shenton 1996).

If we read critiques of development dirigisme, such as Deepak Lal's critique of state-centred development economics – which helped set the stage for the neoconservative turn in development – side by side with post-development critiques of development power, such as Escobar's critique of planning, the

parallels are striking.' Both agree on state failure, though for entirely different reasons. According to Lal, states fail because of rentseeking; Escobar's criticisms arise from a radical democratic and anti-authoritarian questioning of social engineering and the faith in progress. But arguably, the net political effect turns out to be much the same. In other words, there is an elective affinity between neoliberalism and the development agnosticism of post-development.

Escobar offers one of the more forward post-development positions but is also contradictory. On the one hand he caricatures 'Development' and argues for 'alternatives to Development', and on the other he pleads for redefining development. Other positions, such as that of Sachs, are both more limited and more consistent – all past and no future. *The Development Dictionary* features critiques of the market, state, production, needs, etc., which are historically informed but overstate their case and offer no alternatives, and ultimately fall flat. Recognizing the power/knowledge nexus in discourse, Escobar proposes 'the formation of nuclei around which new forms of power and knowledge can converge' (424). Basic to his approach is the 'nexus with grassroots movements'. He evokes a 'we' that, following Esteva (1985), comprises 'peasants, urban marginals, deprofessionalized intellectuals'. What they share is an 'interest in culture, local knowledge', 'critique of science' and 'promotion of localized, pluralistic grassroots movements'. In another passage, grassroots movements include: women, ecological movements, peasants, urban marginals, civic movements, ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, popular culture, youth movements, squatter movements, Christian base communities. Their common features, according to Escobar, are that they are 'essentially local', pluralistic, and distrust organized politics and the development establishment.

As nodal points Escobar mentions three major discourses – democratization, difference and anti-Development – which can serve as the 'basis for radical anti-capitalist struggles'. What is 'needed is the expansion and *articulation* of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-productivist, anti-market struggles' (1992b: 431). Again, as in 1980s alternative development discourse, this is the aspiration to construct a grand coalition of opposition forces, now combined with a Foucauldian search 'toward new power-knowledge regimes' (432). The desire for a grand oppositional coalition involves the evocation of a 'we' that, in the desire for discontinuity, claims to capture all social movements in the 'Third World', now under the heading of anti-Development. 'Many of today's social movements in the Third World are in one way or another mediated by anti-Development discourses ... although this often takes place in an implicit manner' (431). In the West, social movements militate against commodification, bureaucratization and cultural massification; in the Third World, according to Escobar, they militate 'against bureaucratization achieved by Development institutions (e.g. peasants against rural development packages, squatters against public housing programmes), commodification, capitalist rationality brought by Development technologies' (431).

This is clearly a biased representation: social movements in the South are much too diverse to be captured under a single heading. Many popular organizations are concerned with access to development programmes, with inclusion and participation, while others are concerned with alternative development and renegotiating development, with decentralization, or alternative political action. 'Anti-development' is much too simple and rhetorical a description for the views of the 'victims of development'. Indeed 'victims of development' is too simple and biased a label (cf. Woost 1997). This view suffers from the same problems as early alternative development arguments: it underestimates the desire for and appeal of development and engages in 'island politics' or politics of marginality. Besides, it is contradictory. In its reliance on deprofessionalized intellectuals and distrust of experts, post-development rubs shoulders with anti-intellectualism, while it also relies on and calls for 'complex discursive operations'. Post-development no longer focuses on class interests and is postmarxist in outlook, yet Escobar also reinvokes radical anti-capitalist struggles. Like some forms of alternative development, post-development involves populism, now seasoned by an awareness of the articulation effect; yet its striving for a new articulation of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and other movements is populist.

At the same time, the political horizon of post-development is one of resistance rather than emancipation. Made up of resistance *à la* Scott, it participates in the 'romance of resistance' (Abu-Lughod 1990). Its other component is local struggles *à la* Foucault. Earlier I argued that in post-development discourse analysis is used not merely as an analytical instrument but as an ideological tool (Chapter 1); this becomes apparent when it comes to politics. As many have argued (Said 1986, Hoy 1986), Foucault's imagination of power is an imagination without exit. Foucault engages in a 'monologue of power' (Giri 1998: 198). In the footsteps of this logic, post-development takes critique of development to the point of retreat. Retreat from business-as-usual can be a creative position from which an alternative practice may grow. Thus critical theory and its negation of the negation, though pessimistic in outlook, has served as a point of reference and inspiration, for instance to social movements of the 1960s. But the imaginary of power that inspires post-development leaves little room for forward politics.

The quasi-revolutionary posturing in post-development reflects both a hunger for a new era and a nostalgia politics of romanticism, glorification of the local, grassroots, community with conservative overtones. Different adherents of post-development advocate different politics. Escobar opts for a 'romance of resistance'. The politics of Gilbert Rist are those of a conventionally compartmentalized world. Rahnema opts for a Confucian version of Taoist politics (discussed in Chapter 9 below). Ray Kiely adds another note: 'When Rahnema (1997: 391) argues that the end of development "represents a call to the 'good people' everywhere to think and work together", we are left with the vacuous politics of USA for Africa's "We are the World". Instead of a politics which critically engages with material inequalities, we have a post-development era where "people should be nicer to each other"' (1999: 24).

In the *Power of Development*, Jonathan Crush offers this definition: 'This is the power of development: the power to transform old worlds, the power to imagine new ones.' The context is a comment on a colonial text: 'Africans become objects for the application of power rather than subjects experiencing and

responding to the exercise of that power' (1996b: 2). Crush comes back once more to the power of development: 'The power of development is the power to generalize, homogenize, objectify' (22). There is a disjuncture between these statements. While the first is, or seems to be, affirmative, the other two are negative. Clearly something is lost in the process. It is what Marx called, and Schumpeter after him, the process of 'creative destruction'. What happens in post-development is that of 'creative destruction' only destruction remains. What remains of the power of development is only the destructive power of social engineering. Gone is the recognition of the creativity of developmental change (cf. Goulet 1992). Instead, what post-development offers, besides critique, is another series of fashionable interpretations. Above all it is a cultural critique of development and a cultural politics (Fagan 1999). This reflects on more than just development: 'development' here is a stand-in for modernity and the real issue is the question of modernity.

Coda

Post-development is caught in rhetorical gridlock. Using discourse analysis as an ideological platform invites political impasse and quietism. In the end post-development offers no politics besides the self-organizing capacity of the poor, which actually lets the development responsibility of states and international institutions off the hook. Post-development arrives at development agnosticism by a different route but shares the abdication of development with neoliberalism. Since most insights in post-development sources are not specific to post-development (and are often confused with alternative development), what is distinctive is the rejection of development. Yet the rejection of development does not arise from post-development insights as a *necessary* conclusion, that is, one can share its observations without arriving at this conclusion: in other words, there is no compelling logic to post-development arguments.

Commonly distinguished reactions to modernity are neotraditionalism, modernization and postmodernism (e.g. McEvilley 1995). Post-development belongs to the era of the 'post' – poststructuralism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, postmarxism (postcapitalism?). It is premised on an awareness of endings, on 'the end of modernity' and, in Vattimo's words, the 'crisis of the future' (1988). Post-development parallels postmodernism both in its acute intuitions and in being directionless in the end, as a consequence of the refusal to translate, or lack of interest in translating, critique into construction. At the same time it also fits the profile of the neotraditionalist reaction to modernity. There are romantic and nostalgic strands to post-development and its reverence for community, *Gemeinschaft*, the traditional and there is an element of neo-Luddism in the attitude toward science and technology. The overall programme is one of resistance rather than transformation or emancipation.

Post-development is based on a paradox. While it is clearly part of the broad critical stream in development, it shows no regard for the progressive potential and dialectics of modernity – for democratization, soft power technologies, reflexivity. Thus, it is not difficult to see that the three nodal discourses identified

by Escobar – democratization, difference and anti-development – *themselves* arise out of modernization. Democratization continues the democratic impetus of the Enlightenment; difference is a function of the transport and communication revolutions, the world becoming 'smaller' and societies multicultural; and anti-development elaborates the dialectics of the Enlightenment set forth by the Frankfurt School. Generally, the rise of social movements and civil society activism, North and South, is also an expression of the richness of overall development, and cannot be simply captured under the label 'anti'. Post-development's source of strength is a hermeneutics of suspicion, an anti-authoritarian sensibility, and hence a suspicion of alternative development as an 'alternative managerialism'. But since it fails to translate this sensibility into a constructive position, what remains is whistling in the dark. What is the point of declaring development a 'hoax' (Norberg-Hodge 1995) without proposing an alternative?

Alternative development thinking primarily looks at development from the point of view of the disempowered, from bottom-up, along a vertical axis. It combines this with a perspective on the role of the state; in simple terms: a strong civil society needs a strong state (Friedmann 1992). Post-development adopts a wider angle in looking at development through the lens of the problematic of modernity. Yet, though its angle is wide, its optics is not sophisticated and its focus is blurred. Its take on modernity is one-dimensional and ignores different options for problematizing modernity, such as 'reworking modernity' (Pred and Watts 1992), or exploring modernities in the plural (Nederveen Pieterse 1998b). More enabling as a position is reflexive modernity and a corollary in relation to development is reflexive development (Chapter 10 below).

In my view post-development and 'alternatives to development' are flawed premises – flawed not as sensibilities but as positions. The problem is not the critiques, which one can easily enough sympathize with and which are not specific to post-development, but the companion rhetoric and posturing, which intimate a politically correct position. 'Alternatives to development' is a misnomer because no alternatives to development are offered. There is no positive programme; there is critique but no construction. 'Post-development' is misconceived because it attributes to 'development' a single and narrow meaning, a consistency which does not match either theory or policy, and thus replicates the rhetoric of developmentalism, rather than penetrating and exposing its polysemic realities. It echoes the 'myth of development' rather than leaving it behind. Post-development makes engaging contributions to collective conversation and reflexivity about development and as such contributes to philosophies of change, but its contribution to politics of change is meagre. While the shift toward cultural sensibilities that accompanies this perspective is a welcome move, the plea for 'people's culture' (Constantino 1985) or indigenous culture can lead, if not to ethnochauvinism and 'reverse orientalism' (Kiely 1999: 25), to reification of both culture and locality or people. It presents a conventional and narrow view of globalization, equated with homogenization. On a philosophical level we may wonder whether there are alternatives to development for *homo sapiens* as the 'unfinished animal', i.e. to development writ large, including in the wide sense of evolution.

Notes

1 Elsewhere Kothari addresses development in more affirmative ways.
2 Modernism and science are also discussed in Chapter 9.
3 Alvares (1979) proposes appropriate technology as an alternative approach.
4 In some ways this matches the weary anti-politics sensibility of intellectuals in Eastern Europe (Konrád 1984). On representations of others, according to Crush, 'The current obsession with Western representations of "the Other" is a field of rapidly diminishing return' (1996b: 22).
5 In correspondence with the author.
6 At a seminar at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
7 Both papers are reproduced side by side in Corbridge 1995.

8

EQUITY AND GROWTH REVISITED: A SUPPLY-SIDE APPROACH TO SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Does combining a variety of arguments on the relationship between equity and growth yield new insight? Redistribution with growth, prominent in the 1970s, is currently being revisited. East Asian experiences can also be considered with a view to equity. Human development makes a strong case for combining equity and growth along the lines of human capital, but leaves the social dimension unexplored. Studies of welfare states add finesse to equity-growth arguments. Sociology of economics addresses questions of embeddedness, social capital, networks and trust, which are relevant in this context. By adding novel elements, this chapter seeks to arrive at a new overall perspective on social development.

On the occasion of the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995, benevolent statements were issued on the relationship between growth and equity, such as 'Economic growth and social development impinge on each other, i.e. broadly effective social progress is not possible without a socially oriented economic and finance policy' (*Development & Cooperation*, 1, 1995: 12). Here an attempt is made to probe such rhetorical statements to find a core of policy-relevant thinking.

'Social orientation' can have several meanings. In the framework of Copenhagen the dominant tendency has been to relegate questions of social development to poverty alleviation. What may be necessary however is to challenge the Washington consensus in development not merely in policy terms, resulting in an adjustment (but not a structural adjustment) of structural adjustment, but also in intellectual terms. Revisiting Keynesian management strategies (Singer 1996) may be important but one wonders whether they are a viable option in the context of accelerated globalization. Here I explore the equity-growth argument.

First let me briefly refer to two alternative positions: *rejecting growth* or, alternatively, pursuing *equity without growth*. A prominent set of positions for various reasons rejects growth, such as ecological views, according to which more is not better, and alternative development views, according to which what matters is not growth but development that is equitable, sustainable and participatory. In many instances this view is accompanied by a repudiation of growth *per se*. A further position is post-development, which repudiates not only growth but also development as such. A general problem with these positions (discussed in

Chapters 6 and 7 above) is that the target is too wide: what should be at issue is not growth as such but the quality of growth. Exploring this is the point of juxtaposing growth and social development. Clearly 'growth' is a deeply problematic category. The mere question of how growth is defined and measured raises numerous problems. On the other hand, simply rejecting growth may leave us with too narrow a position and too narrow a political coalition to implement whatever policies seem desirable.

At a general level it may be argued that what many people desire is not growth but change, qualitative transformation. Marshall Berman (1988: 47) refers to 'the desire for development'. It seems that the point is not to go against this desire, or complex of desires, not to adopt a confrontational approach, a politics of purity or abstinence, which would invoke resistance; but to transform and channel desire, or, at risk of sounding patronizing, an education rather than a suppression of desire. The marketplace represents powerful and dynamic forces in society, which resonate with deep-seated drives – not merely to 'accumulate, accumulate' but also to 'change, change' and 'improve, improve'. Market forces alienate and marginalize many in society, but is the appropriate response to marginalize, alienate or ignore market forces in return? A wiser course may be to explore what common ground exists between the market and social development, or the scope for a social market approach. The target is not the market but the unregulated market.

A different option is to pursue equity without growth. This kind of approach has been referred to as 'support-mediated security' (Drèze and Sen 1989).[1] This may give us the 'Kerala model' – a constellation of advanced social policies and comparatively high levels of education, health and female empowerment. From the mid-1970s, as Kerala was acquiring international model status, it was slipping into a major crisis, including 'severe stagnation in the spheres of material production, soaring unemployment, acute fiscal crisis and erosion of sustainability of the social welfare expenditures' (Isaac and Tharakan 1995: 1995).[2] Growing unemployment may be due to the fact that investors shun a state where the unions, with the backing of state government, are too strong; that at least is the position of the local rightwing backlash, which coincides with international press comments (e.g. Straaten 1996). This refers us to the familiar chronicles of Western welfare states in the era of post-Fordism and globalization and the question of 'social dumping'. Still, aside from the deeply politicized question of how to account for the Kerala crisis, one conclusion is that 'in the absence of economic growth it is difficult to sustain, much less expand, welfare gains' (Isaac and Tharakan 1995: 1993).

So we turn to equity with growth, summed up under the heading of social development. The point here is not to make a case for social development in *moral* terms, in the name of solidarity, compassion or decency. Thus, according to Galbraith (1996), 'In the good society there must not be a deprived and excluded underclass'. It is not that such moral considerations are irrelevant but they are of limited purchase. Moral economies and discourses are unevenly distributed so that achieving a political consensus purely on moral grounds is unlikely. Moral arguments invite trade-offs – the appeal of moral policy may be

outweighed by the importance of economic growth. Since in conventional views growth is supposed to trickle down, morality would be merely a matter of time: in time growth policies will generate moral outcomes. Hence moral considerations tend to be practically outflanked and too easily neutralized by growth policies.

Neither is the point to make a *political* case for social development. Social and welfare policies enhance political stability and legitimacy but they also invite trade-offs – between political legitimacy and political efficacy or state autonomy. A classic position is that collective demands are to be restrained so that collective interests will not crowd out state autonomy and state capacity to take reform measures. The absence of social development may prompt uncontrolled informalization, including ethnic and religious mobilization and a growing underground economy. These are important considerations but they are not the main line of argument followed here.

Rather, the point is to consider the case for social development on *economic* grounds, in relation to growth itself. Or, to examine the case whether, how, to what extent and under which circumstances social development is good for growth, beneficial to business. Phrasing it in contemporary language, the point is to explore the scope for a market-friendly social development. This line of thinking involves classic debates – on the welfare state, on the 'big trade-off' between equality and efficiency (Okun 1975), on modernization and equality. Here this question is revisited by considering several lines of research and bodies of literature, to see what the present scope is of social development arguments and whether their combination yields new insight. This may be worth doing considering that 'there is no very strong tradition of doing macroeconomics as if poor people and social processes mattered' (Taylor and Pieper 1996: 93).

Relevant lines of research include the following. (1) Redistribution with growth. Prominent in the 1970s, these views are currently being revisited. (2) Lessons from East Asia. Usually discussed with a view to the role of state intervention, they can also be considered with a view to equality and equity. (3) Human development. This approach makes a strong case for combining equity and growth along the lines of human capital, but leaves the social dimension and social capital unexplored. (4) Lessons from welfare states. (5) New institutional economics provides institutional analyses and sociology of economics addresses questions of embeddedness, social capital, networks and trust. Other bodies of literature are relevant to social development – such as comparative studies of social security, the regulation school, post-Fordism, associational democracy – but fall outside this treatment. The point of this exercise is to find out what they add up to when various arguments on equity and growth are grouped together and, by adding novel elements that are not usually combined with social development, to arrive at a new overall perspective.

Social Development

It is appropriate first to delineate in what sense social development is used here. One narrow meaning of social development is public welfare policies of health, education and housing. This approach, as Midgley (1995) points out, suffers

from compartmentalization: the separation of social policies from development policies. The Copenhagen summit was not free of this tendency: social development often referred to or ended up in the basket of poverty alleviation (cf. UNRISD 1995). For the same reason, the present argument does not concern the social economy, progressive market or socially responsible business, cooperatives or fair trade (e.g. Ekins 1992). Not because they are not important, but because they represent a compartmentalized or at least a partial approach. The focus is on the overall economy rather than on particular segments. Secondly, social development can be used in a disciplinary sense, if it is distinguished from in particular economic development (e.g. Booth 1994a).[3] The third option, which is followed here, is to view social development in a substantive and comprehensive manner with equal emphasis both on 'social' and on 'development': in other words an integrated approach to social concerns and growth strategies.

Midgley defines social development as 'a process of planned social change designed to promote the well-being of the population as a whole in conjunction with a dynamic process of economic development' (1995: 25). Here the notion of planning carries dirigiste overtones (while in effect Midgley argues for 'managed pluralism'), which raises the question of the agency of social development.

The dominant discourse of social development used by governments, international institutions and many NGOs is as a terrain of social policy: which means a social engineering, managerial approach to social development. This is apparent if we leaf through the reports submitted to the World Summit for Social Development.[4] The bodies of literature reviewed here reflect this general tendency, except for sociology of economics, which looks at the social from the ground up. We might term this a society-centred approach to social development or, possibly, social development from below. Actual social security concerns much more than government social policy, such as family and local networks (e.g. Hirtz 1995, DSE 1994). As Ann Davis (1991: 84) remarks, 'Of course, social work agencies are only one way of replenishing family and friendship networks'. When social security falls outside conventional social policy, how could a conventional approach to social development be adequate? Accordingly, implicit in 'social development' are multiple layers of meaning: whether social development is compartmentalized or linked to development; whether it is managerial, from above, or society-centred, from below.

Redistribution with Growth

In the 1970s growth and redistribution literature several currents of thought came together. Adelman and Morris (1967) developed an approach to social development influenced by modernization theory; their social development index may be read as a modernization index.[5] At a time when Keynesian demand management played a prominent part, Gunnar Myrdal adopted a productivist or supply-side approach. According to Myrdal, 'welfare reforms, rather than being costly for society, actually lay the basis for more steady and rapid economic growth' (quoted in Esping-Andersen 1994: 723; cf. Myrdal 1968). In presenting redistribution as a *precondition* to growth, Myrdal followed a Swedish tradition. 'The unique

contribution of Swedish socialism was its idea of "productivist" social policy. Its leading theoreticians stood liberalism on its head, arguing that social policy and equality were necessary preconditions for economic efficiency, which, in turn, was a prerequisite for the democratic socialist society' (Esping-Andersen 1994: 713)

The Swedish concept of a 'productivist social justice' in which 'the welfare state invests in optimizing people's capacity to be productive citizens' contrasts with 'the strong Catholic influence in Continental European welfare states [which] has resulted in a policy regime that encourages women to remain within the family' (1994: 722). The productivist approach to social justice addresses the standard criticism of Keynesian policies that they concern demand only and ignore supply factors. We find echoes of productivist arguments in human development (below) and the regulation school.

In a well-known World-Bank sponsored study, Hollis Chenery and associates (1974) argued that egalitarian and developmental objectives are complementary, a position that favoured redistribution of income and assets to the poorest groups. If we now reread *Redistribution with Growth* and sequel studies (such as Adelman and Robinson 1978), we see that they are inspired by dissatisfaction with the mainstream course followed during the first development decade. This egalitarian approach was outflanked and clipped by the rise of monetarism, supply-side economics and neoconservativism in the 1980s. It makes sense to revisit these arguments taking into account subsequent trends and addressing the misgivings about dirigisme, rents and rent seeking, welfarism and dependency.

In the 1990s the idea of redistribution with (or for) growth regained ground in mainstream development policy, with some new inflections: a general concern with social indicators in measuring development, to the point of redefining development itself; an emphasis on human capital; and a growing critique of trickle-down. A World Bank report to the Copenhagen summit, *Advancing Social Development*, notes: 'How growth affects poverty depends greatly on the initial distribution of income. The more equal the distribution of income to start with, the more likely it is that poverty will be reduced for a given increase in average income' (1995: 4-5). Hence the World Bank recognition of the importance of safety nets for the poor when implementing deficit reduction (23). This World Bank package includes 'promoting labor-demanding growth, investing in people, providing safety nets, and improving governance' (48). In this fashion social development is assimilated as part of structural reform – as a supplementary safety net, as structural adjustment with a human face, or as 'stage two' of structural reform and the political stabilization of reform policies.

In view of the importance of the initial distribution of income and its effect on poverty alleviation, would merely installing safety nets be logical or adequate? It would seem that to achieve these effects more far-reaching measures are called for. In addition what is at issue are structural reform policies themselves and their underlying economic rationale. The actual challenge is to examine the nexus not merely between income distribution and poverty alleviation but between equity and growth. Redistribution with growth, in a mix of productivist and demand management elements, also informs South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Programme (cf. Moll et al. 1991).

Lessons of East Asia

Equitable development policies are widely recognized as a crucial factor in East Asian development. Thus, 'there is substantial evidence to suggest that equity in income distribution and decent welfare systems are friends not enemies of growth, a pattern strikingly clear for Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore where equity and growth have gone hand in hand' (Weiss 1996: 195). World Bank studies acknowledge that one of the initial conditions for rapid growth in East Asia

> was the relative *equality of income* in the first generation NIEs [Newly Industrialising Economies]. This factor was more of a change brought about by policy than an inheritance. Most other low- and middle-income countries were not able to achieve similar equality of income or assets. Large land reform schemes in both Korea and Taiwan, China, did away with the landholding classes and made wage income the main source of advancement. Public housing investments in Singapore and Hong Kong were early priorities of governments bent on maintaining a national consensus on development policies. (Leipziger and Thomas 1995: 7)

This point is often noted: 'some of the advantages of the rapidly growing East Asian countries were their unusually low initial income inequality in 1960 and their labor-demanding pattern of growth, which tended to reduce income inequality over time' (World Bank 1995: 5).

Education policies are part of this equation. The World Bank study on *The East Asian Miracle* 'shows that the single most important factor in launching the miracle countries on a path of rapid, sustained economic growth was universal or near-universal primary school enrolment... In 1960 Pakistan and Korea had similar levels of income, but by 1985 Korea's GDP per capita was nearly three times Pakistan's... In 1960 fewer than a third of the children of primary school age were enrolled in Pakistan while nearly all were enrolled in Korea' (ibid.: 34).

Such evidence is less conclusive in relation to the late NICs in Southeast Asia. In Malaysia between 1970 and 1990, the New Economic Policy established an interethnic trade-off between Bumiputras and Chinese (economic gains for the Malays and political citizenship rights for the Chinese, without infringement on their economic position) that was made possible by rapid growth rates and foreign investment, and that resulted in equity among Malays and Chinese (but excluding inhabitants of Sabah and Sarawak, the indigenous Orang Asli, and Indians) (Gomez 1994, Jomo 1995). Policies pursuing equity and growth have been less in evidence in Thailand, play a minor part in Indonesia and have been absent in the Philippines.

While the elements of equity in the growth path of East Asian NIEs are noted in World Bank and other studies, they are not often highlighted. In Leipziger and Thomas' *Lessons of East Asia* they figure in the text but not in their 'Development Checklist', which features items such as selective industrial policies and directed credit (1995: 2). Debates on the East Asian NICs have concentrated on the question of the efficacy of government interventions – as the primary challenge to neoclassical economics and its emphasis on trade liberalization as the clue to Asian economic success. The question of the 'governed market' (Wade 1990) or 'governed interdependence' (Weiss 1996) and the everlasting

debate on state or market (Wade 1996) has tended to overshadow other issues such as equity and growth. In an Asian perspective on the 'East Asian Miracle' study, equity and growth, or 'shared growth', is mentioned in passing while the emphasis is on the institutional capacities of government (Ohno 1996: 20, Iwasaki et al. 1992).

The emphasis on the authoritarian character of Asian regimes (which is itself a variation on the well-worn theme of 'Oriental despotism') biases the discussion. References to Confucianism and 'Asian values' are not particularly helpful either. The first distinctive feature of East Asian authoritarian government is that it has been *developmental* – unlike, say, Somoza's authoritarianism or that of predatory states; the second is that in significant respects it has been *cooperative* in relation to market and society – unlike Pinochet's regime in Chile. The third is that it has not only disciplined labour but also capital. What has been overlooked or downplayed is the coordinating character of government intervention in East Asia and the ingenious political and social arrangements which have been devised in order to effect social policies in a market-friendly fashion, or vice versa, to effect market support strategies in a society-friendly fashion (Weiss 1996, Ohno 1996). Specific examples include state support for small and medium-size businesses in Taiwan (Hamilton and Woolsey Biggart 1992), Singapore's housing policy (Rodan 1989, Hill and Kwen Fee 1995) and Malaysia's new economic policy. China's experiences in combining the market economy and social development are also worth examining (Gao 1995, Griffin 2000b).

Human Development

> Empowerment is not only democratic, it is efficient. (Griffin and McKinley 1994)

The human development (HD) perspective takes the further step of making a general case for the nexus between equity and growth. According to Keith Griffin (1996: 15-17), 'under some circumstances, the greater is the degree of equality, the faster is likely to be the rate of growth'. His considerations include the cost of the perpetuation of inequality and that inequality undermines political legitimacy while 'modern technology has destroyed the monopoly of the state over the means of violence'. Furthermore, 'measures to reduce inequality can simultaneously contribute to faster growth'.

> There is much evidence that small farms are more efficient than either large collective farms of the Soviet type or the capitalist latifundia one finds in Latin America and elsewhere. A redistributive land reform and the creation of a small peasant farming system can produce performances as good if not better than those of other agricultural systems. The experience of such places as China and Korea is instructive... what is true of small farms is equally true of small and medium industrial and commercial enterprises. An egalitarian industrial structure, as Taiwan vividly demonstrates, can conquer world markets. (Griffin 1996: 17; cf. Fei et al. 1979)

Further elements mentioned by Griffin are investments in education – 'There is probably no easier way to combine equality and rapid growth. The whole of East Asia is testimony to the veracity of this proposition' – and the liberation of women. 'A final example of the falsity of the great trade-off is the liberation of

women. Equal treatment of women would release the talent, energy, creativity and imagination of half the population' (ibid.: 17; cf. Buvini et al. 1996).

A broadly similar case is made by ul Haq, who mentions 'four ways to create desirable links between economic growth and human development' (1995: 21-2): investment in education, health and skills; more equitable distribution of income; government social spending; and empowerment of people, especially women. Ul Haq proposes a HD paradigm of equity, sustainability, productivity, and empowerment (1995: 16). It is the element of productivity that sets this paradigm apart from the alternative development paradigm. This refers to the supply-side factor as the nexus between equity and growth.

This position is not necessarily controversial from the point of view of neoclassical economics. HD owes its definition to the emphasis on the investment in human resources, human capital, which is prominent in the East Asian model and Japanese perspectives on development and is now a mainstream development position. The growing knowledge intensity of economic growth, as in innovation-driven growth and the emphasis on R&D and technopoles, reinforces the argument that investment in human capital fosters growth. Ul Haq rejects the idea that adjustment and HD would be antithetical, either conceptually or in policy: 'Far from being antithetical, adjustment and growth with human development offer an intellectual and policy challenge in designing suitable programmes and policies... The challenge of combining these two concerns is like that of combining the conflicting viewpoints of the growth school and the distribution school in the 1970s' (1995: 7-8). The same reasoning informed 'structural adjustment with a human face' (Jolly 1986).

It is not difficult to find confirmation for human capital arguments in neoclassical economics:

> welfare economics and human capital theory provide important market-conforming justifications for a range of social policies, most notably for public health and education... neoclassical economics is inherently theoretically elastic. The theory of market failure may, in fact, justify a 'residual' welfare state, while information failure theory can be applied to argue for a fully fledged, comprehensive welfare state. (Esping-Andersen 1994: 712)

Nevertheless, the author continues, neoclassical economics emphasizes the efficiency trade-offs associated with welfare policies, specifically negative effects on savings (and hence investments), work incentives, and institutional rigidities (as with respect to labour mobility). In other words, neoclassical economics can both acknowledge and deflect welfare arguments by treating them as subsidiary to growth as the primary objective, so that in the end welfare policies end up on the backburner. The key aim should be, rather, to zero in on those elements in the equity-growth debate which are controversial or which open up the framework of neoclassical economics.

The HD approach skirts rather than confronts this issue. This follows from the fact that HD follows the human capital argument, which is part of rather than outside the paradigm of neoclassical economics. In addition, in assuming the *individual* as the unit of human development HD shows that its intellectual roots are in liberalism.[6] HD may also be interpreted as the lessons of East Asia translated into general policy. As such one way of reading it is as a meeting point between the authoritarian state and the neoliberal market, with the state acting as the supplier of human skills to the market, through human resource development programmes, packaged to achieve effective global competition. Merging social concerns and market concerns is excellent, but the question is, on which terms? According to ul Haq there is no contradiction in principle between structural reform and HD, it is only a matter of designing the right policy mix. This means that HD may be institutionally and ideologically acceptable to all sides. Since HD does not challenge but goes along with market logic, it does not in a principled way address the problem of the unregulated market.

HD has been inspired by Amartya Sen's capabilities approach to development (1985). An obvious question is, if capacitation is the objective and measure of development, then who defines capacity, ability, or human resources? What about the disabled, unwed mothers, the aged? What about human traits that *cannot* be translated into economic inputs, resources?[7] Besides, if capacitation and the enlargement of people's choices are the yardstick of development, as HD would have it, should we also consider say the Medéllin Cartel a form of capacitation and enlargement of people's choices? As Gasper (1997) argues, to Sen's capabilities approach there is no moral dimension. To the extent, then, that HD does not challenge neoliberalism and the principle of competitiveness but endorses it, HD may enable development business-as-usual to carry on more competitively under a general 'humane' aura. Then, social development, if sharpened, redefined and renewed in a wider framework, may be a more inclusive and enabling perspective than HD.

Lessons of Welfare States

Looking at social development side by side with the welfare state serves two purposes. It bridges the increasingly artificial divide between developed and developing countries and it helps to clear the path from economic generalizations to institutional and political questions. It might also, on the other hand, confuse issues: equity-growth policies do not necessarily have to take the form of the welfare state, which is a specific institutional arrangement.

It is not difficult to find econometric confirmation for the general positive correlation between equity or equality and growth: 'virtually every single statistical study concludes growth is positively related to equality' (Esping-Andersen 1994: 723); 'most econometric studies conclude that inequality is harmful to growth' (725). However, aside from methodological limitations, a fundamental theoretical fallacy is implicit in this approach. Ironically, this echoes the fallacy inherent in neoclassical economics, namely the tendency to abstract economic factors from institutional and political dynamics. According to Esping-Andersen, 'the narrowly economic framework of the neoclassical model' is the reason for 'the curious gap between theoretical claims and empirical findings': 'The model is consistent only when it leaves out political and social variables; studies that incorporate them invariably produce contradictory results' (724).

The welfare state may also be thought of as a particular way in which the economy is embedded in society. 'The welfare state is not something opposed to or in

some way related to the economy; it is an integral element in the organic linkage of production, reproduction and consumption... what we think of as the postwar welfare state is but one crucial regulatory element in the Fordist system of mass production' (Esping-Andersen 1994: 716-17). The failure of welfare states lies not so much in fiscal strain but can rather be seen as a 'manifestation of a mounting incompatibility between a fossilized welfare state, on one hand, and a rapidly changing organization of production and reproduction, on the other hand' (717). This refers to a series of shifts – toward service production, of industrial production to NICs, from standardization to flexibility, and from the Fordist family to women's economic independence, dual-earner households and non-linear life patterns. In welfare arrangements, this may involve shifts toward the Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop 1994) and toward welfare pluralism (Mishra 1996).

The reorganization of production is a function of new technologies and changing consumer demand (flexible accumulation) as well as globalization and the rise of the NICs. The crisis of welfare states, then, is also, in part, the other side of the coin of East Asian economic success. For instance, 'the redistributive Keynesian demand-stimulus policy, which served very well to assure adequate demand for domestically produced mass-consumption goods ... became increasingly counterproductive when such goods originated in Taiwan and Korea' (Esping-Andersen 1994: 717). This suggests that the framework in which equity and growth are conventionally considered – the society or nation state – needs to be opened up, eventually to a global scope.[8]

Studies of welfare states highlight their diversity. This includes distinguishing between residual welfare states (USA), lean welfare states (Switzerland, Japan), productivist welfare states (Scandinavia), and the Rhineland welfare states which tend to uphold status differences rather than being egalitarian. These distinctions may be merged with dynamic arguments on the relationship between equity and growth.

Arguments on the relationship between equity and growth coined in general terms are superseded by 'more complex, interactive models that posit curvilinear relationships between welfare states and economic performance' (Esping-Andersen 1994: 723). Such arguments suggest that up to a certain point the welfare state will have a positive influence on economic growth but that this then turns increasingly negative. Another curvilinear model suggests that 'full employment is best secured in countries where collective institutions (and the Left) are either very weak or very strong... In the former case, labor market clearing is largely left to naked market forces; in the latter, to political management' (724). Accordingly,

> the effect of a welfare state cannot be understood in isolation from the political-institutional framework in which it is embedded ... there may exist a trade-off between equality and efficiency in countries where the welfare state is large and very redistributive but in which the collective bargaining system is incapable of assuring wage moderation and stable, nonconflictual industrial relations. Thus, in concrete terms, a Swedish, Norwegian, or Austrian welfare state will not harm growth, while a British one will (even if it is smaller)... if we turn to a dynamic interpretation, the evidence suggests that as long as a large and redistributive welfare state is matched by neocorporatist-style political exchange mechanisms, equality and efficiency are compatible; when the capacity for harmonious political bargains ceases to function, the same welfare state may threaten economic performance. (725-6)

One line of argument is that once a certain level has been reached growth yields diminishing returns in terms of welfare and wellbeing (Daly and Cobb 1994). This calls to mind an earlier argument of Keynes on diminishing returns of the pursuit of surplus (Singer 1989).

Similar dynamic and curvilinear arguments have been made in relation to 'social capability': 'a country's potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is backward without qualification, but rather when it is technologically backward but socially advanced' (Temple and Johnson 1996: 2). How to define and measure 'social capability'? Putnam (1993) looks at associational membership and survey measures; Myrdal (1968) considered levels of mobility, communication and education. Temple and Johnson (1996: 1) are concerned with the 'social factors that play a role in the speed of catching up' and they define social capacity narrowly as 'the capacity of social institutions to assist in the adoption of foreign technology' (3). They follow the Adelman and Morris index of social development and conclude from their findings that the 'relative importance of investments in physical capital and schooling appears to vary with the extent of social development' (41).

Social Capital

This brings us to the wider question of the institutional embeddedness of social policies. At the end of the day arguments about equity and growth cannot be made in generic terms. They are political questions or, more precisely, for their economic rationale to be operative they depend on institutional arrangements and political settlements. New institutional economics focuses on the institutional requirements for economic growth such as legal frameworks and structures of rights, while the growing body of work on sociology of economics examines the embeddedness of economic behaviour.

The standard literature on social development is, as mentioned before, dominated by questions of social policy. Literature on economic performance increasingly turns towards social issues (e.g. Granovetter 1992, Stewart 1996), but on an entirely different wavelength. Since the two fields hardly meet it is an interesting exercise to consider their possible intersections. They concern two dimensions of social development: social policy and the economic significance of social networks and relations of trust, which is often summed up under the heading of social capital. Social capital refers to a widely ramifying range of arguments, with various possible intersections with social development, depending on which angle on social capital one adopts.[9]

For Bourdieu (1976) a key concern is that of the relations among economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital, which he regards as cumulative and interchangeable. Current interest is more concerned with social capital as a clue to economic capital, an asset in the process of accumulation. Social capital in this sense may be appropriated in a rightwing perspective, in which civil society serves as

women. Equal treatment of women would release the talent, energy, creativity and imagination of half the population' (ibid.: 17; cf. Buvini et al. 1996).

A broadly similar case is made by ul Haq, who mentions 'four ways to create desirable links between economic growth and human development' (1995: 21-2): investment in education, health and skills; more equitable distribution of income; government social spending; and empowerment of people, especially women. Ul Haq proposes a HD paradigm of equity, sustainability, productivity, and empowerment (1995: 16). It is the element of productivity that sets this paradigm apart from the alternative development paradigm. This refers to the supply-side factor as the nexus between equity and growth.

This position is not necessarily controversial from the point of view of neo-classical economics. HD owes its definition to the emphasis on the investment in human resources, human capital, which is prominent in the East Asian model and Japanese perspectives on development and is now a mainstream development position. The growing knowledge intensity of economic growth, as in innovation-driven growth and the emphasis on R&D and technopoles, reinforces the argument that investment in human capital fosters growth. Ul Haq rejects the idea that adjustment and HD would be antithetical, either conceptually or in policy: 'Far from being antithetical, adjustment and growth with human development offer an intellectual and policy challenge in designing suitable programmes and policies... The challenge of combining these two concerns is like that of combining the conflicting viewpoints of the growth school and the distribution school in the 1970s' (1995: 7-8). The same reasoning informed 'structural adjustment with a human face' (Jolly 1986).

It is not difficult to find confirmation for human capital arguments in neoclassical economics:

> welfare economics and human capital theory provide important market-conforming justifications for a range of social policies, most notably for public health and education... neoclassical economics is inherently theoretically elastic. The theory of market failure may, in fact, justify a 'residual' welfare state, while information failure theory can be applied to argue for a fully fledged, comprehensive welfare state. (Esping-Andersen 1994: 712)

Nevertheless, the author continues, neoclassical economics emphasizes the efficiency trade-offs associated with welfare policies, specifically negative effects on savings (and hence investments), work incentives, and institutional rigidities (as with respect to labour mobility). In other words, neoclassical economics can both acknowledge and deflect welfare arguments by treating them as subsidiary to growth as the primary objective, so that in the end welfare policies end up on the backburner. The key aim should be, rather, to zero in on those elements in the equity-growth debate which are controversial or which open up the framework of neoclassical economics.

The HD approach skirts rather than confronts this issue. This follows from the fact that HD follows the human capital argument, which is part of rather than outside the paradigm of neoclassical economics. In addition, in assuming the *individual* as the unit of human development HD shows that its intellectual roots are in liberalism.[6] HD may also be interpreted as the lessons of East Asia translated into general policy. As such one way of reading it is as a meeting point between the authoritarian state and the neoliberal market, with the state acting as the supplier of human skills to the market, through human resource development programmes, packaged to achieve effective global competition. Merging social concerns and market concerns is excellent, but the question is, on which terms? According to ul Haq there is no contradiction in principle between structural reform and HD, it is only a matter of designing the right policy mix. This means that HD may be institutionally and ideologically acceptable to all sides. Since HD does not challenge but goes along with market logic, it does not in a principled way address the problem of the unregulated market.

HD has been inspired by Amartya Sen's capabilities approach to development (1985). An obvious question is, if capacitation is the objective and measure of development, then who defines capacity, ability, or human resources? What about the disabled, unwed mothers, the aged? What about human traits that *cannot* be translated into economic inputs, resources?[7] Besides, if capacitation and the enlargement of people's choices are the yardstick of development, as HD would have it, should we also consider say the Medéllin Cartel a form of capacitation and enlargement of people's choices? As Gasper (1997) argues, to Sen's capabilities approach there is no moral dimension. To the extent, then, that HD does not challenge neoliberalism and the principle of competitiveness but endorses it, HD may enable development business-as-usual to carry on more competitively under a general 'humane' aura. Then, social development, if sharpened, redefined and renewed in a wider framework, may be a more inclusive and enabling perspective than HD.

Lessons of Welfare States

Looking at social development side by side with the welfare state serves two purposes. It bridges the increasingly artificial divide between developed and developing countries and it helps to clear the path from economic generalizations to institutional and political questions. It might also, on the other hand, confuse issues: equity-growth policies do not necessarily have to take the form of the welfare state, which is a specific institutional arrangement.

It is not difficult to find econometric confirmation for the general positive correlation between equity or equality and growth: 'virtually every single statistical study concludes growth is positively related to equality' (Esping-Andersen 1994: 723); 'most econometric studies conclude that inequality is harmful to growth' (725). However, aside from methodological limitations, a fundamental theoretical fallacy is implicit in this approach. Ironically, this echoes the fallacy inherent in neoclassical economics, namely the tendency to abstract economic factors from institutional and political dynamics. According to Esping-Andersen, 'the narrowly economic framework of the neoclassical model' is the reason for 'the curious gap between theoretical claims and empirical findings': 'The model is consistent only when it leaves out political and social variables; studies that incorporate them invariably produce contradictory results' (724).

The welfare state may also be thought of as a particular way in which the economy is embedded in society. 'The welfare state is not something opposed to or in

What attitude governments take in relation to these forms of cooperation can make a huge difference. The New Order government of Suharto utilized the Chinese business community as a classic 'trading minority', 'the Jews of the East' – keeping them politically dependent, with limited political rights, while nurturing relations with a small coterie of tycoons (Irwan 1996); whereas the Malaysian new economic policy (1970–90) has been able to strike an interethnic deal.

It would follow that a policy of *democratization*, rather than polarization, of interethnic relations can contribute to economic achievement. This may be an instance with wider implications. Social development in this sense refers to policies promoting social trust among and across diverse communities – classes, status groups, minorities, etc. It may also refer to the creation of social infrastructure such as housing, schools, clinics, water supply; or asset development among low-income groups to encourage savings among the poor, which will foster social investments (Midgley 1995: 160). Government can play a facilitative role, in the form of managed pluralism. Synergies between regional, urban and local economic development are another relevant approach. The principle of cooperation also applies to relations among firms and between firms and subcontractors (see e.g. Dore 1992 on goodwill in Japan).

An extensive literature documents intersectoral cooperation and synergies in the context of community or local economic development (CED, LED). This approach may also have international, macro-regional and global implications (cf. Thrift and Amin 1997, Kuttner 1991, Gerschenkron 1992). The emerging theme of transnational social policy is worth considering (Deacon et al. 1998). A further proposition is that of a World Social Development Organization to effect economic and social policy jointly on a world scale (Petrella 1995: 22). Examining transnational social capital in the informal (Portes 1996) and the formal sector (Strange 1996) may enrich these propositions.

Conclusion

> Economic growth does not cause an increase in the quality of life, but increase in quality of life does lead to economic growth. (Mizanur Rahman Shelley, Center for the Study of the Global South 1994: 62)

Structural adjustment programmes and social safety nets make up a convenient combination, and so do the 'Washington consensus' and the Copenhagen summit. In this configuration, social development is a matter of tidying up after the market: a polarizing mode of economic growth, followed by social impact studies to assess its pauperizing impact and poverty alleviation measures to compensate for the immiserization effect. This is the repair or damage control mode of social development. Upon closer consideration it is not so much social development as social fixing and political risk management. Along the way, however, social inequality entails not merely a moral cost and political consequences: 'there is a point at which social injustice undermines economic efficiency' (Center for the Study of the Global South 1994: 15).

In development theory a distinction runs between development as planned change or engineering, and development as immanent change, a process from within (Cowen and Shenton 1996). Modernization theory followed a logic of development from above and outside. Structural adjustment follows in the same footsteps. Modernization policies in the past, and at present the application of liberal productivism to developing countries, first *destroy* existing social capital for the sake of achieving economic growth, and then by means of social policy seek to *rebuild* social tissue. Obviously along the way there is a lot of slippage, displacement, and realignment of power relations. Pursuing Darwinist economics and then sending Florence Nightingale after to tidy up the damage is a cumbersome and economically counterproductive approach to development.

The point of this chapter is to take social development beyond poverty alleviation toward a substantive and pro-active approach. The second objective is to go beyond the human capital approach of human development. A productivist approach to social development involves not merely investing in education, health, housing – the standard fare of human capital approaches – but also accommodating and investing in networking across communities and groups and designing enabling institutional environments – in other words, a social capital or participatory civic society approach. As a supply-side approach, i.e. enhancing productivity and output, rather than promoting consumption, this addresses the criticism of Keynesian demand stimulus policies on the part of the supply-siders of the 1980s. To address the problem of technological change and jobless growth requires a wider approach of investment-led growth (cf. Griffin 2000a).

On several grounds and in multiple fashions – human capital, social capital, democratization – social development can contribute to overall economic achievement. In the words of Amin and Thrift (1997: 160), 'the argument within socioeconomics that there can be a close connection between democracy and economic success is to be welcomed in our market-driven age'. If the market dominates it might as well serve socially useful purposes.

The neoclassical trickle-down argument cannot be made in generic terms because outcomes vary according to political and social circumstances; for the same reason, equity-growth or *trickle-up* arguments cannot be made in general terms either: as such they would have very limited purchase. A social productivist approach might require an interventionist, developmental state,[10] but this may be too heavy-handed. A more modest approach is managed pluralism (Midgley 1995). Intersectoral synergies between local government, NGOs and people's organizations and firms are another field of cooperation (Brown and Ashman 1999, Wignaraja 1992).

Managed pluralism involves political regulation. Merging social and market concerns also involves the development of collective bargaining systems. This may be difficult to achieve in segmented societies. Ethnic segmentation is a case in point; caste and class antagonism is another obstacle. A civic culture that strongly privileges individualism, as in North American free enterprise culture, may be more conducive to a casino mentality than to socially inclusive political settlements. Even so, one application of this kind of approach would be to review affirmative action policies in the United States and reservations policies in India. For these legacies need not to be taken as destinies. The point of the social development approach is not to provide a menu but to suggest a direction of analysis and policy.

Social development, redefined in a wide sense, can serve as an orientation for a new social contract and as such become a new assembly point for development.

Notes

1 In considering infant mortality rates, Drèze and Sen (1989) distinguish two patterns: growth-mediated security, in which the crucial factor in lowering infant mortality rates have been growth and employment (e.g. in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea) and support-led security in which infant mortality rates have come down although growth rates have been low (in Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Cuba during the 1970s). The latter countries have since changed course or been overtaken by events: Chile embarked on a different course under the Pinochet regime; Costa Rica and Jamaica have implemented macroeconomic reforms since the 1980s; Cuba's economy is stagnant.

2 In view of the status of the Kerala model (Robin 1992), a little more information may be in order. 'The open unemployment rate is around three times the national average.... Kerala has earned the dubious distinction of being the only state in India whose real social expenditure has decreased during 1985-86/1991-92 period, compared to the decade 1974-75/1984-85' (Isaac and Tharakan 1995: 1996). Further discussions are Tharamangalam 1998 and 'The Kerala model of development: a debate' 1998.

3 This is a British usage, parallel to e.g. social anthropology.

4 For instance, Indonesia's report to the Copenhagen summit is entirely framed by the 'Presidential Instruction No. 5/1993 regarding the Intensification of Efforts to Alleviate Poverty', the so-called IDT Program (IDT Program Implementation Guide, Jakarta, National Development Planning Agency and Ministry of Home Affairs, 1994). A report such as *Social Dimensions in the Agenda of the IDB* (Inter-American Development Bank 1995) is also confined to an inclusionary social policy approach. By contrast, the parallel meeting organized by NGOs followed a different track. An example is the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement's *The Way of Power: Development in the Hands of the People* (Quezon City 1994) which develops a civil society and grassroots-centred Sustainable Rural District Programme, in other words, a social action and participatory policy approach. Several submissions combine social action and policy approaches, from below and above, such as Møller and Rasmussen (1995). UNRISD (1995) reviews various approaches, from poverty alleviation to participatory social policy and notions such as promoting global citizenship.

5 The components of the Adelman-Morris index of social development are: size of the traditional agricultural sector; extent of dualism; extent of urbanization; character of basic social organization; importance of indigenous middle class; extent of social mobility; extent of literacy; extent of mass communication; crude fertility rate; degree of modernization of outlook (in Temple and Johnson 1996: 10).

6 Cultural bias may be another limitation to HD. Griffin and McKinley (1994) seek to accommodate this by making HD responsive to cultural difference and disaggregating HDI according to ethnic groups within society. Griffin (2000b) takes this a step further by considering cultural difference as an engine of economic growth.

7 Paul Streeten (in ul Haq 1995: xi) mentions the conflict between human resource developers (who emphasize HD as a means to growth) and humanitarians (who view it as an end and are also concerned with the unproductive and unemployable).

8 I address this in a paper on the 'interaction of modernities' (Nederveen Pieterse 2000c).

9 This context only allows a brief engagement. There is now a broad stream of publications on social capital particularly in economics and political science.

10 Or, an 'intelligent' or educator state that is ahead of civil society, such as France and Singapore; a principle that is not part of the Anglo-American tradition, which leans towards the minimal state.

9

CRITICAL HOLISM
AND THE TAO
OF DEVELOPMENT

For Vincent Tucker

Life is poetic and harsh, momentary and evolutionary, personal and abstract, physical, emotional, mental and intuitive. Human experience is layered and multi-faceted, but social science, circumscribed by a Cartesian and Newtonian matrix of knowledge, captures only a narrow slice of experience. Disciplinary boundaries further narrow and theories bend the range. Development processes likewise take place across dimensions – on a physical level, in an ecological framework, as shifts in social relations, changes in emotional landscapes, on a mental plane, in a political field, a historical context, on a moral plane and in a universe of meaning. Given the partial nature of development theories – which reflect disciplinary territories – and policy interventions – which, in addition, reflect political and institutional interests – the development field is carved up in many ways. How then to arrive at a comprehensive approach? Opting for a holistic approach may produce syntheses that are too quick and whose centre of gravity is located outside social science, for instance in ethics, so they yield commentaries with outsider status. One can identify the world of development as 'a totality of fragments' and the world of capitalisms as one of 'difference within a structured totality' (Pred and Watts 1992: 11); yet that does not tell us very much. In fact the notion of 'fragments' implies some kind of pre-existing wholeness. Responding to this dilemma is the context of this chapter. This is a reflexive chapter that is concerned with questions of general methodology and philosophy of development.

Remedying Remedies

This treatment is inspired by Vincent Tucker's work on critical holism, which he developed in relation to sociology of health. He combines sociology of health with critical development studies. In criticizing the role of transnational pharmaceutical industries and their commercialization of health he arrives at a new combination of concerns – holism and critical thinking, or holism with a bite, holism with an attitude. Part of this is an anthropological sensitivity to cultural dimensions of development (Tucker 1996b), a personal engagement with healing,

which include following a holistic health course and taking a degree in holistic massage, and interests ranging from music to psychotherapy.

Tucker's starting point is modern medicine, or the biomedical approach: the 'clinical gaze', 'a pill for every ill' (1997: 37), 'a magical fix for all ailments' (30), and the idea that 'health = doctors + drugs' (1996a: 17); a hegemonic system sustained and propagated by medical professionals and pharmaceutical industries. All along his interest has been not only in the politics of dependence in the South and Ireland but also in the possibilities for dependency reversal (Tucker 1996c) and, likewise, in alternatives to conventional medicine. In this respect his approach differs from treatments of modern medicine which are primarily critical (e.g. Nandy 1995; Kothari and Mehta 1988). Modern medicine is contrasted to an emerging 'new holistic health paradigm' (1997: 32) which is considered at several levels. 'The emergence of the holistic paradigm will require not only a change in the practice of medicine and health care, but also in the knowledge system and the model of science on which it is based. It will also require changes in the institutional fabric of health care' (ibid.). At the same time his approach is concerned with extending holism itself: 'it also addresses weaknesses in holistic thinking and practice by incorporating into the model perspectives from more critical traditions of public health' (1996a: 1). For instance Fritjof Capra's work, 'like most approaches to holism, is less well developed when it comes to incorporating social, economic and cultural systems into the model' (1997: 42). Hence Tucker distinguishes between

> two versions or tendencies in holistic thinking. One focuses primarily on the individual organism. Most holistic health practice belongs to this tendency. It differs from biomedicine in that in its diagnostic techniques and therapies in takes into account a broader range of systems, which include the biological, the energetic, the psychic, the interpersonal and the spiritual. While it is more cognisant of the social and environmental factors which impact on the health of the individual, and takes these into account in its diagnosis, it does not provide ways of analysing or intervening in these macro systems. The second version of holism derives from the more sociological approach of Engels and Virchow... It also derives from the public health tradition. It encompasses economic and political systems as well as biological and environmental systems and is based on the notion that health and illness are not simply biological phenomena but are socially produced. This more sociologically informed holism has been further developed by Marxist political economy and radical development theory... (1997: 42)

Tucker then initiates a further move. While the sociological tradition 'adds a critical edge often missing in holistic health practice... it has little to contribute to our understanding of the personal and interpersonal dimensions of illness and well-being' (1997: 43). Finally: 'The critical combination of these two perspectives, which forms the basis of an expanded and more critical notion of holism, can provide a comprehensive alternative to the biomedical model' (ibid.).

Vincent Tucker's synthesis involves multiple movements: from biomedical reductionism to holism, from individual holism to sociological holism, from sociology and political economy to holism in personal, interpersonal and spiritual dimensions. The components of critical holism are spelled out in several places: 'a critical synthesis of holistic medicine, political economy, development theory, environmentalism and feminism... a theoretical synthesis of holistic theory,

Marxist political economy and culture critique' (1996a: 3); 'critical holism encompasses social, economic, political and environmental systems including world systems' (1996a: 41). In health practice this yields the following combination: 'A holistic perspective on health promotion, while not excluding biomedical interventions, may include public health practices, environmental campaigns, political action, educational activities and complementary forms of medicine. It will include not only changes in personal life style, but also collective action to challenge organisations and institutions... which act in ways detrimental to public health' (1997: 45).

This is a high-wire synthesis. While it is developed in relation to health it addresses gaps in our knowledge that are of general relevance. Its triple movement – providing remedies and remedying not only the original deficiencies but the shortcomings of the remedies as well – is welcome medicine in relation to development studies and social science generally. It involves a developed sense of balance. Thus, we all know, not only intellectually but viscerally, the limitations of modern medicine. We may acknowledge the merits of holism, while its weakness is also evident – no critical edge, no political economy. The reverse applies to political economy – materialist savvy and sociological finesse, but no emotional or spiritual depth. If in a combined movement all these are brought together, balancing the limitations of each with the strengths of others, we have a bridge of uncommon strength and sophistication. This has been Vincent Tucker's contribution. In passing, Tucker notes that his critical holism paradigm 'also provides a basis for elaborating a general theory of human development' (1996a: 1), so it is worth probing what would be the general ramifications of this synthesis. Generally, the limitations of a position or paradigm are often remedied by switching to another position while the limitations of *this* position are not addressed. People often move from one ideological fix to another. The result is the usual pendulum swing alternating between extremes – a common spectacle in everyday politics and theory, and an everlasting merry-go-round of limited options.

Critical holism is an uncommon synthesis. Criticism and holism refer to different modes of cognition. This makes it a welcome synthesis: without a critical edge, holism easily becomes totalizing, romantic, soggy. Without holism, criticism easily turns flat, sour. If we re-code these sensibilities, perhaps the synthesis becomes easier. To 'criticism' there are several strands: it refers to the exercise of analytical faculties; it means a repudiation of 'faith' and dogmatism in the Enlightenment tradition; it entails a commitment to class struggle in Marxism; an emancipatory knowledge interest in critical theory; and equality and social justice in dependency theory. Key elements of criticism then are analysis, anti-dogmatism and social justice. How does this tally with holism as a concern for the whole, the totality? If we take criticism in its affirmative sense it means acknowledging dimensions which have been *left out*. Through criticism an inclusive knowledge is to be achieved, which represents those elements which are outside or not acknowledged in the status quo. Accordingly, criticism is also an attempt at healing in the sense of restoring wholeness – by acknowledging and rendering visible that which has been ignored, left out. In a broad sense both

criticism and holism then refer to modes of healing: from the point of view of completeness in a societal sense by way of emancipation and justice, and from the point of view of wholeness in a multidimensional sense.

Conventional therapies implicitly refer to 'wholeness' through the notion of deficiencies. Through 'additives' or supplements, food or vitamin deficiencies can be remedied. Only, here wholeness is confined to the physical sphere, which permits medicalization and 'fixing'. Modern medicine recognizes psychological dimensions of health, as in psychosomatic illness, but these are compartmentalized away in domains such as psychology, psychiatry, neurology. (Here the idea of multiple layers is well established – such as the id, ego and superego in psychoanalysis – but this hardly feeds back into conventional medicine.) The difference between holistic and conventional therapies is that the former acknowledge emotional, psychological, spiritual (and moral and social) levels of being as dimensions of health and well-being, and seek to integrate them into the healing process.

Wholeness, Holism

Once the whole is divided, the parts need new names. (Lao Tsu, 6th century BC, 1973: 29)

According to a dictionary of word origins, '*Whole* is at the centre of a tightly knit family of English words descended from prehistoric Germanic *khailaz* "undamaged"' (Ayto 1990: 573). Other members of this family include *hail* 'salute', *hale, hallow, heal, health* and *holy*. 'Etymologically, *health* is the "state of being whole".... The verb *heal* [OE] comes from the same source' (277). '*Holy* originated as a derivative of the prehistoric Germanic adjective which produced modern English *whole*, and so its etymological meaning is perhaps "unimpaired, inviolate"' (285). In Germanic languages there is a connection between health, healing, holiness and wholeness which also exists in other language groups, as in Latin *salvus* 'healthy', *salus* 'bliss, health', Irish *slan* 'healthy, whole', Greek *holos* 'whole', old Indian *sarva* 'undamaged, whole' (de Vries 1963: 257). 'Saviour' (Dutch heiland) means 'healer' and connects to the Greek *soter* (de Vries 96). The Dutch *genezen* (healing, healed) refers to Gothic *ganisan* 'saved, healthy, holy', which may be connected to Greek *neomai*, 'I come back, come home'. According to an etymologist (de Vries 82), this would give the meaning of 'coming home safely'.

Health, then, refers to a state of wholeness, and healing is restoring a person to wholeness. Viewed in this light 'holistic healing' becomes a tautology, for apparently all along health basically means wholeness and healing 'making whole'. This tautology makes sense only in distinction to conventional medicine. Holism, in this light, appears to be a cerebral attempt at *recovery* of interconnections lost in the course of analysis, in the process establishing different connections.

Holism is defined as 'the theory that whole entities, as fundamental and determining components of reality, have an existence other than as the mere sum of their parts' (*Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, quoted in Craig 1992: 4). 'Jan Christiaan Smuts gave the word currency in his 1926 book *Holism and Evolution*, where he advocated the exploration of matter, life, and mind in relation to each other, rather than as isolable realms of existence. Since then,

holistic has been applied to approaches and attitudes, in the humanities and the social sciences as well as the sciences, that privilege the study of a system over analysis of its parts' (ibid.: 4-5). In Smuts' work wholeness and holism are used interchangeably. His book follows an essay of 1912, 'An inquiry into the whole'. *Holism and Evolution* is a high-minded work that was influenced by the Cambridge Platonists, Bergson's vitalism, and ideas of evolution from Darwin to de Vries (Meurs 1997). Holism in this work derives from Greek *holos* and stands for 'the activity of the Whole'. 'Holism that is the ultimate activity which prompts and pulsates through all other activities in the universe' (Smuts, quoted in Meurs 1997: 115). The first chapter deals with 'The holisation of the whole' which refers to assimilation and homogenization processes (Meurs 1997: 118).

Apparently there is slippage between wholeness and holism. As a notion wholeness is evocative and descriptive, whereas to holism there is a programmatic element. Now *systems* thinking comes into the picture, as part of the analysis recovery syndrome. Once the analytical mode has generated distinctions and separations, systems thinking is an attempt to piece together again that which has been taken apart. The attributes of system, however, are unlike the properties of wholeness. Holism may be a step forward in relation to the Enlightenment habit of taking everything apart but it's short of wholeness. Humpty Dumpty put together again is not the same Humpty Dumpty. *Esprit de système* is not the spirit of wholeness. More precisely, there are different notions of system. It derives from the Greek *synhistanai*, 'to place together', so to understand things systematically means to put them in a context and to establish the nature of their relationship. This relationship may be thought of as calculable and machine-like, as in mechanistic notions of system; or as approximate network relations, as in general systems theory (Capra 1996: 27f.). In social science the notion of system ranges from structural functionalism *à la* Parsons, and world-system theory, to the complex systems approach of Niklas Luhmann. In Luhmann's words: 'Sociology can only describe society in society.... It is a science of the social system and a social system of science. To make matters even more complex, as a science and, as a social system, sociology is also an internal observer of whatever system it participates in' (quoted in Lee 1997: 15). One problem of systems approaches is that they imply a closure of the field; they achieve understanding (and manipulability) by framing the field, and even reflexivity may not remedy this.

It makes sense then to distinguish between wholeness and holism as perspectives with related but separate lineages: wholeness refers to a comprehensive field which may be divided according to spiritual criteria (there are divisions also in mystical or magical universes); holism is the systemic or scientific recombination of fragments in a new totality. From a historical point of view, wholeness resonates with neolithic and older sensibilities, while holism brings to mind the technology and mindset of the industrial era. While there are continuities between wholeness and holism, 'This is not to say that the differences between modern holistic thinkers and earlier ones are easily reconcilable' (Dunn 1986: 3). Both are relevant angles, each with its range of applicability.

The slippage between wholeness and holism leaves room for a politics of holism. In combination with ideas of evolution, holism can apparently be taken

in any political direction. Jan Smuts is a case in point. A Cambridge graduate, back in South Africa Jan Smuts became a general, minister of defence and mining in the new republic and Prime Minister from 1919 to 1924 and during the Second World War. A pro-British Boer and an empire builder in the tradition of Cecil Rhodes, he was part of the Milner Group, and as a member of the British Imperial War Cabinet he was a party to the Balfour Declaration which partitioned Palestine, and an active negotiator in the partition of Ireland (Quigley 1966, Sampson 1987, Nederveen Pieterse 1989). Smuts endorsed segregation and introduced pass laws. His views on the 'native question' in South Africa were much like those of Rhodes. Africans, 'if left to themselves and their own tribal routine… do not respond very well to the stimulus of progress'. Therefore, in white areas 'the system should only allow the residence of males for limited periods, and for purposes of employment among the whites' (quoted in Minter 1986: 43).[1]

To wholeness there are obviously many dimensions. Wholeness is evoked in mysticism, myth, religion. Faces of wholeness in the theatre of the gods are Pan, who gives us the word for 'all', Okeanos or the world stream and Varuna the encompasser. Wholeness carries intimations of the unity of being as in *unio mystica*, oceanic feeling, cosmic consciousness (Mehta 1989). Religion is replete with 'whole' metaphors such as the tree of life, wheel of life, dharma, 'Thou art That' and other references to the inner interconnectedness of phenomena. Paradise is a state of wholeness and the fall means the loss of wholeness. Paradise regained is wholeness regained. In Christian theology 'the whole of creation' envelops the non-human world. A conventional difference between mysticism and religion is that, in the former, wholeness may be a matter of experience, while in religion it becomes a point of doctrine, so that religion relates to mysticism as abstraction does to experience. While some religions superimpose a 'monotheistic consciousness', 'our psyches are "polytheistic" by nature' and contain an inner pantheon (Ahmed 1997: 33, 36). Wholeness is woven into personal experience – in life's transitions, in love, in experiences of pain and healing, in peak experiences. The paradox of wholeness is the powerful materiality of life and the immaterial nature of the full realization of life. Wholeness includes 'life beyond', but there is no life beyond without life within. The materiality of life makes transcendence possible and constrains it, casting a spell of material life that is shattered only at life's edges – in peak experiences or in the face of death.

It is not difficult to read philosophy from Plato to Aquinas, Hegel to Heidegger as elaborations, systematizations of sensibilities originally set forth in vision, revelation, religion, although to say so is of course sacrilege in reverse. At least, this is the argument of the *philosophia perennis* (à la Huxley 1946). Neo-Platonism, one of the strands in idealistic philosophy, connects Eastern religions with Western philosophy (Nederveen Pieterse 1994). What comes to mind is Hegel's view of world history as a rendezvous with the unfolding *Geist*. Richard Rorty is reproached for his 'undifferentiated, monotonous holism' (Bhaskar 1991: 100), which involves yet a different meaning and facet of holism.

So as a theme, wholeness functions like a kaleidoscope of sensibilities. Among lineages of holism Vincent Tucker mentions ecological thinking in biology which spread to social science. Related currents are Gestalt psychology, psychotherapy and Buddhist thought (1997: 41). In social science wholeness is thematized in several ways. Marxism represents a commitment to 'the whole' within a materialist ontology. Harrod's plea for 'a research for a lost completeness' refers to a return to critical political economy (1997: 108). Gestalt psychology led Ruth Benedict (1935) to a view on cultures as wholes or 'configurations' organized around core meanings. Talcott Parsons' social systems approach is centred on structural differentiation and functional integration. Louis Althusser viewed societies as structured wholes.

In the social sphere wholeness is often associated with romanticism and nostalgia, as in the idealization of 'tradition', communitarianism and the idealization of 'community'. In politics it can involve homogenizing projects of 'totality', as in some types of utopian politics, or nostalgia for a lost political 'unity'. In this light, a dose of difference can be quite a relief. A different and concrete angle on wholeness is the social exclusion approach (Bhalla and Lapeyre 1997). In liberation theology's 'preferential option for the poor' this sensibility is stated affirmatively. For the architect Robert Venturi, part of postmodern sensibilities is 'the obligation toward the difficult whole' (McHale 1992: 3).

Contradictions of Modernity

The question of modern medicine is a subset of a larger problem – the question of modernity and, in turn, the contradictions of modernity: in particular the contradiction between the 'two cultures', the scientific-technological and humanistic cultures, the worlds of science and art. The core of scientific culture is often traced back to Descartes and his project of 'certain knowledge' on the basis of mathematics as a universal scientific method, or 'the world according to mathematics'. The mathematical mind abstracts, generalizes, dichotomizes and is given to formalism (Davis and Hersh 1986, cf. Passmore 1978).[2] Critiques of Cartesianism, in the company of Bacon and Newton, go back a long way, among others to the Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico: 'Mathematics is created in the self-alienation of the human spirit. The spirit cannot discover itself in mathematics. The human spirit lives in human institutions' (quoted in Davis and Hersh 1986: x; Pompa 1990). This general current of dissent is as old as 'the other West of William Blake and Paracelsus' (Nandy 1995: 60). A different twist to this kind of dispute is the argument between Habermas and Lyotard on the virtues of the Enlightenment and the debate on postmodernism.

There is something jarring about the way the tension within modernity is usually conceptualized and represented on either side of the argument. Viewing the relationship between scientific and humanistic cultures as a dichotomy itself follows a Cartesian paradigm. Representing this tension as a dualistic, polarized relationship gives either side the opportunity to profile its position and in the process exaggerate the issue. It is clearly a superficial representation from the outset. Viewing this relationship as a continuum of views that meet and diverge on multiple levels is much more adequate. In addition this involves a one-sided representation of the Enlightenment, which is a much more complex historical field than is granted in conventional views.[3] This is worth keeping in mind when

considering the long-standing attempts to bridge these worlds and reintegrate the sciences and humanities. Siu's *Tao of Science* attempted such a reintegration in 1957, long before Capra's *Tao of Physics*. Generally elements of this fusion include the following:

❑ *Ecology*. Ecological knowledge as part of a general systems approach and deep ecology (as in Arne Naess, 1976).

❑ *History of science*. Joseph Needham's work on the history of Chinese science and technology and its influence on Western science is part of a wider body of work documenting the historical connections between 'Western knowledge and Eastern wisdom'. The Enlightenment also includes figures such as Leibniz and Goethe who bridged Western and Eastern sensibilities. Later Werner Heisenberg was influenced by Indian philosophy through conversations with Tagore, and Niels Bohr was inspired by his visit to China (Weber 1982: 218). On a conceptual level, Kuhn's work on scientific revolutions (1962) debunked the self-representation of progress in science, and through the notion of paradigm shifts introduced a meta level of analysis of scientific procedures and gatekeeping.

❑ *Physics*. Subatomic physics has generated a stream of findings that upset Descartes' certain knowledge, including Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, according to which the instrument of measurement affects the outcome, also known as the observer effect. In the 1920s Alfred North Whitehead developed an inclusive notion of reality beyond dualisms such as those of mind and matter: 'In a certain sense, everything is everywhere at all times. For every location involves an aspect of itself in every other location' (quoted in Siu 1957: 157). In quantum physics this has been taken further in David Bohm's work on the implicate order (1980). Several of these reorientations have been grouped together under the heading of the holographic paradigm (Wilber 1982), building on Dennis Gabor's work on holography.

❑ *New science*. This includes developments such as catastrophe theory, chaos theory, complexity theory, fuzzy logic, the theory of emergence, self-organizing systems (Prigogine and Stengers 1984) and new trends in biology and mind–brain research.

Some of these reorientations turn on a fusion or complementarity of 'Western knowledge and Eastern wisdom'. What is the status of this fusion? To what extent is the new science a marginal concern? It is not quite so marginal if we think of developments such as chaos theory, which has found wide application (Gleick 1988), including in business (Peters 1988) and social science (Eve et al. 1997, Anderla et al. 1997). The butterfly effect, or sensitive dependence on initial conditions, may be interpreted as an instance of the implicate order in action. Subatomic physics finds application in nano technology and advanced materials research. What several accounts suggest is that on the other side of science we come out at findings that intimate an interconnectedness of being that is similar to what has been intuited in mysticism – arguably, a complementarity between 'moonshine physics' and ground-floor mysticism.[4] In this view, the splitting process carried all the way through, to subatomic quantums and quarks, arrives at the ultimate unity of all being, or the universe as a 'sea of quarks' (Adachi 1996). At these deeper strata, contradictions such as those between the sciences and the humanities unravel. They turn out to be 'regional contradictions' that make sense within a certain limited context, but do not hold in the larger field. It is true, of course, that the world of everyday action is not a world of quantums or quarks, yet on the level of the foundational claims of science and epistemology it does matter that the Cartesian and Newtonian premises apply within a narrow range only. This argument cuts two ways. While to all human faculties and expressions there may be a 'territorial drive' and an urge toward functional autonomy, by this wide-angle logic, all are part of the whole and cannot be denied their potential to contribute to wholeness. This also holds for mathematics – in Plato's words, God ever geometrizes; and for computers – without computers the intricate calculations that led to chaos theory could not have been generated. In other words, 'both reductionism and holism are necessary' (Capra in Weber 1982: 241). New science does not replace but supplements Newtonian science.

> Typically, the new paradigm demonstrates that knowledge gained under the old paradigm is true *under specific boundary conditions*. Thus, the rules of motion put forth by Newton are not demolished by Einsteinian physics, but are shown to be a special case of a larger, more inclusive physics.... Chaos and complexity do not 'overthrow' former conceptions and scientific knowledge, but merely supplement them. (Eve 1997: 275)

Development and High Modernism

The contradictions of modernity are of profound relevance to development studies. Considering that development is applied modernity, all the contradictions of modernity are reproduced within development as dramatically unresolved tensions. Development theory is now being torn between paradigms – mainstream, alternative and post-development – or between internal and external critiques of development. What then is the relevance of these disputes over modernity for development studies and of attempts to reconceptualize or bridge these concerns? Arguably, the most fundamental question concerns the meaning of development, which in turn boils down to the question of what is evolution.

The social sciences have a long lineage, but as sciences they go back less than two hundred years. Development thinking goes back to nineteenth-century political economy, but modern development thinking is no more than fifty years old. In relation to the complexities of social life, at times development as applied social science gives the impression of navigating the ocean in a rowboat, or a Lego imitation of collective existence, in which mechanistic notions of social dynamics in tandem with political and hegemonic interests push and shove for the driver's seat. Really existing development has been an arena of ideological posturing or pragmatic reformism, either way involving brutal simplifications and crude interventions. At times in relation to the collective body, development interventions seem like performing surgery with a chainsaw. All the same, in some conditions surgery with heavy equipment beats no surgery at all, although even that depends on which side of the operation one is on.

Development knowledge is fragmented and characterized by discipline-centrism. 'The development process is compartmentalised by each discipline to suit its own areas of specialization, research methods, and theoretical frameworks' (Brohman 1995: 303). In this division of labour there has been a definite hierarchy. 'Development in its halcyon days was mainly economic development. Other disciplines entered the area apologetically or stealthily – as the supplementary knowledge of social structures facilitating or hindering economic growth, as insights into the psychological factors motivating or discouraging economic growth, as information about the political factors influencing economic decisions' (Nandy 1995: 146). Meanwhile divergent theories have often been applied in different policy spheres and economic sectors at the same time, making really existing development a patchwork of zigzag premises and policies.

Development thinking is steeped in mathematics – a world of numbers, indicators and statistics. Neoclassical economics is a formidable instance of applied Cartesianism. Part of this is a rendezvous with intellectual and managerial power – power to classify, administer and change the world. The theoretical and methodological characteristics of neoclassical economics – the assumptions of universal applicability, measurability, objectivity, formal modelling – make it a powerful instrument. Reductionism along with disciplinary fragmentation has made expert regimes and technocratic interventions possible, and has generously contributed to development policy failures. According to a former president of the American Economic Association, 'When you dig deep down, economists are scared to death of being sociologists. The one great thing [they] have going for [them] is the premise that individuals act rationally in trying to satisfy their preferences. This is an incredibly powerful tool because you can model it' (Charles Schultze in Brohman 1995: 302). Conventional development is a politics of measurement, a matter of 'fixing' within limited spheres, achieving desired change by manipulating indicators and modifying numerical relationships, such as the ratio of external debt to GDP, or debt to exports. The gap between economic development and social and cultural development, or the hard and soft dimensions of development, is reproduced in the institutional division between the Bretton Woods institutions and UN agencies, in which the former hold the purse strings. Indeed, this mathematical universe is inhabited in many different ways. For the sake of macroeconomic and financial management – by the IMF and Bank of International Settlements; with a view to economic growth in combination with sustainable development and poverty alleviation – by the World Bank; with a view to human development and the indicators of schooling, health, housing, sustainability – by the UNDP. What they share is a commitment to social engineering.

The American psychotherapist Thomas Moore proposes to add another ailment to psychology's list of disorders: 'I would want to include the diagnosis "psychological modernism", an uncritical acceptance of the values of the modern world. It includes blind faith in technology, inordinate attachment to the material gadgets and conveniences, uncritical acceptance of the march of scientific progress, devotion to the electronic media, and a life-style dictated by advertising. This orientation towards life also tends toward a mechanistic and rationalistic

understanding of matters of the heart' (1992: 206). Modern development has suffered from a severe case of psychological modernism, has erected monuments to modernism, placing technological progress over human development. In Latin America the work of the *científicos* is not yet complete. In Asia 'laboratory states' have used science as an instrument of power and reason of state (Visvanathan 1988). Modernization and development, including critical Marxist development thinking, have been 'scientist' in temperament. 'Science became the integrating myth of industrial society' (Berman 1984: 187), so it became the guiding light of development policy. Rationalization was the key to modernization, so it became the master key to development. This is the familiar Enlightenment headache syndrome. We now turn to the countermoves.

Shortcuts and Other Remedies

> Do you think you can take over the universe and improve it? (Lao Tsu, 6th century BC, 1973: 29)

Rather than another round of diagnosis, what the situation calls for is a scrutiny of remedies. Often what is presented as the way ahead is no more than a shortcut – the ailment may be diagnosed correctly but the remedy is not examined. Some medicine turns a headache into a migraine, induces medicinal toxification, or provides only temporary or local relief. So in considering remedies for the culture of high modernism we may apply Vincent Tucker's recipe of remedying remedies. Some of the problems affecting the antidotes to high modernism are reproducing dichotomous thinking, skipping levels, and neolithic nostalgia, or framing contemporary dilemmas in anachronistic terms.

Positions and counterpositions in the development field often operate on the basis of simplistic dichotomies – such as modernization versus 'tradition', science versus indigenous knowledge, the impersonal versus the personal, the global versus the local. Also, critiques of development modernism often take the form of dualisms that in effect replicate the dichotomous thinking of modernism. Does it make sense to subject modernity to the same simplistic treatment to which the project of modernity has subjected social life? We need to distinguish between the *project* of modernity and *really existing modernities* (and the sociology of modernity), which are far more complex than blueprint modernity. Opposition to modernization has been part of modern experience and the dialectics of modernity include modernism, as a cultural politics that at times runs contrary to modernity, critical theory and reflexive modernity.

The world of post-development ranges from militant development agnosticism and rejectionism to the New Age development thinking of the Schumacher College, which offers courses on 'Systems thinking and learning for change' and 'Buddhist economics'. There is a beatific island effect to this project. It describes itself as 'A truly Green oasis, a centre for deep green values expressed beautifully by people from all over the world' (1997). At either end of the spectrum, adherents of post-development use statistics to make their case. 'For example, it has been estimated that a single edition of the *New York Times* eats up 150 acres of forest land' (Rahnema 1997: 379). According to Gustavo Esteva, 'if all countries

'successfully' followed the industrial example, five or six planets would be needed to serve as mines and waste dumps' (1992: 2). In other words, post-development dichotomization and formalism often apply abstraction, generalization, dichotomization and formalism often apply abstraction, generalization, dichotomization and formalism in order to make their case, including in the development field. While presenting itself as an external critique, the post-development critique is external to (some of) the goals and not necessarily to the premises or the means of development. Some of the points of reference of post-development – opposition to reductionist science and modernity (Nandy 1988, Alvares 1992) – are unreflective and dichotomous in their logic. They exhibit a similar polarized and dualistic thinking to that of modernization theory, which dichotomizes 'tradition' and 'modernity', and thus tend to fall into the trap of modernization in reverse. The question, however, is how to overcome dichotomies, not merely to change the direction of the current.

Majid Rahnema criticizes 'compulsory actomania' and the 'mask of love' in development aid. In his view what lies behind solidarity or 'charity' is 'the great fear we have of becoming fully aware of our powerlessness in situations when nothing can be done' (1997: 392, 393). Who are we to intervene in other people's lives? He recalls the Chinese notion *wu-wei*, which is variously translated as 'non-intervention' or 'action through non-action' (397). What is odd in Rahnema's treatment is that he proceeds to explain this Taoist notion by setting forth the Confucian 'arts of governance' and 'aesthetic order', as if unaware of the tensions between Taoism and Confucianism, which run as deep as those between mysticism and official religion, and of Confucianism's comeback as an ideological prop for authoritarian regimes. It may be argued that 'non-intervention' is a superficial translation of *wu-wei*. A relevant passage in the *Tao te Ching* is: 'Tao abides in non-action, / Yet nothing is left undone' (Lao Tsu 1973: 37). 'Nothing is left undone' is not the same as doing nothing. Again, what is offered as the road ahead is a shortcut, a rapid and easy synthesis that does not do justice to the multiple dimensions of existence, each of which involves tensions which require engagement in their own right and appropriate to the level at which they are experienced. This is holism without sufficient critical edge.

A polemical polarization that is taking shape in relation to globalization. Some who identify globalization with corporate, market-driven transnationalism opt, in reaction to globalization, for localization and, in reaction to free trade, for 'new protectionism'. An example is the volume *The Case against the Global Economy and for a Turn toward the Local* (Mander and Goldsmith 1996). This position reduces globalization to economic globalization, and thus confuses opposition to neoliberalism with opposition to globalization, and mixes up the current form of globalization with the underlying trend of globalization. This involves setting up a false dichotomy between the global and the local. The global and the local require and sustain one another in many ways. Examples of interpenetration are 'glocalization' and 'insiderism', or the thesis according to which transnational corporations can enter foreign markets effectively only if they become insiders; the argument according to which flexible specialization leads towards the relocalization of operations so as to be close to consumers, suppliers, competitors and high-skilled labour; the dialectics of globalization which show, for instance, that transnational corporations may well end up as active promoters of localism (Miller 1997); and a host of cultural studies which show that the global and the local are embedded in one another. A further argument is that the local itself is a construction, a performative stance that owes its meaning and dynamics to its relationship to wider units, including the global (Boon 1990). So on several counts the contrast between the global and the local does not work as a clear-cut distinction or as a dichotomy, because for either to function it requires the other.

'Identifying with the whole' is a formidable challenge and taking shortcuts is tempting. Part of the remedy for modernism is to recover lost sensibilities, a resurrection of subjugated knowledges'; or, 'rediscovering traditional knowledge' (Fals-Borda 1985). This may involve reconnecting with spiritual sources sidelined and bulldozed by the incursions of colonialism and modernization, for instance reinvoking the shaman (Nandy 1989). Max Weber already pointed to charisma as a way out of the 'disenchantment of the world'. However, the problem with charisma is that it makes no distinction between Hitler and Gandhi. The shaman stands in contrast to the scientist and the priest, but that is only half the story; the other half includes the different types of shamans, for example distinguishing between the *brujo* or wizard and the *curandero* or healer. A recourse to cults is another option, with obvious limitations; 'cults can have either a tranquilizing or a liberating effect on people, depending, among others, on the leadership's inspiration and the social context' (Huizer and Lava 1989: 15). Morris Berman made a point about the 'flip side of Cartesianism' which, even if he overstates his case, is still valid:

Why not abandon Cartesianism and embrace an outlook that is avowedly mystical and quasi-religious, that preserves the superior monistic insight that Cartesianism lacks? Why not deliberately return to alchemy, or animism, or number mysticism? ... The problem with these mystical or occult philosophies is that they share ... the key problem of all nondiscursive thought systems: they wind up dispensing with thought altogether. To say this is not, however, to deny their wisdom. ... My point is that once the insight is obtained, then what? These systems are, like dreams, a royal road to the unconscious, and that is fine; but what about our relation to it? What of society, and our relationship to each other? ... In fact, it is but the flip side of Cartesianism; whereas the latter ignores value, the former dispenses with fact. (1984: 188)

'The commitment toward the difficult whole' is ill served by binarisms. What is needed is a combination of wholeness and difference, as in Vincent Tucker's synthesis. Shortcut holism may just produce neolithic nostalgia – revisiting Arcadia, which yields only temporary comfort, island paradises that provide merely local relief, politics of ecstasy that produces a hangover. Recovering the wisdom of ages is needed, but not as a shortcut. What is needed, rather than simply flipping over to another extreme, is a new sense of balance, between science and art, fact and value, analysis and meaning. Nowadays this means bridging the development gap and crossing sensibilities ranging all the way from neolithic to postindustrial settings. It involves recognizing multiple dimensions of existence and, accordingly, multiple modes of cognition, which need to coexist rather than compete. The assumption that only a single mode of cognition should prevail implies skipping levels.

Towards the Tao of Development

Vincent Tucker's critical holism cannot be readily translated into a general theory of development because, unlike in health, there is no holistic practice in development. Alternative development practices tend to be local and short of a holistic approach. While there is a mysticism of the human body, a theory and a practice (holistic medicine), there is no equivalent holism of the social field. This is the missing element. There are, so to speak, 'a thousand points of light', but they are scattered about, like 'ten thousand things' – local alternatives, cultural and spiritual alternatives, rival theories, counterpoints and countercurrents,[5] but there is no unifying, overarching paradigm as there is, up to a point, in relation to health. The appeal of critical holism is that it places holistic theorizing and practice in relation to collective existence on the agenda and thus renders it imaginable: at least steps can be taken in its general direction.

Since in its epistemology social science has been a follower of natural science, would it not be logical for it also to follow new developments in science, including new science? It would be, except that the extent of specialization has narrowed the nexus between the two. The present situation in social sciences and development studies is an uneven combination of trends – towards polemical antagonisms, partial recombinations and occasional syntheses.

Criticisms of Cartesian science also have deep roots in the South. Both science and critique of science movements have played a role in development activism and popular movements (Zachariah and Sooryamoorthy 1994). One trend is to view science as a religion,[6] and as power. Suspicion of Enlightenment science is also a leitmotif in radical ecological thinking (e.g. Shiva 1988a). Science here stands for Cartesianism, Newtonian mechanism, positivism, an instrument to achieve mastery over nature. At times this presents a caricature of science that ignores ongoing developments in science and new science. Why should critique of science and of science-as-power mean being anti-science? This would be a Luddite view and at times 'anti-development' comes across as twentieth-century Luddism. Meanwhile science, of course, is a major instrument of ecological monitoring. The 'Limits to Growth' takes the form of a mathematical argument. 'Green accounting' uses scientific measures to arrive at realistic costing and pricing. Critique of science is part of reflexive modernity. What this means is the integration of multiple knowledges within a larger framework.[7]

Positivism is no longer the dominant temperament in social science except in economics and number-crunching sociology. Increasingly the lead paradigm in social science is constructivism. In development studies, one-sided disciplinary perspectives are gradually in retreat and being relegated to the status of partial knowledge. A development economist can no longer afford to ignore politics, sociology, gender, ecology, culture; nor can a political scientist or sociologist afford to ignore economics. Most problems now faced in development require a combined approach, such as structural adjustment, currency instability, corruption, the environment, gender, poverty, conflict prevention, complex emergencies, post-conflict reconstruction. Many policies that are now initiated involve partnerships of different parties, joint efforts of government agencies, social

organizations and firms. Clearly the 'partnership' gospel itself prompts new forms of critical engagement; but even so the field is changing profoundly. To make synergies possible in policy they must become part of development thinking. Also, now that participation and empowerment have become part of the mainstream, even if primarily in rhetoric, the bottom-up, ground-up sensibilities and local culture that were the domain of grassroots, activist and anthropological approaches need to be integrated into mainstream discourse. Many new concepts that are current in development talk imply a combination of disciplines: good governance, accountability, human development, institutional development. New theoretical perspectives are likewise interdisciplinary, such as new institutional economics and public action. We witness both a return to and renewal of political economy and new combinations such as ecological economics (which is more than simply resource economics) and sociology of economics. Economic sociology shows, for instance, that markets are socially embedded and politically constituted and vary culturally, and yields novel notions such as social systems of production (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). At the same time these reorientations tend to be *ad hoc* and only dimly reflected in general theoretical reorientations or in everyday research, which remains empiricist. Disciplinary knowledge still ranks as foundational knowledge. Interdisciplinary research is more widely applauded than it is practised. A multidisciplinary approach refers to a combination and an interdisciplinary approach to an interaction of disciplines; a holistic approach is a step further. Holistic means integrated from the outset, which implies a revisioning of each discipline (a new view of economics,[8] etc.) and not just an adding up.

An example of holistic science is Gregory Bateson's synthesis, which Berman refers to as 'a non-Cartesian mode of *scientific* reasoning ... a methodology that merges fact with value and erodes the barrier between science and art' (1984: 232). For Berman this represents a general point of reference: 'I see our immediate future in a post-Cartesian paradigm, not in a premodern one' (271). The difference between Bateson's holism and the archaic tradition, according to Berman, is its 'self-conscious character' (272). Berman's *Reechantment of the World* likewise is a self-conscious re-enchantment.[9]

Considering that one of the problems of conventional development thinking is linearity, a relevant option is the application of chaos theory to development. In social science, chaos theory can be used as the basis of a non-modern social theory (Lee 1997) and with a view to public policy (Elliott and Kiel 1997; Anderla et al. 1997). A preliminary point is that there is no ready translation of chaos theory from natural to social systems (Elliott and Kiel 1997: 72). Chaos does not mean randomness or the absence of order; it refers to the unpredictability of the outcome of processes because of small differences in initial conditions. The butterfly effect, or sensitive dependence on initial conditions, has its place in folklore:

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;
For want of a shoe, the horse was lost;
For want of a horse, the rider was lost;
For want of a rider, the battle was lost;
For want of a battle, the kingdom was lost! (traditional, quoted in Gleick 1988: 23)

Chaos theory suggests distinguishing between different spheres of collective existence: those in which Newtonian dynamics prevail, and where robust policy interventions may be effective; and those in which non-linear dynamics predominate and where 'gentle action' is appropriate. In addition chaos theory suggests an ecological perspective: 'If chaos theory is right, a myriad of interactions in the nonhuman world is required to support and sustain the human world. Perhaps the Gaia hypothesis is undergirded by the mathematics of chaos to a degree even its originator might be surprised to learn of' (Eve 1997: 279-80).

Thus, some spheres would lend themselves to intervention: 'In those cases where a stable and predictable response is known, related policy is eminently sensible. In areas such as tax expenditures where consumers and corporations do behave as Newtonian machines in response to interest rates or tax abatements, public policy is quite effective in altering behavior' (Elliott and Kiel 1997: 77). Whether this would apply in countries in the South with 'soft states' is an open question. Neoclassical economics with its assumption of atomistic individuals exercising rational choice proceeds as *if this* sphere is the only sphere. In reality the sphere in which this applies is quite circumscribed. Complexity is by far the more common condition, North and South. In the North this has led to an awareness of the limited effectiveness of social engineering and of the malleability of society as a fiction. 'As societies become more complex, even the most arduous efforts to change social dynamics provide only minimal benefit' (ibid.: 76). This insight has barely penetrated development thinking. Modernization efforts remain surgery with a chainsaw. Poverty alleviation remains a matter of advanced arithmetic. Now chaos theory confirms what anthropologists have known all along: that 'Complex adaptive systems often exist on the edge of chaos' (Eve 1997: 280; an example given is the irrigation system in Bali). Many so-called traditional ways of life involve a sophisticated, time-tested social and ecological balance. That outside interventions can do more damage than good is confirmed by the harvest of several development decades.

Where non-linear dynamics prevail, the counsel for policy is 'gentle action' (Elliott and Kiel 1997: 73). This may be a more faithful approximation of *wu-wei* than 'non-intervention'. Thus, chaos theory yields a complex range of action orientations. Consideration for the ramifications of small differences can be translated in several ways – as sensitivity to local conditions and cultural differences, and as an antidote to abstract models that gloss over local conditions and the actual implementation of development interventions. This is the point of the cultural turn in development, the return of anthropology to development. It also suggests regard for the organizational and managerial dimensions of development on the ground and points to institutional analysis. A related consideration concerns the reflexivity of development as a form of applied cybernetics. Reflexivity here has two meanings – the self-referential character of development thinking, which in effect represents layer upon layer of reflexive moves, each a reaction to and negotiation of previous development interventions, as an ongoing trial and error motion. And also the importance of subjectivities in the development process, the reactions of people on the ground to development plans, projects, outcomes, or people's reflexivity, which should be built into the development process. Steps in this direction include popular development (Brohman 1996) and public action theory.

The contributions of chaos theory to social science are preliminary and schematic. The distinction between linear and non-linear dynamics is of some use but too sketchy to be of much use. Already at times development processes are regarded as curvilinear, rather than linear.[10] Development refers both to a *process* (as in a society develops) and an *intervention* (as in developing a society). For Cowen and Shenton, this produces an intrinsic tension: 'Development defies definition... because of the difficulty of making the intent to develop consistent with immanent development' (1996: 438).

Considering this kind of difficulty, would it make sense to think of the Tao of development? While the Tao of physics refers to a combination of physics and mysticism, the Tao of development is a more difficult combination because development is not merely a science or analytics (development theory) but also a politics. Taoism evokes an association of inaction, quietism. It is not clear whether this really applies to Tao, but there is no historical example of existing Taoism that disputes this and historically there is a dialectic between Taoism and Confucianism.[11] Still this does not simply close the issue. For instance, by analogy, although existing socialism has not met expectations, Marxism continues to be relevant as a method.

One of the core problems of development is its pretentiousness, the insurmountable arrogance of intervening in other people's lives. This may be balanced by an equally pretentious notion, but an entirely different kind of pretension – the Tao of development. Setting a high goal for development may be better than setting no goal at all, or declaring development over and done with – as in post-development approaches – while, in the meantime, development business-as-usual goes on. Setting an elusive goal for development may be better than carrying on with development as a positivist politics of measurement; although when it comes to, for instance, poverty alleviation there will obviously be different opinions on this. The Tao of development means acknowledging paradox as part of development realities: such as the antinomies between measurement and meaning, between intervention and autonomy, or the tension between the local and the global. These antinomies are part of the perplexities of the human condition. Development participates in these perplexities and is not in some fashion outside or beyond them. Some will regard this acknowledgement of complexity as a gain, and others – who are fighting a different kind of battle – as a loss. The Tao of development is asymptotic – never entirely approachable, like an ever-receding horizon. What it involves is a subtle and sophisticated sense of balance across different dimensions of collective existence.

Balanced development in a conventional sense refers to a balance between economic growth and redistribution, and between growth across different sectors. Critical holism as a balancing act involves balance in a wider and more fundamental sense, across dimensions of collective existence, from the epistemological to the practical, which may take several forms.

❑ A *multidimensional* approach, or a balance between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of collective existence. The horizontal refers to the worldly

and social spheres; the vertical refers to the inner dimension of subjectivities and meanings, to the depth of the social field, its layered character, which Anouar Abdel-Malek referred to as the 'depth of the historical field'.

❑ A *multifaceted* approach or a diamond social science, which reflects or shines light upon relations and dynamics across sectors (economy, politics, social, cultural) and levels (local, microregional, national, macroregional, global) and achieves a balance between them.[12] This might be termed Gestalt sociology.

❑ A *chiaroscuro* social science which abandons the assumption of full transparency of society. The assumption of transparency is what lent the Enlightenment its totalitarian bend, as in Bentham's panopticism and in socialist state ideology (Laclau 1990). This is a matter of modesty, a sense of the contingency of knowledge, or self-limiting rationality (Kaviraj 1992).[13] *Clair–obscur*, originally a term to describe the play of light and shadow in oil paintings, here refers to a sense of balance and interplay between that which is known and unknown, conscious and unconscious, the day and night sides of life.

❑ A distinction between and combination of objective and subjective dimensions of development. Development thinking is now increasingly anchored in people's subjectivities rather than merely in overarching institutions – the state or international institutions. While development thinking has become more participatory and insider-oriented, as in the actor-oriented approach (Long 1994), development practice has not been democratized, particularly when it comes to macroeconomic management, so there is a growing friction between development thinking and practice.

❑ A trend in local and increasingly also in large-scale development is towards partnerships across sectors, or synergies between different development actors – government, civic associations and firms. This is a marked departure from times when development was seen as either state-led, or market-led, or civil society-led (cf. Chapter 6). This might be considered a holistic approach;[14] but not a critical approach because talk of partnership in unequal relations of power is clearly apolitical (cf. Tvedt 1998: 224).

❑ Since development is concerned with the measurement of desirable change over time, it is chronocentric. For a more complex awareness what is needed is combining multiple time frames and a balance between 'slow knowledge' and the 'fast knowledge' of instant problem solving. 'Slow knowledge is knowledge shaped and calibrated to fit a particular ecological context' (Orr 1996: 31). The conventional time horizon of development policy – the mid-term time span of a generation, or shorter, down to five years or so, in the case of planning, development projects and project-based lending – has changed with sustainable development and the implied notions of intergenerational equity and 'coevolutionary development'. It is changing also as a consequence of the duration of the development era and the failures of 'development decades', which gradually brings to the fore the *longue durée* of development. Evolution, a long-time silent partner of development, is coming to the foreground.

On the whole, this sense of balance is better achieved in social science than in development studies; it is comparatively more developed in relation to situations that are geographically and socially near than those which are distant (as a function of insider knowledge); and more developed in relation to the past and in history (where hindsight makes it easier to acknowledge complexity of motive, action and result) than in relation to the present or future. In forecasting and future projects, one-dimensional science and technology treatments, or the flat earth extended in time, are almost the norm, except in science fiction.

There is an affinity between spatially wide and temporally long approaches, or between globalization and evolution. Both are forms of holism, spatial and temporal. With evolution coming back to the foreground, ideas such as those of Teilhard de Chardin are making a comeback (e.g. Arruda 1996). Terhal has compared Teilhard de Chardin's ideas of 'evolutionary convergence', the noosphere and the dawn of collective reflection, with Kuznets and Wallerstein's perspectives on world development.[15] He finds that Teilhard underestimates social stratification and inequality in human evolution (1987: 228) and that there are elements of Eurocentrism to his work (266-7), which makes it another instance of shortcut holism.

In Skolimowski's perspective too evolution is taking a reflexive turn: 'we are evolution conscious of itself' (1994: 92). For Skolimowski, 'The feast of life is participation' (157). For Stuart Todd, what follows from this kind of perspective is that the clue for development is to 'align with life processes' (1997: 36). But this is too generic a recipe, like an all-purpose elixir, or like Bergson's vitalism, for what are 'life processes'? Are not development and its contradictions themselves manifestations of 'life processes'? This introduces 'life processes' in a normative, discriminating sense, without providing the terms of distinction. Goonatilake (1991) introduces the notion of 'merged evolution' to characterize the situation in which through biogenetic engineering the strand of cultural evolution – which hitherto has run a separate course – merges with and impacts on biological evolution. This perspective distinguishes *and* combines: rather than positing a shortcut 'evolutionary convergence' it confronts the dilemmas of really existing convergence.

As to globalization, critical holism calls for a perspective on world history and globalization beyond conventional disciplinary methodologies (e.g. Mazlish and Buultjens 1993). There is no doubt that the future lies with visions of cooperative globalization (as in Arruda 1996), in contrast to competitive globalization, although these cannot be neatly separated, because competition and cooperation are also two sides of the same coin. However, shortcut holism – which ignores or underrates inequality and difference – falls short as a remedy.

This sense of balance means treating development as a tightrope act. The source of critical holism is the field of health and healing, in which individual and collective concerns typically come together. Feminism is another approach in which personal and social concerns are combined by rethinking the boundaries between the private and the public, the personal and the political. These combinations, along with the idea of Gestalt sociology or social science, raise a further option: viewing social science not merely as explanation or as critique, the standard assignments of social science, but as healing, as socio-therapy. As there is therapy in relation to the individual body and psyche, can there be healing of the

collective body? In popular culture the idea is not uncommon, as in Sinéad O'Connor's lyrics about Ireland: 'And if there ever is going to be healing, there must be remembering, and then grieving, so that then there can be forgiving' ('Famine', O'Connor 1994). In development work this is not such an uncommon idea either – after all, what else is post-conflict rehabilitation and conflict prevention? Both notions have emerged in relation to complex emergencies and ethnic conflict. Yet if the notion of development as healing sounds novel, it is presumably because it makes explicit that which has been implicit, and in doing so combines sensibilities which are usually kept neatly apart in separate boxes. These then are elements of the Tao of development: a holistic approach, a sense of balance across dimensions, a notion of collective healing. Critical holism in combining holism and difference merges these sensibilities in a balancing act.

Wholeness then should not be expected from a shortcut towards an undivided whole in a divided world but should be sought in a new balance. The counsel for development studies and social science is to distinguish between multiple spheres and levels, each of which requires engagement on its own terms, and not merely to contrast but to combine knowledges. As to implications for action and policy, this involves a case-by-case, contextual assessment of whether linear or non-linear dynamics prevail and whether robust or gentle action is appropriate. It also exceeds local alternatives. Critical holistic development includes macroeconomic management, global democratization and planetary ethics. Identifying with the whole means that development can no longer be simply geared to material aims and achievements but includes non-material dimensions, as in cultural development. It means that development can no longer be anthropocentric but encompasses the planetary ecology. Stretching the meaning of development to its fullest, it may be summed up as a collective learning process of human self-management according to the most comprehensive standards conceivable and practicable.

Notes

1 Note the reference to 'system' in this quotation. As Minter notes (1986: 42), several biographies try to whitewash Smuts' reputation as a humanitarian philosopher-statesman. An example is Meurs 1997 who presents him as an obstacle in the way of the architects of apartheid.

2 'The computerization of the world represents an advanced stage of Cartesianism. Within that stage, programs become autonomous. We have even been given intimations of automated concept formulation and of action instigated as a consequence of such automation' (Davis and Hersh 1986: 303). Current developments in global currency trading are an example of automated action: triggers built into trading programmes set in motion series of financial operations whose ripple effects can upset financial systems. For a more developed argument, see Yurick 1985.

3 A standard omission in representations of the Enlightenment is that it was not only an epoch of rationalism, but also of romanticism, and that these occurred in combination. For instance, what is one to say of these statements of Diderot: 'what makes me angry is that the passions are never regarded from any but the critical angle. People think they do reason an injury if they say a word in favor of its rivals. Yet it is only the passions, and the great passions, that can raise the soul to great things... The language of the heart is a thousand times more varied than that of the mind, and it is impossible to lay down the rules of its dialectics' (quoted in Gay 1977: 188, 189).

4 The complementarity between new physics and mysticism is disputed by, among others, Wilber, who deems it a false complementarity and at most concedes that new physics *accords* with mysticism (1982: 166-79). While mysticism addresses all levels – physical, biological, mental, subtle, causal and ultimate – physics pertains only to a single level (159).

5 Besides alternative development literature (Chapter 6) see e.g. Henderson 1996a, Whitmyer 1995, Roszak 1976.

6 'Positivism is just a crank religion' (Chris Mann in Dunn 1986: 2).

7 Capra gives another example of this integration of multiple knowledges: 'From the very beginning it was clear to me that there was no reason to abandon the biomedical model. It could still play a useful role for a limited range of health problems within a large, holistic framework, as Newtonian mechanics was never abandoned but remains useful for a limited range of phenomena within the larger framework of quantum-relativistic physics' (1988: 171; cf. Abraham et al. 1992).

8 According to Hazel Henderson (1996b), economics is not a science but politics in disguise.

9 This is not as clear with Toulmin, who advocates not the abandonment of modernity or a return to pre-modernity, but *humanizing modernity* and a return to the oral, the particular, the local, the timely (1990: 180f.).

10 E.g. Cowen and Shenton about Hegel's views on development: 'Unlike the linear image that the idea of progress evoked, the course of development was curvilinear or spiral-like, always impeded or arrested within its own logical structure' (1996: 130).

11 As to Taoism: 'It is inconceivable to a Taoist that Tao should be actualized in this world by human efforts because the core of Taoist doctrine is to teach its followers to transcend merely human affairs and psychologically dwell in "nothingness" (*wu*) so as to be in line with the "nonaction" (*wu-wei*) of the great Tao' (Wei-ming 1979: 10-11). Generally, while there have been episodes of a working balance between mysticism and official or state religion – between Buddhism and governance, Qabbala and Judaism, Christian mysticism and Christendom, Sufism and Islam, etc. – such episodes are not well known or readily accessible, so that they could act as sustainable examples.

12 Several of the significant books in social science achieve this in different ways. It applies to the oeuvre of Max Weber, Gramsci and Braudel and to books such as Wertheim's *Evolution and Revolution* (1974), Stavrianos' *Global Rift* (1981), Worsley's *The Three Worlds* (1984), David Harvey's *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1989).

13 'I plead not for the suppression of reason, but an appreciation of its inherent limits' (Gandhi in Parekh 1997: 68).

14 This is the theme of a report in the *Irish Times* on social partnerships, particularly in disadvantaged areas. The partnerships include 'business, trade unions, farming organizations, schools, health boards, state agencies ... and representatives from the local community' (Catherine Foley, 'The holistic way of solving problems', *Education & Living* supplement, 17 February 1998, pp. 2-3).

15 For instance, according to Teilhard de Chardin, 'Although mounting demographic pressure causes quite a number of evils at one level of human interaction', in principle it leads to 'social unification and a higher level of collective consciousness' (quoted in Terhal 1987: 176).