

THE THREE
WORLDS
OF WELFARE
CAPITALISM

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analysts would agree that a reformed poor-relief tradition qualifies as a welfare-state commitment. Some nations spend enormous sums on fiscal welfare in the form of tax privileges to private insurance plans that mainly benefit the middle classes. But these tax expenditures do not show up on expenditure accounts. In Britain, total social expenditure has grown during the Thatcher period, yet this is almost exclusively a function of very high unemployment. Low expenditure on some programs may signify a welfare state more seriously committed to full employment.

Therborn (1983) is right when he holds that we must begin with a conception of state structure. What are the criteria with which we should judge whether, and when, a state is a welfare state? There are three approaches to this question. Therborn's proposal is to begin with the historical transformation of state activities. Minimally, in a genuine welfare state the majority of its daily routine activities must be devoted to servicing the welfare needs of households. This criterion has far-reaching consequences. If we simply measure routine activity in terms of spending and personnel, the result is that no state can be regarded as a real welfare state until the 1970s, and some that we normally label as welfare states will not qualify because the majority of their routine activities concern defence, law and order, administration, and the like (Therborn, 1983). Social scientists have been too quick to accept nations' self-proclaimed welfare-state status. They have also been too quick to conclude that if the standard social programs have been introduced, the welfare state has been born.

The second conceptual approach derives from Richard Timuss's (1958) classical distinction between residual and institutional welfare states. In the former, the state assumes responsibility only when the family or the market fails; it seeks to limit its commitments to marginal and deserving social groups. The latter model addresses the entire population, is universalistic, and embodies an institutionalized commitment to welfare. It will, in principle, extend welfare commitments to all areas of distribution vital for societal welfare.

The Timuss approach has fertilized a variety of new developments in comparative welfare-state research (Myles, 1984a; Korpi, 1980; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984, 1986; Esping-Andersen, 1985b; 1987b). It is an approach that forces researchers to move from the black box of expenditures to the content of welfare states: targeted versus universalistic programs, the conditions of eligibility, the quality of benefits and services, and, perhaps most importantly, the extent to which employment and working life are encompassed in the state's extension of citizen rights. The shift to welfare-state typologies makes simple linear

welfare-state rankings difficult to sustain. Conceptually, we are comparing categorically different types of states.

The third approach is to theoretically select the criteria on which to judge types of welfare states. This can be done by measuring actual welfare states against some abstract model and then scoring programs, or entire welfare states, accordingly (Day 1978; Myles, 1984a). But this is ahistorical, and does not necessarily capture the ideals or designs that historical actors sought to realize in the struggles over the welfare state. If our aim is to test causal theories that involve actors, we should begin with the demands that were actually promoted by those actors that we deem critical in the history of welfare-state development. It is difficult to imagine that anyone struggled for spending *per se*.

A Re-Specification of the Welfare State

Few can disagree with T. H. Marshall's (1950) proposition that social citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state. But the concept must be fleshed out. Above all, it must involve the granting of social rights. If social rights are given the legal and practical status of property rights, if they are inviolable, and if they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they will entail a de-commodification of the status of individuals *vis-à-vis* the market. But the concept of social citizenship also involves social stratification: one's status as a citizen will compete with, or even replace, one's class position.

The welfare state cannot be understood just in terms of the rights it grants. We must also take into account how state activities are interlocked with the market's and the family's role in social provision. These are the three main principles that need to be fleshed out prior to any theoretical specification of the welfare state.

RIGHTS AND DE-COMMODIFICATION

In pre-capitalist societies, few workers were properly commodities in the sense that their survival was contingent upon the sale of their labor power. It is as markets become universal and hegemonic that the welfare of individuals comes to depend entirely on the cash nexus. Stripping society of the institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labor contract meant that people were commodified. In turn, the introduction of modern social rights implies a loosening of the pure commodity status. De-commodification occurs

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when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market.

The mere presence of social assistance or insurance may not necessarily bring about significant de-commodification if they do not substantially emancipate individuals from market dependence. Means-tested poor relief will possibly offer a safety net of last resort. But if benefits are low and associated with social stigma, the relief system will compel all but the most desperate to participate in the market. This was precisely the intent of the nineteenth-century poor laws in most countries. Similarly, most of the early social-insurance programs were deliberately designed to maximize labor-market performance (Ogus, 1979).

There is no doubt that de-commodification has been a hugely contested issue in welfare state development. For labor, it has always been a priority. When workers are completely market-dependent, they are difficult to mobilize for solidaristic action. Since their resources mirror market inequalities, divisions emerge between the 'ins' and the 'outs', making labor-movement formation difficult. De-commodification strengthens the worker and weakens the absolute authority of the employer. It is for exactly this reason that employers have always opposed de-commodification.

De-commodified rights are differentially developed in contemporary welfare states. In social-assistance dominated welfare states, rights are not so much attached to work performance as to demonstrable need. Needs-tests and typically meager benefits, however, serve to curtail the de-commodifying effect. Thus, in nations where this model is dominant (mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries), the result is actually to strengthen the market since all but those who fail in the market will be encouraged to contract private-sector welfare.

A second dominant model espouses compulsory state social insurance with fairly strong entitlements. But again, this may not automatically secure substantial de-commodification, since this hinges very much on the fabric of eligibility and benefit rules. Germany was the pioneer of social insurance, but over most of the century can hardly be said to have brought about much in the way of de-commodification through its social programs. Benefits have depended almost entirely on contributions, and thus on work and employment. In other words, it is not the mere presence of a social right, but the corresponding rules and preconditions, which dictate the extent to which welfare programs offer genuine alternatives to market dependence.

The third dominant model of welfare, namely the Beveridge-type citizens' benefit, may, at first glance, appear the most de-commodifying.

It offers a basic, equal benefit to all, irrespective of prior earnings, contributions, or performance. It may indeed be a more solidaristic system, but not necessarily de-commodifying, since only rarely have such schemes been able to offer benefits of such a standard that they provide recipients with a genuine option to working.

De-commodifying welfare states are, in practice, of very recent date. A minimal definition must entail that citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary. With this definition in mind, we would, for example, require of a sickness insurance that individuals be guaranteed benefits equal to normal earnings, and the right to absence with minimal proof of medical impairment and for the duration that the individual deems necessary. These conditions, it is worth noting, are those usually enjoyed by academics, civil servants, and higher-echelon white-collar employees. Similar requirements would be made of pensions, maternity leave, parental leave, educational leave, and unemployment insurance.

Some nations have moved towards this level of de-commodification, but only recently, and, in many cases, with significant exemptions. In almost all nations, benefits were upgraded to nearly equal normal wages in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But in some countries, for example, prompt medical certification in case of illness is still required; in others, entitlements depend on long waiting periods of up to two weeks; and in still others, the duration of entitlements is very short. As we shall see in chapter 2, the Scandinavian welfare states tend to be the most de-commodifying; the Anglo-Saxon the least.

The Welfare State as a System of Stratification

Despite the emphasis given to it in both classical political economy and in T. H. Marshall's pioneering work, the relationship between citizenship and social class has been neglected both theoretically and empirically. Generally speaking, the issue has either been assumed away (it has been taken for granted that the welfare state creates a more egalitarian society), or it has been approached narrowly in terms of income distribution or in terms of whether education promotes upward social mobility. A more basic question, it seems, is what kind of stratification system is promoted by social policy. The welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations.


REPLACEMENT AND DECOMMODIFICATIONS

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SECOND EDITION



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distinguishing between the 'deserving' and the 'undeserving' poor tended to fall upon the officer dealing with the applicant in the field, just as it had fallen upon the relieving officer in the past. While the politicians and administrators who framed the Act would not have wished to have espoused the notion of the 'undeserving poor', they felt unwilling to risk the public criticism that would have resulted from an approach to poverty that involved ignoring the potential waste on the 'work-shy' and the fraudulent application in order adequately to meet the needs of the majority of applicants.¹

This has continued to be true of many aspects of social security policy. This source of implementation problems is closely related to another of some importance. Sometimes the political ambivalence about a policy is reflected not so much in the policy itself as in the constraints that are set upon the implementation process. The simplest form of constraint here is, of course, the failure to provide the means, in money and staff, to enable a policy to be implemented properly.

Another example of a quite deliberately imposed implementation problem is the adoption of administrative procedures that are explicitly designed to affect the impact of a policy. Thus Deacon has shown how 'the genuinely seeking work test' was manipulated in the 1920s to make it difficult for unemployed people to establish their claim to benefit.² He describes it as imposed as a quite explicit deterrent, without reference to the actual availability of work.

It is important, while acknowledging that many policies are made complex and ambiguous by the conflicts within the policy-making process, to recognize that it is intrinsically difficult to specify some policy goals in terms that will render the implementation process quite clear and unambiguous. This is one important source of discretion for implementers. Jowell has drawn attention to examples where the concern of policy is with 'standards' that are not susceptible to precise factual definition.³ He argues that standards may be rendered more precise by 'criteria', facts that are to be taken into account, but that 'the feature of standards that distinguishes them from rules is their flexibility and susceptibility to change over time'. Questions about adequate levels of safety on the roads or in factories, or about purity in food, are of this kind. So are many of the issues about need in social policy. Discretionary judgement is likely to be required by policy, alongside the more precise rules that it is possible to promulgate.

If a policy is a complex and ambiguous phenomenon, with aspects that go 'too far' for some people and 'not far enough' for others, it is important to acknowledge that the dissensus that attends its 'birth' will continue to affect its implementation. It may therefore provide opportunities for some implementing agencies to develop new initiatives that were perhaps not originally envisaged. However, policies also often contain 'footholds' for those who are opposed to their general thrust, or

who wish to divert them to serve their own ends. Bardach has developed an extensive analysis of the various 'implementation games' that may be played by those who perceive ways in which policies may be delayed, altered or deflected.⁴ While some policies contain few features that their opponents can interfere with — laying down, for example, a clear duty to provide a particular service or benefit — others, such as the DHSS commitment to the development of community care for the mentally ill, depend heavily upon the commitments of implementers, and are relatively easily diverted in other directions or even rendered ineffective.

It is important to raise questions about the ways in which policies are expressed, and the evidence required to establish the extent of implementation. Policies may be conveyed to local implementers in a range of ways from, at one extreme, the explicit imposition of duties and responsibilities to, at the other end of the continuum, the very loose granting of powers which may or may not be used. We can contrast, for example, the comparatively strict ways in which regulations under the 1986 Social Security Act instruct local authorities in the administration of housing rebates, with powers given (originally in the 1963 Children and Young Persons Act, now in the 1980 Child Care Act) to local authorities to make money payments, in exceptional circumstances to prevent children being taken into care, where no attempt has been made to prescribe how this should be done.

In this discussion it has been hard to draw the line between issues that are essentially 'characteristics of policy' that affect implementation, and points that are really observations about the characteristics of either the relationships between central policy makers and local implementers, or of the organization of the implementing agencies. While it is helpful to make a distinction between 'policies' on the one hand and the implementation process on the other, this must raise problems at the margin. Policies are formulated with the implementation process in mind, and often it is more realistic to see policies as *products* of implementation rather than as 'top-down' inputs into the process.

HILL

THE 'CENTRE-PERIPHERY' RELATIONSHIP

It is possible to some degree to distinguish between those implementation issues that arise essentially from the 'distance' between what we may describe as 'centre' and 'periphery' and those that are facets of other aspects of relationships within complex organizations. The latter, which will be discussed in the section after this, are of course considerably complicated by the problem of 'distance', particularly when two or more separate organizations are involved.

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In British public administration the 'centre' will generally have been involved in the policy-making process. But where implementation is delegated to other organizations the 'centre' generally maintains an interest in the implementation process. Equally, the 'periphery' has an interest in policy making and can be expected to contribute to a feedback process from implementation into policy elaboration. However, there are several different kinds of centre-periphery relationships that significantly influence the implementation process. The simplest model is clearly that in which the centre and the periphery belong to the same organization. The most complex occurs where policy implementation depends upon co-operation between separate autonomous organizations, and particularly where responsibility at the periphery is (a) delegated to several organizations with separate territories and (b) dependent upon co-ordinated action between two or more local organizations.

Even the more straightforward implementation systems tend to involve a complex organizational structure. The DHSS has, at headquarters, a Regional Directorate to channel policy directives on social security matters to the regions and local offices. This was set up in 1972 to cope with the fact that, in the words of the director of the regional organization,

More and more instructions, more and more complex in their nature descended more and more frequently upon local offices, but without any adequately effective co-ordination at the Headquarters level to ensure that those in the outfield had a clear enough idea of what their order of priorities should be as they became less and less able to deal effectively with the totality of their responsibilities.⁵

Previously when bottlenecks arose in the benefit delivery system regional or local decisions had to be made that might affect implementation; now there is a central 'directoriate' which is likely to be involved in the examination of policy feasibility and which plays an important part in determining how policy is implemented. Crucial as this innovation may have been for co-ordination, it has contributed to an increased sense of 'distance' between policy makers and implementers in a policy system that operates primarily in a unified, top-down, manner.

Recognition that there may be issues to consider about 'levels', even in the social security system, emphasizes the importance of this dimension for the study of implementation where separate organizations are involved. It is clearly important to identify not merely the issue of the relationship between different levels of elected government but also the existence of a variety of organizations whose relationships to either central or local government, or both, is often ambiguous: the health

authorities, the Manpower Services Commission, the University Grants Committee and the universities, the New Town Corporations and so on.

It is important to bear in mind the wide range of inter-agency linkages that may be necessary, without reference to the subject matter of those linkages. Pressman and Wildavsky have made a tentative attempt to draw attention to what may loosely be described as the mathematics of implementation, the way in which the mere quantity of agreements necessary may, even when all parties are committed to a policy, undermine or delay effective action.⁶ Hence it is necessary to give attention to the following issues about centre-periphery relations:

- 1 the relationship will be likely to involve two or more organizations at either the 'centre' or the 'periphery' or both. Effective implementation may depend upon co-operation not merely between the two 'levels' but also between different organizations at the same level;
- 2 the centre-periphery relationship may be mediated through one or more intermediary or regional body;
- 3 relationships between agencies will in practice involve a number of different issues, and the symmetry that it is possible to draw in an abstract model will not be the same for each issue.

In reality any organization will be involved in a web of relationships, which vary in character and intensity according to the issue. Hence, local authorities have to deal with a number of different central government departments, but the extent to which this is the case varies from issue to issue. Equally, some activities require considerable co-operation between 'peripheral' agencies while others require very little. However, it may be misleading to lose sight of the overall pattern since the outcome of one relationship will affect responses to another. Relationships are ongoing; each will have a history that conditions reactions to any new issues. Equally, each organization will have developed its own sense of its task, mission and role in relation to others. These will affect its response to anything new.

One issue deserving of attention, if only because of the importance it assumes in the United States implementation literature, is the 'special' agency set up to concern itself with policy making and implementation in a specifically limited policy field. Schon has described government agencies as 'memorials to old problems'.⁷ It has long been recognized in the United States that there are difficulties in getting old agencies to implement new policies. A crucial innovation strategy has therefore involved the creation of new agencies for this purpose. However, students of this process have pointed out that these new organizations then face problems about their relationships to older agencies.⁸ While new organizations may possess a strong commitment to a new policy,

and may have powers that enable it to bring together the resources for its implementation that were not possessed by any single previous organization, it still has to relate to a world in which other agencies have a great deal of power to influence its success.

One of the crucial issues, to which the creation of *ad hoc* agencies in the United States is a response, is the problem, at all levels but particularly at local level, of 'overlapping governments'. There are so many ways in which different government agencies can veto or neutralize other agencies' initiatives that a new agency, with more precisely defined policies, is seen as offering, perhaps in desperation, a new way to 'get something done'. While it would be foolish to suggest that a comparable problem does not exist at all in Britain, it is important to recognize that ours is a more simple system in which individual agencies have more clearly defined powers and more definite boundaries to their responsibilities and sphere of influence. Only rarely, therefore, can we identify examples of agencies set up explicitly to circumvent problems of this kind. Moreover, when they do occur they are more often allowed to operate in territories (in both a spatial and a policy sense) in which others' intervention is limited.

The New Towns are examples of successful British innovations in this sense. What is interesting about them is that, while the development corporations acquired powers that gave them a great deal of autonomy within their own territories, there is today a variety of questions to be raised about the extent to which their 'success' was secured at the expense of other policies to which they 'ought' to have related. While the New Towns often built up relatively successful and prosperous new communities, they have done little to relieve the problems of the least privileged in the old communities from which they drew, and hence, while by providing for 'overspill' they have helped to solve some inner-city problems, they have exacerbated others.

While the use of the New Town device is now being discontinued, British governments continue to experiment with approaches to urban renewal which bypass existing agencies. The Urban Development Corporations are the latest such devices, spawned by a central government which sees the local authorities as likely obstacles to local economic development.

Three motives can perhaps be identified for the creation of special agencies in Britain, although there are of course dangers in taking ostensible motives as real ones: to create an effective separate and accountable 'management system', to reduce political 'interference' and to provide for the direct representation of special interests. The development of a separate manpower policy agency seems to have been carried out with all these motives in mind. The University Grants Committee has been seen as serving the second and third purposes.

Doubts are being expressed about whether its successor, the Universities Funding Council, will do this. Clearly, the special character of the National Health Service structure owes a great deal to the strength of special interests, though its reorganization in the 1970s owed much to 'managerial' thinking. It is also interesting as perhaps the key example of a special system designed to minimize political influence at the local level, since local authority involvement is only indirect and slight.

Two of the three 'motives' outlined above are of special importance to the study of implementation, since the removal of some aspects of policy making from direct political influence and deference to special interests both introduce complications that make it particularly difficult to distinguish policy making from implementation. These agencies may be seen alternatively as implementers that affect the character of policy or as independent creators of policy forever in a relationship of tension with the 'centre'. It is this tension that can then sometimes be seen as leading to central efforts to curb the independence of agencies whose initial freedom was provided by government. All three of the agencies mentioned in the last paragraph have recently been the subject of central limitations to their activities or curbs upon their freedom!

THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTIC OF IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

In the study of agencies concerned with policy implementation two significant bodies of literature can be drawn upon. There are studies by organizational sociologists that suggest the limitations upon the formal control of subordinates by means of rules,⁹ and the behavioural studies of law enforcement, which have emphasized the significance of bargaining and discretion in the activities of the police and other rule-enforcers.¹⁰ Both suggest that there are finite limits upon the prescription of subordinate behaviour. Very detailed rule-making is a difficult and time-consuming activity. If it has to be backed up by close supervision and control a point may be reached where such activities are self-defeating. If the subordinate has to be so elaborately controlled the supervisor might just as well undertake the task. Conformity to rules relies primarily upon compliance, upon a willingness to work within a regulated framework which Etzioni has suggested resists either upon acceptance of a 'utilitarian' financial bargain or upon a 'normative' commitment.¹¹ A key point about the former is that it also invokes in practice some measure of 'tolerance' on both sides: some concept of 'trust'.¹² This applies limits to the things the supervisor can require the subordinate to do, and involves acceptance by the superior of limited deviations by the subordinate from the activities that are expected.

It is not necessary to elaborate this diversion into industrial sociology unduly. The general point is that the mindless conformist implementation is rare. More common, even in a wide range of situations in which subordinate staff are primarily motivated by 'utilitarian' rather than 'normative' considerations, is some concern about the justification for the policy that is to be implemented. Indeed, as the recent concerns of trade unions in, for example, the health services and in social security suggest, there seems to be a growing 'rank and file' interest in policy. This extends beyond a tendency to influence policy delivery by the characteristic 'insubordinate' responses of evasion, delay and so on, into a desire to feed back views into the policy-making process.

The studies of rule enforcement particularly indicate that in most tasks, and particularly in the more elaborate tasks, there will be a strong element of discretion. In the last section three sources of discretion were identified, arising from (a) a deliberate recognition of local autonomy, (b) 'political' difficulties in resolving key policy dilemmas, and (c) 'logical' problems in prescribing 'standards'. This discussion adds a fourth, the inherent limits to the regulation of tasks.¹² In practice, prescriptions for policy implementation convey discretionary powers to field-level staff for reasons that are combinations of these four 'sources' of discretion. An alternative way of looking at this phenomenon is to see the field official as a 'street-level bureaucrat'.¹⁴ His or her job is characterized by inadequate resources for the task, by variable and often low public support for the role, and by ambiguous and often unrealistic expectations of performance. The official's concerns are with the actual impact of specific policies upon the relationships with specific individuals; these may lead to a disregard of or failure to understand the wider policy issues that concern those 'higher up' in the agency. The 'street-level' role is necessarily uncertain. A modicum of semi-professional training defines the role as putting into practice a set of ideals inculcated in that training. Yet the 'street-level' bureaucrat is also the representative of a government agency, one that is itself subject to conflicting pressures. In day-to-day contact with clients and with the community at large, he or she becomes to some degree locked into the support of individuals and groups that may be antipathetic to the employing agency. In such a situation of role confusion and role strain, a person at the end of the line is not disposed to react to new policy initiatives from above as if he or she were a mere functionary. New policies are but factors in a whole web of demands that have to be managed.

It is interesting how many of the social workers who regard themselves as identified with their clients, sharing some sense of oppression by the 'bureaucracy' that weighs upon them both and working therefore to help the clients receive resources from the 'system', have a view of

social security field staff that is directly in contrast to their view of their own position. They see social security staff as biased and prejudiced against the poor and only too ready to evade their responsibility to help. They demand, therefore, that the social security bureaucracy should more effectively control and discipline its subordinates. Without taking sides on these views it can be acknowledged that there are 'two faces' to street level bureaucracy. It may be seen as the effective adaptation of policy to the needs of the public, or it may be seen as the manipulation of positions of power to distort policy towards stigmatization, discrimination and petty tyranny. Which it does will vary according to the policy at stake, and the values and commitments of the field workers, but it will also depend upon the scope accorded by the organizational control system. For this phenomenon is not necessarily independent of 'biases' built into the policy delivery system. Social workers can manipulate their 'system' in favour of some clients because their agency grants them licence to deploy such commitments. Social security officers can discriminate negatively because they are encouraged to be vigilant to prevent fraud and abuse.

Consideration of discretion and of the roles of 'street-level bureaucrats' must also involve looking at the implications of professionalism for implementation. For Etzioni the compliance of professionals to their organizations rests upon 'normative' commitments.¹⁵ But policy makers may be said to have to 'pay for' a lessening of day-to-day control problems with concessions in the implementation process; professionalism tends to involve participation in the determination of policy outcomes. In the health service, for example, doctors have been able to secure a very full involvement in policy making within the service as one of the prices for participation. Three interrelated points may be made about professionalism:

- 1 that it may entail a level of expertise that makes lay scrutiny difficult;
- 2 that professionals may be, for whatever reason, accorded a legitimate autonomy;
- 3 that professionals may acquire amounts of power and influence that enable them to determine their own activities.

These sources of professional freedom clearly have a differential impact depending upon (a) the professional involved, (b) the organizational setting in which professionals work, and (c) the policies that they are required to implement. The importance of the level of expertise for professional power has led some writers to make a distinction between professions and semi-professions,¹⁶ with doctors and lawyers in the former category but social workers and teachers in the latter.

Point (b) has been the subject of controversy about the impact upon professional activities of organizational, and particularly public, employ-

ment, the conclusion to which would seem to be, in short, that 'it depends on the profession and upon the organization'. On point (c), once again, a good deal depends on the nature of the policy involved.

There are a large number of situations in which it is expected that professional judgement will have a considerable influence upon the implementation process. Clearly explicit in many policies is an expectation of this. This applies to many decisions made in face-to-face relationships between professionals and their clients. Many of the issues involved are increasingly the subject of controversy, involving arguments about 'rights' versus 'discretion'. Within these arguments disputes occur about the significance of expertise and about the scope for effective limitation of discretionary power. The effective resolution would also impose many difficult policy questions – about moral rights to choose (for example, with reference to abortion) and the best way to allocate scarce resources (for example, with regard to kidney machines) – which are at present partly masked by professional discretion. There are also some important questions here, which are very hard to resolve, about the way to link together professional autonomy in dealing with an individual relationship with a client, and a policy-based concern (or public concern) about the way in which professionals allocate their services as a whole.

A further important complication for the study of implementation introduced by the involvement of professionals is that some activities depend upon the co-operation of two or more professional groups. Studies of attempts to co-ordinate the efforts of various professions concerned to protect children from injury by their parents have suggested that particular professional practices, activities and terminology may intensify communication problems.¹⁷ There are also, clearly, some key problems about the boundaries between the various professional 'territories'.

It is important to recognize the extent to which professional involvement with policies implies not merely scope to influence implementation but also an impact upon policy itself. Within the health service the very direct influence of the doctors has been subjected to considerable attention by policy analysts.¹⁸ What has perhaps been accorded less attention has been the ways in which policy and implementation have involved a feedback from implementation as policies have been found inadequate to meet the demands of 'good professional practice'.

Packman has examined the way in which social workers in children's departments gradually found that good child care practice required not merely the control and care powers possessed under the 1948 Children's Act but also preventive work to keep children out of 'care'.¹⁹ They innovated as far as possible under the 1948 Act but eventually secured a further Act, in 1963, which legitimated 'preventive' work. A similar

concern to extend social work practice, to enable integrated work with whole families, led, as Hall has shown, to further legislation in 1970 bringing all local authority social work within one department.²⁰

The discussion in this section has developed the key points about inter-organizational practice by means of consideration of the rules-discretion dichotomy. But to end it three issues must be raised, which have been implicit rather than explicit within the argument so far: the relevance of the lack of clarity within much policy, the significance of value conflict; and the importance of rewards.

The first of these points does not require much further emphasis at this stage. A lack of clarity in policy has already been identified as one explanation for discretion. But equally when the relationship, within a system of rules, between means and ends is far from evident, then implementers may be more disposed to break rules, and their supervisors may be disinclined to enforce them.

A lack of clarity about policy goals and conflict about values, as already suggested, often go hand in hand. Burton Clark has written of 'precarious values'.²¹ Policies may have among their goals objectives that lack support in the community. Implementers will be aware of the controversial character of the policies and may not themselves subscribe to the goals entailed. The social security official required to secure the delivery of benefits to one-parent families, but also expected to prevent abuse, may well take the latter consideration more seriously than the former, letting his or her conception of morality and stereotypes about the social behaviour of the claimants influence behaviour.²²

But the implications of Clark's analysis go further than this, seeing the problem of precarious values as affecting not merely day-to-day behaviour but also the way in which a whole organization may conceive its tasks. In particular, an organization that is given a task that is controversial and unpopular in many quarters, such as an organization charged to promote racial and sexual equality or one providing help to a stigmatized group such as vagrant alcoholics, may find that it is given an unclear mandate and is placed in a position in which it finds it hard to acquire 'legitimacy' for its activities. This may lead to the adoption of 'safe' and uncontroversial activities, organizational security being put before any movement towards potentially disruptive goals.

The problem of 'precarious values' may also be related to the problem of rewards. We return here to Etzioni's analysis of the distinction between 'utilitarian' and 'normative' rewards. Clearly the official placed in a position of 'role-strain' between the demands of superiors and the expectations of the public, or of 'value conflict' between his or her own ideals and those embodied in policy, will be influenced by rewards of both kinds. Benefits now and hopes of advancement may curb an inclination to deviate from the requirements of superiors; a feeling that

some parts of the job are 'worth doing' may be even more influential. But the substitution of 'unofficial' or 'official' goals may be a product of recognition that more 'worthwhile' activities may thereby be undertaken. The motivation of field-level staff is an important issue even within the most integrated organization. Where, however, 'control' is attenuated by a gap between those concerned with policy and the implementing agency, it may assume crucial significance.

THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Policies are evolved in a wider environment in which problems emerge that are deemed to require political solutions, and pressures occur for new political responses. Implementing agencies continuously interact with their environments. Much has already been said that has a bearing upon the underlying significance of the environment.

Whatever the relationship between state and society, policies may be interpreted as responses to perceived social needs. Government is concerned with 'doing things to', 'taking things from' or 'providing things for' society, or for parts of it. Putting policies into practice involves interactions between the agencies of government and their environment. Those who do that are, of course, themselves a part of the social environment in which they operate.


However, in looking at social policy we must also question whether the distinction between the policy system and its environment can be easily made. In chapter 1 it was established that it is misleading to see any single equation between the activities of the social policy system and the enhancement of social welfare. But just as the policy determinants of welfare are multiple, and sometimes unexpected, so individuals' welfare is influenced by phenomena that have nothing to do with the activity of the state. The determinants of an individuals' welfare can be broadly classified as depending upon their own capacity to care for themselves combined with (a) market activities and relationships, (b) the behaviour of 'significant others' as providers of 'informal care', amongst whom family members are likely to be the most important, and (c) the role played by the state. To study welfare requires attention to all 'determinants', and changes in the way in which welfare is provided are particularly likely to involve shifts in the roles played by these 'determinants' and shifts in the relationships between them. In other words, the process of interaction between policy system and environment is a very active one, and those interactions occur across an ambiguous and shifting boundary. To give a concrete example, personal social services care is only one element in individual care systems in which family,

neighbour and purchased care are likely also to play a part. A shift in the availability of, or character of, any one of these care ingredients is likely to have an impact on the others. Day to day policy implementation in the state-provided sector involves the management, or indeed mismanagement, of its relationships to the other elements.

Accurately studies of social policy have conceived of the system as a 'mixed economy of welfare'.²³ Furthermore, 'social divisions of welfare' have been identified recognizing not merely that there are different sources of welfare for individuals but also that individuals differ in the access they have to different welfare systems. Timmuss,²⁴ who originated the notion of 'social divisions of welfare', identified alongside mainstream 'public welfare' 'fiscal welfare', the system of relief from taxation (of which the relief for mortgage interest payments and pension contributions are among the most important examples); and 'occupational welfare' (the range of fringe benefits available to some employees). Timmuss, together with others who developed his work such as Sinfield and Townsend,^{25,26} argued that these other welfare systems may provide large benefits additional to, or quite separate from, the benefits provided by the more central institutions of the welfare state. They may operate in a direction quite contrary to any egalitarian tendencies in the mainstream policies. The 'social divisions' theme has been taken up in another way by some recent feminist writers who have been concerned to show not merely that many welfare provisions discriminate against women, but also that female services within the family and neighbourhood form crucial separate welfare systems, enhanced in importance when other systems fail or are withdrawn.²⁷

These points have been emphasised in this chapter because the implementation of many contemporary policy initiatives – privatization, the limitation of social expenditure, the extension of community care – involve changing the balance between the various ingredients in the 'political economy of welfare'. Where government withdraws or reduces its direct contribution to welfare it may still make an indirect contribution if the social security system subsidizes private provision, or it may have to acquire a new range of regulatory concerns about the quality of private services, or it may face increased problems in the other areas of concern because of the new pressures placed upon individuals and families.

Those who are directly affected by policies, the public, may be crudely divided into unorganized and isolated public – who pay taxes, receive benefits, seek planning permission, visit doctors and so on – and the organized public, the organizations upon whom policies have an impact. These relationships may be studied with a view to ascertaining whether implementation proceeds in terms of the even-handed justice that Max Weber suggested is, or should be, characteristic of bureaucratic



nositi a kteří mají být zárukami hospodářské prosperity. Křehkou rovnováhu mezi dostatečnou motivací pro uplatnění na trhu práce a dostatečným sociálním zajištěním není lehké udržet.

Nerovnost je vzhův holf o dvou koncích: ten první představuje funkční diferenciaci nutnou k motivaci výkonu a ten druhý přehnané rozdíly vedoucí k chudobě a dezintegraci společnosti. Subjektivě hospodářství nejsou jen podniky a malé, ale také domácnosti a příbuzenské klany. Nejde o problémy neznámé, nicméně přece jen zasuté. Zuzana Mlková se zabývá ekonomickou subjektivitou domácností, její aktivitou v rychle se měnícím prostředí. Měli bychom připustit, že pohlízet na domácnosti jen zvenku, pouze optikou "prahů tolerance" je riskantní. Sam jsem se pokusil uvést do širšího kontextu tematiku chudoby, řešení zatím jen v jedné poloze přímého minima. Nebylo dostatek sil, abychom i v jiných polohách zpracovali výsledky již tří výzkumů "Ekonomických očekávání a postoje", zabývajících se věřejem obecných názorů a specifických reakcí na nové problémy. Tento dluh splatíme jinak.

Jsou však i další témata, v nichž se sociologie dotýká sociálních problémů a sociálního zdraví. Proto jsme do tohoto čísla zařadili článek Jiřího Kabeleho (pocházející ještě z předrevolučních dob jeho působení ve zdravotnictví) a výzkumné výsledky čs. psychiatrů Kubičky, Cšemého a Koženého o alkoholismu žen. Upozorníme i na zprávu ze zasedání Výboru pro sociální stratifikaci ISA v Praze, kde problémy sociální politiky sice nebyly přímo dotčeny, kde však fungovala sekce věnovaná ekonomickým nerovnostem a mj. byl formulován pokus pevněji propojit sociologická data a výzkum s ekonomickými. Iniciativa měla své pokračování na konferenci věnované příjmové nerovnosti v komparativní optice (Luceňburek, červenec 1991), kde byla sociální politika jedním z nejdůležitějších témat. Z této konference ostatně pochází i Bartův příspěvek. Na jiný aspekt sociální problematiky, otázky rozvoje měst a bydlení, poukazují recenze knih, které získává knihovna pro sociologická a sociální studia z nadace Rockefeller Brothers.

Nechť je toto číslo výzvou k pokračování a diskusi problémů sociální politiky, k většímu angažmá sociologie do této tematiky.

Jiří Večeřník

Tři politické ekonomie sociálního státu

GÖSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN

The three political economies of the welfare state

Abstract: The protracted debate on the welfare state has failed to produce conclusive answers about the nature or causes of welfare state development. This article has three aims: 1) to reintegrate the debate into the intellectual tradition of political economy, thus putting into sharper focus the principal theoretical question involved; 2) to specify the salient characteristics of welfare states, because the conventional ways of measuring welfare states in terms of their expenditures will no longer suffice; 3) to "sociologize" the study of welfare states. Most studies have assumed a world of linearity: more or less power, industrialization or spending. This article insists that we understand welfare states as clusters of regime-types, and that their development must be explained interactively.

Sociologický časopis, 1991, Vol. 27 (No. 5: 545-567)

Úvod

Vleklá diskuse o sociálním státu zatím neposkytla jasné odpovědi na povahu a příčiny jeho vývoje. Tento článek má tři cíle: 1) znovu napojit tuto diskusi na intelektuální tradici politické ekonomie a postavit její základní teoretické otázky do centra pozornosti; 2) stanovit hmatatelné charakteristiky sociálních států, neboť již nelze vystačit s konvenčním způsobem jejich hodnocení podle vynaložených nákladů; 3) "sociologizovat" studium sociálních států. Většina prací vycházela z předpokladu linearity světa: více nebo méně moci, industrializace či spotřeby. V tomto článku chápeme sociální státy jakožto určité seskupení typických režimů, jejichž vývoj je nutné vysvětlovat interaktivně.

Odkaz klasické politické ekonomie

V současně diskusi o sociálním státu jsou kladeny dvě otázky. První otázka zní: mizí třídní vyhraněnost sociálního občanství? Jinými slovy, může sociální stát zásadně transformovat kapitalistickou společnost? Druhá otázka: jaké kauzální síly ovlivňují vývoj sociálního státu? Tyto otázky nejsou nové. Zformulovali je již političtí ekonomové 19. století, tedy sto let před tím, než se dá vůbec o vzniku jakéhokoli sociálního státu hovořit. Klasičtí političtí ekonomové - ať už liberální, konzervativní nebo marxistické orientace - byli příliš zaujati vztahem mezi kapitalismem a

1) Článek byl poprvé otištěn v *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, č. 2/1989 a přejat jako kapitola do knihy *The Three Worlds of Welfare: Capitalism, Polity Press 1990*. Redakce vyslovuje svoji vděčnost paní J. Rosemary Vanderkam, Production Manager of the *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, University of Guelph, Ontario, Kanada.

Mezi socialisty začala převažovat pozitivnější analýza parlamentarismu až po rozšíření plně politické formy občanství. Teoreticky nepropocovanéjší byly příspěvky austromarxistů jako byli Adler a Bauer a německých sociálních demokratů, zvláště pak Eduarda Heimanna. Podle Heimanna [1929] nebyly konzervativní reformy motivovány ničím jiným než touhou poletici mobilizaci práce. Jakmile však byly zavedeny, působily protikladně: rovnována třídních sil se podstatně změnila, když dělnici dostali sociální práva. Sociální mzdy snižují závislost dělníka na trhu a zaměstnavatelů a stávají se tedy potenciálním zdrojem síly. Podle Heimanna, sociální politika vnaší do politické ekonomie kapitalismu cizí prvek. Tato intelektuální pozice se těší jisté renesanci v současném marxismu [Offe 1985; Bowles, Gintis 1986].

Jak jsme uvedli, sociálně demokratický model neopouští nutně ortodoxní předpoklad, že základní rovnost si vyžaduje socializaci ekonomiky. Historická zkušenost brzy ukázala, že socializace je cílem, který nelze reálně dosáhnout prostřednictvím parlamentarismu.

Sociálně demokratické zahrnutí parlamentních reforem jako dominantní strategie pro dosažení rovnosti a socialismu, bylo založeno na dvou argumentech. Za prvé, pro dělníky jsou nezbytné sociální a zdravotní zabezpečení a vzdělání, aby se mohli efektivně zapojit do demokratizované ekonomiky. Za druhé, sociální politika nevyhází jen ze soucitu, ale je také ekonomicky efektivní [Myrdal a Myrdal 1936]. Podle Marxe je strategickým přínosem sociální politiky napomáhání rozvoji výrobních sil v kapitalismu. Ale zajímavost sociálně demokratické strategie spočívá také v tom, že sociální politika zajišťuje mobilizaci moci. Vymycením chudoby, nezaměstnanosti a odstraněním úplné závislosti na mzdě zvyšuje sociální stát politické schopnosti a zmenšuje sociální rozdíly, jež jsou bariérou politické jednoty pracujících.

Sociálně demokratický model je tedy otcem jednotné z hlavních hypotéz současného diskuse o sociálním státu parlamentní mobilizace tříd je prostředkem k realizaci socialistických ideálů rovnosti, spravedlnosti, svobody a solidarity.

Politická ekonomie sociálního státu

Předkové politické ekonomie určili klíčové proměnné jako je třída, stát, trh a demokracie, a formulovali základní tvrzení o občanské a třídě, výkonnosti a rovnosti, kapitalismu a socialismu. Od klasické politické ekonomie se současná sociální věda odděluje na dvou vědecky živých frontách. Za prvé se definuje jako pozitivní věda a opouští normativní předpisování [Robbins 1976]. Za druhé, klasická politická ekonomie měli malý zájem o historickou proměnlivost; své úsilí se snažili dovést k systému univerzálních zákonů. Ačkoliv současná politická ekonomie se

9) Uvádějí si to pomohly dva typy zkušenosti. První zjištění, zaznamenané švédským socialisem 20. let bylo, že ani dělnická třída neukázala mnoho nadšení pro socializaci. Když švédští socialisté založili zvláštní komisi, aby připravila plán socializace, dospěla po 10 letech výzkumu k závěru, že je nemožné ji provést. Norští socialisté a vláda Blumova Ladové fronty v roce 1936 zaznamenali zkušenost druhého typu, když zjistili, že radikální návrhy mohly být ze strany kapitalistů snadno sprobolovány díky jejich možnostem zastavit investice a vyvézt

stále ještě někdy dříží víry v absolutní pravdy, komparativní a historická metoda vede k odhalování proměnlivosti a prolínání.

Navzdory těmto rozdílům je dnes studován vztah mezi státem a ekonomikou tak, jak byl definován politickými ekonomy 19. století. Vzhledem k obrovskému růstu sociálního státu je pochopitelné, že se stal hlavním testovacím případem pro kontroverzní teorie politické ekonomie.

Dále budeme posuzovat příspěvky srovnávacího výzkumu vývoje sociálních států ve vyspělých kapitalistických zemích. Chceme ukázat, že většina bádání byla špatně naměřována, hlavně proto, že se odtrhla od svých teoretických základů. Pro adekvátní studium sociálního státu musíme vzít znovu v úvahu metodologii a koncepci politické ekonomie. Na to se zaměřuje poslední část tohoto článku.

Ve výkladu sociálního státu dominují dva typy přístupů. První zdůrazňuje struktury a celé systémy, druhý instituce a aktéry.

1) Systémový/strukturalistický přístup

Systémová či strukturalistická teorie se snaží uchopit logiku vývoje holisticky. Zaměřuje se na funkční potřeby reprodukce společnosti a ekonomiky. Má tendenci zdůrazňovat spíše globální podobnosti než rozdíly.

Jedna varianta začíná teorií industriální společnosti a dokazuje, že industrializace ční sociální politiku nutnou a možnou zároveň. Sociální stát se stává nezbytností, protože předindustriální způsoby společenské reprodukce jako jsou rodina, církev, "noblesse oblige" a cechovní solidarita byly zničeny sociální mobilitou, urbanizací, individualismem a tržní závislostí. Podstata problému je v tom, že trh není adekvátní náhradou, protože se stará pouze o ty, kdo jsou schopni na něm participovat. "Sociální funkce" je proto vlastní národním státu.

Sociální stát byl rovněž umožněn vznikem moderní byrokracie jakožto racionální, univerzální a účinné formy organizace. Je prostředkem pro správu společných věcí, ale také centrem její vlastní moci a podporuje sklony k jejím rozrůstání. Tento způsob uvažování zformoval perspektivu tzv. "logiky industrialismu", podle které sociální stát vzniká současně s tím, jak moderní industriální ekonomika ničí tradiční sociální instituce [Flora a Alber 1981; Pryor 1969]. Pro tuto tezi je ale problémem vysvětlit, proč vládní sociální politika vznikla až padesát nebo dokonce sto let poté, co byla tradiční společnost skutečně zničena. Základní odpověď staví na Wagnerově zákonu z roku 1883 [1962] a na Marshallovi [1920], podle kterých teprve určitá úroveň ekonomického rozvoje a tedy přebytku umožňují vyčlenění omezených zdrojů z produktivního užití (investování) na sociální spotřebu [Wilensky, Lebeaux 1958]. Uvedená perspektiva tak sleduje stopu starých liberálů. Sociální redistribuce ohrožuje výkonnost, a pouze na jisté ekonomické úrovni se lze vyhnout negativnímu výsledku [Okun 1975].

Nový strukturalistický marxismus je překvapivě paralelní. Opouští teorii klasiku zaměřenou na jednání a analytický vychází z pojetí sociálního státu jakožto nutného produktu kapitalistického způsobu výroby. Akumulace kapitálu vytváří rozpor, které může zmírnit sociální reforma [O'Connor 1973]. V této tradici marxismu, stejně jako v dvojí "logiky industrialismu", sociální stát nemůže být

zována strukturou moci praviceových stran. Podle Castlese [1978, 1982] je stupeň jednoty konzervativních stran důležitější než aktivovaná moc levice. Podle jiných autorů konfesi strany (obvykle sociálně katolické) v zemích jako je Nizozemí, Itálie a Německo mobilizují rozsáhlé složky pracujících tříd a usilují o státní sociální programy, které se příliš neliší od socialistických konkurentů [Schmidt 1982; Wiliensky 1981]. Teze třídní mobilizace byla proto oprávněně kritizována pro švédcentrismus, tj. pro svůj sklon definovat proces mocenské mobilizace především na základě spíše výjimečné švédské zkušenosti [Shalev 1983].

Tyto námítky mří na základní omyl týkající se formování tříd: nemůžeme předpokládat, že socialismus je přirozenou bází pro mobilizaci námezdně pracujících. Popravdě řečeno, podmínky, za nichž se pracující obracejí k socialismu, ještě nebyly adekvátně dokumentovány. Historicky byly přirozenými organizačními základy mobilizace pracujících předkapitalistická společenství, zvláště: cechy, ale také církve, ebnika nebo jazyk. Prefabrikované reference na falešné vědomí nemožno vysvětlit, proč se holandský, italský či americký pracující stále mobilizují na nesocialistických principech. Převaha socialismu u švédské dělnické třídy je stejnou hádanou, jakou je dominance konfesionalismu v Holandsku.

Snad nejzásadnější je námítka třetí, týkající se lineárního pohledu na moc. Je problematické tvrdit na tom, že číselný nárust hlasů, odborových svazů, nebo parlamentních křesel se promítá do silnějšího sociálního státu. Za prvé, pro socialistické i jiné strany se magický "padesátiprocentní" práh parlamentní většiny jeví prakticky nepřekonatelný [Przeworski 1985]. Za druhé, pokud socialistické strany reprezentují pracující třídy v jejich tradičním smyslu, je jasné, že ve svém plánu nikdy nemožno uspět. Jen velmi zřídka má tradiční dělnická třída numerickou většinu, a její role se rychle stává okrajovou.

Pravděpodobně nejsilnější cestou, jak vysvětlit kombinovaný problém linearity a minoritní dělnické třídy spočívá v aplikaci Barington-Mooreovy teze mezi třídami koalice na transformaci moderního státu [Weir a Skocpol 1985; Gourvich 1986; Esping-Andersen 1985a; Esping-Andersen a Friedland 1982]. Původní keynesiánská konstrukce plně zaměstnanosti a sociálně demokratického sociálního státu se proto utváří podle schopností (proměnlivě) silných hnutí dělnické třídy ukout politické spojení s organizací farmátů. Tak lze zdůvodnit, proč podporovaná sociální demokracie posléze začala záviset na zformování nové koalice pracujících tříd a bílých límečků.

Tříděné koaliční přístup má ještě další přednosti. U dvou zemí jako jsou Rakousko a Švédsko se proměňané týkající se mobilizace pracujících tříd mohou chovat podobně, a přesto poskytují značně rozdílné politické výsledky. Lze to vysvětlit rozdíly v historickém formování koalice v těchto zemích: průlom švédské sociálně demokratické hegemonie pramení ze schopnosti ukout známou "rudozelenou" alianci, zatímco srovnatelná nevyhoda rakouských socialistů spočívá v si-

7) Toto samozřejmě není problémem týkajícím se pouze parlamentárního třídání hypotézy.

Strukturální marxismus čelí stejnému problému při specifikaci třídního charakteru nových středních tříd. Pokud taková specifikace nepokládá, že se konstituují nová dělnická třída, jsou

tuaci "ghetta", do kterého je uvrhla schopnost konzervativní koalice podmanit si rurální třídy [Esping-Andersen a Korpi 1984].

Celkově tedy musíme uvažovat v pojmech sociálních vztahů, nejen sociálních kategorií. Strukturální a funkcionalistické výklady identifikují konvergentní výsledky sociálního státu; paradigma třídní mobilizace vidí značné, ale lineární rozdíly; interaktivní modely jako je koaliční přístup se zaměřují na odlišné režimy sociálních států.

Co je sociální stát?

Krážde teoretické paradigma musí nějak definovat sociální stát. Jak poznáme, zda a kdy sociální stát funkčně odpovídá potřebám industrialismu nebo kapitalistické reprodukci a legitimizaci? A jak poznáme, že sociální stát odpovídá požadavkům, které by mohla mít mobilizovaná dělnická třída?

Přiznací pro celou literaturu je nedostatek pravého zájmu o sociální stát jako takový. Studie sociálního státu byly motivovány teoretickým zájmem o jiné jevy jako je moc, industrializace nebo protiklady kapitalismu. Konceptuální pozornosti se sociálnímu státu dostalo obyčejně postrovnu. Liší se sociální státy a jak? A kdy je stát skutečně sociálním státem? To obrací pozornost k původní otázce: co je sociální stát? Běžná učebnicová definice obsahuje odpovědnost státu za zabezpečení určitého základního zabezpečení pro své občany. Taková definice zakrývá, zda má sociální politika emancipační charakter či nikoli, zda pomáhá legitimizaci systému či nikoli, zda je v souladu či v rozporu s tržními procesy, a co vlastně znamená ono "základní"? Nelbylo by přilohodnější požadovat od sociálního státu, aby uspokojil více než naše základní či minimální sociální potřeby?

První generace srovnávacích studií začala s tímto typem konceptualizace. Předpokládalo se, že úroveň sociálních výdajů adekvátně odráží sociální závazky státu. Teoretickým zájmem ve skutečnosti nebylo dospět k pochopení sociálního státu, ale spíše testovat platnost sportních teoretických modelů politické ekonomie. Věřilo se, že poměřováním států podle stupně urbanizace, úrovně ekonomického růstu a podílu starých osob byly adekvátně uchopeny podstatné rysy industriální modernizace. Alternativně, poměřováním síly levice nebo mocenské mobilizace pracujících tříd (složitě váženými skóry odborářské aktivity, volební síly, vládní moci), se jiní autoři snaží nalézt dopad této mobilizace tak, jak jej formuloval sociálně demokratický model.

Zjištění první generace komparativistů je velmi obtížné zhodnotit. Žádnou z teorií nelze přesvědčivě doložit. Nedostatek statistických dat za různé země omezuje počet proměnných, které lze testovat simultánně. Když Cutright [1965] a Wiliensky [1975] zjistili, že ekonomická úroveň se svými demografickými a byrokratickými korelály vysvětluje větší rozdíly sociálních států v "bohatých zemích", relevantní míry mobilizace pracujících tříd a otevřenosti ekonomiky nebyly zahrnuty. Závěr ve prospěch hlediska "logiky industrialismu" je proto pochybny. Když Hewitt [1977], Stephens [1979], Korpi [1983], Myles [1984] a Esping-Andersen [1985b] našli naopak silný důkaz ve prospěch teze o mobilizaci pracujících tříd, nebo když Schmidt [1982, 1983] nalézají oporu pro neokorporativistickou a

Cameron [1978] pro ekonomickou otevřenost, neprovedli plně otestování vůči nejsilnějšímu alternativnímu vysvětlení.

Většina těchto studií tvrdí, že vysvětluje sociální stát. Avšak jejich zaměření na rozpočtové výdaje je irelevantní, nebo v nejlépeším případě zavádějící. Výdaje jsou jen doprovodem teoretické substance sociálního státu. Navíc lineární hodnotící přístup (více či méně moci, demokracie, výdajů) odporuje sociologickým představám, že moc, demokracie či sociální oblast jsou vztahové a strukturované jevy. Srovnávaním sociálních států na základě výdajů automaticky předpokládáme, že všechny tyto výdaje mají stejnou váhu. Avšak některé sociální státy, např. Rakousko, poskytují značný díl privilegovaným státním zaměstnancům. Toto zpravidla nepovažujeme za závazek solidarity a sociálního občanství. Jiné země neúměrně vydávají na sociální výpomoc vázanou na majetkové poměry. Jen málo současných analytiků by souhlasilo, že reformovaná tradice pomoci chudým kvalifikuje sociální stát. Některé země utrácejí ohromné sumy za fiskální dávky v podobě daňových privilegií pro soukromé pojištění, ze kterého těží hlavně střední třída. Ve Velké Británii za Thatcherové vzrostly celkové sociální výdaje, avšak téměř vylučně v důsledku velmi vysoké nezaměstnanosti. Naopak nízké výdaje na některé programy mohou být známkou sociálního státu zaměřeného na plnou zaměstnanost.

Oprávněné je tvrzení Therborna [1983], že musíme začít od koncepce státní struktury. Jaká jsou kritéria, na základě kterých bychom měli usoudit, zda a kdy je stát sociálním státem? K této otázce existují tři přístupy. Therborn navrhuje začít od historické transformace státních aktivit. V pravém sociálním státu musí většina jeho každodenních rutinních aktivit sloužit sociálním potřebám domácností. Toto kritérium má dálekosáhlé důsledky. Z měření rutinních aktivit pomocí výdajů a personálního zajištění plyne, že až do sedmdesátých let nemůžeme žádný stát považovat za skutečně sociální. Některé státy, normálně označované za sociální, nespĺňují toto kritérium, protože většina jejich rutinních aktivit slouží na obranu, udržování vlády a pořádku, administraci apod. [Therborn 1983]. Společenskovědní badatelé přijali příliš rychle statut sociálního státu proklamovaný zemění samotnými. Také příliš rychle dospěli k závěru, že existence baterie typických sociálních programů znamená zrod sociálního státu.

Druhý konceptuální přístup se odvozuje od klasického rozlišení Richarda Timusse [1958] mezi reziduálním a institucionálním sociálním státem. Odpovědnost reziduálního sociálního státu začíná tam, kde rodina na trhu neuspěje, zaměřuje se na marginální skupiny ve společnosti. Institucionální model oslovuje celou populaci, je univerzalistický. V zásadě rozšiřuje sociální aktivitu na všechny oblasti distribuce životně důležité pro společenskou blahobyt. Institucionální přístup vedl k novému rozvoji komparativního výzkumu sociálního státu [Myles 1984; Korpi 1980; Esping-Andersen a Korpi 1984, 1986; Esping-Andersen, 1985b, 1987]. Badatelé byli přinuceni odstoupit od černé skříňky výdajů směrem k obsahu sociálních států: cílené versus univerzalistické programy, podmínky pro jejich

9) Detailní přehled této literatury poskylo mnoho autorů, např. Wilensky et al. [1985].

Vynikající a kritičtější vyhodnocení lze najít v Uusialo [1994], Shalev [1983] a Skoopol a Am [1986].

volbu, kvalitní příjmů a služeb, a - snad nejdůležitější - rozsah, ve kterém stát rozšiřuje občanská práva ve sféře práce a zaměstnání. Díky tomu je jednoduše lineární seřazení sociálních států nadále sítěž přijatelné.

Třetí přístup spočívá v teoretickém výběru kritérií, podle kterých jsou sociální státy posuzovány. To lze realizovat srovnáním konkrétních sociálních států s nějakým abstraktním modelem a oceněním programů nebo celých sociálních států [Day 1978; Myles 1984]. Slabina tohoto přístupu spočívá v tom, že nemá historickou dimenzi a nutně nezachycuje ideály a projekty, o které usilovali historičtí aktéři v boji za sociální stát. Je-li našim cílem testovat kauzální teorie zahrnující aktéry, měli bychom začít požadavky, které skutečně hájili a které považujeme v historii vývoje sociálního státu za rozhodující. Sítěž si lze představit, že by kulokoliv bojoval za výdaje samotné.

Respicifikace sociálního státu⁹

Sotva můžeme nesouhlasit s tvrzením T. H. Marshalla [1950], že sociální občanství je jádrém sociálního státu. Jaké jsou klíčové principy sociálního občanství? Za prvé, míši poskytovat sociální práva, což znamená hlavně dekomodifikaci individua tvářiv v tvář trhu. Za druhé, sociální občanství zahrnuje společenskou stratifikaci: status jednotlivce jakožto občana souteží s jeho třídní pozicí, nebo ji dokonce nahrazuje. Za třetí, sociální stát je nutno chápat jako propojení trhu, rodiny a státu. Ztělesnění těchto zásad má při teoretické specifikaci sociálního státu přednost.

Práva a dekomodifikace

Pracovníci jakožto tržní komodita jsou sociálně závislí vylučně na peněžním pojivu ("cash nexus"). Otázka sociálních práv je tedy otázkou dekomodifikace, tj. zajištění prostředků zabezpečení alternativních k tržním. Dekomodifikace se může vztáhnout jak k poskytnutým službám, tak ke statusu individua, v obou případech je však důležité, v jaké míře je rozdělování odděleno od tržního mechanismu. Pouhá přítomnost sociální pomoci nebo pojištění nemusí nezbytně vést k výrazné dekomodifikaci, pokud jednotlivce podstatně neosvobozují od závislosti na trhu. Výpomoc v chudobě vázaná na majetkové poměry snad nabízí zachránnou síť poslední volby. Avšak jsou-li dávky nízké a spojené se společenským stigmatem, výpomoc není všechny, kromě těch nejobožejších, k účasti na trhu. Přesně to bylo záležitostí chudinských zákonů v 19. století. Podobně většina prvních programů sociálního pojištění byla záměrně koncipována tak, aby maximalizovala výkony na trhu práce [Ogus 1979]. Výplata dávek vyžadovala dlouhé období placení příspěvků a řídila se předchozím pracovním úsilím. V každém případě šlo o to, zabránit demotivaci práce.

Dekomodifikace byla bezpečivby velmi rozpornou otázkou rozvoje sociálního státu. Pro pracující byla vždy prioritní. Když jsou pracující plně závislí na trhu, je obtížné je mobilizovat pro solidární akce. Protože zdroje jejich prostředků odrážejí nerovnosti trhu, dochází k rozdělení těch, kdo jsou uvnitř a těch, kdo jsou mimo.

9) Tento oddíl čerá většinu svého materiálu z dřívějších článků (viz zvl. Esping-Andersen 1985b, 1).

což ztěžuje formování dělnického hnutí. Dekomodifikace posiluje pracovníka a oslabuje absolutní autoritu zaměstnavatele. Právě z tohoto důvodu zaměstnavatelé vždy dekomodifikaci bránili.

Dekomodifikovaná práva jsou v současných sociálních státech různě rozvinutá. V sociálních státech založených na sociální pomoci nejsou práva svázána ani tak s pracovním výkonem, jako s manifestovanou potřebností. V zemích, kde je tento model dominantní (hlavně v anglosaských), je výsledkem vlastně posilování třídy, neboť všichni kromě těch, kteří na trhu selhali, jsou motivováni napojit se na sociální sektor.

Druhý převažující model kombinuje povinné státní sociální pojištění s příměně silnými nároky na pobírání dávek. Avšak ani to automaticky nezajišťuje podstatnou dekomodifikaci, neboť je zde silná závislost na pravidlech výběru a poskytování dávek. Německo bylo pionýrem v sociálním pojištění, ale po většinu 20. století zde lze sleži hovořit o větším přínosu ve způsobu dekomodifikace prostřednictvím sociálních programů. Dávky závisely téměř výlučně na příspěvcích a tudíž na práci a zaměstnanosti. Před II. světovou válkou byly v německém pojišťovacím systému průměrné důchody pracovníků ve skutečnosti nižší než obvyklé sazby pomoci v chudobě [Myles 1984]. Stejně jako u modelu zaměřeného na sociální pomoc je důsledkem to, že většina pracujících raději zůstává v práci, než aby odešla do důchodu. Ne pouhí existence sociálních práv, ale jim odpovídající zákony a výchovná podmínky určují rozsah, v němž sociální programy nabízejí skutečně alternativy k závislosti na trhu.

Třetí hlavní model sociálního zabezpečení, totiž občanské dávky Beveridgeova typu, se na první pohled zdá nejvíce dekomodifikující. Nabízí základní a rovný příjem všem, bez ohledu na dřívější výdělky, příspěvky nebo pracovní výkon. Tento systém by skutečně mohl být solidárnější, ale není nutně dekomodifikující, neboť taková schémata jsou jen zřídka schopná nabídnout příjmy na takové úrovni, aby příjemcům poskytla jinou možnost než pracovat.

Dekomodifikující se sociální stát je zcela nedávného data. Minimálně jde o to, že občané se mohou svobodně, bez případné ztráty zaměstnání, příjmu nebo celkového zabezpečení, rozhodnout nepracovat, když to sami považují za nutné z důvodů zdravotních, rodinných, věkových a dokonce i sebevzdělávacích: zkrátka když to pokládají za nutné pro své adekvátní zapojení do sociálního společenství.

Podle této definice bychom například měli požadovat nemocenské pojištění zajišťující příjmy ve výši normálního výdělku či právo zůstat doma s minimálním dokládáním zdravotních potíží. Obdobně by byly požadávky na penzi, mateřskou dovolenou, studijní volna a pojištění v nezaměstnanosti.

Některé země se k této úrovni dekomodifikace přiblížily, ale pouze nekdavno a většinou s podstatnými výjimkami. Skoro ve všech zemích byly sociální dávky zvýšeny téměř na úroveň normální mzdy koncem 60. a na počátku 70. let. Avšak v některých zemích se při nemoci ihned žádá lékařské potvrzení, jinde se musí na dávky dlouho čekat nebo trvání nároku je velmi krátké (např. v USA je lhůta poskytování podpory v nezaměstnanosti maximálně 6 měsíců, ve srovnání

s 30 měsíci v Dánsku). Obecně tihnou skandinávské země k nejsilnější dekomodifikaci, zatímco anglosaské k nejslabší.

Sociální stát jako stratifikační systém

Vztah mezi sociálním občanstvím a společenskou třídou je stále silně zanedbáván jak teoreticky, tak empiricky, a to navzdory důrazu, který na něj klade jak klasická politická ekonomie, tak T. H. Marshall. Problém je buď odsouván (to, že sociální stát vytváří rovnostářšší společnost, se bere jako dané), nebo se k němu přistupuje zúžené v pojmech příjmové distribuce nebo vlivu vzdělání na sociální mobilitu. Důležitější však je, jaký druh stratifikačního systému nastoluje sociální politika. Sociální stát není mechanismem, který zasahuje do struktury nerovnosti nebo ji koriguje: sám o sobě je totiž stratifikačním systémem. Aktivně a přímo organizuje společenské vztahy.

Komparativně a historicky můžeme snadno určit alternativní systémy stratifikace, které jsou vlastní sociálním státům. Tradice pomoci chudím a její současné pokračování v sociálních dávkách poskytovaných podle majetkových poměrů jsou zjevně účelově stratifikační. Trestáním a stigmatizací jejich příjemců sociální pomoc podporuje výrazný sociální dualismus, zvláště pokud jde o pracující třídy. Není překvapením, že tento model sociálního zabezpečení je hlavním terčem útoků dělnického hnutí.

Model sociálního pojištění podporovaný konzervativními reformátory jako byli Bismarck a von Taaffe, byl rovněž jasnou formou třídní politiky. Usiloval ve skutečnosti o simulánní dosažení dvou stratifikačních výsledků. Prvním cílem bylo upevnit rozdělení námezdně pracujících uzákoněním odlišných programů pro různé třídy a stavy, každou s jejích vlastním, výrazně jedinečným souborem práv a privilegií. Druhým cílem bylo vytvořit loajlnost k monarchii a ústřední státní moci. Takto byl Bismarck motivován ke státnímu příspěvku k penzím. Hlavně země jako jsou Německo, Rakousko, Itálie a Francie usilovaly o takovýto státně korporativistický model, který často vedl k labyrintu statusové specifických pojišťovacích fondů.

V této korporativistické tradici bylo zvláště důležité zajištění výrazně privilegiovaných dávek pro státní úředníky ("Beamten"). Byl to zčásti prosředek, jak odměnit loajlnitu státu, a zčásti způsob, jak pro tuto skupinu vymezit jedinečný sociální status. Měli bychom být nicméně opatrní s tvrzením, že korporativistický model statusové diferenciace má svůj původ hlavně ve staré cechovní tradici. Neoabsolutističtí autokraté Bismarckova typu viděli v této tradici prosředek, jak bojovat proti rostoucímu dělnickému hnutí.

Dělnické hnutí bylo stejně nepřátelské ke korporativistickému modelu jako k chudinské pomoci. Avšak jeho první alternativy nebyly o nic méně problematické z hlediska sjednocování pracujících jako solidární třídy. Šlo o modely, které byly téměř bez výjimky založeny na sebeorganizujících se spolcích nebo na podobných, odbory či stranami dotovaných bratrstvích pokladnicích. To nepřekvapuje. Pracující byli přirozeně podezřaví k reformám, které podporoval nepřátelský stát, a viděli své vlastní organizace nejen jako bázi třídní mobilizace, ale také jako prostředek

mikrokosmu socialistického přístavu. Tyto mikrosocialistické společnosti se však částo stávaly problematickými třídními ghety, která pracující spíše rozdělovala než spojovala. Typické bylo omezení členství na nejsilnější vrstvy dělnické třídy, přičemž ti nejsilnější - kteří potřebovali ochranu nejvíce - zůstávali mimo. Model bratrské společnosti byl zkrácen v rozporu s cílem - mobilizaci pracujících tříd.

Přístup "socialistického gheta" byl také překážkou, když socialistické strany samy formovaly vlády a musely přistoupit k sociálním reformám, kterých se tak dlouho dožadovaly. Z důvodů politické konice a širší solidarity musely svůj sociální model přestavět na blahobyt pro "lid". Socialisté proto začali vkládat naděje do principu univerzalizmu a (s výjimkou od liberálů) navrhovali vlastní sociální model v konturách demokraticky rovnostářských a s financováním ze státního rozpočtu.

Jako alternativu k pomoci testující majetkové poměry a korporativistickému sociálnímu pojištění nastoluje univerzalistický systém statusovou rovnost. Všem občanům jsou poskytována podobná práva, bez ohledu na jejich třídní či třídní pozici. V tomto ohledu systém směřuje k mezitřídní solidaritě, k národní vzájemnosti. Solidarita rovnostářského univerzalizmu není předpokládá historicky zvláštní třídní strukturu, ve které jsou převládající většíou "malí lidé", pro které lze skromné dávky považovat za adekvátní. Tam, kde už takové podmínky neexistují vzhledem k rostoucí prosperitě dělnické třídy a vzestupu nových středních tříd, rovnostářský univerzalizmus nevyhnutelně vede k dualismu, protože majetní se obrací k soukromému pojištění a dalším výhodám doplňujícím základní dávky na standard, na jaký jsou zvyklí. Když se takový proces rozvine (jako tomu je v Kanadě a Velké Británii), původně podivuhodně rovnostářský duch univerzalizmu se mění v dualismus podobný státu sociální pomoci: chudí spoléhají na stát a ostatní na trh.

Dilematu třídně strukturálních změn musely čelit všechny modely sociálního státu, nejen univerzalistického. Reakce na prosperitu a růst střední třídy se však lišily a tím se lišily i stratifikační výsledky. Ke zvládnutí vyšších očekávání od sociálního státu byla v jistém smyslu nejlépe vybavena tradice korporativistického pojištění, neboť existující systém byl technicky schopen rozdělovat lépe odpovídající dávky. Pionýrskou v tomto ohledu byla Adenauerova reforma důchodů v Německu v roce 1957. Jejím cílem bylo obnovit statusové rozdíly, které byly smazány v důsledku neschopnosti starého pojišťovacího systému nadále poskytovat příjmy odpovídající očekáváním. Provedení bylo prosté: od dávek odstupňovaných podle příspěvků se přešlo k odstupňování podle výdělků, aniž by se změnil rámec statusového rozlišení.

V zemích majících buď systém sociální pomoci, nebo univerzalistického typu bylo nutné rozhodnout, zda aspirace střední třídy budou přechozeny trhem nebo státní. Tato politická volba vede ke dvěma alternativním modelům. Ve Velké Británii a většině anglosaského světa se udržuje nezbytý, skromně pojatý univerzalizmus státu a trhu se ponechává uspokojení stále širších sociálních vrstev požádávajících vyšší standard. Díky politické síle těchto vrstev se nevytváří dualismus mezi státem a trhem, ale také mezi formami sociálního přerozdělování: jednou z nejry-

111
 tzv. "soukromé" sociální zabezpečení. Typickým politickým důsledkem je, že rozdělovací systém veřejného sektoru je stále méně univerzalistický a ztrácí podporu středních tříd.

Existuje však ještě další možnost, jak hledat syntézu univerzalizmu a příměře nosí vně trhu. Tuto cestu sledovaly země, ve kterých stát zapojuje nové střední třídy otevřením druhé, luxusní vrstvy pojištění vázaného na výdělky, který je nadstavbou nad rovnostářstvím stejných dávek. Příklady jsou Švédsko a Norsko. Tím, že zaručené dávky odpovídají očekáváním, je znovu zavedena nerovnost, přičemž jale tři účinně blokována. Toto řešení úspěšně zachovává univerzalizmus a tím nezbytný stupeň politického konsensu pro udržení široké solidaristické podpor vysokých daní, které takový model sociálního státu vyžaduje.

Režimy sociálního státu

Sociální státy se značně různí v právních základech a stratifikaci. To vede ke kvalitativně různým uspořádáním mezi státem, trhem a rodinou. Různé varianty sociálního státu se proto nelíší lineárně, nýbrž jsou seskupeny podle typů.

Jedním typem jsou "liberální" sociální státy, ve kterých převládá sociální pomoc testující majetkové poměry, malé univerzalistické přerozdělování a skromné sociální pojištění. Zabezpečují převážně klientelu s nízkými příjmy, která je na státu závislá, obvykle dělnickou třídou. V tomto modelu byl pokrok sociální reformy omezen tradičními liberálními normami pracovní etiky. Meze sociální politiky se v něm rovnají mezinárodní sklonu žádat podporu místo práce. Pravidla vzniku nároků jsou proto striktní a částo jsou spojena se stigmatem; typická je i malá výše dávek. Naopak stát povzbuzuje trh, buď pasivně tím, že garantuje pouze minimum, nebo aktivně dotacemi soukromého sociálního zabezpečení.

V důsledku tento režim sociálního státu minimalizuje dekomodifikační efekt, účinně ovládá sociální práva a vytváří stratifikační stav, kde se mísí relativní rovnost v bádě příjemců státní podpory s tržně diferencovaným blahobytem prosperujících vrstev a kde panuje třídně politický dualismus mezi oběma skupinami. Archeotypem tohoto modelu jsou USA, Kanada a Austrálie, blíž se k němu Dánsko, Švýcarsko a Velká Británie.

Druhý typ sestává ze zemí jako jsou Rakousko, Německo, Francie a Itálie. Zde bylo dědictví korporativistického státu dovedeno do nové "postindustriální" třídní struktury. V těchto "korporativistických" státech nebyla nikdy významná liberální posedlost výkonnosti trhu a komodifikační, stejně poskytování sociálních práv zde solva někdy bylo problémem. Převažovalo zde zachovávání statusových rozdílu: práva byla vázána třídně a statusově. Tento korporativismus byl zabudován do státu dokonale připraveného nahradit trh coby zdroj sociálního zabezpečení. Soukromé pojištění a zaměstnancké příspěvky hrají v tomto modelu pouze marginální roli. Důraz státu na zachování statusových rozdílu na druhé straně znamená, že jeho redistributivní působení je zanedbatelné.

Korporativistické režimy však byly obvykle utvářeny církvemi a proto jsou ovlivněny úsilím o zachování tradičních rodinných vzorů. Sociální zabezpečení obvykle nezahrnuje nepracující manželky, přičemž rodinné příživkyňky mají

mateřství. Denní péče o děti a podobné služby nejsou vyvinuté a stát zasahuje pouze tehdy, jsou-li možnosti rodiny posírat se o své členy vyčerpány. Ilustrativním příkladem je podpora v nezaměstnanosti v Německu. Když člověk vyčerpá normální nárok na pojištění v nezaměstnanosti, další pomoc závisí na tom, zda rodina disponuje finančními prostředky.

Třetí a nejméně čelný typ je v zemích, kde byly zásady univerzalizmu a dekomodifikace sociálních práv rozšířeny také na nové střední třídy. Můžeme použít název "sociálně-demokratické" režimy, neboť v těchto zemích byla sociální demokracie dominantní silou sociální reformy. Nejjasnějšími příklady jsou Norsko a Švédsko, ale patří sem také Dánsko a Finsko. Namísto tolerování dualismu mezi státem a trhem, mezi dělnickou a střední třídou, sociální demokracie usilovaly o sociální stát poskytující rovnost v nejvyšším standardu, nikoli o rovnost minimálních potřeb. Důsledkem za prvé bylo, že poskytované služby a dávky se pozvedly na úroveň souměřitelnou i s těmi největšími požadavky nových středních tříd a za druhé, že rovnost byla nastolena garantováním plné participace pracujících na úrovni, které se těšili ti zámožnější.

Tato formule představuje směs silně dekomodifikujících a univerzalistických programů, které jsou nicméně přízračněby diferencovanému očekáváním. Manuálně pracující tedy získávají práva identická s těmi, jež požívají úředníci a státní zaměstnanci. Všechny vrstvy a třídy jsou zahrnuty do jednoho univerzálního systému pojištění, avšak dávky jsou odstupňovány podle obvyklých výdělků. Tento model vyžaduje trh a důsledkem je podstatná univerzální solidarita na pozadí sociálního státu. Všichni z něj těží, všichni jsou závislí a všichni se pravděpodobně budou cítit zavázáni platit.

Emancipační politika sociálně demokratických režimů oslovuje trh i tradiční rodinu. Na rozdíl od korporativistického dotabního modelu je zásadou nečekat, až se svépomocně možnosti rodiny vyčerpají, nýbrž předjímat rodinné výdaje. Ideálem není maximalizovat závislost na rodině, ale naopak umožnit individuální nezávislost. V tomto smyslu je tento model zvláštní fází liberalismu a socialismu. Výsledkem je sociální stát, který zaručuje poskytování prostředků přímo dětem, a přejímá přímou odpovědnost za děti, staré a bezmocné lidi. Zavazuje se nést břímě sociálních služeb, a to nejen pokrývat potřeby rodiny, ale také umožnit ženám, aby si mohly zvolit práci mimo domácnost.

Snad nejnápadnější charakteristikou sociálně demokratického režimu je jeho sloučení sociálního zabezpečení a práce. Sociální stát se zavazuje k plné zaměstnanosti a sám je současně plně závislý na jejím dosažení. Na jedné straně má právo na práci stejný status jako zaručený příjem. Na druhé straně obrovské náklady na vzdělávání solidaristického, univerzalistického a dekomodifikujícího systému sociálního zabezpečení znamenají, že stát musí minimalizovat sociální problémy a maximalizovat své příjmy. Nejlepší cestou k tomu je, když většina lidí pracuje a co možná nejméně jich žije ze sociálního přerozdělení.

Zatímco uvedený typ je empiricky jasný, žádný jednotlivý případ není čistý. Sociálně demokratické režimy ve Skandinávii míší klíčové socialistické a liberální

561
né. Dánské dělnické hnutí bylo chronicky neschopné usilovat o politiku plné zaměstnanosti, částečně pro odpor odborů k aktivní politice na trhu práce. Jak v Dánsku, tak ve Finsku hraje trh rozhodující roli v důchodech.

Avšak ani liberální režimy nejsou čisté. Americký systém sociálního zabezpečení je redistributivní, povinný a má daleko k pojišťovacímu. Prinejmenším alespoň ve své první formulaci byl "New Deal" asi tak sociálně demokratický, jako jsou současně skandinávské sociální demokracie. Australský sociální stát se naopak zdá být mimořádně blízký buržoazně-liberálnímu ideálnímu typu, ale do jeho podstaty je zabudována spoluodpovědnost australských odborů. Evropské korporativistické režimy dostaly jak liberální, tak sociálně demokratické impulsy. Plány sociálního pojištění se v Rakousku, Německu, Francii a Itálii podstatně destruktivněji a sjednotily a jejich extrémně korporativistický charakter tím byl redukován.

I přes nedostatek čistoty, mají-li naše hlavní kritéria definice sociálního státu co dělat s kvalitou sociálních práv, společenskou stratifikací a vztahem mezi státem a trhem na jedné straně a rodinou na straně druhé, sestává svět z odlišujících se typických režimů. Srovnávání sociálních států založené na mířkách jako více nebo méně, lepší nebo horší, poskytuje značně zavádějící výsledky.

Důvody různosti sociálních států

Členili se sociální státy na tři různé typy režimů, jsme postaveni před složitější úkol: identifikovat příčiny rozdílů mezi sociálními státy. Jaká je explanací síla institucionalizace, ekonomického, rústu, kapitalismu a politické síly dělnické třídy pro objasnění rozdílů? První povrchní odpověď by byla: velmi malá. Studované země jsou si více nebo méně podobné ve všech souvislostech, kromě mobilizace dělnické třídy. U všech tří typů však nalézáme velmi silná dělnická hnutí a strany. Teorie rozvoje sociálního státu musí zvažovat svá kauzální východiška, máme-li toto seskupení do tří typů vysvětlit. Musíme zanechat naděje, že nalezneme jeden silný kauzální motor a zaměřit se na identifikaci jasných interakčních efektů. Na základě dřív uvedených argumentů jsou zvláště důležité tři faktory: povaha třídní mobilizace (zvláště u dělnické třídy), třídní politické koaliciční struktury a historický odkaz institucionalizace jednotlivých režimů.

Jak jsme uvedli, neexistuje žádný důvod, že pracující automaticky a přirozeně vytvoří socialistickou třídní identitu. Nepatí ani, že jejich mobilizace bude vyprázdňovat zvlášť "švédsky". Skutečně historické utváření kolektivní dělnické třídy je různorodé, právě tak jako jejich cíle a politické schopnosti. Zásadní rozdíl se projevují u odborů i stran. Klíčovým prvkem odborového sdružování je směšice profesních a odvětvových svazů. Profesionální jsou náchylné k partikularismu a korporativismu, odvětvové inklinují k vyjadřování širších, univerzálnějších cílů. Toto mísení významně ovlivňuje pole působnosti pro dělnické strany a také povahu politických požadavků. Dominance Americké federace práce (AFL) v USA před II. světovou válkou tak byla hlavní překážkou rozvoje sociální politiky. Podobně silně profesně orientované dánské dělnické hnutí, ve srovnání s jeho norskými a švédskými protějšky, blokovalo aspirace sociální demokracie na aktivní politiku na trhu práce zaměřenou na plnou zaměstnanost. Pro profesní svazy v USA bylo

jejich privilegovanou tržní pozici. Profesní svazy v Dánsku zářlivě sřezily svůj monopol na výcvik a mobilitu pracovních sil. Centralizované odvětvové odborové svazy naopak lhnou ke vzhovávání jednotné a konsolidované klientely z dělnické třídy do dělnické strany, což usnadňuje politický konsensus a zvyšuje účinnost mocenské mobilizace. Teze o mobilizaci dělnické třídy musí proto věnovat pozornost struktuře odborů.

Stejně důležitá je také politická nebo konfesní fragmentace odborů. V mnoha zemích, např. ve Finsku, Francii a Itálii, jsou odboráři rozděleni mezi socialistické a komunistické strany; svazy zaměstnanců jsou politicky naznařené nebo se včleňují hned do několika stran. Konfesní unionismus se silně projevuje v Nizozemí, Itálii i jiných zemích. Odbory jsou životně důležité jako báze pro stranickou mobilizaci, jejich fragmentace oslabuje levici a zlepšuje mocenskú šance nesocialistických stran. Fragmentace může navíc nasměrovat sociální požadavky k mnoha stranám najednou. Výsledkem jsou sice menší spory o sociální politiku mezi stranami, ale může to také vést k pluralitě konkurujících si principů sociálního státu. Například dotační principu křesťanských odborů je v příkrém rozporu se zájmem socialistů o emancipaci žen.

Struktura odborového hnutí se může, ale nemusí zrcadlit ve formování dělnických stran. Za jakých podmínek bychom ale měli očekávat zformování určitého sociálního státu na základě specifických konfigurací stran? Řada faktorů znemožňuje předpokládat, že by jakákoli dělnická nebo levicová strana byla bez pomoci jiných vůbec, kdy schopna sociální stát ustavit. Bez ohledu na konfesní či jiné rozdělení, dělnická strana samotná může jen za zcela výjimečných historických okolností ovládat parlamentní většinu natolik dlouho, aby prosadila svou vůli. Již jsme se zmínili, že tradiční dělnická třída nikdy nemá volební většinu. Z toho plyne, že teorie třídny mobilizace musí přesahovat hlavní levicovou stranu. Budování sociálního státu tradičně záviselo na výstavbě politické koalice. Struktura třídny koalice je mnohem důležitější, než mocenské zdroje kterékoliv jednotlivé třídy.

Vznik alternativních třídnych koalicí je zčásti určován formováním tříd. V ranějších fázích industrializace tvořily obvykle největší část voličstva rurální třídy. Pokud chtěli sociální demokraté získat politickou většinu, museli se ohlížet po spojenech právě tam. Byla to paradoxně venkovská ekonomika, která byla rozhodující pro budoucnost socialismu. Možnost aliance byla větší tam, kde na venkově převažovaly intenzivně hospodářící malé rodinné farmy, než když závisela na velkých skupinách levně pracovní síly. Tam, kde se farmáři politicky projevíli a měli dobrou organizaci (jako ve Skandinávii), byla schopnost dohodnout politické spojení velmi nesmírně důležitá.

Role farmářů při formování koalic a tudíž v rozvoji sociálního státu je jasná. V severovýchodních zemích vedly podmínky k široké rudo-zelené alianci, k sociálnímu státu s plnou zaměstnaností, a to za protiváhu cenových dotací do zemědělství. To platí zvláště pro Norsko a Švédsko, kde bylo zemědělství velmi řízkové a závislé na státní pomoci. V USA vycházel "New Deal" z obdobné koalice (iniciované demokracií stranou) ale s tím důležitým rozdílem, že silně dělnický jih blokoval

šimú rozvoji sociálního státu. Naproti tomu venkovská ekonomika kontinentálních Evropy byla velmi nehostinnou pro rudo-zelené koalice. Tam, kde bylo intenzivní zemědělství, byla často (např. v Německu a Itálii) v dělnických odborech a levicových stranách spatřována hrozba. Navíc se konzervativním silám na kontinentu podařilo začlenit rolníky do "reakčních" aliancí, když se snažili upevnit politickou izolaci dělnictva.

Politická převaha před II. světovou válkou byla hlavně olázkou agrární třídny politiky. Budování sociálního státu v tomto období proto záviselo na tom, která síl si podmanila rolníky. Absence rudo-zelené koalice nutně neznamená, že by nebyl možné reformy směrem k sociálnímu státu. Naopak to napovídá, které politické síly dominovaly při jeho návrhu. Velká Británie je výjimkou z tohoto obecného pravidla, protože v ní byl politický význam agrárních tříd narušen už před přelícem 19. století. Britská koaliční logika tak ukázala velmi brzo dilema, kterém větší zemi čelila později, totiž, že nové zaměstnanecké střední třídy tvořili "zákolník" politické většiny. Konsolidace sociálního státu po II. světové válce začal hlavně záviset na politických aliancích nových středních tříd. Pro sociální demokracii či bylo těkým úkolem složit požadavky dělnické třídy a zaměstnanců, aniž by obě tovala závazek solidarity.

Protože nové střední třídy se tradičně těšily relativně privilegované pozici n trhu, byly také úspěšné v uspokojování svých sociálních požadavků mimo stá nebo - jako státní zaměstnanci - v rámci privilegovaného státního zabezpečení. Jistota jejich zaměstnání byla tradičně laková, že plná zaměstnanost byla na okraji jejich zájmu. Nakonec jakýkoli program drastické nivelizace přijmú by pravděpodobně narazil na důrazný odpor středních tříd. V tomto ohledu se zdá, že vzestup nových středních tříd zavrhne sociálně demokratické projekty a posílí liberální stícky model sociálního státu.

Politická pozice nových středních tříd však byla rozhodující pro upevnění sociálního státu. Jasná je i jejich role při uváření tří typů sociálních států. Skandnávisky nebo sociálně demokratický model se téměř výlučně spolehal na schopnost sociální demokracie zapojit střední třídy do nového druhu sociálního státu, který b poskytoval dávky odpovídající nárokům a očekáváním středních tříd, ale nicméně b si uchovával univerzalizmus práva. Rozšiřováním sociálních služeb a počtu zaměstnanců veřejného sektoru měl sociální stát fakticky přímou účast na uváření střední třídy instrumentálně oddaných sociální demokracii.

Anglosaské země si naproti tomu podržely reziduální liberální model sociálního státu právě proto, že se o nové střední třídy neucházel stát místo trhu. Důsledkem je třídny dualismus. Sociální stát se v zásadě stará o dělnickou třídu a chudlinm Soukromá pojištění a zaměstnanecké příplatky zajišťují střední třídy. Vzhledem k jejich volební síle je zcela logické, že další rozšíření aktivit sociálního státu j zabrzděno. V těchto zemích je ve skutečnosti největší tlak zaměřen na fiskálních blahobyt, tj. daňové výdaje a úlevy na soukromé sociální zabezpečení.

Třetí typ, korporativistický sociální režim kontinentální Evropy, byl rovně uvářen novými středními třídami, ale jiným způsobem. Příčina je historická. Tyto režimy rozvířily korporativními politickými silami institucionálními, což jim

středních tříd k zachování jak profesně oddělených programů sociálního pojištění, tak politických sil, které je stvořily. Adenauerova velká důchodová reforma v roce 1957 byla explicitně navržena ke znovuoživení loajality středních tříd.

Závěr

Předložili jsme alternativu k jednoduché třídně mobilizační teorii rozvoje sociálního státu. Je to motivováno analytickou nezbytností posunu od lineárního k interaktivnímu přístupu s ohledem jak na sociální státy, tak na jejich historické základy. Chceme-li si studovat sociální státy, musíme zůstat souborem kritérií, které definují jejich roli ve společnosti. Tato role jistě není pouze vydávat a sbírat daně, ani nutně nespočívá ve vytvoření rovnosti. Uvedli jsme rámec pro srovnávání sociálních států, který bere v úvahu principy, za které historičtí aktéři ochotně bojovali. Když sledujeme principy vložené do sociálních států, objevujeme určité skupiny režimů, tedy nejen pouhé variances "nahoru" či "dolů" okolo společného jmenovatele.

Hlavní síly, které vysvětlují krystalizaci rozdílů mezi režimy, jsou navzájem propojené. Zahnují za prvé vzorec politického formování dělnické třídy, a za druhé strukturaci politické koalice s historickým posunem od agrární ekonomiky ke společnosti středních tříd. Otázka formování politické koalice je rozhodující. A za třetí, minulé reformy podstatně přispěly k institucionalizaci preferencí tříd a politického chování. V korporativistických režimech upevnilo hierarchické statusové rozlišující sociální pojištění loajalitu střední třídy k určitému typu sociálního státu. V liberálních režimech se střední třídy staly institucionálně spjaté s trhem. Ve Skandinávii byly úspěchy sociální demokracie po II. světové válce těsně svázané se zavedením sociálního státu středních tříd, který byl ku prospěchu jak tradiční dělnické klientele, tak nové vrstvě zaměstnanců. Zčásti to bylo umožněno tím, že soukromý sociální trh byl relativně nevyvinutý, a zčásti tím, že skandinávští sociální demokraté byli schopni vybudovat sociální stát na tak vysoké úrovni, aby uspokojili přání náročnější veřejnosti. To také vysvětluje neobyčejně vysoké výdaje skandinávských sociálních států.

Teorie, která hledá vysvětlení růstu sociálního státu, by také měla být schopna porozumět jeho stagnaci nebo úpadku. Obecné mínění je takové, že hnutí proti sociálnímu státu a danové revolvy propukají, když se břemeno sociálních nákladů stává příliš těžkým. Paradoxně však opak je pravdou. V posledním desetiletí byly náklady proti sociálnímu státu všeobecně nejslabší tam, kde byly výdaje nejsilnější a naopak Prof?

Růzika, odmlínutí sociálního státu nezávisí na výdajích, ale na třídním charakteru sociálních států. Sociální státy středních tříd, ať už jsou sociálně demokratické (jako je Skandinávie) nebo korporativistické (jako je Německo), posilují loajalitu středních tříd. Naopak liberální, rezidualistické sociální státy jsou USA, Kanada a stále více Velká Británie, jsou závislé na loajalitě početně slabé a často politicky okrajové sociální vrstvy. V tomto smyslu třídní koalice, na kterých byly tyto tři sociální státy založeny, vysvětlují nejen jejich minulý vývoj, ale také jejich budoucí vyhlídky.

Přeložil Lumír Gahnar a Jiří Večeřník

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
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Sociální politika a politika solidarity

Existují perspektivy pro sociální demokracii ve střední a východní Evropě?

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Social policy and the politics of solidarity

Are there any prospects for social democracy in East-Central Europe?

Abstract: Social policy affects the production of a new, or the reproduction of an existing political power structure in a society. This paper starts by contrasting the "conservative-corporatist" and "social citizenship" ideal types of social policy regimes of Western Europe with the "Leninist" ideal type of post-war Central and Eastern Europe. It interprets these three regimes in terms of three distinct strategies of attaining a different kind of solidarity. It addresses the question of how the respective forms of solidarity induced or reinforced the loyalty of the different actors within each regime. It concludes with a discussion of the implications of the "Leninist" regime for actors in the current Czechoslovak political scene by examining how the organizational and ideological legacy of forty years of Marxist-Leninist rule constrains the options available to actors who advocate "social citizenship" as a model for social policy.

Sociologický časopis, 1992, Vol. 28 (No. 3: 351-366)

V tomto článku se zabýváme tím, jak a v jaké míře může sociální politika ovlivňovat mocenskou základnu aktérů spolupracujících v politickém režimu. Zvláště se zaměříme na způsob využití sociální politiky jakožto nástroje uvěření a konsolidace mocenského základny sociálně demokratických stran střední a východní Evropy. Nejdříve ukážeme "ideální typy" režimů sociální politiky, tak jak jsou rozlišovány v literatuře o vývoji poválečné západní Evropy. Budeme se zabývat vlivy, které měly tyto typy politiky na vytváření nových či reprodukci stávajících struktur politické moci, tj. jak zaváděly či posilovaly loajalitu různých aktérů v rámci každého politického režimu. Šíře se rovněž zabýváme minulým "leninským" režimem sociální politiky střední a východní Evropy. Důvodem našeho zájmu je skutečnost, že jakkoli se mohou změny v roce 1989 a po něm zdát radikální, minulý režim za sebou zanechal dědičtí určitě organizace a ideologie. Toto dědičtí limituje vytváření stavu, který by dnešní aktéři považovali za možný nebo žádoucí. Nakonec předkládáme několik úvah o rozsahu, v němž mohou sociálně demokratické strany pozitivně ovlivnit sociální politiku.

1. Tři "klasické" ideální typy režimů sociální politiky v západní Evropě

V literatuře o sociální politice v zemích OECD se obvykle rozlišují tři typy režimů. Lze je považovat za obměnu tří ideálních typů definovaných R. Timusem v jeho úvodu do sociální politiky [Timmus 1974]. První z nich přibližně odpovídá

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Timusovu ideálnímu typu *institutionální redistributivního* modelu sociální politiky a v literatuře je označován také jako *solidaristický, sociálně demokratický* nebo *univerzalistický s dominantní úlohou státu*. Je pro něj charakteristické, že zahrnuje celou populaci bez ohledu na to, zda je nebo není sociálně potřebná (viz např. [Baldwin 1990], Esping-Andersen 1990]). V tomto ideálním typu rší práva zahrnující celou populaci vliv statusových privilegií a tříd. Dávky jsou, alespoň v principu, plošné a jsou financovány z daní. Stát je chápán jako základní prostředek uskutečňování sociálních práv svých občanů. Tento ideální typ se nejvíce blíží skandinávským zemím, hlavně Švédsku v prvních desetiletích po 2. světové válce, ale také do určité míry Velké Británii.¹ Tento typ dále označujeme jako *občanský* model.

Druhá skupina zemí se přibližuje Timusovu *přímýstřední* výkonovému modelu sociální politiky, který je rovněž označován jako *k příjmům* *vztahový, moderní konzervativní* nebo *korporativní model se státní dominancí* a je založen na historicky vyvinutém dědičtí korporativního státu. Vychází z toho, že sociální potřeby mají být zajištěny pouze na základě zásluh, pracovního výkonu a produktivity. Klíčovým prvkem tohoto modelu je status. Dávky odrážejí hierarchii mezd a jsou financovány z příspěvků zaměstnavatelů a zaměstnanců. Redistributivní efekty tohoto typu sociální politiky jsou jen malé.

V mnoha případech byly tyto režimy částečně uváženy církví a křesťanskou demokracií. To přispívá k profilování jejich konzervativního postoje k rodině, který stanoví ne stejnou výši dávek pro muže a ženy a tím podporuje tradiční formu patriaralistské rodiny. Tento postoj zahrnuje princip *subsidiarity*, podle něhož stát podporuje a zajišťuje pouze ty formy sociálního zabezpečení, které ostatní instituce, především církve, nejsou schopné poskytnout. Tyto konzervativní korporativní systémy nejvíce odpovídají zemím kontinentální Evropy, zejména Německu a Rakousku, ale také Belgii.² Uvedený typ bude v této studii označován jako *konzervativně korporativní* model.

Třetí skupina zemí je přirovnávána k Timusovu modelu *reziduální sociální politiky*. V tomto typu se téměř výhradně spolehná na soukromý trh a rodinu. Pouze v případě, že tyto kanály selžou, měly by nastoupit instituce sociálního zabezpečení. Základem tohoto modelu je myšlenka, že "skutečným členem sociálního modelu".

1) Beveridgeův systém zavedený po válce si stále uchovává prvek "pojištění", několi v zmiřněné podobě. Byl koncipován jako *institutionální* typ, ale plošné dávky byly tak nízké, že zde zůstalo hodně prostoru pro všechny druhy soukromých komerčních aktivit, které se nacházejí v "tradičních" reziduálních systémech jiných anglosaských zemí, zvláště v USA. Avšak *Státní zdravotní služba* ve Velké Británii zůstává důležitou vymožeností odpovídající *občanskému* modelu.

státu je učít lidi, jak žít bez něho" [Peacock 1960]. Reziduální model přijímá bez dalšího nerovnost vytvářenou trhem. Dávky v tomto režimu jsou skromné, čisto vázané na průkaz potřebnosti a stigmatizující. Stát podněcuje soukromé formy sociálního zabezpečení, jako je soukromé pojištění a zaměstnavecké zabezpečení. Nejvíce je tento typ pravděpodobně realizován ve Spojených státech, avšak také Velká Británie se k této kategorii v poslední době značně přiblížila. Tento typ zde označujeme jako *reziduální* model.

Rozdíly mezi těmito třemi typy se během doby šířily. To se zejména týká rozdílů mezi *občanskými* a *konzervativně korporativními* režimy západní Evropy, který se za minulá dvě desetiletí stal méně výrazným.³

2. K charakteristice sociálně politických režimů pováliečně střední a východní Evropy, s ohledem na "klasické" západoevropské ideální typy

Předehozí diskuse naznačuje, že *občanský* a *konzervativně korporativní* model může být referenčním východiskem, uvažujeme-li o systémech sociálního zabezpečení ve střední a východní Evropě. Letný pohled na tyto systémy ukazuje, že opravdu mají trsy nacházející se v obou modelech.⁴ To však neznamená, že režimy ustavené ve střední a východní Evropě po 2. světové válce jsou jednoduše kompromisem mezi *občanským* a *konzervativně korporativním* modelem. Střední a východní Evropa si vytvořila svůj vlastní druh sociální politiky, kterou zde nazýváme *leninistým* typem. Přesto se zdá vhodné tyto režimy analyzovat, za použití stejných kritérií jako v literatuře o západní Evropě: záber, financování, typ dávek atd.

Pováliečně režimy měly formální snahu o univerzální pojeří a skutečně mnoho legislativních změn zaváděných v pováliečných letech se neso v tomto duchu. Československo přijalo v roce 1948 *Zákon o národní pojištění*, který sjednotoval různé způsoby sociálně důchodového zajištění z předváliečného období. Tento zákon rozlišoval tři kategorie na základě obtížnosti práce, ale více než 90 % univerzálnímu schématu.

3) Tato konvergence může být nejlépe shrnuta názvy kapitola Baldwinovy nové knihy [Baldwin 1990a]. Kapitola zabývá se "univerzalistickým" sociálním státem je nazvána "Od Beveridgeova systému zpátky k Bismarckovi: otázka výslužby". Zabývá se tím, jak skandinávské země zavedly *doplňkové* důchody, odřázející hierarchii mezd. Jiná kapitola, "Solidarita zaudm věhodem", popisuje kontinentální Evropu v 60. letech směřující k více univerzálnímu schématu.

4) Musíme zdůraznit, že tyto podobnosti jsou založeny na analýze, která vědomě slučuje režimy v různých zemích střední a východní Evropy. Je možné, že bližší pohled na jednotlivé země by objevil konzistentnější režim. Zdá se, že komparace s třetím, *reziduálním* modelem je nejméně zajímavá (alespoň v období let 1948-1989) vzhledem k téměř absolutnímu odstranění soukromého trhu ve východoevropských společnostech. Přesto někteří autoři zdůrazňují, že ve východní Evropě lze nalézt také prvky *reziduálního* modelu, zvláště v případě Polska, kde je velké množství programů vázaných na průkaz potřebnosti [Morawska 1989: 11 anj. Němčové tyto programy se zdají spíše srovnatelné s tradičním uspořádáním "poor-relief", které nadále existuje v kontinentální západní Evropě vedle systému národního pojištění (může jít také o to, že tyto programy vázané na průkaz potřebnosti byly specifické pro Polsko, ve kterém jako v jediné zemi střední a východní Evropy po komunistickém uchopení

pracující populace spadalo do třetí (nejméně náročné) kategorie s *Zákon o národním pojištění* z roku 1948 byl v roce 1957 nahrazen *Zákonem o sociálním zabezpečení*, který formálně zrušil příspěvkové financování vyplývající ze *Zákona o národním pojištění* a nahradil jej všeobecným důchodovým financováním.

Odstranění trhu a destrukce zprostředkujících institucí společnosti bezprostředně vedly k situaci, ve které jediným poskytovatelem sociálních služeb byl stát. Stejný vzorec je sledován ve větší východoevropských zemích, ve kterých byla pro téměř každého občana ústavně zaručená sociální práva podřízena tichému nebo i explicitivnímu předpokladu, že sociální programy slouží primárně potřebám "pracujících lidí" a jejich rodin. Jakmile jedinec odmítá stát se částí "pracujícího lidí", vysílá se riziko vyloučení z "univerzálního" zabezpečení.⁶

Formálně vyřádkováno se tedy režimy poválečné východní Evropy nejvíce přiblížily občanskému modelu; avšak restrikce sociálních práv byla tak značná, že téměř univerzální pojem nesloužilo emancipaci, ale představovalo část státní totální kontroly občanů. Podmínkou pro obdržení takových dávek bylo přijetí zaměstnání ve státním sektoru; záběr systému se postupem času zvyšoval, avšak ještě v 80. letech bylo zřejmě upřednostněno zaměstnanců ve státním kontrolovaných sektorech obecně a v určitých odvětvích půmyslu zvláště.

Ve svém působení byla tedy východoevropská sociální politika podobná spíše modelu *konzervativně korporativního* než *občanskému*. Její zvláštností je "vztaženost k práci" - netoliko díky faktu, že byla financována z příspěvků,⁷ ale také proto, že zahrnují do zabezpečení záviselo na zaměstnání, především ve státním sektoru.

Práce představuje stavební kámen marxistické ideologie stejně jako institucionálního systému socialistických zemí. V tomto kontextu je práce pojata jako zaměstnání v socialistickém sektoru a současně jako základna pro účast v politických a ekonomických systémech. Zaměstnání, nikoli občanství, je klíčovým kritériem pro nárok na sociální dávky a zařazení do sociálních programů.⁸ [Sik, Sveilik 1990: 276]

5) Podle právní úpravy z roku 1952 byl Fond sociálního zabezpečení financován ze státního rozpočtu. Poplatky pracovníků za pojištění byly zahrnuty do daně z mzdy a zaměstnavatelská část byla původně odvozena procentem z celkové vyplácené mezd. Avšak počínaje rokem 1957 byly poplatky na pojištění nahrazeny 50 % daní z hrubého mzdového fondu podniků (tyto informace byly poskytnuty International Social Security Organization). Sociální zabezpečení tak ztratilo přímý vliv na příspěvky pracovníků a zaměstnavatelů. Je nutné podotknout, že E. Morawska ve své zajímavé diskusi je poněkud skeptická, pokud se týká rozsahu, ve kterém tento předstíraný "nepříspěvkový" systém odráží realitu [Morawska 1989: 9].

6) Jednotlivé kategorie populace, které byly vyloučeny ze sociálních práv, se v různých zemích a obdobích liší. Obecně se však diskriminace týká všech "nezárodních" skupin, od politických disidentů až po pracující mimo státní sektor. Třebas v zemích, jako je Maďarsko, předstíraly nezádnost skupin až do roku 1970 družstevní rolníci.

7) Systém sociálního zabezpečení ve střední a východní Evropě, jak je již uvedeno v poznámce 5, byl financován z daní mzdového fondu podniků. Někdo může poukazovat na to, že se jedná o formu příspěvkového financování.

Kromě toho, sociální dávky nadále odrážely statusové rozdíly, především mzdovou hierarchii. Je ovšem nutné mít na zřeteli, že v zemích, jako je Československo, byla mzdová diferenciace vskutku malá. V tomto kontextu poukázal Miroslaw Ksiezopolski na zajímavý rozpor poválečné východní Evropy:

"Pevné spojení mezi sociálními právy a povinnostmi, mezi pracovním výkonem a úrovní uspokojení individuálních potřeb, se shoduje se základními principy výkonového modelu. Avšak na druhé straně, ... tak na zvýšení individuálního výkonu byl spojen s poměrně úspěšnou snahou zbovati stejné jednolice odpovědnosti za jejich sociální zabezpečení. Během celého poválečného období ... zajišťovala mzdová politika každému zaměstnanci slušné životní, ale bylo velice obtížné dosáhnout vyšší životní úrovně zvýšením individuálního výkonu" [Ksiezopolski 1990: 55].

To naznačuje, že podmínkou pro zahrnutí do systému sociálního zabezpečení nebyl výkon jako takový, ale spíše kombinace fyzické přítomnosti na pracovišti a loajalita (či alespoň absence zjevného nesoouhlasu) vůči straně a státu.

Toto ústřední poslání loajaliti také znamená významný odklon od "výkonového" ideálního typu; dávky a služby sociálního zabezpečení mohly být nárokovány pouze na základě přítomnosti na pracovišti a nebyly považovány (státem ani příjemci) za smluvní právo, ale spíše za "dar socialistického státu". Například Z. Fergeová uvádí, že tomu tak bylo díky totálnímu charakteru moci a absenci demokracie:

"... každý krok při zlepšování systému sociálního zabezpečení byl široce prezentován veřejnosti nikoli jako odezva požadavků veřejnosti, ale jako benevolentní dar státu-strany" [Ferge 1990].

Fergeová ukázala, že v Maďarsku lidé bez zaměstnání a jejich rodiny neměli nárok na příjem, včetně rodinných dávek [Ferge 1991a]. E. Morawska uvedla, že v Polsku byly univerzální plošné dávky zaručené občanům vlastně neznámé: existoval tam minimální státní důchod jako 80 % minimální mzdy, ale starobní důchody byly (a stále ještě jsou) vázány na výdělky [Morawska 1989: 10]. V Polsku navíc byly právně určené důchody zvýšeny *preferenčními přídatky* pro zaměstnance v civilních službách, členy bezpečnostních sil a zaměstnance na "důležitých ideologických frontách", jako je např. žurnalistika nebo školství [Morawska 1989: 16].

Podobné úpravy zahrnující asi 300 benefitů existovaly také v Československu. O. Uje cituje příklad bývalých členů politických elit, kteří pobírali takzvanou "čestnou" nebo "osobní" penzi značně převyšující standardní sociální zabezpečení.⁹ Tyto úpravy nebyly stanoveny zákonem a udělovaly se více či méně ad hoc; proto se neobjevují v informacích poskytovanych International Social Security Association a je nadále obtížné přesně odhadnout, o kolik lidí se zde jednalo. Tyto přídatky značně připomínají privilegia úředníků v zemích, jako je Rakousko - několi v Československém případě se počet příjemců zdá být menší.

9) Jeden z nekritičtějších příkladů, který uvádí Otto Uje [1974: 53], je případ K. Bacfika, ministra bezpečnosti z doby stalinových procesů; počátkem 70. let pobíral důchod 2.500 Kčs za měsíc, tj. dvakrát více než univerzální profesor s tříletou praxí.

Zdá se tedy, že *leninský* režim sociální politiky poválečné východní Evropy měl prvky společné s oběma modely, *občanským* i *konzervativně korporativním*. Na jedné straně to byl pokus o realizaci určitého druhu univerzálního pojetí, ačkoli zaměnil kategorii "občana" za kategorii "dělník". Uspokoučoval to prostřednictvím silného veřejného sektoru tak, že "stát" byl jediným poskytovatelem většiny dávek a služeb, ačkoli tento "stát" byl pod vylučnou kontrolou jediné politické klíčky, která však v některých zemích delegovala výkon určitých služeb jiným "převodovým pákám" pod svou kontrolou.

Na druhé straně, *leninský* model v některých aspektech připomínal *konzervativně korporativní* typ, a to zvláště svým důrazem na "práci" jako kritérium zahrnutí - ačkoli fyzická přítomnost na pracovišti se zdála být důležitější než skutečný výkon. Další podobnosti s *konzervativně korporativním* modelem zahrnují pevné vazby mezi individuálním sociálním zabezpečením a pracovní hierarchií, ačkoli v hierarchii se zdají být více determinovány longitudinalou k režimu než kompetentností, výkonem nebo dědičností a poskytováním zvláštních výhod pro civilní službu, ačkoli reálně nebyly vlastně určeny a¹⁰. Bylo by samozřejmě pošetilé vytvářet z těchto *relativních* podobností úspěchané závěry: prvky probírané v předchozím textu byly vytřeny z kontextu a za odlišných podmínek různých režimů mohou klidně mít jiné vzájemné vztahy a jiné významy. Nelze například ignorovat odlišnosti významů kategorie "práce" v běžném životě demokratických kapitalistických zemí a marxisticko-leninských společností.

3. Zavedení kritéria solidarity a formování identity

V této části nehodláme vytvářet jinou typologii sociálně politických režimů. Chci-li bychom spíše popsat specifické prvky těchto režimů s cílem nalézt konceptuální vazby mezi rozvíjením sociální politiky a (re)produkcí politické moci. Jedním ze základních argumentů tohoto článku je, že různé režimy sociální politiky, které se v Evropě institucionalizovaly v poválečném období, se dají interpretovat jako *říz různé strategie dosažení solidarity*.

9) V této souvislosti je dědičností mnoha formální, legálně potvrzený transfer statusových privilegií. V neformální rovině hraje samozřejmě důležitou roli rodinné konexe lidí při pozitivním ovlivňování šancí vzstupu ve společenské hierarchii.

10) Podle Z. Ferguse je podobnost s *občanským* modelem pouze formální. Uvádí, že "emananční dimenze skandinávského modelu absolutně chybí v sítné socialistickém modelu sociálního zabezpečení" a "má dokonce mnohem méně společného s ostatními typy režimů v Evropě". Uznává označení leninského sociálního systému jako "antiliberálního, sítného, socialisticky hierarchizovaného, smíšeného a s konzervativními prvky" [Ferguson 1991b: 9]. Ačkoli Ferguson sama stovmání nedělá, je takové udělení paralelu mezi užitím a formou sociální politiky poválečné východní Evropy s císařským Německem na konci 19. století. Koneckonci všechny příklady jako "antiliberální", "sítné" a "hierarchizovaný" se zdají být stejně aplikovatelné na bismarckovskou koncepci sociální politiky.

11) Dva ze tří zde probíraných režimů více či méně korespondují s Timusovým "institucionálním modelem" a jeho "industriálním výkonovým" modelem; třetí režim je smíšeným leninským modelem.

První strategie, přijatá v sociálně demokratických sociálních státech severní Evropy a částečně zavedená ve Velké Británii ihned po válce, využívá jako prostředku vytvoření solidarity sociální občanství. Rovně sociální občanství bylo zaručeno každému členu společnosti bez ohledu na jeho třídní původ. Začlenění do systému sociálního zabezpečení se jasně oddělilo od pozice ve struktuře nebo od výkonu příjmece na trhu práce. Tato strategie jako taková vytvářela *mezitřídní* solidaritu.¹²

Druhá strategie, přijatá v konzervativně korporativních sociálních státech kontinentální Evropy, je založena na technice "pojištění"¹³ a je kombinována s principem subsidiarity. Tato strategie nezpochybňovala status quo a byla omezena na redistribuci vybraných rizik mezi sociálně rovnými. Nevytvářela proto solidaritu mezi zaměstnaneckými skupinami, ale *uvnitř* skupin: nejednalo se o solidaritu mezi třídami solidarity, ale o mezigenerační solidaritu v rámci téže vrstvy nebo o *uvnitř-třídní* solidaritu. Duchovní předchůdce tohoto přístupu k utváření solidarity lze nalézt v různých směřech, od Bismarckovy sociální politiky [De Deken, Ruesschemeyer 1992] přes práci Emila Durkheima [1978] a sociální učení katolické církve [Van Kersbergen 1991, Spieker 1986] až k tomu, co se dá nazvat "novou školou" sociální ekonomiky [Gide 1932, Donzelot 1984].

Třetí strategie byla uplatněna v marxisticko-leninských společnostech střední a východní Evropy a pokoušela se ustavit solidaritu vytvořením "beztrždního" a dělnického státu. Místo zaručení sociálního občanství všem třídám bez ohledu na jejich původ, jak je tomu v *občanské* strategii, se *leninské* režimy pokoušely udělat z každého občana členu jedné preferované třídy (dělnické třídy) a v hospodářství z každého občana členu jedné stranou garantované všem těmto "dělníkům" plnou zaměstnanost. Sociální dávky byly proto podmíněné tím, že jedinci akceptovali začlenění do předtva tohoto "dělnického státu".

Zatímco konzervativně-korporativní strategie povýšila "korporativní" statusovou identitu a sociálně demokratická strategie se pokusila vytvořit "lidskou" identitu podnětem souměřitelnosti mezi dělníky, rolníky a ostatními námezdními pracovníky - leninská strategie měla vtěsnat každého členu společnosti do identity "dělníka".

Tato strategie šla daleko za rozložení rizik, za organizování sociálních služeb nebo redistribuční příjmu: podstatně změnila strukturu společnosti, zvláště její ekonomickou organizaci. Zatímco strategie přijaté v západní Evropě lze chápat jako pokus vytvořit solidaritu ve sféře spotřeby, režimy střední a východní Evropy se pokusily realizovat solidaritu již na úrovni výroby. Z tohoto důvodu se uvádělo,

12) K diskusi o předchůdci sociálně demokratické občanské založené strategie upevňující mezitřídní solidaritu viz [Esping-Andersen 1987]. Ke kritice této "labouristické" interpretace univerzálního sociálního státu viz [Baldwin 1990b].

13) Koncepcie "pojištění" má v tomto článku poněkud užší význam: odpovídá systému financování spíše z příspěvků než z daní, kde dávky odrážejí rozdíl mezi diferenciací mezi příjemci. Pojištění tedy není používáno v širším smyslu "rozložení rizika" - kdyby byl používán tento význam, pak každý systém sociálního zabezpečení by mohl být vydáván za systém "pojištění".

že ve společnostech sovětského typu měly být sociální zabezpečení a solidarita zajištěny uvnitř všech institucí společnosti a v důsledku toho by měl takový sociální řád malé využití pro redistributivní sociální politiku.

"Předpokladem bylo, že by automaticky zmizel ... dřívější střet ekonomických a sociálních zájmů; ... že by nebylo potřeba oddělených institucí reprezentujících ekonomické a sociální zájmy. Sociální politika jakožto samostatná institucionalizovaná sféra by mohla být zrušena, neboť sociální zájmy by byly již zabudovány ve fungování ekonomiky" [Ferge 1989: 271].

Někteří dokonce prohlašují, že to, co v těchto režimech existovalo jako sociální politika, ve skutečnosti často mělo opačný efekt: "sociální politika" namísto redukce nerovnosti tuto nerovnost vytvářela [Szelenyi 1978].

4. Strategie utváření solidarity, produkce a reprodukce režimu

Sociální politika může být pojata jako systém generující stratifikaci. Například práce německého historika J. Kocky přesvědčivě ukázala, že pojišťovací systém vládnovského Německa přispěl k vytváření třídy rozlišováním mezi zaměstnanci (*Angestellte*) a dělníky (*Arbeiter*).¹⁴ Vzhledem k této stratifikačním důsledkům může sociální politika ve společnosti hrát důležitou roli v produkci a reprodukci specifické mocenské struktury.

Sociálně demokratické vlády ve Skandinávii použily občanský založenou strategii jako způsob vytvoření vnitřní solidarity. Navrhly reformu sociální politiky, která

"byla univerzální ve své organizaci a vlivu a tudíž minimalizovala vnitřní rozdíly a navíc vytvářela kolektivní identitu" [Esping-Andersen 1985: 147].

Jednou ze základních charakteristik, která odlišovala sociálně demokratický způsob rozšíření občanství v sociální oblasti od jeho liberálních předchůdcůs je tedy fakt, že sociální občanství jako takové není samo o sobě cílem; spíše je to *prostředek*, kterým se sociální demokracie pokoušela překážky svého vlastního formování, zvláště problémy interní diferenciace a stratifikace na jejích přirozené politické bázi.

V tomto ohledu může být považována technika založená na pojištění za opačnou strategii. Jak poukázal Donzelot:

"tato metoda (pojišťovací technika) v žádném případě neposkytuje státu možnost, aby byl aktérem vědomé transformace struktury společnosti, ale aby maximalizoval efektivní vazby solidarity *uvnitř sdávajících struktur*" [Donzelot 1988].

14) Podobný rozdíl lze nalézt ve francouzském a belgickém systému sociálního zabezpečení, ve kterém "cades" a "ouvriers" mají odlišné schéma pojištění. Avšak kategorie "kádru" se zdá být méně inkluzivní ve srovnání s *Angestellte* [Kocka 1981].

15) Koneckou lze považovat hlavně liberální myšlenku a politiku, jako je T. H. Marshall a W. Beveridge, za "otec" sociálního občanství, ačkoli v jejich vlastním zemi zůstalo sociální občanství omezeno pouze na akademické debaty [Marshall 1950, Beveridge 1942].

Tento důraz na existující struktury vytváří z principu *subsidiarity* "přirozený" protipól pojišťovací metody. Princip *subsidiarity* pochází ze sociálního učení katolické církve: Manfred Spieker to shrnul následovně:

"subsidiarita je ústřední princip řízení vztahu mezi státem a společností, který vyjadřuje, že jakákoliv činnost státu či společnosti musí prospívat všem účastem společnosti, tedy nakonec i lidu. Negativně vzato stát může zasahovat do společnosti pouze, když schopnost jednotlivců nebo jejich sdružení konat ve vlastním zájmu se ukáže nedostatečná" [Spieker 1986: 222].

Konečně, ve společnostech sovětského typu ve střední a východní Evropě byla sociální práva vázána na povinnou plnou zaměstnanost. Hlavní cílem bylo vytvoření společnosti sestávající výhradně z "pracujících": "ve sociální dávky byly často podmíněny zaměstnáním ve státním sektoru a jako takové byly využívány jako nástroj rozložení jiných sektorů v ekonomice."¹⁷

Lze tedy odvodit, že strategie tvorby zvláštních vazeb solidarity v každém z typu těchto tří režimů byly částí "širšího" pokusu o udržení, produkci nebo reprodukci mocenských struktur uvedených režimů. Sociální politika jako taková nebyla cílem sama o sobě, ale sloužila jiným cílům.¹⁸

5. Je nějaká perspektiva cesty k moci pro sociální demokracii ve střední a východní Evropě?

V této závěrečné části chceme prozkoumat míru možnosti, jaké mají sociálně demokratické strany střední a východní Evropy pro posílení své politické a organizační pozice vytvořením sociálního státu založeném na občanském a univerzálním principu.

Sociální občanství a ekonomický rozvoj

Před diskusí o důsledcích leninského dědictví pro takovou strategii je nutné odpovědět na řadu obecnějších námitek. Tyto námítky se týkají snadnosti zavádění univerzalistického systému sociálního zabezpečení ve střední a východní Evropě, primárně financovaného ze státního rozpočtu, který by v podstatě poskytoval plošné dávky na základě rovného občanství. Někteří pozorovatelé pochybují o rozsahu, ve kterém jsou relativně chudé společnosti střední a východní Evropy schopny nést břímě takového univerzalistického systému.

16) Někteří autoři uvádějí, že "státní socialismus" nevyrovnával sociální strukturu, ale spíše ji "housal". V tomto smyslu hovoří Boguszak, Gabal a Matějů o "destruktivaci" československé sociální struktury [Boguszak, Gabal, Matějů 1990].

17) Viz např. způsob politiky uplatňované proti *kulakům* v Československu v 50. letech, jak to popisuje E. Táborský [Táborský 1961: 401].

18) Neříkáme, že to je skutečně nový pohled. Myšlenka je samozřejmě ústředním tématem teorii klíčové politiky jako na prostředek legitimizace [Habermas 1975] nebo [Wolfe 1977]. Avšak tyto teorie byly rozvíjeny v kontextu demokratického kapitalismu, ačkoli někteří se je dokonce pokoušeli rozšířit na společnosti sovětského typu [Arato 1982]. Legitimizační argumenty více pohlízejí na sociální politiku jako na určitý druh funkcionálního ekvivalentu dopravnice oslavených sítí *života* a neukazují, jak může být sociální politika součástí strategie sociální výstavy mocenské struktury.

Tento druh kritiky slučuje dva aspekty: velkorysost redistribuce jako systém (kolik peněz je shromáždováno a vydáváno na sociální zabezpečení) a organizaci redistribuce systémem (jak jsou peníze shromažďovány a vydávány). Asi je pravda, že současná ekonomická krize v střední a východní Evropě značně omezi velkorysost systému sociálního zabezpečení. V nejbližších letech budou sociální dávky, stejně jako mzdy nejspíše velice skromné.

Metoda financování systému sociálního zabezpečení a základní logika poskytování většího úřvek jako takových jsou však na úrovni ekonomického rozvoje značně nezávislé. Každá urbanizovaná a industrializovaná společnost musí používat část svého hrubého národního důchodu na takové účely, jako jsou státní důchody, bydlení, vzdělávání, zdravotní péče atd. Makroekonomicky není velkého rozdílu, jakými formami se uskutečňují.¹⁹ Peníze mohou být získány prostřednictvím systému progresivního zdanění a následně rozdělovány podle jednoho nebo více programů; mohou pocházet z příspěvků zaměstnavatelů a zaměstnanců a mohou být následně alokovány na základě pojišťovacího principu; nebo se všechno může nechat na domněle "svobodném" trhu. Proto i relativně zaostalá společnost může zvolit systém založený na sociálním občanství.

Ty západoevropské země, které přijaly občanský model, jej zaváděly za situace, kdy nebyly o mnoho ekonomicky rozvinutější, než je dnes většína zemí střední a východní Evropy. Z porovnání se zeměmi západní Evropy v době vytváření jejich režimů sociální politiky je zřejmé, že vyspělá ekonomika není nezbytným předpokladem univerzálního sociálního zabezpečení. Například Švédsko bylo první zemí, která zavedla univerzální a povinný starobní a invalidní důchod v roce 1913,²⁰ tj. kdy úroveň jeho ekonomického rozvoje byla (významně) nižší, než byla v zemích jako USA, Belgie nebo Francie, které si v té době zvolily reziduální nebo konzervativně korporativní model.²¹ Vysoká úroveň vyspělosti není předpokladem univerzalizmu; naopak se zdá, že pouze po dosažení vyšší ekonomické zralosti má univerzalistický systém tendenci být doplňován přídatky odvozenými z příjmu, aby nedošlo k jeho oslabení vůči rostoucímu tlaku soukromých zabezpečovacích schémata [Esping-Andersen, Micklethigh 1991].

Podíváme-li se znovu na švédský případ, uvidíme, že to bylo v 60. letech, kdy švédští sociální demokraté připojili k univerzálnímu plnošnému schématu povinné od platu odvozené doplnkové zabezpečení. Ve Švédsku byl tedy občanský založený

19) Nejde o to, jak vláda financuje svůj rozpočet. Na makroekonomické úrovni je samozřejmě rozdíl v tom, zda je státní rozpočet financován z daně z příjmů všech občanů nebo zdaněním podnikatelů. Zvláště v případě střední a východní Evropy, kde hlavní cílem se zdá být přilákání zahraničních investic, by vláda nebyla schopna uvalit na podniky vysoké daně. Avšak kdyby byly státní výdaje převážně hrazeny příjmy a nepřímým zdaněním, stále by existovala základna pro určitý druh mezdilhoce redistribuce charakteristické pro občanský model solidarity. Nadále by to znemožňovalo rozvoj korporativních statusových identit.

20) Nicméně až do reformy v roce 1946 tento účelové univerzální systém nadále používal průkaz prosředků pro poskytování dávek nad stanovené minimum.

21) Někteří dokonce uvádějí, že skandinávský "univerzalizmus" může být zčásti vysvětlován jakožto "způsobilá" solidarita mezi rolníky a dělníky. K diskusi o roli agrární třídy při uvážení švédského sociálního systému viz [Olsson 1990].

plnošný systém přijal v době, kdy země byla v raném stádiu ekonomického rozvoje; až když švédská společnost dosáhla vyšší ekonomické vyspělosti, byla zavedena druhá řada důchodů odvozených od výdělků. Jinými slovy, zavedení takového univerzalistického systému nebylo pouze otázkou ekonomických předpokladů, nýbrž bylo spíše záležitostí politické vůle.

Není však účelem tohoto článku dokazovat, že tato politická vůle je prostě omezená. V poslední části budou ukázány dva druhy překážek, které země střední a východní Evropy zdědily po čtyřiceti letech leninismu: organizační a ideologické dědictví.²²

Organizační dědictví

Organizační dědictví *leninských* režimů je přinejmenším poněkud dvojnásobné. Marxisticko-leninské vlády byly formálně nakloněny univerzalizmu a - s výjimkou zákonné pozitivní diskriminace upřednostňující "vysocé rizikové dělníky" a kvazi-legální pozitivní diskriminace ve prospěch některých státních úředníků - sociálně politické systémy, které v těchto režimech vznikly, byly více či méně univerzální. Bylo by však chyběné označovat je jako systémy založené na občanství, neboť byly založeny na formální vazbě mezi "příjmem na sociální zabezpečení" a "povinností pracovat", v každém případě byly vztaženy k výdělkům.²³ To ostatně nebyl hlavní problém těchto režimů vzhledem k tomu, že byly silně zaměřeny na plnou zaměstnanost a mzdová diferenciace byla velmi omezena: avšak s přechodem k tržní ekonomice se tyto mzdové difference pravděpodobně budou drasticky zvětšovat a plná zaměstnanost bude zřejmě, alespoň v kratší perspektivě, nahrazena masivní nezaměstnaností. Kdyby nedošlo k zásadním změnám v současném systému sociálního zabezpečení, pohyb od režimu *sociálně občanského* typu by byl nevyhnutelný.

22) Mělo by být zřejmé, že zde nemůžeme říci, že země střední a východní Evropy mohou nebo by se měly pokusit dohnat švédský model. Bylo by chybné si myslet, že tyto země mohou jednoduše napodobit zákeřnosti osídlených zemí, které se nacházely v jiných mezinárodních podmínkách, s jinou demografickou strukturou atd. Tato omezení se stejně tak vztahují na napodobování konkrétního "bismarckovského" nebo anglo-amerického "reziduálního" modelu. Zaujali jsme se švédským modelem sociální politiky jenom proto, abychom demonstrovali, že občanský model pocházel z poněkud odlišného sociálně-ekonomického kontextu než ten, který se sám tvořil po několika dalších desetiletí.

23) Existující samozřejmě i jiné překážky na cestě k sociálně demokratickému univerzalizmu. Avšak omezení rozsahů nám zde nemůžeme jejich rozbor. Tento článek je zaměřen na organizační a ideologické překážky, neboť tyto lze se vši pravděpodobností odstranit vědomým působením.

24) "Výkon" nemusí být v režimech východoevropských zemí vhodným označením této dimenze práce, neboť (jak je již naznačeno výše) od lidí na pracovišti nebyl opravdu vyžadován výkon, ale pouze fyzická přítomnost. Z. Konopáček v tomto kontextu uvádí, jak tyto režimy sloučily dvě věci, podle kterých byla sociální práva udělována, status "zaměstnanec" a "občana", a jak tato sloučení zapříčinilo, že se tyto kategorie staly poněkud bezvýznamnými [Konopáček 1991]. Fakt, že systémy byly vztaženy k výdělkům, neznamená jeho vykonávání orientaci, neboť mzdové diferenciace neodrážely úsilí zaměstnanců, ale spíše jejich lazního kr. správné a státní.

Leninské režimy zanechaly systém zahrnující určité prvky subsidiarity, např. podnikové odbory a bytová družstva byly částečně zodpovědné za řízení systému sociální politiky. Celkem vzato však tyto organizace byly "převodovými pákami" komunistické strany; po zrušení její moci lze klást otázku, do jaké míry budou tyto organizace nadále efektivní. Současně pokusy ustavit správní výbory sestávající ze zaměstnavatelů, zaměstnanců, příjemců důchodů, finančních institucí a správy sociálního zabezpečení budou, vzhledem k absenci organizovaných zájmových skupin, pravděpodobně čelit závažným obtížím.

Avšak koncepcce nazvaná *Hlavní principy nového systému financování sociálního zabezpečení* [Hlavní 1991] pro Československo, pocházející z ledna 1991, předjímá takovou korporativní formu řízení. Stejný dokument zároveň obsahuje detailní návrh příspěvkového financování, kde by stát byl pouhým garantem solventnosti fondu sociálního zabezpečení a příspěvní by do něho jako garant existenciálního zajištění některých kategorií, jako jsou učedníci, obětní zaměstnanci v armádě, nezaměstnaní a studenti. Tento návrh tedy jasně volí příspěvkový systém financování sociálního zabezpečení, korporativní kontrolu jeho fondů a pouze okrajovou roli státu. Jinými slovy navrhuje transformaci *leninského* režimu na *konzervativně korporativní*, s několika málo ústupky pracujícím.²⁵

Ideologické dědictví a nepřítavný mezinárodní konsensus

Výše jsme naznačili, že organizační dědictví *leninských* režimů stále ponechává určitý prostor pro systém založený na sociálním občanství; avšak ideologické škody jejích čtyřicetileté pseudovládě se mohou ukázat natolik zničující, že pro myšlenky sociální demokracie zůstává velice malý prostor. *Leninské* režimy dokonale zdiskreditovaly vše, co i vzdáleně připomíná socialismus. Dokonce samy výrazy "sociální" a "sociální politika" se staly nečím, co je považováno za pochybné. Leninistický mocenský systém znetvořil hodnoty jako je "kollektivismus" nebo "solidarita".²⁶ To mělo trvalý vliv nejen na vnímání populace, zvláště také na akademické a politické debaty v létu a o létu oblasí.

25) Avšak rodící se tripartitní uspořádání lze považovat za druhou nejlepší možnost za předpokladu, že odbory budou dostatečně silné, aby reprezentovaly zájmy zaměstnanců, což není úplně zřejmé vzhledem k jejich zkompromitování se v roli "převodové puky" minulého režimu. Navíc tripartitní uspořádání může spíše připraviv půdu pro konzervativní křesťansko-demokratický režim sociálního státu. V určitém ohledu může být takový režim považován za funkcionální ekvivalent sociální demokracie, neboť také vede k částečné "dekomodifikaci" pracovní síly, zatímco její závislost na tržní distribuci důchodů. Přesto takové tripartitní uspořádání může být škodlivé pro dlouhodobý výhled mocenské základny sociální demokracie.

26) To částečně vysvětluje relativní úspěch různých druhů nacionalistických a populistických stran v Československu a ve střední a východní Evropě vůbec, neboť nacionalismus a populismus jsou běžné jedním "legitimním" kanálům, prostřednictvím kterého může obyvatelstvo projevit svou úzkost z disrupčních efektů "tržní ekonomiky bez přívlastků" (sv. proslav Václava Klause u příležitosti udělení Schumpeterovy ceny, Václav 1991).

27) Jestliže například zkoumáme volební preference vyjádřené v létě 1991 československou populací, jen necelých 7 % hlasů by bylo pro strany se sociálně demokratickým zaměřením: Československá sociální demokracie (následník předválečné Československé sociální demokracie) by obdržela 2 % hlasů; Občanské hnutí 2,6 %, Československá strana

V těchto debatách je často leninismus sličován se sociální demokracií. Například Konopásek tvrdí, že sociálně demokratický model trpí stejnou "totalitně zmatenou instrumentalací" jako *leninský* režim sociální politiky. Implicitně naznačuje, že tento systém, založený na sociálním občanství zahrnuje stejný druh lhbvdle, stejný druh totalitního zpošlelého přístupu, který nič zprostředkující instituce společnosti, a že *sociální občanství* má stejný druh atomizujících důsledků na společnost, na rodinné struktury atd.²⁸ Takový pohled má tendenci ignorovat fakt, že demokraticky kontrolovaný stát funguje poněkud jinak než ten, který je kolonizován jednou stranou. Je závažný rozdíl mezi tím, zda jsou sociální dávky a sociální služby řízeny demokraticky kontrolovaným, responsivním státním aparátem nebo totalitním státním vedením jednou dogmatickou stranou.

Diskreditace jakékoli formy socialismu je zhoršena (pokud není plně způsoben) poněkud nepřiznivým mezinárodním konsensem, obtahujícím neoliberalní a monetaristické řešení rekonstrukce střední a východní Evropy. Zdá se, že marxismus-leninismus začíná být nahrazen tím, co M. Glasman nazývá "tržním leninismem" (market leninism): leninský třídní předvoj opouští své pozice, aby byl nahrazen novou, institucionálně vycvičenou a ideologicky motivovanou elitou, která se vzdělávala na nových školách mezinárodního řízení v západní Evropě a severní Americe.²⁹ Tento "nový předvoj", reprezentující nový světový řád transnacionálního kapitalismu, bude sloužit jako "hlídací pes" pořádku ve společnosti považovaných za "nevyvinuté a zaostalé", kterým se nedostává odbornosti či schopnosti efektivně zavádět tržně orientované reformy. Glasman tvrdí, že právě proto, že tato nová "komisari" nemají kontakt s dějinami a kulturou společnosti, kterou reorganizují a tvarují, mohou stát nad politiky a konflikty, aplikující své vědecky "neutrální" metody a "korektní" procedury.

socialistická, pokračovatelka z předválečného období, 1 %. Hlavní pravicová strana, Občanská demokracická strana V. Klause, 10,8 % hlasů (výsledky výzkumů *Ekonomická očerávání a postoje* provedených Střediskem empirických výzkumů STEM Sociologického ústavu ČSAV). Nemějí bychom však přehlédnout velký význam těchto předložným snímkům politického života: v pozdějším výzkumu provedeném na různých vzorcích populace zryžila Československá sociální demokracie svůj podíl volebních hlasů na více než 7 % a Občanské hnutí na více než 4 %. To znamená, že sociální demokracie se stala druhou nejsilnější stranou v českých zemích po ODS, jež obdržela v prosincovém měření 14 % volebních preferencí [Mansfeldová 1992].

28) Není žádoucí překvapením, že tento druh argumentů se často odvolává na články švédské sociálního státu z pozice *Nové pravice*. Konopásek se odvolává na články D. Popence [Popence 1991]. K širší diskusi o kritice sociálně demokratického "welfare" státu z pozice *Nové pravice* viz [Huntford 1977].

29) Koncepcce tržního leninismu je rozvíjena a analyzována M. Glasmanem [Glasman 1992]. Studie také obsahuje pozoruhodnou analýzu toho, jak změna mezinárodního konsensu únes omezuje výběr, který mohou aktéři působící ve východoevropském transformačním procesu racionálně sledovat. Zkoumá omezení kladené na racionální agendu kognitivní kontrolou toho, co Tito aktéři považují za rozumné.

Tato hegemonie idejí svobodného trhu má několik příčin.³⁰ Částečně je to důsledek toho, jak v západní Evropě *Nová levice* a *Nová pravice* zatlačily obhajče socialistického státu do defenzivy. *Nová levice* obvinila socialistní stát, že způsobil byrokratickou demagogii života, kolonizaci živého světa a podkopávání sebeorganizujících se hnutí, které historicky představovaly socialistní základnu boje za socialistní reformy. Tento "útok zevnitř" učinil socialistní stát a jeho obhajče více zranitelnými vůči trvalému útoku zvenjšku. *Nová pravice* vzala ze své větší analýz socialistického státu vypracovaných *Novou levicí* a připojila k nim svůj vlastní pohled, zabývajíc se "škodlivými efekty" progresivního zdanění na ekonomickou motivaci a stagnaci způsobenou státním vlastnictvím a "přetžením vlády", v jehož důsledku docházeli k "přílišnému zasahování" státu do výroby.

To vše znamená, že koncem 70. let zůstal socialistní stát bez aktivního voličstva, pouze s několika málo akty ochotnými jej bránit. Defenzivní pozice, do níž byli obhajči socialistického státu vmanévrováni, frustrovala jakýkoli pokus rozvinout funkční sociálně ekonomickou strategii jako alternativu k neokonzervativnímu modelu rekonstrukce střední a východní Evropy. Přestože instituce socialistického státu byly méně zkorodovány v těch zemích, které se úspěšně vyrovnaly s ekonomickými krizemi 70. a 80. let, i tyto instituce přestaly být schopné efektivně a konzistentně artiklovány jako alternativní model společnosti. Důsledkem byla absence sociálně demokratického modelu v politických debatách o rekonstrukci střední a východní Evropy.

Akteři reformy v této oblasti se zdráhali přijmout sociálně demokratické ideje také proto, že mnoho členů dřívějších opozičních skupin, kteří dnes zastávají vládní pozice, viní prominenty socialistní demokracie (jako je Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky a "pozdní" Olof Palme) za jejich pokusy o posílení dialogu s marxisticko-leninskými režimy v 70. letech. Tento proces sblížení byl bytými disidenty interpretován jako akt posilující leninistickou mocenskou strukturu. Ve skutečnosti z dlouhodobého hlediska byl opak pravdou: *uvolnění* otevřelo opoziční prostor pro vystoupení z ilegality a pro otevřené napadení leninských režimů. V podmínkách "studené války" by pro marxisticko-leninské vlády bylo mnohem snadnější násilím polácat jakoukoli formu opozice. Toto neopodstatněné a neproctivé přisuzování role "andělů strážných zavržených neostalinových komisářů" socialistickým demokraciím usnadnilo připodobňování socialistní demokracie k leninismu a nadále přispělo k diskreditaci návrhů socialistické demokracie.

Neokonzervativní ideologie může nakonec snadno obnovit "centralitu práce", kterou marxisticko-leninské vlády čtyři desetiletí vyloukaly lidem do hlavy. "Očkánství" nebylo vlastně obsaženo v diskusi legitimující socialistní dávky. Místo toho bylo režimy propagovány formou "každému podle práce" a "každému podle zásluh" jako cíl spravedlivé distribuce. Již výše jsme naznačili, že "centralita práce a zásluh" byla prakticky redukována na fyzickou přítomnost na pracovišti a lonjaltitu

³⁰ Bohužel nedostatek místa znemožňuje rozsáhlejší diskusi o všech faktorech, jež přispívají k hegemonii *Nové pravice*. Glasmanova studie, zmíněná v předchozí poznámce, rozsáhleji rozpracovává tento problém a diskutuje sdílné předpoklady marxistické a neoklasické ekonomické vědy.

k režimu; avšak přesto se zdá, že populace byla dobře poučena o správnosti obou cílů. Úchylky v praxi byly zjevně vnímány jako zvrácení v zásadě platných principů. Po období transformace bude disciplinární mechanismus vznikající tržní ekonomiky považován za efektivnější "nástroj", který nakonec bude schopen zavést do praxe "oprávněné" distributivní zásady vyhlášené po čtyřicet let. Noví "komisáři tržního leninismu" mohou nyní efektivně apelovat na normativní orientace v populaci, ježž myšlení bylo ovlivněno desetiletími propagandou komisářů marxismu-leninismu.

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Summary

The literature on social policy in OECD countries generally distinguishes three regime clusters: the "institutional Redistributive" model of Scandinavia, the "Achievement Performance" model of continental Western Europe, and the "Residual" model of North America. If one examines the "Lennist" model of post-war Eastern Europe in terms of the same criteria that define these three Western ideal-types, it appears to have features in common with both the "institutional Redistributive" and the "Achievement Performance" model. With the former it shares a formal commitment towards some form of universality and a strong reliance on the state. On the other hand both the "Achievement Performance" and the "Lennist" models emphasize the centrality of work. However, these apparent similarities seem to be relative to an abstraction of elements from their complex context within the different setting of the different regimes they probably have a different relationship to one another, and different meanings. A comparison of Eastern and Western European regimes therefore requires the introduction of an additional conceptual device. The different social policy regimes which were institutionalized in Europe during the post-war era can be interpreted as three strategies aimed at attaining solidarity. The first strategy, the "social citizenship" strategy, was adopted in the "institutional Redistributive" welfare states of Scandinavia and uses social citizenship as a means of establishing solidarity. Inclusion within the social security system is largely detached from the structural position or the performance of the beneficiary in the labour market. As such this strategy created inter-class solidarity. The second strategy, the "conservative corporatist" strategy, was adopted in the "achievement performance" welfare states of continental Europe: it is based on the "insurer" technique. It did not create solidarity between occupational groupings, but only within such groups; it was a form of inter-class solidarity, but of solidarity between generations of the same stratum, or intra-class solidarity. The third strategy, the "Lennist" strategy, was adopted in the societies of post-war Central and Eastern Europe, and tried to establish solidarity by creating a "classless" workers' state. As such this strategy promoted what one could call a "single class" solidarity. Instead of granting social citizenship to all classes irrespective of their background, as in the citizenship strategy, the "Lennist" regimes tried to turn every citizen into a member of the one preferred class (the working class) and guaranteed full employment to all those "workers" in an economy controlled by the party-state. Social benefits were thus made conditional upon the acceptance by individuals of inclusion in the issue of this "workers' state".

Now that the "Lennist" project has failed, one can wonder what model is likely to emerge in the societies of Central and Eastern Europe. The organizational legacy seems to favour the emergence of a "conservative corporatist" model: the "universality" of Lennism was

conditional on a full employment which is bound to go with the transition towards a capitalist market economy. Furthermore, under Leninism benefits were earnings-related, which within the context of the increased wage differentials of a capitalist market economy will promote corporatist status identities. This means that without any substantial organizational changes, it seems to be unavoidable that the societies of Central and Eastern Europe will move further away from the "social citizenship" model. The bleak prospects for social citizenship are aggravated by the fact that during their four decades of misrule, the "Leninist" regimes succeeded in effectively discrediting anything that makes even the most moderate allusion to socialism. They consistently abused such values as "collectivism", "socialism" or "solidarity". Forty years of Marxism Leninism has discredited the conceptual tools of the advocates of the "social citizenship" model. It has left Social Democracy without a vocabulary for mobilizing its fragmented electorate. The discrediting of any form of socialism is further amplified by a rather unfavorable international consensus that through "Market Leninism" imposes a set of neo-conservative/neo-liberal solutions for the reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. This unfavorable international consensus has several causes amongst which the sustained attack of West European welfare states from both within (the "New Left") and without (the "New Right") seems to be the most important one. Finally, the neo-conservative ideology underpinning "Market Leninism" can easily recycle the centrality of work which the "Leninist" regimes have been promulgating, though not consistently practising, for more than forty years. In other words, Marxism Leninism appears to be more compatible with neo-liberal conservatism than with Social Democracy.

BEYOND
THE
WELFARE
STATE?

Christopher Pierson

runs from its origins in the last third of the nineteenth century through to the period of its much accelerated growth after 1945.

Before the Welfare State

In fact, welfare states are scarcely a hundred years old and mass social democratic movements little older. Significantly, welfare states tended to emerge in societies in which capitalism and the nation state were both already well established and these pre-existing economic and state formations have themselves prescribed the limits of subsequent welfare state development. Capitalism in its many forms has a relatively long history, stretching across several centuries and touching upon, if not penetrating, almost every quarter of the globe. This longevity and ubiquity of capitalism has often been seen to predominate over the comparatively modern and (territorially limited) influence of welfare administered through the state. A similar logic applies to the relationship between the welfare state and pre-existing state forms. Normally, the welfare state was a product of already existing (nation) states, which were themselves intimately related to the rise of capitalism. Accordingly, prior elements of state formation (territoriality, monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, underwriting of the rule of law) have often been seen to predominate over the commitment to welfare even within the more highly developed welfare states.

While it is the case then that most welfare states emerged under (liberal) capitalism and its corresponding state forms, this does not define the first or original relationship between state, economy and welfare. Pre-capitalist (and, at least in their ideology, contemporary non-capitalist) societies have subscribed to quite different views of the responsibility for social welfare. In fact, the theorists of nascent liberal capitalism had considerable success in sustaining the belief that the laws of capitalism corresponded with the laws of nature and chimed with men's 'natural instincts'.² The brilliance of these accounts should not however blind us to the fact that liberal capitalism was not naturally given but historically created and often, if not universally, historically imposed. Taking up this argument, C. B. Macpherson insists that the pre-modern notions of 'fair prices', 'fair wages' and 'just distribution' – sustained by the external sanction of church or state – themselves arose as a defence of the pre-existing order against the novel encroachment of market relations. They

4 Origins and Development of the Welfare State, 1880-1975

For many people, the welfare state is a product of the period immediately following the end of the Second World War. In the Anglo-Saxon world, it is widely identified with the (partial) implementation of the recommendations of Sir William Beveridge's celebrated Report on Social Insurance in the first years of the post-war UK Labour government (Beveridge, 1942). The very term 'welfare state' is widely associated with Archbishop Temple's wartime contrast between the ambition and promise of post-war Allied reconstruction (Temple, 1941; Temple, 1942; Zimmern, 1934).¹ This common understanding may well be justified inasmuch as most of the developed capitalist world saw a quantitative and, at times, qualitative leap in the public provision of welfare in the twenty-five years following the war. Yet, while the world was profoundly altered by the experience of world war, after 1945 as after 1918, there were important elements of continuity with the pre-war order, not least in the provision of public welfare. In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that if we are to understand the experience of the 'Golden Age' of the welfare state after 1945 and the epoch of 'crisis' after 1970, we shall need to consider their common origins in a much earlier period of public welfare innovation. Correspondingly, this chapter offers a synoptic reconstruction of the history of the welfare state which

1 Ashford (1986a) attributes the first use of 'welfare state' to A. Zimmern (1934). It is sometimes suggested that the term 'welfare state' was already in common usage in the UK by the late 1930s. For a differing explanation, see Hayek (1960) p. 502.

2 Definitively in Smith (1976a) Smith (1976b); though Smith famously had his reservations about this belief.

endorsed the subjugation of economic relations to social and political ends *under which all previous human societies had operated*. Similarly, the mediaeval idea of a 'Christian duty to charity', while more honoured in the breach than in the observance, reflected a view of the nature of welfare which was quite different from the maximizing individualism of the advocates of liberal capitalism. Furthermore, if we move forward to the early capitalist period itself, it was not the views of Adam Smith but those of the mercantilists, of whom he was so critical, that defined the prevailing view of state, economy and welfare. Under this mercantilist doctrine, the state was seen to have an active role to play in the promotion of national prosperity and a responsibility for the labouring poor, as the principal source of this national wealth. This, as seen, for example, in the Elizabethan reform and codification of the Poor Law, expressed itself in an almost modern disposition to coercion and control (Webb and Webb, 1927; Fowle, 1890; Fraser, 1981). Thus, the liberal capitalist view of an extremely limited entitlement to public welfare did not arise primarily from the state of nature but had, as Gaston Rimlinger and before him Karl Polanyi noted, itself to be created and sanctioned by the 'liberal break' in states' practice (Rimlinger, 1974; Polanyi, 1944). That is, the non-intervention of the state under liberal capitalism did not arise from a pre-ordained 'state of nature' but had consciously to be created by the state's *disengagement* from previous patterns of intervention in the securing of social welfare (albeit that the pre-modern state and its interventions were wholly different from those of its modern counterparts).

Nor did the 'minimal' nineteenth century state 'stand off' from involvement in the economy and the provision of welfare. Victorian Britain, sometimes depicted as the very essence of *laissez-faire* liberal capitalism and the 'nightwatchman' state, saw the implementation of a wide range of measures on the control of factory work, the quality of housing, the securing of public health, the provision of public education, the municipalization of basic services and compulsory workers' compensation following industrial accidents (Roberts, 1960; Mommsen, 1981; Ensor, 1936; Evans, 1978). Even the de-finitively liberal US made federal provision in the nineteenth-century not only for public education but also for the public support of the blind, dumb, insane and insane/indigent, as well as for public Boards of Health (Tratner, 1988; Katz, 1986). Other states, with a more paternalistic and activist state tradition, saw still more and more intrusive public regulation of welfare. Thus, the prelude to Bismarck's innovative welfare legislation in a newly unified Germany was a tradition of (sometimes compulsory) welfare and insur-

ance legislation in nineteenth-century Prussia.³ Again, states with a colonial background were often developmentally precocious in their welfare legislation. This in part explains the rapid and early development of the welfare state in Australia and New Zealand (Castles, 1985).

In practice, most of the developed capitalist countries considered here have institutional arrangements for the provision of public welfare dating back several centuries. Most had legislated some form of Poor Law, under which specified (generally local) public authorities were charged with the responsibility for raising and disbursing (often under pain of some civic penalty for the recipient) limited funds for the relief of destitution (Webb and Webb, 1910; Bruce, 1968; Henriques, 1979; Samuelsson, 1968, pp. 129-30; Axinn and Levin, 1975; Fowle, 1890). The concern of these earlier states was primarily with the maintenance of public order, the punishment of vagrancy and the management of the labour market rather than the well-being of the poor.⁴ With the increasing spread of industrialization, a number of nineteenth-century states provided for the maintenance of public health, the regulation of conditions of employment and limited public education. These states also showed a growing interest in the day-to-day surveillance and management of their national populations (Giddens, 1985, pp. 172-97; Mitchell, 1975; Foucault, 1975).

Origins of the Welfare State

Abram De Swaan has argued that 'the development of a public system of social insurance has been an administrative and political innovation of the first order, comparable in significance to the introduction of representative democracy' (De Swaan, 1988, p. 149). Yet for all its importance, it was an innovation that was both gradual and rather mundane, and there are considerable difficulties in defining with any precision the dates at which national welfare states

³ See Tampleke (1981) pp. 72-5; Rimlinger (1974) pp. 102-15. Ritter (1985) argues that 'the 1854 law on miners' provident societies was of central importance in influencing the design of Germany's later social insurance legislation of the 1880s' (pp. 17-21).

⁴ Graphically, Fowle (1890) insisted that 'in England, France, Spain, and the German Empire, we read the same dismal tale of whipping, branding, the pillory, burning the ear, cropping the ear, couples chained together to cleanse sewers, long terms of imprisonment, and, finally, death itself, in hundreds every year in every country' (p. 43).

became established. The implementation of some measure of public control over welfare is hardly a sufficient criterion for such a definition and few would want to characterize even the most developed of these nineteenth-century capitalist states as welfare states. But identifying a point along a continuum of expanding public provision as the threshold of the welfare state is itself somewhat arbitrary. A substantial difficulty is that those traditional accounts through which 'the welfare state' moved into common usage have tended to describe it in terms of that state's intentions, that is, as a state principally concerned to realize the welfare aspirations of its subjects (see, for example, Hall, 1952). One obvious objection to this approach is that such an aspiration cannot be taken to define the intention or purpose of the welfare state. A still more fundamental objection is that attributing a global intentionality to the state and seeking to define it in terms of this intention is itself unsustainable (Weber, 1968, p. 55). At the same time, there is clearly a qualitative difference between a comparatively tiny nineteenth-century bureaucracy devoting a few hundred thousand pounds each year to the provision of poor relief and a modern state directing as much as half of its massively enhanced expenditure to the provision of social welfare. While offering no definitive resolution, in this study the origins of the welfare state are isolated around three sets of criteria:

1 **First introduction of social insurance.** This is a widely used indicator of welfare state development. Although very modest by contemporary standards, in both breadth and depth of coverage, these are the programmes which have developed into the major institutional (and financial) elements of the welfare state. They entail the recognition that the incapacity to earn a living through contingencies such as old age, sickness or unemployment is a normal condition in industrialized market societies and that it is legitimately the business of the state to organize for collective provision against the loss of income arising from these contingencies (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981a; Flora, 1986; see also the reservations of Jones, 1985).

2 **The extension of citizenship and the de-pauperization of public welfare.** The legitimization of social insurance means also a change in the relationship of the state to the citizen and of both to the provision of public welfare. Firstly, the interest of the state in public welfare is extended beyond the traditional concerns with the relief of destitution and the maintenance of public order (albeit that these remain major elements within even the most developed welfare states). Secondly, the provision of social insurance is increasingly seen as a part of the assemblage of rights and duties which binds

the state and the (expanding) citizenry. Thirdly (and correspondingly), the receipt of public welfare becomes not a *barrier* to political participation but a *benefit* of full citizenship.⁵ Simple indices of this extension of citizenship are the dates of the inauguration of male and universal suffrage and the date at which the receipt of public welfare ceases to be a bar to full citizenship (that is, no longer entails disenfranchisement).

3 **Growth of social expenditure.** One of the most important aspects of the developed welfare state is the sheer quantity of public spending that it commands. Throughout the twentieth century (at least until the 1970s), the welfare state has commanded a sometimes rapidly growing proportion of a much enhanced national product. Clearly there is no critical threshold figure at which the welfare state may be said to have begun, but as an indicator of this important quantitative aspect of welfare state development, we may take a social expenditure of 3 per cent of GNP as a notional indicator of the *origins* of the welfare state. It may be useful to compare this threshold with the date at which social expenditure exceeds 5 per cent of GNP.

The Birth of the Welfare State: 1880-1914

Cross-national evidence of these developments is varyingly approximate. We may be reasonably certain about dates for the extension of suffrage and for the first introduction of various measures of social insurance. However, these last cover programmes with large variations in range, expenditure and funding criteria which may mask important differences in the social and political impact of seemingly similar initiatives. Of these differences, perhaps the most important was whether provision was tax-funded or contributory. These figures may also conceal the extent to which alternative policies (for example, public works or retraining rather than unemployment compensation) represent a society's commitment to the public redress of the consequences of market disutilities by other means. However, these cautions having been sounded, the figures do reveal a striking historical pattern (see tables 4.1 and 4.2).

In the thirty years between Germany's initiation of health insurance in 1883 and the outbreak of war in 1914, all the countries cited in tables 4.1 and 4.2, with the exception of Canada and the US, had introduced some state-sponsored system of workmen's compensation. Even within the US, considerable advances were made towards

⁵ On the importance of claims to welfare as rights, see Goodin (1988).

Table 4.1 Introduction of social insurance (OECD countries)

| | Industrial Accident | Health | Pension | Unemployment | Family allowance |
|-------------|------------------------|--------|---------|--------------|---------------------|
| Belgium | 1903 | 1894 | 1900 | 1920 | 1930 |
| Netherlands | 1901 | 1929 | 1913 | 1916 | 1940 |
| France | 1898 | 1898 | 1895 | 1905 | 1932 |
| Italy | 1898 | 1886 | 1898 | 1919 | 1936 |
| Germany | 1871 | 1883 | 1889 | 1927 | 1954 |
| Ireland | 1897 | 1911 | 1908 | 1911 | 1944 |
| UK | 1897 | 1911 | 1908 | 1911 | 1945 |
| Denmark | 1898 | 1892 | 1891 | 1907 | 1952 |
| Norway | 1894 | 1909 | 1936 | 1906 | 1946 |
| Sweden | 1901 | 1891 | 1913 | 1934 | 1947 |
| Finland | 1895 | 1963 | 1937 | 1917 | 1948 |
| Austria | 1887 | 1888 | 1927 | 1920 | 1921 |
| Switzerland | 1881 | 1911 | 1946 | 1924 | 1952 |
| Australia | 1902 | 1945 | 1909 | 1945 | 1941 |
| New Zealand | 1900 | 1938 | 1898 | 1938 | 1926 |
| Canada | 1930 | 1971 | 1927 | 1940 | 1944 |
| US | 1930 | — | 1935 | 1935 | — |

Note: These dates include schemes which were initially voluntary but state-aided as well as those that were compulsory.

Sources: Flora (1987b) vol. 1, p. 454; Flora and Heidenheimer (1981a) p. 83; Dixon and Scheurell (1989) pp. 151, 245, 192; Flora (1987a) pp. 144, 210, 433, 559, 627, 777

the end of this period in individual states' provision (Axinn and Levin, 1975, p. 131; Reede, 1947; Kudrle and Marmor, 1981).⁶ In the same period, eleven of the thirteen European countries had introduced measures to support health insurance and nine had legislated for old age pensions (as had Australia and New Zealand). Although compensation for unemployment was generally the last of the four initial measures of social insurance to be introduced, by 1920 ten of the European countries had acknowledged some form of state responsibility for protection against the consequences of unemployment. What table 4.1 also shows is that for most countries family allowances belong to a 'second generation' of welfare legislation. Only one-third of the states cited had legislated for family allowances by the outbreak of the Second World War.

⁶ Kudrle and Marmor (1981) cite evidence that about 30 per cent of the US work-force was covered by workmen's compensation legislation by 1915.

Table 4.2 Welfare state innovators: first introduction of major welfare state programmes

| | First | Second | Third |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Industrial accident insurance | Germany (1871) | Switzerland (1881) | Austria (1887) |
| Health | Germany (1883) | Italy (1886) | Austria (1888) |
| Pensions | Germany (1889) | Denmark (1891) | France (1895) |
| Unemployment | France (1905) | Norway (1906) | Denmark (1907) |
| Family allowances | Austria (1921) | New Zealand (1926) | Belgium (1930) |
| Male suffrage | France (1848) | Switzerland (1848) | Denmark (1849) |
| Universal suffrage | New Zealand (1893) | Australia (1902) | Finland (1907) |

Sources: Flora (1987b) vol. 1, p. 454; Flora and Heidenheimer (1981a); Dixon and Scheurell (1989)

Turning to the expansion of citizenship, there is a strong correspondence (though, as we shall see, no straightforward causal link) between the coming of male universal suffrage and the earliest development of social insurance. In the quarter-century between 1894 and 1920, eleven of the seventeen countries shown in table 4.3 achieved (more or less) universal male suffrage. Notably, those that had achieved full male suffrage earlier (including Germany, France, Denmark and New Zealand) were also among the most precocious of welfare innovators. We might also note that New Zealand, which was 'a generation early' in extending the vote to women (while restricting this right to Europeans), was also 'a generation early' in introducing family allowances. It is also towards the end of this period that we see the abolition of rules disenfranchising those who had been in receipt of public welfare. As late as 1894, universalization of the suffrage in Belgium explicitly excluded 'les mendians et vagabonds internes dans une maison de refuge ... par decision des juges de paix' (Orban, 1908 p. 24). However many countries extending their suffrage in the early twentieth century reversed this disqualification of paupers from voting. The enfranchisement of

Table 4.3 The expansion of citizenship

| | Universal male suffrage | Universal adult suffrage |
|-------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Belgium | 1894 | 1948 |
| Netherlands | 1918 | 1922 |
| France | 1848 | 1945 |
| Italy | 1913 | 1946 |
| Germany | 1871 | 1919 |
| Ireland | 1918 | 1923 |
| UK | 1918 | 1928 |
| Denmark | 1849 ^a | 1918 |
| Norway | 1900 | 1915 |
| Sweden | 1909 | 1921 |
| Finland | 1907 | 1907 |
| Austria | 1907 | 1919 |
| Switzerland | 1848 | 1971 |
| Australia | 1902 ^a | 1902 ^a |
| New Zealand | 1879 ^b | 1893 ^b |
| Canada | 1920 | 1920 |
| US | 1860 ^b | 1920 |

^a With significant restrictions.

^b Largely restricted to Europeans/whites.

Sources: Flora (1987b) vol. 1; Mackie and Rose (1982); Taylor and Hudson (1983)

paupers was effected during this period in, for example, the UK (1918), Norway (1919) and Sweden (1921) (Flora, 1987b, vol. 1; Rawlings, 1988, p. 98). This is an important indicator of the transition from public welfare as an *alternative* to citizenship to public welfare as one of the *rights of citizenship*. As we shall see later, this evidence does not however justify the unqualified claim that it was democratization that created the welfare state.

Figures for the growth of social expenditure in this early period (see table 4.4) must be approached with especial caution. Differing national criteria in defining 'social expenditure', differences in the calculation of national income, difficulties in aggregating national and sub-national expenditures and the unreliability and paucity of figures before 1945 mean that these expenditure thresholds must be seen to be very approximate. Certainly, they should not be taken to define some international sequence of rising expenditure. Yet the overall figures do give compelling expression to the modest but consistent growth in social expenditure throughout this period. With the possible exception of Germany and Switzerland, it appears

Table 4.4 The growth of social expenditure

| | Social expenditure ≥3% GDP | Social expenditure ≥5% GDP |
|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Belgium | 1923 | 1933 |
| Netherlands | 1920 | 1934 |
| France | 1921 | 1931 |
| Italy | 1923 | 1940 |
| Germany | 1900 | 1915 |
| Ireland | 1905 | 1920 |
| UK | 1905 | 1920 |
| Denmark | 1908 | 1918 |
| Norway | 1917 | 1926 |
| Sweden | 1905 | 1921 |
| Finland | 1926 | 1947 |
| Austria | 1926 | 1932 |
| Switzerland | By 1900 | 1920 |
| Australia | 1922 | 1932 |
| New Zealand | 1911 | 1920 |
| Canada | 1921 | 1931 |
| US | 1920 | 1931 |

Sources: Flora (1986); Flora (1987a); Flora (1987b); Mitchell (1975); Taylor and Hudson (1983); US Department of Commerce (1975) part 1, p. 340; Uryuhart (1965); Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics (Australia) (1910-); New Zealand Official Year-Book (1902-)

that none of these countries had reached social expenditure levels of 3 per cent by 1900. Yet by 1920, more than half had reached this threshold and by 1930 all had passed it. Indeed, about a third of these states passed the 5 per cent threshold during the 1920s and most of the others were to follow in the early and middle years of the 1930s (years in which increasing demands upon social insurance funds had often to be met from a *falling* national product under circumstances of depression).

Welfare States 1920-1975: The Epoch of Growth

In fact, this experience of the expansion of social budgets in the inter-war years helps to isolate the most consistent and remarkable feature of the welfare states in the whole of the period down to the mid-1970s - that is, the ubiquitous dynamic of *sustained growth*. By the 1970s, all of the welfare states we are considering were quite different from what they had been at the end of the First World

War. Much else in the advanced capitalist societies had changed with them, and sometimes because of them. Furthermore, the core institutions of the welfare state are now so commonplace that we are perhaps inclined to forget the sheer scale of the transformation wrought between 1920 and 1970. In fact, throughout this period, the pace of growth varied between differing phases, differing programmes and different countries. Here, as elsewhere, caution is required in talking about the generic experience of the welfare state. Yet so substantial and striking are the developments of this period that at least some generalizations are warranted.

The growth of the social budget

First, there is the sheer scale and ubiquity of growth in the social budget. In 1914 only seven of the countries in table 4.4 had reached social expenditure levels of 3 per cent of GNP. By 1940, nearly all had reached social expenditure levels in excess of 5 per cent. In the early 1950s, this figure ranged between 10 and 20 per cent. By the mid-1970s, among the European welfare states, between one-quarter and something more than a third of GNP was devoted to social expenditure. Even the most 'reluctant' welfare states saw a wholesale transformation of their public budgets. In the US, total social expenditure rose from 2.4 per cent of GNP in 1890 to 20.2 per cent in 1981. Even in Japan, where an exceptional proportion of welfare is organized and delivered through private corporations, the social budget has expanded from 1.4 per cent of GDP in 1890 to 16.2 per cent in 1985 (Flora, 1986, vol. 1, p. xxii; Maddison, 1984; Mima-mi, 1986, pp. 332ff; Oshima, 1965, pp. 368-371; OECD, 1985a; OECD, 1988; US Bureau of Statistics, 1975).

Much of the remarkable overall growth in public expenditure of the twentieth century can be attributed to the growth of the social budget, and this rapidly growing proportion of national wealth devoted to social welfare must be set against the background of a sevenfold increase in average per capita output in the cited countries over the past 100 years (Maddison, 1984, p. 59).

Incremental growth and demographic change

A substantial source of this remarkable and general growth in the social budget was the maturing of rights and claims as pensions legislated in the 'take-off' period came 'on stream'. This was substantially an incremental and inertial development which was the more pronounced because of certain demographic changes which were common to most of the advanced capitalist societies. The most important of these changes were the continuing increase in life

expectancy and the decline in mortality rates. For example, life expectancy of females at birth rose between 1900 and 1967 from 49.4 to 74.1 years in England and Wales, from 47 to 75 years in France and from 46.6 to 73.5 years in West Germany. Crude annual death rates fell in the same countries between 1900 and 1950 from 18.2 to 12.5 per thousand in England and Wales, from 21.9 to 12.7 per thousand in France and from 22.1 to 10.5 per thousand in West Germany (Winter, 1982; Mitchell, 1975, pp. 104-24). What did constitute an authentically *political* intervention was the common practice of introducing (contributory) pensions *before* sufficient premiums had been collected to fund these on an actuarially sound basis. The electoral call for 'pensions now' was a powerful one, even in the characteristically insurance-minded US (Quadagno, 1988b; Fraser, 1973, p. 213; Rimplinger, 1974, p. 234).

It is possible that the severest demographic challenge to the welfare state lies in the future, but the growing aged population in advanced capitalism has certainly hugely extended the costs of the welfare state not just in the provision of pensions, but in those other costly areas where the elderly are disproportionate users of services, as in public health provision. The proportion of the population aged 65 or over in the OECD countries has risen from 9.7 per cent in 1960 to 12.7 per cent in 1985, and is projected to increase further to 18.0 per cent by 2020 (OECD, 1988, p. 11). Meanwhile, Heikkinen notes that 'the use of [health and social] services among the aged is 3-4 times that expected on the basis of proportion of the population' (Heikkinen, 1984, p. 162).

In fact, the demographic structure of the several welfare states has varied. For example, the disproportionately youthful structure of the early twentieth-century New Zealand and Australian populations (as 'new', immigrant-based nations) afforded unusually favourable circumstances for their early expansion. In other countries, notably in France, social policy initiatives have been related to the demographic consequences of the First World War (especially in the number of war pensions and later in the structure of natalist policy).⁷ But overall, the number of aged in the population has grown throughout the industrialized world as life expectancy has increased. In the 1980s, only 5 per cent of the population was over 65. One hundred years later, the elderly constitute some 13 per cent of the population

⁷ The First World War saw losses of approximately 1.3 million among the French population and an equally large birth deficit (McEvedy and Jones, 1978, p. 56). See also McIntosh, 1983, esp. pp. 43-57; Ashford, 1986a, pp. 112-3; Dyer, 1978; Glass, 1940.

and a still higher proportion of the electorate. In Western Europe, the percentage of people aged 65 and over in the population is predicted to rise from 13.3 per cent in 1985 to 14.9 per cent in 2000 (Heikkinen, 1984, p. 162; OECD, 1984, pp. 3-6; OECD, 1986a, pp. 3-10). Still more importantly, the ratio of the economically inactive to the economically active section of the population (out of whose productive labour 'pay-as-you-go' pensions must be funded) is rising and set to continue to rise. Dependency ratios (the proportion of people aged 0-14 years plus the proportion of people aged 60 years and over as a ratio of the population aged 15-59 years) actually fell in Western and Northern Europe in the 1980s because of the declining numbers of young people. But they are set to rise from 59.2 per cent to 66.8 per cent in Western Europe and from 64.4 per cent to 66.2 per cent in Northern Europe between 1990 and 2000. The UK Treasury estimates that whereas there were 2.3 economic contributors to each pension claimant in the UK in 1985, by 2025 this number will have fallen to 1.8 contributors to each pensioner (Heikkinen, 1984, p. 169; DHSS, 1985, p. 15). Overall, the OECD estimates that the old-age dependency ratio will have doubled by 2040 (OECD, 1988, p. 35; this demographic challenge to the welfare state is extensively discussed in chapter 6).

Sequential growth of welfare state programmes

Most of the welfare states considered here have also expanded their social welfare provision in terms of a broadly shared sequence. Certainly, there have been differences between 'early' and 'late' adopters in terms of the comparative stage of industrialization at which social welfare was introduced, the sorts of funding regimes established and the generosity of initial coverage. There is some disagreement as to whether the spread of the welfare state is best explained in terms of *prerequisites* (with state welfare initiatives being a response to endogenous national developments) or *diffusion* (a process of international imitation of welfare state innovators). In the period before 1908, the spread seems to have been from less industrially developed and more authoritarian regimes towards the more developed and democratic. In the period between 1908 and 1923, the principal determinant of innovation appears to have been geographical proximity to an existing welfare state rather than the level of industrial development. After 1923, there is a tendency for countries to adopt welfare state measures at a lower level of their own economic development (with the notable exception of the US). Paralleling the pattern of the spread of industrialization, 'late starters' have tended to develop welfare state institutions earlier in their own

individual development and under more comprehensive terms of coverage (Collier and Messick, 1975, p. 1301; Schneider, 1982; Alber cited in Flora, 1986, vol. 1, p. xxiv; Alber, 1982; Kuhnle, 1981).

Wherever welfare states have emerged, the order of adoption and expansion of programmes has been broadly similar. We can identify three sequential patterns. In terms of *programmes*, workers' compensation for industrial accidents was generally the first measure to be adopted. This was followed by sickness and invalidity insurance, old age pensions and finally unemployment insurance. Though some provision for maternity occurred quite early, family allowances were generally introduced rather later and were widely viewed as an 'endowment of motherhood' rather than as insurance against the contingency of having children. Secondly, *coverage* also followed a shared pattern. Initially, coverage was limited to workers in particularly strategic industries or in peculiarly dangerous occupations. Mining, for example, was often one of the first industries to be covered (Tampeke, 1981, pp. 72-3). Legislation was subsequently extended to cover all industrial workers, thence to rural/agricultural workers and so to dependants and survivors of insured workers. In the later stages, coverage was extended to the self-employed and thence characteristically to the generality of the population (or at least to all those recognized as citizens) without further discriminating criteria.

Thirdly, there were broadly similar patterns in the *expansion* of programmes. Earlier extensions tended to be built upon a broadening of the criteria of eligibility (making for more beneficiaries) and the legislating of more generous benefits. Characteristically, later enhancements were built upon the less restrictive application of definitions of eligibility and, from the late 1950s and 1960s onwards, upon the transition from flat-rate to earnings-related benefits. There was also a general tendency for programmes to proceed from voluntary to compulsory provision.

The Periodization of Welfare State Growth

In fact, it is possible to think not just of a sequential but indeed of a shared historical pattern in the development of the welfare states of advanced capitalism. Clearly this is not a uniform pattern. The US lacked basic federal provisions for social insurance down to 1935 and still lacks comprehensive measures for healthcare or family allowances. Some welfare states emerged early and then 'stagnated' (Australia), some developed early and expanded before 1940 (New Zealand), while others were marginal before the Second World War

but expanded rapidly after 1945 (for example, Finland). Yet a significant historical pattern may be identified.

1918-1940: 'Consolidation' and Development

The period between the wars has often been described as a rather uneventful one for the welfare state, falling between the extensive innovations of the preceding twenty-five years and the period of remarkable growth immediately after 1945. Hamilton characteristically describes this period in the UK experience as one of 'steady and purposeful social advance' (Hamilton cited in Bruce, 1968, p. 255).

Yet more recent commentators have tended to see the 1920s and 1930s as the seed-bed of post-war welfare state development. For Douglas Ashford, this was the period in which serious obstacles to 'the complete nationalization of social policy' were removed, making the expansion of the welfare state after 1945 comparatively uncontentious:

First, the liberal refuge of private or charitable assistance proved totally inadequate. Second, the private insurers learned ... that many serious social problems exceeded the capacity of actuarially sound insurance. Third ... professional groups were gradually co-opted into national social security programmes. Fourth, the agricultural sector first received the protection of the state ... before substantial aid went to urban dwellers. (Ashford, 1986b, p. 107)

In the UK, Sweden and the US, for example, this is seen as the decisive epoch in establishing the institutions and practices of that more interventionist form of government in which the post-war welfare state was grounded. It also saw governments facing new choices about the macro-management of the economy and the possibility of the active and interventionist pursuit of full employment. Thus Middlemas, in his study of *Politics in Industrial Society*, argues that it was in the inter-war years that a new system of 'managerial collective government', built upon the negotiation and compromise of the interests of the state, organized capital and organized labour, first emerged in the UK. This was a system oriented around the amelioration of class conflict and the avoidance of systemic crisis through, among other media, the promotion of social policy (Middlemas, 1979).⁸ As we shall soon see, in both Sweden and the US,

⁸ Although primarily concerned with the UK, Middlemas comments that his 'propositions have an importance not only for modern Britain, but most western industrialized societies' (Middlemas, 1979, p. 23).

the Great Depression of the early 1930s triggered new forms of government intervention in social and economic life, new relationships between state, employers and trades unions and a process of political realignment which established new political forces at the heart of the state (Korpi, 1979; Korpi, 1983; Weir and Skocpol, 1985).

Certainly in terms of coverage and cost, the inter-war welfare state often dwarfs provision in the period of innovation. As the figures for social expenditure indicate, while the period between 1880 and 1920 is properly understood as the epoch of legislative innovation in the welfare state, it is only after 1920 that the fiscal consequences of these initiatives become clear. Many of the early systems of social insurance offered, like Lloyd George's old age pensions in the UK, extremely modest benefits to 'the very poor [and] the very respectable' (Thane, 1982, p. 83).⁹ Many programmes, notably those in Germany, envisaged a strictly limited financial involvement by the state, expecting benefits to be drawn from the premiums of potential beneficiaries or their employers (Alber, 1986, pp. 40-1). However, the growth of social expenditure in the 1920s and the early 1930s is what we might have expected as the legislative innovations of the pre-1914 period yielded to the maturing of insurance and pension claims in the post-war age. In fact, this tendency for innate or incremental growth of social expenditure - growth not through legislative or executive initiative but through the maturing of pension rights or demographic change - has been a marked feature of the whole period of the welfare state.

In many countries, this process was accelerated by the consequences of the First World War. Firstly, it led to a major expansion of pension, health, housing and rehabilitation demands from those millions incapacitated or bereaved as a consequence of the armed conflict. In Australia in 1922, for example, war pensioners outnumbered old age and invalid pensioners in a proportion of nearly two to one.¹⁰ Secondly, it conditioned politicians, bureaucrats and taxpayers to new levels of public expenditure, from which there was no wholesale retreat once the immediate demands of wartime had passed (the 'displacement effect' described by Peacock and Wiseman, 1961, pp. 52-61). Thirdly, it necessitated new forms of

⁹ New Zealand's innovative old age pensions, for example, cost £197,292 in 1900, rising to £362,496 in 1910 (*New Zealand Official Year-Book*, 1919).

¹⁰ In 1922, in Australia, there were 225,372 war pensioners, 110,278 claiming old age pensions and just 5,182 invalid pensioners. We shall see below (pp. 118-19) that the early American welfare state was largely made up of Civil War veterans. Germany, France and the UK lost a total of 3.75 million soldiers in the 1914-18 war. (*Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia*, 1923; McEvedy and Jones, 1978, p. 34.)

governmental control and administration which were again not to be abandoned in the post-war epoch (Middlemas, 1979, p. 19).

The late 1920s and early 1930s also saw what might be described as the first 'fiscal crisis of the welfare state'.¹¹ The depth of the economic recession of the early 1930s occasioned the earliest major cuts in social welfare provision and demonstrated (1) that it was impossible to sustain actuarially sound social insurance under circumstances of profound economic recession, (2) that demand for social expenditure (especially unemployment compensation) was inversely related to the capacity of the economy to fund it and (3) that to respond to this problem by cutting social expenditure would simply intensify rather than alleviate these economic problems. The scale of the difficulties of the 1930s also probably dealt the final death blow to the belief among the governing classes that the provision of social welfare or even the relief of destitution could be satisfactorily met from voluntary or charitable sources.

New Deal and Historic Compromise

The 1930s was also a decisive period in the development of two of the most widely differing and frequently contrasted welfare state regimes - those of Sweden and the US. In comparative typifications of welfare state development, these two examples are often recorded as the most developed (Sweden) and the least developed (US) welfare states, and, given the centrality of this opposition, it is worth developing this contrast in some detail.

Ironically, in much contemporary scholarship, the origins of the modern American and Swedish welfare states, as a response to the consequences of the Great Depression, are seen to be remarkably similar. Thus, Weir and Skocpol contrast the shared response of the US ('commercial Keynesianism') and Sweden ('social Keynesianism') to the traditionally deflationary policy of the UK government (Weir and Skocpol, 1985). Gosta Esping-Andersen has argued that 'at least in its early formulation, the New Deal was as social democratic as was contemporary Scandinavian social democracy' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 28). In both countries, this period of welfare state enhancement also saw profound political realignment and the

installation of the Democrats and the Social Democrats, respectively, as 'the natural party of government'. Yet the contexts in which these 'similar' institutions were to be developed (and indeed the intentions of those who initiated and developed them) were profoundly different.

It is one of the many myths of the American welfare state that there was little or no public provision of welfare before the 1930s. In fact, 'American welfare practice has a very old history', but it is a practice that 'has always been mediated by the complex structure of American federalism'. Similarly, 'public welfare always has supported more dependent people than private relief'. Yet, in the 'pre-lean mix' of public and private provision which characterizes every welfare state, the private and especially the corporate provision of welfare has always had an unusually prominent role (Katz, 1986, pp. xiii, x, 291).

At the turn of the twentieth century, such limited public relief as there was within the US was largely locally administered according to local poor-law customs (Quadagno, 1984, p. 635; Axinn and Levin, 1975; Katz, 1986). At the local level, public welfare rolls fluctuated wildly in response to changing social and political regimes (Katz, 1986, pp. 3-109). Federal provision was substantially confined to pensions for (Northern) veterans of the Civil War. However by 1900 these federal veterans' pensions had come to constitute an extremely extensive system of surrogate social welfare. At this time, 'at least one of every two elderly, native-born, white Northern men and many of their widows received a pension from the federal government' and 'pensions were the largest expense in the federal budget after the national debt' (Katz, 1986, p. 200). In 1913, I. M. Rubinow, 'one of the nation's leading social insurance advocates', calculated that American pensions were costing three times as much as the supposedly advanced UK system of old age pensions and covering 'several hundred thousand' more people (cited in Skocpol and Ikenberry, 1983, p. 97; Katz, 1986, p. 163). It is little wonder that Skocpol concludes that 'in terms of the proportional effort devoted to public pensions, the American federal government was hardly a 'welfare laggard'; it was a precocious social-spending state' (Orloff and Skocpol, 1984, pp. 728-9). However, as the number of veteran claimants and their dependents declined in the early years of the twentieth century, and despite the mobilization of pensions advocates such as Rubinow, Seager and the American Association for Labor Legislation, there was no attempt to replace the veterans' programmes with a more universal system of old age pensions (see Orloff and Skocpol, 1984, p. 735; Skocpol and Ikenberry, 1983, pp. 95-100; Katz, 1986, p. 128). There was some advance in other

11 In the UK, the 1931 May Committee Report 'compounded of prejudice, ignorance and panic' recommended a cut in public expenditure of £120m, including a 20 per cent cut in unemployment benefit. In Australia, old age, invalid and some war pensions were reduced under the terms of the Financial Emergency Act, 1931. (Taylor, 1965, pp. 287ff; *Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia*, 1932, p. 30.)

areas of welfare provision by the individual states in the years immediately prior to the First World War. Between 1909 and 1920, forty-three states enacted legislation on workmen's compensation and within two years of Illinois' 'Funds to Parents Act' of 1911, twenty states had provided similar cash relief programmes for widows and dependent children. Yet the financial impact of such measures was severely limited and although there was some programme enhancement in the 1920s, the prevalent welfare trend in the post-war New Era was away from the European model of social insurance towards a reliance on occupational welfare (employee representation, workers' shares, company welfare and pensions) under the rubric of welfare capitalism. However, this welfare capitalism was always largely confined to the 'progressive' corporate sector of American capital (to large companies such as Proctor and Gamble, Eastman Kodak and General Electric). It was more important as a legitimating ideology than as an effective social practice and certainly wholly unable to respond to the scale of social need generated by the Great Depression (Axinn and Levin, 1975, pp. 130-4; Brody, 1980; Skocpol and Ikenberry, 1983).

Opinions as to which social, economic and political forces shaped and were served by the expanded social policy of the New Deal are vigorously divided. So are judgements as to whether it was the 'social' or the 'economic' side of the New Deal that had the most lasting influential impact. However, there is near universal agreement that the 'social' side of the New Deal, embodied in the 1935 Social Security Act, 'declared the birth of the [American] welfare state and established a basis for its growth and development' (Axinn and Levin, 1975, p. 195). It is also widely argued that this 'charter legislation for American social insurance and public assistance programs' set the parameters for virtually all further developments in America's 'semi-welfare state' (Skocpol, 1987, p. 35; Katz, 1986, pp. ix-xiv; Quadagno, 1988a).

The 1935 Act legislated for:¹²

- 1 a federal-state unemployment insurance programme
- 2 federal grants-in-aid to the states for assistance to:
 - (a) needy dependent children
 - (b) the blind
 - (c) the elderly
- 3 matching federal funds for state spending on:

¹² Berkowitz and McQuaid (1980) p. 103.

- (a) vocational rehabilitation
- (b) infant and maternal health
- (c) aid to crippled children
- 4 a federal old age insurance programme

Although the 1935 Act brought the US in some measure into alignment with the welfare states of Western Europe, it was still a quite limited initiative. The provision of welfare was largely devolved to the individual states, funded from (regressive) payroll taxation rather than from general tax revenue and allowed for very considerable state 'discretion' and for very substantial 'exceptions'. (Initially, one half of the employed work-force, notably black southern farm workers, was excluded from participation in Old Age Insurance). There was an emphasis upon actuarially sound insurance principles and 'earned benefits' - the rhetoric of which long outlived its early compromise in practice. Generally, where entitlement was not earned through insurance payments, benefits were means-tested and traditional relief of destitution (among the able-bodied poor) remained a local responsibility. The legislation made no provision for either health insurance or a family allowance.

The 1930s was also a decade of major change in the Swedish welfare state and of a still more profound political realignment, the nature of which is no less fiercely debated than that surrounding the New Deal. In fact, the background of national public welfare was already more extensive in Sweden than in its North American counterpart. Sweden had a more developed national bureaucracy and a centralized state tradition dating back over several centuries. Schooling had been compulsory since 1842, state support of sickness and occupational injury insurance had been legislated around the turn of the twentieth century and Sweden had been the first state to introduce universal and compulsory (if minimal) old age pensions in 1913. At the start of the 1930s, her social expenditure as a proportion of GDP stood at 7 per cent, compared with 4.2 per cent in the US (Olsson, 1986, p. 5). However, Swedish provision, compared with that of near neighbour Denmark, for example, was very modest. As Esping-Andersen notes:

the long era of conservative and liberal rule [prior to 1932] had produced remarkably few social reforms. There was no unemployment insurance, except for financially weak union funds, and insurance coverage for sickness was marginal ... old age pension ... benefits were meager at best. In addition, no system of public job creation was in effect when the economic depression led to explosive unemployment. (Esping-Andersen, 1985, p. 153)

It was under these circumstances, with unemployment rising rapidly, that the first Scandinavian social democratic government was elected in 1932. In fact, the Social Democrats with 42 per cent of the popular vote were reliant upon the coalition support of the peasant-based Agrarian Party, and were consequently obliged to compromise the interests of their own core working-class constituency (in welfare reform and full employment) with policies for agricultural price support (in the interests of the rural peasantry). While 'social reform was a top priority [and] the party actually developed a long-range strategy for full social and industrial citizenship ... by and large, political energies were concentrated on the immediate problems of crisis management and economic relief' (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1987, pp. 46-7).

A still more important accommodation was that struck by the newly empowered Social Democrats and organized capital. Rather than pursuing the traditional (maximalist) socialist policy of pressing for immediate socialization of the ownership of capital, the Social Democrats, recognizing the stalemate between organized labour and organized capital that their election occasioned, pressed for a formalization of the division of economic and political control and the celebrated 'historic compromise' ensured that capital would maintain intact its managerial prerogatives within the workplace, subject only to guarantees on rights to unionization, and capitalist economic growth would be encouraged. At the same time, the Social Democratic government would pursue Keynesian economic policies to sustain full employment and use progressive taxation to reduce economic inequality and promote provision for collective needs, such as education, health, and housing. When in the post-World War II period the defence of welfare institutions and full employment threatened inflation and the loss of international competitiveness, the compromise was complemented by the adoption of the 'Rehn' model, which entailed (1) an 'active manpower policy' - facilitating the redistribution and reallocation of labour and capital from less to more efficient enterprises - and (2) a 'solidaristic' wage policy, which would allow for the centralized negotiation of wages and the reduction of wage differentials, through a principle of equal pay for equal work, irrespective of a given company's capacity to pay. In this way, it was hoped that welfare provision and a rising standard of living for the working population could be reconciled with continuing non-inflationary economic growth.

Thus in the 1930s and beyond, the Swedish welfare state was secured as much by *economic policy* - the support of an active labour market policy, public works, solidaristic wage bargaining, deficit

budgeting - as by social policy. Indeed, the Swedish social democrats have always shown an awareness of the intimate relationship between economic and social policy upon which the institutional or social democratic welfare state is dependent and which is recognized in the twin-termed Keynesian Welfare State.¹³ Thus, job creation or full employment may be seen as a more desirable alternative to the payment of unemployment compensation. It may also be the indispensable basis of funding a 'generous' welfare system.

In Sweden in the 1930s, then, it was probably Keynesian *economic* policies, rather than innovations in social policy, that were the most important components in the nascent welfare state. Nonetheless, there were significant and complementary social policy initiatives. Perhaps the most important of these was the 1934 legislation that increased the state's involvement in what had previously been exclusively a union-managed system of unemployment insurance (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1987). In addition, between 1933 and 1938, the Social Democratic government also legislated:¹⁴

- new employment creation programmes
- a housing programme for families with many children including subsidies and interest-subsidized construction loans
- the indexation of pensions to regional differences in the cost of living
- maternity benefits to around 90 per cent of all mothers
- free maternity and childbirth services
- state loans to newly married couples
- the introduction of two weeks' holiday for all private and public employees

A number of other states saw major developments in their welfare states between the wars. Denmark's 'Great Social Reform' of 1933, if less radical than its advocates have claimed, 'nevertheless, remained the fundamental administrative framework of the Danish welfare state for a quarter century' (Johansen, 1986, pp. 299-300; Levine, 1983). New Zealand, which had introduced the first comprehensive pensions for the needy old aged in 1898 and been among the first to introduce family allowances in 1926, created, through its 1938 Social Security Act, 'what could be argued to be, in late 1930s terms, the

¹³ Ashford (1986b) stresses the general importance of the interrelationship between social and economic policy. He argues that historically this was recognized in France but not in the UK; this led to the French welfare state being the more effectively entrenched.

¹⁴ Olsson (1986) p. 5.

most comprehensive welfare state in the world' (Castles, 1985, p. 26). This unusually comprehensive measure was

to provide for the payment of superannuation benefits and of other benefits designed to safeguard the people of New Zealand from disabilities arising from age, sickness, widowhood, orphanhood, unemployment, or other exceptional conditions; to provide a system whereby medical and hospital treatment will be made available to persons requiring such treatment; and, further, to provide such other benefits as may be necessary to maintain and promote the health and general welfare of the community. (cited in Castles, 1985, p. 27)

Elsewhere, there were substantial if less spectacular advances. In Canada, (means-tested) old age pensions were introduced in 1927 and the 1930s saw a succession of federal-provincial unemployment compensation schemes culminating in the 1940 Federal Unemployment Insurance Act (Bellamy and Irving, 1989; Leman, 1977). The UK, whose inter-war social policy was dominated by the spectre of unemployment, saw modest legislation on the social provision of housing and healthcare, education, contributory old age pensions, provision for widows and orphans and the steady 'break-up' of the Poor Law (Gilbert, 1970; Fraser, 1973; Thane, 1982). Yet, writing of the UK experience, Parry concludes that 'the creative impulse of the welfare state progressed little from the 1910s to the 1940s' (Parry, 1986, p. 159).

Even where initiatives of this period were very modest, some have argued that the *underlying* changes which permitted the flowering of the welfare state after 1945 were secured in the inter-war years. Such a view is sometimes taken in describing the Beveridge Report not as the founding charter of a radically new UK welfare state after 1945, but as a rationalization of existing pre-war legislation. Addison, for example, suggests that Beveridge's 'background assumptions' - 'full' employment and a national health service - were much more radical and innovative than his 'fundamentally conservative' proposals on social insurance (Addison, 1977, p. 213). Similarly, Ashford argues that in France, where advances in pensions, health and accident insurance were limited and painfully slow between the wars, this was the period in which the political compromises and coalitions upon which the developed post-war welfare state was built were themselves fought over and secured. Indeed, he suggests that the very slowness and difficulty of achieving welfare advances in France compared with the UK made these victories and the welfare state thus constructed more secure and entrenched than its less contested UK counterpart (Ashford, 1986a; Ashford, 1986b;

Ashford, 1982). As we have seen, what remains the single most important innovation in the US welfare state dates from the 1930s.

Other significant developments of this period included the evolution in Germany and Italy of a pattern of social policy interwoven with the corporatist institutions of Fascism. But everywhere, and particularly under the impact of the mass unemployment of the 1930s, the inter-war years were marked by growing welfare expenditures. Indeed, between 1920 and 1940, Flora and Alber's index of social insurance coverage in Western Europe more than doubled (see figure 4.1).

1945-1975: The 'Golden Age' of the Welfare State?

Just as the inter-war years have been seen as years of 'consolidation', so has the period after 1945 been widely characterized as ushering in a thirty years' 'Golden Age' of the welfare state. Upon such an account, the period between 1945 and the mid-1970s is seen as bringing (1) rapid initial reforms to create a much more comprehensive and universal welfare state based on the idea of shared citizenship, (2) a commitment to direct increasing resources towards the rapid expansion of benefits and coverage within this extended system, (3) a very broad-based political consensus in favour of a mixed economy and a system of extended social welfare, and (4) a (successful) commitment to economic growth and full employment.

In fact, this model of the post-war evolution of the welfare state has always been heavily dependent upon the (unique) UK experience, and indeed upon a particular, broadly social democratic and 'optimistic' understanding of this experience. Great emphasis is placed upon the consequences of the Second World War - its expansion of the powers and competence of government, the generation of new forms of collective provision and, above all, the broadly shared experience of austerity and mutual mortal danger generating a high degree of citizen solidarity in favour of radical reform. Also stressed is the 'messianic' quality of Beveridge and his proposed reforms, the radical break occasioned by the election of the post-war Labour government and the subsequent development of a broad cross-party consensus ('Butskellism') in favour of compromise of the interests of capital and labour, within which the welfare state was a crucial component.

Recently, this synoptic view of the post-war history of the (UK) welfare state has itself come under increasing challenge. First, claims about the impact of the Second World War on the development of social policy have been questioned. It has been argued: (1) that the




Figure 4.1 The growth of social insurance coverage in Western Europe
 UK = United Kingdom, SW = Sweden, IT = Italy, CAN = Canada,
 US = United States
 Source: Flora and Heidenheimer (1981a)

experience of government planning and state intervention in the wartime period was not an especially promising one, (2) that sympathy for collective provision arose not from the bonds of mutual citizenship but from the perceived threat of a commonly uncertain future and (3) that the pressure for social policy reform came less from a radicalized citizenry than from a trades union movement whose industrial muscle had been much strengthened by wartime full employment. Secondly, it is widely insisted that the social policy reforms proposed by Beveridge (and only partially enacted in the post-war period) represented not a radical charter for a new social order, but a tidying-up and codification of pre-war social legislation. Thirdly, it is argued that the consensus within which the post-war welfare state was said to have developed either never existed or else was much more limited than the traditional social democratic account has allowed (Barnett, 1986; Dryzek and Goodin, 1986; Addison, 1977; Taylor-Gooby, 1985; Deakin, 1987; Smith, 1986; Pimlott, 1988).

There are then serious doubts as to whether this model is fully applicable even to the UK experience.¹⁵ Yet it retains a significant (if varying) element of truth. In 1948, Article 40 of the newly founded United Nations' *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* proclaimed that:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and the necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (United Nations, 1948)

Similarly, Article 38 of the Constitution of newly independent India declared that 'the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting . . . a social order in which justice, social, economic and political shall inform all the institutions of national life' (cited in Brownlie, 1971, p. 43). Within the developed West, many countries other than the UK saw major social policy reforms immediately after 1945. In France and Ireland, for example, there was a period of rapid policy innovation in the late 1940s, and these policy changes had an immediate effect upon the proportion of GNP devoted to social welfare (Ashford, 1986a, pp. 255-65; Hage,

¹⁵ It has been very properly objected that 'intensive study of the British case' may not be 'the optimal way of starting to grasp the general characteristics of welfare state development' (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981a, p. 21).

Table 4.5 Growth in social expenditure (7 major OECD countries), 1960-1975, as a percentage of GDP (%)

| | 1960 | 1975 |
|--------------|------|------|
| Canada | 11.2 | 20.1 |
| France | 14.4 | 26.3 |
| West Germany | 17.1 | 27.8 |
| Italy | 13.7 | 20.6 |
| Japan | 7.6 | 13.7 |
| UK | 12.4 | 19.6 |
| US | 9.9 | 18.7 |
| Average | 12.3 | 21.9 |

Source: OECD (1988) p. 10

Hanneman and Gargan, 1989; Maguire, 1986, pp. 246-7; Kennedy, 1975, p. 11). Indeed, throughout the developed capitalist world, the post-war period was one of unprecedented growth and prosperity, and of new and varied forms of government intervention in the economy.

By almost any criteria, these were years of rapid expansion in welfare state provision. Thus, for example, in Western Europe in the early 1930s, only about a half of the labour force was protected by accident, sickness, invalidity and old age insurance. Scarcely a fifth were insured against unemployment. However, by the mid-1970s, more than 90 per cent of the labour force enjoyed insurance against income loss due to old age, invalidity and sickness; over 80 per cent were covered by accident insurance and 60 per cent had coverage against unemployment. The average annual rate of growth in social security expenditure which stood at around 0.9 per cent in 1950-5 had accelerated to 3.4 per cent in the years 1970-4. Broadly defined, social expenditure which had in the early 1950s consumed something between 10 and 20 per cent of GNP had grown to between a quarter and something more than a third of a rapidly enhanced GNP by the mid-1970s (Flora, 1986, vol. 1, p. xxii). A further indication of this rapid growth after 1960 is given in table 4.5. However we choose to explain this development, the sheer growth in social expenditure throughout this period is one of the more remarkable phenomena of post-war capitalist development.

For many commentators, these developments in social policy may only properly be understood in the much broader context of what in

the US was styled the 'post-World War II capital labor accord' and is more familiarly described in the UK and Western Europe as the 'post-war consensus' (Bowles and Gintis, 1982). In this view, the new social, political and economic order of the post-war world was to be secured around (1) Keynesian economic policies to secure full employment and economic growth domestically, within the agreed parameters of an essentially liberal capitalist international market, (2) a more or less 'institutional' welfare state to deal with the dysfunctions arising from this market economy and (3) broad-based agreement between left and right, and between capital and labour, over these basic social institutions (a market economy and a welfare state) and the accommodation of their (legitimately) competing interests through elite-level negotiation (Bowles and Gintis, 1982, Taylor-Gooby, 1985; Kavanagh, 1987; Kavanagh and Morris, 1989). These liberal democratic or social democratic institutions were seen as the best guarantee of avoiding both the economic disasters and the concomitant political polarization of the inter-war years.

This post-war consensus may be thought of in two ways, as a consensus between *classes* or as a consensus between *political parties*. At the class level, consensus involved the abandonment by labour of its traditional aspiration for socialization of the economy and of the ideology and practices of 'class war'. For capital, it meant an acceptance of the commitment to full employment, to the public ownership of strategic utilities and support for the welfare state. Both labour and capital were to share in the common objectives (and rewards) of sustained economic growth. This compromise was to be managed by the overarching presence of the government, which would co-ordinate relations between unions and employers, secure the background conditions for economic growth and administer the welfare state. In its party form, consensus indicated broad agreement on the constitutional rules of the political game, the marginalization of the extremes of both left and right (both within and outside 'mainstream' parties), a political style of compromise and bargaining, the broad acceptance of predecessors' legislation and the 'mobilization of bias' in favour of certain interests and ideas, including organized capital, organized labour and Keynesian economics (Kavanagh, 1987, pp. 6-7).

In both formulations, there were certain core public policy elements around which the compromise was built. Internationally, there was an endorsement of the open international market and commitment to 'the collective defence of the Western world', (both under American leadership). Domestically, it meant a commitment to (1) the maintenance of a comprehensive welfare state, (2) support

of the 'mixed economy' of private and public enterprise and (3) policies of full employment and sustained economic growth.¹⁶

For many commentators in the 1950s and 1960s, the coming of the post-war era of consensus politics seemed to herald 'an irreversible change'. Within the sphere of the welfare state, Tom Marshall argued in 1965 that there was now 'little difference of opinion as to the services that must be provided, and it is generally agreed that, whoever provides them, the overall responsibility for the welfare of the citizens must remain with the state' (Marshall, 1975, p. 97). Still more confidently, Charles Schottland proclaimed that 'whatever its beginnings, the welfare state is here to stay. Even its opponents argue only about its extension' (Schottland, 1969). Much more recently, Mishra comments that

state commitment to maintaining full employment, providing a range of basic services for all citizens, and preventing or relieving poverty seemed so integral to post-war society as to be almost irreversible. (Mishra, 1984, p. 1)

We have already noted that recent scholarship has cast doubt upon the reality of the post-war consensus. Most sceptically, Ben Pimlott has written of 'the myth of consensus', while Deakin insists of the UK experience that while 'real convergences in policy between the major political parties and individuals within them certainly took place ... there was far less homogeneity than is usually believed' (Deakin, 1987; Pimlott, 1988; Taylor-Cooby, 1985). In Sweden, once identified by right-wing social democrats as the definitive terrain of the consensual 'middle way', there has been an attempt to redefine the historic accommodation of organized capital and organized labour as a temporary and strategic compromise of irreconcilable differences of interest which are now becoming increasingly manifest (Childs, 1961; Crosland, 1964; Tingsten, 1973; Tomasson, 1969; Tomasson, 1970; Scase, 1977a, 1977b; Korpi, 1979; Stephens, 1979; Himmelstrand et al., 1981; Korpi, 1983; Pierson, 1986; Pierson, 1991).

Yet even for its most enthusiastic supporters, the politics of consensus was always recognized to be a *positive-sum* game. Agreement rested upon the capacity to generate a growing economic surplus with which to satisfy simultaneously a multiplicity of disparate claims. In this way, it was reliant upon the fourth element we have identified in the post-war period, that is the commitment to economic growth and full employment.

¹⁶ On consensus, see Kavanagh and Morris (1989) and Deakin (1987), for a sceptical view see Pimlott (1988).

Table 4.6 Annual percentage growth in GNP (7 major OECD countries), 1950-1981

| | 1950-60 | 1960-73 | 1973-81 |
|--------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Canada | 4.0 | 5.6 | 2.8 |
| France | 4.5 | 5.6 | 2.6 |
| West Germany | 7.8 | 4.5 | 2.0 |
| Italy | 5.8 | 5.2 | 2.4 |
| Japan | 10.9 | 10.4 | 3.6 |
| UK | 2.3 | 3.1 | 0.5 |
| US | 3.3 | 4.2 | 2.3 |
| Average | 4.4 | 5.5 | 2.3 |

Sources: OECD (1966) p. 20; Bruno and Sachs, (1985) p. 155

Economic growth was seemingly the irreplaceable foundation of the traditional welfare state. It was the basis of Keynesian policies to induce capital investment, the stimulus to support economic activity at levels securing full employment and the fount of resources for increased expenditure on health, education, welfare and social services. It was economic growth that made a reconciliation of the opposing interests of capital and labour viable and sustainable. Fittingly, what has been described as 'the "Golden Age" of the welfare state' was also a period of unprecedented and unparalleled growth in the international capitalist economy.

Table 4.6 gives some general indication of this growth. In the seven major OECD countries (which at the start of the 1950s accounted for 90 per cent of OECD output), annual growth in GNP stood at 4.4 per cent in the 1950s, rising to 5.5 per cent in the years between 1960 and 1973. There was substantial international variation in rates of growth. The UK struggled to achieve growth above 3 per cent even in the years of most rapid expansion, while Japan's remarkable growth exceeded 10 per cent per annum throughout the period. In the years after 1960, a number of previously 'underdeveloped' economies, (for example, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey), achieved levels of growth in excess of 6 per cent per annum. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s average annual growth rates within the OECD economies as a whole stood close to 5 per cent while inflation, though rising slowly, stayed below 4 per cent until the late 1960s. This contrasts sharply with experience after 1973 when the average rate of economic growth was more than halved (falling as low as 0.5 per cent in the UK). At the same time, inflation became a persistent problem, peaking at 14 per cent in 1974.

Table 4.7 Unemployment rates as a percentage of total labour force in 6 major OECD countries, 1933-1983

| | 1933 | 1959-67 | 1975 | 1983 |
|--------------|------|---------|------|------|
| France | — | 0.7 | 4.1 | 8.0 |
| West Germany | 14.8 | 1.2 | 3.6 | 8.0 |
| Italy | 5.9 | 6.2 | 5.8 | 9.7 |
| Japan | — | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.6 |
| UK | 13.9 | 1.8 | 4.7 | 13.1 |
| US | 20.5 | 5.3 | 8.3 | 9.5 |
| Average | 13.0 | 2.8 | 4.7 | 8.5 |

Source: Godfrey (1986) p. 2

Table 4.7 reveals a parallel pattern in terms of employment. The years of sustained, low inflationary economic growth were also years of particularly low levels of unemployment. The period between 1950 and 1967 in which the average levels of unemployment in six major OECD countries stood at 2.8 per cent contrasts markedly with the experience in 1933 at the height of the depression, when unemployment reached 13 per cent. In fact, the figure for the 1960s is distorted by the persistently high levels of unemployment in Italy and the US, all the other countries showing averages significantly below 2 per cent. These figures from the 1960s also contrast sharply with the experience after 1970. Unemployment rose throughout the 1970s, peaking at about 8.5 per cent in 1983. This period also saw a particularly steep increase in youth unemployment and in long-term unemployment. In the UK, for example, youth unemployment reached 23.4 per cent in 1983 and the proportion of those unemployed for more than a year rose above 40 per cent in 1986, while overall unemployment rates in the early 1980s came close to the worst levels of the 1930s. Thus the 1950s and 1960s defined a period of sustained economic growth and full employment which contrasted not only with the pre-war years but also with experience after 1973.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the way in which this pattern of sustained economic growth was co-ordinated with an increase in the proportion of national product directed towards social expenditure.

The Middle-Class Welfare State

Two further social and political consequences of this rapid growth of the welfare state in the post-war period are worthy of particular




Figure 4.2 Real social expenditure and real GDP, 1965-1985 (1965 = 100)

Source: OECD (1988) p. 13

attention. First, expansion of the social budget brought with it some 'universalization' of the constituency of the welfare state. Tomasson has written of three characteristic phases in the development of the welfare state:

Social welfare before the First World War was a concern of the political Right for the poor. Between the World Wars social welfare was adopted as an issue by the political Left, still for the poor. After the Second World War social welfare became a concern of both right and left but ... "not for the poor alone". (Tomasson, 1983, p. ix)

Rarely has the post-war welfare state served simply the interests of society's poorest and most distressed. Almost everywhere, 'the non-poor play a crucial role of (variously) creating, expanding, sustain-

Table 4.8 The distribution of public expenditure on the UK social services

| Service | Ratio of expenditure per person in top fifth to that per person in bottom fifth | |
|----------------------------------|---|-------|
| | Pro-poor | Equal |
| Council housing | 0.3 | |
| Primary education | 0.9 | |
| Secondary education | 0.9 | |
| Pro-rich | | |
| National Health Service | 1.4 | |
| Secondary education (16+) | 1.8 | |
| Non-university higher education | 3.5 | |
| Bus subsidies | 3.7 | |
| Universities | 5.4 | |
| Tax subsidies to owner-occupiers | 6.8 | |
| Rail subsidies | 9.8 | |

Source: Goodin and Le Grand (1987) p. 92

ing, reforming and dismantling the welfare state' (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987, p. 3). Consequently, the nature of middle-class involvement has been one of the most important (if sometimes neglected) aspects of later welfare state evolution. In fact, the expansion of the welfare state in the post-war period has tended to benefit members of the middle class both (1) as *consumers*, giving rights of access to facilities in healthcare, education, housing, transport and so on which 'actually benefited the middle classes ... in many cases more than the poor' and (2) as *providers*, increasing professional employment opportunities within the public sector (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987, p. 91). As Le Grand's work on the UK welfare state suggests (table 4.8), perhaps counter-intuitively, it is often middle-class elements that have been the principal beneficiaries of such redistribution as the broad welfare state allows.

The Growth of Welfare State Employment

A second general consequence of the rapid expansion of the welfare state in the post-war period is to be found in the radical changes in

the composition of the work-force that it has effected. The state, and more especially the welfare state, is now a major employer in all advanced societies. The UK National Health Service is the single largest employer in Western Europe with an annual wages bill in excess of £13 billion (Department of Health, 1989). Within the more general shift in employment from manufacturing to the service sector, state welfare has had a peculiarly prominent role. Studying changes in employment patterns in West Germany, Sweden, the US and the UK, Martin Rein concludes that between the early 1960s and the 1980s social welfare and 'services to business' have been the only two areas of the service sector of the economy to experience real growth. By the latter period, the 'social welfare industry' accounted for between 11 per cent (West Germany) and 26 per cent (Sweden) of overall employment, and social welfare jobs accounted for between 20 and 40 per cent of all employment in the service sector (Rein, 1985, pp. 39-40).

OECD figures suggest that in Denmark by the mid-1980s, government employment (about two-thirds of which is in the social welfare sector) *exceeded* employment in manufacturing. In other countries (for example, Norway and Sweden), the two sectors were close to parity, while in *every* country reviewed, the gap between employment in manufacturing and government services had significantly narrowed since the early 1970s (OECD, 1989, pp. 120-2). Rein noted that the consequences of expanded welfare state employment were particularly pronounced for women, and especially for those women who had passed through higher education. In 1981, between 65 and 75 per cent of college-educated women in West Germany, Sweden and the US were employed in the 'social welfare industries'. The growth of the welfare state has clearly been a major area of growth in female labour force participation, especially for the growing number of professionally qualified women (Rein, 1985, pp. 43-5).

A number of profound (political) consequences have been seen to follow from this pattern of middle-class involvement and expanded employment within the welfare state. Therborn, for example, takes it as evidence of the 'creeping universalism' of the welfare state, which has rendered New Right attempts to dismantle it electorally impossible. For the New Right itself, the growth of a highly unionized, middle-class public sector work-force was a major source of economic and political crisis in the 1970s. Others have identified new lines of electoral cleavage developing around the welfare state (reliance on the public sector v. reliance upon the private sector), displacing traditional cleavages along the lines of social class (Therborn, 1987; Dunleavy, 1980). Claus Offe has argued that the secure employment and comparative affluence which first attached the

middle classes to the 'welfare state project' is now increasingly threatening their defection to neo-liberalism and a consequent re-stabilization of state welfare. These themes are further developed in chapter 6. For now, we return to a more detailed assessment of social policy changes in the post-war period.

1945-1950: Reconstruction

Within the very broad parameters of the 'Golden Age' or, more soberly, the era of welfare state expansion between 1945 and 1975, it is both possible and useful to offer some further periodization. Thus we may think of the immediate post-war period down to 1951 as defining a period of *reconstruction* following the débâcle of World War Two. In this period, a number of countries created that broad and systematic platform upon which the developed welfare state was based. In the UK, even before the end of the war, the coalition government had passed legislation to reform secondary education and to introduce family allowances. In the immediate post-war period, the Labour government (partially) implemented Beveridge's reform proposals with the setting up of the National Health Service, the final abolition of the Poor Law and the reconstruction of national insurance and national assistance. The essentials of the post-war UK welfare state were in place by 1948.

In France, where social policy enhancement between the wars had been modest, there was a 'major commitment to social security in 1945 and 1946' (Ashford and Kelley, 1986, p. 257). This included a law providing sickness and disability insurance, pension legislation and a law providing for the aged poor. There was also an enhancement of the 1932 Family Allowances legislation, providing pre-natal payments, additional payments for the third child and a rising scale of benefits as families grew larger (Ashford, 1986a, pp. 183-4). In Finland, where pre-war provision had been still more limited, the years between 1945 and 1950 saw a spectacular average growth rate in social expenditure of 22.2 per cent. Social expenditure as a proportion of central government spending rose from 3 to 13 per cent in the same period. Most of this increased effort was directed towards children and families, healthcare, the organization of social services, benefits for war victims and state-supported housing construction (Alestalo and Uusitalo, 1986, pp. 202-3, 246). Similarly in Ireland, 'the period from 1945 to the early 1950s was a time of heightened interest and activity in the area of social policy'. During these years, the share of social expenditure in GDP rose by almost six percentage points. The reforms included the enhancement of public health

provision, the expansion of social insurance coverage and improved state aid for housing in both the public and private sectors (Maguire, 1986, pp. 246-8, 252; Kennedy, 1975, p. 5).

Not every developed capitalist country participated in this rapid enhancement of social legislation after 1945. In Italy, for example, proposals for a systematic reform of social insurance were rejected following the election of a Christian Democrat-dominated coalition government in 1948, which opted instead to restore the pre-war institutional framework (Ferrera, 1986, p. 390; Ferrera, 1989, p. 124). In New Zealand, the major period of welfare state expansion had preceded the Second World War, while it has been said that 'by the end of the Labour administration in 1949 Australia hardly possessed a welfare state' (Jones, 1980, p. 36). However, the single strategically most important nation in this period of international welfare state expansion was probably the 'taggardly' US. While Bowles and Gintis identify the emergence of a 'capital labor accord' in a number of legislative initiatives in the immediate post-war years, additions to the US's own 'semi-welfare state' were quite limited. It was, however, US military and economic power which underwrote the post-war reconstruction of Europe and the new political and economic order of which the welfare state was an essential feature. America was the guarantor and sponsor of Western Europe's 'embedded liberalism' (economic liberalism in a context of state intervention), and thus 'ironically, it was American hegemony that provided the basis for the development and expansion of the European welfare states' (Keohane, 1984, pp. 16-17).

1950-1960: Relative Stagnation

By contrast with the burst of legislative and executive action in the immediate post-war years, which for many commentators heralds the real coming of the welfare state, the 1950s was a decade of relative stagnation. In what was generally a period of sustained economic growth, the proportion of resources directed to social expenditure rose very slowly compared with both the years before 1950 and those after 1960. In Western Europe, the average growth in central government social expenditure as a percentage of GDP was something under 1 per cent for the whole decade (Flora, 1987b, vol. 1, pp. 345-449). Strong economic growth means that such figures often mask sustained growth in real social expenditure. Jens Alber writes of the period 1951-58 as the 'take-off' phase of the West German welfare state, but while average real growth in welfare expenditure rose over 10 per cent, its share in a rapidly growing

GDP rose by just three percentage points in the same period. Social expenditure commanded a very similar proportion of national wealth at the end of the decade as it had at its beginning (Alber, 1988b; Alber 1986, pp. 15-16; Maguire, 1986, pp. 321-30). However, there were some countries in which the proportion of social expenditure actually fell during the 1950s. In Ireland, for example, central government social expenditure as a proportion of GDP fell by 3.6 percentage points between 1951 and 1960. The share of social expenditure in GDP did not recover its 1951 level until 1964. In the period between 1952 and 1966, public social security expenditure in Australia rose by two percentage points, but this was from 6.1 per cent of GNP to a still modest 8.2 per cent. In New Zealand, growth in the same period was less than 1 per cent (Kaim-Caudle, 1973, p. 53). Of course, these figures for proportionate social expenditure do not give an exhaustive description of welfare state developments. Political disputes over welfare policy – the Swedish pension reforms of 1957 or the introduction of health charges by the UK Labour government in 1951, for example – are not captured by these statistics (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Sked and Cook, 1984, p. 96). Nonetheless, the contrast with the 1940s and the 1960s is quite clear.

A number of reasons have been advanced to explain this comparative decline in social expenditure growth. Some have suggested that need was adequately met by the levels of expenditure established in the late 1940s. Others point to the increased private affluence and low unemployment achieved in the sustained economic growth of the 1950s. For some, the element of mutual risk and austerity which wartime conditions generated had evaporated by the 1950s. Tom Marshall wrote 'that the welfare state reigned unchallenged while linked with the Austerity Society and was attacked from all sides as soon as it became associated with the Affluent Society' (Marshall, 1963, p. 282). Others argued that the succession of defeats of left-wing governments marked a political realignment towards the right and the end of the zeal for reform which had characterized the immediate post-war years.

1960-1975: Major Expansion

From about 1960 onwards, we enter a third phase in the post-war development of the welfare state, one that lasts some fifteen years and which is best characterized as an era of major expansion. In terms of the resources devoted to social expenditure, this is perhaps the most remarkable period in the whole evolution of the international welfare states. Thus, the proportion of GDP devoted to social expenditure rose from 12.3 per cent in 1960 to 21.9 per cent in 1975.




Figure 4.3 The growth of social expenditure in the OECD area, 1960-1981
 — unweighted average for the seven major OECD countries^a
 - - - unweighted OECD average^{a,b}


a Prior to 1975 there are no figures for expenditure on education in France. Therefore, only the growth rates for the years after 1975 reflect the growth in expenditure on education in France. The pattern of growth rates over these later years is unaffected by their inclusion.

b Average for 17 countries (excluding Denmark and Switzerland except for 1981, where Belgium and Greece are also excluded).

Source: OECD (1985a) p. 19

Both absolute levels and rates of growth varied. By 1975, six countries – France, West Germany, Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands and Sweden – were devoting in excess of 25 per cent of their GDP to social expenditure. Amongst the seven major OECD economies, only Japan (13.7 per cent), the US (18.7 per cent) and the UK (19.6 per cent) now devoted less than a fifth of GDP to social expenditure. In the 1960-75 period, average annual growth in deflated social expenditure was in excess of 8 per cent in Australia, Denmark, Japan and Norway. It fell below 4 per cent only in the UK and Austria. The overall average for the OECD countries throughout this period was 6.5 per cent per annum (OECD, 1988, p. 11).

As figure 4.3 illustrates, the annual growth rate of deflated social expenditure ranged between 7 and 10 per cent throughout the period 1960-75. It experienced a sharp rise in the period immediately after



1973 but fell sharply after 1975. The average growth rate for the years 1975-81 was little more than half of what it had been in the period prior to 1975.

Again, while there was some international variation, three areas - education, health and pensions - commanded some four-fifths of resources throughout this period. There was some change in the distribution of effort between these three areas as expenditure on education first rose and then declined, while expenditure on health and pensions increased steadily. Of the three, pensions appeared to be least vulnerable to retrenchment following the economic reverses of the mid-1970s. Even with the rapidly rising levels of joblessness in the late 1970s, unemployment compensation remained a minor programme, commanding on average less than 5 per cent of social expenditure (OECD, 1985a).

A number of reasons have been advanced to explain this remarkable growth. In part, these are demographic, reflecting not just the growing numbers of old age pensioners but also the rise in the ratio of elderly (who are also disproportionate users of health services) to the economically active. Some point to the central role of the growth of prosperity in this period as generating the necessary resources for the expansion of social programmes (Alber, 1988b). Others offer more political explanations of the growth of social spending stressing, for example, the mobilization of labour movements, socialist parties and others (including the civil rights movement in the US) in favour of enhanced welfare; the essential role of social spending as a part of the 'capital-labour' accommodation of the post-war consensus; the growing density and capacity of interest groups to mobilize in favour of sectional interests within the welfare state; the increase in urbanization and educational provision leading to greater social and political mobilization.

Many commentators link these explanations of the rapid growth of the welfare state down to 1975 with its problems or 'crisis' thereafter. Indeed, in more or less apocalyptic terms, 1975 is often seen to mark the end-point of nearly 100 years of welfare state growth and to bring the threat or promise of its imminent dismemberment. It is to the distinctive theories and experiences of this period (both on the New Right and the neo-Marxist left) that we turn in chapter 5.

5 Contradiction and Crisis in the Developed Welfare State

Most commentators on the historical evolution of the welfare state have been agreed in identifying a break with a long-standing pattern of growth and development in international social policy from the early or middle years of the 1970s. Some have done no more than draw attention to the slackening pace of welfare state growth in this period (Flora, 1986; Alber, 1988a). Others, particularly those writing from the perspective of the 1970s, drew a much more alarming picture of 'crisis' and 'contradiction' in the welfare state, a condition which challenged either the continuation of the welfare state or even the integrity of the democratic capitalist order itself. It was in this period of the early and mid-1970s that social democratic confidence in the competence of the mixed economy and the welfare state to deliver continuing economic growth allied to greater social equity came under increasing challenge. It was also, as we have seen, the period of the flowering of New Right and neo-Marxist accounts of the welfare state, both of which concentrated on the ubiquity of crisis arising from the inherently unstable and contradictory elements within the post-war welfare capitalist consensus.

Of course, such views were not entirely new. The claim that welfare rights were inconsistent with a market economy can be retraced at least to Malthus and Nassau Senior (see p. 9 above). Germany has a history of criticism of the *costs* of the welfare state dating at least from the turn of the century, when social insurance expenditure stood at just 1.4 per cent of GDP (Alber, 1988a, p. 181). Again, Hayek's philosophical case against the welfare state predates the Second World War and was sustained throughout its post-war 'Golden Age'. Turning to the neo-Marxist account, Marx himself had

challenged the possibility of reconciling the *real* interests of labour with the dynamics of a capitalist economy, while John Saville's classic article locating the origins of the UK welfare state in turn-of-the-century class struggle dates from 1957-8 (Saville, 1975, pp. 57-69). The more social democratic Asa Briggs argued at the start of the 1960s (and in the middle of the 'Golden Age') that with 'a background of recurring fiscal crises, "paying for services" has replaced "fair shares for all" as a current political slogan' (Briggs, 1967, p. 26). Even as early as 1918, Joseph Schumpeter had written of the fiscal limits of the capitalist state in Austria:

the state has its definite limits [and these are] limits to its fiscal potential ... [In] bourgeois society ... the state lives as an economic parasite. [It] must not demand from the people so much that they lose financial interest in production. (Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 20-2)¹

The perspective of contradiction and crisis in the welfare state was not then so much new-found in the writings of the New Right and the neo-Marxists as newly influential. It seemed as if, in an instant, 'complacency about the momentum of the welfare state gave way to doom-mongering by many in the intellectual elite' (Heclio, 1981, p. 399). With astonishing speed, the warnings of a looming crisis (particularly those of the New Right) seemed to replace the benign assumptions of social democracy as a privileged discourse among governing and 'opinion-forming' elites.

Yet precisely what was intended by this discourse of 'crisis' and 'contradiction' is not entirely clear. Alec Pemberton complains that the use of 'contradiction' in Marxist analyses of the welfare state is 'notoriously imprecise'. He identifies two main variants. These were (1) contradiction as *paradox* (as in the claim that 'the working class struggles for welfare rights but this inadvertently strengthens the position of capital'), and (2) contradiction as *opposite effect* (as in the argument that 'the welfare state is introduced to assist the needy and deprived but, in practice, it worsens their position'). The principal difficulty identified in both usages is that it is unclear in what sense the relationships specified are truly 'contradictory'. The outcomes described may be perverse or even establish 'real oppositions', but they do not entail a contradiction which, properly speaking, is a description of the relationship between two logically inconsistent statements (of the kind 'This is the final crisis of capitalism/This is

not the final crisis of capitalism') (Pemberton, 1983, pp. 289-308; Berton, 1977; Offe, 1984, pp. 130-46). Although Pemberton's strictures are addressed to the neo-Marxist literature, much the same problem arises in New Right accounts. Indeed, the New Right's use of 'contradiction' is in some sense inherited from a prior Marxist tradition.²

Similar difficulties surround the widespread usage, by both right and left, of the idea of a 'crisis' of the welfare state. We may identify three distinct senses in which 'crisis' is employed in contemporary discussions. The first derives from the two associated meanings given to it in its classical origins. These were first a medical usage in which crisis describes 'the turning point in a disease when death or recovery hangs in the balance' and secondly a dramaturgical sense in which crisis describes a 'turning point in a fateful process' when the participants must either succumb to the logic of fate or summon up the moral will or energy to defy it (Rader, 1979, p. 187). This sense of crisis as a decisive phase in which a long-standing or deep-seated struggle must be resolved one way or another has been extended by analogy to describe particularly strategic or decisive episodes in the historical or social process.

'Crisis' is also employed in contemporary discussions in two further senses. First, there is an understanding of 'crisis as a catastrophe caused by an external blow' (Moran, 1988, p. 397). Offe describes this as a *sporadic crisis concept*, in which the crisis is confined to one event or brief series of events. In this sense, 'the crisis event or the defencelessness against it is not seen as a characteristic quality of the system' (Offe, 1984, pp. 36-7). Offe himself prefers a second contemporary notion, that of 'a *processual concept of crisis*'. Here, crises are 'developmental tendencies that can be confronted with "counteracting tendencies" ... making it possible to relate the crisis-prone developmental tendencies of a system to the characteristics of the system'. On this reading, crises 'need not be seen as catastrophic events having a contingent origin' (Offe, 1984, pp. 36-7). Rather they relate immediately to Offe's sense of contradiction as 'the tendency inherent within a specific mode of production to destroy those very preconditions on which its survival depends'. These contradictions when seen within the capitalist mode of production may call forth 'counteracting tendencies' (this is, indeed,

¹ It is instructive that Schumpeter here raises the spectre of a 'fiscal crisis of the tax state' only to reject it.

² As Britan acknowledges in an early footnote in his celebrated article on 'The Economic Contradictions of Democracy': 'Strictly speaking only statements can be contradictory, not events or procedures. The title of this paper represents a stretching of the term of the kind in which Marx indulged when speaking of the "contradictions of capitalism"' (Brittan, 1975, p. 129.)

very largely what the welfare state is), but the structural and systemic limitations upon such countervailing tendencies reveal a chronic likelihood 'that contradictions will finally result in a crisis of the capitalist mode of production' (Offe, 1984, p. 133). At the same time, all of these more or less technical uses are overlain by the popular and devalued currency of 'crisis' as describing any (and every) large-scale contemporary problem.

For all its advocates, the idea of a 'crisis of the welfare state' may thus have a wide range of meanings. We may isolate the most important of these as:

- 1 crisis as *turning point*
- 2 crisis as *external shock*
- 3 crisis as *long-standing contradiction*

The idea of a crisis or of contradictions surrounding the welfare state is then neither entirely new, nor unproblematically clear. However, we can isolate the early 1970s as the period in which (particularly in the Anglo-American context) the idea of a crisis of the welfare state achieves an unparalleled prominence. The late 1960s had seen the emergence of a growing discontent among both left and right-wing libertarians about the enervating bureaucratic and statist aspects of social welfare (Mlich, 1973, 1978; Lasch, 1978, p. 224). It had also been a period of growing political mobilization and renewed industrial action, notably within the public sector trades unions that had themselves been a by-product of welfare state expansion (Jackson, 1987; Hyman, 1989b; Giddens, 1981a). All of these contributed to a climate in which social conflict was of renewed interest. But it was above all the end to uninterrupted post-war economic growth that undermined the incremental confidence of the social democrats and set the stage for 'the new pessimism' (Hecló, 1981, p. 398).

The nature of the 'Golden Age' of post-war capitalism is now itself much debated. There has been some tendency to redraw (and shorten) the parameters of the period of sustained economic growth and comparative social peace – on which both the 'end of ideology' and the perspective of open-ended economic expansion were premised – to cover little more than the fifteen years between 1950 and the mid-1960s.³ But, wherever one places 'the beginning of the end' of this era, by the early 1970s the signs of economic difficulty were unmistakable and the five-fold increase in oil prices which OPEC

3 The earliest version of O'Connor's fiscal crisis theory appeared in 1970. On the post-war period, see Deakin (1987); Kavanagh and Morris (1989).

Table 5.1 Macroeconomic performance in the OECD, 1960–1981 (%)

| Economic indicator | 1960–73 | 1973–81 |
|---------------------|---------|---------|
| Unemployment rate | 3.2 | 5.5 |
| Inflation | 3.9 | 10.4 |
| GNP growth | 4.9 | 2.4 |
| Productivity growth | 3.9 | 1.4 |

Source: Bruno and Sachs (1985) p. 2

was able to impose in 1973 precipitated (rather than caused) a severe slump throughout the western industrialized world.

A few figures will illustrate the scale of this economic 'crisis'. Between 1965 and 1973, the economies of the OECD countries showed an annual average growth rate of about 5 per cent. In 1974, this annual growth rate fell to 2 per cent and in 1975, nine OECD economies 'shrank', bringing the annual average growth rate below zero. Though there was some recovery from this low point, there was to be a second oil-price 'shock' in 1979, and for the decade 1974 to 1984, annual average growth was little over 2 per cent (Alber, 1988a, p. 187). Nor were these economic difficulties confined to sluggish growth. By 1975, unemployment in the OECD area had risen to an unprecedented 15 million. At the same time, inflation accelerated and there was a growing balance-of-trade deficit throughout the OECD. The 'discomfort/misery index' (the rate of inflation plus the rate of unemployment) which, for the seven major OECD countries, had averaged 5.5 per cent through the 1960s had risen to 17 per cent by 1974–5. At the same time, levels of investment and levels of profitability fell, while the value of disposable incomes stagnated. As table 5.1 shows, governments throughout the developed West were simultaneously failing to achieve the four major economic policy objectives – growth, low inflation, full employment and balance of trade – on which the post-war order had been based (Gough, 1979, p. 132; Goldthorpe, 1984, p. 2).

One of the clearest manifestations of this economic crisis was the growing indebtedness of the public household. As the economic recession deepened, so demands upon public expenditure, and especially social expenditure, grew, in part through the inertia of incrementalism but also through costs that rose directly from economic decline (the costs of enlarged unemployment and social benefits claims). At the same time as demand grew, with the slump in tax-generating growth, revenue declined. This manifested itself in a 'yawning gap between expenditure and revenues' and a rapid

growth in the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR). Most acutely in the period 1973-5, as economic growth (and the capacity to fund state expenditure) declined, public expenditure increased (Gough, 1979, p. 132). About half of the 10 per cent growth in the share of GDP devoted to public expenditure in the OECD countries between 1960 and 1975 occurred in 1974 and 1975 (OECD, 1985a, p. 14). In the same period, specifically social spending (on education, health, income maintenance and other welfare services) had taken an increasing share of this enhanced public expenditure, rising from 47.5 per cent in 1960 to 58.5 per cent by 1981 (OECD, 1985a, p. 21). Consequently, concern about state indebtedness and public expenditure was above all concern about the costs of the welfare state.

We shall consider the nature of (differing) governments' (differing) responses to this challenge later in this chapter. In fact, as we shall see, there were important policy differences between the several national governments. Indeed, not only was there the customary discrepancy between what these governments said and what they did but also a divide between what these governments did and what people widely believed them to have done. But we now have sufficient evidence to place in context the 'crisis' theories of the early and mid-1970s, theories which were themselves a response to the economic crisis and the immediate reaction of government agencies.

OPEC and the 'Contingent Crisis'

Perhaps the earliest response to the economic crisis of the early 1970s was to understand it, in Offer's terms, as a 'sporadic crisis'. Upon this view, the essentially sound and well-ordered international capitalist system had been subjected to an 'external shock' or series of shocks which had temporarily thrown it out of equilibrium. Most prominent among these shocks was the oil price increase of 1973 which had precipitated the deep recession of 1974 and 1975. Other candidates for disruption were the consequences of the long-standing US involvement in Vietnam, the rapid rise of (non-oil) basic commodity costs (notably of basic foods), and the breakdown of international monetary exchange relations. What was crucial about all these 'shocks' was that they were essentially exogenous (from outside the system) and if not non-replicable (after all OPEC could, and did, impose a second oil price hike) then certainly contingent. Paul McKracken's 1977 Report prepared for the OECD, probably the most celebrated statement of this position, concluded that the recession of the early 1970s arose from an unusual bunching of unfortunate disturbances unlikely to be repeated on the same scale, the

impact of which was compounded by some considerable errors in economic policy' (OECD, 1977). Upon such an account, crisis was external to the welfare state in two senses. First, the source of (temporary) economic problems lay outside the prevailing international market order and second, insofar as there was a knock-on problem of funding for the welfare state, this was one which was wholly attributable to the shortfall in economic product and not to the (damaging) interrelationship between social welfare and economic performance.

However, this essentially optimistic view – of a 'hiccup' in economic growth leading to a temporary pause in welfare state growth – was increasingly overtaken in the welfare state area by studies which stressed the contradictions within the mixed economy (or liberal representative democracy or welfare capitalism) as the real source of crisis. The five-fold increase in crude oil prices was simply the dramatic precipitating event which disclosed the deep-seated structural weaknesses of the post-war political economy which had been in the making for twenty-five years, and manifest to the discerning eye since at least the late 1960s. At the heart of this account is the claim that the end of the period of post-war economic growth was not externally caused but inherent in the social, political and economic order of the post-war consensus and especially in its ameliorating institutions for the management of economically based political conflict.

It will be recalled from chapter 2 that this was precisely the position adopted by both New Right and neo-Marxist commentators in response to the events of the early 1970s. For both schools, this crisis cannot be understood as 'simply' economic. Rather it is a crisis of the social and political order established after 1945 under the rubric of the Keynesian Welfare State. For both, the problems of the early 1970s express the economic and political contradictions inherent in a democratic capitalist society. Such an analysis embraces our two further senses of crisis. First, for all of these commentators the post-war order is threatened by the consequences of deep-seated and 'long-standing contradiction'. Also, typically in its earliest, boldest and most apocalyptic formulations, this perspective raises the spectre of an historical turning point. That is, the contradictions of the post-war order are now so acute that a radical change is no longer simply desirable, it has become unavoidable. Whatever the radical alternatives, the status quo is not an option.

We also saw in chapter 2 that it is extremely difficult to think of the neo-Marxist theory of the welfare state outside of the context of its perceived crisis. For contemporary Marxist thinkers, the welfare state is essentially contradictory, and its crises are but an especially

acute expression of these contradictions. This view was first stated with some force at the turn of the 1970s in O'Connor's *Fiscal Crisis of the State*. O'Connor's study centred upon the claim that 'the capitalist state must try to fulfil two basic and often mutually contradictory functions - accumulation and legitimization'. On the one hand, the state must try to maintain or create the conditions under which profitable capital accumulation is possible; on the other, it must also try to maintain or create the conditions for 'social harmony'. He expands the contradiction thus:

A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power, the economy's surplus production capacity and the taxes drawn from this surplus. (O'Connor, 1973, p. 6)

In essence, these imperatives of accumulation and legitimization are seen to be contradictory. Expenditure to secure legitimization is essential, to defray the otherwise potentially explosive social and political costs of capitalist development, yet these costs must themselves be met via state revenues derived from the profits of capital accumulation. In this way the costs of legitimization, which are to secure circumstances for successful capital accumulation, themselves tend to undermine the very process of profitable accumulation. Correspondingly,

The socialization of costs and the private appropriation of profits creates a fiscal crisis, or 'structural gap', between state expenditures and state revenues. The result is a tendency for state expenditures to increase more rapidly than the means of financing them. (O'Connor, 1973, p. 9)

This fiscal crisis is intensified by the pluralistic structure and accessibility of liberal democratic politics, which privileges the servicing of organized interests, furnishing 'a great deal of waste, duplication and overlapping of state projects and services'. Thus, 'the accumulation of social capital and social expenses is a highly irrational process from the standpoint of administrative coherence, fiscal stability and potentially profitable capital accumulation' (O'Connor, 1973, p. 9).

By the early 1970s in the US (which was the focus of O'Connor's

study), these problems had become intense.⁴ Growing tax resistance, intensified hostility to the authority of government, growing mobilization by new social movements among welfare recipients, and heightened politicization among an increasingly unionized state work-force all intensified those pressures upon government which generated fiscal crisis. O'Connor insisted that 'By the late 1960s, the local fiscal crisis was almost completely out of hand' and federal attempts to cope with this simply intensified the difficulties at national level (O'Connor, 1973, p. 212). O'Connor doubted that the crisis could be resolved within the parameters of the existing order. For him, 'the only lasting solution to the crisis is socialism' (p. 221).

The New Right and the Crisis of Liberal Representative Democracy

Even more influential and dramatic as an account of the crisis of the welfare state in this period were the writings of the New Right. From the turn of the 1970s, the technical arguments of Hayek and the public choice theorists (discussed in chapter 2) were given an enhanced prominence by critics who insisted that the general contradictions underlying social democracy were now beginning to manifest themselves in an immediate and profound crisis of the existing political order. In a 1975 *Report on the Governability of Democracies*, Michael Crozier argued that within Western Europe

the operations of the democratic process... appear to have generated a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a delegation of political and other forms of authority, and an overload of demands on government, exceeding its capacity to respond. (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975, p. 8)

For the neo-conservatives, the core of this 'democratic distemper' lay in the decline in respect for traditional sources of authority and in the break with traditional constraints upon individual aspirations. In the US in the 1960s, so Huntington argued, the 'vitality of democracy... produced a substantial increase in governmental activity and a substantial decrease in governmental authority' (Huntington, 1975,

4 Although the specific focus of O'Connor's analysis was the post-World War Two US, he did argue that 'many of the ideas presented can be adapted to the experience of other advanced capitalist countries' (O'Connor, 1973, p. 6).

p. 64). Thus at the same time as democratic publics made greatly increased demands of their governments, they were becoming less willing to accept the decisions taken by these public authorities. Indeed, the decline in respect for executive authority and the decline in support for mainstream political parties suggested a general decline in attachment to the traditional forms of representative democratic life. There was a growing mobilization of sectional demands with no recognition of a greater public interest, whether or not represented by the existing government. At the same time, sustained post-war economic growth, the institutionalization of the welfare state and the 'bidding-up' process of adversarial democratic politics had generated a 'revolution of rising expectations' among democratic publics. They were increasingly disposed to claim as non-negotiable 'rights', goods and services to which they had no sound claim. Decline of authority and mutual responsibility within the family meant that social welfare functions traditionally met within the private and family sector generated new claims upon the state – and produced a population increasingly dependent upon state beneficence. Daniel Bell noted as a manifestation of 'the cultural contradictions of capitalism', the fact that capitalism, which required sober, regular and systematically acquisitive individuals for its successful development, tended rather to generate hedonistic and consumption-oriented individuals, resistant to the traditional work ethic (Bell, 1979).

If for the neo-conservatives the major problem was one of declining social control and public authority, for the neo-liberals, following the public choice theorists, the major difficulties lay in the relationship between representative liberal democracy and the market economy. Thus, Samuel Brittan wrote in 1975 of the danger of the (self-)destruction of liberal representative democracy being precipitated by 'two endemic threats': (1) the generation of excessive expectations; and (2) the disruptive effects of the pursuit of group self-interest in the marketplace. He insisted that 'an excessive burden is placed on the "sharing out" function of government', where this function is understood as 'the activities of the public authorities in influencing the allocation of resources, both through taxation and expenditure policies and through direct intervention in the market place'. In essence, the 'growth of expectations imposes demands for different kinds of public spending and intervention which are incompatible both with each other and with the tax burden that people are willing to bear' (Brittan, 1975, pp. 129–31). Marrying Schumpeter's account of democracy as the process of elite competition for votes to the insights of the public choice theorists, Brittan argued that liberal representative democracy is imperilled by two

underlying weaknesses.⁵ First, the process of political competition generates unrealistic and excessive expectations about the possibilities afforded by government action among a largely (and rationally) uninformed voting public. Parties and politicians are systematically disposed to promise 'more for less'. A party which reminds the electorate of the necessary relationship between income and expenditure is likely to prove unelectable. Secondly, the growth of well-organized sectional interests (most especially trades unions) and especially their willingness to use this power to achieve sectional ends intensifies the difficulties of reconciling liberal and democratic government with national economic solvency. In the short term, this contradiction is likely to manifest itself in rising inflation, but 'in the last analysis the authorities have to choose between accepting an indefinite increase in the rate of inflation and abandoning full employment to the extent necessary to break the collective wage-push power of the unions'. However, such governments may be forced 'to choose between very high rates of unemployment and very high rates of inflation, neither of which can be sustained in a liberal democracy' (Brittan, 1975, p. 143). Consequently, Brittan judged that 'on present indications', liberal representative democracy 'is likely to pass away within the lifetime of people now adult' (Brittan, 1975, p. 129).

There were other elements in these accounts of the early 1970s. Some argued that the growth in resources and personnel directed towards the public sector as a consequence of the rise of the post-war welfare state had 'crowded out' the private sector investment upon which continued economic growth was dependent. Bacon and Eltis argued of the UK experience that there is 'a strong case' for maintaining that 'the great increase in public-sector employment that occurred in Britain in 1961–75 [largely within the welfare state sector] played a significant role in the deterioration of Britain's economic performance' (Bacon and Eltis, 1978, p. 16). Some stressed the growing difficulties of government macro-management in a more open world economy. Others highlighted the particularly entrenched position of public sector trades unions (itself a by-product of expanded (welfare) state employment), whose wages were politically – rather than market-determined (Rose and Peters, 1978, p. 23; Brittan, 1975). Anthony King drew attention to the secular growth in the complexity and interdependency of governmental decisions in all developed societies which would make the governance of even

⁵ On Schumpeter's account of democracy as elite competition, see Schumpeter (1976); Held (1987) pp. 164–85.

the most compliant of democracies more uncertain and problematic (King, 1975).

For many of these commentators, this overload thesis was intimately related to the spectre of growing ungovernability. Rose and Peters, for example, argued that a number of Western governments faced the imminent prospect of 'political bankruptcy' should they fail to show 'the political will to limit growth' of public expenditure in times of declining economic growth and falling take-home pay. While such 'political bankruptcy' would not mean anarchy and fighting in the streets, it would lead to an increase in citizen hostility to the conventional political process, accelerate the process of citizen indifference to the conduct of government and, perhaps most seriously, aggravate the tendency towards tax resistance, with an accompanying growth in the black economy (Rose and Peters, 1978, pp. 31-7). For King, the evidence of ungovernability was already present and, expressing himself 'a little pessimistic about the future', he argued that it was now the duty of political scientists to suggest 'how the number of tasks that government has come to be expected to perform can be reduced' (King, 1975, p. 296). Michael Crozier feared that Western Europe faced the prospect of 'Finlandization', while most apocalyptically, Peter Jay insisted that 'the very survival of democracy hangs by a gossamer thread' and that 'democracy has itself by the tail and is eating itself up fast' (cited in Rose and Peters, 1978, p. 14, n. 17; Jay, 1977; Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975, p. 54).

Not all these commentators were so iconoclastic (nor can they all be identified unproblematically with the New Right). Rose and Peters, for example, insist that any 'attempt to dismantle the policies of the contemporary welfare state would be a response out of all proportion to the cause of the problem' (Rose and Peters, 1978, pp. 38, 232). Yet all were convinced that the continuation of the welfare state status quo was not an option.

Crisis? What Crisis?

However, by the end of the 1970s, it seemed clear that expectations of a system-threatening crisis – whether a legitimization crisis of welfare capitalism or a crisis of governability of liberal representative democracy – were ungrounded. Nowhere in the advanced capitalist world had the system of representative democracy broken down nor the market system been challenged by mass mobilization in favour of socialism. Certainly, there had been considerable resistance to retrenchment of public expenditure and rising levels of unemployment. There was some (extremely approximate) evidence of growth

in the black economy (a 1986 OECD report placed it at between 2 and 8 per cent of total hours worked in the developed economies) and limited evidence of tax resistance, notably in the meteoric rise of the anti-tax Progress Party in Denmark in 1973 and in the passage of Proposition 13 statutorily restricting state taxation in California.⁶ Yet none of this represented a real challenge to the prevailing order which had seemingly been endorsed by the electoral success of right-wing parties in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This process was given its definitive expression in the popular election in 1979 and 1980 (and landslide re-election in 1983 and 1984) of self-professedly neo-liberal governments in the UK and the US.

One response to these developments has been to argue that the threat to the system was real enough, but that, just in time, 'the electorate' had recognized 'the incoherence of the providential idea of government in a free society'. Thus, Nevil Johnson argues of the UK that 'there was a shift of opinion and mood just sufficient to yield a modest parliamentary majority at the 1979 general election for a Conservative government committed ... to the reassertion of market principles' (Nevil Johnson, 1987, p. 155). Yet such talk of 'the changing mood of the electorate' really stands in lieu of an explanation and was one of the options seemingly ruled out by the public choice theorists' explanations of 'voting paradox' (see above, pp. 45-7).

Such developments might however be reconciled with a less dramatic view of crisis. Gough raises such a possibility in writing, broadly within the classical Marxist tradition, of crisis as a process of restructuring, in which new circumstances are established for successful capital accumulation. Writing at the end of the 1970s, Gough argued that such a restructuring could only be achieved through a systematic weakening of the power of working-class organizations and a retrenchment of the political and social rights that had been institutionalized in the post-war advanced capitalist world (Gough, 1979, pp. 151-2).

It is this perspective which can be seen to set the agenda for a second and distinctive species of crisis theories that came to dominate discussion in the 1980s (Taylor-Gooby, 1985, p. 14). We may think of these as 'crisis containment theories'. In such accounts, it is argued that the challenge which seemed in the 1970s to be addressed to democratic advanced capitalism itself has, in practice, been

⁶ OECD (1986b): of Proposition 13, it has been observed that it is difficult to sustain a view of California as a state in which the general citizenry faced ruin arising from profligate welfare expenditure.

displaced upon the social and economic policies that constituted the post-war welfare state. In fact, interventions in areas of social and economic policy have been successful in the limited though decisive sense that they have managed to contain and control, if not actually to resolve, those contradictory and crisis tendencies which earlier theorists had thought would imperil the very continuation of liberal democracy. If it is any longer appropriate to speak of a crisis, it is now a crisis within the institutions of welfare state social policy itself.

Crisis: Containment and Reconstruction

Following Taylor-Gooby, we can isolate three sets of claims as characteristic of this 'crisis containment' theory. First, it is suggested that throughout the advanced capitalist world there has been a break with the political consensus for a managed economy and state welfare that characterized the post-war period. Secondly, this has been made possible by a 'sea-change' in public opinion, which has moved from support for collective solutions to problems of social need to a preference for market provision to satisfy individual welfare demands. Thirdly, and most importantly, these changes have opened the way for cuts in welfare entitlements and a 'restructuring' of public welfare provision. This indicates a move away from the model of a universalist, rights-based welfare state towards a more residualist, needs-governed system of public relief.

The end of consensus

The argument of 'crisis containment' theorists is that while critics were right to observe a severe challenge to the post-war consensus in the heightened social and political struggles of the early 1970s, they were wrong to identify this with an unmanageable threat to the prevailing democratic capitalist order. The threatening contradictions of welfare capitalism have been, if not definitively resolved, then at least effectively managed. This has been achieved through a radical reconstruction of the social and political order of the advanced capitalist societies, a reconstruction in the interests of capital and parties of the right, achieved through an abandonment of the post-war consensus.

Although this is a process which has taken different forms in different countries, according to specifically local conditions, its definitive and most articulate expression is seen in the rise of 'Thatcherism', both in the UK and, by extension, elsewhere. Despite its self-ascribed single-mindedness and conviction, the precise

meaning of 'Thatcherism' remains unclear. (see Jessop et al., 1988, pp. 3-56). For some, perhaps for Mrs Thatcher herself, it signifies, above all else, a rejection of the politics of consensus. According to Gamble, it represents 'a coherent hegemonic project', summarily constructed around the twin themes of 'the free economy and the strong state' (Gamble, 1988, p. 23). It is sometimes given a wider and international resonance, indicating a more generalized policy response to the perceived economic and social problems of the 1970s. Thus, Dennis Kavanagh writes that:

economic recession and slow economic growth undermined popular support for the welfare consensus in a number of ... states. The Thatcher governments' policies of tax cuts, privatization, 'prudent' finance, squeezing state expenditure and cutting loss-making activities has had echoes in other western states. (Kavanagh, 1987, p. 9)

It is not perhaps surprising that the 'Thatcher agenda' should have an appeal for right-wing governments in the UK, the US and perhaps West Germany. What was seen as still more decisive for the proponents of 'crisis containment' was the extent to which avowedly socialist or social democratic governments were forced to adopt 'austerity' measures which mimicked the policies of right-wing governments. This might be taken to describe the experience of the Labour government in the UK in the late 1970s. To an extent, it even spread into the heartland of the welfare state in Scandinavia (particularly in Denmark). But perhaps most instructive was the experience of the Socialists in France, who, though elected on a radical socialist manifesto in 1981, were abruptly forced to 'U-turn' and embrace the politics of austerity. What seemed to divide this 'Thatcherism with a human face' from the real thing was a lack of enthusiasm for the policies adopted.

The 'sea change' in popular opinion

This political abandonment of consensus could not have been effected, it is argued, had there not been a wholesale erosion of popular support for existing welfare state arrangements. There are some who argue that the working class never had a strong attachment to the idea of welfare rights and social citizenship, and who trace 'the long hostility of working people to what is perceived as dependency on public provision' (Selbourne, 1985, p. 117). Certainly, most commentators concede that public attitudes to welfare have always been ambivalent and that even where support for the welfare state has appeared to be strong, such strength has often

been 'brittle'. Thus, Golding and Middleton identified in the UK of the 1960s 'behind a diffuse and lingering loyalty to the notion of "the welfare state" ... more severe views [that were] readily tapped' by its critics (Golding and Middleton, 1982, p. 229). On this basis, the economic downturn of the early 1970s afforded an opportunity for 'a fullscale assault on the welfare consensus', a consensus which 'has never taken deep root, and [which] was therefore relatively easy to dislodge by the return of an incisive neo-liberal rhetoric in the wake of the significant material shifts in working-class experience in the mid-1970s'. Certainly, '[b]y the 1979 election the thin veneer of the post war welfare consensus had been stripped down to a barely visible remnant' (Golding and Middleton, 1982, pp. 229, 205, 109).

Similarly, John Alt argued that people's support for the welfare state was basically 'altruistic ... supporting a benefit which will largely go to others'. In economic 'good times', when people's earnings are rising, they may be willing to afford such 'altruistic policies'. But times of 'economic stress', such as the 1970s, tend to be associated with 'less generosity' and a preference for 'spending cuts over taxation' (Alt, 1979, p. 258).

Perhaps the single clearest (and most widely challenged) statement of the case for a decline in public support for state welfare has come from the Institute of Economic Affairs. In the most recent of a series of surveys of UK public opinion on welfare, Harris and Seldon claim to have isolated

a large, latent but suppressed desire for change in British education and medical care among high proportions of people of both sexes, all ages and incomes, whether officially at work or not, and of all political sympathies. (Harris and Seldon, 1987, p. 51; see also Harris and Seldon, 1979, p. 201)

The decline of the welfare state as a decline of social democracy

Further evidence of this decline in popular support for the welfare state is premised on the growing electoral difficulties of social democratic parties and the renaissance of the political right. Social Democrats have long been identified as 'the party of the welfare state'. Their rise in the 1960s was often associated with the incorporation of the welfare state in advanced capitalist societies. Correspondingly, the decline in their popularity in the 1970s has been seen as evidence of a decline in support for the welfare state itself.

Here again, the most familiar examples are those of the UK, the US and West Germany. But perhaps more important are the exam-

ples of a shift to the right in the heartland of the welfare state. Of these, the most important examples are Denmark and, of course, Sweden where the return of a 'bourgeois' coalition in 1976 brought to an end 44 years of continuous social democratic government. But evidence of the decline of socialist parties is Europe-wide. The proportion of votes going to all left-wing parties (Social Democratic, Socialist and Communist) fell from 41.3 per cent in the 1960s to 40.1 per cent in the 1970s. In the same period, support for Conservative parties crept up from 24.6 to 24.9 per cent. In the early 1980s, the proportion of the Conservative vote advanced to 25.3 per cent. A still more dramatic picture emerges if we consider a shorter and more recent period. Thus, between 1977 and 1982, incumbent Socialists were defeated in the UK, West Germany, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Luxembourg and Denmark. In 1975, there were more than twice as many Socialist as Conservative cabinet ministers in European governments (54.1 per cent contrasted with 25.1 per cent). By 1982, the Conservative parties had established a one percentage point lead over the socialists (37.6 per cent Conservative; 36.4 per cent Socialist). Lane and Ersson conclude that the Socialist parties' position 'was reinforced during the 1950s and the 1960s; in the 1970s and early 1980s, however, a decline to a lower level set in'. For the parties of the right, by contrast, the data 'confirm the hypothesis of a conservative revival in the 1970s and early 1980s' (*The Economist*, 1982a, pp. 35-6; Lane and Ersson, 1987, pp. 112-15).

'The cuts'

The third, and possibly the most important element in the 'crisis containment' perspective was the spectre of cuts and 'restructuring' in social expenditure. On the basis of a change in popular and electoral opinion and given the successes of parties of the right and the breakdown of the politics of consensus, it seemed that the 1980s must be a decade of welfare retrenchment. For many commentators, both advocates and opponents, it seems as if there was to be a retreat from a universal welfare state based on citizenship towards a more modest policy of the relief of destitution upon the basis of demonstrated need.

The first public expenditure white paper of the newly elected UK Conservative government in 1979 maintained that 'public expenditure is at the heart of Britain's present economic difficulties' and, as we have seen, the single largest (and fastest-growing) aspect of this public spending was social expenditure (H.M. Treasury, 1979). Accordingly, the welfare state looked particularly vulnerable to retrenchment and within a year of Thatcher's election, Ian Gough was arguing that

Britain is experiencing the most far-reaching experiment in 'new right' politics in the Western world. [A number of] policy shifts ... contribute to this aim: legal sanctions against unions, mass unemployment by means of tight monetary controls, the cutting of social benefits for the families of strikers, a reduction in the social wage on several fronts, and a shift to more authoritarian practices in the welfare field. It represents one coherent strategy for managing the British crisis, a strategy aimed at the heart of the post-war Keynesian-welfare state settlement. (Gough, 1983, pp. 162-3)

Much the same process was identified in the US. Here it was said in 1986 that 'the Reagan administration and its big business allies have declared a new class war' against the working class and those reliant on social assistance (Piven and Cloward, 1986, p. 47). Writing in the same year, Michael Katz insists that

In the last several years, city governments have slashed services; state legislatures have attacked general assistance (outdoor relief to persons ineligible for benefits from other programs); and the Reagan administration has launched an offensive against social welfare and used tax policy to widen the income gap between rich and poor. (Katz, 1986, p. 274)

Perhaps even more telling were the prospects for retrenchment in the continental European welfare state. In September 1982, *The Economist* argued that 'during the 1980s, all rich countries' governments ... are likely to make ... big cuts in social spending'. Without such large-scale cuts in the UK, *The Economist* anticipated that public expenditure could reach 60 per cent of GNP by 1990! Within a month, it was reporting 'the withering of Europe's welfare states'. In West Germany, there were to be delays in pension increases, the collection of sickness insurance contributions from pensioners and an end to student grants. Holland faced 'a savage cutback', while the one-time leading welfare state, Denmark, was to seek a 7 per cent cut in public spending by reducing levels of unemployment compensation and introducing new charges for children's daycare. Most saliently, the newly elected Socialist government in France was introducing new charges to meet non-medical hospital costs and increasing social security contributions in a quest to curb spending by \$12 billion in a full year. Only the perverse Swedes were 'the exception that proved the rule', re-electing a socialist government on an anti-cuts programme (*The Economist*, 1982b, pp. 67-8).

In contrast to some of the more committed of conservative politicians and the most enthusiastic of their supporters, few academic commentators have ever believed that the future belongs unprob-

lematically to the New Right project. However, the 'crisis containment' perspective did offer a clear account of the breakdown of consensus, a popular political shift to the right and an unpicking of the fabric of the welfare state. It suggested that this change had successfully addressed the threat of systemic crisis that had been identified in the mid-1970s and replaced it with a more modest and piecemeal, if squallid, crisis for those in society who were most reliant upon the support of public services.

Crisis of the Welfare State: Evaluation

The idea of crisis had a profound impact upon studies of the welfare state in the 1980s. To take just three examples, the Director of Social Affairs for the OECD argued that 'the lower growth of the OECD economies since the early 1970s ... put the Welfare State in crisis' (OECD, 1981). Pat Thane wrote in 1982 of 'a time when the post-war "welfare state" is being actively dismantled', while Ramesh Mishra began his study of *The Welfare State in Crisis* with the claim that 'the welfare state throughout the industrialized West is in disarray' (Mishra, 1984). Just four years later it seemed as if this perspective had changed. In 1988, Jens Alber insisted 'that the concept of a welfare state crisis is neither necessary nor fruitful', while Michael Moran was still more definitive: 'There is no crisis of the welfare state' (Gass, 1981, p. 5; Thane, 1982, p. viii; Mishra, 1984, p. xiii; Alber, 1988a, p. 200; Moran, 1988, p. 412). It is some twenty years since the discourse of 'crisis' first achieved prominence and we are therefore now in a position to make some substantive judgements about the rise (and fall) of theories of crisis in the welfare state. This assessment is focused upon the three major species of crisis identified above.

Welfare state crisis as 'external shock'

With the rise of the more dramatic accounts of systemic crisis and given the continuing problems of Western economies, it soon became commonplace to dismiss the idea of crisis arising from an 'external economic shock' as a naive hankering for the 'good old days' of social peace and economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s. Certainly, it is a view with very real weaknesses. First, its confidence about the early re-establishment of the political and economic status quo ante was misplaced. Secondly, it lacked a sense of the interrelatedness of the political and economic problems of the advanced capitalist societies. Finally, it showed little awareness of the very real changes in the balance of economic and political forces that

had been the consequence of twenty-five years of post-war economic growth.

Yet it is an approach which, with the benefit of still more hindsight, can be seen to have had some substantial strengths. Certainly, the crisis presented itself to many contemporaries as a problem of inadequate economic resources (trying to pay for more welfare with a stagnating national product), and there is indeed good reason to think that the crisis of the early 1970s was, in some senses, much more 'purely economic' than later critics were to allow. Thus, much of the perceived 'spiralling' of welfare costs was due not to 'democratic disemper' but to the logic of demographic pressure and statutory entitlement under circumstances of recession. This was simply an expression of the double-bind that the welfare state always faces under circumstances of recession, as national product and taxation revenue fall, while demands for welfare compensation rise. Further, as the more dire predictions of neo-Marxists and New Right analysts have failed to materialize, so it may seem that the difficulties of the welfare state are indeed more appropriately seen to be based in the shortfall of resources available to fund further growth. Such a belief is buttressed by recent evidence that the best indicator of the capacity of national welfare states to weather the difficulties of the 1970s was not so much a reflection of their *political* complexion (the intensity of their democratic contradictions), as of a given nation's *economic* strength before the 1970s and of its capacity to absorb the oil shock of 1973 (Schmidt, 1983, pp. 1-26).

However, even if we concentrate solely upon economic developments, it is clear that the changes observed in the early 1970s were both more profound and longer lasting than the idea of a one-off 'shock to the system' supposed. This new economic context is not adequately defined by one or two hikes in the price of basic commodities but rather by a whole series of changes in the international political economy which cumulatively shattered the stability of the post-war economic order. Such changes include the decline in stable exchange rates, the loss of the hegemonic role of the US, changing international terms of trade, the rise of newly industrialized countries, changing financial institutions, the impact of new technologies and the continuing de-industrialization/post-industrialization of the advanced capitalist economies. For a number of commentators, changes of this kind add up to a systematic transition from the sorts of *organized capitalism* which had characterized much of the twentieth century towards a new period of *disorganized capitalism*. The changes represent then not so much a crisis for advanced capitalism as the process of establishing what Flora calls 'a changed historical macro-constellation' (Flora, 1985, p. 26). However, the challenge posed to

the welfare state may still be severe, since the welfare state was one of the major institutional pillars of that organized form of capitalism which it is suggested is in the process of being transformed (Lash and Urry, 1987; Offe, 1985).

The welfare state and the crisis of liberal democratic capitalism

The theoretical poverty of the perspective of 'external shock' has often been contrasted with New Right or neo-Marxist critics who are seen to have penetrated the 'depth structure' of contradictions in the welfare state. Certainly, there are considerable strengths in the shared features of these accounts of crisis. They were among the first to develop a modern 'political economy' approach, indicating that while the *symptoms* of the difficulties of the 1970s were economic, their *causes* lay in the interrelation of social, political and economic forces. They were also among the first to indicate that the recession of 1973-4 was not simply a 'blip' in the continuing process of unfettered post-war economic growth, in which 'business as usual' could be restored just so soon as the 'oil shock' had been absorbed. They demonstrated that inflation had not just a political *consequence* but also, in part, a political *cause*. They drew out the political consequences of the growing complexity and complicity of government, of greater bureaucratic and organizational density and of the rise of organized and sectional interests, under circumstances of representative democracy and full employment.

However, the glaring weakness in this analysis is that the substance of its claims about a systemic crisis of advanced capitalism and/or liberal representative democracy remain substantially unfulfilled. In the UK, where the prognoses were often the most gloomy, there has been little real challenge to the political process. There is evidence of growing electoral volatility (masked by the plurality voting system), evidence of declining public deference to government, of the intensified prosecution of sectional interests and of a break with elements of consensus government. There has been an erosion of local government democracy, the circumscription of some civil liberties and the curtailment of trade union rights. All of these have met with more or less fierce resistance. But there has been no real threat of a breakdown of liberal democratic government and limited interest in major constitutional reforms (outside the minor and nationalist parties). In the same period, a right-wing government has been returned to office three times (at least twice with a large plurality of votes), while welfare spending in the major areas (pensions, health and education) has remained largely intact.

Why were analysts on both left and right so mistaken about the consequences of the welfare state structures they helped to reveal? First, there is an element of misunderstanding of the nature of the welfare state. For the New Right, the welfare state was seen largely as an unproductive deadweight on the economy, imposed through the dynamics of irresponsible (social) democracy. In the prevalent Marxist account, the welfare state was the necessary legitimating trade-off for (the unacceptable social costs of) capital accumulation. For both, the inevitable outcome was fiscal crisis. But such a view is difficult to reconcile with the historical development of the welfare state outlined in chapter 4. The welfare state was *not* generally an imposition of organized labour through the pressure of electoral politics. It was as much (if not more) the product of conservative or liberal regimes. It was as frequently (if not more often) status-preserving or market-supporting as it was decommodifying. In fact, the evidence that, as both New Right and neo-Marxists seem to assume, the welfare state dampens capitalist economic growth is limited at both 'micro' and 'macro' levels. Similarly, the claims that public spending displaces private investment or that social benefits represent a real disincentive to labour are thinly grounded.⁷ Certainly, under some circumstances and as part of a broader constellation of forces, social spending may be complicit in poor economic performance. But this is something different from the claim that social spending *causes* poor economic performance (Pen, 1987, pp. 346-7). Indeed, Nicholas Barr argues that the welfare state has a 'major efficiency role' and that, in a context of market failures, 'we need a welfare state for efficiency reasons, and would continue to do so even if all distributional problems had been solved' (Barr, 1987, p. 421; Blake and Ormerod, 1980; Block, 1987).

The UK case is peculiarly instructive in this context. The UK was often portrayed in the literature of the 1970s as the country with the most pronounced problems of overload, ungovernability and welfare state malaise, so much so that this complex was often identified as 'the English disease' (see, for example, Jay, 1977). Yet, we have seen that the UK was not an especially large welfare spender, nor were the terms of her social benefits either very generous or particularly 'decommodifying'. There were consistently more extensive and generous welfare states with a far better economic record. The size and disposition of the UK public sector and welfare state might

contribute to its economic difficulties, but only in a context of much longer established problems of economic growth and capital formation (Gamble, 1981). Conversely, as Mishra points out, New Right critics at least tended to neglect those welfare states with a good economic record (Austria, Sweden) or to attribute their success to fortunate and extraneous circumstances (Mishra, 1984, p. 56). In general, this 'Anglocentric' bias (which has long been observed by continental analysts of the welfare state) is also a clue to the weakness of the more apocalyptic theses of contradiction and ungovernability (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981a, p. 21). Thus Anthony Birch maintains that the New Right thesis is only sustainable for the UK at a very particular historical moment. Seeking to extrapolate from these very particular circumstances, a general theory of the prospects for representative liberal democracy is quite unwarranted (Birch, 1984, pp. 158-9).

Perhaps a clue to these misunderstandings can be found in the problematic use of 'contradiction'. 'Contradiction' as a description of the welfare state can only mean 'perverse outcomes', 'real oppositions' or 'competing objectives'. However, both New Right and neo-Marxist critics have tended to employ it as if its 'proper' sense of irreconcilability (A and not-A) applied to this analogical usage. Correspondingly, they are persuaded to see (irreconcilable) contradictions, where only (deeply problematic but potentially manageable) conflicts exist.

A number of more specific problems can be identified in these accounts. New Right critics in particular have tended to overstate the powers of trades unions. Even at the height of their ascendancy in the early 1970s, unions were essentially the reactive and defensive organizations of labour (Clarke and Clements, 1977; Hyman, 1982a). All governments, and not only those who saw it as potentially therapeutic, have found it difficult to control unemployment. This, in concert with growing international competition and greater capital mobility, has radically curtailed even this limited power of trades unions. Similarly, the last fifteen years have seen no inexorable rise of social democratic parties, irresponsibly promising 'more for less'. (Nor, it should be noted, is the currently fashionable 'ascendancy of the right' likely to prove any more inevitable or permanent.) Despite the ubiquitous talk of governments 'buying' electoral victories through irresponsible manipulation of the economy, such empirical evidence as there is suggests that the impact of the 'political business cycle' has been greatly exaggerated. In Alt and Chrystal's view, 'no one could read the political business cycle literature without being struck by the lack of supporting evidence' (Alt and Chrystal, 1983).

⁷ Nicholas Barr insists that 'the effect of the welfare state on capital accumulation and output growth, despite much research and strident polemics, remains largely *terra incognita*' (Barr, 1987, p. 424).

Finally, it is worth drawing attention to the inadequacies of the accounts of legitimacy that underpin many of these accounts of crisis. Both left (notably Habermas and Wolfe) and right suggest that the difficulties surrounding the welfare state are likely finally to express themselves as a crisis of legitimacy of the democratic capitalist order (Habermas, 1976; Wolfe, 1979). But it seems clear that this is to operate with a conception of legitimacy which belongs to constitutional theory rather than to political sociology. The principle of legitimacy as the acknowledged right to rule is not one that has a prominent place in the day-to-day thinking of the democratic citizen. As Rose and Peters indicated, even 'political bankruptcy' does not mean fighting on the streets (Rose and Peters, 1978). Michael Mann has given definitive expression to the view that the 'social cohesion of liberal democracy' rests primarily upon an *absence* of considerations of legitimacy, upon the fact that the average citizen does not have a comprehensive view of the legitimate claims and limitations of governmental authority. It is a mistake to look to a legitimization crisis where legitimacy is not constituted in the way that analysts of its anticipated crisis suppose (Habermas, 1976; Wolfe, 1979; Mann, 1970).

Crisis Contained?

We have seen that as the prospect of an institutional or constitutional débâcle receded towards the end of the 1970s, a new species of theory, that of 'crisis containment', gained increasing prominence. Upon such an account, any threat posed to the existing social and political order during the 1970s had effectively been displaced into a crisis of the welfare state itself. The end of political consensus (in part premised upon general support for the welfare state), a shift to the right in public opinion and public policy initiatives to cut spending had 'saved' capitalism only by imperilling the post-war welfare state. How convincing is this second school of crisis thinking?

The End of Consensus?

We saw that it was possible to define consensus as either inter-party or inter-class, but that whichever form it took it could be isolated in policy terms around (1) the maintenance of a comprehensive welfare state, (2) support of the 'mixed economy' and (3) policies of full employment and sustained economic growth. There were always those opposed to consensus, and though we are now inclined to think of the breach with consensus as an intervention from the

right, it is worth recalling that some of the earliest mobilization against the social democratic consensus came from the left in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Similarly, while we think of the break being consummated towards the end of the 1970s, 'the beginning of the end of consensus' might be as convincingly retraced to the late 1960s. Even if we identify the demise of consensus with this later date, it is worth recalling that some on the left welcomed this as an opportunity to radicalize politics around the failure of the social democratic 'management of capitalism'.

One of the lessons of empirical research on the welfare state in the 1980s has been to trace the *diversity* of developments in the last twenty years. Faced with similar difficulties, though under nationally variable circumstances, there has been a variety of responses within the Western welfare states. As the nature of the consensus varied among countries, so too has the process of its 'deconstruction' been far from uniform. Thus the consequences of the election of parties of the right committed to reform in Sweden (1976), the UK (1979) and Germany (1982) are widely different given the variation in national backgrounds.

The UK: The Definitive End of Consensus?

The most abrupt 'end to consensus' is often ascribed to the UK in which a quarter of a century of Butskellite agreement between Conservative and Labour parties was seen to yield in 1979 to the radically anti-consensus politics of Thatcherism. Here is potentially the most fruitful ground for the 'end of consensus' theory. Certainly, the polemical hostility to consensus was clear. In 1981, Margaret Thatcher dismissed consensus as

The process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values and policies ... avoiding the very issues that have got to be solved merely to get people to come to an agreement on the way ahead. (cited in Kavanagh and Morris, 1989, p. 119)

In the 1979 election campaign, the Conservatives in the UK presented themselves as a party breaking with the exhausted legacy of post-war politics. This break extended to each of the major policy elements of consensus. In terms of the 'mixed economy', there was a commitment to return publicly owned industries to the private sector and to limit government interventions in the day-to-day management of relations between employers and employees. There was a commitment to sustained or enhanced economic growth, but this was to be achieved by an *abandonment* of Keynesian economics and

the commitment to full employment in favour of monetarism and supply-side reforms. On the welfare state, there was to be a drive to cut costs by concentrating resources upon those in greatest need, to restrain the bureaucratic interventions of the 'nanny state' in the day-to-day life of citizens, a greater role for voluntary welfare institutions and the encouragement of individuals to make provision for their individual welfare through the private sector (encouraging private pensions, private healthcare and private education).

Certainly, the 1979 general election in the UK may be described as a watershed. Labour had been in office for eleven of the previous fifteen years. This election brought to power a Conservative government that remained in office throughout the 1980s and won three consecutive elections. The 1979 election also saw a major defection of skilled working-class voters from Labour to Conservative. Yet in judging the breach with consensus that it represented, one must be circumspect.

First, the break-up of the consensus pre-dates the election of the Conservatives in 1979. As early as 1970, Richard Crossman heard 'the sound of the consensus breaking up' (Crossman, 1970). The first two years of the Heath government (1970-2) had been committed to the sort of neo-liberalism that the 1979 Thatcher government promised. It was the Labour government of 1974-9 that presided over the earliest retrenchment in welfare spending and a (then) unprecedented rise in post-war unemployment. The ill-fated 'Social Contract' may be seen less as the culmination of post-war collaboration of capital, labour and the state than as a desperate attempt to hold together forms of corporatist bargaining which had already been undermined and were destined to issue in the sort of débâcle that was seen in 'the Winter of Discontent' of 1978/9 (Deakin, 1987, pp. 2-3).

Turning to the record of the post-1979 Thatcher government, political practice did not always match party rhetoric. Certainly, unemployment was allowed to reach unheard-of levels (officially in excess of three million) and a string of major public corporations and utilities were returned to the private sector (notably British Telecom, British Gas, British Airways and water supply and sewerage services). There was a major (and popular) drive to sell off public housing and there were limited cuts in expenditure on education. Yet in the period of the first Thatcher administration total social expenditure showed a significant growth of about 10 per cent, rising as a proportion of GDP from 21.7 per cent to 23.6 per cent. Much of this increase was the consequence of extremely high levels of unemployment and low economic growth (Taylor-Gooby, 1985, p. 72).

In 1985, the government Green Paper on *The Reform of Social Security* ('The Fowler Reviews') promised 'the most fundamental examination of our social security system since the Second World War' (DHSS, 1985). The proposals – and especially the abolition of State Earnings Related Pensions (SERPS) which had been introduced as a bipartisan policy as recently as 1975 – were condemned by the government's critics as a break with the welfare state consensus (Kavanagh, 1987, p. 27). But when government legislation was brought forward, it contained substantial concessions and, most importantly, a scaling-down rather than abolition of SERPS. There were limited inducements for private welfare provision and a deterioration in the terms of welfare services for the least privileged. But the major and mainstream pillars of the welfare state (public pensions and the National Health Service) were largely unscathed and there was no effective cut in social expenditure. In 1985/6, this stood at £36 billion, a third higher than its 1979 level (Kavanagh, 1987, p. 217). More recently, the government has made efforts to address the issue of reforms within the NHS. However, these proposals focus upon 'internal market' reforms rather than a wholesale commitment to the privatization of healthcare and retain the commitment to a service 'available to all, regardless of income, and to be financed mainly out of general taxation' (Thatcher, 1989). Even so, the government has run into acute public and professional resistance and the political outcome remains unclear.

The Thatcher governments were significantly different from those that preceded them. In the area of the welfare state, there have been important changes – the sale of council houses, the 'contracting out' of ancillary services in hospitals, the 'opting out' of schools from local government control, the depreciation of child benefit, the promotion of private healthcare. But these changes have not necessarily meant a saving to the public purse. Greater home ownership, for all its promise of greater self-reliance, imposes a financial burden in tax expenditures on mortgage interest relief. This increased by almost five times between 1963/4 and 1983/4 rising in the period from 1979 to 1983 alone by 44 per cent. In 1985/6, the cost of mortgage interest relief was officially estimated to have been about £4.5 billion (rising to £5.5 billion in 1988/9), exemption from capital gains tax approximately £2.5 billion and council house sales discounts a further £1 billion (Taylor-Gooby, 1985, p. 84; Forrest and Muir, 1988; Forrest, 1988; CSO, 1990, p. 93). The 'heartlands' of the welfare state – pensions and healthcare – have proven extremely difficult to restrain. On healthcare, the government has increased real spending, while facing charges from all quarters of systematic

underfunding.⁸ This looks like a very traditional problem of post-war governments. Finally, Mrs Thatcher's successor, John Major, in distancing himself from the New Right's more radical proposals for reform, has insisted that 'the welfare state is an integral part of the British instinct. It will remain an integral part of the British instinct' (cited in *The Guardian*, 1990).

Indeed, the problem of funding pensions and health is one which the Thatcher administration has shared with governments throughout the advanced industrialized world (OECD, 1984; OECD, 1986a). It is to this international context that we turn in the remaining pages of this chapter. Earlier we identified three areas as the definitive testing ground for an 'end to welfare state consensus'. These were (1) changing public opinion, (2) the decline of 'welfare state parties' and (3) changes in public policy. We shall consider each of these in its international context.

Changes in Public Opinion

One of the principal claims of 'crisis containment' was that, in contrast to the period in which the post-war consensus was constructed and sustained, popular opinion has shifted away from support for equity and citizenship through the welfare state. Crudely put, public welfare was something which people would support in economic 'good times', when both public and private consumption could rise, but to which they were much less sympathetic in times of economic stagnation. A strictly temporary and provisional support for the welfare state had been dissipated through an appeal to traditional and much more deep-seated hostility to the poor and indolent.

Perhaps the fullest review of international public opinion on the welfare state is Coughlin's *Ideology, Public Opinion and Welfare Policy*. Across a sample of eight rich nations he found that

public attitudes toward the principles of social policy have developed along similar lines both of acceptance and rejection. The

⁸ This seeming paradox of increasing expenditure and a worsening record of meeting demand is often explained in terms of (1) the demographic pressure of an ageing population, (2) the 'technological push' of new medical technologies making more treatments possible, (3) the 'relative price effect' that follows from the labour-intensive nature of healthcare and (4) supplier control over the level of production (Cullis and West, 1979; Ashmore, Mulkey and Pinch, 1989).

idea of collective responsibility for assuring minimum standards of employment, health care, income, and other conditions of social and economic well-being has everywhere gained a foothold in popular values and beliefs. And yet the survey evidence suggests a simultaneous tendency supporting individual achievement, mobility, and responsibility for one's own lot, and rejecting the elimination of aspects of economic life associated with capitalism. (Coughlin, 1980, p. 31)

Levels of support varied between 'big spenders', such as Sweden and France, and 'low spenders', such as the US and Australia. Generally, 'a country's mix of economic collectivism and economic individualism will match its social spending and taxing and the actual amount of government intervention' (Wilensky, 1980, p. xii). But broadly the same patterns of support were revealed. The same areas – pensions, public health insurance, family/child allowances – were most popular (and expensive) and the same sort of provision – unemployment compensation and public assistance – the least popular. Not only between nations, but between social classes and across political sympathies, it seemed that everyone liked pensions and no-one liked 'scroungers' (Coughlin, 1980, p. 52).

More recently, Tom Smith has drawn together international survey material that reveals a similar pattern. Collating evidence for the US, Austria, West Germany, Italy and the UK, Smith records very strong endorsements of government responsibility for health care (94.5 per cent) and for ensuring 'a decent standard of living for the old' (95.2 per cent). His more recent evidence shows majority support everywhere for increased government spending on healthcare and an average of 57 per cent in favour of increased retirement benefits. In both these areas, questions controlled clearly for 'tax blindness', and again in both areas the UK showed the highest disposition for increased spending (at 87.8 and 74.6 per cent, respectively). In the more stigmatized area of unemployment benefit, the proportion favouring increased spending was much lower (at 33.3 per cent) but this was still greater than those who favoured a reduction in such support (at 21.9 per cent). The endorsement by an average of 70.2 per cent of respondents of the view that it was 'the government's responsibility to ... provide a job for everyone who wants one' suggests that the question of unemployment elicits responses to perceived indolence rather than to state intervention in the economy. Again, given the choice, respondents everywhere saw the government's responsibility to keep unemployment down as more important than its responsibility to control inflation (Smith, 1987).

Taylor-Gooby's recent review of the international evidence, looking at the same five countries plus Australia, reveals lower absolute levels of popular support, but a similar ranking of both countries and programmes (Taylor-Gooby, 1989). The survey material recorded majorities everywhere for increased state spending on healthcare (88 per cent in the UK and 81 per cent in Italy), and a clear (unweighted) majority for increases in old age pensions (with support highest again in the UK and Italy, which had positive responses of 75 and 76 per cent, respectively). As in Smith's survey, the endorsement of increased state spending on the unemployed was much lower, with only the Italians mustering majority support (Taylor-Gooby, 1989, p. 41). Yet Smith has continued to record substantial majorities everywhere supporting increased state spending on benefits for the poor (Smith, 1989, p. 62). Overall, Taylor-Gooby has concluded that

the attitudes of the citizens of the six nations correspond more closely to the traditional post-war settlement than they reveal any enthusiasm for change, although within this framework there are substantial national variations ... Social welfare that provides for mass needs is warmly endorsed, but provision for minorities, whose interests challenge the work ethic, receives meagre approval. Direct social engineering to advance equality of outcomes is not endorsed. (Taylor-Gooby, 1989, p. 49)

Taylor-Gooby's more detailed if parochial survey of public opinion in the UK reveals a similar pattern. His evidence suggests that

a general climate of opinion exists among the public that strongly supports services for the elderly, the sick and disabled, education and the NHS, and is antipathetic to benefits for the unemployed, low paid, lone parents and children ... (Taylor-Gooby, 1985, p. 29)

In the favoured areas there is support for increased spending even when the tax consequences are made explicit. Least favoured are those areas of provision to minorities – one-parent benefits, unemployment benefits – from which most taxpayers do not foresee themselves benefiting. Taylor-Gooby reports an ambivalent attitude to public/private provision. Generally, the public is concerned with the nature of the benefits received and their cost. Delivery through the public or private sector is not a pressing concern. Many persist in endorsing both public and private provision, persuading Taylor-Gooby to conclude that the 'sentiments that support privatisation

are real. They coexist with countervailing sentiments of collectivism' (Taylor-Gooby, 1986, p. 244). Furthermore, Coughlin's analysis revealed that in all the nations for which we have data, anti-tax/welfare sentiments are nowhere expressed by clear majorities of national populations, and that continued popular support for improved programs is broadly based' (Coughlin, 1980, p. 151).

Overall, the pattern of popular attitudes to state welfare is complex but stable. There is public hostility to certain areas of state provision, probably some repressed demand masked by state compulsion, hostility to certain categories of beneficiary and some support for private/market provision of welfare services. However, these views are not new and they coexist with widespread popular endorsement of the most expensive and extensive elements of state provision. There is little evidence here of large-scale popular backlash against the welfare state.

The Demise of 'the Welfare State Party'

We have seen that, however doubtful is the *historical* basis of such a claim, the welfare state has come to be strongly identified with socialist and particularly social democratic parties. Another source of evidence of decline in popular support for the welfare state is thus to be found in the decline of these parties of the welfare state. Evidence of such a decline was considered above. It included (1) a series of defeats of social democratic governments in Europe and North America between 1977 and 1982, (2) a long-term decline in left-wing voting after 1960 and (3) a fall of more than a third in socialist participation in government between 1975 and 1982. It is clear that there was a movement (perhaps more properly a counter-movement) against the left in this period. However, obstacles for 'the strange death of social democracy' are surely premature (Kavanagh, 1987, pp. 4–5). Thus, the combined electoral strength of the left in Western Europe, which had stood at 40.1 per cent through the 1970s, advanced to 42.5 per cent in the period 1980–3. In the 1980s, while the right has taken or retained power in the UK, the US and West Germany, the left has retained or been restored to office in Sweden, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece (*Keating's World Events*, 1989). Following the 1989 European Parliament elections, the Socialists formed the single largest group (with 180 members), while the Conservatives were reduced to 34 members, with the Christian Democrats forming the second-largest grouping of 121 MEPs (*Keating's World Events*, 1989, p. 36818). Throughout this period it has tended to be the socialists/social democratic parties which have

Table 5.2 Changing patterns of electoral support for left-wing parties

| | Most recent election (up to 1987) % | Average of previous three elections % | Change % |
|--------------|--|--|-------------|
| Greece | 57.5 | 40.3 | +17.2 |
| New Zealand | 42.6 | 39.7 | +2.9 |
| Spain | 47.9 | 46.1 | +1.8 |
| West Germany | 45.3 | 43.6 | +1.7 |
| Norway | 46.9 | 45.5 | +1.4 |
| Sweden | 50.1 | 48.8 | +1.3 |
| Belgium | 29.4 | 28.5 | +0.9 |
| Netherlands | 35.1 | 35.2 | -0.1 |
| Australia | 46.3 | 47.4 | -1.1 |
| Denmark | 46.6 | 48.5 | -1.9 |
| Switzerland | 23.7 | 26.8 | -3.1 |
| UK | 31.3 | 35.5 | -4.2 |
| Finland | 37.7 | 42.1 | -4.4 |
| France | 42.9 | 49.5 | -6.6 |
| Austria | 43.8 | 50.7 | -6.9 |
| Portugal | 39.4 | 52.0 | -12.0 |

Source: Pulzer (1987) p. 387

gained ground *within* the left everywhere (including the stronghold of the former Communist Party in Italy).⁹

In fact, the experience of the left in the 1980s was a mixed one, as table 5.2 illustrates. On the basis of this evidence, Peter Pulzer insists that there is no reason to presume that we are witnessing 'a long-term and unstoppable decline of parties of the democratic Left' (Pulzer, 1987, p. 388).

Writing of the ascendancy of the Reagan presidency in the US, Kelley insists that there is 'almost no support for the view that the Reagan administration came to power as the result of an increasingly insistent popular demand for the economic and welfare policies Reagan had proposed'. He concludes that 'opposition to New Deal-like policies won some support for Reagan, but it had won support

9 In Italy, the PCI (communists) outvoted the PSI (socialists) by a proportion of less than 2:1 in the 1989 European parliamentary elections, compared with a proportion of 3:1 in the previous European elections of 1984 (Keating's *World Events*, 1989, p. 36876). Indeed, after much soul searching, the PCI decided to reconstitute itself as the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS).

in roughly equal measure for all Republican candidates since 1952' (Kelley, 1988, p. 7). Of course, a revival of the social democratic left might be much less important if these were no longer 'the parties of the welfare state', that is, if the period of right-wing ascendancy had so transformed the political agenda that a *new consensus* had been formed in which the welfare state now had a much reduced place. There is some evidence that certain traditional goals of the left, such as public ownership, may have been downgraded, though as much in response to changes in the international political economy as to the ascendant ideology of the New Right. To assess claims that the welfare state may be similarly displaced, we need to consider the way that the welfare state has itself fared over the past ten to fifteen years.

'The Cuts'

We have already reviewed the general evidence of cuts in welfare state provision since the early 1970s. However, a fuller survey of the evidence reveals that while most states enacted some programme cutbacks, most also introduced new forms of entitlement and in most countries social spending has continued to grow faster than GDP. Alber notes that in 'all countries except Germany ... the social transfer expenditure ratio [was] higher in 1984 than in 1975' (Alber, 1988a, p. 187). Certainly, there has been a major restraint in the levels of *growth* of social expenditure. Between 1960 and 1975, real growth in social expenditure stood at about 8 per cent a year. Between 1975 and 1981, this rate of real growth was halved to just over 4 per cent (OECD, 1984). But only four countries (the US, Canada, the Netherlands and West Germany) saw reduced social expenditure ratios (of a maximum of 1.1 per cent in West Germany), while these ratios continued to increase substantially in seven countries (Sweden, France, Belgium, Austria, Japan, Italy and Finland). While in some countries (West Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Finland, the US) welfare state expansion largely came to a halt after 1985, in others (Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, France, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Austria and Italy) it continued to expand. Reviewing this evidence, Jens Alber concludes:

the welfare state has continued to grow in most Western European countries even throughout the most recent period of austerity. Only in four countries have the expansionary trends come to a visible halt. Nowhere, however, did the expenditure ratios fall below the record levels reached in the early 1970s. This suggests an interpretation of the recent period as a phase of consolidation rather than of welfare state dismantling. (Alber, 1988b, p. 463)

Table 5.3 offers a useful summary of recent Western European evidence on welfare retrenchment and backlash.

Table 5.3 Welfare state curtailments and popular reactions in Western European countries

| Country | Curtailments | Backlash symptoms | Mass attitudes (survey results) |
|---------|--|---|--|
| Sweden | Starting in 1981-2 (bourgeois government); cuts in health, housing, various transfers including pensions; extensions in child allowances and unemployment benefits | 1976 electoral victory of bourgeois parties, 1982 Social Democrats re-elected; polarization between employers' associations and trade unions weakening corporatist consensus on social policy | Declining welfare state support during late 1970s; trend turned in favour of welfare state in 1980s; majority in favour of welfare state schemes |
| Denmark | Starting in 1980 (social democratic government), continued with more severe cuts under bourgeois government; cuts in health, social assistance, unemployment benefits; pensions relatively safeguarded; extensions in various programmes | 1973 rupture of established party system with rise of anti-tax party whose share of the votes halved in subsequent years; 1982 election victory of bourgeois parties, re-elected in subsequent years; declining social policy consensus among major parties | Declining welfare state support in 1973; rising support in subsequent years; in 1984 highest welfare state support since 1969 |
| Finland | Starting in 1977 (social democratic government); cuts in health and various transfers; extensions in some fields mixed with cutbacks in others | Basic pro-welfare state consensus among all major parties | Declining welfare state support between 1975 and 1980, rising support after 1980; majority across all social groups in favour of welfare state |

| | | | |
|--------------|--|--|---|
| Norway | Starting in 1980-1 (social democratic government); continued under conservative government; cuts in health and various transfer schemes; extensions especially for low-income groups | Foundation of anti-tax party in 1970s; 1981 government turnover in favour of bourgeois parties, later re-elected | Sudden decline in welfare state support in 1973 which later disappeared; large, but slightly declining pro-welfare state majorities; percentage in favour of cutbacks in 1980 same as in 1965 |
| UK | Starting in 1980 under conservative government; cuts in housing, education, unemployment benefits and various transfers; segmentation into protected schemes (pensions) and marginal sectors susceptible to curtailments | Government turnover to Conservatives in 1979, later re-elected; increasing ideology in social policy since 1970s | Move in favour of social programmes after 1979; percentage in favour of tax cuts halved between 1979 and 1983 |
| West Germany | Starting in 1975 (social democratic government), continued more severely under conservative governments; cuts in social assistance, unemployment compensation, health and various transfers; pensions relatively safeguarded; minor re-extensions since 1985 | 1982 government turnover to bourgeois parties, later re-elected; no symptoms of an organized backlash | Declining welfare state support from 1978 to 1983; turning of trend in 1984 with growing resistance against further cutbacks; large pro-welfare state majorities across all social groups |

Conclusion

Evidence of crisis in any of the principal senses in which it has been addressed in this chapter is extremely thin. Claims about the destabilization of liberal democracy, the declination of social expenditure and the withdrawal of public support for major welfare programmes have been poorly vindicated. Certainly, since 1975, 'the growth party is over' and growth in the welfare state has been severely (though varying) restrained. However, in contrast to the rather grand generalizations of both New Right and neo-Marxists, Manfred Schmidt may be right to identify 'muddling through' as the generic form of government policy throughout this period (Schmidt, 1983, pp. 14ff). Taylor-Gooby concludes rather bleakly that, far from being transformed, 'The forces that mould the status quo are still alive' (Taylor-Gooby, 1985, p. 142).

However, this does not mean that all is well with the welfare state. First, the reconstruction of the international political economy has definitively altered the circumstances in which welfare states have to operate. Exposing national economies and national corporatist arrangements to an unregulated world economy has transformed the circumstances under which any government might seek, for example, to pursue a policy of full employment. The long-term consequences for the welfare state of this change in the world economy are likely to be profound. Secondly, changes in the economy nationally and internationally may transform the configuration of individuals' interests and the political articulation of those interests. The character of a welfare state cannot be adequately measured by levels of aggregate spending. Long-term high levels of unemployment amidst societies of generally rising affluence, increasingly segmented labour markets and new patterns of consumption may change the disposition of social expenditure. Rising levels of social spending and continuing public endorsement of the popular elements of the welfare state may well be consistent with an internal transformation from a solidary, universalistic, citizenship-based welfare state towards a system based on the more generous provision of insurance-style entitlement and a further deterioration in the position of the poor and stigmatized (Alber, 1988a, pp. 187-9; see also Parry, 1986, pp. 155-240).

Finally, what may remain in the face of all our evidence is an intellectual crisis of the welfare state. That is, the social democratic vision of the welfare state as the mechanism for taming capitalism through redistributive social policy may be losing its authority. Its core elements, the commitment to economic growth, the enabling

Table 5.3 (Cont.)

| Country | Curtailments | Backlash symptoms | Mass attitudes (survey results) |
|---------|---|--|--|
| Italy | Starting in 1978 under national solidarity government with communist support; more severe cuts from 1981 to 1983; cutbacks targeted on health and pensions; several extensions counteracting restrictive measures | Politicization of welfare state issues with group formation against or in favour of social programmes; growing white-collar mobilization against selectively targeted benefits | Slightly declining welfare state support between 1978 and 1982, but still large majorities in favour of existing social programmes |
| Ireland | Starting in 1980; cutbacks targeted on health, unemployment compensation and various services; pensions safeguarded; some minor extensions | Growing resistance after 1979, dying out in 1983; growing party consensus on welfare state issues | (no longitudinal data) |

Source: Alber (1988a) p. 194

capacity of the state bureaucracy and the attempt to exercise indirect control over capital are increasingly under challenge. The 'welfare state malaise' of which Therborn writes, is identified not only by the New Right or neo-Marxist left but also by 'supply-side socialists' and ecologists (Therborn, 1986). On both left and right, the claims of mutualism, voluntarism and self-help are being reassessed. It is to these prognoses for the future of the welfare state that we turn in the final chapter.

6 Beyond the Welfare State?

In this final chapter, I return explicitly to the issue of whether and in what sense we are moving towards social and political arrangements that are 'beyond the welfare state', and particularly to the challenge that such changes pose for traditional social democracy. Some of the most important grounds for anticipating such a transformation in welfare arrangements were contained in propositional form towards the end of the Introduction. Summarily, these suggested that existing welfare state arrangements were unlikely to survive because of (1) the long-term incompatibility of the welfare state with a market economy, (2) changes in the international political economy leading to an erosion of class compromise between organized labour and organized capital, (3) changes in class structure and patterns of consumption leading to an erosion of the alliance for public welfare between middle and working classes, (4) changes in class structure and patterns of consumption leading to an erosion of class solidarity action within the 'broad' working class itself and (5) the incompatibility of a growth-based welfare state with the securing of genuine individual and social well-being. This final chapter is given over to an assessment of these claims in the light of the evidence considered in earlier chapters. We shall see that at least some of the problems raised in the Introduction, and more fully elaborated in the following theoretical chapters, arise from a serious misunderstanding of the nature and history of the international welfare states, but also that a very serious challenge remains, particularly for social democrats.