Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity
Author(s): Allen Carlson
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Autumn, 1981), pp. 15-27
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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ReprintedfromTheJournalof AestheticsandArtCriticism,XXXX/1,Fall 1981.Printedin U.S.A.
ALLEN CARLSON
Nature, Aesthetic Judgment,
And Objectivity
I
CONSIDER THE VIEW that some aesthetic
judgments about nature and natural objects
(e.g., "The Grand Tetons are majestic")
are appropriate, correct, or perhaps
simply true; while others (e.g., "The Grand
Tetons are dumpy") are inappropriate, incorrect,
or perhaps simply false. If one accepts
some such view, one discovers that the
opposition falls into two clearly distinguishable
groups. On the one hand, there are
those who hold that such views are untenable
in regard to aesthetic judgments in
general, whether a judgment be about nature
or about art-whether it be "The Grand
Tetons are majestic" or "Donatello's David
is dumpy." Such objectors often hold some
version of a subjectivist, a relativist, and/or
a noncognitivist view about all so-called
aesthetic judgments. On the other hand,
there are those who reject these latter views
in regard to aesthetic judgments about art,
but have serious reservations about rejecting
them in regardto such judgments about
nature. These objectors readily admit and
often defend the view that, for example,
"Guernica is dynamic" is appropriate, correct,
or true, but find "The Grand Tetons
are majestic" somewhat worrisome-at least
in their theoretical moments, if not in their
actual practice. The remarks of this paper
are addressed to only the latter group of
objectors. To consider the issues raised by
the former group would require not only
a much more substantial paper, but also
one with an essentially different focus.
ALLENCARLSONis associate professor of philosophy
at the University of Alberta.
Although the position of the latter group
is quite common among aestheticians, it can
be properly discussed only by considering
a concrete example. One such example is
found in Kendall L. Walton's important
paper "Categories of Art."1 I select Walton's
position for consideration for two reasons:
First, it presents a persuasive and
well developed account of the truth and
falsity of aesthetic judgments about art,
which account does not directly apply to
aesthetic judgments about nature, and thus
it appears to necessitate a relativist view in
regard to these judgments. Second, the position
is developed in such a way that it
makes possible a clear understandingof why
aestheticians might hold an essentially objectivist
view concerning aesthetic judgments
about art and yet a relativist view
concerning those about nature. My general
point in considering Walton's position is to
demonstrate that a somewhat analogous position
does in fact apply to aesthetic judgments
about nature. If this is the case, then
to the extent that positions of this general
type underwrite the objectivity of aesthetic
judgments about art, the objectivity of aesthetic
judgments about nature is similarly
underwritten.
II
To begin we must have at our disposal
a brief and schematic account of Walton's
position together with his reservations concerning
its applicability to aesthetic judgments
about nature.2 Essentially Walton
holds that the truth value of aesthetic judgments
about a work of art is a function of
two things: first, the (nonaesthetic) percepThis
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CARLSON
tual properties which a work actually has,
and second, the perceived status of such perceptual
properties when a work is perceived
in its correct category or categories of art.
He provides evidence for the psychological
claim that the aesthetic judgments which
seem true or false of a work are a function
of the perceived status of its perceptual
properties given any category in which the
work is perceived; he argues for the philosophical
claim that the aesthetic judgments
which are true or false of a work are a function
of the perceived status of its perceptual
properties given that the work is perceived
in its correct category or categories.3 He
then provides four circumstances which
count toward the correctness of perceiving
a work in a category (see below).
The above sketch is most succinctly elaborated
by means of an example. Consider
"Guernica is awkward." If this aesthetic
judgment is false, it is false as a function of
the perceptual properties of Guernica, i.e.,
its lines, colors, forms. With this few would
disagree. Walton goes further to point out
that Guernica can be perceived in different
(perceptually distinguishable) categories of
art.4 It can be perceived, for example, as
a painting, as an impressionist painting, or
as a cubist painting. With respect to such
categories of art, certain perceptual properties
are what Walton calls standard, contrastandard,
and variable.5 For example, flatness
is standard for all three of the above
mentioned categories, being colored is variable
for all three, but having predominately
cube-like shapes is variable for the first,
contra-standardfor the second, and standard
for the third. The perceived status of perceptual
properties as standard, variable, or
contra-standard is thus a function of the
category in which the work is perceived.6
If Guernica is perceived as a cubist painting,
its cube-like shapes will be perceived
as standard; if it is perceived as an impressionist
painting these same shapes will be
perceived as contra-standard (or possibly as
variable). Walton's psychological claim is
that this perceived status affects which aesthetic
judgments seem true or false to a
perceiver on an occasion. "Guernica is awkward"
may seem a true judgment when the
painting is seen in the category of impressionist
paintings, for its cube-like shapes
will be perceived as contra-standard (or
variable) and thus as counting toward awkwardness.
The same judgment will seem
false, however, when the painting is seen
in the category of cubist paintings, for then
its cube-like shapes will be perceived as
standard and consequently as counting toward
awkwardnessno more than its flatness
as a painting, for example, is perceived as
counting toward its representing flat objects.7
But is "Guernica is awkward" really
true or really false? Walton's philosophical
claim is that this depends on the perceived
status of the perceptual properties when
Guernica is perceived in its correct category.
In this particular case the aesthetic judgment
in question is false because Guernica
is correctly perceived as a cubist painting;
thus the perceived status of its cube-like
shapes does not count toward awkwardness.
The four circumstanceswhich count toward
it being correct to perceive Guernica as a
cubist painting are (i) that it has a relatively
large number of properties standard with
respect to cubism; (ii) that it is a better
painting when perceived as a cubist painting;
(iii) that Picasso intended or expected
it to be perceived as a cubist painting; and
(iv) that the category of cubist paintings
was well established in and recognized by
the society in which Guernica was produced.
Walton argues that generalized versions of
these four circumstances are relevant to determining
the correctcategory within which
to perceive any work of art.8
It follows from Walton's account that in
order to determine the truth value of an
aesthetic judgment such as "Guernica is
awkward," it will not do simply to look at
Guernica, as it will if we wish to determine
the truth value of "Guernica is colored."
Rather, we must perceive Guernica in its
correct category. This requires two kinds of
knowledge: first, the knowledge that certain
factors make cubism its correctcategory and
consequently that cubism is its correct category;
that is, certain factual knowledge
about the history and nature of twentiethcentury
art. And second, the knowledge how
to perceive Guernica as a cubist work; that
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Nature, Aesthetic Judgment and Objectivity
is, certain practical knowledge or skill which
must be acquiredby training and experience
in regard to the category of cubist paintings
and other related categories of art. In short,
simply "examining a work with the senses
can by itself reveal neither how it is correct
to perceive it, nor how to perceive it that
way."9
We are now in a position to consider the
relevance of a Walton-like position to aesthetic
judgments about nature. Walton
holds that his philosophical claim is not
applicable to most such aesthetic judgments,
and that these judgments are perhaps better
understood in terms of what he calls the
category-relative interpretation. On this interpretation
aesthetic judgments such as
"Guernica is awkward" and "Guernica is
not awkward" are not incompatible, for the
first may amount to the judgment that
"Guernica is awkward as an impressionist
painting," and the second to the judgment
that "Guernica is not awkward as a cubist
painting." On such an interpretation judgments
are relativized to any category in
which a person happens to perceive a work.
Walton argues that, in regard to aesthetic
judgments concerning art, this interpretation
is inadequate for it does not allow our
aesthetic judgments to be mistaken often
enough. We say that the judgment "Guernica
is awkward" is simply wrong, false; we
say that the individual making such a judgment
does not appreciate the work because
he perceives it incorrectly. Similarly, we say
that judgments we ourselves made about
works before we appreciated them properly
were simply false or wrong. But the
category-relative interpretation does not allow
for these facts; thus, in order to accommodate
them we must accept that certain
ways of perceiving works of art are correct
and others incorrect. However, although
Walton rejects the category-relative interpretation
of judgments about art, he proposes
it for aesthetic judgments about nature.
He says "I think that aesthetic judgments
are in some contexts amenable to
such category-relative interpretations, especially
aesthetic judgments about natural objects
(clouds, mountains, sunsets) rather
than works of art."10He suggests that we
simply attribute aesthetic properties to natural
objects in a way in which we could, or
would have to, in regard to a work of art
"about whose origins we know absolutely
nothing" and which we are, consequently,
not "in a position to judge . . . aestheti-
cally."
1
III
It should be clear that Walton's account
is a concrete example of one of the positions
mentioned at the beginning of this paper:
Aesthetic judgments about art are true or
false and can be determined as such, but
aesthetic judgments about nature are in
some sense subjective or relative. Walton
has an essentially objectivist account of aesthetic
judgments about art and yet a relativist
account of those about nature. In regard
to the latter, the implicit view is that
such judgments are relative to the way in
which a perceiver happens to perceive a
part of nature or a natural object on a particular
occasion. There seem to be no essentially
corrector incorrectcategories in which
to perceive nature, and thus with nature
one can only attribute to it certain aesthetic
properties rather than judge which aesthetic
properties it has. With nature it appears
to be a matter of aesthetically appreciating
whatever one can and as much as one can,
but not a matter of getting it aesthetically
right or wrong, not a matter of making true
or false aesthetic judgments.
This position has an initial implausibility
which leads one to ask why Walton and
other aestheticians accept it. Its implausibility
can be seen by noting that not only
do many aesthetic judgments about nature
strike us as clearly true (e.g., "The Grand
Tetons are majestic") or clearly false (e.g.,
"The Grand Tetons are dumpy"), but also
that many of such judgments seem to be
paradigmatic aesthetic judgments-ones in
virtue of which we initially grasp aesthetic
concepts (e.g., graceful gazelle, majestic
mountain, sublime sunset). In light of these
considerations a position which bifurcates
the classof aesthetic judgments and suggests
an essentially different and weaker philosophical
account of those about nature than
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CARLSON
of those about art seems counterintuitive.
If such an account is inadequate, it might
be suggested that this inadequacy is due to
the fact that aestheticians have in recent
years paid relatively little attention to the
aesthetics of nature.12However, although it
is perhaps true that philosophers hold less
adequate views in regard to that to which
they give less attention, this cannot be the
complete explanation for a position such
as that sketched above. There are more important
reasons which can be made explicit
by further considering our example.
As we saw above Walton provides four
circumstances which count toward it being
correct to perceive a work in a given category
of art. Circumstances (iii) and (iv) are
respectively that the artist who produced
the work intended or expected it to be perceived
in a certain category or thought of
it as being in that category, and that the
category in question is well established in
and recognized by the society in which the
work is produced. These circumstancescannot
count toward it being correct to perceive
parts of nature or natural objects in
certain categories, for nature is not produced
by artists who intend or expect it to
be perceived in certain ways and it is not
produced within certain societies. Consequently
an important aspect of Walton's
philosophical account is, as Walton says,
"not readily applicable to most judgments
about natural objects."13 Essentially, this is
because works of art are produced by artists
within societies and nature is not. Moreover,
not only are works of art the products
of societies, but in a similar way so are the
categories of art themselves. Consequently,
not only do the circumstancesfor a category
being correct not readily apply to nature,
but the categories themselves do not apply.
In short, nature does not fit into categories
of art.
These remarksallow us to see more clearly
the basic reason why some aestheticians
hold an essentially objectivist view concerning
aesthetic judgments about art and a
relativist view concerning those about nature.
In short, it is because the objectivity
of the former class of aesthetic judgments
is based on a certain kind of account of the
nature of aesthetic appreciation, aesthetic
qualities, and/or aesthetic objects. The relevant
accounts are in some sense societal,
institutional, or more generally, cultural.'4
Walton's circumstances (iii) and (iv) make
reference to certain cultural facts and his
categories are themselves culturally established
and maintained. It is the difficulty
of bringing aesthetic judgments about nature
into the general framework of these
cultural accounts which leads aestheticians
to abandon such judgments to relativism.15
Once it is clear that cultural accounts of
the aesthetic are the basic reason for a bifurcated
view of aesthetic judgments, we
might be tempted to remedy the situation
by rejecting such accounts. However, although
there are philosophical problems
with these accounts, I think this temptation
should be resisted.16 Cultural accounts of
the aesthetic are simply more promising
than other alternatives. Consequently, in
regard to the aesthetics of nature, the interesting
issue is the extent to which we can
develop an analogous account which applies
to aesthetic judgments about nature. In order
to pursue this issue we must consider
carefully the important differences between
art and nature which cultural accounts of
the aesthetic force to our attention. I have
brieflyindicated these differencesin this section,
but they need to be further discussed
if we are to move toward a unified account
of aesthetic judgments. I return to them
shortly. Initially, however, it will be fruitful
to see exactly how much of a cultural account
roughly of the kind outlined by Walton
does directly apply to nature and how
well it applies. This will allow us to see
more clearly exactly what and how much
needs to be said about these differences in
order to achieve a unified account.
IV
Walton's position embodies not only a
philosophical claim but also a psychological
claim. The latter is the claim that the aesthetic
judgments which seem true or false
of a work are a function of the perceptual
status of its perceptual properties given any
category in which the work is perceived. I
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Nature, Aesthetic Judgment and Objectivity
think that a similar psychological claim can
be demonstrated to hold for aesthetic judgments
about nature. In fact Walton presents
one case which suggests that this is so.
A small elephant, one which is smaller than most
elephants with which we are familiar, might impress
us as charming, cute, delicate, or puny. This
is not simply because of its (absolute) size, but
because it is small for an elephant. To people
who are familiar not with our elephants but with
a race of mini-elephants, the same animal may
look massive, strong, dominant, threatening, lumbering,
if it is large for a mini-elephant. The size
of elephants is variable relative to the class of
elephants, but it varies only within a certain (not
precisely specifiable) range. It is a standard property
of elephants that they do fall within this
range. How an elephant's size affects us aesthetically
depends, since we see it as an elephant, on
whether it falls in the upper, middle or lower
part of the range.17
This case illustrates the application of the
psychological claim to natural objects and
provides an example of a relevant category
with properties standard, variable, and
contra-standard in respect to that category.
The category is that of elephants, a perceptually
distinguishable category in which we
do perceive certain natural objects-under
most conditions, elephants. With respect to
this category, size is a variable property
while the limits of range on size is a standard
property. Thus the small elephant's size
is variable in this example. However, were
the elephant small enough to fall outside
the limits set by the standard property-for
example, the size of a large mouse-its size
would be contra-standard. In such a case,
if we could still perceive it in the category
of elephants, other aesthetic judgments
would seem true. In addition to (or as opposed
to) appearing delicate, it might appear
frail or fragile. And it would certainly
strike us as being surprising or disconcerting-aesthetic
properties related to certain
contra-standardperceptual properties. The
point illustrated by this case generally holds
true for similar cases. Consider, for example,
the aesthetic judgments we take to be
true of Shetland ponies (charming, cute)
and Clydesdale horses (majestic, lumbering).
These judgments are made with respect to
the category of horses. Similarly a foal (calf,
fawn, etc.) typically strikes us as delicate
and nimble when seen in the category of
horses (cattle, deer, etc.), but a particularly
husky one may strike us as lumbering or
perhaps awkward if seen in the category of
foals (calves, fawns, etc.).
In the above example, particular natural
kinds (elephants, horses) constitute categories
which function psychologically as do
categories of art; and our aesthetic appreciation
is directed toward a natural object.
We also need, however, to consider the application
of the psychological claim to a
somewhat different kind of example-the
aesthetic appreciation of landscapes or of
natural environments. In discussing the enriching
of aesthetic appreciation, Hepburn
describes the following cases:
Supposing I am walking over a wide expanse of
sand and mud. The quality of the scene is perhaps
that of wild, glad emptiness. But suppose
that I bring to bear upon the scene my knowledge
that this is a tidal basin, the tide being out. I see
myself now as virtually walking on what is for
half the day sea-bed. The wild, glad emptiness
may be tempered by a disturbing weirdness.l8
This case may be elaborated as follows:
Note that what is described is a change in
which aesthetic judgments seem true of the
"wide expanse of sand and mud," and this
change is a function of perceiving the expanse
in different ways. Initially it is apparently
perceived as a beach, but then due
to the realization that it is half the day
under the sea, it is perceived as a sea-bed.
Here beach and sea-bed-along the tidal
basin-function as categories.19These categories
are perceptually distinguishable in
terms of their perceptual properties, and we
can and do perceive things such as a "wide
expanse of sand and mud" as in or as belonging
to them. Moreover, such perceiving
is not a matter of inferring, but rather a
matter of simply seeing the expanse in the
relevant categoriesgiven our experience and
knowledge. It is a matter of perceiving a
number of perceptual properties characteristic
of (standard for) these categories combined
into a single gestalt (see footnote
number 6).
Once we recognize beach and sea-bed as
categories, the aesthetic judgments which
Hepburn mentions can be accounted for in
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CARLSON
terms of properties standard, variable, and
contra-standardin respect to such categories.
Perceiving the expanse in the category of
sea-beds (as opposed to beaches) results in
its appearing to possess a "disturbing weirdness."
The property of being relatively dry
(or above water) and thus such that it can
be walked upon is a property standard with
respect to beaches and contra-standardwith
respect to sea-beds. Dryness is among those
properties in virtue of which such an expanse
belongs to the categoryof beaches and
which tends to disqualify it from belonging
to the category of sea-beds (see footnote
number 5). Thus perceiving the expanse in
the category of sea-beds results in its dryness
(and the walking upon it) being perceived
as contra-standard. Contra-standard
properties are ones we tend to find "shocking,
disconcerting, startling, or upsetting,"
and thus results the "disturbing weirdness."
The weirdness is the result not simply of
the realization that one is walking on a tidal
basin, but of the experience of walking
where it is, as it were, contra-standard to
walk, that is, in perceiving the wide expanse
as a sea-bed and perceiving oneself as walking
upon that sea-bed.
Similarly, in regard to properties standard,
variable, and contra-standardin respect
to beaches we might explain the initial aesthetic
judgment involving "wild, glad emptiness."
As in the case of the size of elephants,
the width and expansiveness of, in
this case, a beach is a variable property and
the limits on the range of width and expansiveness
a standard property with respect
to this category. Thus if the sand and mud
is, as suggested by the quote, quite wide
and expansive, that is, in the upper part of
the range, the resultant aesthetic impression
will be of a "wild, glad emptiness." On the
other hand, had the expanse of sand and
mud been in the lower part of the range,
the beach may have appeared warm and
cozy or perhaps cramped and confining. Of
course, the actual aesthetic judgments which
seem true will be a function not only of
these variable and standard properties of
beaches, but also of many others and, of
course, of our other experiences with this
category and the properties standard, variable,
and contra-standardwith respect to it.
Other examples similar to the above
could be provided. In fact I think reference
to the kind of categories in which we perceive
natural objects and landscapes and the
properties standard, variable, and contrastandard
with respect to such categories
helps to explain which aesthetic judgments
seem to be true or false in regard to much
of nature-whether it be completely natural
or modified by man. Reflection on our
judgments about mountains, sunsets, and
waving fields of grain appears to bear this
out.20 However, rather than pursue further
examples which support this psychological
claim, I wish to turn to the more important
question of the correctness of such judgments.
In short, given the truth of the psychological
claim, I wish to ask whether we
should, with Walton and others, opt for
the category-relative interpretation of our
aesthetic judgments about nature; or alternatively
whether there are persuasive arguments
for considering certain categories of
nature to be correct and others incorrect,
as is the case in regard to categories of art.
Given the implausibility of a bifurcated account
of aesthetic judgments, I assume that
the existence of such arguments constitutes
adequate reason for rejecting the categoryrelative
interpretation.
V
In the remainder of this paper I sketch
some arguments which give grounds for
holding that certain categories of nature are
correct and others not. Initially, however,
we should note that there is one obvious
way in which certain of such categories are
correct and others not. It appears, for example,
that the category of elephants and
not that of mice is the correct category for
perceiving an elephant, regardless of its
size. Similarly, to perceive an elephant as
a mountain, as a sunset, or as a waving field
of grain are clear cases of getting the incorrect
category-if such perceivings are even
possible. These are easy cases, for in such
cases the number of perceptual properties
standardwith respect to the correctcategory
are relatively large in number-even a very
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Nature, Aesthetic Judgment and Objectivity
small (or very large) elephant has considerably
more perceptual properties standard
with respect to the category of elephants
than with respect to the category of mice
(or mountains). In short, in such cases the
correct category is determined by something
like Walton's first circumstance for it being
correct to perceive a work of art in a given
category-and determined by that alone.
The more difficult kind of case is that in
which the perceptual properties of a natural
object or a part of nature do not by
themselves clearly indicate a correct category.
Such a case is posed when, given the
perceptual properties, it is yet plausible to
perceive an object in two or more mutually
exclusive categories. Very simple examples
are perceiving a sea-anemone as a plant or
as an animal, or perceiving a whale as a
fish or as a mammal. Yet, even with these
examples it may be argued that perceptual
properties are adequate to determine correctness
of category-depending, of course,
on what properties count as perceptual.
In order to consider the first argument,
however, it is not necessary to debate the
difficult issue of what counts as a perceptual
property. Rather it is more fruitful to simply
assume that in such cases perceptual
properties are not adequate to determine
correctnessof category. Consequently, let us
assume, for example, that in regard to perceptual
properties alone it is plausible to
perceive a whale either in the category of
fish or in the category of mammals. This
makes plausible the claim that in regard
to aesthetic judgments about whales, there
is no correct category, and that we must
therefore accept the category-relative interpretation
of such judgments. We can see
why anyone with a Walton-like position
might be moved to this view: Given our
assumption, Walton's circumstance (i) does
not determine a correct category, and as
already suggested circumstances (iii) and
(iv) cannot determine a correct category.21
Whales are not produced by artists who
intend them to be perceived in certain categories
and are not produced within societies.
Whales do not fit into categories of
art. However, from these truisms, Walton
and others apparently move to the view that
in regard to nature we are completely without
resourcesfor determining a correct category.
As we have seen, Walton compares
making aesthetic judgments about nature
with making aesthetic judgments about a
work of art "about whose origins we know
absolutely nothing."22
It is this move and the resulting conclusion
which the first argument calls into
question. To see how this occurs we must
note first that although whales and nature
in general do not fit into categories of art,
they yet do fit into a number of common
sense and/or "scientific" kind groups. A
whale can be perceived as a fish or as a
mammal; as a whale or as, for example,
a large porpoise; as a blue whale or as a
humpbacked whale. Hepburn's expanse of
sand and mud can be perceived as a beach,
as a tidal basin, or as a sea-bed. That nature
in general can be and is perceived in such
biological and geological categories and that
such categories psychologically function in
a way similar to categories of art, is what
has already been established by the above
discussion of the application of the psychological
claim to aesthetic judgments about
nature. Once this is granted, we must next
observe that although nature is not produced
by artists who intend it to be perceived
in certain categories and is not produced
within certain societies, it does not
follow that we know nothing about it or
more particularly that we do not know
which categories are correct for it. Works of
art are produced within societies within
which categories are recognized and by artists
who intend these to be correct categories;
it follows that certain categories are
correct for a given work and that we can
know which ones are correct. But what must
be recognized is that human production is
not the only key to correctnessof category.
In general we do not produce, but rather
discover, natural objects and aspects of nature.
Why should we therefore not discover
the correct categories for their perception?
We discover whales and later discover that,
in spite of somewhat misleading perceptual
properties, they are in fact mammals and
not fish.23It is plausible to claim that we
have discovered the correct category in
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CARLSON
which to perceive whales. In the first place,
that whales are not of our production does
not count against this category being correct.
In the second, it fits our intuitions in
regard to correct categorization or classification
of whales if this issue is considered
independent of aesthetic issues. And in the
third place, this correctness of category can
function philosophically in regard to aesthetic
judgments about nature as the correctness
of categories of art functions in regard
to aesthetic judgments about art works.
The only significant difference is that in
regard to the latter the grounds for correctness
are the activities of artists and art critics,
while in regard to the former, they are
the activities of naturalists and scientists in
the broadest sense. But given the differences
between art and nature, this is only to be
expected.
The above line of thought takes us only
so far in undercutting the plausibility of
the category-relative interpretation of aesthetic
judgments about nature. One might
say that it at best shifts the burden of proof
to those who defend such an interpretation.
Moreover, it is based on the (at best unclear)
assumption that in a case such as that
of whales perceptual properties themselves
do not determine the correct category. Consequently
we must consider some further
arguments which do more than shift the
burden of proof and which do not depend
upon this assumption. To find a realistic
case in which perceptual properties are neutral
in regard to correctnessof category it is
useful to envisage a situation where man
is involved. We, or landscapers, sometimes
construct (or reconstruct) landscapes which
are perceptually indistinguishable from natural
landscapes. Consider a scenic coastline
which appears to be natural, but in fact has
been created by man. Imagine that it has
been carefully planned and designed to be
perceptually indistinguishable from a natural
coastline, but its construction involved
the removal of buildings and parking lots,
the redistribution of great quantities of
sand and soil, and the landscaping of the
whole area to blend with its surroundings.24
It is in fact a large scale artifact, but can,
and probably would, be perceived in the
category of apparent (see footnote number
19) natural coastlines. In such a case perceptual
properties alone clearly do not determine
whether it is correct to perceive the
landscape as natural coastline or as artifact,
yet the question of which is the correct
category can be raised. It is essentially the
question of whether it is correct to perceive
the object as what it is (an artifact) or as
what it appears to be (a natural coastline).
It is this form of the question to which I
wish to address two additional lines of
thought to the effect that certain categories
in which we perceive nature are correct and
others not. The general direction of these
arguments is that it is correct to perceive
an object in the category of what it is (as
opposed to what it appears to be) even in
difficult cases where its perceptual properties
do not themselves count toward one or
the other categories being correct (or, if anything,
suggest that the category of what it
appears to be is correct).
The first of these two additional arguments
can be made clear by imagining another
coastline. This is a coastline which
is perceptually indistinguishable from the
above described coastline, but is natural
rather than man-made. We can assume it
is the coastline which served as the model
for the man-made one. Since the two coastlines
(call them N for natural and M for
man-made) are perceptually indistinguishable,
there is one level at which our aesthetic
appreciation of the two will be identical.
This is the level at which we appreciate
only perceptual propertiessuch as the curves,
lines, colors, shapes, and patterns of N and
M. I tend to think such aesthetic appreciation
of nature is somewhat problematic.25
However, whether it is or not, there is certainly
another level at which aesthetic appreciation
occurs.26At this level we appreciate
not simply, for example, the identical
patterns of N and M, but such patterns
under certain descriptions. For example,
the pattern of M can be described as indicating
careful design, as an exact copy of
the pattern of N, or as the product of man's
ingenuity; while the pattern of N can be
described as typical of, say, North American
Pacific coastlines, as indicating a high tide
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Nature, Aesthetic Judgment and Objectiv,ity
coastal formation, or as the product of the
erosion of the sea. It is clear that aesthetic
appreciation of perceptual properties under
such descriptions constitutes an important
part of aesthetic appreciation of nature.27
It essentially involves the contemplation of
perceptual properties in light of such descriptions
and the appreciation of them as
something in virtue of which such descriptions
are true.
Given the aesthetic relevance of these
kinds of descriptions, it must be recognized
that the above descriptions of the patterns
of N and M are such that those which are
true of N's pattern are not true of M's and
vice-versa. In fact for any such N and M
there are an infinite number of descriptions
which are true of N and not of M and
vice-versa. That any of such descriptions
are aesthetically relevant in the way suggested
above is all that need be the case in
order to establish the importance of perceiving
an object in the category of what
it is as opposed to what it appears to be.
This can be seen by noting that if we, for
example, perceive M in the category of natural
coastlines (what it appears to be) we
become involved in one or both of the following:
(i) failure to appreciate it under
descriptions which are true of it such as its
being carefully designed by man; (ii) appreciation
of it under descriptions which are
false of it such as its being the result of the
sea's erosion. The first alternative is undesirable
as it constitutes a case of aesthetic
omission. It is possible to contemplate M
in light of the description "being carefully
designed by man" and moreover to appreciate
it as something in virtue of which this
is true, but these possibilities are not likely
to be achieved if M is perceived (only) in
the category of natural coastlines. The opportunity
for such contemplation and appreciation
is not provided by perceiving M
in this category. The second alternative is
undesirable as it constitutes a case of aesthetic
deception. Perceiving M in the category
of natural coastlines, of course, provides
:he possibility of contemplating M in
light of the description "being the result
of the sea's erosion," but this is a tenuous
and misleading contemplation. It is tenuous
in that it is always in danger of being destroyed
by the knowledge of M's true reality
and it is misleading in that it directs our
contemplation away from this reality. Moreover,
if we appreciate M as something in
virtue of which this description is true, we
are simply mistaken; our appreciation involves
a false belief. On the other hand, if
we perceive M in the category of artifact
or perceive N in the category of natural
coastlines-the categories of what each in
fact is-then aesthetic omissions and aesthetic
deceptions of the kind described
above need not occur.
There are two things to observeabout the
preceding argument. The first and most important
is that it provides grounds for construing
the category of what something is
as the correct category and the category of
what something only appears to be as an
incorrect category. The grounds are essentially
that doing so avoids both aesthetic
omissions and aesthetic deceptions. Consequently,
we have reason to hold that even
in cases where perceptual properties do not
by themselves determine correct and incorrect
categories, there are yet grounds for
this determination and, therefore, grounds
for rejecting the category-relative interpretation
of our aesthetic judgments about nature.
The second is that this conclusion depends
neither upon the example involving
very broad categories (natural coastline versus
artifact or man-made coastline) nor
upon it involving one "non-natural" category.
As suggested earlier, these features of
the example are due to the desire for a realistic
case in which perceptual properties
themselves cannot be construed as determining
the correctness of one or the other
category. In this regard it is important to
note that this same line of argument applies
to, for example, our earlier case involving
the categories of beach, sea-bed, and
tidal basin. Different aesthetically relevant
descriptions are true of the wide expanse
of sand and mud depending upon whether
it is in fact a beach, a sea-bed, or a tidal
basin. And only perceiving the expanse in
the category of what it is will avoid various
aesthetic omissions and deceptions. Consequently
in such cases we similarly have
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CARLSON
grounds for the determination of the correct
category and for rejecting the categoryrelative
interpretation of aesthetic judg-
ments.
The second line of thought for construing
the category of what a natural object is as
the correct category and what it only appears
to be as an incorrect category is in
part an ethical argument. It is essentially
the contention that this is the best way to
keep our aesthetics and our ethics in harmony.
Consider the aesthetic appreciation
of a Playboy centerfold model.28 Whether
or not this is considered aesthetic appreciation
of nature, there is a common line of
argument in regard to such aesthetic appreciation.
It is argued that this is to aesthetically
appreciate the model not as what she
is (in the category of human beings), but
only as what she here appears to be or is
presented as being (in the category of sex
objects). And, the argument continues, this
is ethically suspect for to engage in such
aesthetic appreciation is to endorse and promote
(in ourselves, if no where else) a sexist
attitude toward woman. I think this kind
of argument has merit for the following
reason: It is clear that we do not aesthetically
appreciate simply with our five senses,
but rather with an important part of our
whole emotional and psychological selves.
Consequently, what and how we aesthetically
appreciate cannot but play a role in
the shaping of our emotional and psychological
being. This in turn helps to determine
what we think and do, and think it
correctfor ourselves and others to think and
do. In short, our aesthetic appreciation is
a significant factor in shaping and forming
our ethical views.
If this argument has merit, it is especially
pertinent to the aesthetic appreciation of
nature. If our aesthetic appreciation of nature
helps to determine our ethical views
concerning nature, then our aesthetic appreciation
of nature should be of nature as it
in fact is rather than as what it may appear
to be. By aesthetically appreciating nature
for what it is, we will shape our ethical
views such that there is the best opportunity
for making sound ethical judgments in regard
to matters of environmental and ecological
concern. Consider again the manmade
coastline. What if we discover that it
causes environmental and ethical problems?
Perhaps it greatly decreases the possibility
of successful upstream migration by spawning
salmon, or perhaps it causes an undercurrent
which is exceedingly dangerous to
swimmers. If we perceive the coastline in
the category of natural coastlines (and are
entrenched in doing so), a sound ethical
view might involve noting that fish and
men have in such cases long accepted and
met the challenges of nature. Consequently
perhaps we rightly conclude that we should
let nature take its course and swimmers take
their chances. On the other hand if we perceive
the coastline in the category of artifact
or man-madecoastline, a sound ethical view
might involve regarding our environmental
and ethical responsibilities quite differently.
Perhaps we, ethically and ecologically,
should construct a fish ladder up the coast
(as has been done to allow salmon migration
around hydroelectric dams), and perhaps
we, ethically, should forbid swimmers
to use the area. An actual case of the kind
indicated here might be the way in which
ethical views about whales apparently alter
as a function of perceiving them as mammals
rather than as fish. At the very least it
appears that some of the arguments advancd
for preserving whales presuppose
perceiving them as mammals and aesthetically
appreciating them as such. Strictly
analogous arguments could not be advanced
for preserving, for example, sharks (although
different arguments could be).
The above line of argument does not by
itself clearly establish that there are correct
and incorrectcategoriesin which to perceive
parts of nature or natural objects nor does
it clearly establish that the correctcategories
are the categories of what things in fact are.
However, it does, I think, establish that
there is ethical merit in regarding certain
categories as correct and others as incorrect,
and in regarding as correct the categories of
what things in fact are, or, as we described
them earlier, the common sense and/or
"scientific"categories which are determined
by the naturalist and the natural scientist.
Consequently, if this argument together
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Nature, Aesthetic Judgment and Objectivity
with the others offered above give adequate
grounds for claiming truth and falsity for
our aesthetic judgments of nature (rather
than accepting the category-relative interpretation),
then these arguments help to
establish a position which has additional
merit. This is the merit of bringing the
interests and points of view of aesthetics,
ethics, and natural science together such
that they reinforce one another, rather than
stand in opposition as they so often appear
to do.
VI
I conclude these remarks by further emphasizing
one consequence of the position
which I have attempted to establish. The
consequence can be brought out by noting
that the position remains within the general
confines of a cultural account of the aesthetic.
There is a difference of emphasis,
of course. When the aesthetic appreciation
of art is considered in light of a cultural
account, the relevant part of our culture is
that embodied in and revealed by art history
and art criticism; while when aesthetic appreciation
of nature is so considered, the
relevant part of our culture is natural history
and natural science. Nonetheless, in the
manner in which a cultural account of the
aesthetic requires knowledge of art history
and art criticism to play an essential role
in our aesthetic judgments about art, likewise
a cultural account requires knowledge
of natural history and natural science to
play the same essential role in our aesthetic
judgments about nature. We can, of course,
approach nature as we sometimes approach
art, that is, we can simply enjoy its forms
and colors or enjoy perceiving it however
we may happen to. But if our appreciation
is to be at a deeper level, if we are to make
aesthetic judgments which are likely to be
true and to be able to determine whether
or not they are true; then we must know
something about that which we appreciate.
We must know that certain factors make
aspects of nature and natural objects belong
to certain categories and that they are therefore
correctly perceived in these categories.
And we must know how to perceive those
aspectsof nature and natural objects in the
categories in question.29 This means that
for significant aesthetic appreciation of nature,
something like the knowledge and experience
of the naturalist is essential. It is
not surprising that individuals such as Muir,
Ruskin, Audubon, and Leopold who demonstrated
an acute aesthetic appreciation of
nature in their paintings and writings were
not only appreciators of nature but also
accomplished naturalists.
1Kendall L. Walton, "Categories of Art," Philosophical
Review (1970) 334-67. Also reprinted in J.
Margolis, (ed.), Philosophy Looks at the Arts, Revised
Edition (Temple University Press, 1978) pp.
88-114. All page references are to the original pub-
lication.
2The following necessarily brief sketch of Walton's
position fails to capture its detail and subtlety.
Footnotes 4-7 are designed to supplement the sketch
to some extent.
3 Walton puts his psychological and his philosophical
claims in terms of what aesthetic properties a
work seems to have or has, as opposed to in terms
of what aesthetic judgements appear to be or are
true or false of it. I prefer the latter and nothing,
I believe, turns on this way of putting his position.
4"Such categories include media, genre, styles,
forms, and so forth-for example, the categories of
paintings, cubist paintings, Gothic architecture, classical
sonatas, paintings in the style of C6zanne, and
music in the style of late Beethoven-if they are interpreted
in such a way that membership is determined
solely by features that can be perceived in a
work when it is experienced in the normal manner."
Op. cit., pp. 338-39. The latter condition is what
makes a category of art "perceptually distinguish-
able."
5"A feature of a work of art is standard with
respect to a (perceptually distinguishable) category
just in case it is among those in virtue of which
works in that category belong to that category-that
is, just in case the lack of that feature would disqualify,
or tend to disqualify, a work from that category.
A feature is variable with respect to a category
just in case it has nothing to do with works belonging
to that category; the possession or lack of
the feature is irrelevant to whether a work qualifies
for the category. Finally, a contra-standard feature
with respect to a category is the absence of a standard
feature with respect to that category-that is, a
feature whose presence tends to disqualify works as
members of the category." Ibid. p. 339.
6"To perceive a work in a certain category is to
perceive the 'Gestalt' of that category in the work.
This needs some explanation. People familiar with
Brahmsian music-that is, music in the style of
Brahms (notably, works of Johannes Brahms)-or
impressionist paintings can frequently recognize
members of these categories by recognizing the
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CARLSON
Brahmsian or impressionist Gestalt qualities. Such
recognition is dependent on perception of particular
features that are standard relative to these categories,
but it is not a matter of inferring from the
presence of such features that a work is Brahmsian
or impressionist." Ibid., p. 340. As is evident in the
above and in footnote number 4, Walton uses "perceive"
in a rather broad sense. I follow his usage
throughout this paper.
7In general Walton's view is that properties perceived
as standard are aesthetically inert or "contribute
to a work's sense of order, inevitability, stability,
correctness"; properties perceived as variable
contribute to a work its representational, symbolic,
and expressive nature; and properties perceived as
contra-standard contribute to a work a shocking,
disconcerting, startling, or upsetting nature. Ibid.,
see pp. 343-54.
8 Ibid., see pp. 357-63.
Ibid., p. 367.
10Ibid., p. 355.
1 Ibid., p. 365, my italics.
12This has been noted in different ways by a
number of writers. See, for example, Ronald W.
Hepburn, "Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature" in H.
Osborne, (ed.), Aesthetics in the Modern World,
(London, 1968) pp. 49-66; Mary Carman Rose,
"Nature as an Aesthetic Concept," British Journal
of Aesthetics (1976) 3-12; Michael Hancher, "Poems
Versus Trees: The Aesthetics of Monroe Beardsley,"
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1972) 181-
91. However, that lack of attention is not the complete
explanation for views such as that under discussion
here can be seen from the fact that such
views are more or less implicit in the writings of
aestheticians who have carefully attended to the
aesthetics of nature. For example, this is evident in
certain parts of the above mentioned article by
Hepburn and in Donald Crawford's "Art and the
Aesthetics of Nature." The latter paper was presented
at the meeting of the Pacific Division of the
American Society for Aesthetics at Asilomar, April
1980. Certain ideas in the present paper were initially
developed as comments on Crawford's paper.
I wish to thank Crawford and other participants at
the Asilomar meeting for valuable discussion of
those ideas.
13Op. cit., p. 355.
14It should be clear that the position in regard
to the aesthetics of nature which I here exemplify
by means of Walton's article can also be seen as a
natural consequence of George Dickie's institutional
analysis of aesthetic objects (not art). See Art and
the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Cornell
University Press, 1974) Chapters 7 and 8, especially
p. 169 and pp. 198-200. I do not consider Dickie's
analysis as he does not explicitly endorse a relativist
position in regard to aesthetic judgments about
nature. He does however make certain remarks
which suggest it. For example: "Where natural visual
aesthetic objects are concerned, we can be content
to appreciate whatever happens to 'fall together'
into a visual design" (p. 169). In spite of such comments,
it is nonetheless clear from the concluding
paragraphs of the book that Dickie wishes to leave
open the question of the status of the aesthetic appreciation
of nature. The view which I elaborate in
this paper constitutes a partial response to some of
the issues raised in those paragraphs.
15
One means by which aesthetic judgments about
nature can be brought under cultural accounts of
the aesthetic is in virtue of the practice of perceiving
nature as if it fit into certain kinds of artistic
categories. There is, for example, a tradition of
perceiving landscapes as if they fit into various landscape
painting categories. Paradoxically, however,
such perceiving of landscapes seemingly lends support
to a category-relative interpretation of aesthetic
judgments of nature, for it is difficult to
justify the claim that any such artistic categories
are correct for nature, rather than simply imposed
upon nature. I think imposing such categories upon
nature poses certain difficulties which I cannot
elaborate here, but have touched upon in "Appreciation
and the Natural Environment," Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1979) 267-75.
16There is, of course, no lack of philosophical
problems with cultural accounts of the aesthetic.
These problems are illuminated in a general way
by comparison with attempts to analyse the aesthetic
in noncultural, purely perceptual terms. See,
for example, Monroe Beardsley's analysis in Aesthetics,
Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism
(New York, 1958) and in later articles such as "The
Aesthetic Point of View," Metaphilosophy (1970),
39-58; or Frank Sibley's in "Aesthetic Concepts,"
The Philosophical Review (1959), 421-50 and "Aesthetic
and Non-Aesthetic," The Philosophical Review
(1965), 135-59. Some of the particular problems
inherent in Dickie's institutional analysis of
aesthetic objects are brought out in the following:
Gary Iseminger, "Appreciation, the Artworld, and
the Aesthetic" in L. Aagaard-Mogensen, (ed.), Culture
and Art (Atlantic Highlands, 1976), pp. 118-30;
Robert McGregor, "Dickie's Institutionalized Aesthetic,"
British Journal of Aesthetics (1977), 3-13;
Michael Mitias, "The Institutional Theory of the
Aesthetic Object," The Personalist (1977), 147-55. In
regard to Walton's account in particular additional
objections have been raised concerning a number of
standard issues which are involved in his position:
For example, the intentionalism to which his view
gives renewed life and the analysis of representation
which his view yields. In regard to the former, see
Daniel Nathan, "Categories and Intentions," Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1973), 539-41 and
Kendall L. Walton, "Categories and Intentions: A
Reply," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
(1973), 267-68. Walton's initial analysis of representation
is modified and expanded in Kendall L.
Walton, "Pictures and Make-Believe," The Philosophical
Review (1973), 283-319. The general line of
analysis is usefully remarked upon in Joseph Margolis,
Art and Philosophy: Conceptual Issues in Aesthetics
(Atlantic Highlands, 1980),pp. 100-03. Perhaps
as worrisome as any of these lines of objection, however,
are the number and kind of case which seemingly
must remain undecided on Walton's account.
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Nature, Aesthetic Judgment and Objectivity
He notes cases of undecidability in regard to the
correctness of two different ways of perceiving works
(op. cit., p. 362) and in regard to different aesthetic
judgments resulting from different but equally correct
ways of perceiving works (ibid., note 24, p. 363).
I find most problematic those cases of undecidability
involving different aesthetic judgments by individuals
each of whom perceive the work in the same
category.
The extent to which these and related problems
give grounds for rejecting cultural accounts of the
aesthetic in general or in any particular case is by
no means clear. Nor is it clear to me the extent to
which these problems infect the account of aesthetic
judgments about nature which I develop in the remainder
of this paper. Some problems, such as those
involving representation, clearly do not; others such
as those involving undecidable cases, seemingly do.
I cannot, however, pursue these issues here.
17 p. cit., pp. 350-51. Walton, I suspect, would
agree that the psychological claim applies to the
aesthetic appreciation of nature. This is not only
evidenced by his use of the elephant example, but
also by his remark to the effect that what the claim
purports "is obviously not an isolated or exceptional
phenomenon, but a pervasive characteristic of aesthetic
perception" (p. 354).18
Op. cit., p. 55.
1 In discussing the psychological claim, the categories
involved are, strictly speaking, the categories
of, for example, apparent beaches, apparent seabeds,
or apparent elephants, that is, the categories
of things which because of their perceptual properties
look like beaches, sea-beds, or elephants. See
Walton, op. cit., p. 339. Constant repetition of "apparent"
is not necessary as long as it is clear that the
categories involved are perceptually distinguishable,
see footnote number 4, above.
0Mountains seem a particularly good case in
point for testing the psychological claim. See Marjorie
Hope Nicolson's classic work Mountain Gloom
and Mountain Glory, (Cornell University Press, 1959).21I have not mentioned Walton's circumstances
(ii), for I think it directly relevant in the case of
neither art nor nature. This is because it seems not
to be a circumstance constitutive of correctness as
are circumstances (i), (iii), and (iv). In contrast to
these, (ii) seems only to provide some evidence for
correctness. At best it might be construed as a "tiebreaking"
consideration somewhat analogous to the
way in which simplicity is viewed in regard to
theory testing. It is possible that this is also the
27
proper way in which to view the ethical considerations
which I discuss near the end of this paper.
22Op. cit., p. 364, my italics.
23It may be held that the idea of discovering, for
example, that a whale is in fact a mammal is simplistic-that
the more correct description is in terms
of something such as inventing and applying a conceptual
system. Although I do not wish to assume
any such views here, to the extent that they are
plausible, my general line of thought is strengthened.
Such views help to bring the categorization of
art and the categorization of nature more in line
with one another.
241 owe this example to Donald Crawford.
25I have attempted to bring out some of its problematic
aspects in "Formal Qualities in the Natural
Environment," Journal of Aesthetic Education (1979),
99-114.
Hepburn
notes "Suppose the outline of our
cumulus cloud resembles that of a basket of washing,
and we amuse ourselves in dwelling upon this
resemblance. Suppose that on another occasion we
do not dwell on such freakish aspects, but try instead
to realize the inner turbulence of the cloud,
the winds sweeping up within and around it, determining
its structure and visible form. Should we not
be ready to say that this latter experience was less
superficial than the other, that it was truer to
nature, and for that reason more worth having? If
there can be a passage, in art, from easy beauty to
difficult and more serious beauty, there can also be
such passages in aesthetic contemplation of nature."
Op. cit., p. 62. Compare Hepburn's general remarks
on pp. 60-64 with the argument which follows.
27Note, for example, the following remark by
Aldo Leopold: "Consider ... a trout raised in a
hatchery and newly liberated in an over-fished
stream .... No one would claim this trout has the
same value as a wholly wild one caught out of some
unmanaged stream in the high Rockies. Its aesthetic
connotations are inferior, even though its capture
may require skill. "Conservation Esthetic," A Sand
Country Almanac with Essays on Conservation from
Round River (New York, 1974), p. 285, my italics.
The inferior aesthetic "connotations" of one trout as
opposed to the other can only be a function of what
descriptions are true of one as opposed to the other.
28This illustration was suggested to me by Donald
Crawford.
2 I have made some tentative suggestions in regard
to this issue in "Appreciation and the Natural
Environment," op. cit.
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