

## RENEWABLES: LONG-TERM TRENDS, POLICIES AND BARRIERS

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INVESTICE DO ROZVOJE VZDĚLÁVÁNÍ

#### What are RES?

- = renewable energy is energy derived from natural processes that are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed.
- Solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower, bioenergy, ocean power.







#### Pros and cons

- Infinete by definition in contrast to fossil fuels.
- No geopolitics included are spread globally, in contrast to the conventional (fossil) fuels that are more geographically concentrated.
- Low environmental impact (vary according the technology) GHG emissions, local pollutants.
- Strategic economic development (rural development, agriculture sector, hightech manufacturing).
- Energy access through distributed or off-grid sollutions  $\rightarrow$  de-centralized energy system.
- Low density source difficult to produce the energy quantity equivalent to that produced by non-renewable sources
- Technology is costly
- Affected by weather, their reliability is reduced.







- Based on the advantages governments have put in place supportive policies. As a result "RES have been the driver of much of the growth in the global clean energy sector since the year 2000 ... As global renewable elektricity generation axpands in absolute terms, it is expected to ... become the second most important global elektricity source, after coal (by 2016)" (IEA).
- In 2013 RES accounted for almost 22% of total power generation. Globally, renewable generation was on par with that of natural gas.







- Global renewable elektricity generation projected to grow by almost 45% (+5,4% per year) by 2020.
- 2 global trends driving the development of RES power capacity. 1) development should spread out geographically 2) RES technologies are becoming competitive on a cost basis with alternatives.
- Annual growth in new capacity is expected to stabilise over 2013-2020, reflecting growing risks to deployment in some markets and remaining development barriers.
- Non-OECD countries are expected to account for around 70% of new RES generation from 2013-2020. (Number of markets have adopted long-term policy framework).







- China remains the anchor of RES capacity deployment, accounting for almost 40% of the global expansion and over 60% of non-OECD growth. RES should account for nearly 45% of incremental power generation over the medium term, ahead of coal.
- In 2013 global new investment in RES capacity estimated over USD 250 billion (plateued, slightly decreasing in last years).
- Reduction in investment costs have helped the LCOE. Closing gap between competitiveness of traditional sources and RES. Competitiveness depends heavily on market conditions and political framework (onshore wind in Brazil, South Africa, PV in Chile).








### RES production by region

#### Global renewable electricity production by region, historical and projected



Notes: unless otherwise indicated, all material in figures and tables in this chapter derive from International Energy Agency (IEA) data and analysis. Hydropower includes pumped storage; the onshore and offshore wind split is estimated; total generation is gross power generation.












### Costs of PV technology



























#### Renewable power spreading out everywhere



Emerging markets more than compensate for slowing growth and volatility in markets such as Europe and the US

# Progress tracked on different scales

Incremental TWh (2012-18)	
1. China	+ 750
2. USA	+ 150
3. Brazil	+ 130
4. India	+ 95
5. Germany	+ 70


Avg annual growth (2012-18)	
1. Morocco	+ 24.9%
2. South Africa	+ 20.1%
3. Korea	+ 14.1%
4. Australia	+ 14.0%
5. UK	+ 13.0%





















#### COSTS AND PRICING

Argument that RES costs more than other energy resources

But variety of factors can distort the comparison.

- Public subsidies In 2011 renewables received roughly €30 billion in subsidies, nuclear power €35 billion and fossil fuels took €26 billion. (EEA 2013).
- High initial capital costs lower fuel and operating cost make RES cost competitive on a life-cycle basis, but higher initial capital costs results in less installed capacity per initial euro invested. RES generally require higher amounts of financing for the same capacity. Capital markets may demand a premium in lending rates for financing RES because more capital is being risked up front than in conventional projects.







#### COSTS AND PRICING


- Transaction costs RES instalations typically smaller than conventional energy projects. That makes transaction costs (eg. resource assessment, sitting, permitting, planning...) higher.
- Environmental externalities
- Unfavourable power pricing rules RES may not receive full credit for the value of their power. On one hand, they are close to the consumer, on the other hand those sources are intermitent.
- Difficulty of fuel price risk assessment risk associated with fluctuations in future fossil fuel prices may not be quantitatively considered in decisions about new power generation capacity because these risks are inherently difficult to access.







#### Levelised costs of electricity (USD per megawatt hour [MWh]), beginning year



Notes: CSP = concentrated solar power; CCGT = combined cycle gas turbine. Wholesale power prices are expressed as the annual average of daily traded, day-ahead base-load power prices. CWE (Central Western Europe) refers to annual average of power prices in France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland. United States (US) PJM refers to the regional transmission organisation covering parts of 13 states in the mid-Atlantic and Midwest portion of the United States. LCOEs reflect typical system costs for selected technologies. Costs are indicative and ranges reflect the system cost, resource and financing differences among countries. Geothermal LCOE range includes only conventional and binary plants.

Source: IEA analysis with 2013 wholesale electricity price data from Bloomberg LP (2014), accessed 01 June 2014; and EIA (Energy Information Administration) (2014), Wholesale Electricity and Natural Gas Market Data accessed 20 May 2014, Washington D.C.









#### LEGAL AND REGULATORY BARRIERS

- Lack of legal framework for independent power producers in many countries power utilities still control a monopoly on production and distribution → absence of a legal framework for independent producers investing in RES facilities and selling their electricity.
- Restriction on siting and construction based on height, aesthetics, noise, safety. Permiting authorities may not be familiar with the technologies.
- Transmission access utilities may not allow favorable transmission access to RES or may charge high prices for transmission access.







#### LEGAL AND REGULATORY BARRIERS

- Utility interconnection requirements individual home or commercial systems connected to utility grids can face inconsistent or unclear utility interconnection requirements. Lack of uniform requriements add to transaction costs.
- Liability insurance requirement problem for small power generators that may face excessive requirements for liability insurance.










- In 2005 law setting the support for RES (180/2005 Sb.) in an affort to have 1695 MWe by 2020. Exceeded in 2010.
- □ In 2006 fixed price 12 times higher than market price.
- Permits distribution halted in 2010, now majority of support schemes cancelled.



#### MARKET PERFORMANCE


- Lack of access to credit small investors may lack access to credit to invest in RES (esp. when state support policy is unstable).
- Percieved technology performance uncertainty and risk even proven and cost effective technologies may be percieved as risky if there is little experience with them in region. Wrong perception (or missing experience) may increase required rates of return, resultin in less capital availability. "Lack of utility acceptance".







In Germany, RES amost ignored by "Big 4" (E.On, RWE, En.BW, Vattenfal) till 2011.



#### MARKET PERFORMANCE

Lack of technical or commercial skills and information — markets function best when everyone has low-cost access to information and skills. But in specific markets, skilled personnel who can install, operate and maintain RES technologies may not exist in sufficient numbers.





- = Policy remains vital to the competitiveness of RES. Policy uncertainty remains a key challenge to the RES deployment.
- = Non-economic barriers, integration challenges, grid connection risks ... can all increase financing costs and prevent investments.
- = In markets based on short-term marginal cost pricing RES can often require policy incentives.
- $\square$  = in some areas RES are competitive without financial suppport.











- 1) price setting and quantity-forcing policies
- 2) investment cost reduction policies
- □ 3) Public investments and market facilitation activities (roreduce market barriers and accelerate RES energy markets).
- Historically govts enacted them in ad hoc manner, now they are they are driven by RES energy targets (EU).







#### PRICE SETTING AND QUANTITY-FORCING POLICIES

- Price-setting policies reduce cost- and pricing-related barriers by establishing favorable pricing regimes for RES relative to other sources of power generation. The quantity is unspecified, but prices are known in advance.
- Quantity-forcing policies do the opposite. They mandate a certain percentage (or absolute quantity of generation) at unspecified prices.









- □ Since RES projects are capital-intensive with low operating costs, the logical support for them is investment tax credits, not operating subsidies. This was the norm in the early days and some countries still give personal income, corporate, property tax and VAT exemptions for RES, in particular Finland until recently. Consumer levies also hit the poorer harder.
- But funding through consumer levies has the advantage of a) not putting a further burden on hard-pressed government budgets, and b) being less visible, except in countries like Germany where the RES surcharge is clearly marked on consumers' energy bills.







- **Feed-in tariffs.** Exists in 21 EU states, provide a fixed rate of subsidy for fixed period. Designed to cover all a producer's costs and profit, they essentially replace the market. Very successful in triggering large deployment of RES, but at a high cost. Instrument of choice for big RES players (Germany, Spain). Basic rule is government sets the price, market (investor response) sets the quantity, but many recent amendments to control costs.
- □ Feed-in premiums act as a partial FiT providing a top-up to electricity market price. Increasing popularity.
- **Quota obligations** with tradeable certificates. Government sets the quantity, the market the price. These exist in 6 EU states, have been less successful, but are cheaper.







- FiTs generally regarded as more effective, because they can be tailored to specific technologies. Drawback include
  - a) difficulty of setting the right price too high and money is wasted, too low and no deployment – and once the price is set, it is hard to make radical changes without breaking contracts, and
  - b) they insulate the RES producer from the market. So move towards feed-in premiums (fixed or variable) which top up whatever the RES producer gets from the market.
- Grid priority the grid must take RES electricity first.








 Quota systems with tradable certificates tend to be cheaper, but favour mature technologies like onshore wind and biomass.







#### Source: Ragowitz



What makes good support scheme?

- Stability. Changes, basically reductions in tariffs to reflect falling costs, are inevitable, but should be transparent and predictable -for instance either at regular date or when a certain annual volume level of RES deployment is reached. If the latter, then the volume should be announced in advance, and be easy for investors to monitor. Example of Germany which now publicly targets a 'corridor' of 2.5-3.5 GW of solar PV it wants to see deployed each year (compared to the 7.5GW it actually got in 2011).
- Level of support. This obviously matters to investors. But in surveys investors say the money comes second to stability. So governments that can encourage perception of stability can get away with lower levels of financial support.








What makes bad support scheme?

- Cuts inevitable and moratoria on new projects may be unavoidable. But retroactive measures could do longer lasting damage to investment.
- □ Spain: in 2010 put annual limit for hours of support payment for nearly all existing RES-E producers who now after every August/September have to operate without support, as well as in 2012 suspending all new projects.
- Czech republic: in 2010 imposed **retroactive** profit tax on all bigger PV installations.
- Bulgaria: in 2012 introduced retroactive grid access tax for all producers receiving FiTs. Discriminatory because for RES-E only, and may break EU legal ceiling on transmission charges















#### COST-REDUCTION POLICIES

Designed to provide incentives for voluntary investments in RES by reducing the cost of this investments.

- Reduction of capital costs up front via subsidies and rebates. (In the EU a long history, in 1991 Germany's 1000 solar roofs program to subsidise individual household purchases of PV of up to 60% of capital system costs).
- Reduction of capital costs after purchase via tax relief (esp. U.S., but also Japan, Europe, India...).
- Offsetin costs ghrough the payments based on power production via production tax credits (grants).
- Providing concessionary loans and other financial assistance.







#### PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND MARKET FACILITATION ACTIVITIES

- Public funds for RES development. Could be based for example on money collected from levies on fossil-fuel-based generation. Could pay for the difference between the cost of RES and traditional sources, for loans for RES facilities, to provide energy-related services, to increase public education, to support research and development etc.
- Infrastructure policies. To build and maintain market infrastructure, design standards, accelerate siting and permitting procedures etc.
  - Construction and design policies.
  - Site prospecting, review and permitting.
  - Equipment standards and certification.
- Government procurement
- Custromer education







#### EMISSION REDUCTION POLICIES

- Policies to limit GHG increase the price of carbon, resulting in higher competitiveness of RES.
- Regulation favours RES (and nuclear) in energy mixes at the expense of fossil fuels
- Taxation higher price of fossil energy
- Cap-and-trade policies again increase the price of fossil energy









#### POWER-SECTOR RESTRUCTURING POLICIES

Complex changes of traditional mission and mandates of electric utilities.

- Competitive wholesale power markets and removal of price regulation on generation. That allows for bypassing the biases traditional monopoly utilities have against RES (by-product of the EU market, primary aim of Sri Lanka or Thailand's market reform). But still there are costs constrains of RES.
- Self-generation by end users and distributed generation technologies. Shift to end users being also independent power producers. RES is well suited to self-generation (but competition from gas).







#### POWER-SECTOR RESTRUCTURING POLICIES

Complex changes of traditional mission and mandates of electric utilities.

- Privatization (and/or commercialization) of utilities. Utilities are becoming private for-profit entities that must act like commercial corporation. (or losing state subsidies in terms of state-run companies). It could affects the RES deployment in many ways, pozitive or negative, depending on the situation.
- Unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution. Unbundling can provide greater consumer incentives to selfgenerate using RES (to avoid transmission and distribution charges).







#### POWER-SECTOR RESTRUCTURING POLICIES

Complex changes of traditional mission and mandates of electric utilities.

■ Competitive retail power markets and green power sales – consumers are free to select their power pupplier from those operating in a given market, they can choose for the green energy. (In Netherland after restructuring in 2001 1 million green power customers signed up within the first year – there was also a large tax on fossil fuels).









#### Sources

- IEA
- Elsevier
- http://www.euractiv.com/video/biofuels-which-future-are-youworking-312139









