RELIGIONBETWEENSTATEAND SOCIETY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
EUROPE
Henk van Dijk
Introduction
European differences
Religion and the state in preindustrial societies were linked in a specific
way. Kings legitimated their power with the help of a particular relationship
with a supranatural order.At first glance we may think that this is no
longer applicable to the situation in industrial societies. However, that is
spurious, because religion can also play an important role in modern
society. In some industrial societies, like Japan, for example, religion is
still fundamental to the state. In some countries ideology took over the
role of a state religion during the twentieth century. However, in pluralistic
democratic societies, too, religion has still been able to influence
public life. In some cases, consciously or unconsciously, states use religious
symbols and metaphors. The American statement, 'In God we
trust', is an example of this. The use of generally accepted or at least tolerated
religious symbols has been called civil religion. It is particularly
visible in societies with a population adhering to different confessions,
but in which Protestantism dominated in the past.
Even if we leave aside these forms of public religion, we may notice
that states have some relationship with religion. Although the legitimation
of power in industrial societies is no longer grounded on
supranatural powers, as in, for example, the absolutist states of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, the problem of legitimation still exists.
254 HENKVAN DIJK
The concept of people's sovereignty, which has been applied since the
French Revolution, seems convincing at first glance, but is a difficult
one, because it is not clear how 'the people' has to be defined. The common
practice of using the concept of the nation as a synonym of the
people does not bring about any clarification.
The nation, as a group of people, who feel that they are belonging to a
community, must provide the emotional bond, which the abstract state as
such cannot give; it is, however, the state that defines the membership of
the nation. The emotional bond also requires the symbolism and rituals,
which have been so characteristic of religions. Myths and rituals are as
'important for nations as they are for the bonds of the community within
religion. This applies to an even greater extent to those nations for which
a common religion is the most important source of their nationhood.
Religion has customarily been identified with tradition and with a society
mostly dominated by agriculture. For that reason one could expect a
decline of the role of religion in nineteenth-century society at least in
some areas, because industrialisation and urbanisation were important
factors changing society during that period. However, it can be observed
that during the first half of the nineteenth century a revival of religion
took place. Although this revival diminished during the second half of
the century, religion still influenced societies strongly in several ways.
In all West European states, with the exception of Britain, political battles
between the state and religious institutions were fought over the
control of the educational system. Also political parties with a religious
affiliation developed. Although religion still dominated European society,
the position of religion in society changed over the period in several
respects, but these changes were influenced by various factors.
If we look to the countryside, the position of religious institutions was
important, at least in many parts of Europe. It was there that clergymen
and priests belonged to the local elite and played sometimes a role in the
processes of societal change. Sometimes they stimulated innovations
(one may think of farmers' leagues, cooperative movements etc., in particular
at the end of the century), but sometimes they also slowed down
developments.
In many cases clergymen were not born in the area, but came from outside.
The Roman Catholic Church tried to avoid in its policy of
appointments and displacements a strong emotional bond between the
local priest and his parish. Sometimes the clergy identified with the
established order. At least they belonged to a separate group. The Protestant
clergy -- at least the members of the established churches - saw
themselves as intellectuals. Although their incomes were not very high,
RELIGIONBETWEEN STATEAND SOCIETY 255
they had a status comparable with the professions (notaries, doctors etc.).
The Anglican clergymen in the UK even saw themselves as gentlemen.
In the eyes of their Methodist critics they were, with their gardens and
spacious livings, a leisured class. This relatively affluent situation did not
exist in urban society, yet, there too the clergy had some influence. However,
the situation could differ according to local or regional
circumstances. Important factors could be the existence of an established
church, or specific political or economic situations.
It is even possible that differences in family structures could have
played a role, as Emmanuel Todd tried to prove in a recently published
b0ok.l He linked the process of what he called 'de-christianisation' (by
which he meant the loss of influence of religious institutions in society)
to specific family structures in different European regions. Although his
approach is very interesting, at the same it is time debatable. In this contribution
I will not discuss the outcome of the process of the diminishing
influence of religious institutions as such,*but will stress the differences
in the relationship between state and religion, or crown and altar. Also a
sociopolitical and institutional approach will be applied.
For several reasons my attention will focus on developments during
the nineteenth century: firstly, contemporaries had the idea that religion
was losing its position in society and they had lively and sometimes
fierce debates about this topic. The question arises how far their impression
was true. Secondly, during this period societies underwent not only
important political but also massive social change (one may think of the
influences of the revolutions, industrialisation, urbanisation and the
impact of migration). And finally, different tendencies could be detected
during this period. In general we may see a revival of the position of religion
at the beginning of the century, in particular in the aristocracy and
also parts of the working class, whereas some parts of the middle classes
stayed critical. During the second half of the century we can detect a
change of position. Large parts of the lower class, at least during the first
half of the century, stayed only nominal members, whereas the middle
classes became more attracted to these institutions. However, before we
can say something about these changes, we have to define religion as
such.
A definition of religion
Any attempt to define religion will depend on the starting point taken,
whether it is a sociological, anthropological, historical or psychological
256 HENKVAN DIJK
viewpoint. It is clear, however, that although religion is related to individual
ideas, social factors, such as community, are important. To quote
the sociologist Talcott Parsons: 'Religion involves community.' Religion
offers not only a system of significance and the possibility of understanding
the world and one's place in it, but, with the help of rituals,
these individual feelings and views are linked to those of the larger community.
Rituals not only give a symbolic participation in this world, but
also strengthen the feelings of community. Although there may be differences
between various religious groups, in the majority of cases these
communities have an institutional character.
Within nineteenth-century Christianity, four dominant institutional
forms existed:
1. A hierarchical type without important influence of the laity, such as the Roman Catholic
Church.
2. A hierarchical type with important influence of the laity andlor state such as the Russian
Orthodox churches or the Episcopal Lutheran churches in Scandinavia and the
German states.
3. A nonhierarchical type with important influence of the clergy, such as the Calvinist
churches in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Scotland.
4. A nonhierarchical type with only minor distinction between clergy and laity, such
as in the dissenting churches in the Netherlands, England, Wales, and in Switzer-
land.
Because these differences in organisational structure also influenced the
relationship between religion and society we will return to this point
later.
Religion not only has an important social impact, because it is formalised
and institutionalised, but it also provides its adherents with
norms of behaviour for the social setting. These norms and values can
either be deduced from a supernatural origin or they can be rationalisations
of what were originally mythical ideas. Ritual can also be important
for the internalisation of values, and rituals can strengthen norms and
normative structures. According to Parsons, particularly during periods
of crisis, ritual serves as a safety net to bring structures back into bala
n ~ e . ~But it may be clear that the existence of norms and values can
have important social effects.
Secularisation
It is clear that religion plays an important role in many societies; but this
role can change over time. In modem, pluralistic societies the influence
RELIGIONBETWEEN STATEAND SOCIETY 257
of formal religion on the various aspects of society is limited. The development
towards this situation is generally referred to as secularisation.
One of the confusing aspects of the debate about secularisation is that the
concept itself is understood in different ways. Sometimes it is used in
relation to the individual, namely, the behaviour and attitudes of individuals,
and at other times it is applied to religious institutions.
The most generally accepted definition is that secularisation is a
process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose their
social ~ignificance.~That does not mean, however, that there needs to be
a discrepancy between the individual and the institution. Individual
forms of religiosity can exist, even if institutions lose their function in
society. It is also possible that political or social movements can be
inspired by religion, even though their adherents may no longer be members
of a church in a formal sense.
For many people secularisation has been seen as a decline in the influence
of religious institutions in society, including diminishing church
attendance, a decrease in the income of the institutions and a decline in
other aspects of religious institutions in the daily lives of their members.
Although difficulties exist in the measurement of the institutional aspects
of religion, it is questionable whether this decline in fact reflects a general
decline of religion in society. Nevertheless, the institutional aspects
are important, as we shall see.
If we attempt to define secularisation, several aspects come to mind.
The word itself developed within the Christian world. This is not to say
that this phenomenon did not manifest itself in other religions, but the
concept seems to belong, at least in part, to the culture of Christian religions.
Within Judaism, for example, similar developments can be seen,
but these tended to occur later. It is clear, however, that within the major
religions of Asia, such as Buddhism and Confucianism, the concept of
secularisation does not exist. Also, to the third major religion of the
Mediterranean world, Islam, the idea of secularisation is not a native
concept. The only important exception to this general rule seems to be
Turkey after Ataturk.
In Europe the idea of secularisation came into existence during the first
half of the seventeenth century. By origin it was a legal term, involving
the takeover of former ecclesiastical possessions by temporal powers.
The concept itself was not new, because within canonical law during the
Middle Ages, secularisation was used to describe the takeover of possessions
of the regular clergy (i.e., monks living according to a rule) by the
secular clergy (the ordinary priests). The devastating religious wars of
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as well as the devel-
258 HENKVAN DIJK
opment of the new absolutist monarchies in Europe, coined and used the
term in this way.
With the emergence of new ideas during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, including expansion of the sciences, the idea of
secularisation became embodied within other contexts. It became
increasingly more desirable to separate the supernatural sphere (which
was seen in stricter terms, as, for example, in deism) from the natural and
verifiable sphere. Max Weber called this general process the disenchantment
of the world (Entzauberung der Welt). It is debatable, however, as
to how and to what extent this process was directly related to a diminishing
influence of religion in general, and of religious institutions in
particular. At least we may say that during the nineteenth century it was
not a linear process.
The burden of the past
Although during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries religion had specific
characteristics, which were partially moulded by society, these
characteristics developed within a framework that had previously
existed. This framework can be regarded as a result of national differences,
or rather the result of state formation during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. These differences were a part of the former close
relationships between religion and state policy, in particularly in the patrimonial
states.
The French Revolution served to undermine this relationship, but if we
try to detect more general structures, we see that within Europe four
major zones existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. There was
a predominantly Roman Catholic zone (including France, Spain, the Italian
States, Belgium and the Habsburg countries), a predominantly
Protestant zone (including the Scandinavian countries), an Orthodox
zone (Russia, Greece and Bulgaria) and finally a mixed one (Britain, the
Netherlands, Switzerland and a major part of the German states). This
situation was largely a result of the outcome of the Reformation and
Counter-Reformation movements during the sixteenth century and the
fierce religious wars that followed in their wake.
In those areas in which the Counter-Reformation was successful, a
close link between the crown and altar was established, although during
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the state was gaining
power over the church. A well-known example which illustrates this situation
is the expulsion of the Jesuit order from many European states and
RELIGIONBETWEEN STATEAND SOCIETY 259
the development of the so-called national churches. In addition, general
public education had become a state affair. The strict ties between the
social and political establishments and the church, however, meant that in
these areas political opposition was also opposition against the ~hurch.~
In the virtually homogeneous Roman Catholic areas, this led to the
development of anti-clericalist movements, which were influenced by
religion in both form and content. In France examples of this can be
found within the Saint-Simonism and Comteianism movements. The
state could be either religious or nonreligious. In contrast, the church was
generally identified with political reaction in those areas, a situation different
from that in the mixed areas.
A similar situation could be found in the largely homogeneous Protestant
areas. In the Scandinavian countries some Free Churches existed,
but their influence was not strong and they could not be seen as an altern
a t i ~ e . ~Their adherents were mainly lower class, whereas their members
in the mixed areas were mainly middle class or so-called respectable
working class. Nevertheless, the clashes between the church and its anticlericalist
opposition did not develop in the Protestant areas as in the
homogeneous Roman Catholic areas. There are several reasons for this.
During the first half of the nineteenth century Scandinavian Lutheranism
was strongly influenced by Pietism. In Norway and Denmark particularly
this led to specific movements of religious revival related to forms of
nationalism and romanti~ism.~In Denmark Grundtvig, a parson as well
as a poet and writer, had a strong influence on this movement, whereas
Hauge, a merchant from Bergen, was the most influential person in Norway.8
These movements not only stimulated popular attraction to
Christianity, but also popular education (high schools for the people) and
self-advancement for artisans and farmers. They also stimulated the
democratisation of s~ciety.~
Secondly, during the nineteenth century it can be seen that when religion
was related to'some kind of national question there was no split in
society between adherents and nonadherents of religion. This can be
illustrated by the situation in Ireland and Poland, and it can also be seen
in Finland, Denmark and Nonvay.lo It is interesting to note that in Sweden,
the only country in which religion and the national question did not
play a role, these tensions developed to a greater extent!
It was clear that within the Scandinavian countries the church was
already totally subordinated to the state, therefore the establishment
could not elevate the church as a sacred society above the state. This
meant that the church adapted more easily to the state, even when the
political structure of the state changed.
260 HENKVAN DIJK
A third, mainly homogeneous area, was the Orthodox lands in Eastern
Europe and the Balkans. Here, too, the church was mainly monopolistic
and represented an instance of extreme collusion between the church and
the state - particularly in Russia where, since Peter the Great, the Orthodox
church was in fact a state department under the autocratic rule of the
tsar. This model could also be found in the Balkans, where the Russian
church played an influential role. The Turkish Empire had also been
dominating the majority of these areas for a long time; therefore, the
Byzantine heritage was very important.
Mixed areas could be found mainly in the border areas between Reformation
and Counter-Reformation lands, such as Switzerland, the
Netherlands and parts of Germany. Britain also belonged to this model,
although it was not a border area in the strict sense. In these areas nothing
of the strong antithesis between religion and nonreligion can be found, as
was the case in the nonpluralistic areas. Not only was there an important
Roman Catholic minority, which contributed to the processes of democratisation
and parliamentary control, but also denominational dissent within
Protestantism was strong. These dissenting movements played an important
role within politics during the nineteenth century. In Britain, for
example,they contributedmuch to liberalismand later to the Labour Party,
whereasAnglicanism and conservatismtended to be more closely linked.l2
In the mixed areas Roman Catholicism was not the conservative force
that it was in the homogeneous Roman Catholic areas. During the nineteenth
century there was a period of collaboration with liberalism (as in
the Netherlands and in Belgium, although the latter belongs to the more
homogeneous Catholic area). Also later in the nineteenth century and
during the twentieth century, when Roman Catholic parties already
existed they tended towards the centre-left of politics (in particular if
they had many working-class voters). In the case of Britain a Catholic
party was absent and with a great proportion of the working class being
members of the Roman Catholic Church, votes went directly to the
Labour party.
Dissenting religious groups contributed in general to the process of
democratisation and growing parliamentary influence. This was also the
case with neo-Calvinism, with its specific orthodox characteristics. The
reason was its strong populist undertones, being in the tradition of the
Covenanters. For example, in the Netherlands in the 1870s and 1880s
neo-Calvinism was the first movement not only to break with the
Reformed Church dominated by a liberal establishment, but also to create
the first modern party, with structured organisation of its voters. This
movement attracted many artisans, shopkeepers and traders.
RELIGIONBETWEEN STATEAND SOCIETY 261
Two aspects were particularly important in the mixed areas. In contrast
to the situation in the predominantly homogeneous Catholic areas, the
break with religion was not so strong in the mixed areas. Although the
distance between state and religion increased in the aftermath of the revolutionary
period, governments used vague but unmistakable religious
symbols in their rhetoric. This symbolism and rhetoric was very pronounced
in the USA, but can also be seen in the Netherlands, Denmark,
Britain, Switzerland, etc. It has been called civil religion.13But the most
important aspect was the necessity in those societies to find solutions for
the increasing problem of pluriformity. The lack of a dominating religious
group required solutions through compromises.
In some cases this pluriformity could be found in a situation of decentralisation
of power. In such cases the state only served as an overall
'umbrella' organisation. This was the case in Switzerland, where the
more urban areas became Protestant, whereas the more rural areas
remained mainly Catholic. In spite of some troubled periods, with a short
civil war in 1847,religion as well as educationwas organised on the canton
level. This was particularly strong during the second half of the
nineteenth century when liberalism tended to play down its secularising
and centralising policies in favour of some cooperation with Catholics
and conservative Protestants against the Labour movement. Swiss
Catholicism therefore kept within some form of distinct pillar, as did its
counterparts in the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium.l4
A similar situation could be found in Germany. Here, the extreme
decentralisation, and the effects of the Reformation as well as the religious
wars, led to the establishment of different confessions according to
regions. Although during the nineteenth century this geographical basis
changed, due to industrialisation and urbanisation (as well as changes in
state boundaries as a result of political movements during and after the
Napoleonic period), some regional differences persisted. Catholicism
could be found predominantly in the south and in the western Rhineland,
whereas the Protestants dominated the north and the eastern areas.
Although Roman Catholics had a strong foothold in some areas, after the
unification of Germany under Prussian supremacy in 1871,their position
within the whole empire was relatively weak. Whenever the Catholics
did not vote for the (Catholic) Centre Party, they tended to vote for the
left-wing parties.l5
The political and social developments in Germany led to the emergence
of a confessionally pluralistic society in which, due to the
dominating position of Prussia, Protestantism had a prominent place.
State and church were, however, strongly related to each other, as shown
in the Kulturkampf (i.e. the conflict between Bismarck and the Catholic
church, which was most violent in Prussia, but also played a role in other
regions, such as Baden). As a result of the link between the state and the
church(es), the nominal membership rates of the churches and synagogues
were rather high.16However, by the end of the nineteenth century
nonbelief was also rather high, at least in the larger cities.
Deviationsfrom the model
We have seen that in the case of Scandinavia the effects of an almost
monopolistic situation were different from the situation in the Latin
countries. Also within predominantly Catholic areas, deviations could
exist. The most well-known examples are those of Ireland and Poland
and, to a lesser extent, Belgium. The Irish and Polish cases are examples
of a situation in which external pressure or military and political occupation
resulted in a close relationship between the nation and religion.
The necessity for national unity tended to diminish criticism concerning
the position and the role of the church. Consequently, religion seemed to
play a unifying role and was generally accepted. Secularisation, defined
as a diminishing influence of the religious institutions, was minimal in
these cases.
Austria, too (at least the Austrian Republic after the First World War)
seems to be an exception to the general rule within homogeneous
Catholic areas. Although the development there - the autocratic rightwing
government under Dollfulj - was similar to what occurred between
1934 and 1935 in other Catholic countries such as Spain and Portugal,
the general tendency from the late nineteenth century was towards some
form kind of pillarisation comparable to the Belgian, Swiss and Dutch
situation.
Changes over time
Not only did the traditional cleavages within Christianity affect the position
of religion within societies, but also general political and economic
developments. Since the late eighteenth century, states developed from
patrimonial monarchies towards more bureaucratic and centralised
organisations, based on territory and legitimised by the concept of
nationhood. This affected the role of religion within society in a different
way. Whereas during the late eighteenth century religion was seen by
'Enlightened' monarchs as an obstacle to modernisation, these views
RELIGION BETWEEN STATEAND SOCIETY 263
changed in reaction to the political and social upheavals that culminated
in the French Revolution.
The period between 1789 and 1848 showed a remarkable religious
revival, compared with the eighteenth century. This revival was rooted in
two developments. Political elites and the governments came to believe
that the established churches could be an important force to hold back the
tide of revolution. Romanticism as a cultural movement to some extent
contributed to this development. New territorial divisions also created
the need to define the concept of established churches in a new way.
Examples of this situation could be found in the new kingdom of the
Netherlands (where the future Belgian and Dutch territories were
brought together), in Bavaria (where Protestant strongholds like the former
Reichsstadte (city states) merged with a traditional Roman Catholic
area) and in the enlarged Prussian state (with the Rhine provinces and the
former Polish territory of Posen).
Another contribution to the revival of religion in society was the fact
that religious sectarianism appealed to many groups of the middle and
lower strata, who were in the process of establishing their own identity
and cultural autonomy.17Although comparable movements in Roman
Catholic areas did not exist, the Catholic Church at that time gained new
influence because it was more tolerant than during the eighteenth century
to various forms of popular belief and devotion.18 The recruitment of
priests from the lower strata also contributed to a stronger link between
the population, the church and the religious revival.
During the same period, however, religion was challenged by the fact
that political radicals popularised deistic and atheistic ideas on a broader
scale.l9 The revolutionary French government also conducted one of the
first state-directed anti-religious campaigns, which gained a mass following
for the first time. Nevertheless, the impact of atheism on society
was less influential than was the thought of, for example, Engels (Die
Luge der arbeitenden K l a ~ s e ) , ~ ~at least during the first half of the nineteenth
century. Royle investigated this topic for the English situation and
concluded that atheism was not widespread among the working clas~es.~'
Although some relationship with Chartism existed (particularly among
the artisans), atheism was, at least in England, a marginal phenomenon.
Whereas atheism did not increase during the second half of the nineteenth
century, agnosticism increased remarkably. There were several
reasons for the decline in active church membership. Urbanisation and
industrialisation became more general phenomena in the majority of
European societies. In particular, in the industrial areas, social conflict
between the working classes and the middle classes, on the one hand, and
264 HENKVAN DIJK
the upper class, on the other, increased. More traditional forms of poor
relief, mostly related to church organisation, came under pressure. The
state, to an extent, took over education and charity, areas previously
dominated by the church. This meant that the necessity to attend church
services diminished for the lower classes.
Moreover, the development of more well-to-do neighbourhoods with
their own churches led to greater financial problems for churches in
working-class areas, particularly where the church organisation was a
parish system.Also, working-class movements developed a more anti- or
nonreligious standpoint. They were particularly opposed to the unionism
related to churches, which emerged in Catholic areas with the new social
policy of Pope Leo XIII, and in Protestant areas with the development of
neo-Cal~inism.~~The increasing influence of Marxism on the workingclass
movement on the Continent, particularly in Germany, also
contributed to this situation, mainly because it propagated a more scientific
view of the world. Besides that, some working-class movements
adopted socialism as a substitute for religion.
In addition, within the upper and middle classes agnosticism became
stronger during the second half of the nineteenth century. Intellectual
developments including Darwinism, liberal theology with its biblical
criticism, and the increasing prestige of science contributed to these
developments, both in urban and rural areas. Scientific methods of agriculture
undermined the more traditional forms, which were often related
to Christianity. It was not only these developments, but also Judaism that
affected the Christian churches.23Assimilation not only implied the
adoption of a different lifestyle but also, in some cases, a more critical
stance towards religion.
At the end of the nineteenth century new forms of leisure gained popularity,
which often detracted from traditional forms of church
attendance. Some churches tried to cope with this problem by offering a
combination of worship and leisure activities, even sport facilities on
Saturdays. But in general the majority spent their Sunday on other activities
other than attending church.
Although contemporary writers complained about these developments,
in reality the situation was not so unambiguous. Political fights about the
relationship between the state and the church, as, for example, in Germany
during the so-called Kulturkampf and in France during the Third
Republic, strengthened the ties between clergy and people. Movements
to combine more traditional religious views with some aspects of modernisation,
as in Dutch neo-Calvinism and in Catholic neo-Thomism in
RELIGIONBETWEEN STATEAND SOCIETY 265
reaction to these developments, tended to strengthen the position of the
churches. The development of the so-called People's Parties
(Volksparteien) in Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands
also contributed to this situation. Thepillarisation of society with a political
party, associations and an educational system related to a religious
organisation led to counter-reactions from socialist working-class movements.
Although pillarisation in this sense did not exist in Germany,
similar reactions against the Centre Party existed.24It is undeniable that
during the second half of the nineteenth century there was a massive
decrease in working-class participation in church life in most countries,
although this development was partially compensated by the bourgeoisie's
return to the churches, most notably in France. Questions about
the relationship between the church and the state, particularly the problem
of education, led to a greater sense of cohesion among members of
the churches.
During the second half of the nineteenth century there was not simply
just a general tendency towards 'de-christianisation'. In some
areas, not only political parties and social movements related to specific
churches, but also the clergy itself participated in the
modernisation processes. In specific areas, like Belgium, the Netherlands
and parts of Germany, the Roman Catholic Church was involved
in the establishment of banks, the forming of cooperatives and the
organisation of the sale of fertilisers.
Changes in society as a factor influencing religion
It was not only regional divisions between Catholicism and Protestantism
(related to historical events and cultural developments) that
influenced the relationship between religion and society, but also specific
changes within society itself. The process of modernisation of
society in general,2s and the Industrial Revolution in particular, contributed
to a changing relationship between religion and society. Two
aspects were of key importance: urbanisation and the changing relationship
between towns and the countryside. Migration also played an
important role during the nineteenth century. Several factors were
important in this process.
The general increase in population, particularly in the countryside, led
to a constant and sometimes dramatic mobility (examples can be found
during and after the so-called 'hungry forties').26The constant factor was
that people tried to combine the income from small properties in the
266 HENKVAN DIJK
countryside with temporary incomes elsewhere. Irish peasants went to
England to earn a living, while their families stayed home to care for the
animals and the property.27Similar situations could be found in Westphalia,
where peasants worked in Dutch agriculture during harvest times,
as well as in Denmark and parts of Germany. Besides the movement to
other agricultural areas, people were also attracted by urban areas. Peasants
from the mountainous areas in France went to Lyon or Paris to
supplement their earnings in construction or other industries, as did the
Flemish peasants from the North and from Belgium.
Although this pattern of migration was rather traditional (but in everincreasing
numbers), this was not true for other types of typically
nineteenth-century migration. Political and economic changes led to a
modified situation in the countryside and also to emigration. The most
obvious example is the so-called enclosure movement of the British
countryside, which also existed on the Continent in slightly different
forms. The so-called Prussian reforms during the Napoleonic period had
similar e f f e ~ t s . ~The result was a different division of property and, in
particular, a rationalisation of agriculture. This led to an enormous
increase in the mobility of the population.
Migration and urbanisation affected not only society in general, but
also the role and position of religion within s~ciety.'~Nineteenth-century
authors, with their contemporary ideas about the strong influence of the
environment on ideology and morality, took these trends and movements
very seriously. Diminishing church attendance and widespread disbelief
were anticipated. In reality, however, the developments were less clear
cut. Religion, rather than ethnicity or geographical origin, tended to bind
immigrants together, particularly in the United States.30
The expulsion of population led to a more definitive break with country
life. Urban centres in general, and particularly the new industrial
centres, experienced an enormous increase of inhabitants. Thus, the nineteenth
century became a period of urbanisation. Cities such as London,
Paris, Vienna, Berlin and Petersburg were striking examples of this
process, as were the boom towns of the English Midlands, the Ruhr area,
Northern France and Italy, as well as the traditional transport centres of
Liverpool, Marseilles, Genoa, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg and Le
Havre. The formation of nation states, with their policy of centralisation
and their bureaucracies, also resulted in an increasing number of capital
cities with rapidly growing populations.
RELIGIONBETWEEN STATEAND SOCIETY 267
Adaptation to urban environment andforms of identity
It is clear that these developments affected not only society as a whole,
but also the position of religion within society. Contemporary authors,
writing on this topic, feared a loss of belief and morality." They considered
that the environment influenced people and that the urban
environment exerted a bad influence.32It is debatable, however, to what
extent migration and urbanisation affected religion. Studies on specific
groups of emigrants to the United States show that religion played a
stronger role in group identification than factors such as language or ethWen
i ~ i t y . ~ ~ have to remember, however, that in the USA the
denominational model encompassed all groups, including Roman
Catholics and Jews.
In Europe, where this was either absent, or related to specific Protestant
groups, the situation was different - although here also religion
could play a role in the adaptation of migrants to their new surroundings.
In general, it seemed that the first generation stuck to their traditional
belief. One of the greatest problems was a lack of money. The majority
of the immigrants were of humble origin and the expanding urban areas
were only provided with limited religious services. In many cases, the
state was no longer inclined to contribute to the building of new
churches.
In specific Protestant areas this problem was moderated by the activities
of Free or dissenting churches, and the so-called 'internal mission' (a
movement against de-christianisation of cities and towns, appearing in
different forms in different European c~untries).~~Churches with a parish
system, like the Roman Catholic church and the Anglican church, were
more vulnerable to the effects of the separation of the social classes into
distinct urban and suburban neighbourhoods, than other types of church
organisations which provided a system of solidarity between different
local churches. Sometimes, however, the increase in the numbers of
immigrants created new opportunities for specific churches. A good
example was the influx of Irish migrants to English cities, which stimulated
the Roman Catholic Church in England. Without such influx the
position of this church would have been weaker, in spite of the upperclass
interest during the last decades of the nineteenth century.35But
even within the Irish Catholic community in England, church attendance
decreased with the second generation. However, the popular antiCatholicism
in Victorian England was partially rooted in the strong Irish
influence in English Cath~licisrn.~~
268 HENKVAN DIJK
Similarly, for the Polish workers emigrating to the Ruhr area or Belgium
and Northern France, religion was an important instrument for
maintaining their identity. In the Western parts of Germany this led to
clashes with the Prussian government, which not only had problems with
Roman Catholics, but also tried to diminish Polish national feelings and
the use of the Polish language.37
In general, however, the process of urbanisation and the migration to
towns tended to decrease church attendance of the working classes. In
Britain, where a strong relationship existed between Nonconformism and
the working classes, even the dissenting churches were losing influence
by the end of the century. Only the so-called respectable working class
and labourers in the mining areas remained members of the church,
rather than the traditional working class.38
Widespread migration also served to intensify tensions inside religious
communities. Within the Jewish communities in Western Europe, complaints
about the poorer and more pious Eastern immigrants increased
towards the end of the century; this was also the.case with some Christian
communities. The arrival of masses of people from the countryside
represented a threat to the established urban community.
As well as industrialisation and urbanisation, another important development
was the emergence of the (nation) state, with its tendency
towards homogeneity and centralisation. In different countries this led to
a series of clashes, particularly on the subject of education. Although
these developments influenced the role of religion in society, the effects
were mainly political and do not need to be discussed here.
Conclusions
In spite of the general idea that religion is not important in industrial
societies, we may conclude that - at least during the nineteenth century
- there was no linear development towards a decline in religion. In the
first half of the nineteenth century Christian churches were regaining
ground in several ways. Agnosticism and nonbelief was not widespread,
and also the working class - who later ia the century had a widespread
tendency towards lower church attendance - was involved in the church
in many ways. Within the Roman Catholic Church, popular belief played
an important role, and in Protestant areas dissenting churches and Free
Churches were important, particularly for the artisans and lower middle
classes.
BETWEEN STATERELIGIOK AND SOCIETY 269
This situation changed during the second half of the nineteenth century.
Although many migrants moving to towns and industrial areas
found that religion could play a role in the process of adaptation, giving
them some feeling of identity, in the long run migration and urbanisation
negatively affected the relationship between religion and society. Even in
Britain, where the Roman Catholic Church benefited from the large number
of Irish immigrants, there was gradual decline in church attendance
over the years. Other factors contributed to this change, including the
increasing influence of modem science and the development of a working-class
movement with its rather anti-religious tendencies.
But even during the second half of the century, it is difficult to say that
there was a tendency towards a diminishing influence of religion in society.
Church membership remained attractive for the middle classes. New
political and social movements related to church membership also played
a role in this process, especially in Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, the
Netherlands and in Germany (although a Roman Catholic political party
only developed in the latter).
Europe in the nineteenth century showed many differences in the relationship
between religion and society, and religion and politics.
However, it was not so much the differences between the contemporary
nation states that influenced these divisions. Structural divisions were a
result of developments in the past, in particular during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. State formation in early modern Europe was also
strongly influenced by these religious quarrels.
The areas with religious pluralism and the border areas were different
from the more homogeneous areas. These differences influenced the outcome
of the process of secularisation. This process was not a linear one,
thus one cannot speak of a steady decline of religion in society. Finally,
the role of religious institutions did become weaker, but the process was
slow and was certainly not smooth. Even the results of the process of
social and economic change, which affected Europe enormously, were
partially influenced by this structural division.
Notes
1. E. Todd, L 'inventionde I 'Eur~ope,Paris, 1990.
2. The result was a decrease in the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in some areas
during the eighteenth century and a stabilisation of this church during the nineteenth
century up until the 1960s. In contrast to that there was a relatively lasting influence of
Protestant churches until 1880 and a very rapid decline thereafter.
270 HENKVAN DIJK
3. T. Parsons, 'Sociology of Religion', in Action Theory and the Human Condition, ed. T.
Parsons, New York, 1978,pp. 167-324.
4. B.R. Wilson, Religion in a Secular Society, London, 1966.
5. D. Charlton, Secular Religions in France, Oxford, 1963; A. Dansette, The Religious
History of Modern France, New York, 1962; F. Goguel, 'Religion et politique en
France', Re'vuefranqaise de science politiqzie 16 (1966), pp. 1174ff., A.C. Jemolo,
Church and State in Italy 18.50-19.50, Oxford, 1969.
6. A. Hassing, 'Methodism in Norwegian Society', Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University,
1973; J. Gusfield, SvenskKyrkogeographi, Malmo, 1966; K. Kjzr, 'Free Churches in
Denmark', Ph.D. thesis, University of Copenhagen, 1968; M. Balle-Petersen, Guds
folk i Danmark: nogle synspunkter pd studiet af religime grupper, Lyngby, 1977; C.
Bjmn, 'De folkelige bevaegelser i Danmark', Fortid og Nutid 26 (1976), pp. 346-57.
7. G. Kaser, 'L'eveil du sentiment national. R81e du pietisme dans la naissance du patriotisme',
Archives de sociologie des religions 12 (1966), pp. 59-80.
8. D. Breistein, Hans Nielsen Hauge, Merchant of Bergen: Christian Belief and Economic
Activity, Bergen, 1855; Bjsrn, 'De folkelige bevsegelser i Danmark'.
9. H.P. Clausen et al., Kulturelle, politiske og religime bev~gelseri det 19. Arhundrede,
Arhus, 1973; A.E. Christensen, Danmarks Historie, Ksbnhavn, 1992; H.J.H. Glsedemark,
Kirkeforfatningssporgsmaalet i Danmark, indtil 1874. En historiskkirkeretlig
studie, Ksbnhavn, 1948;P.G. Lindhardt, Vakkelse og kirkelige retninger, Arhus, 1977.
10. E. Allardt, 'Factors Explaining Variations and Changes in the Strength of Finnish Radicalism',
in Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology,Washington, 1962.
11. G. Gustafsson,Religion och Politik, Lund, 1967; S. Rydenfelt, Kommunismen i Sverige,
Lund, 1954.
12. T. Brennan, E.W. Cooney and M. Pollins, Social Change in South-West Wales, London,
1954; C. Davies, Religion in the Industrial Revolution in South Wales, Cardiff, 1965;
K.S. Inglis, Churches andthe Working Classes in Ectorian England, London, 1963;H.
McLeod, Religion and Class in the Ectorian City, London, 1974; B. Semmel, The
Methodist Revolution, London, 1974;E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English working
class, 2nd edn, Harmondsworth, 1968.
13. J.A. Coleman, 'Civil Religion', SociologicalAnalysis 31 (1970), pp. 67-77.
14. H. Righart, De katholieke zuil in Europa: Het ontstaan van verzuiling onder
katholieken in Oostenrijk, Zwitserland, Belgie en Nederland, Amsterdam, 1986; H.H.
Ken, Switzerland: Social Cleavages andPartisan Conflict, London, 1974.
15. E.L. Evans, The German Center Party 1870-1933: A Study in Political Catholicism.
Carbondale, IL, 1981.
16. H. McLeod, 'Secular Cities? Berlin, London, and New York in the Later Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries', in Religion andModernization, ed. S.Bruce, Oxford, 1992,
pp. 59-89, p. 66.
17. There exists a vast literature on this theme for the UK. Examples can be found in:
Inglis, Churches and the Working Classes in Ectorian England; McLeod, Religion and
Class in the Victorian City;D.H. McLeod, 'Class, Community and Religion: The Religious
Geography of Nineteenth Century England', Sociological Yearbook of Religion
RELIGIONBETWEEN STATEAND SOCIETY 271
in Britain 6 (1973), pp. 29-73; Brennan et al., Social Change in South-West Wales;
Davies, Religion in the Industrial Revolution in South Wales; C. Field, 'Methodism in
Metropolitan London l82O-l92O', Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, 1975;Semrnel, The Methodist
Revolution;Thompson, TheMaking of theEnglish workingclass; J. Baxter, 'The Great
Yorkshire Revival 1792-6', Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, London,
1974. See for other countries: L. Brunt, 'The "Kleine Luyden" as a Disturbing Factor
in the Emancipation of the Orthodox Calvinists (Gereformeerden) in the Netherlands',
Sociologica Neerlandica 8 (1972), pp. 89-102; Hassing, 'Methodism in Norwegian
Society'; Kjaer, 'Free Churches in Denmark'; G. Tiegland, 'Study of the Haugean
Movement as a Case Study of Mobilisation', Ph.D. thesis, Bergen University, 1970;
L.H. Mulder, Revolte der$jnen: een studie omtrent de Afscheiding van 1834als sociaal
conflict en sociale beweging met een bronnenonderzoek in een achttal Friese
dorpsgebieden, Meppel, 1973;Balle-Petersen, Gudsfolk i Danmark; Bjsm, Defolkelige
bevcegelser i Danmark; Gkdemark, Kirkeforfatningssp0rgsmaalet i Danmark
indtil1874; Lindhardt, Vcekkelse og kirkelige retninger; A. Pontoppidan Thyssen, 'De
religiose bevaegelsers samfundskritik og den demokratiske udvikling', in Kulturelle,
religiase og politiske bevcegelser i det 19. brhundrede, ed. A. Pontoppidan Thyssen,
H.P. Clausen and P. Meyer (Det Larde Selskabs publikationsserie, Ny serie I),hhus,
1973; R.J. Evans, 'Religion and Society in Modern Germany', European Studies
Review 12 (1982), pp. 249-88.
18. E. Larkin, 'The Devotional Revolution in Ireland, 1850-1 875', American Historical
Review 77 (1972), pp. 625ff.; W. Schieder, 'Religion in der Sozialgeschichte', in
Sozialgeschichte in Deutschland, ed. V. Sellin, Gottingen, 1987.
19. Charlton, SecularReligions in France.
20. S. Royle and E. Royle, TheInJidel Tradition: From Paine to Bradlaugh, London, 1976.
21. E. Royle, Radicals, Secularists and Republicans: Popular Freethought in Britain,
1866-191 5, Manchester, 1980.
22. For a more elaborate list of literature on this topic see: Righart, De katholieke zuil in
Europa; F.A. Isambert, Christianisme et classe ouvri&e, Paris, 1961;Inglis, Churches
and the Working Classes in Ectorian England.
23. D. Bensimon, 'Aspects of theAbandonment of Religious Practice in the French Jewish
Milieu. Preliminary Results of an Inquiry', Social Compass 18 (197l), pp. 413-25.
24. Protestantism in Germany did not create political parties in Germany: R.M. Biglers,
ThePolitics of German Protestantism: TheRise of theProtestant ChurchElite in Prussia
1815-1 848, Berkeley, 1972;G. Hiibinger, 'Kulturprotestantismus und Politik. Zum
Verhaltnis von Liberalismus und Protestantismus, Biirgerlicheund liberaler Revisionismus
im wilhelmischen Deutschland', in Religion und Gesellschaji im 19.
Jahrhundert, ed. W. Schieder, Stuttgart, 1993.
25. The concept of modernisation is rather unclear and controversial.A useful introduction
for the historian is: H.U. Wehler, Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte, Gottingen,
1975.
26. In particular the Irish migration to England and America was an example of the dramatic
effects during a period of economic stagnation. See e.g., S.H. Cousens,
'Emigration and Demographic Change in Ireland', Economic History Review 2nd
series, 14 (1961), pp. 275-88.
272 HENKVAN DIJK
27. S.H. Cousens, 'The Regional Variations in Emigration from Ireland between 1821and
1841', Transactions andPapers of the Institute of British Geographers 37 (1965), pp.
15-30.
28. F. Tennstedt, Sozialgeschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland: Yom 18.Jahrhundert
bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, Gottingen, 1981.
29. McLeod, 'Secular Cities?' in Religion and Modernization, ed. Bruce; F. Charpin, Pratique
religieuse etformation d'une grande ville: Marseilles 1806-1 9-56,Paris, 1964.
30. W.I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, ThePolish Peasant in Europe andAmerica, 2 vols,New
York, 1927.
31. E.g. Jacques-Victor-Albert,4e duc de Broglie, ConservativeFrench statesman and man
of letters who served twice as head of the government during the early crucial years of
the Third French Republic, but failed to prepare the way for the return of a king. He
wrote the incompleted L ' ~ ~ l i s eet I'empire romain au IF2 si8cle, 6 vols (1856-66).
32. L. Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et Classes dangereuses a Paris duns la premiBre
moitii du XIXe sikcle, Paris, 1982.
33. P. Berger, The Social Reality of Religion, London, 1969; Thomas and Znaniecki, The
Polish Peasant in Europe andAmerica.
34. H.D. Loock, ed., Seelsorge und Diakonie in Berlin, Berlin, 1990; D.B. McIlhiney, 'A
Gentleman in Every Slum: Church of England Missions in East London 1837-19 l4',
Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1977.
35. G.A. Beck, ed., The English Catholics, 1850-1 950, London, 1950.
36. E.R. Norman, Anti-Catholicism in Ectorian England, London, 1968.
37. C. KleBmann, Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet 1870-1945: Soziale Integration
und nationale Subkultur einer Minderheit in der deutschen Industriegesellschaft, Gottingen,
1978.
38. C. Field, 'The Social Structure of English Methodism', British Journal of Sociology28
(1977), pp. 199ff.
Bibliography
Allardt, E. 'Factors Explaining Variations and Changes in the Strength of Finnish Radicalism',
in Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology.Washington, DC, 1962.
Balle-Petersen,M. Gudsfolk iDanmark: nogle synspunkterpti studiet af religi0segrupper.
Lyngby, 1977.
Baxter, J. 'The Great Yorkshire Revival 1792-6', in Sociological Yearbook of Religion in
Britain 7. London, 1974.
Beck, G,A. (ed.) The English Catholics, 1850-1950. London, 1950.
Bensimon, D. 'Aspects of the Abandonment of Religious Practice in the French Jewish
Milieu. Preliminary Results of an Inquiry', Social Compass 18(197I), pp. 413-25.
Berger, P. The Social Reality of Religion. London, 1969.
Biglers, R.M. The Politics of German Protestantism: The Rise of the Protestant Church
Elite in Prussia 1815-1 848. Berkeley, CA, 1972.
RELIGIONBETWEEN STATEAND SOCIETY 273
Bjerrn, C. 'De folkelige bevaegelser i Danmark', Fortid og Nutid 26 (1976), pp. 346-57.
Breistein, D. Hans Nielsen Hauge, Merchant of Bergen: Christian Belief and Economic
Activity. Bergen, 1955.
Brennan, T., Cooney, E.W. and Pollins, M. Social Change in South-West Wales.London,
1954.
Brunt, L. 'The "Kleine Luyden" as a Disturbing Factor in the Emancipation of the Orthodox
Calvinists (Gereformeerden)in the Netherlands', Sociologica Neerlandica 8 (1972),
pp. 89-102.
Charlton, D. Secular Religions in France. Oxford, 1963.
Charpin, F. Pratique religieuse et formation d'une grande ville: Marseilles 1806-1956.
Paris, 1964.
Chevalier, L. Classes laborieuses et Classes dangereuses a Paris dans lapremidre moitie'
du XIXe si8cle. Paris, 1982
Christensen,A.E. Danmarks Historic. Kkbnhavn, 1992.
Clausen, H.P. et al., Kulturelle, politiske og religierse bev~gelseri det 19. Arhundrede.
khus, 1973.
Coleman, J.A. 'Civil Religion', Sociological Analysis 31(1970),pp. 67-77.
Cousens, S.H. 'Emigration and Demographic Change in Ireland', Economic History
Review, 2nd series, 14 (196I), pp. 275-88.
'The Regional Variations in Emigration from Ireland between 1821 and 1841', Transactions
and Papers of the Institute of British Geographers 37 (1965), pp. 15-3 0.
Dansette,A. TheReligious History of Modern France. New York, NY, 1962.
Davies, C. Religion in the Industrial Revolution in South Wales.Cardiff, 1965.
Evans, E.L. The German Center Party 1870-1933: A Study in Political Catholicism. Carbondale,
IL, 1981.
Evans, R.J. 'Religion and Society in Modem Germany', European Studies Review 12
(1982), pp. 249-88.
Field, C. 'Methodism in Metropolitan London 1820-192OY,Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, 1975.
'The Social Structure of English Methodism', British Journal of Sociology 28 (1977), pp.
199ff.
Glaedemark, H.J.H. Kirkeforfatningssporgsmaalet i Danrnark, indtil 1874: En historiskkirkeretlig
studie. Kabnhavn, 1948.
Goguel, F. 'Religion et politique en France', Re'vue franqaise de science politique 16
(1966), pp. 1174ff.
Gusfield, J. Svensk Kyrkogeographi. Malmo, 1966.
Gustafsson, G.Religion och Politik. Lund, 1967.
Hassing, A. 'Methodism in Norwegian Society', Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University,
1973.
Hiibinger, G. 'Kulturprotestantismus und Politik. Zum Verhaltnis von Liberalismus und
Protestantismus, Biirgerliche und liberaler Revisionismus im wilhelmischen Deutschland',
in Religion und Gesellschaft im 19.Jahrhundert, ed. W. Schieder. Stuttgart, 1993.
Inglis, K.S. Churches and the Working Classes in Kctorian England. London, 1963.
Isambert, F.A. Christianisme et classe ouvri2re. Paris, 1961.
Jemolo,A.C. Church and State in Italy 1850-1950. Oxford, 1969.
Kaser, G. 'L'eveil du sentimentnational. R61e du piktisme dans la naissancedu patriotisme',
Archives de sociologie des religions 12 (1966), pp. 59-80.
Ken, H.H. Switzerland: Social Cleavages and Partisan Conflict. London, 1974.
Kjar, K. 'Free Churches in Denmark', Ph.D. thesis, University of Copenhagen, 1968.
KlelJmann, C. Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet 1870-1945: Soziale Integration und
nationale Subkultur einer Minderheit in der deutschen Industriegesellschaft. GZittingen,
1978.
274 HENKVAN DIJK
Larkin, E. 'The Devotional Revolution in Ireland, 1850-1875', American Historical
Review 77 (1972), pp. 625ff.
-The Roman Catholic Church and the Home Rule Movement in Ireland, 1870-1874.
Chapel Hill, NC, 1990.
Lindhardt, P.G. Vcekkelse og kirkelige retninger. Arhus, 1977.
Loock, H.D. (ed.). Seelsorge und Diakonie in Berlin. Berlin, 1990.
McIlhiney, D.B. 'A Gentleman in Every Slum: Church of England Missions in East London
1837-19 l4', Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1977.
McLeod, D.H. 'Class, Community and Religion: The Religious Geography of Nineteenth
Century England', Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain 6 (1973), pp. 29-73.
-Religion and Class in the Kctorian City. London, 1974.
-'Secular Cities? Berlin, London, and New York in the Later Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth Centuries', in Religion and Modernization, ed. S. Bruce. Oxford, 1992, pp,
59-89, p. 66.
Mulder, L.H. Revolte derfijnen: een studie omtrent de Aficheiding van 1834 als sociaal
conflict en sociale beweging met een bronnenonderzoek in een achttal Friese dorpsgebieden.
Meppel, 1973.
Norman, E.R. Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England. London, 1968.
Parsons, T. 'Sociology of Religion', inAction Theory andthe Human Condition, ed. T. Parsons.
New York, NY, 1978, pp. 167-324.
Pontoppidan Thyssen, A. 'De religiose bevagelsers samfundskritik og den demokratiske
udvikling', in Kulturelle, religime ogpolitiske bevcegelser i det 19. Brhundrede, ed. A.
Pontoppidan Thyssen, H.P. Clausen and P. Meyer (Det Larde Selskabs publikationsserie,
Ny serie I). Arhus, 1973.
Righart, H. De katholieke zuil in Europa: Het ontstaan van verzuiling onder katholieken in
Oostenrijk, Zwitserland, Belgie en Nederland. Amsterdam, 1986.
Royle, E. Radicals, Secularists and Republicans: Popular Fveethought in Britain,
1866-191 5. Manchester, 1980.
Royle, S. and Royle, E. The Infidel Tradition: From Paine to Bradlaugh. London, 1976.
Rydenfelt, S. Kommunismen i Sverige. Lund, 1954.
Schieder, W. 'Religion in der Sozialgeschichte', in Sozialgeschichte in Deutschland, ed. V.
Sellin. Gottingen, 1987.
Semmel, B. The Methodist Revolution. London, 1974.
Tennstedt, F. Sozialgeschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland: Vom 18. Jahrhundert bis
zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Gottingen, 1981.
Thomas, W.I. and Znaniecki, I. The Polish Peasant in Europe andAmerica, 2 vols. New
York, NY, 1927.
Thompson, E.P. The Making of the English Working Class, 2nd edn. Harmondsworth, 1968.
Tiegland, G. 'Study of the Haugean Movement as a case study of mobilisation', Ph.D. thesis,
Bergen University, 1970.
Todd, E. L 'invention de I'Europe. Paris, 1990.
Wehler, H.U. Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte. Gottingen, 1975.
Wilson, B.R. Religion in a Secular Society. London, 1966.