8 Narratives of media history
revisited
Introduction
It was chance that took me to see Copenhagen, a play that re-enacts, from different
perspectives, fateful interchanges between a D a n i s h and G e r m a n physicist during
the 1930s and 1940s. I t gave me the idea o f presenting British media history as a
series o f competing narratives i n the opening chapter of m y book Media and Power?
T h i s oudine subsequendy provided the organising framework for a good collection
of essays on media history.I
n adopting an unconventional formula for a Hterature review, I was responding
to w h a t seemed to me to be three underlying problems. British media history is
highly fragmented, being subdivided by period, m e d i u m and interpretative strand.
It is often narrowly centred o n media institutions and content, leaving the w i d e r
setting of society as a shadowy background. A n d media history has not become
as central i n media studies as one might have expected, given that it is a grandparent
o f the field. So I was looking for a way o f integrating medium history into
general accounts of media development, and o f connecting these to the 'mainframe'
^ o f general history. I was also seeking to convey h o w media history illuminates the
^ ^ role of the media i n society - i n the present, as well as the past,
•g g I n returning to the subject o f m y essay some seven years after it was first written,
2 ^ I shall attempt to do two things. I w i l l briefly restate the essay's central themes,
though i n a n e w way by concentrating primarily on recent research. I vinll also
-r£Q suggest, w i t h great diffidence, possible n e w directions i n w h i c h media history might
° I develop i n the future, including the reclaiming of'lost narratives'.
I - r~-
o
2.2 Dominant tradition
of a
i ^ A n y review o f British media history must begin w i t h its leading and longest-estabg'
g lished interpretation — the Uberal narrative.This was first scripted, i n its initial form,
3 ^ i n the nineteenth century and comes out of the hallowed tradition of 'constituQ
[2 tional' history w h i c h examines the development o f Britain's pofitical system from
A n g l o - S a x o n times to the present.
K e y landmarks i n Britain's constitutional evolution are said to be the defeat
of absolutist monarchy, the establishment of the rule o f law, the strengthening o f
parliament and the introduction of mass democracy i n five, cautious, instalments. I t
124 Media and history
e g
•O
i g
2 m for the dynamic forces o f t h e 'new society'; that is to say, the expanding middle
51
c
is also claimed that the media acquired a 'constitutional' role by becoming the voice
o f t h e people and a popular check on government.
T h e media's constitutional elevation is usually described i n terms o f two intertwined
narrative themes. T h e first recounts h o w the press became fi-ee o f government
control by the mid-nineteenth century, followed by the liberation o f fiilm and
broadcasting i n the mid-twentieth century. T h e second theme is concerned w i t h
h o w Uberated media empowered the people. R e c e n t historical w o r k has focused on
the latter, so this is what w e shall concentrate upon.
T h e r e is broad agreement among Hberal media historians that the rise of a more
independent press changed the tenor and dynamics of E n g h s h politics. Newspapers
increased their political content during the eighteenth century, and successfiiUy
defied during the 1760s the ban on the reporting of parHament. T h i s enabled
newspapers to shine a low-wattage light on the previously private w o r l d o f aristocratic
politics. People outside the poHtical system could observe, through the press,
factional battles among their rulers. H o w spectators reacted to these battles began to
matter, as increasing references i n the later eighteenth century to the wider public
testify. I n a more general sense, the rise o f the press was part of a profound shifi: i n
w h i c h it came to be accepted that the general public had the right to debate and
evaluate the actions o f their rulers. Some publications also direcdy attacked c o r r u p tion
and oligarchy, functioning as pioneer watchdogs monitoring the abuse o f official
power. I n short, the growth o f public disclosure through the press rendered the
governmental system more open and accountable.''
T h e expansion o f t h e press after the end o f Hcensing i n 1694 also contributed,
it is argued, to the building o f a representative institution. D u r i n g the eighteenth
centur}', newspapers mushroomed i n different parts o f the country and expanded
their readership. A n increased number o f newspapers published views as well as
news reports, seeking to speak for their readers. B y the 1850s, following a period o f
rapid expansion and enhanced independence, the press allegedly came of age as an
E o empowering agency. Its thunder echoed d o w n the corridors o f power.
However, the central unanswered question at the heart o f this eloquent hberal
narrative is preciselyfuSo^^as being represented by this 'empowering' press. A
% T. much-favoured answer used to be that the expanding press was speaking primarily
classes and urban w o r k i n g class brought into being by rapid economic growth
^: 1 i n the 'first industrial n a t i o n ' . T h i s interpretation stressed the progressive nature
o f t h e evolving press^_the way i n w h i c h it broke fi-ee from the political agenda o f
the landed elite and supported campaigns to reform the institutions o f the British
aristocratic state. Indeed, i n some versions o f this argument, the growing power o f
the press both reflected the changed balance o f social forces i n British society and
2 " contributed to the building o f a new, post-aristocratic poUtical settlement.
^ >> T h i s beguiUng interpretation has been undermined from two different direc®
^ tions. Revisionist histories o f nineteenth-century Britain increasingly emphasise
continuity rather than radical change. T h e y point to the embedded nature of the
ancien regime before the extension o f the franchise; the powerful puU o f Anglicanism,
localism and tradition; the incremental, uneven riatire o f the industrial revolution;
and, above aU, the landed ehte's continued dominance o f pohtical hfe until late
Narratives of media history revisited 125
i n the nineteenth century.^ Meanwhile historical studies o f the press have drawn
attention to the continuing importance o f the conservative press ( w h i c h greatly
strengthened i n Q i F last quarter of the eighfee:iith century), the enormous diversity
o f nineteenth-century newspapers and the tenuous evidence that the press
strongly influenced pohtical ehtes and pubhc policy, save i n special circumstances.''
T h e thesis that an independent press, representative o f a transformed society, helped
to forge a n e w political order is n o w widely disputed.
So w h o m did the press represent? T h e undermining o f the claim that the later
Hanoverian press represented a progressive social alliance has encouraged a return
to a traditionahstWhig v i e w o f t h e press as the voice o f an indeterminate 'public'.
Typical o f this shift is H a n n a h Barker's n o w standard textbook, w h i c h argues that
newspapers gained a larger and more socially diverse readership and came to be
shaped primarily by their customers i n the absence of strict government censorship.
' T h e importance o f sales to newspaper profits', she vwites, 'forced papers to
echo the views o f their readers i n order to thrive.'^ B y 1855, she concludes,'the
newspaper press i n England was largely free o f government interference and was
able — w i t h some justification — to proclaim itself as the fourth estate o f t h e British
constitution'.^ I n her view, the press informed and represented pubhc opinion and
made it a powerful poUtical force.**
However, some hberal historians remain rightly uneasy about v i e w i n g the press
as the voice o f an undefined (and indivisible) pubhc. Jeremy Black, for example,
argues that 'the press was at best a limited guide to the opinions of the public' and
should be viewed as connecting to 'public opinions rather than public opinion'.
T h i s more nuanced v i e w enables h i m to conclude that 'pubhc culture' (in w h i c h
the press was central) became less representative o f political difference during the
post-Chartist e r a . " O t h e r liberal historians point to the growing interpenetration
o f journalism and politics i n the second half o f the nineteenth century and
S g2 early twentieth century, w h e n m u c h o f t h e press became an extension o f t h e party
Si OO
g ^ system." Indeed, the liberal historian^tephen Koss concludes that the British press
O S did_,nolbecoitiie fuUy independent, and subject to popular control, until the late
11 1940s and 1950s.^-^
'•B T. B u t i f the W h i g conception o f t h e press as a fourth estate looks vulnerable, there
S § is another interpretation waiting i n the wings. I n 1982, B r i a n H a r r i s o n wrote an ^^'n/^
erudite essay assessing the role o f t h e pressure-group periodical i n the nineteenth /p^^-^-fCX-lS^^l
'anH twentieth centuries. H e showed that these modest, and widely overlooked, 'J
publications helped to sustain pressure groups 'through three major functions:
inspirational, informative and integrating'." T h e y inspired some people to j o i n or
g g support a public-interest group; they armed activists w i t h factual ammunition and
strengthened their resolve; and they could build bridges, helping to unify reforming
g 2 movements. B y contributing to the functioning and effectiveness o f pressure
U'g. groups, the minority pohtical press contributed to the development o f a maturing
_r»5
O a
. S
—' a
cafe
democracy.
T h i s is an important hne o f argument that can n o w be extended, w i t h the
help o f more recent research, to the earlier period. T h e eighteenth-century press
provided the oxygen o f pubhcity for pohtical campaigning centred on petitions,
addresses, instructions (to M P s ) , public meetings and concerted demonstrations.^'
126 Media and history
These fostered a 'modern' style of politics based on pubhc discussion and participation,
rather than on personal relationships, chentelist networks and social deference.
Sections o f t h e press aided this n e w poUtics by conferring prominence on leading
campaigners, by communicating their arguments and demands and by mobihsing
pubhc support. T h e y contributed i n other words to building a democratic infrastructure
of representation based on collective organisations.
I n the nineteenth century, radical newspapers contributed to the growth o f trade
unions; reformist papers sustained a growing multiphcity o f interest groups and
a^ iiew, party-ahgned press helped to transform aristocratic Tactions i n parhament
into mass pohtical parties.This last development — often attracting disapproval from
liberal press historians - represented a crucial contribution to the building o f a
key institution of democracy. PoUtical parties became key co-ordinating organisations
w i t h i n the British poUtical system: they aggregated social interests, f o r m u lated
political programmes that distributed costs and redistributed resources across
society and defined pohtical choices for the electorate.'*
^ ^ v i e w ofdie^press as an agency contributing to the building o f civil society^
is subtly different from, a n d more persuasive than, a traditional conception o f
the press as the representative organ o f public opinion. Arguments and evidence
supporting this alternative interpretation are to be found i n numerous r a d i c a l " as
w e l l as liberal accounts.'^ These portray the press as contributing to the development
o f civil-society organisations through which different pubUcs were represented.
Implicitly, they also depict civil society rather than the press as the m a i n locus o f
representation.
M a r k H a m p t o n has revised traditional Uberal press history i n another way. I n
a notable book, he documents the m i d - V i c t o r i a n eUte vision of an educative
press that w o u l d induct large numbers of people into 'poUtics by discussion'. T h i s
"giveaway, he shows, to growing disenchantment w h e n newspapers became more
commercial and sensational, and large numbers of people turned away from 'liberal'
§ enlightenment. After 1880, the educational ideal was increasingly replaced by a
D S v i e w o f t h e press as a representative institution - something that H a m p t o n , drawing
i ® on radical press history, largely rejects.'^
H e has since written an essay that can be read as an account-setding epilogue to
S m his book.^" I n effect, he concludes that the twentieth-century press may not have
measured up to the unreal expectations of Victorian visionaries, nor fulfdled the
I heroic destiny assigned to it i n W h i g history, yet neither should the press's d e m o o
O
en
o cratic role be written off as an illusion. T h e r e were times during the twentieth
-S^.a century - most notably during the South African War, at the onset o f the C o l d War
I I i n the 1940s and during the 1970s debate about economic management - w h e n
'^J^ the British press offered multiple perspectives. T h i s enriched public debate and
I 2 manifestly contributed to the functioning of democracy.
U "g. Some Uberal historians also argue that the educational mission of the press may
® ^ have faltered, but it was absorbed by radio and television. T h e rise of pubUc-service
broadcasting^it^is claimed, diminished the knowledge gap between efites S i d t h e
general pubUc; aided recipfo^aTcoinmuSication between social groups; and fostered^
the development o f a policy-based discourse o f rational democratic debate, o r i e n tated
towards the pubhc good.-'
Narratives of media history revisited 127
O n e counter-charge to this is that puWic-service broadcasting was locked
into a paternahstic style o f journahsm, a v i e w that is i n effect endorsed by H u g h
C h i g n e l l . ^ However, his contention is that B B C radio introduced more popular
styles o f journahsm, particularly during the 1960s, i n response to social change,
competition and the possibihties created by n e w technology. T h i s popularisation
produced a furious reaction from elite critics, w h o were placated i n the 1970s by
the development o f a more analytical, research-based form o f journahsm on B B C
R a d i o 4. T h e imphcation o f this study is that the B B C learned to develop different
registers o f journalism, w h i c h responded to the orientation o f different audiences.
Liberal media historians have usually shrugged off criticism by ignoring it. B o t h
H a m p t o n and Chignell signify a change by registering and partly accepting critical
arguments originating from outside the canon. I n doing so, they are contributing to
the development of a more guarded and persuasive hberal interpretation o f media
history.
Feminist challenge
_ <=>
I S
«3 OO
p
2 to
SO
T h e dominance o f the liberal narrative is n o w challenged by the rise of feminist
media history. T h i s argues that the media did not become fiilly'independent'when
they became free of government, because they remained under male control. A n d
far from empowering the people, the media contributed to the oppression o f half
the population. T h i s feminist interpretation is thus not merely different from the
liberal one but direcdy contradicts it.
It comes out of a historical tradition that documents the subordination of w o m e n
i n the early m o d e r n period, w h e n wives, without ready access to divorce, could be
lawfully beaten and confined by their husbands, and w h e n w o m e n did not have the
same social standing or legal rights as m e n . I t describes the struggle for women's
emancipation and advance as a qualified success story i n w h i c h w o m e n gained
n e w legal protections, greater independence and improved opportunities, but i n a
context where there is not yet full gender equaHty. Its account of the development
of media history is told as an accompaniment to this narrative.
Feminist media history is n o w the fastest-growing version of media history. T h i s
return visit w i l l thus focus attention on recent w o r k that is revising the pioneer
version o f feminist media history.
T h i s pioneer version argued that popular media indoctrinated w o m e n into
acce£migA.siib£JEdinate..pQsitiorLin.i^ It did this primarily by portraying m e n
and w o m e n as having different social roles — m e n as breadwinners and participants
i n public life and w o m e n as mothers and housewives. A s the Ladies' Cabinet,
a leading women's j o u r n a l , apostrophised i n 1847: w o m a n 'is given to m a n as his
better angel ... to make home delightful and Ufe joyous' and serve as a 'mother to
make citizens for e a r t h ' . T h i s understanding o f t h e proper role of w o m e n was
justified i n terms o f t h e innate ('natural') difierences between the sexes and, i n the
earher period, by divine providence. D u r i n g the course o f the nineteenth century,
this gender discourse was strengthened by being articulated to discourses o f class
and progress. Images o f femininity were hnked to those o f affluent elegance, w h i l e
understandings o f domestic duty were associated w i t h the moral improvement o f
128 Media and history
society. Traditional gender norms were upheld also by family custom, peer-group
pressure and education, and rendered still more coercive by being reproduced i n
mass entertainment - including media produced specially for women.
T h i s pioneer version also stressed the underlying continuity o f patriarchal
representations o f gender from the nineteenth through to the late twentieth
century. 1 h e ' m a i n cohce^^ were defined, according to this account,
as courtship, marriage, motherhood, h o m e - m a k i n g and looking good.There were
m i n o r shifts o f emphasis over the years (for example, a stress on being a professional
housewife and mother i n the 1930s,'make do and m e n d ' i n the 1940s and
'shop and spend' i n the 1950s). B u t the central media message remained, it is
argued, essentially the same. Women's concerns were projected as being p r i m a rily
romantic and domestic; m e n and w o m e n were depicted as being innately
different; and w o m e n w h o transgressed gender norms were generally portrayed
i n an unfavourable light. T h e functionalist cast o f this argument is typified by
Janet T h u m i m ' s analysis of post-war f i l m . ' O u r exploration o f popular filins', she
concludes,'shows that screen representations i n the period 1 9 4 5 - 6 5 performed a
consistently repressive function i n respect o f w o m e n . T h e r e are, simply, no depictions
of autonomous, independent w o m e n either inside or outside the structure
o f the family, w h o survive unscathed at the narrative's close.'^'' Popular media, i n
short, consistently sustained patriarchy.
T h i s stress on continuity is n o w being challenged w i t h i n the feminist tradition.
First, revisionist research is drawing attention to ^Qjn^n's active resistance to
patriarchal domination through the creation o f their o w n media.^^ I n particular,
Michelle Tusan shows i n a ground-breaking book that the women's press grew out
of women's associations and single-issue campaigns i n Victorian Britain. Originating
i n the 1850s, the women's press confounded L o r d Northchffe's observation that
' w o m e n can't w r i t e and don't want to read'^'' by gaining a significant readership
before the First W o r l d War. Its leading publications reported news that was not
g covered i n the mainstream press, developed women-centred pohtical agendas and
Q o advanced alternative understandings of society. E v e n w h e n the women's press was
i n decline during the 1920s, it stiU boasted the early Time and Tide, a weekly that
u
eS OO
'M published a satirical 'Man's Page' and thoughtful commentary by leading feminists
S § from Virginia W o o l f to Rebecca West. Echpsed i n the 1930s, the feminist press was
reborn i n the 1970s.
g Second, increasing references are made to the advance o f wronen w i t h i n med^
organisations. T h u s , D a v i d Deacon documents h o w female journaUsts, mosdy firom
^_^.S3' privileged backgrounds and w i t h influential male patrons, made a breakthrough
i n the 1930s by breaching a traditional male preserve: the reporting o f war. E v e n
so, female journahsts were stiU encouraged to concentrate on the everyday hves o f
g 2 ordinary people and to report war as an extended human-interest s t o r y . Y e t , by the
u-g. 2000s, w o m e n had risen to positions o f increasing prominence w i t h i n the British
® ^ media.^«
T h i r d , revisionist research argues that representations o f gender changed i n
meaningful ways.itLresponse to w i d e r changes i n society.Thus, A d r i a n B i i i g H a m
attacks the standard v i e w that the popular press sought to contain the advance
o f w o m e n during the interwar period.^'' A narrow focus on women's pages, he
Narratives of media history revisited 129
argues, ignores the diversity o f viewpoints that were expressed i n the m a i n body
of popular daily papers. A l t h o u g h reactionary sentiments were sometimes voiced,
the prevailing v i e w expressed i n the interwar press was that there should be
no going back to the p r e - w a r era. Women's increased freedom from restrictive
social codes and dress was generally welcomed; successfiil w o m e n i n pubhc and
professional life were depicted both prominendy and positively; the greater i n d e pendence,
assertiveness and athleticism o f ' m o d e r n w o m e n ' was w i d e l y presented
as being part o f a generational change and an inevitable step towards greater
gender coiwergence; there was an increased stress on the need for a c o m p a n ionate
marriage and for an appropriate adjustment o f traditional male behaviour;
and w o m e n were invested, i n a variety o f ways, w i t h greater prestige (not least as
n e w l y enfranchised citizens).
However, this scholarly study acknowledges that change was not unidirectional
or across the board. Fashion, housewifery and motherhood stiU dominated women's
pages. T h e women's movement was under-reported; feminism itself was frequently
said to be outdated and 'superfluous'; and the R o t h e r m e r e press opposed votes
for w o m e n under thirty. W o m e n were more often presented i n sexualised ways,
w h i c h had no counterpart for men. B u t although Bingham's assessment stresses
complexity and diversity, his conclusion is that the interwar popular press adopted,
overall, a more enlightened v i e w o f gender.
I n passing, it should be noted that revisionists are not having it entirely their
o w n w a y . T h u s , Michael Bailey looks at radio's response to 'gender modernisation'
during the same era as B i n g h a m but reaches a significandy different conclusion.
L i k e the press, the B B C also encouraged w o m e n to be efficient housewives and
informed mothers during the interwar period. However, Bailey argues that the
B B C ' s briefing was more than just helpful advice since, implicitly, it was also a way
of m a k i n g w o m e n internalise a sense o f domestic duty and feel guilty i f they fell
short o f t h e standards expected o f ' m o d e r n w o m e n ' . T h e B B C ' s domestic educa£
^ tion is thus viewed by h i m as psychologically coercive and strongly traditionahst i n
Q g reaffirming women's place i n the home.^"
i ° F o u r t h , revisionist research has d r a w n attention to the ambiguity or 'textual
tension' o f some media representations. T h i s argument is not n e w and can be
c3 0 0
^ I —
§ m found i n earlier studies o f eighteenth-century ballads,^' nineteenth-century
women's magazines,^^ and twentieth-century women's fdms^^ - all media, it is
argued, w h i c h sometimes provided a space i n w h i c h w o m e n could imagine a
different gender order or express a veiled f o r m o f protest. B u t w h i l e this a r g u ment
is not original, it has become both more prominent and more explicitly
g I l i n k e d to social change. F o r example, D e b o r a h Philips and Ian H a y w o o d draw
"^J^ attention to popular 1950s women's novels w h i c h featured w o m e n doctors.^*
g Z, These heroines were held up for admiration and were even portrayed as builders
d " ^ of a brave n e w w o r l d represented by the post-1945 welfare state. B u t they were
also presented as being traditionally feminine, and their careers were implicitly
v i e w e d as being an extension o f women's traditional caring role. T h e s e books,
according to Philips and H a y w o o d , were pleasurable because they offered a
mythological resolution o f conflicting impulses, one embracing change and the
other harking back to the past.
o u
11
130 Media and history
D e b o r a h Philips extends this argument i n a subsequent study.''^ I n her account,
1980s 'sex-and-shopping' novels celebrated women's advance, without questioning
the structures of power that held back w o m e n . T h e 'Aga-saga' novels o f the 1990s
reverted to domesticated romance, w h i l e expressing unmistakeable dissatisfaction
w i t h contemporary men. A n d some early 2000s 'chick-Ut' novels depicted
successful w o m e n i n search of stiU more successful m e n . A U these novels responded,
accorcUng to Phillips, to contradictions i n contemporary female sensibiUty.
Fifth, revisionist research points to a different denouement of the feminist narrative.
Instead o f arguing that media representations o f gender remained fundamentaUy
the same, the case is riow being made more often that a cumulative sea change
took place from the early 1980s onwards. A growing number of T V series — made
or shown i n Britain - depicted independent w o m e n w i t h successful careers as being
strong, capable and also appealing, indeed as people to identify with.^'" Teen magazines
emerged that expressed female sexuality i n new, more open ways.^^ However,
some traditionalist representations o f gender also persisted.^^ Depictions could also
mislead by implying that gender equaUty had been achieved: indeed, as one analyst
w r y l y notes, w o m e n i n the fictional w o r l d o f television have advanced further
than w o m e n i n real life.^' Some seemingly'progressive' lifestyle journalism also had
conservative undertones, urging w o m e n to take control o f their lives i n i n d i v i d u alistic
ways rather than seeking to change society through coUective action.^" A n d
some dramas Uke the cult series Sex and the City (1998-2004) expressed conservative
consumerist values, w h i l e also staging a debate about w h a t w o m e n should
expect out o f life.'*' Its success was emblematic of a more questioning media o r i e n tation
towards gender relations at the turn o f the century, compared w i t h even
twenty years before.
T h i s feminist narrative, i n its revised form, does not question the historical role
o f t h e media i n socialising w o m e n into the norms o f patriarchy. B u t the contours
2 p2 oTthis narrative, and its ending, are changing i n response to n e w research. Historical
£ o w o r k o n the development o f mascufinity is also developing i n a w a y that shadows,
Q o and supports, the feminist narrative.'*^ I n short, a n e w way of v i e w i n g the media's
-a ts
i g evolution has come into being that takes account of one of the most important
- 0^ social developments o f t h e last 150 years - the advance o f w o m e n . I t is leading to
the rewriting of media history.
-a
o a
w 2
Radical challenge
T h e liberal tradition is also assailed from another direction. R a d i c a l media histog
i rians attack the same vulnerable point o f the liberal narrative as feminist critics: its
•^^^ assumption that the media switched allegiances from government to the people
g S w h e n the media became 'free' o f official control. R a d i c a l ^ i g ^ a history argues that,
u "g. on the contrary, mainstream media remained integrated into the underlying power
structure and continued to support the sjociaLorder.'*^
T h i s version o f media history comes primarily out o f a historical account that
records the rise o f an organised working-class movement i n the first half o f the
nineteenth century. T h i s movement became more radical, w o n increasing support
and developed its o w n popular press, w h i c h conferred publicity on working-class
Narratives of media history revisited 131
institutions and radical causes and encouraged its readers to v i e w society i n more
critical ways. B u t early working-class militants, and their heirs, were defeated. A n d ,
subsequendy, the w i n n i n g o f equal citizenship, through mass enfranchisement, did
not lead to the creation o f an equal society.'*'' R a d i c a l media liistory seeks to shed
hght o n this by focusing on how, i n its view, the media were 'tamed' even w h e n they
ceased to be government controlled.
I n essence, its explanation boils down to three arguments. First, the market developed
as a system o f control (not as an engine of freedom, as i n the liberal narrative).
T h e rise of mass-market newspaper entry costs i n the period 1850—1918 contributed
to the consolidation o f unrepresentative, capitahst control o f the press (and
also o f t h e music haU and later film and television industries). T h e media's growing
dependence on advertising also disadvantaged the left, w h i l e the development o f
media concentration curtailed choice.
Second^ elites e ^ ^ o n the media through informal processes. A
m o d e r n apparatus of news management developed, beginning w i t h the 'introduction'
o f the lobby system i n 1885 and culminating i n the enormous expansion
of state public relations i n the period after 1980. Informal alliances were forged
between press controllers and governments, as during the Chamberlain and
Thatcher eras. Above aU, elites set the parameters o f pohtical debate i n broadcasting
tlirough their ascendancy over state institutions, especially parliament.
T h i r d , dornimnt groups also influenced the culture o f society, and j n this w a y
shaped the~content of the media. T h e prevaihng ideas o f t h e time — the intensification
o f nationahsm i n the eighteenth century, the rise o f imperialism i n the
nineteenth century, the diffusion of anti-communism during the C o l d W a r and the
triumphahst neo-liberalism that followed - have tended to uphold, impUcitiy or
exphcitly, the prevailing social order.
T h i s narrative has been usefully synthesised i n a recent e s s a y . A n d it continues
to be embelhshed by n e w research. Examples include a study o f the radical press
I § during its triumphant Chartist phase ;''^ an illuminating study of the role of the
D g media i n the transformation of Q u e e n Victoria into the 'Mother of her People' and
i g symbol of imperial and industrial greatness;''^ and a radical, Foucauldian analysis o f
'•B T. h o w the B B C sought to 'train and reform the unemployed as docile but efficient
i 0 0
§ citizens' during the 1930s.''*
O t)
T h i s historical tradition has unstitched the more vulnerable seams of traditional
J - ^ liberal history. I t also makes an insightful contribution to a historical understanding
of w h y socialism was defeated i n Britain. B u t it suffers from one central defectnts^
'^_^.S3 failure to acknowledge that the reformist heirs o f the early working-class m o v e ment
succeeded i n the twentieth century i n changing significandy the social order.
"Moreover, a progressive aUiance did so partly as a consequence o f securing an
^ § extensive hearing - even support - from part ofthe media system. Misleading arguO
" ^ ments about the 'refeudahsation o f society' after 1850, linked to a very simphstic
sketch o f a subordinated media system, as i n Jiirgen Habermas' classic radical
account,^** no longer seem satisfactory - even to the author himself^" I n short, the
traditional radical narrative needs to pay more attention to political success rather
than to failure and to the media's involvement i n progressive change. To this, w e
shall return.
132 Media and history
Populist challenge
T h e populist interpretation o f media history describes the development o f the
media as aprolonged escape story - not from government but from a cultural elite
w h i c h once controlled the media and w h i c h sought to foist its taste and cultural
judgements on the people. I t recounts h o w the public demanded entertainment i n
place o f uphft, and largely prevailed as a consequence of the increasing c o m m e r ciahsation
of the media.
T h i s interpretation connects to two themes i n the general history o f Britain. Its
description o f a revolt against a cultural ehte is part of a more general account of the
erosion o f deference to authority (whether based on birth, wealth, age, education or
occupation). A n d its celebration of the 'egalitarian' power of the media consumer
connects to a more general narrative that describes the rise o f a consumer society
and the alleged subversion o f class authority by consumer power.
T h e core of this media narrative is provided by specialist studies that record the
triumphs o f the entertainment-seeking pubhc over high-minded V i c t o r i a n elites
and their heirs: registered for example i n the advent of the 'new journalism' i n the
1880s, the stocking o f light fiction i n Edwardian public hbraries, the expansion
o f popular music on 1940s and 1960s radio and the cumulative popularisation
of television. T h i s narrative has as a subsidiary theme an historical account of the
pleasure people derived from the media.
N e w studies continue to fill out this narrative. T h u s a recent study o f the rise o f
a consumer society i n nineteenth-century Britain portrays the growth o f popular
journahsm as part o f an efflorescence of'bright colour, hght and entertainment' i n
w h i c h life became more fun, fuller and richer — enhanced by the retail revolution
and the rise o f football, mass tourism, bestseUing books and the music haU.^'
Similarly, another populist study argues that the expansion of popular music
o ^ through the gramophone, radio and dance hall immeasurably improved the quality
g » of hfe i n interwar Britain, just as cheap food, electricity and better housing did. T h e
^ ? enormous pleasure derived €rom popular music was allegedly a direct consequence
g of its commerciahsation. ' I n an important sense', writes James Nott, 'the apphcation
2 ^ ofthe profit motive to cultural production was democratic.'''^ I t meant that music was
^ ;zi directed towards what people wanted, rather than what disapproving — and some_r£2
times snobbish and racist - cultural gatekeepers thought was worthy. Nott also argues
S I that commercial popular music during this period had vitality, affirmed the ordinary,
7^ I connected to popular romanticism and produced sounds and songs that have lasted.
S^'*', Likewise, Jeffrey Millard contrasts the patrician and paternahstic sentiments
g"| o f those w h o shaped the development of a public-service broadcasting regime
(including commercial television) i n the 1950s and 1960s w i t h the opportunities
B% for pleasurable fiilfiknent created by multiple digital television channels and video-
3 o on-demand i n the twenty-frrst c e n t u r y . T h i s interpretative strand of media history
@f2 also continues to generate celebrations o f popular media content, as connected to
the real, lived experiences o f ordinary people.^'*
T h e popuhst tradition of media history has Umitations, and is not the dynamic
force that it was during neo-hberalism's heydayJt.does not evaluate h o w the rise o f
ejitertaitmient impinged on the democratic role ofthe media. It mistakenly equates
Narratives of media history revisited 133
consumer and_ civic equality w i t h social m it fails to
engage adequately w i t h issues of cultural quality. E v e n so, it has illuminated greatly
the life-enhancing pleasures generated by the rise of the media.
Nation building
T h e liberal, feminist, radical and populist traditions belong recognisably to the
same intellectual family. T h e y recount media history i n relation to different fprrns
of power - political, economic and social/cultural. T h e y also intersect, overlap
and confi-ont each other i n ways that indicate a troubled relationship o f affinity.
However, there are three other estabhshed narratives w h i c h have only a tangential
relationship to this core o f media history. B u t what they have to say is important.
T h e 'anthropological' narrative is inspired by the insight that the nation is pardy
a cultural construct and explores the role o f the media i n fostering an imaginary
sense o f national communion. T h e U K is i n fact a relatively 'new' nation: created
formally (though there had been a historical build-up) through the political union
o f England and Wales with Scodand i n 1707 and the constitutional union o f Britain
and Ireland i n 1801 (followed by a messy divorce w i t h most of Ireland i n 1921).
T h e emergent media system, it is argued, played a significant part i n bonding this
conglomerate o f nations and forging a sense o f being'British'.
T h u s , print media helped to foster a British national identity i n the eighteenth
century principally through Protestant bigotry and antagonism towards Catholic
France (with w h o m Britain was at w a r for m u c h o f t h e c e n t u r y ) . T h i s became
overlaid i n the nineteenth century by a sense o f imperial superiority, expressed
i n a hubristic v i e w o f national character, and i n the first half o f the twentieth
century by widely diffused images of B r i t a i n as an Arcadia.^** However, the dechne
of Protestantism and the dismandement of the empire after 1945 undermined
the traditional conception o f Britishness, while conventional visualisations o f
I S Britain as an unchanging Constable painting did not accord w i t h a n e w stress on
Q S modernity. W i t h difficulty, and still in a contested form, a weaker national identity
emerged after 1970, a time w h e n the U K joined the E E C (1973) and was exposed
to increased globahsing influences. T h i s took the f o r m o f a multicultural, m u l t i ^
§ ethnic, plural understanding o f Britishness. T h u s , the optimistic claim is that British
3 " 1 national identity, forged originally through religious hatred and racist imperialism,
"^•^ ^ evolved to include people o f all rehgions and none and to embrace people o f
different ethnic backgrounds.
R e c e n t research has extended this relatively n e w narrative, giving it greater depth
I and fine-grained detail. F o r example, James Chapman's examination o f British
historical films between the 1930s and 1990s argues persuasively that these films say
g S as m u c h about the time they were made as about the past.^^ A m o n g other things,
U his study draws attention to a deepening sense of national dechne during the 1950s.
R i c h a r d Weight's study o f patriotism between 1940 and 2000 is especially i l l u m i nating
about the attempt, Mrith strong press support, to reverse this sense o f national
decline during the 1980s through the projection o f Britain as a recuperated nation,
the victor of the short, exciting Falklands War, and further regenerated through
a return to traditional values (with an implied single ethnicity).^* T h i s failed to
•a <N
S <=>
134 Media and history
capture permanently the national imagination, Weight argues, and gave w a y by
the 1990s to a looser, more inclusive and multiple understanding of Britishness.
However, a sense of being British has always been mediated through other identities,
such as class, gender, region and membership o f t h e nations o f Scodand, Wales
and Ulster. A s Paul W a r d argues, there is an underlying continuity i n the fractured
and mediated nature o f British national identity between 1870 and the present.^''
B u t i f recent research extends existing lines of argument, it also offers a n e w
twist by giving more critical attention to identification w i t h the 'national regions'.
T h i s reorientation has given rise to ground-breaking research into Englishness.
R i c h a r d Colls argues that a sense of Englishness was buried inside the mythologising
o f t h e ' A n g l o - B r i t i s h imperial state', and came to be viewed as synonymous
w i t h Britishness. B u t this equation o f England and Britain was undermined first by
the death of imperiahsm (a project i n w h i c h aU countries o f t h e U K had a shared
investment) and then by pohtical devolution. However, the Enghsh found difficulty
i n expressing their sub-national identity partly because readily available images o f
England were so outdated. A s R i c h a r d Colls eloquently puts it,'island races, garden
hearts, industrial landscapes, ecclesiological villages, fixed properties, ordered relationships,
native peoples, cultural survivals, northern grit, southern charm, rural
redemption, rule Britannia — all these discourses persist, but w i t h less conviction'.
T h i s portrait of'Enghshness' as a buried, inarticulate sense o f commonality accords
w i t h Krishan Kumar's subsequent study, w h i c h argues that an English identity was
dehberately repressed for the sake of imperial and national unity (with clear parallels
to the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires).^'
Historical exploration o f Enghshness has been accompanied by renewed interest
in Welsh and Scots national identity (and a b o o m i n good, revisionist books about
Irish nationalism that lies outside this review). Especially notable is a study o f the
media in W a l e s . T h e Welsh region o f t h e B B C (radio) was established i n 1937; a
Welsh I T V company i n 1958; a unified Welsh B B C television service i n 1964; and
E S the Welsh television channel, Sianel Pedwar C y m r u ( S 4 C ) , i n 1982. A l l these initiaQ
g tives came about partly as a consequence o f Welsh nationahst pressure and helped
S 0 0
- a ts
i g to sustain a distinctive Welsh identity. S 4 C played an especially important role i n
'•B supporting the declining Welsh language ( w h i c h is n o w spoken by only 20 per cent
IS§ ofWelsh people).
" B u t these developments should not obscure the extent o f national (and predomi-O U
rr,
I nandy English) domination of Britain's media system. B a r l o w and associates point
out that, i n 2002, 85 per cent of daily m o r n i n g papers bought i n Wales came from
across the border.^'* I n 2003, less than 10 per cent o f t h e output o f B B C l and 2
g I and I T V l ( H T V ) was produced specifically for Welsh consumption, and m u c h of
this was accounted for by news.** W h i l e emphasising the complex factors i n play
Is i n sustaining rival national identities, this study highhghts just h o w important the
5 national integration o f the U K ' s media system has been i n supporting an overarching
British national identity.
T h e increased attention given to 'regional nationahsm' is thus an important
feature o f the w a y i n w h i c h the anthropological narrative is developing.*^ T h i s is
pardy a response to the revival of separatism and the estabhshment o f the Scottish
Parhament and Welsh National Assembly i n 1999.
o
IE
Narratives of media history revisited 135
Culture wars
T h e libertarian media narrative arises from different developments i n British
society. T h e r e was a sustained decUne o f religious behef and observance from the
later nineteenth century onwards. T h e increasing de-Christianisation o f Britain,
combined w i t h greater individualism fostered by capitalism, contributed to the
advance o f social UberaUsm i n the 1960s. T h i s was fiercely resisted by traditionaUsts,
w h o sought to turn the clock back. T h e batde between social conservatives and
social liberals that ensued provides the central theme of the Ubertarian narrative for
the second half o f the twentieth century.
T h e best-documented part o f this narrative is provided by research into the
social reaction that took place against 1960s^social UberaUsm. T h i s highUghts the^
role o f the media i n generating moral panics about a. succession o f deviant-groupsfrom
the 1960s through to theT9EUs.TTie media presented these groups i n stereotypical
ffidexaggefat ways; represented them to be part o f a deeper social malaise;
mobihsed support for authoritarian retribution; and recharged i n varied ways social
conservatism.**
R e c e n t w o r k , w i t h i n the libertarian narrative, updates this narrative and offers
a different provisional ending. T h u s , one study examines the emergence o f a n e w
k i n d o f left i n municipal poUtics - owing more to the Sixties counter-culture than
to M a r x i s m or Methodism - w h i c h was symboUcaUy annihilated i n the media
during the 1980s.Yet, its poUtical agenda and some of its once controversial policies
became almost mainstream i n the early 2000s, w h e n the Sixties generation gained
control o f leading public institutions.This outcome 'was because i n Britain — unhke
A m e r i c a - progressives were w i n n i n g major batdes i n an unacknowledged culture
war'.*''
I f this study suggests that the tide of social reaction receded after the 1980s
(though this did not extend to issues arising from immigration and terrorism
£ during the early 2000s), another survey reappraises the concept of moral panic, the
J ^ deus ex machina o f the radical libertarian narrative. Chas C r i t c h e r argues that some
•g g moral panics were prevented through opposition and~expert intervention (as i n the"
. 2 ^ '1980s, over A I D S ) ; some were deflected from authoritarian control towards h a r m
minimisation (as iri^die 1990s, over raves and ecstasy); and some led to ritualistic
— 22 illusions of effective action (as w h e n the complexities o f child abuse were reduced,
S S i n the late 1990s and early 2000s, to a hue and cry against 'stranger paedophiles').
7^ § T h e concept of moral panic, concludes Critcher, is an 'ideal type' w h i c h , i n reaUty,
^ takes different forms and has different outcomes.*** T h i s is a significandy different
« ' | position from the depiction o f t h e moral panic as a mechanism for the reassertion
i £ o f t h e 'control culture' that featured i n his earlier, co-authored work.***
§1 T h e libertarian narrative exists only i n embryonic f o r m and is i n need o f more
§ ^ w o r k and clearer definition. However, one can obtain a glimpse of h o w it can be
g) [2 projected back i n time through research into media representations of'out' groups.
These helped to establish boundaries deUneating what was acceptable.
D u r i n g the 1880s, the press supported an outcry against gay m e n (accompanied
by the strengthening o f penal legislation), followed by a comparable crusade against
lesbians i n the 1920s. Representations o f sexual minorities continued to be strongly
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136 Media and history
hostile until there was a softening o f media homophobia i n the 1960s (accompanied
by the partial decriminahsation of gay sex). E v e n so, gay people were often
presented on British television i n the 1970s as being either silly or threatening.
T h e 1980s witnessed a dichotomisation i n T V drama: positive portrayals o f gay
m e n tended to be confined to those w h o appeared reassuringly asexual, w h i l e the
sexuahsed were more often projected i n strongly negative ways. I t was only at the
turn o f t h e century that gay people were more often featured as 'ordinary'.'" T h e
symbohc turning point was the British T V series Queer As Folk (1999—2000), a
soap opera set m Manchester's gay village. I t portrayed, i n bright p r i m a r y colours, a
young generation o f gay m e n as intelhgent, attractive, heterogeneous and 'normal':
free o f shame or concealment and relatively untouched by the stigmata o f traditional
celluloid representation. T h e perspective of the series' narrative, the gaze of
its camera, even its sex scenes, normahsed rather than pathologised being gay. I t
marked a milestone of social change, followed by legislation i n the early 2000s that
ended some forms o f continuing discrimination against gays and lesbians.
Another w a y i n w h i c h the Ubertarian narrative can be extended over time is
through studies of moral regulation o f t h e media. T h e r e was draconian censorship
i n the first half o f the twentieth century (especiaUy i n relation to sex, morality and
bad language) but this tended to diminish overall during the second half.
Technological determinism
T h e last of the alternative interpretations o f media history, technological deterniinismjjxanscends
national frontiers and represents a proposecPmaster narrative'.
' Instead o f seeing the media as linked to change, it portrays the media - or rather
communications technology - as being the origin and fount of change.
T h e r e are a number o f classic studies advancing this position. H a r o l d Innis
argues that each new m e d i u m of communication changed the organisation of
I § society by altering dimensions o f time and space.'* Elizabeth Eisenstein maintains
Q o that the printing press contributed to cultural advance i n early modern Europe
§M by preserving and m a k i n g more widely available the inteUectual achievements
'•BT. o f the past.'^ MarshaU M c L u h a n claims that electronic media fostered a 'retribalSffl
ised', syncretic culture by re-engaging simultaneously the human senses.'^ Joshua
S Meyrowitz argues that the universality of television changed social relations by
demystifying the'other'."'*
T h i s tradition is n o w being renewed through accounts w h i c h argue that the
Internet is fundamentaUy changing the world. T h e Internet, w e are told, is 'blowing
I i t o T ) i t s ' tradmonaFbusiness strategy;'^ rejuvenating democracy;'* empowering the
people;" inaugurating a n e w era o f global enUghtemnent;'* transforming h u m a n
g 2 sensibility;'** rebuilding community;*" generating a self-expressive culture;*** and
O undermining, w i t h interactive television, estabhshed media empires.
catt,
T h e r e is only sufficient space here to register briefly two points i n relation to
these studies. A review o f the evidence strongly suggests that the offine w o r l d
influences the onUne w o r l d — i n particular its content and use — more than the
o t h e F w a y around. However, this should not lead us to accept a social determinist
position, the mirror opposite o f technological determinism, w h i c h is n o w gaining
Narratives of media history revisited 137
ground. T h i s last sees the Internet — and by implications aU n e w communications
technology - as merely an extension of society reproducing, i n a closed loop, its
culture and social relations. T h i s misses the point that the specific attributes o f
internet technology (its international reach, cheapness, interactivity and hypertextuality)
make a difference. Social determinism also tends to present society as a
simphfying abstraction, instead of investigating the ways i n w h i c h the architecture,
content, use and influence o f the Internet have been shaped by interacting and
contending forces w i t h i n society that have evolved and changed over time.**^
W i d e r issues i n relation to the development of n e w media continue to be
explored. For example, Paddy Scannell makes an eloquent case that c o m m u n i c a tions
technology has built a better world, though most o f his essay is about technology
i n general (from the atomic bomb to washing machines) and is therefore
utterly irrelevant to a discussion o f media development."'' G r a h a m M u r d o c k and
Michael Pickering address one aspect o f the modernist thesis, arguing that the
telegraph and photography have not automatically promoted communication and
understanding through killing distance: i n fact, they have been misused to extend
control and to impede understanding through objectification.*^ I n a similar vein,
M e n a h e m B l o n d h e i m argues that the starting point o f many influential technodeterminist
accounts — their v i e w o f communications technology as autonomous
- is misleading.**
Technological determinist media history, based on the argument that n e w media
technologies have transformed society i n successive waves, has been highly influential.
B u t it has hmitations and is i n need o f academic revision.
Lost narratives
^ W h e r e does this leave us? T h e obvious next step is to construct alternative syntheses
2 gS: of the seven narratives i n a batde of meta-narratives. However, rather than recapituI
§ late m y o w n outUne version,*' it is perhaps more usefial to reflect upon w h a t has
Q o been left out of this review.
i g I set about w r i t i n g m y original essay, after some initial difficulty, by hsting on
'•BT. a sheet of paper key trends i n British history and then reflecting upon w h a t the
IS § available media-historical hterature said i n relation to each o f these. Some trends
3 I had to omit because there was no relevant media historical research to sustain a
^- § 'narrative'. T h e six trends that survived this w i n n o w i n g process were: (1) national
unification; (2) mass democracy; (3) defeat of socialism; (4) advance of w o m e n ; (5)
'^^.s rise o f consumer society; and (6) dechne o f religion/moral traditionahsm.
B u t this leaves out important developments i n the history o f Britain i n w h i c h
the media played a part. I t is w o r t h drawing attention to four 'lost narratives', i n
I i particular, w h i c h failed to make the shordist.They merit furtheFinvestigation.
O T h e most glaring omission is the building of the welfare state, linked to a
® ^ 'reformist' narrative of media development. Adapting rather freely a celebrated essay
by the social democratic theorist T . H . Marshall** it is possible to see British history
as an evolving, coUective struggle for securing human rights: civil rights (notably
the right to assembly and equal justice), poUtical rights (the right to vote), social
rights (including access to free health care and social security) and cultural rights
eapt,
r
138 Media and history
(including access to 'cultural privilege', public-affairs information and symbolic
representation). T h e first o f these two struggles had been largely (but not wholly)
w o n by 1918. T h e period from 1918 to the present marked the intensification o f
the collective batde for social and cultural entidements. Late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century advances i n social welfare were gready extended i n the 1940s to
include state protection 'from the cradle to the grave'. I n the cultural sphere, n i n e teenth-century
advances — free elementary schools, public hbraries, parks, museums
and galleries — were extended i n the next century through the expansion of free
education, public-service broadcasting, creative arts subsidies and the creation of
the free W o r l d W i d e Web.
T h i s historical perspective bears some resemblance to that proposed by G r a h a m
Murdock.*' R o s s M c K i b b i n ' s fine study is a key source for this narrative, showing
the way i n w h i c h a sohdaristic working-class culture, supported by popular entertainment,
reached its zenith o f confidence and influence i n the 1940s.''° Elements
o f this narrative are to be found i n a study by James C u r r a n and Jean Seaton, w h i c h
dwells, i n three chapters, on the 1940s, a time w h e n m u c h o f t h e media system
(including a radicalised section o f the wartime press) contributed to building a
consensus i n favour o f a consohdated welfare state.^^ T h i s study also differentiates
between the positive role o f pubhc-service broadcasting (including regulated
commercial T V ) and o f the web, and the negative role o f a debased press - a theme
pardy shared w i t h other histories.'** T h i s critical celebration o f pubhc-service broadcasting
is supported by other studies documenting the development o f innovative
public-service T V journalism;'^ the B B C ' s struggle to defend public-service virtues
under siege;*"* pubhc-service T V ' s extension of symbohc representation i n the
second half o f the twentieth century;'^ and, o f course, Asa Briggs' (1961-85) histoiy
of the BBC.*"" M o r e generally, there is a strong historical tradition of policy analysis
that exainines successfiil and failed attempts to reform the media and to resist neoliberal
transformation (although some o f these authors w o u l d object vehemendy
to being characterised as 'reformist' historians).'''There are r i c h secondary materials
Q o available for the development o f a reformist media history, especially i n the t w e n §
§ tieth century. B u t these are currently too fragmented, and more importantly their
'•B ?! perspectives are too internally divided, for this proto-history to make it into the
^ ffl 'canon' o f established media-historical narratives. B u t there is a gap here that needs
to be filled.
T h e second missing dimension is a narrative that describes the distributional
2 S batdes between social classes i n terms o f power, status and material rewards, and
'^_^.2f describes the evolving role o f t h e media i n relation to these. Surveying the last tw'o
I I centuries, there have been two major losers: the aristocracy, w h i c h used to rule
"^j^ B r i t a i n (but does so no longer), and the w o r k i n g class, w h i c h was once a powerful
g ^ political, economic and cultural force but w h i c h has n o w contracted, subdivided
U " ^ and i n important respects lost ground. T h e great victors have been key sectors o f
the bourgeoisie best adapted to the globalising economy. A class media narrative
can be constructed for the nineteenth century, but - because of the present state
o f research and shifting fashion — it loses coherence by the later twentieth century.
I n essence, this w o u l d be a more ambitious version of the radical narrative w e
have now.
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O QJ
IN g
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Narratives of media history revisited 139
T h e third lost dimension is the rise o f t h e British economy (and associated gains
i n living standards and j o b creation) paired w i t h an economic history ofthe British
media. B r i t a i n became the 'first industrial nation', was overtaken by the U S and
then evolved into a service-based economy. T h i s seems to have parallels w i t h the
development o f British media. Imperial Britain played a key role i n the development
o f telegraph technology and of news agencies. B u t it was the U S , not Britain,
w h i c h pioneered industrialised, mass journahsm, while H o l l y w o o d locked horns
w i t h , and defeated, the British fdm industry by 1910. B r i t a i n failed also to capitaUse
on the construction o f a pioneer digital computer i n 1944 and its prominent role
i n the development of packet-switching network technology during the 1960s.Yet,
Britain became (and remains) the second biggest exporter o f T V programmes i n
the w o r l d . W h e t h e r there are links between the successes and failures ofthe British
economy and of the British creative industries w o u l d be an interesting avenue
to explore. Stefan Schwarzkopf has made a pioneer contribution to this potential
'narrative'by examining the A m e r i c a n take-over of m u c h o f t h e British advertising
industry, at a time w h e n many British agencies were slow to respond to the rise o f
commercial television.'*
A fourth theme was half in, and half out of, m y review. T h i s featured a technological
determinist v i e w of n e w communications technology i n a supranational
context. It was not possible to present an alternative version of this perspective i n
a U K context, given the existing nature o f research. G o o d w o r k has been done i n
this general area, but primarily limited to researching influences shaping c o n u n u nications
technology and mostly i n other countries." B u t it w o u l d be interesting
to develop a national account of how n e w communications technology changed
British pohtics, culture and social relations.
Retrospect
§SS
E ^ I n short, what I came up w i t h was necessarily highly selective. I t offered only a
Q g partial account, dictated by what was available rather than what was needed. B u t ,
§ g hopefiilly, its portrayal o f how the media contributed to the making o f m o d e r n
'•B T. Britain - as a series o f competing narratives - w i l l provoke fiirther discussion and
serve as an antidote to the narrowness of too m u c h media history.'""
O f course, specialist studies provide the essential building blocks o f all areas
\ of enquiry. B u t it is also important to advance a tradition of media history that
"CjS seeks ambitiously to situate historical investigation o f t h e media i n a wider societal
^_.S2 context. I n due course, this approach should w i d e n the context still fiirther through
O (U
I § comparative research.'"'
i §
i o